



The “One China” Dilemma

Edited by Peter C. Y. Chow

Foreword by Robert A. Scalapino



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Peter C. Y. Chow

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For Alice, Isabella, and Philbert

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FOREWORD

Taiwan and China: Testimony to the Complexity of Our Times

At the close of World War II, Taiwan was “liberated” from some 50 years of colonial rule. Or was it? Nationalist forces from China took over governance, and having suffered defeat in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and the remnant nationalist army came to the island. By this time, tensions between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders had been heightened as a result of the 2–28 Incident when a large number of Taiwanese protesters were killed by nationalist troops on February 28, 1947.

In the ensuing years, Taiwan’s politics were characterized by one party, one man, and one goal. The Kuomintang (KMT) was the sole party permitted to function and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, was unchallengeable. His goal, moreover, was to return as leader of China. Hence, there was no argument about “One China,” but only about who should govern the nation. These conditions continued under Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, but toward the end of his leadership, in 1987–1988, a modest political opening had begun, with parties additional to the KMT emerging and permitted to operate within limits.

By this time, Taiwan’s economy was characterized by advancing private entrepreneurship and market orientation. Trade and foreign investment had begun to expand, auguring a rapidly growing economy and rising living standards in the years ahead. Consequently, Taiwan exemplified the successful developing state, with authoritarian leaders pursuing basically pragmatic economic policies leading to accelerated economic growth. As in the case of South Korea, such a development had political repercussions at a certain point, with a middle class emerging that demanded greater rights and participation, leading to a more open politics.

Hence, martial law was suspended in July 1987 and several new parties were formed, not yet fully legal but permitted to operate cautiously. The most significant of these was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that ultimately became a major political force. After his death in 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo was succeeded by Lee Teng-hui, previously vice president and a Taiwanese. In the new KMT Central Committee selected in mid-1988, the average age of members dropped from 70 to 59, and the number of Taiwanese rose from 20% to 45%, with 11 of the 25 members of the new cabinet also being Taiwanese. The Taiwanization process had commenced.

During the 1990s, greater political competition ensued with the DPP share of the vote rising. Toward the close of that decade, the DPP won a major victory in

local elections. Finally, in the presidential race of March 2000, Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate, was victor in a bitterly contested three-way race against James Soong, independent, and Lien Chan, KMT. In the course of the next few years, two political coalitions emerged, the Pan-Blue group composed of the KMT, the People First Party (Soong), and the New Party, and the Pan-Green group composed of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) led by Lee Teng-hui, with the Pan-Blue group holding 114 seats in the legislature to 110 seats held by the Pan-Green group; Taiwan's politics were deeply divided.

Consequently, Taiwan has come to represent the strengths and challenges of a democratic system. On the one hand, the primary criteria of a democratic society have been met: full political freedom for the citizenry; open, competitive elections that enable a choice of leadership; and the rule of law. At the same time, the system has resulted in protracted political instability, with constant bitter quarrels within a government often divided, and consequently, inaction on certain critical fronts.

Serious corruption became a problem in the early years of 2000. The son-in-law and wife of President Chen were charged with corruption, and Chen himself was accused of misconduct although he could not be tried while in office. Repeated attempts were made in the legislature to initiate Chen's recall, unsuccessfully. While the president's popular support declined even within the DPP, important defections took place and the party vote in various elections held up reasonably well. Moreover, Ma Ying-jeou, the former mayor of Taipei and popular leader of the KMT, was also charged with misuse of funds while in office and resigned as head of the KMT, although the charges were subsequently dropped. Consequently, the prospects for the presidential election of 2008 were cloudy some months in advance with Frank Hsieh the DPP candidate and Ma the KMT choice. At year's end, most polls showed Ma in the lead, but various events might change the picture.

Meanwhile, Chen seemed determined to leave as his legacy a strengthened independent Taiwan. Thus, his efforts were focused on undertaking further constitutional changes and adding the title "Taiwan" to various official bodies. Such statements as proclaiming his support for making Taiwan "a normal and complete country," and asserting that Taiwan was "independent and sovereign" not under People's Republic of China (PRC) jurisdiction were clear declarations of purpose that enraged Beijing. In his 2007 New Year message, Chen was even more specific, asserting that "the sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to its 23 million people, not to the PRC; only the people of Taiwan have the right to decide Taiwan's future." He also noted that in 2006, he had declared that the National Unification Council "had ceased to function and the Guidelines for National Unification had ceased to apply," thereby closing an earlier channel for cross-Straits dialogue.

A combination of factors have placed certain restraints on Chen's actions foremost among them, Taiwan's deeply divided government and the US government's disapproval of moves toward independence that threaten to produce a major cross-Straits crisis. As will be noted shortly, Washington has not been hesitant on occasion to signal its unhappiness with Chen's actions. In recent polls, the Taiwanese people, by an overwhelming majority of 80%, favor maintaining the

status quo supporting neither a formal move to independence nor reunification now. Nonetheless, it is certain that Chen will continue his campaign for Taiwan's independence, hoping to use nationalism to win support for the DPP.

Despite Taiwan's recurrent political uncertainties, the Taiwan economy has generally retained sturdy growth rates, a few brief periods of remission excepted. At the close of the Chiang Ching-kuo era, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had grown between 7% and 11% per annum, per capita income had reached nearly US\$5,000, and foreign trade in 1988 totaled over US\$100 billion. In the early and mid-1990s, growth slowed slightly but remained over 5%, with per capita income reaching over US\$10,000, and trade topping US\$160 billion. Even in the late 1990s, at a time when the Asian economic crisis caused a severe recession in many East Asian economies, Taiwan's economy remained healthy. Only in the first years after 2000 did the economy reflect the continuous turmoil that marked the opening period of Chen's time in office. However, recovery came soon, abetted by the rapidly rising economic intercourse across the Strait. By 2006, cross-Strait trade had reached US\$107.8 billion and the Taiwanese crossing the Strait exceeded 4.6 million, with at least 800,000 Taiwanese having residences on the mainland. Despite earlier concerns, Taiwan's economy had become ever more dependent upon interaction with the PRC.

Notwithstanding the rapidly expanding economic ties, however, political-strategic relations between the two governments have remained strained, with anger and threats periodically expressed. A few years ago, Beijing wisely shifted from a policy of uniform threat and intimidation to a policy of seeking to reach out to the opposition party leaders and more generally, to the Taiwanese people. The KMT and People First Party (PFP) leaders were invited to visit the PRC and were received cordially at the highest levels. Although the pronouncements issued did not contain any specific agreements on the key issues, they were positive in nature. Moreover, certain gestures such as the proffered gift of two baby pandas were clearly intended to show the public a different PRC from that depicted by its critics.

At the same time, Beijing's leaders have made no secret of their profound distrust of Chen Shui-bian and his party. As indicated earlier, he was regarded as irrecoverably committed to Taiwan independence and prepared to take whatever steps were possible to move in that direction. Although semiofficial discussions were temporarily resumed at one point these soon ended with no results. The position of the PRC that there was one China, and Taiwan was a part of that China, has never been altered. At times, Beijing has signaled that under the "one country, two systems" principle, it would be prepared to give Taiwan greater autonomy than that accorded Hong Kong, but that satisfies few Taiwanese, even among the KMT leaders, although some of them are prepared to show greater flexibility in order to reduce the strategic risks.

The progressive strengthening of PRC military weaponry and the disposition of an increased number of missiles on the Strait have worried many in Taiwan; this recently caused the Taiwan government to seek to purchase some US\$400 million worth of missiles and parts from the United States to bolster its air defenses. As might be expected, this effort produced strong protests from

Beijing. However, US military sales to Taiwan in recent years have reportedly totalled about US\$1 billion annually, and account for some 90% of the island's imports of foreign weapons.

Thus, relations between Taiwan and the PRC seem destined to remain troubled with periodic crises. As might be expected, Beijing's leaders hope that the KMT will win the 2008 presidential elections since they believe that such individuals as Ma Ying-jeou would be less committed to independence than DPP leaders. Beijing was prepared to reenter a dialogue after certain compromises, such as a return to the so-called 1992 consensus, when there was supposedly an agreement on the principle of "One China" without definition. It is doubtful that any KMT leader would be prepared to accept Beijing's conditions for reunification—now or for the foreseeable future. Could an agreement be reached upon federation or confederation, with the issue of sovereignty set aside? Only the future can determine what progress if any with respect to Taiwan-PRC relations can be achieved. Meanwhile, Taiwan will remain a *de facto* independent political entity, albeit, one recognized by only a few small nations and precluded from membership in virtually all international organizations.

The current and future situation bears directly upon Sino-American relations, constituting one of complications in that complex relationship. US policy toward Taiwan has not changed since it was first articulated in the 1970s; it can be defined as one of conscious ambiguity. One China is accepted, without definition, with opposition expressed to either the use of force or any declaration of independence. Yet military support for Taiwan's defense is pledged, and indeed, in the recent past, the United States has been unhappy with the Taiwan legislature's reluctance on occasion to purchase the military supplies necessary for further modernization. At the same time, the administration in Washington has regarded Chen as unreliable with respect to maintaining the status quo, and in this respect, shown a certain affinity for PRC views. At the same time, the United States and China remain far apart with respect to any resolution of the Taiwan issue. Recently, China voiced its strong displeasure with a contingency plan discussed by the United States and Japan to meet any possible crisis in the region near Japan, including the Taiwan Strait.

As can be seen, Taiwan remains a symbol of the complexity of the era in which we are living, both in terms of its domestic political and economic evolution and in terms of its role in the region of which it is a part. The essays which follow deal with aspects of this situation in a more detailed fashion, and are the products of extensive research and careful analysis. They warrant careful study if one is to appreciate the nature of Taiwan, its present and future, as well as the changing role of China, both in the region and in the world.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

PREFACE

In the decades since the 1972 historic Shanghai Communiqué was signed by President Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, much has transpired in the region addressed therein. China's fast-burn economic growth accompanied by a rising sense of nationalism, and Taiwan's transformation into a modern, industrialized, and democratic nation, have altered the dynamic between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

However, US policy has yet to catch up to the times, even as Chinese missiles were tested in the Strait waters and its People's Congress passed an "Anti-Secession Law" attempting to legalize military actions against Taiwan. Such developments have posed a potential crisis situation which would undermine US security and strategic interests in East Asia and, in the gravest scenario, lead to unwanted military confrontation involving the United States and other regional powers such as Japan.

As such, this adherence to the "One China" policy points to the struggle between idealism and realism within American foreign policy. Although the United States has tenuously supported a democratic Taiwan as a political and economic role model within East Asia, these ideals are incongruent with its heightened "conengagement" with an authoritarian Chinese regime in Beijing. In order to explore the danger of upholding the "One China" policy whilst advocating status quo across the Taiwan Strait, we must fully explore the complete historic, legal, sociopolitical, foreign policy, and international arena complications surrounding the dilemma of the "One China" policy. This is the discussion we humbly aim to commence within this book.

I want to thank the Palgrave Macmillan Publisher for its enthusiastic interest in publishing this book at an early stage of proposal. My deepest, sincere gratitude is also due to those contributors who strongly supported me throughout various stages of this book project. Other prominent scholars have also offered me invaluable and timely assistance in constructively reviewing the manuscript. Finally, a publication grant from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy is graciously acknowledged. All of them have contributed to the publication of this book, along with the usual caveats.

It is my deepest regret that one of the contributors, Professor Edward Dreyer, passed away before the book reached publication. His excellence as a dedicated scholar is exemplified in chapter 2 of this book, which serves as one of his last

and excellent pieces. His passing is a deep loss in China Studies community, and we will miss him.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. My wife Alice, my daughter Isabella, and my son Philbert have tolerated my negligence of family obligations while I was editing this book. Their unwavering support has made this book possible.

PETER C. Y. CHOW

July 2007

PART I

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 1

AN OVERVIEW ON THE DILEMMA OF “ONE CHINA”: MYTH VERSUS REALITY

Peter C. Y. Chow

The Origin and Significance of the “One China” Dilemma

The Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula are the two potential crisis situations that could possibly lead to devastating military confrontation between the United States and China in East Asia. Yet the situations are not parallel and, in fact, appear to be fundamentally different. To say the least, both Koreas are members of the United Nations, and many countries recognize both Koreas simultaneously. Parallel diplomatic recognition of both Beijing and Taipei has not worked out so far, and Taiwan is still barred from the United Nations, mainly due to the “One China” factor. The potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait is deeply rooted in the so-called One China policy dating back to the Cold War era, and even as far back as World War II.¹ Prior to the 1990s, both Beijing and Taipei insisted that there is only “One China.”² Each side claimed to represent all China; yet neither one could extend its jurisdiction beyond its own side of the Taiwan Strait.

Before January 1, 1979, the US government recognized the Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei as the only legitimate government representing the whole of China,³ despite unofficial diplomatic interactions between Washington and Beijing following Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) established a liaison office in Washington, DC in 1973, while the ROC retained its embassy.⁴ After the US government switched diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979, the US government recognized the PRC as sole legitimate government of China without yielding to Beijing’s claims on Taiwan’s sovereignty.⁵ As a result, the Taiwan Relations Act, along with the three communiqués,⁶ has served as one of the pillars for the United States to manage the cross-Strait relations. Regardless of what is the “One China” policy or the “One China” principle, there is a political reality of two separate

states simultaneously coexisting across the Taiwan Strait. In diplomatic practice, many countries adopted various ways to circumvent the political taboo of "One China, Two States," "One China, Two governments," "One China, Two equilateral political entities," "Two Chinas," or "One China, One Taiwan," to represent their national interests in both Beijing and Taipei.⁷ In fact, "the United States treats Taiwan as an independent country for all intents and purposes" in accordance with Section 4(b) 1 of the Taiwan Relations Act.⁸ Meanwhile, Taiwan pragmatically participates in a few international organizations under variants of its national titles.⁹

Taiwan has been transformed from an authoritarian regime to a full-fledged democracy over the past two decades. Evolving democratization and economic liberalization in Taiwan since the early 1990s have substantially transformed its sociopolitical structures as well as economic relations with China. Since then, several rounds of full-scale elections of the Legislative Yuan and direct elections of president as well as referenda have been held. Moreover, a turnover of government leadership from the Kuomintang (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),¹⁰ which was considered by Beijing and Washington as pro-Independence, took place as the DPP won presidential elections in March 2000 and reelection in 2004.

In the meantime, liberalization of Taiwan's trade with and investment in China since the late 1980s has substantially increased informal economic integration across the Taiwan Strait. As of June 2007, more than 30% of Taiwan's exports and more than half of Taiwanese foreign direct investment were destined for China. Consequently, China has replaced the United States as Taiwan's largest export market since 2002. Reportedly, there are more than 1 million Taiwanese businessmen and women residing in China.¹¹ It was estimated that Taiwanese firms in China have generated more than 4 million jobs and contributed more than 40% toward China's exports of information technology products.¹² Hence, there is a high degree of economic interdependency between China and Taiwan.¹³

Nevertheless, economic and trade flows have not generated political rapprochement in bilateral relations across the Taiwan Strait as China's diplomatic initiatives to isolate Taiwan from international organizations, and its military threat to Taiwan's security, have steadily accelerated. For example, several countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Islands, have switched their diplomatic ties between Beijing and Taipei due to the reportedly bitter competition of "money diplomacy" between China and Taiwan. Moreover, China has substantially boosted its military expenditures and installed more than 900 ballistic missiles on its coastline to intimidate Taiwan. China's challenge to Taiwan's international status and its military threat to Taiwan's security have greatly alienated the 23 million people in Taiwan and aggravated the syndrome of "Asian orphan" among the people of Taiwan. Consequently, there is an increasing Taiwanese identity amidst Taiwan's rapid democratization and social transformation with more and more people identifying themselves as "Taiwanese,"¹⁴ regardless of where they were born or when they arrived in Taiwan. Despite the lack of consensus on national identity,¹⁵ more and more people in Taiwan distinguish themselves from mainland Chinese.¹⁶

So far, China's robust economic and export growth have yet to contribute to political liberalization.¹⁷ In spite of its economic openness, China has been and still is an authoritarian government with little progress on human rights, civil liberty, and political freedom. Decades of economic reform and openness have not transformed China's one-party authoritarian regime to a multiparty democracy with political freedom and civil liberties. In fact, China has not moved itself from the left side of the world political spectrum to those on the right side in Western industrial democracies.¹⁸ China's sizable domestic market and surplus agricultural labor, its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, and its potential to be the world's factory have been irresistible attractions for many foreign investors, including Taiwanese entrepreneurs. The trade and foreign investment nexus in China has substantially contributed to economic integration between China and many of its neighbors including Taiwan, formally or informally. China's impact as a powerhouse is formidable.

Economic leverages have enabled China not only to isolate Taiwan internationally, as exemplified by the reported "money diplomacy" but also to intimidate Taiwan in the security realm by military threat as evidenced by the swollen defense budget and the 1995–1996 missile crisis. Beijing's increasing geopolitical influence has sharpened its prodding to undercut Taiwan's visibility in the international community and has threatened Taiwan's "de facto" independence by passing the "Anti-Secession Law" in 2005. Moreover, Beijing has been able to use its economic dividends to intervene in Taiwan's domestic politics.¹⁹ Entangled relations between China and Taiwan have thus become much more complicated and threatening than before.

The United States has upheld its own version of the "One China" policy, substantially different from either Beijing or Taipei.²⁰ Washington maintains that neither side of the Taiwan Strait should unilaterally change the status quo without the consent of the other.²¹ Yet the status quo is subject to different interpretations among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. In fact, the status quo should be considered as a dynamic object and is subjectively defined by each party due to their differing perspectives.²² Consequently, mismanagement from any of the three parties in Washington, Taipei, or Beijing could plausibly lead to disastrous military confrontation, which would jeopardize the peace, prosperity, and security of East Asia.

The developments across the Taiwan Strait have illuminated the dilemma of the "One China" policy, which could lead to inconsistent or even contradictory policies and result in a devastating military confrontation involving the United States and possibly Japan. In its 2004 annual report to the US Congress, the United States–China Economic and Security Commission, a bipartisan consultative government agency, recommended "that the Congress and the administration conduct a *fresh assessment* of the 'One China' policy, given the changing realities in China and Taiwan"²³ (emphasis added). Therefore, it calls for a rigorous and critical review.

This book explores the historical legacies and developments of the dilemma of "One China." The dilemma of "One China" was because of the conflict of overlapping sovereignty claims; the coexistence of a democratic Taiwan versus

an authoritarian China; the increasing divergence between Taiwanese identity and China's rising nationalism; the incongruities between economic interest and security concerns in Taiwan; the conflict between its domestic politics and external relations; and the struggle between idealism and realism in American foreign policy. Hence, there are clearly contradictory policy dynamics here. One such conflict is between maintaining the status quo and the pursuit of "de jure independence or unification" for Taiwan, and another is between peace and the potential for military confrontation in East Asia. Even among the "panda huggers," some still have trouble reconciling between the China of legend and the real China that currently exists.

The book is a collaborative research effort from a group of prominent scholars specializing in various aspects of Chinese and Taiwanese studies. It covers the historic, legal, sociopolitical, security, and international aspects of the dilemma of the "One China" policy, with important implications on the future course of developments across the Taiwan Strait. Part II of the book deals with the historic legacies of "One China" and the legal reappraisal of Taiwan's statehood. Part III deals with Taiwanese identity amidst a rising China. Part IV explores the dilemma of the "One China" policy from various perspectives. As any mismanagement of the "One China" policy will lead to crisis and possibly military confrontation, Part V focuses on Taiwan's national security and defense strategy, which involves not only the United States but also Japan in the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

Historic Legacies and Legal Reappraisal of Taiwan's Statehood

In chapter 2, Edward Dreyer explores the myth of only "One China," whose boundaries have remained essentially unchanged. Disunity is actually more common than unity in China's long history even though Chinese historiographical and calendrical conventions obscure this fact. Even when unified, China's territory typically has been restricted to lands south of the Mongolian steppe and east of the Tibetan plateau. Rule over more extensive territory is associated with non-Chinese dynasties of conquest, especially the Mongol Yuan (1280–1368) and the Manchu Qing (1644–1911). The Qing permanently annexed Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, inadvertently making it possible for the ROC, and later the PRC, to define all of these territories as parts of China.

Taiwan had only slight involvement with China before the Qing, who annexed it in 1683 as part of a pirate-suppression strategy and settled it with immigrants from the mainland. Japan formally annexed Taiwan in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War, and Japan's rule over Taiwan until 1945 was internationally recognized and important in molding Taiwan's current identity. Since 1895, Taiwan has been ruled from the mainland only during the disastrous years of 1945–1949. Correct understanding of the historical issues is a necessary precondition for dealing with the status of Taiwan and other aspects of the contemporary situation in East Asia.

Chapter 3 focuses more on Taiwan's own history. Bruce Jacobs argues that Taiwan has never belonged to China. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch in 1624,

Taiwan was an island controlled by disunified aboriginal peoples. Very few Chinese lived on Taiwan, and they mostly came for short temporary stays to fish or trade. The Dutch, the Spanish, the Zheng family, the Manchus, and the Japanese all established colonial regimes. Jacobs argues that the partial rule of the Qing Empire over Taiwan (1683–1895) was Manchu rule and not Chinese rule. Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang) also established a colonial regime on Taiwan that paralleled the Japanese colonial regime in several ways. In 1949, the Chinese Nationalists lost their homeland to the Chinese Communists, who, of course, have never controlled Taiwan.

Since Taiwan's democratization, the Taiwanese majority has reasserted itself and a new Taiwan Nationalism has grown on the island. This Taiwan Nationalism rejects identification with China in the same way as modern-day Australians do not identify with Great Britain. Furthermore, according to international law, Taiwan is a sovereign independent state (see chapter 4). Any international dangers in the Taiwan Strait arise from a misunderstanding and/or a misrepresentation of Taiwan's history.

The subject of Taiwan's sovereignty has been a hot issue among scholars of international law. In chapter 4, Chiang and Hwang address the present legal status of Taiwan by taking into account its latest developments. This chapter identifies and addresses three main factors inhibiting Taiwan's Statehood: the "One China" policy, lack of claiming statehood, and lack of recognition by other States. On the "One China" policy, Chiang and Hwang redefine this argument as a political statement of a future goal, instead of a legally binding principle of current status. Moreover, under the principles of modern international law, the international community will not accept as legal the use of force or policies supported by Chinese threats. On the second factor, the government of Taiwan has long been seeking separate statehood for Taiwan via various statements and acts, though short of a formal declaration of independence. The intent and effects of such statements and acts should not be ignored. Finally, the lack of recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state by other states should not be considered a legal barrier against Taiwan's Statehood in that recognition has only declaratory effects and is not a criterion for statehood. Since Taiwan meets all the traditional criteria of statehood under international law, Chiang and Hwang conclude that it is legally tenable to regard Taiwan as an independent sovereign State.

In chapter 5, Cal Clark argues that the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty and statehood appears quite paradoxical. Domestically, Taiwan has a strong and successful state that exercises all facets of sovereignty. Moreover, in the 1990s the country completed a model democratic transition, and its earlier state-led development strategy was widely termed an "economic miracle." Yet there is limited official recognition of Taiwan's statehood and sovereignty in the international arena because of the confluence of three factors. First and foremost, important for Taiwan's diplomatic status, is the extreme pressure exerted by the PRC, which claims that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Second, internally Taiwan's historical development and recent politics have created a polarizing dispute over sovereignty between the country's two major political forces, which undermines Taiwan's ability to respond to the threat posed by China. Finally,

legal ambiguities surrounding the transfer of Taiwan from a Japanese colony to Chiang Kai-shek's ROC at the end of World War II further cloud the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty.

Taiwan Identity amidst a Rising China

The problem of identity became a popular issue among all the ex-colonies in the postcolonial era and Taiwan was no exception. In chapter 6, Hans Stockton places the discussion of national identity in Taiwan within the broader theoretical context of national image and image projection. A great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding national identity construction on Taiwan and Taiwan's relations with the United States, but far less attention has been devoted to building a theoretical framework that can incorporate both phenomena. By applying some indicators for rationalism and derationalism to developments in Taiwan since 1949, Stockton frames the national image of Taiwan during three periods of state development. After briefly reviewing the issues of identity formation, cross-Strait relations, and national security, Stockton argues that the current elite struggling to dominate the national identity agenda have unraveled several formerly "rationalized" or consolidated aspects of Taiwan's system. This has jeopardized the congruence of the identity and image that Taiwan projects to the international community, in particular the United States. Consequently, image projection and perception are out of sync. According to Stockton, struggles over national identity not only threaten domestic stability but may also destabilize a state's external relations. If aggravated, this incongruence may place Taiwan's national security in peril.

How would Taiwanese identity affect political attitudes toward independence or unification? In chapter 7, Shen and Wu address the issue of ethnic identity and civic nationalism since Taiwan's democratic transition in the late 1980s. Based on data collected in eight nationwide interview surveys from 1992 to 2005, Shen and Wu analyze the trends and patterns of identity change among the general public and challenge some conventional views. Among the findings of their study, the proportion of "Taiwanese Nationalists" has largely stagnated at approximately 30% of the population since 1996, although "Taiwanese identity" has become the dominant identity in society. Along with the decline of "Chinese Nationalists" to less than 20% of the population, a great proportion of people in Taiwan are pragmatically open to a future cross-Strait relationship, willing to accept both independence and unification on some conditions. The second finding is that mainlanders, presumed staunch protectors of orthodox Chinese identity, are not free from the impacts of the rise of a separate Taiwanese identity. Many of them have come to accept the idea of an independent Taiwan. Although the two groups have converged in accepting an independent Taiwan, they however showed different patterns of identity change. The nationalist image of the native Taiwanese is based more on cultural-ethnic identity; mainlanders, without forsaking their Chinese ethnic-cultural identity, are more inclined to the idea of civic nationalism. Tension is thus created because of feelings of exclusion on the part of mainlanders and distrustfulness on the part of native Taiwanese. Third, and most

importantly, although people are divided on national identity, they converge on wanting autonomy and self-determination in deciding their future. The undemocratic Beijing government is unlikely to respect that autonomy. Consequently, the more hostile Beijing is to autonomy, the stronger Taiwanese identity becomes. This finding is a basic source of disequilibrium in Taiwan's partisan politics and contributes to the dilemma of the “One China” policy.

The Dilemma of the “One China” Policy

In chapter 8, Edward Friedman presents the European view on the “One China” doctrine. Essentially, a political adage says that where you stand depends on where you sit. Europe has a vantage point on China/Taiwan relations that is very different from that held in Tokyo or Washington. Geopolitical and historical differences are decisive. Therefore the notion of Taiwan's legal status and how to relate to the Communist Party of China's (CCP) “One China” principle will be very different in Europe than in Japan or America. In addition, those countries that were recently freed from Communist Party dictatorship will have their own unique perspective; economic particulars will also shape very different national perspectives on these issues. Friedman explores how these differences are expressed in policy choices on the “One China” principle. This new understanding helps explain why the industrialized democracies find it difficult, virtually impossible, to cooperate on behalf of an autonomous and democratic Taiwan. The new understanding better explains why a powerful and rising China is so able to impose its agenda on the world rather than being constrained by a joining of democracies on behalf of Taiwan.

In chapter 9, Arthur Waldron examines the role Taiwan played as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger began the process of opening up to China in the 1970s. Using recently declassified documents, Waldron shows—assurances at the time and thereafter notwithstanding—the clear intent of the Americans to “sacrifice” Taiwan as a necessary price for winning relations with China. As a matter of fact, Nixon himself announced to his Chinese hosts that “Taiwan is part of China”—a fact kept secret until recently, and which, of course, had no legal standing. Nixon and Kissinger expected that once the United States broke relations with Taipei, Taiwan would realize it had no choice but to come to terms with China. He assured Zhou Enlai that the process would take less than 10 years.

Of course, the break in relations, when it finally came under Carter in 1979, did not sink Taiwan. Thanks in part to the resolution of the island's people, and not least the absolute unwillingness of President Chiang Ching-kuo to negotiate, as some Americans were desperate that he should, Taiwan instead began the process of liberalization. The island has thrived in certain ways since the break; GDP for example has gone from US\$ 6.67 billion in 1971, when Kissinger visited, to US\$ 364.4 billion in 2006.

Nixon and Kissinger's intent had been to eliminate what is sometimes called the “Taiwan Problem,” once and for all, by forcing the island to join China and thus disappearing from the political map. They and their successors failed

to accomplish this. Today the possibility that democratic Taiwan will vote to do what China-born autocrats expected in the early 1970s is very small indeed. Viewed in this way, Nixon's diplomacy did not succeed, for one of its most important results is a situation that is even more unstable and difficult now than it was almost 40 years ago. The only solution, Waldron argues, is to bring Taiwan back into the international system without a connection to China.

Chapter 10 deals with the new Taiwan triangle. Throughout the post-war period, the United States has consistently been the principal guarantor of Taiwan's national security. The asymmetrical interdependencies—Taipei's need for US support to retain its independent existence, Beijing's need for tacit US support to pressure Taiwan, and the requirement that Washington have a balance between the two in order to retain its advantageous pivot position—have locked the three together in a complex, ambivalent embrace. Lowell Dittmer argues that the future of Taiwan may be conceived of as the result of a triangular dynamic among Taiwan, China, and the United States. The chapter analyzes the dynamics of this triangle during the administrations of Chen Shui-bian, Hu Jintao, and George W. Bush, and offers an informed projection of likely future developments.

In chapter 11, Suisheng Zhao examines a strategic dilemma in China's Taiwan policy: Although Beijing has never given up its threat to use military force to achieve national reunification, Chinese leaders have used all means to prevent military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Based on his studies of the making of China's Anti-Secession Law, Zhao tries to find answers to the following question: Has the rise of Chinese Nationalism made it more difficult for the Chinese leadership to deal with the strategic dilemma? He argues that the new generations of Chinese leaders have been pragmatic nationalists in the sense that they want to use nationalism as a tool but are very cautious about international as well as domestic reactions to their nationalist rhetoric because of awareness that nationalism is a double-edged sword. Although the rise of Chinese Nationalism is expressed in the tough rhetoric of Chinese policy statements, it has not changed the two-pronged approach to deal with the strategic dilemma of Beijing's Taiwan policy.

National Security and Defenses Strategy

Managing the military balance between China and Taiwan would critically determine the peace and security of East Asia, in which the United States has strong strategic and security interest. In chapter 12, Richard Fisher argues that considerations of military balance across the Taiwan Strait remain critical to the "One China" policy issue, as force of arms remains a key tool for Beijing to achieve its goal of unification under its terms. During the current decade, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could achieve comfortable superiority in almost all military indices versus Taiwan. The PLA may even, for the first time, be able to mount a credible invasion threat while managing to deter US intervention. Although the issue of Taiwan's future relationship with China is one that most residents of Taiwan would prefer to be settled peacefully, China's military

buildup against the island is creating pressure, limiting Taiwan's room for strategic maneuver and raising the stakes for Washington. In Taiwan, the PLA's continuous buildup exposes the insufficiency of Taiwan's defensive preparations while also exposing weaknesses in the Pan Blue group's arguments that they can insure Taiwan's security and "enshrine" the status quo with China. Finally, the PLA's buildup challenges assumptions that the United States can always successfully save Taiwan from Chinese attack, an assumption that is critical for defense decisions in Taiwan and for Washington to exert leverage on Taipei.

Whereas Beijing's military buildup is well known, Taiwan's defense strategy is yet to be explored. In chapter 13, Alexander Huang describes the evolution of Taiwan's defense strategy and analyzes the rationales for the doctrinal changes from retaking the Chinese mainland to the active defense of Taiwan. He identifies seven competing paradigms in the pursuit of post-Cold War international security as the backdrop to Taiwan's assessment of their changing security environment and policy choices. In describing the difficulty Taiwan defense planners encounter today, Huang identifies 10 frequently asked questions by foreign observers that need to be clarified and debated.

In view of future military requirement and the nature of increased Chinese military threat, Huang argues that Taiwan should have a new national defense strategy composed of two major elements: war prevention and force sustainability. To achieve successful war prevention, Taiwan needs to continue its military modernization programs to build a sustainable war fighting capability that could complicate the PLA's war plans, compromise China's goal of swift military victory, and deter invasion. Under such guidelines, Huang proposes several sets of principles for defense planning and force modernization.

How is Taiwan's defense capability? In chapter 14, York Chen argues that as the military capabilities of the PRC have continued to grow at a rapid pace, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has noticeably shifted in the mainland's favor in recent years. The PLA's persistent efforts in acquiring advanced weapons and improving its training and doctrine have diminished Taiwan's previous qualitative advantage in personnel and equipment. This chapter focuses on the element of time, as this is the most critical factor in the equation of the cross-Strait balance. Chen demonstrates its significances as to how the cross-Strait balance is affected by the PLA's modernization and the resultant strategic consequences. If the PLA, with its many operational options, were to launch a surprise assault against Taiwan in the not-too-distant future, it would have the capability to carry out a full spectrum of attacks against both military and political assets and attain its desired objectives immediately before US intervention. Chen gives concrete suggestions and feasible measures about how Taiwan could decrease China's advantage in the element of time and counterbalance the military inequity in the Taiwan Strait.

Needless to say, Japanese security and strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait are imperative. In chapter 15, June Dreyer argues that although Japanese interest in Taiwan's security did not completely diminish after Tokyo formally relinquished control of its former colony, it was informal and conducted largely out of public view. Both Japan and Taiwan were under American protection and

Japan was constitutionally barred from maintaining a military force. In addition, the Chinese PLA remained essentially a continental force with little ability to project power beyond the country's borders. After months of hostile PLA actions in and around the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996 that looked like a possible prelude to invasion, Tokyo became more concerned with ensuring stability in the Strait and has gradually assumed a more active posture in tandem with Washington. Japan agreed to provide the United States with logistics support in contingencies involving “the areas surrounding Japan,” and in February 2005 the two sides issued a statement that a peaceful Taiwan Strait was a common strategic objective.

Conclusion

The dilemma of “One China” could generate a potential crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait, which is not parallel to that on the Korean peninsula. At least the United States was able to push for the “six-party” talks to check the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Yet, there is no similar arrangement to check China's military buildup aimed at Taiwan. Moreover, the United States still cannot even convince both China and Taiwan to conduct any type of dialogue without any preconditions. Taiwan wants to pursue its own vibrant democracy, and maintain its freedom as well as economic prosperity, with no intention to be China's rival in any sense at all. Yet, China wants Taiwan to join her under its one-party authoritarian regime. It is like a bandit with a shotgun pointed at an innocent girl, trying to force her into a marriage with him. However, without any sympathy for the innocent girl, or even siding with the bandit, many onlookers still insist that the problem is between them, and the bandit and the innocent girl should resolve their disputes by themselves without disarming the bandit. That is why some China experts argue that there is no “Taiwan problem,” but there are problems in the Taiwan Strait. In fact, it is really a problem caused by the Chinese Communist Party. It is generally agreed that the crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait has been underestimated, consciously or unconsciously, by policymakers in Washington. Therefore, China has been able to take advantage by accelerating its military buildup, especially the ever-increasing ballistic missile deployment, against Taiwan.

The US policy of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is not sustainable because the rise of China on the global stage will enhance its leverage to challenge Taiwan's independence by all means available. China will take over Taiwan by peaceful means if possible, and by force if necessary. Nevertheless, Taiwan's democratization will lead the country to drift further away from China's authoritarian government. In spite of a lack of consensus on national identity, democratic consolidation in Taiwan has made it virtually impossible for any elected leader in Taiwan to surrender its *de facto* independent sovereignty to China.

Developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have made it harder for the United States to continue its “One China” policy. Therefore, American strategic and security interests in East Asia will be at stake if the triangular relationship

between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington deteriorates to the extent that military confrontation is inevitable. Before the situation in the Taiwan Strait further deteriorates, the United States should take a preemptive action to revise its "One China" policy by helping Taiwan to obtain the international status that she deserves and by accommodating Taiwan's aspiration to join the United Nations, which is supported by more than 70% of the population in Taiwan. Once Taiwan is admitted to the United Nations, the United States will have more leverage to administer a cross-Strait policy which is consistent with its security and strategic interests.

In his second-term inaugural speech, President George W. Bush pledged to achieve "the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." According to President Bush, democracies that respect public opinions and international norms and institutions, in contrast to authoritarian states, are less likely to engage in war against one another—an interesting hypothesis yet to be proved. One should praise President Bush for his heroic attempt to end tyranny all over the world. But Taiwan's democracy is sacred, no matter how immature it is. America's foreign policy should not undermine robust, major democracies like Taiwan. Therefore, one may wonder how the United States could repress democratization in Taiwan, yet advocate and nurture democracies elsewhere in the world.

Nevertheless, for the United States to support a democratic Taiwan as a role model of global democracy it should take strong actions to check China's claims on Taiwan's sovereignty, and to bring Taiwan into the international community, just as Arthur Waldron concluded in chapter 9. Although it is a commendable ambition for the American leader to pursue global democracy, it may not completely resolve the dilemma of "One China" because even if China were to democratize in the remote future, it could only entice some, but not all, people in Taiwan to associate with China. Therefore, one tends to agree with Arthur Hummel that "...down the road, perhaps the only solution would be an independent Taiwan" (cited in chapter 9).

If one believes that democracy is a universal value and that human rights are of global concern, then the United States should pledge to protect democracy in Taiwan and respect the "collective human rights" of the 23 million people of Taiwan to determine their own destiny and to join the United Nations. Recognizing Taiwan's democracy is one of the best ways to resolve the dilemma of "One China," to accelerate the ending of tyranny in the world, and to promote democracy globally.

Notes

1. A key historical document on which China bases its claim that Taiwan is part of China was the Declaration of the Cairo Conference among the Allied leaders on December 1, 1943. However, that declaration was merely a communiqué. For example, it is classified under neither the treaty series nor executive agreement series in the US National Archives and Records Administration. Therefore, it has no legal binding on Taiwan's sovereignty. During the Cold War era, most Western countries maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC as the legitimate government until the 1970s, whereas much of the communist bloc recognized the PRC as the sole legal government representing China.

2. After the termination of the Emergency Decree (Provisions of Mobilization against Rebellion) in 1991, Taipei realistically claimed its sovereignty only to the territory under its effective jurisdiction: Taiwan, Pescadores (Penghu), Kinmen, and Matsu, and other islands near Taiwan.
3. Nevertheless, the United States did not specifically recognize the ROC's sovereignty on Taiwan as evidenced on some historic episodes such as the "undetermined status of Taiwan" announced by President Harry S. Truman.
4. Needless to say, the United States simultaneously had an embassy in Taipei and a liaison office in Beijing during the 1973–1978 period.
5. The US government only acknowledged but did not recognize China's claim over Taiwan's sovereignty. The Sixth Assurance of the August 17 communiqué in 1982 specifically said that "the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan."
6. The three communiqués are the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the communiqué that established diplomatic ties in 1978, and the August 17, 1982 communiqué.
7. For example, many countries chose to recognize Beijing without explicitly "recognizing" or "supporting" Beijing's claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. Many countries adopted various diplomatic wordings such as "acknowledge," "understand," or "take a note of" Beijing's position on Taiwan's status to enable them to maintain quasi-official relations with Taiwan.
8. John Tkacik, "Kung Pao Taiwan," *National Review Online*, October 29, 2004.
9. Taiwan joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under its official title as Republic of China. But, the ADB changed its title from ROC to Chinese, Taipei, after Beijing was admitted to the ADB; and Taiwan was absent from ADB annual meetings during the late 1980s. Under Teng-hui Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy," Taipei sent its then Finance Minister Shirley Kuo to attend the ADB annual meeting in Beijing in 1989. In 2002, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization under the title of "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu Custom Territory," with the abbreviation of "Chinese, Taipei."
10. The nonconcurrent elections of the president and Legislative Yuan only transferred the executive branch to the DDP. The KMT and its ally, the People's First Party (PFP), still controlled the majority of the Legislative Yuan.
11. For Taiwan's trade with and investment in China, see Peter C. Y. Chow "The Change and Continuity of Taiwan's Economic Policy Toward China Under the New Administration," in *Taiwan's 2000 Presidential Election*, ed. Deborah A. Brown (Center of Asian Studies, 2001) and "Boomerang Effects of Taiwan Trade with and Investment in China." A paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC on July 18, 2006.
12. Peter C. Y. Chow, 2004, "China as the World Market and/or the World Factory in the Global Economy." A paper presented at the annual conference of the American Association for Chinese Studies at the College of Williams and Mary on October 23–24 estimated that Taiwan accounted for 15% to 20% of China's total inward foreign investment. Based on the estimates from the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) that foreign enterprises created about 23 million manual labor jobs by 2002, it is reasonable to argue that Taiwanese firms have created more than 4 millions jobs in China.

13. Given the relative sizes of their economies, Taiwan has had an "asymmetric dependency" on China's market. See Chow, "Boomerang Effects of Taiwan Trade."
14. Survey data from the Mainland Affairs Council. See www.mac.gov.tw. There is a movement of rectification from the pro-Independence groups in Taiwan to change the title of the nation to "Republic of Taiwan" or "Taiwan."
15. It is noted that there is an increasing consensus on Taiwan's bid for its membership at the United Nations under the title of "Taiwan." There is an ongoing initiative to put it in a referendum in the coming presidential election in March 2008.
16. For those mainlanders who arrived in Taiwan after 1949 and still considered themselves and their descendants as "Chinese," they were issued an entry visa from Beijing as "Taiwanese compatriots."
17. For the reasons why China's economic reform and openness have delayed its democracy, see Mary E. Gallagher, "'Reform and Openness,' Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy?" *World Politics* 54 (April 2002).
18. See Ian Bremmer, *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
19. For China's gains of economic dividends from Taiwan's trade with and investment in China, see Chow, "Boomerang Effects of Taiwan Trade." For China's incorporating Taiwan's domestic politics, see Edward Friedman, "China's Incorporating Taiwan's Politics," in *Economic Integration, Democratization and National Security in East Asia: Shifting Paradigms in the US, China and Taiwan Relation*, ed. Peter Chow (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar).
20. At the House International Relations Committee on the "Taiwan Relations Act" on April 21, 2004, James A. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of State of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, testified that our "'One China' and I didn't really define it, and I'm not sure I very easily could define it." He added, "I can tell you what it is not. It is not the 'One China' principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan." See the Taiwan Relations Act: The Next Twenty-Five Years, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations at www.commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa93229.000/hfa93229_0.htm (accessed on July 20, 2007).
21. President George W. Bush opposed Taiwan's referenda in front of the visiting Chinese Premier on December 9, 2003. Moreover, when the DPP government changed the names of some state-owned enterprises from Chung Hwa to Taiwan in February 2007, the US State Department issued a statement that "We do not support administrative steps by the Taiwan authorities that would appear to change Taiwan's status unilaterally or move toward independence. The United States does not, for instance, support changes in terminology for entities administered by the Taiwan authorities," *Taipei Times*, February 12, 2007.
22. Though polls showed that a great majority of people in Taiwan chose to maintain the status quo, Bellocchi argued it was not really their choice due to external threats. See Nat Bellocchi, "Taiwan's Choice," in *Economic Integration, Democratization and National Security in East Asia: Shifting Paradigms in the US, China and Taiwan Relations*, ed. Peter Chow (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007). For the erosion and damage of status quo to Taiwan's future, see Bellocchi "Who Gains from the Status Quo," *Taipei Times*, December 26, 2006, p. 8.
23. See www.uscc.gov/annual_report/04 pp. 119.

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PART II

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND
TAIWAN'S STATEHOOD

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CHAPTER 2

THE MYTH OF “ONE CHINA”

Edward L. Dreyer

Introduction

“‘T here is only ‘One China,’ and Taiwan”—or Tibet, or Xinjiang, or some other territory—“has always been part of that China.”¹ This at least is the official position of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), repeated again and again by spokespersons who remain relentlessly on this message. The message is well suited to the PRC’s contemporary political needs, and it permits the PRC to deny the legitimacy of any aspirations to independence on the part of Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, or any other minority ethnic group. Since their territories have “always” been part of “China,” their histories are, in some sense, part of Chinese history, even if the peoples in question are not native speakers of Chinese and do not identify with the dominant Han nationality.² If Taiwan has always been part of China, then surely the PRC government has the right to “reunify” the island with the mainland, even though the PRC has never exercised any authority over Taiwan. The “One China” doctrine thus underlies a powerful claim to Taiwan that is widely, if not universally, recognized by the international community.

Although the “One China” doctrine is useful to the PRC’s current polemics and diplomacy, it is difficult to reconcile with the actual course of Chinese history. Traditional Chinese political theory assigned such an important role to the monarch as the regulator of the relationships between heaven, earth, and mankind that it became a historiographical necessity to identify someone as the legitimate king or emperor at any given time, even when actual political and military power was divided. In fact, during its millennia of recorded history, China was often divided for very long periods, and during those periods the theory of a unified China under a single emperor had to accommodate itself to reality.

The assertion that Taiwan and other territories have always been part of a unified China, whose borders are similar to those of contemporary China, is also challenged by reality. Even in those periods in which it is reasonable

to speak of a unified China, the territory included therein usually has been confined largely to China proper: the 18 provinces east of the Himalayas and south of the Inner Mongolian steppe. Tibet, Outer Mongolia, and Taiwan were never, and (parts of) Xinjiang and Manchuria were but rarely ruled by dynasties of indigenous origin. China's boundaries during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), themselves the result of centuries of slow expansion of the Chinese cultural area, are a useful historical context that helps us to differentiate between territories that have “always been part of China” as opposed to more recent acquisitions.

Twice in history China has been part of a multinational empire ruled by non-Chinese people. The Mongol Yuan Dynasty was overthrown by the Ming in 1368, and after the Ming the Manchu Qing Dynasty ruled China from 1644 to 1912. The Qing differentiated clearly between the Chinese and non-Chinese parts of their empire, and long attempted to exclude Han Chinese from the non-Chinese part, which included Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. The Qing reversed the policy of excluding the Chinese from these territories only in the late nineteenth century. As for Taiwan, the island is almost unknown to Chinese history prior to the Qing, who annexed the island in 1684 in order to prevent its continued use as the base of operations of pirate fleets nominally loyal to the Ming. After its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 the Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan. But in its final decades, the Qing behaved less like a multinational empire and more like a Chinese dynasty of indigenous origin. By deliberately breaking down the distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese parts of the empire and extending the Chinese pattern of provincial administration beyond its original boundaries, the Qing contributed to the idea of “One China.”

Since 1911 China has had three republican regimes. The first was proclaimed by Sun Yat-sen and betrayed by Yuan Shikai; the second was established at Nanjing following the Northern Expedition of 1926–1928; and the PRC, established on the mainland in 1949, is the third. Despite political and ideological differences that led to armed conflict, all three republican regimes have adhered to the line established by Sun Yat-sen before the 1911 revolution: The boundaries of the Qing Empire that are the boundaries of China, and Manchus, Mongols, Uighurs, and Tibetans, together with the majority Han nationality, constitute the five major nationalities whose individuals are all Chinese by virtue of their status as citizens of the Republic of China (or PRC). Outer Mongolia was overrun by Soviet-backed Communists after a decade of independence after 1911, and in 1950 Mao Zedong was forced to recognize its independence from Chinese rule. Also in 1950, PRC troops ended the *de facto* independence that Tibet had enjoyed since 1911. Nationalists and communists alike expected that the return of Taiwan to Chinese rule would be a natural consequence of the defeat and surrender of Japan in 1945. Successive republicans have all found it useful to define the territory of the defunct Qing Empire as “China” and to include Taiwan in the “China” so defined. The myth of “One China” therefore has a continuing relevance to the current relationship between Taiwan and the mainland.

Unity and Disunity in China's Imperial History

The founding of the Zhou Dynasty sometime near 1000 BC³ inaugurated a powerful theory of monarchical government, that endured without serious challenge for some 3,000 years, only to vanish suddenly at the beginning of the twentieth century. According to this theory the ruler (called *wang* or king in the Zhou, and *huangdi* or emperor afterwards) was a man appointed by heaven (hence the term *tianming*, usually translated as Mandate of Heaven) on criteria that included moral qualities but did not necessarily include either royal descent or great ability.⁴ The ruler's task was to balance and harmonize the triad of heaven, earth, and mankind. This task is symbolized by the traditional etymology of the character for *wang*, whose three horizontal strokes representing heaven, earth, and man are brought together by a vertical stroke representing kingship.⁵ The ruler performed his task by appointing the right men to official positions and by performing the appropriate rituals and ceremonies properly. While he might use force against the incorrigible, the force of his example was paramount causing his subjects to be content and distant barbarians to come bearing tribute. The theory assumed dynastic rule with hereditary succession, but it also assumed that in time the mandate of a dynasty would run out and be overturned (*geming*, literally to overturn the mandate, is the contemporary term for revolution). Natural portents, including floods, earthquakes, and human rebellion, could be signs of this process.

While this theory provided for dynastic change, and seems to have been created to justify the transition from the Shang to the Zhou, it also assumed the unification of all the lands under heaven (*tianxia*, referring to civilized lands inhabited by Chinese, as opposed to the barbarian periphery) during any dynasty. Obviously two or more monarchs could not perform a regulatory function that extended from human society to the natural order. Just as there could not be two suns in the sky, there could not be two emperors on earth.

The assumption of unity affects all pre-1911 historiography, since events were dated according to the reigns of kings or the era-names (*nianhao*) decreed by the emperors. Recording the history of periods of division thus forced historians to choose a legitimate ruler for every year, even when political authority was actually divided among regimes of comparable strength. Sima Guang's *Zizhi tongjian* (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government) illustrates this vividly.⁶ Beginning in 403 BC with Zhou recognition of the partition of Jin, an event that symbolized both Zhou loss of the Mandate of Heaven and the beginning of the Warring States period, Sima Guang arranged his chronicle first by the reigns of the powerless Zhou kings, and later—after the actual unity that prevailed during most of the Han period (206 BC to AD 220)⁷—by the reigns of Cao Cao's descendants in Wei during the Three Kingdoms period, and by the reigns of the emperors of the Nanjing dynasties during the Northern and Southern Dynasties period that ended in 589. The Sui and then the Tang (618–907) provided actual unity until the An Lushan rebellion (756), which was followed by fragmentation of authority ending in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period to 959. Of the 1363 years covered in Sima Guang's chronicle, China actually had

the degree of political unity called for by Mandate of Heaven political theory in only about 570 years (41.8%): 221–210 BC, 202 BC to AD 23, 37–190, 290–301, and 589–755. Even these years include some massive if short-lived rebellions, and reference to the “barbarian” influences on the Sui and Tang is a standard theme in contemporary scholarship.⁸ In the rest of the years covered in the *Zizhi tongjian* there were either independent warlords challenging or ignoring imperial authority, or two or more rival dynasties claiming royal or imperial titles.

The remainder (960–1912) of the imperial period presents a greater appearance of unity since we think of it as dominated by the four major dynasties of Song (960–1276), Yuan (expelled from China in 1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912). However, on closer examination, it becomes clear that the Song never ruled over “One China,” while under both the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing a unified China was part of a greater empire whose non-Chinese rulers maintained distinctions between their Chinese and non-Chinese territories. “One China” may fairly describe the Ming, whose territorial sway extended over only a fraction of the lands later ruled by the Manchus, but it is a dubious proposition for the other three dynasties.

Song China failed to destroy the Xixia kingdom in northwestern China (986–1227), whose Tangut military elite had migrated from the highlands of Qinghai and had established de facto control over much of Gansu and Ningxia in the waning years of the Tang, before their ruling Tuoba clan assumed royal honors. The Song suffered military defeats at the hands of the Liao dynasty (907–1125), whose nomadic Khitan ruling elite had close cultural affinities with the Mongols. The Treaty of Shanyuan (1004) that resulted from these defeats provided that the Liao and Song emperors would address one another as “elder brother” and “younger brother” according to their actual ages, and thus made the equality of the two empires explicit, in contradiction to the “One China” ideal of a single emperor ruling over all under heaven. The ideal remained strong, however, and when the Jurchen tribes rebelled against Liao, Song went to war again. The Jurchen Jin dynasty (1116–1234) overthrew the Liao and then went on to conquer north China from Song, in one of the greatest catastrophes in Chinese history. In the Peace Treaty of 1142, Song had to pay substantial tribute and accept a formal status as a vassal of Jin. From then until the Mongol conquest, there were three unequal but independent Chinas: Xixia, Jin, and Southern Song.⁹

Xixia, Liao, and Jin all were dynasties of conquest, following a pattern established during the earlier period of division by the Northern Wei dynasty (386–531), whose Tungusic Xianbei ruling elite were distantly related to the Tungusic Jurchens (the later Manchus) and whose royal clan had the surname Tuoba later borne by the Xixia kings. In all of these dynasties, a non-Chinese (non-Han) ruling and military elite made use of educated Chinese officials to govern its agricultural subjects and eventually succumbed in some degree to the seductions of Chinese culture. We regard these dynasties as part of the history of China, and the major sources for their histories are in Chinese. Nevertheless, their histories all record a continuing effort to maintain distinctions between non-Chinese rulers and subject populations that are largely Chinese, and while these dynasties existed, the “One China” idea was in suspension.

The Mongols differed from the earlier dynasties of conquest. Temüjin (d. 1227) completed the unification of Outer Mongolia in 1206 and took the title Chinggis (popularly, but wrongly named "Genghis") Khan. He began invading China soon afterwards and completed the conquest of Xixia in the last year of his life. Mongol armies conquered the Jin Empire completely by 1234, but the Mongols in China began using Chinese-style *nianhao* only in 1260 and adopted the dynastic designation Yuan only in 1271. They attracted, and were attracted to, the Chinese educated class only late in the dynasty and composed most of their Chinese language official documents in common speech (*baihua*) rather than the classical language (*wenyan*). Of course, the Yuan emperors continued to be acknowledged into the fourteenth century as the overlords of Mongol dominions as far removed as Russia and Iran.

Like the Mongols, the Manchus also maintained strong distinctions between themselves and their Chinese subjects, and between their Chinese and Central Asian territories. After recovering the purported Yuan dynasty imperial seal in 1634, the Manchus effectively claimed to be the legitimate successors of the Yuan emperors, and they governed their Mongol and other Central Asian subjects with ceremonies of Central Asian derivation. These ceremonies included giving Mongol rulers the same titles as princes of the Qing imperial house, a level of status that no Chinese could ever hope to attain.

Despite the historical persistence of the "One China" ideal, unity has not always been a reality. For much of its history China has been divided, and when China has been unified, it has not always been under Chinese rule. The PRC official statement on Taiwan actually admits this in a subtle fashion. After acknowledging periods of dynastic breakdown and disunity, it goes on to state that "unity has always been the main trend in the development of Chinese history. After every separation, the country was invariably reunified..."¹⁰ followed by glorious cultural achievements. Yet if Taiwan is actually part of "China," then China is not now unified, and it is equally logical to say that every period of unity has been followed by a period of disunity.

China's Boundaries before the Qing

Just as the idea of "One China" applies only partially to China's history, so the concept of certain territories as always having been part of China applies only to a minority of the lands now included in the territories of the PRC. The territory occupied by Chinese agricultural civilization has expanded steadily, mostly southward, since ancient times, but most of the land area now ruled by the PRC is Manchurian and other Central Asian territory annexed by the Qing, and ruled separately from the Chinese provinces during most of Qing history.

The Ming dynasty ruled over all the lands inhabited by Chinese farmers for 276 years. It was the first dynasty of indigenous origin to accomplish this since the Tang, and Ming rule was mostly peaceful and stable until large-scale rebellions broke out in the reign of the last Ming emperor. The Ming administrative map¹¹ is thus a generous starting point for determining which territories have "always been part of China." While Ming China included Yunnan and other

territories that had not belonged to earlier dynasties, its boundaries also reflected the gradual southward expansion of the ethnic Chinese population. To put the matter negatively, any territory not included in the Ming administrative map should not be regarded as a territory that has “always been part of China.”

As of 1644, when the conquering Manchu armies poured through the Great Wall, Ming China consisted of 15 province-level units, including the Northern Metropolitan Region around Beijing (later redesignated Hebei Province) and the Southern Metropolitan Region around Nanjing, which the Qing divided into Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. The Qing also hived off Gansu Province in the northwest and split Huguang into Hubei and Hunan provinces, creating a total of 18 provinces south of the Great Wall. The term “18 provinces” became a shorthand term for “China proper” as opposed to the rest of the Qing Empire. Most of these provinces had long histories of Chinese settlement, with the significant exception of Yunnan, which bulges outward on the southwestern border of the Ming map. Yunnan had been inhabited almost entirely by indigenous peoples until the Ming conquest of 1381, after which the first Ming emperor settled it with numerous Chinese colonists. Yunnan remained administratively anomalous, being ruled by the dukes of the Mu family throughout the Ming dynasty, and Hainan Island was administered as Qiongzhou prefecture of Guangdong province. Despite a land link with the Northern Metropolitan Region, the Liaodong peninsula and the lower Liao River valley were part of Shandong Province. Most of their Chinese population were military colonists under the control of a separate headquarters designated the Liaodong Regional Military Commission (*du zhihuishi si*, usually abbreviated as *dusi*). The Ming northern border ran along the Great Wall, which the Ming had built to define and defend the northern border, and in the northwest Ming territory stopped abruptly at the fortress of Jiayuguan that marked the western extremity of the Great Wall. Ming China made no claims to rule and created no administrative presence in most of Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, or Xinjiang, or in the heartland of Tibet. In the broader sense of Tibet that included the later provinces of Qinghai and Xikang, the Ming presence was limited to a military garrison (*Wei*) in Xining.

Another territory that the Ming dynasty did not administer, claim, or know much about was the island of Taiwan. Under the heading Jilong, the *Mingshi* describes a Taiwan whose people were scattered, with no lords or chiefs, and no taxes or labor service obligations, and who sent no tribute even when Zheng He was sailing all over the oceans, and “there was no one who did not present precious objects.”¹² Both Taiwan and, especially, the Pescadores (Penghu) islands off the southwest coast of Taiwan, were often used by pirate fleets, but defensive measures against pirates never led the Ming to contemplate permanent annexation of the islands. After the Dutch built a fort on the Pescadores in 1622, Fujian governor Nan Juyi (1565–1643) met them with a combination of diplomacy and force, causing the Dutch in 1624 to move to Castle Zeelandia on Taiwan, after which the Ming abandoned the Pescadores.¹³ Taiwan had not been under Chinese rule in any dynasty before the Ming, and there had been no significant Chinese immigration to the island. As with most of Central Asia, one may say categorically that Taiwan has not always been part of China.

The Qing Empire in China and Central Asia

Nurhaci (1559–1626), the founder of the Qing line of emperors, grew up among the Jurchen tribal leaders of Manchuria who often accepted military titles from, and paid tribute to, the Ming emperors. As he grew independent, he proclaimed himself emperor in 1616 of a new Jin dynasty, whose name evoked the memory of previous Jurchen rule in North China. His son and successor Hong Taiji (1592–1643) ordered his people to call themselves Manchu (Manzhou) in 1635, changed the name of the dynasty to Qing in 1636, and created the *Lifanyuan* (Court of Colonial Affairs) in 1638 to regulate Qing relations with the Mongols and other peoples of Central Asia. From the beginning of the dynasty, the Qing rulers strove, sometimes against strong opposition from their leading subjects, to create a political system in which they could rule their Chinese subjects in the manner of Chinese emperors, using mostly Chinese officials, while approaching Central Asians, especially the divided Mongol tribes, as the legitimate successors of the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty.

This policy paid off handsomely. While troops of the Eight Banners (*baqi*: Manchu-dominated, but including Mongol and Chinese components) played an important part in the conquest of Ming China (1644–1662),¹⁴ the conquest could not have been accomplished without the collaboration of Ming generals who joined the Qing with their entire armies. The troops of these armies became the Green Standard (*lüying*) battalions, the other component of the mature Qing military system. Despite the 1673 rebellion of the Three Feudatories (*sanfan*) led by Wu Sangui, the most important of the collaborating generals, the Qing kept the loyalty of most of its Chinese military officers. And despite the long survival of Ming loyalism among the educated, the Qing eventually won the allegiance of the crucial scholar-official class. Chinese loyalty to an alien dynasty that appeared culturally Chinese, at least within China proper, was the major factor that sustained the Qing Empire from the Taiping Rebellion until the beginning of the twentieth century.

In 1696 Qing armies defeated Galdan Khan at Jao Modo in Outer Mongolia and ended Galdan's dream of reviving a pan-Mongolian Central Asian monarchy. Galdan himself was murdered the following year. Over the following decades, Qing diplomacy kept the Mongols divided from one another and mostly attached to the Qing, while Banner armies crushed opposition in Central Asia.¹⁵ The devotion of the Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism was one factor leading the Qing to assume greater and greater control over Tibet, and to regulate the succession to the Dalai Lama and the other major church figures chosen by incarnation.¹⁶ These processes, essentially completed by the mid-eighteenth century, made the Qing Empire into a dual monarchy: governed in the familiar bureaucratic manner in the 18 Chinese provinces and governed by other means in its much larger, but sparsely populated, Central Asian part. There the forms of rule varied: military governors drawn from the Eight Banners were in charge of the Manchurian provinces, while hereditary Mongol princes in Mongolia, incarnate Lamas in Tibet, and Muslim *begs* in the region afterwards called Xinjiang, all ruled their respective territories under the watchful eyes of Manchu commissioners (*amban*)

in key locations. The Qing had annexed permanently about 2 million square miles of territory that had been sources of repeated military threats to dynasties of indigenous Chinese origin. But the Qing had annexed these territories to the multinational empire that it ruled, rather than to China.

In the long run, it was not possible to sustain the exclusion of Chinese from the rest of the empire. Despite official prohibitions, Chinese immigrants swarmed into Manchuria and Chinese moneylenders overran Mongolia.¹⁷ After defeating Muslim rebels and facing down the Russians in the far west, Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) recommended the creation of a regular Chinese-style provincial government there, partly in order to forestall allegations that this indirectly ruled region was not Qing territory. Xinjiang was duly created in 1884, and Zuo's demobilized Chinese soldiers joined its population, which has had a growing percentage of Han Chinese ever since. Chinese-style provincial government was extended to the three Manchurian provinces after 1900. By formally ending indirect rule and norming local government to the pattern prevailing in the Chinese provinces, the Qing hoped to reduce the threat that its border territories posed by an aggressive and expansionistic Russian Empire. The Qing in its final decades thus contributed to the intellectual sleight of hand that turned its Central Asian territories into parts of "China."

The Qing Empire and Taiwan

The Qing Empire was fortunate that the wars that led to territorial expansion in Central Asia came after the conquest of the Ming and the suppression of the rebellion started by Wu Sangui. These earlier wars led to the Qing annexation of Taiwan, an island whose area was insignificant compared to broad new domains in Central Asia, but which also had never previously been ruled by China.

In 1624 the Dutch abandoned the Pescadores and settled on Taiwan. Four years later George Candidius, a Dutch protestant minister, did a major survey of the island, traveling up and down the western coastal regions and into the foothills of the mountain range. He described palisaded aboriginal villages in the foothills, whose inhabitants lived by hunting and gathering, and primitive agriculture. The coastal villages collectively held a maximum of a few hundred Chinese from Fujian, who lived in individual households among the aboriginal population, and whose livelihood consisted of trading salt, earthenware pottery, and iron implements for deer skin and deer meat. These Fujianese were, in other words, part of a niche economy since large-scale agricultural settlement would have led immediately to the creation of villages populated by Chinese. Starting in 1636, the Dutch started rice and sugar plantations, and imported gangs of Chinese contract laborers from Fujian (where both crops were also grown) as plantation workers. The gang bosses who recruited the laborers were also Chinese, and initially the pattern was for the laborers to return to Fujian after a few years, taking their earnings with them.¹⁸ The Dutch thus created an infrastructure that Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong, 1624–1662) and his descendants could exploit after the fall of the Ming dynasty.

Koxinga's father, Zheng Zhilong (1604–1661), was the real founder of the pirate-loyalist dynasty usually identified with Koxinga. Born in Quanzhou, he migrated to Macao and became a baptized Catholic, under the name Nicholas Iquan, and thereby entered a commercial network that took him certainly to Manila and possibly also to Taiwan. In Hirado, near Nagasaki, he married a Japanese woman surnamed Tagawa, the mother of Koxinga. In 1624, the year Koxinga was born, Zheng Zhilong joined a pirate band, and by 1628 had become so successful as a pirate, and so much of a problem for Ming authorities, that the Ming government offered to buy him out. So he "surrendered" to the Ming authorities and became the head of the Ming anti-pirate fleet, which amounted to a license to wage war on his competition. The naval power of Zheng Zhilong's fleet thus gave him added opportunities to amass commercial wealth. In 1645 he presented his son Koxinga to the Ming pretender at Nanjing, who conferred upon him the surname Zhu of the Ming imperial family. This created the title (Guoxingye, Lord of the National Surname) from which the Dutch derived the appellation Koxinga. In 1646, Zheng Zhilong, despairing of the Ming cause, surrendered to the Qing. The Qing never trusted him and executed him, along with his two sons and other family members, in 1661.

Koxinga broke with his father and refused to surrender. His fleet continued to dominate the South China coast, and permitted him to raise armies on the mainland, but his defeat near Nanjing in September 1659 forced him back to his base at Xiamen and ultimately away from the coast altogether. At the end of April 1661, Koxinga and his fleet arrived off Castle Zeelandia (at Anping, within the municipal boundaries of today's Tainan City) with a force estimated by the Dutch garrison as 900 ships crewed by 25,000 men. On February 1, 1662 the Dutch agreed to surrender the fort and evacuate the island. Koxinga allegedly committed suicide on June 23, 1662, out of rage at events and at people including his son Zheng Jing (d. 1681), who succeeded him.¹⁹

The fleet formerly led by Koxinga continued to raid the China coast from its bases on Taiwan and the Pescadores, and the Qing in response ordered the evacuation of the coastal inhabitants of Shandong and all provinces further south to a distance of 30 to 50 *li* inland, lest they cooperate with the fleet. When Wu Sangui and his collaborators launched their rebellion in December 1673, Zheng Jing supported the rebellion and came in person to reoccupy his father's former base at Xiamen. Qing troops suppressed the rebellion in Fujian, and Zheng Jing returned to Taiwan in 1680. When he died the next year, his principal commanders elevated his adolescent son Zheng Keshuang as his nominal successor.

Shi Lang (1621–1696) was never a pirate but had become a trusted subordinate of Zheng Zhilong after the latter's surrender to the Ming. Koxinga's jealousy led Shi Lang to surrender to the Qing in 1646, and Koxinga retaliated by killing Shi Lang's father, son, younger brother, and nephew. Thereafter, Shi Lang was greatly trusted by the Qing and rose in their service. In 1668 he first presented a plan to eliminate the pirate-loyalist fleet by taking Taiwan and the Pescadores and in 1681 the Qing government finally approved this plan and appointed Shi Lang to organize, train, and lead the fleet. In July 1683 he led a fleet of 300 ships crewed by 20,000 men from Fujian to a great naval victory in the Pescadores,

and in September and October he proceeded to Taiwan and received the surrender of Zheng Keshuang and his commanders. Shi Lang received the title of marquis with the right of perpetual inheritance for this achievement.²⁰

The Qing authorities had been badly discomfited by Koxinga and his successors, and after Shi Lang's victory they intended to abandon the ocean entirely and to leave Taiwan to its aborigines and the scattered Chinese settlers. Shi Lang argued against that idea. "Developments in this part of China manifest themselves by sea and not by land; evil forces on lurking on land possess a form, but on the sea they cannot be observed, as they are scattered far and wide." He went on to observe that without Taiwan the Pescadores could not be held and that the entire southeastern coast was exposed and vulnerable to attack from pirate fleets based on the Pescadores. The annexation of Taiwan in 1684 consequently had as its basis the military objective of securing continued control of the traditional pirate and fishermen's anchorage in the nearby Pescadores Islands. After the annexation, many Taiwanese who had supported the pirate-loyalist fleet were deported to the mainland, and immigration from the mainland was tightly restricted.

Taiwan became a prefecture (*fu*) under a prefect (*zhifu*) residing at Anping, where the Dutch castle captured by Koxinga had been located. Three districts (*xian*) reported to the prefecture, which itself was under the jurisdiction of a civil and military circuit intendant (*fenxun bingbei dao* or *daotai*) located at Xiamen, who in turn reported to the governor of Fujian whose seat was at Fuzhou. While both governors and circuit intendants visited the island regularly, the fact that Taiwan's government was not one but two levels beneath the provincial government seems to symbolize the continued reluctance of Qing authorities to recognize the permanent annexation of Taiwan. New administrative units were created slowly as the population increased, but the island had to wait until 1875 for its second prefecture.²¹

There was a major rebellion on Taiwan during 1786–1788 that illustrated both the ethnic divisions within the island's population and that population's limited attachment to the Qing Empire. Since the restrictions on immigration applied with special force to immigrants from eastern Guangdong, which was considered a nest of pirates and thieves, most of the Chinese immigrants were from Fujian, and they were divided into Quanzhou and Zhangzhou camps. Most of the Zhangzhou men were members of the Heaven and Earth Society (*Tiandihui*), a secret society that continues to have influence as an umbrella organization for organized crime in southern China. Lin Shuangwen, leader of the society in northern Taiwan, led the rebellion, whose suppression required the mobilization of substantial forces under the celebrated commander Fukang'an (d. 1796).²²

After 1868, the nature of Qing rule over Taiwan became an issue in relations with a modernizing Japan. The Ryūkyū (*Liuqiu*) Kingdom of Okinawa had a long history as a recognized tributary of both the Ming and Qing dynasties, but had unbeknownst to the Chinese secretly under the control of Satsuma *han* (fief) in southern Japan since 1609.²³ With the abolition of Satsuma and the other *han* that followed the Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan formally annexed Okinawa and the other islands of its archipelago, whose inhabitants thus became the direct

subjects of the unified Japanese Empire. In 1871, 54 Ryūkyūan sailors, who were shipwrecked on Taiwan, were murdered by Taiwanese aborigines. The Qing *Zongli Yamen* (the functional equivalent of a Foreign Ministry), unaware of Japan's annexation of the Ryūkyū kingdom, denied the authority of Japan to speak on behalf of the Ryūkyūans. When they disclaimed responsibility for the actions of the aborigines, they seemed to renounce sovereignty over Taiwan, or at least over that part of the island dominated by aborigines. Inept Qing diplomacy unwittingly encouraged the Japanese to send an expedition of their own in 1874, commanded by Saigō Tsugumichi, the father of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In the end, the Qing paid an indemnity to Japan and recognized her sovereignty over the Ryūkyū Islands, and Japan recognized Qing sovereignty over Taiwan. In part, this episode illustrates that Chinese authorities had not yet fully grasped the importance of the idea of territorial sovereignty in international law; it also illustrates the marginal status of Taiwan in the Qing worldview.

The nineteenth-century wars against Western powers and Japan all exposed China's vulnerability to attack from the sea, and the Sino-French War (1884–1885) led the Qing government to pay more attention to the island. Liu Mingchuan (1836–1896), a protégé of Li Hongzhang and a successful commander in the wars to suppress the Taiping Rebellion, was appointed governor of Fujian in 1884 with orders to hold Taiwan. Even though the French captured the northern port city of Keelung during the war, Liu Mingchuan enhanced his reputation by repelling their assault on Taipei and keeping the island in Chinese hands for the peace treaty. After the war, the Qing made Taiwan a province with Liu Mingchuan as its governor (1885–1891). He made Taipei the capital and laid it out in Western style—with paved streets, electric lights, and a modern postal system. Before he left office, the beginnings of railway and telegraph systems were in place. Even before the Japanese annexation, Taiwan was beginning to develop in ways that emphasized the significant differences between the Taiwanese and the Chinese society that existed on the mainland.

After 1874, Japan's expansionist energies targeted Korea rather than Taiwan, and, just as Vietnam's ambiguous tributary relationship with China had been a background factor in the Sino-French War, similarly Korea's tributary relationship encouraged China to act as her patron and protector. The (First) Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was thus a war over Korea, but Japan's stunning victories on land and sea in September 1894 widened the scope and raised the stakes. Partly in order to forestall Japanese Army plans for an expanded war on the mainland of China, Admiral Saigō Tsugumichi, now Navy Minister, and Admiral Kabayama Sukenori, Chief of the Naval Staff, proposed an alternative "southern strategy" whose centerpiece was the annexation of Taiwan and the Pescadores.²⁴ It helped that most of the leading figures in the Japanese Navy had participated in the Taiwan expedition of 1874.

So it came to pass that, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which ended the Sino-Japanese War, Li Hongzhang²⁵ on behalf of the Qing Empire, ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan, and Japan annexed them, and this is the last occasion in history so far in which territorial sovereignty over these islands has been the subject of an international treaty. "Taiwan's flowers are

not sweet, and Taiwan's people are neither beloved nor friendly," according to words attributed to Emperor Guangxu, who had never visited the island. These disparaging words sound like sour grapes, but the observation that Taiwan was an island isolated in the ocean that could not be defended made more sense, given the destruction of China's fleet in the war.

Abandoned by a Qing government that seemed indifferent to Taiwan, elements of the population rose in rebellion against the treaty. They proclaimed independence (May 23, 1895) under the name Republic (*minzhuguo*) of Taiwan, and sought international recognition. The fall of Tainan to Japan's capable army on October 21 ended major military operations, even though guerrilla warfare shading off into banditry continued for some time afterward.²⁶

Japan did not merely "occupy" Taiwan and the Pescadores, but made the islands part of her national territory, and Japan's sovereignty over the islands was recognized by every country in the international community, including the United States. US authorities initially had reservations, but in the Taft-Katsura memoranda of July 29, 1905 the United States explicitly recognized Japan's rule of Taiwan in return for Japan's recognition of American rule in the Philippines.

Japan created a Government General (*sōtoku-fu*) to administer Taiwan, and the initial rule, lasting until 1919, was that the governor general was to be an officer of the Japanese army or navy holding the rank of at least lieutenant general or vice admiral.²⁷ Admiral Kabayama was the first holder of the office. Japanese rule incorporated more of the kind of infrastructure development begun under Liu Mingchuan, as well as an education system that included a great deal of Japanese language instruction and indoctrination. In Korea, Japanese rule had the effect of intensifying Korean Nationalism, but in Taiwan the modernizing aspects of Japanese colonialism eventually evoked a more positive response.

The "One China" Ideal since the 1911 Revolution

If, indeed, the ideal is that there is only "One China" and Taiwan is an integral part of that China, then since 1895 the ideal has been fulfilled only in the years 1945 to 1949, ironically the period of the civil war that brought communist rule to the mainland. Those four years included the February 28, 1947 massacre, and were the worst years in Taiwan's history from the viewpoint of the island's inhabitants. Yet the ideal persists, not because it describes reality, but because it is politically useful.

The revolution of 1911 led to the proclamation of the Republic of China on February 12, 1912. In return for the new republic's acceptance of the debts and treaty obligations of the deposed dynasty, the foreign powers recognized the republic's sovereignty over all Qing territory as of 1911, boundaries that did not include Taiwan but did include the Qing conquests in Central Asia. Despite the political turmoil of much of the republican period, an alert and professional foreign service continued to insist on all of China's treaty rights,²⁸ consequently giving China a sound claim in public international law to territories that historically had seldom or never been under Chinese rule.

The new political order introduced new symbols into Chinese political discourse, and these symbols made powerful statements about China's unity and territorial extent. The old dynastic name *Da Qing Guo* or Great Qing Empire was replaced with *Zhonghua Minguo* or Middle Flowery Republic, both Middle (as in Middle Kingdom) and Flowery being terms that emphasized the central and civilized position of the Chinese people vis-à-vis the barbarian peoples on the periphery. The new flag said the same thing while seeming to say the opposite. Designed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself, it consisted of five horizontal stripes, from the top down red, yellow, blue, white, and black. The colors supposedly represented "five races in one union," referring to Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Uighurs (Chinese Muslims), and Tibetans, respectively. All of the non-Han "races" were now Chinese too, even if they were not *Han* Chinese, and as for the territories they inhabited, since it was all Chinese territory, presumably Chinese immigrants of all races were welcome. When non-Han national minorities amounted to less than 6% of the population when the PRC took its first census and classified the population by nationality,²⁹ it is apparent that the racial equality symbolized by the flag actually masked potential Han dominance in all former Qing territories.

This potential did not become real everywhere, at least not immediately. Mongol princes saw their status as being subjects of the Qing emperors and held that their allegiance to "China" had dissolved with the fall of the dynasty. Outer Mongolia became briefly an independent monarchy under its highest ranking incarnation, only to fall within a decade to communist revolution and Soviet satellite status. In Tibet's heartland *de facto* independence under the rule of the Dalai Lama followed the fall of the Qing dynasty. But in Inner Mongolia, Republican governments carved out three new provinces (Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningxia), and two more (Qinghai and Xikang) in the eastern regions of the broader Tibetan cultural area, and all of these new provinces became theaters of operation for the warlord politics that consumed much of republican history. By the time of the 1911 revolution, the three Manchurian provinces (which had been given the Chinese form of provincial government only in 1907) were majority Han in their populations, and the Manchuria-based Fengtian military clique was a major player in the warlord era. In Xinjiang too, warlord politics was largely a Han Chinese affair, though the warlords who emerged there had only local importance.

After a history of failing to exert effective sovereignty over much of the territory internationally recognized as Chinese, the Republic of China (ROC) then suffered the seizure of Manchuria (1931) and further Japanese encroachments, followed by full-scale hostilities in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) that merged with World War II in 1941. American efforts to assist China to participate more effectively in the war were not supported by either the Soviet Union or Britain, and the Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943 that called for the unconditional surrender of Japan, ironically came at a time when Allied priorities, always serving a "Europe first" strategy, gave last place to the land war against Japan.

The Cairo Declaration stated that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored

to the Republic of China.” Pursuant to this, Chinese armed forces occupied Taiwan after the Japanese surrender in 1945, and by 1947 had provoked insurrection on the island; at the same time they were losing the civil war on the mainland. By the end of 1950 the territory actually controlled by the ROC consisted of Taiwan and a few islands off the Chinese coast. Hostilities with Japan ended formally with the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 8, 1951, in which Japan renounced any claim on Taiwan without any transfer of sovereignty to any other state. This created a kind of legal limbo, which has endured to the present day: Some argue that the island is independent, or that the United States retains authority as the occupying power in Japan, while the PRC argues that the peace treaty incorporates the provisions of the Cairo Declaration (later incorporated into the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 that preceded Japan’s surrender), since Taiwan belongs to “China,” it belongs to the PRC. The ROC also endorsed the position that Taiwan was part of “China” from 1945 to 1988, during the presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo. Under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the Taipei government has made statements indicating that whatever “China” may mean, the PRC government has no authority over Taiwan, and the PRC response to such statements has consistently been threatening.

“One China” has endured since then as a normative, if inconvenient, principle of international relations. United Nations Resolution 2758 in 1971 recognized the PRC as the government of “China,” meaning that the ROC left the United Nations and Taiwan is not represented there. In the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972, the United States “acknowledged” and “did not challenge” the position “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but ‘One China’ and that Taiwan is a part of China.” The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979, and the last of the so-called Three Communiqués, issued on August 17, 1982, repeated this position. However in 1979 the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), that mandates *de facto* diplomatic relations with, and sale of “defensive” weapons to the island. In fact, the TRA requires the government of the United States to treat Taiwan as the equivalent of an independent nation-state. For those who see Taiwan as part of the Chinese cultural area, the myth of “One China” conflicts, as has been the case so often in the past, with the reality of two or more regimes ruling over a divided China. And for those who celebrate the existence of a distinct Taiwan identity, “One China” does not include Taiwan.

Conclusion

Our trip through China’s history has been too brief to be anything other than superficial, yet it has highlighted some themes that have contemporary relevance, particularly with regard to the status of Taiwan.

First, disunity has been a more normal condition than unity during most of the last 3,000 years. Casual students of Chinese history tend to overlook this, and to regard the unity and power of the greatest dynasties as more normal than

such periods actually were. The Chinese conception of monarchy made unity a powerful ideal and created historiographical and calendrical conventions that created an appearance of unity, even when the facts on the ground contradicted that appearance.

Second, it abuses Chinese history to argue that Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, or Taiwan has "always" been part of China. Actual Chinese rule in Central Asia is the exception, and the instances in which it occurred are limited both temporally and territorially. Yuan (Mongol) and Qing (Manchu) rule in Central Asia is more Central Asian history than Chinese history. Taiwan has no significant place in Chinese history before the Qing.

Third, the accomplishment of the Qing dynasty needs proper acknowledgment. By permanently annexing large parts of Central Asia including Tibet, the Qing eliminated the Central Asian military menace that had been a major element in Chinese history previously. Qing pacification of Central Asia had the effect of encouraging settlement of Han Chinese in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, even though Qing policy tried to prohibit this.

Fourth, Taiwan's history is anomalous, and Taiwan's association with China is very recent, considering the long span of Chinese history. The Ming never occupied Taiwan and withdrew from the Pescadores after forcing the Dutch out. Chinese immigration to Taiwan really began in the brief period of Dutch rule, and the Qing annexed Taiwan reluctantly after defeating the heirs of Koxinga. Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945 had important effects on the Taiwanese population.

Finally, the "One China" ideal has contradicted reality since 1895, with the brief exception of the years 1945–1949 when the nationalist government occupied Taiwan before it collapsed on the mainland. After the 1911 revolution, the ROC received international recognition as the successor to the Qing Empire and constructed symbols to redefine the Qing territories in Central Asia as part of China. The PRC succeeded the ROC on the mainland in 1949 but has never been able to enforce its claim to rule Taiwan.

For the future, there is no realistic prospect that Mongols, Uighurs, Tibetans, or any other minority people now incorporated into China and relabeled Chinese will succeed in recovering either its independence or any lesser degree of autonomy within its traditional territory. China continues to be a double anachronism: an empire in Central Asia, and a one-party authoritarian state. Meanwhile the survival of freedom and democracy on Taiwan will not depend on arguments about international law or history but on the will of the Taiwanese and American peoples and their ability to deter, or defend against, armed attack by the PRC. But history remains important, and the repeated use of tendentious, or sometimes completely false, historical claims to advance contemporary political ends tells us something important about the essential nature of the communist regime. Whenever Yasukuni Shrine visits, textbook revisions, or the Nanjing Massacre is mentioned in the press, one may expect a stern lecture from PRC spokespersons about the importance of the Japanese getting the historical issues right.³⁰ This admonition is important for China, too.

Notes

1. For the official expression of this point of view regarding Taiwan, see the two statements issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council: "The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China," September 1, 1993, and "The 'One China' Principle and the Taiwan Issue," February 21, 2000. Both are posted on the Taiwan Affairs Office website. For Tibet, see the White Paper "Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, September 1992). For Xinjiang, see the White Paper "History and Development of Xinjiang" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, May 2003) asserts in its foreword that Xinjiang "has been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation" since the Western Han dynasty (206 BC to AD 9), despite the infrequent assertion of Chinese rule in that region.
2. For the assertion that the kingdom of Bohai, a successor state to Koguryō/Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms (*samguk*) of pre-unification Korea, was "not an independent country but a local government under the control of the Tang dynasty" whose history is "inseparable from Chinese history," see "Raiders of the Arc of History," *South China Morning Post*, October 4, 2006. For differing Chinese and South Korean view on Koguryō itself, see Choe Sang-Hun, "Tussle Over a Vanished Kingdom," *International Herald Tribune*, October 12, 2006. The issue resurfaced recently in a dispute between China and South Korea over the sacred mountain on the China-North Korea border: see Koichi Furuya, "Squabble over Mt. Baekdu May Be Prelude to Bigger Problems," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 24, 2007.
3. The traditional dates of the Zhou are 1122–256 BC, but the chronology before 841 is uncertain, and the actual beginning of Zhou rule was probably nearer to 1000.
4. While dynastic founders might be able, it was designation by heaven that enabled them to use the talents of underlings who might be even more able. The Han founder Liu Bang (Han Gaozu) eventually triumphed after defeats by a rival whom he acknowledged as a superior general. In 202 BC, Liu Bang admitted that he was inferior in planning ability, administrative skills, and battlefield leadership to three principal subordinates, yet "I was able to use them, and this is why I have taken all under Heaven." Sima Qian, *Shi Ji* (1739 Palace Edition), p. 8.28ab.
5. This etymology from the *Chunqiu fanlu* of Dong Zhongshu is translated on p. 179 of Wm. Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, *Sources of the Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), a compilation that includes translations of other sources of Mandate of Heaven and dynastic cycle theory.
6. The edition published by the punctuated *Zizhi tongjian* Committee (Shanghai, 1956) is now the edition usually cited.
7. The unity of the empire ended around 190 with the rise of Cao Cao and other warlords after the Yellow Turban rebellion of 184.
8. "These centuries of political and social dominance by non-Chinese peoples left deep marks on the society and institutions of northern China," and thus molded the elite who ruled the Sui and Tang. Denis Twitchett, ed., *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 3: Sui and T'ang China, 589–906, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 3 and elsewhere.

9. Morris Rossabi, ed., *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983) contains several case studies of diplomacy among these empires.
10. See "The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China," cited in n. 1.
11. This map is on p. xxiv of Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
12. *Mingshi* 323, 16b. Note that the *Mingshi*, the official history of the Ming dynasty, was issued in 1739, well after Taiwan had come under Qing rule.
13. See Nan Juyi's biography in L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., *Dictionary of Ming Biography* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 1085–1088.
14. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth Century China*, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985) for a detailed account of these events.
15. Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) deals authoritatively with these developments.
16. L. Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet*, 2nd revised ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972) for this history.
17. Charles R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia* (New York: Praeger, 1968) for this phenomenon, and for a general history of the Qing attempt to maintain the separateness of Mongolia and the breakdown of this separation.
18. This material is from pp. 47 and 54 of Leonard Blussé, *Tribuut aan China: View Eeuwen Nederlands-Chinese Betrekkingen* (Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel, 1989). I am grateful to Gerrit van der Wees for forwarding these selections in translation. John E. Wills Jr., *Pepper, Guns and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company in China, 1662–1681* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974) is an important study based on Dutch and Chinese sources.
19. Swisher's entry on Koxinga in Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 109, says "is supposed to have committed suicide." Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth and the Hero* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 25–27, suspects natural causes but allows that the evidence is inconclusive: "As with so much about his life, the manner of his death remains a historical mystery and a potent source of myth."
20. The entries for Shih Lang, Cheng Chih-lung (Zheng Zhilong), Cheng Ch'eng-kung (Zheng Chenggong), and Cheng Ching (Zheng Jing), all written by Earl Swisher, in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, are excellent and include references to primary sources.
21. See Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684–1985," *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1971), pp. 495–520.
22. See the entry for Ch'ai Ta-chi (Chai Daji) in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*.
23. See Robert S. Sakai, "The Ryūkyū (Liu-ch'iu) Islands as a Fief of Satsuma," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 112–134.
24. Edward I-te Chen, "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Itō-Mutsu Diplomacy," *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1 (November 1977), pp. 61–72.

25. In his forged memoirs, Li Hongzhang is made to describe the island as “worse than worthless” and as a “black ulcer spot” on the otherwise beautiful body of the empire. Nowhere else in the world were the people as “degraded and filthy” as the people of Taiwan. See *Memoirs of Li Hung Chang*, by William Francis Mannix, *With the Story of a Literary Forgery*, by Ralph D. Paine (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1923), pp. 260–270. The original edition (1913) fooled most authorities, including US Secretary of State John W. Foster.
26. See the entry on Ch’iu Feng-chia (Qiu Fengjia) in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*.
27. Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 30 (1970), pp. 126–158.
28. For a vivid example of Chinese diplomacy in action, see Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 269–303.
29. June Teufel Dreyer, *China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).
30. For one of many examples, see “China Urges Japan to Take Right Attitude towards Issues of History,” *People’s Daily*, Tuesday, May 15, 2001.

CHAPTER 3

TAIWAN'S COLONIAL HISTORY AND POSTCOLONIAL NATIONALISM

J. Bruce Jacobs

The claim that Taiwan belongs to China is actually very modern. After Chiang Kai-shek came to power in China, the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) displayed considerable ambivalence toward Taiwan. Some Chinese Nationalists claimed that Taiwan should be returned to the bosom of the Motherland, while others, who noted that Taiwanese had fought with the Japanese forces in China and played important roles in the Japanese “puppet” governments in occupied China, viewed Taiwan as enemy territory to be occupied and exploited.¹

Ironically, during this same period, Chairman Mao Zedong claimed that Taiwan should be independent in his interview of July 16, 1936 with Edgar Snow. This interview is worth quoting at length:

Question: “Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regain all the territories lost to Japanese imperialism, or only to drive Japan from North China, and all Chinese territory above the Great Wall?”

Answer: “It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia . . .” [Emphasis added]²

This chapter argues that the Chinese Nationalist perceptions of Taiwan history were wrong and that they were primarily used to justify Chinese Nationalist colonial control over Taiwan. It also argues that Chairman Mao Zedong was right in 1936, but that the post-1949 Chinese Communist Party, following the

lead of the Chinese Nationalist Party, has also misrepresented Taiwan's history. In addition, those scholars in Taiwan as well as those foreigners who were influenced by the nationalist propaganda—such as this writer—must now reconsider their perspectives in light of new historical evidence.

Taiwan's Precolonial Past to 1624

Before 1624, various Austronesian tribes, the ancestors of today's aborigines, inhabited Taiwan. Since these tribes were fierce and happy to take the heads of foreigners, very few outsiders ventured to the island. The tribes themselves never united or formed a "state," though some tribes did engage in a limited, irregular trade with foreigners. Small numbers of Chinese went to Taiwan for a few months at a time to fish,³ but very few lived on the island. In 1623, when the Dutch sent an exploratory party to the island, "they found less than 1,500 Chinese immigrants settled there."⁴ It is clear that no real Chinese community had settled on the island by that time.

In the years before 1624, several European powers began to establish their colonial empires. The Portuguese, who sailed through the Taiwan Strait on their way to Japan in 1544,⁵ called Taiwan "Ilha Formosa" or "Beautiful Island." Formosa became the most important Western name for the island for many years, and the Chinese translation of Ilha Formosa, *Meilidao*, became a potent force on behalf of those seeking democratization from the late 1970s. The name Formosa appeared in a Portuguese map in 1554 and appeared in an important Dutch compilation during the 1580s.⁶

The First Colonies in Taiwan, 1624–1683

From 1624 until the late 1980s, Taiwan had a series of six colonial rulers: the Dutch (1624–1662), the Spanish (1626–1642), the Zheng family (1662–1683), the Manchus (1683–1895), the Japanese (1895–1945), and the Chinese Nationalists (1945 to the late 1980s).

During the late sixteenth century, the Dutch were establishing their empire in what is now Indonesia while the Spanish were in the Philippines. In an attempt to open trade with China, the Dutch tried to establish a base in Penghu (a group of islands to the west of Taiwan that now forms a county of Taiwan, also known in English as the Pescadores), but the Ming Chinese government insisted that they leave. The Dutch went to what is now Tainan in Taiwan and set up a colonial base there and conducted trade. At this time the Dutch imported Chinese to Taiwan in order to help with both agriculture and trade. Chinese numbers increased to 4,995 in 1640, 15,000 in 1650, 35,000 in 1661, and at most 50,000 when the Dutch left in 1662.⁷

In 1626, the Spanish, concerned that the Dutch were gaining too strong a toehold, established a base in northern Taiwan near modern Keelung and then at Tamsui. It is clear that the Spanish occupation of northern Taiwan proved unhappy for the Spaniards, who endured pressure from both the aborigines and the Dutch.⁸ Only 16 years later, in 1642, the Dutch attacked the Spanish bases

and drove the Spanish out of Taiwan, but the Dutch remained in control until 1662. In the meantime, China had undergone the great transition from the Chinese Ming dynasty to the Manchu Qing dynasty in 1644.

In 1661, a force under Zheng Chenggong (also known as Koxinga, a name derived from *Guoxingye* meaning “of the imperial surname”), the son of a Chinese pirate and a Japanese woman, besieged the Dutch in their two forts in Tainan. In February 1662, the Dutch surrendered and left Taiwan, and Zheng himself died in May 1662.

Chinese have looked back on Zheng Chenggong as a loyal patriot of the Ming dynasty and Zheng did support the last Ming emperor, who died in 1661. Zheng arrived in Taiwan after the death of the last Ming emperor, some 18 years after the fall of the Ming dynasty. At this stage, Zheng and his successors tried to establish a trading empire rather than restore the Ming dynasty. Huang Fu-san, for example, argues Zheng established an independent “administration [that] exercised full authority over Taiwan and dealt with foreign countries as a sovereign nation.”⁹

The Zheng regime fell in 1683 when the Manchus conquered Taiwan as part of their suppression of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (*sanfan zhi luan*) in southern China. Zheng Chenggong's son, Zheng Jing, had intervened on the side that opposed the Manchus. Originally, the Qing “court had never intended to send forces overseas but, in the aftermath of the rebellion, the Manchu rulers began devising a plan to eliminate” Zheng Jing.¹⁰ In 1683, the powerful Manchu Kangxi emperor himself declared Taiwan had never belonged to either the Manchus or China: “Taiwan is a small pellet of land. There is nothing to be gained by taking it, and no losses in not taking it.”¹¹ His son, the Yongzheng emperor, stated in 1723: “From ancient times, Taiwan has not been part of China. My holy and invincible father brought it into the territory.”¹²

The Manchu Empire, 1683–1895

Most people who assert that Taiwan is “Chinese” focus on the two centuries of Manchu control from 1683 to 1895. The Manchu empire was administratively and ideologically very complex. Its rulers were all Manchus as were many of its high officials. Manchus, for example, dominated the Grand Council.¹³ As Han Chinese accounted for over 90% of the empire's population, many high officials were naturally Chinese, but the ultimate sources of power rested with the Manchus, not with the Chinese.

At the end of the eighteenth century the Qing empire encompassed an area twice the size of Ming China. The court handled this expansion in a range of fashions without any one model of incorporation and administration. Differentiation and heterogeneity came to be the keys to the division of space within the empire. As a conquest dynasty, Qing political culture and institutions derived as much from the traditions of Inner Asia as they did from traditional Confucian political theory.¹⁴

China, like Taiwan and many other places in East and Central Asia, had become part of the multinational Manchu Empire.

As suggested by the statement of the Kangxi emperor quoted before, Qing attitudes toward Taiwan remained ambivalent over their two centuries of rule. According to Shepherd, "even after paying a high price to defeat the rebel Cheng [Zheng] regime, the court still had to be convinced that the strategic importance of Taiwan justified retaining the revenue-poor island within the empire."¹⁵ In Taiwan, "the state was saved the expense of initial pacification of the natives... because it inherited the system of taxation and control created by the Dutch and continued by the Chengs."¹⁶ This substantially reduced the costs of administering Taiwan, yet in its first century of rule, Qing administration remained limited to the western plains of Taiwan.¹⁷

The situation changed somewhat in the nineteenth century. Early in the nineteenth century, Han migration into the isolated Ilan plain in Taiwan's north-east "began suddenly and on a large scale." Qing government administration only arrived in 1810 after Han Chinese colonization of the Ilan plain was well under way.¹⁸ Yet it appears that the Qing government still did not claim the "uncivilized" parts of Taiwan. This became clear when the Qing government refused responsibility for protecting foreign seamen whose ships were wrecked in aboriginal areas of Taiwan.

In 1867, an American ship ran aground off Pingtung in southern Taiwan and aborigines killed most of the surviving crew. The American consul at Xiamen, General Charles William LeGendre, signed a treaty with the aboriginal chief Tauketok rather than with the Qing government.¹⁹

In late 1871, matters became even more serious when Taiwan aborigines killed 54 shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors. When China said that "it could not be held responsible for the behavior of [Taiwan] aborigines, because it always allowed them large measures of freedom and never interfered in their internal affairs," Japan responded, "sovereignty over a territory was evidence[d] by effective control; since China did not control the Formosan aborigines, they were clearly beyond its jurisdiction."²⁰ It is clear that different people in the Qing government had different perspectives. Li Hongzhang wanted to accept responsibility for the actions of the Taiwan aborigines, but in July 1873, another group of Qing leaders informed the Japanese foreign minister "that China claimed no control over the savage tribes in the mountainous eastern half of Formosa..."²¹

In summary, the Qing "record there [Taiwan] since the mid-eighteenth century was one of corrupt but minimal government, punctuated by periodic suppression of uprisings. The shelling of Keelung by British ships during the Opium War and the opening of Tamsui and Ta-kao (the present Kaohsiung) as treaty ports in the early 1860s barely began to awaken Peking to the importance of the island."²² The ensuing Japanese invasion of 1874–1875, as well as the later French attacks on Taiwan during Sino-French war of 1884–1885, "did...convince a few statesmen of the urgent need to strengthen its [Taiwan's] defences."²³ The Qing established new administrative units in 1875 and 1887²⁴ and made Taiwan a province in 1885.²⁵ Nevertheless, despite this apparent last minute appreciation of Taiwan by at least some Qing officials, such a view was apparently not unanimous. In the words of Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui, at the end of the Qing-Japanese War in 1895, the first thing the Qing dynasty negotiators gave

the Japanese was Taiwan. According to Lee Teng-hui, Li Hongzhang, the Qing dynasty lead negotiator, “implied he did not want Taiwan as it was land beyond civilization (*huawai zhi di*)!”²⁶ A Japanese source confirms that Li Hongzhang “surrendered nothing which he was not prepared and glad to get rid of, except the indemnity. He always considered Formosa [Taiwan] a curse to China and was exceedingly pleased to hand it over to Japan, and he shrewdly guessed that Japan would find it a great deal more trouble than it was worth.”²⁷

This analysis suggests two key points about Qing control of Taiwan. First, Qing control was—at best—loose, “minimal,” and partial. Substantial parts of Taiwan remained outside of Qing control throughout whole period of Qing rule in Taiwan (1683–1895). Second, this partial Qing control was not Chinese, but Manchu. Despite administration by some officials of Chinese ethnic-origin, for Taiwan the Qing period was a period of foreign colonial rule.

Similarities between the Japanese and Kuomintang Colonial Governments

In modern terms, the two key colonial regimes were those of the Japanese (1895–1945) and the Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang (1945–late 1980s). Before examining each regime separately, it is worth noting that the two shared a number of characteristics in terms of their nature and in terms of the timing of their policies.

First of all, both regimes considered the Taiwanese natives to be second-class citizens and both systematically discriminated against the Taiwanese. Under the Japanese, for example, a Taiwanese never held a position above head of county (or prefecture).²⁸ In October 1934, after almost 40 years of colonial rule, the Japanese finally unveiled their “long-awaited reform of local autonomy,” but this “outraged the Formosans . . . because what had been granted was, in essence, a rigged system in favor of Japanese residents.”²⁹ Similarly, when the Chinese Nationalist Party took over from the Japanese in late 1945, Taiwanese were excluded from many jobs in both central and local government. In addition, under both Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, mainlanders, who account for only 15% of Taiwan’s population, always had a majority in the cabinet and in the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Central Standing Committee.³⁰ Right until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, no Taiwanese ever held the position of Premier or Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Economics, Education, Finance, or Justice,³¹ or any senior military or security position. At least until 1983, no Taiwanese had ever held the cabinet positions in charge of the Economic Planning Commission and the Government Information Office or such key Kuomintang positions as Secretary-General or Director of the Organization, Youth, Policy, and Culture departments.³²

Second, both regimes clamped down very hard at first, killing tens of thousands of Taiwanese. Davidson estimates that close to 8,000 Taiwanese died resisting the Japanese in 1895.³³ Lamley says that the Japanese killed 12,000 Taiwanese “bandit-rebels” during 1898–1902,³⁴ while a Japanese source states that the Japanese colonial regime executed over 32,000 “bandits,” more than 1%

of Taiwan's population, in the same period.³⁵ In March 1947, as a result of the February 28, 1947 Uprising, Kuomintang armies came from the mainland and slaughtered 10,000–28,000 of Taiwan's leaders and educated youth.

Third, both regimes continued to rely on oppression for about 25 years. During the Japanese colonial period, this was a period of military governors, strong rule through the police, and continued repression. From 1907 to 1915, more than 800 Taiwanese were executed. During the White Terror of the 1950s, the Kuomintang executed 1,017 people and during the whole period of martial law from 1950 to 1987 some 3,000 to 4,000 people were executed for political offenses.³⁶

Fourth, owing to international and domestic circumstances, both colonial regimes "liberalized" after about a quarter century. Following World War I, Woodrow Wilson gave his speech about "self-determination" and the Koreans had a major revolt called The March First (1919) Movement. The liberalization under "Taisho democracy" at this time enabled public discussion in Japan of various policies. These discussions began to influence Japan's colonial policies in Taiwan and led to the appointment of civilian governors from October 1919 until September 1936. While police repression continued, this was also the period when Taiwanese, often in cooperation with liberal Japanese, began their political movements.³⁷ Similarly, under the Chinese Nationalist Party, in the early 1970s with Taiwan's defeat in the United Nations, the Diaoyutai movement, the activities of The Intellectual (*Daxue*) magazine, and the promotion of Chiang Ching-kuo to the premiership in 1972, Taiwan began to liberalize.

Finally, as both regimes came under pressure, they again stepped up repression. Under the Japanese the repression came with World War II, the appointment of military governors in 1936, and the push toward assimilation (*kōminka*). Under the Kuomintang, repression occurred following the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979.

Ultimately, the Allied Powers defeated the Japanese and forced them to leave Taiwan. The reforms in the last 18 months of Chiang Ching-kuo's life, the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency, and cooperation between the moderate elements in the Chinese Nationalist Party and the moderate elements in the new opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led to the end of the Chinese Nationalist Party's colonial dictatorship and to the beginning of the island's democratization.

The Japanese Colonial Regime

Although the Japanese had sent their expedition to Taiwan in 1874, when the Western powers forced Japan to withdraw, an excellent analysis suggests that Japan only became interested in Taiwan as a spoil of war well after the start of the Qing-Japan War of 1894–1895. In fact, Japan's main interest at that time was Korea. Japan's interest in Taiwan grew from three factors: Japan's major victories early in the Qing-Japan War, the Japanese Navy's new interest in Taiwan, and the feeling that accession of Taiwan would be the one part of Qing territory least likely to precipitate Western intervention.³⁸ Japan's decision to annex Taiwan

came only on December 4, 1894, three months after the start of the war.³⁹ For Japan, gaining a colonial territory meant it had become equal with the West.⁴⁰

Despite lacking arms, Taiwanese resisted the Japanese invasion following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded Taiwan to Japan. This was done on two levels. First, the Qing dynasty officials in Taiwan declared a Republic of Taiwan (*Taiwan minzhu guo*). Although it had a flag and issued stamps, the Republic of Taiwan was very short-lived, only 148 days.⁴¹ Second, Taiwanese resisted the Japanese through armed confrontation and guerilla warfare. According to a Japanese source, 14,000 Taiwanese died in action or were massacred compared to 278 Japanese killed. Thus, Japanese fatalities in invading and capturing Taiwan were less than one-fiftieth of the number of Taiwanese they killed.⁴²

Originally, many people believed that the Japanese colonial experience on Taiwan was much more benign than in Korea. Taiwan was Japan's first colony and the Japanese, wishing to impress the West with their colonial capabilities, attempted to establish a "model" colony. Japanese may have had a view that Taiwanese, being "Chinese," were more "civilized" than Koreans. In addition, the Taiwanese had never had their own king and their own "nation," so Korean resistance was supposedly much greater. In addition, many Taiwanese probably looked back on the Japanese colonial period as a "good" time after the Chinese Nationalists began to rule.

In fact, Japanese rule was brutal and Taiwanese resistance proved ongoing. As noted earlier, Japanese suppression was great and many Taiwanese were executed. From 1895 until 1919, Taiwan had military governors. And, while colonial rule in Korea was undeniably tough, Korea "gained some semblance of self-rule while in Formosa it was strongly bureaucratic." Koreans held many senior positions in the Japanese colonial government, while Taiwanese held very few.⁴³ This was in part because Japanese formed only 2.8% of the population of Korea compared to 6% in Taiwan.⁴⁴ Chen argues that the Japanese used force in the two places for different reasons. In Taiwan, force was used to "eliminate active resistance," a goal achieved by 1919. In Korea, which revolted in the very substantial March First (1919) Movement, Japan "decided to relax control somewhat in the hope that the Koreans might be reconciled to 'autonomy' and abandon their demand for independence."⁴⁵

In 1919, as noted earlier, the Japanese colonial government "liberalized" owing to Woodrow Wilson's self-determination speech, the development of Taisho democracy in Japan, and the apparent repression of Taiwanese uprisings, though, in fact, some armed resistance continued.⁴⁶ The Japanese appointed a civilian governor in October 1919. The heyday of Taiwanese political activity under the Japanese occurred after this time.⁴⁷ Woodrow Wilson's self-determination speech, the May Fourth Movement in China, and the March First Movement in Korea, as well as the new governor's "expressed intention to carry out a policy of conciliation and his hope to introduce shortly a system of local autonomy," led the 2,000 Taiwanese students in Japan at that time to think of "Formosa for Formosans" for the very first time.⁴⁸ Police repression made life difficult for the Taiwanese, but coercion "had the effect of radicalizing the movement."⁴⁹ Many Taiwanese spent considerable time in jail.

Rivalry among leaders in the late 1920s and early 1930s led to several different organizations being founded. The more radical people formed a labor movement and those even more radical founded the small Taiwan Communist Party, established by the Comintern as a branch of the Japanese Communist Party. The founders of the Taiwan Communist Party included seven Taiwanese and representatives of both the Chinese and the Korean Communist Parties. The Japanese police arrested all Taiwanese members by June 1931.⁵⁰

Perhaps the greatest successes of the Taiwanese political movements involved gaining some very limited elections in the mid-1930s. In the first election of 1935, more Japanese (30,969) qualified to vote than did Taiwanese (28,952) despite Taiwanese being 16 times as numerous because of the minimum tax that a voter had to pay. The voters only chose one-half of the council memberships while the Japanese governor-general chose the rest. In addition, the councils were merely advisory and could be dismissed by the government at any time.⁵¹ Naturally, the announcement of this system “outraged” the Taiwanese.⁵² The Japanese reduced the financial requirement for voters and by the third biennial election in 1939 the number of Taiwanese voters had increased to 286,700 and the number of Taiwanese elected to local posts had risen to 3,014.⁵³ The number of voters was still a minority of Taiwan’s citizens, about 10% of the Taiwanese population and perhaps 20% of the adults, but it was still 10 times greater than 4 years previously. By then, with the war in full-swing, the Japanese were attempting to assimilate the Taiwanese (and the Koreans) with their *kōminka* policies aimed at changing Taiwanese into “true Japanese” with Japanese ways and Japanese names.

In many ways, Taiwanese political activity during the Japanese period was limited and, since none of the Taiwanese organizations achieved its goals, the Taiwanese political movements during the Japanese period may be considered “failures.” Yet, in the words of a Taiwanese scholar written over 35 years ago during the height of the Chinese Nationalist colonial dictatorship, the Taiwanese political movements did help preserve “the cultural identity of Formosans... and they helped Formosans to learn about the many hitherto totally alien concepts of democracy, such as home rule, popular election, and universal suffrage. Formosan desire for self-determination today [1972] has its deep roots in the days of Japanese rule.”⁵⁴

The Chinese Nationalists Arrive in Taiwan

The Chinese Nationalists occupied Taiwan on October 25, 1945, over two months after the end of World War II. Despite their earlier ambivalence, the Chinese Nationalists came to Taiwan as occupiers of enemy territory. The Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office (*Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu*) differed from all provincial governments on the Chinese mainland as it combined executive, legislative, judicial, and military authority in one office, hence “continuing a colonial structure similar to that of the Japanese period.”⁵⁵

As noted earlier, the Chinese Nationalist colonial regime systematically discriminated against Taiwanese in political appointments and gave mainlanders all of the senior appointments. They forced children to speak the colonial

language—Mandarin Chinese—and fined, and humiliated students who spoke their own languages, such as Hokkien, Hakka, or aboriginal languages, at school. The regime also insisted upon teaching about China and not Taiwan. Consequently, Taiwanese children learned about all of the rivers and mountains of China, and about Chinese political leaders, but they learned virtually nothing about their own history and geography.

In addition to the many parallels with the Japanese colonial regime, the Chinese colonial regime also had many similarities with European colonial regimes such as those run by England and France. Because of the large number of Chinese who came to Taiwan in 1949, owing to the communist victory, perhaps the closest parallel is with the French colonial regime in Algeria where *colons* (European colonists) or *pièdes noirs* (black feet) accounted for 10% of the population by 1909.⁵⁶ This ratio of about 10% Europeans continued until Algeria gained independence on July 3, 1962. During 1962–1963, more than 1.4 million European colonists left Algeria and only 30,000 remained.⁵⁷ After this departure, Algeria had a population of 12 million according to the 1966 census.⁵⁸

Cultural misunderstandings added to the lack of trust between Chinese and Taiwanese. Most Chinese could not speak Hokkien and other Taiwanese languages while most Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin and various other mainland Chinese dialects. Taiwan also had much higher standards of living than China. Furthermore, in ever-worsening economic conditions, the Chinese rulers proved very corrupt. Consequently, many Taiwanese said that the “dogs” (the Japanese) were bad, but the “pigs” (the Chinese) were worse.

These events led to the “February 28 (1947) Uprising” (*er erba shijian*), perhaps the most politically important event during the whole of the Chinese Nationalist colonial regime.⁵⁹ From early 1946, as the repression of the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office became more and more obvious, Taiwanese began to protest and to organize.⁶⁰ Details of the “February 28 Uprising” need not be related here.⁶¹ More importantly, with their grievances, Taiwanese formed a Settlement (or Resolution) Committee (*chuli wei-yuanhui*) to seek democratic and administrative reforms.

The Chinese colonial government negotiated with Taiwanese leaders and agreed to some democratic reforms, but at the same time called for troops from the mainland. On the evening of March 8, the Chinese troops reached Keelung, Taiwan’s northern harbor. On March 9, the 21st Army landed, reached Taipei, and continued south. At the same time, troops also landed at Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s southern harbor, and wherever they went, the troops massacred people. Chen Yi declared the Taiwanese Settlement Committee illegal, and those affiliated with the Settlement Committee became special targets of the military and security forces.

The killing was horrendous. George Kerr, the US Consul who witnessed the whole uprising wrote:

Many mainland Chinese at Taipei were of course shocked by the brutality of this campaign, but few were surprised. One prominent person, visibly moved, told me that he had witnessed the notorious “Rape of Nanking” by the Japanese in 1937,

but that this surpassed it, for the Nanking rape was a product of war, a wild outburst of wartime passion, whereas this was a coldly calculated revenge, perpetrated by the Nationalist Government upon its own people.⁶²

Many bodies were taken from Keelung Harbor and “[f]or days the dead continued to be washed up...”⁶³ Under the leadership of General P’eng Meng-chi, “the atrocities perpetrated at Kaohsiung were (if possible) even more revolting than the mass executions and torture used at Taipei...”⁶⁴

Those killed number at least 10,000 to as many as 28,000. A large proportion of Taiwan’s leadership and its youth, especially its educated youth, lost their lives. The February 28 Uprising firmly separated native Taiwanese from the Chinese mainlanders both politically and socially. Furthermore, even though a large proportion of Taiwanese families lost one or more persons to the massacres, no one was allowed to talk about the Uprising publicly in Taiwan and many dared not speak privately either. Taiwanese overseas and Western scholars were very aware of the February 28 Uprising, but it was not until well into the 1990s that Taiwanese on Taiwan began to learn more about this horrible event.

Having lost the civil war on the mainland, President Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Chinese Nationalist government to move to Taipei on December 7, 1949,⁶⁵ an event that happened the next day.⁶⁶ The Chinese Nationalists were clearly on their last legs, but two events saved Chiang Kai-shek’s regime: (1) the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 and President Truman’s neutralization of the Taiwan Strait two days later, and (2) Chiang Kai-shek’s implementation of the Kuomintang Reform of 1950–1952, which reduced corruption and made the Kuomintang a viable ruling party.⁶⁷

The regime remained heavily repressive, however, as it implemented the White Terror.⁶⁸ As noted earlier, a wide variety of prominent and not-so-prominent Chinese and Taiwanese were arrested. Over the whole of the martial law period under both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, some 140,000 people suffered imprisonment in some 29,000 political cases and the number executed in political cases totaled 3,000 to 4,000.⁶⁹

In 1960 the Chinese Nationalist colonial regime faced a special challenge when liberal Chinese intellectuals under the leadership of Lei Chen came together with local Taiwanese politicians to form the China Democratic Party (*Zhongguo minzhu dang*). This made Lei, who published the famous *Free China Fortnightly Magazine* (*Ziyou Zhongguo banyuekan*) from November 20, 1949 until September 1, 1960, especially threatening and he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on October 8, 1960. Not until 1979, almost twenty years later, did the *Formosa Magazine* leaders attempt again to establish an opposition political organization.

Except for one other major event, the 1960s in Taiwan remained quiescent politically. Professor Peng Ming-min, together with his two assistants, Hsieh Tsung-min and Wei Ting-chao, issued their “Declaration of Formosans,”⁷⁰ which called for a democratic Taiwan separate from China. Peng held a privileged position and, though sentenced to eight years, was ultimately placed under house arrest, from which he escaped abroad with the help of foreign missionary friends.⁷¹ Hsieh was sentenced to 10 years while Wei got 8 years.⁷² On February 23, 1971, Hsieh and

Wei got another 15 and 12 years respectively for “sedition” while Li Ao of the *Apollo* (*Wenxing*) magazine got 10 years.⁷³

Internal and External Pressures for Reform in the Early 1970s and the Leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo

Toward the end of Chiang Kai-shek's rule, the “logic” of his “One China” policy, in which the Republic of China on Taiwan represented the whole of China, began to crack. Though the Cultural Revolution in China gave Chiang Kai-shek a few years of breathing room, by 1970 the international pressure against Taiwan grew substantially. In turn, this international pressure created cracks in the colonial, dictatorial regime giving space to reform elements. Chiang's elderly age—he was 87 when he died in 1975—also provided opportunities for new leadership.

An early movement concerned the small Diaoyutai Islands—known in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands—consisting of five uninhabited small islets and three reefs with an area of 6.3 sq. km located about 200 km northeast of Keelung.⁷⁴ This movement brought together the government and patriotic youth. From the government perspective, the support of patriotic youth added strength to the government's legitimacy, but their demonstrations also gave opportunities to the disaffected.

Following World War II, the United States considered the Diaoyutai Islands as part of the Ryukyu chain flowing southwest of Japan with Okinawa as its largest island. In a real sense, the Diaoyutai Island problem for Taiwan began on November 21, 1969 when the United States and Japan issued a joint communiqué in which the United States stated that it would return Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972.⁷⁵ Only several months later, in mid-August 1970, did any parts of the Taiwan government make statements on the Diaoyutai Islands.⁷⁶ The next month, on September 25, 1970, Premier Yen Chia-kan told the legislature: “Our government's position with regard to our legitimate rights and interests in those Islands remains firm. Furthermore, we are determined to use all our powers to defend them.”⁷⁷

In fact, Mab Huang argues, “the government's reaction . . . had been modest . . . [while] society at large and the press were much more agitated.”⁷⁸ Pressure came from students demonstrating in Hong Kong as well as in various centers of the United States.⁷⁹ Finally, a series of statements and demonstrations in Taiwan itself followed in April 1971.⁸⁰ In perhaps the largest demonstration, 4,000 students from National Taiwan Normal University demonstrated and, afterward, 2,000 signed a petition with their blood.⁸¹ The press, too, became hysterical with the normally moderate Independence Evening News (*Zili wanbao*) editorializing, “This is our oil and this is our blood!”⁸²

This patriotic protest movement, perhaps as the government feared, also became a movement for political reform. In its July 1971 issue, *The Intellectual* (*Daxue zazhi*) editorialized:

So-called political reforms are not simply the raising of administrative efficiency. They involve fundamental reforms of the complete political system. We resolutely

believe, from the beginning to the end, that only with a flawless and modernized domestic politics can we establish an international position that cannot be lightly insulted. Only then can we establish a firm foundation for successful diplomacy.⁸³

Although the title of the editorial warned the United States and Japan, at least some of the bold type in the editorial also warned the Chiang Kai-shek government. Ironically, as this issue of the magazine was being published, Henry Kissinger was on the first of his trips to Beijing. This, too, would have serious consequences for the colonial government in Taiwan including Taiwan's departure from the United Nations.

The story of Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on "One China" and Taiwan's resulting departure from the United Nations has been told elsewhere and need not be repeated.⁸⁴ Basically, the Chinese colonial government in Taiwan was unwilling to consider "dual representation" in the United Nations, even though this policy had substantial support from the United States as well as from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, and would have ensured Taiwan had separate representation in the world body. Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 only further humiliated the Chinese colonial leadership in Taiwan.

At the same time, a large group of intellectuals was pushing hard for various political reforms through the magazine, *The Intellectual (Daxue zazhi)*.⁸⁵ At this same time, Chiang Ching-kuo was being readied to succeed his father, something that came about in a de facto sense with Chiang Ching-kuo's appointment as Premier in May 1972. Chiang Ching-kuo appointed many more Taiwanese as well as younger, more highly educated people to his cabinet. He also issued and implemented his "Ten Rules of Reform."⁸⁶ Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father as leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party following Chiang Kai-shek's death on April 5, 1975 and transferred from the premiership to the presidency at the end of the presidential term in May 1978.

It is important to draw a distinction between "liberalization" and "democratization." Sometimes authoritarian regimes engage in "liberalization," allowing some increase in freedom of speech and the press, and even allowing opposition politicians to win office. But these authoritarian regimes do not relinquish ultimate control. In a democracy, of course, the citizens can vote out the rulers; during "liberalization," this cannot happen. Upon his succession to the leadership, Chiang Ching-kuo engaged in "liberalization" in an effort to gain wider support for his regime.

This "liberalization" brought about a Chinese Nationalist Party electoral "defeat" in the county executive and provincial assembly elections of November 19, 1977 when nonpartisans won one-fifth of the county executive seats and over one-quarter of the provincial assembly seats.⁸⁷ Then, a major external crisis came with the announcement of the United States on December 15, 1978 that it was diplomatically recognizing the People's Republic of China. This led to a delay in the scheduled central-level elections in Taiwan and to further demonstrations and activities by the nonpartisan opposition, who struggled for publicity and recognition in Taiwan's controlled media.

These demonstrations culminated in Kaohsiung Incident on December 10, 1979, when some violence broke out. This writer has investigated this demonstration thoroughly and it appears that the violence happened accidentally in a "Tragedy of Errors." However, after a long Central Committee plenum, the conservatives proved preponderant in the Chinese Nationalist Party and many opposition leaders were arrested on December 13, 1979 and later sentenced to long terms in prison.

The strong repression, led by General Wang Sheng, one of Chiang Ching-kuo's most conservative key supporters, continued until Wang Sheng was exiled as ambassador to Paraguay on September 20, 1983. It was during this period that a strong element of Taiwan Nationalism was added to the demands for democratization.⁸⁸ In 1986, following the downfall of President Marcos in the Philippines, Chiang Ching-kuo moved for more reform, and the Nationalist Party started formal "Dialogues" with the opposition.⁸⁹ Then on September 28, 1986 the opposition announced the founding of the DPP. The colonial government, much to everyone's surprise, did nothing and allowed the DPP to fight the election of December 6, 1986 under its own name. On October 15, 1986, the Nationalist Party announced the end of martial law, effective in July 1987. Then, in October 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo allowed Taiwan residents to visit the mainland, where they discovered things were worse than nationalist propaganda had stated. Finally, on January 1, 1988, the government terminated the restrictions on newspapers. On January 13, 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died.

The Presidency of Lee Teng-hui

The death of President Chiang Ching-kuo did not signal the end of the Chinese colonial regime. Many Taiwanese had been appointed to deputy positions including deputy premier over the years. For both of his presidential terms, Chiang Ching-kuo had chosen a Taiwanese to be vice president. In 1978 he chose Hsieh Tung-min, a "half-mainlander" who had worked on the mainland with the Chinese Nationalists during the Japanese colonial period,⁹⁰ and in 1984 he selected Lee Teng-hui.

Lee Teng-hui on several public occasions has stated clearly that Chiang Ching-kuo did not choose him as his successor. Lee had an active, but clearly subordinate, role as vice president. When Lee Teng-hui became president following Chiang Ching-kuo's death, the Chinese mainlanders still maintained control. Only after two fierce weeks of debate did the Central Standing Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party agree to make Lee the *acting* chairman of the party. He only became the formal Chairman on July 8, 1988, almost six months after Chiang's death.⁹¹

Lee allied with various groups of mainlanders to defeat other groups of mainlanders. Taking advantage of major reforms of the system including termination of the indefinitely extended terms for legislators elected on the mainland in the late 1940s, the direct election of the president in 1996, election results in Taiwan, and the wide support of Taiwan's population, Lee moved to end the Chinese

colonial government, which he called a “regime that came [to Taiwan] from the outside” (*wailai zhengquan*).⁹²

In the process of democratization, Lee also Taiwanized the Chinese Nationalist Party. During visits to the Central Party Headquarters in the mid-1990s, this writer saw a new informality, which contrasted with the strong formality of the Chiang Ching-kuo period and which included speaking mainly Hokkien rather than the colonial Mandarin. The opposition DPP was also gaining strength, while the conservative mainlanders lost their formerly exalted position in the political system.

This Taiwanization of politics reached a new climax in March 2000 when Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the DPP, defeated the two main candidates of the divided Nationalist Party and won the presidency with a plurality of votes. While not gaining a majority of support, Chen Shui-bian did have a honeymoon period and in late 2001, the DPP became the largest party in the legislature even though it still lacked a majority. In March 2004, President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lü gained a bare majority over the united ticket of their opponents, Lien Chan and James Soong, winning by a bare 0.228% of the vote.

Under the chairmanship of Lien Chan (2000–2005), however, the Chinese Nationalist Party retreated and became more Chinese and less Taiwanese in its identity. Taiwan’s politics descended into gridlock. Ma Ying-jeou, the Chairman from 2005 to early 2007, fitfully attempted to reform the Chinese Nationalist Party, but he has also tried to retain the support of the very conservative Chinese mainlanders. This contradictory behavior did not alleviate the gridlock.

A New Taiwanese Nation and Culture

With democratization, the culture of Taiwan has undergone substantial change. Fewer people think of themselves as Chinese, while more and more see themselves as Taiwanese. In 1992, the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in Taiwan began to examine identity in Taiwan semiannually. The surveys asked respondents to identify themselves in one of three categories: “both Taiwanese and Chinese,” “Taiwanese,” and “Chinese.” Over time, with minor blips in the data, the proportion of respondents who reply that they are “Chinese” has shown a consistent downward trend from more than one-quarter to less than one-sixteenth of those surveyed. In other words, in 14 years, the number identifying as “Chinese only” is less than one-fourth the number of the earliest surveys. On the other hand, the number replying that they are “Taiwanese” has increased some 2.5 times, from about one-sixth to over two-fifths of the respondents. The percentage of those claiming to be both Taiwanese and Chinese has remained in the low forties. The halving of the nonresponse rate from 11% to about 5% also demonstrates that these issues have been widely discussed in Taiwan and that people are not afraid to respond to surveys.⁹³

This significant cultural and psychological transformation in Taiwan resembles a similar process in Australia. Thirty or forty years ago many Australians referred to “going home,” meaning Great Britain, even if they had never been

there. Now, no one says such things. Similarly, many Taiwanese once viewed China as the "homeland," but very few now hold that view. These cultural changes in Australia and Taiwan have been relatively quiet and peaceful, but they are very significant nonetheless.

This change is reflected in the way Taiwanese now describe their culture. Previously, under the Chinese colonial regime, people said, "Taiwan culture is a subset of Chinese culture." Now, people say, "Chinese culture is a part of Taiwan culture along with aboriginal cultures, Dutch culture, Spanish culture, Manchu culture, Japanese culture, and Western culture."

We have noted that 228 (February 28) is an important figure in Taiwan history. The democratic movement of 2.28 in 1947 resulted in the deaths of Taiwan's leadership. In 1980, someone killed the mother and twin daughters of imprisoned opposition provincial assemblyman Lin Yi-hsiung. In the March 2004 election, President Chen Shui-bian won with a bare margin of only 0.228% of the vote.

Prior to that election, at 2.28 p.m. on February 28, 2004, 2 million people lined up and down the length of Taiwan and "held hands to protect Taiwan." The chorus of a song written for this event, which has become an unofficial anthem of Taiwan, goes:

Hand holding Hand
Heart united with Heart
Let us stand together
This is our precious [land].⁹⁴

The actions of this demonstration and the words of the song symbolize a new Taiwanese Nationalism that is growing rapidly on the island among all ethnic groups including mainlanders and those of mainland descent.⁹⁵ This Taiwanese Nationalism states clearly that Taiwan is not a part of China. Although opinions differ about whether Taiwan ought to declare formal "independence," most citizens agree that Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent state and has no need for such a formal declaration.

International law supports Taiwan's claim as a sovereign independent state. In the "Convention on Rights and Duties of States" signed at Montevideo on December 26, 1933, Article 1 says: "The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."⁹⁶ Taiwan clearly has these four characteristics. In addition, the citizens of the state of Taiwan freely and democratically choose their own government.

In addition, Article 3 of the Convention says:

The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.⁹⁷

Hence, even should all of Taiwan's diplomatic allies formally recognize Beijing, Taiwan would still continue to exist as an independent sovereign state.

China's claim to Taiwan is based on false history and the People's Republic clearly needs to revise its Taiwan policies accordingly. Similarly, the democratic powers that recognized the People's Republic of China during the 1970s, at the height of the Chinese colonial government in Taiwan, need to reconsider their "One China" policies in view of Taiwan's democratization and decolonization. Only then will we have a more peaceful world.

Notes

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64. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
65. *Zhongyang ribao* [Central Daily News], December 8, 1949, p. 1.
66. *Ibid.*, December 9, 1949, p. 1.
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70. The text is available in Victor H. Li, ed., *The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1980), pp. 174–185.
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78. Mab Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971–1973* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), p. 7.
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80. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
82. “Women de You! Women de Xue! [Our Oil! Our Blood!],” *Zili wanbao [Independence Evening News]*, April 15, 1971, p. 1 as cited in Mark Harrison, *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 119.
83. “Yanli jinggao Mei Ri zhengfu qinlue Diaoyutai shengming [An Announcement Severely Warning the American and Japanese Governments about Invading Diaoyutai],” *Daxue zazhi [The Intellectual]*, vol. 43 (July 1971), pp. 2–3, quote from p. 3.

84. J. Bruce Jacobs, "One China, Diplomatic Isolation and a Separate Taiwan," in *China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemmas and International Peace*, ed. Edward Friedman (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 85–109, esp. pp. 89–94.
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92. Sometimes this term is translated as an "alien regime." For Lee's first use, see Shiba, *Taiwan kikō [A Taiwan Journey]*, p. 495. For Chinese translations see Shiba, *Taiwan jixing [A Taiwan Journey]*, p. 531 and Li Denghui, *Jingying da Taiwan [Managing a Great Taiwan]*, p. 477.
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CHAPTER 4

ON THE STATEHOOD OF TAIWAN: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL

Huang-Chih Chiang and Jau-Yuan Hwang

Introduction

Many international lawyers have advanced various arguments as to why existing states do not recognize Taiwan¹ as a state or, more specifically, why Taiwan is not a state.² Several have pointed out that the so-called One China policy, the lack of claiming statehood by the Taiwanese government in the past, and lack of foreign recognition are probably the most critical factors that would negate Taiwan's statehood. All these arguments, however, are more or less questionable in the light of contemporary developments in Taiwan. Ever since the late 1980s, there has been much strong evidence indicating that the Government of Taiwan has asserted, expressly or implicitly, a separate statehood for Taiwan as distinct from that of China. It is the premise of this chapter that the latest developments of Taiwan during past two decades must be taken seriously by all parties concerned in evaluating its current legal status.

This chapter will focus on the "One China" policy, Taiwan's self-claims, and the recognition issue in light of the recent developments of past two decades. In the second section, this chapter will first discuss the "One China" policy and its legal implication on the current legal status of Taiwan. The third section will go on to examine the Taiwan government's claim of an independent statehood. In the penultimate section, this chapter will discuss the theory and practice of recognition of states under the international law, followed by a critical appraisal of its application to the case of Taiwan.

The main purpose of this chapter is to explore whether Taiwan is in the process of emerging, or may have already emerged, as an independent state as examined against the traditional criteria concerning statehood. In conclusion, this chapter argues that it is legally tenable to regard Taiwan as an independent state at the present time.

“One China” Policy and Its Impact upon Taiwan’s Legal Status

Historical Background to “One China” Policy and Its Impact upon Taiwan’s International Legal Status

One of the greatest difficulties facing Taiwan as an independent sovereign state is the so-called One China policy, which the nationalist government of Taiwan once deliberately promoted until as late as 1988. Long after its defeat on mainland China in 1949, the nationalist government still competed with the Chinese Communist government in the international community to represent the State of China. Despite their competition for Chinese representation, both the communist and nationalist governments claimed that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of the State of China. This is the so-called “One China” policy.³ Because of the Cold War, through the 1950s and 1960s, the nationalist government on Taiwan, with the support of the United States, occupied the Chinese seat in the United Nations (UN).⁴ As a result, the governing authority on Taiwan, in the name of the Republic of China (ROC) government, was largely accepted, mostly by the western states, as being the sole legitimate government of the State of China, while the legal status (i.e., territorial title) of Taiwan was deliberately left undetermined by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952. This will be further discussed below.

On October 25, 1971, the UN General Assembly voted to give the Chinese seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government, and thus excluded the representatives dispatched by the ROC government from participation in the United Nations and all its subsidiary bodies.⁵ Against this backdrop, many international lawyers once regarded the Taiwan issue as choosing between two governments making identical claims to represent the same State of China.⁶ Nevertheless, could such assertion still be entertained at present?

The PRC government continues to maintain that it is the sole legitimate government of China and that China includes Taiwan. However, does the Government of Taiwan still maintain it is the sole legal government of the State of China? This is of great importance in determining the legal status of Taiwan. Theoretically, if the Government of Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole legitimate government of the State of China, then the once-existing competition between the PRC and ROC governments over the Chinese representation becomes irrelevant in determining the legal status of Taiwan.

Stating that the Government of Taiwan no longer claims to be the government of the State of China⁷ is not the same as claiming that Taiwan is an independent state and the current effective authority as its government. Accordingly, it is important for us to examine whether or not the Government of Taiwan does claim an independent statehood for Taiwan as distinct from the State of China. Given the complicated and twisted historic developments, we have to examine what the Government of Taiwan claims “not to be” and “to be” simultaneously in order to assess the current legal status of Taiwan.

Does the Government of Taiwan Still Claim to be the Government of the State of China?

Changes in Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Its Implication for the "One China" Policy

Many commentators argue that the ROC government on Taiwan always claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China until the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. However, as early as 1952, the government on Taiwan had implicitly, though only in some cases, limited its sovereign claim to the territories under its effective control.

In early 1951, John Foster Dulles, then US Secretary of state, told Taiwan's Ambassador Wellington Koo that, if the United States accepted Taiwan as Chinese territory, it "would lose her grounds for dispatching the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan."⁸ Accordingly, he urged the Taiwan government to conclude a treaty with Japan with the provisions of the San Francisco Treaty relating to the legal status of Taiwan, and limit the territorial application, on the ROC part, of the peace treaty with Japan to Taiwan and those islets only. Ultimately, the nationalist government accepted that the force of the 1952 Peace Treaty with Japan would be limited to those territories under its effective control, that is, Taiwan proper, the Pescadores, and a couple of islets in the vicinity of the Chinese coast.

On April 28, 1952, the ROC government concluded a peace treaty with Japan. Upon signing this treaty, the Japanese government also delivered a Note No. 1 to the ROC government, which said:

In regard to the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China signed today, I have the honor to refer, on behalf of my Government, to the understanding reached between us that the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect to the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government.⁹

On the same date, Taiwan's ambassador also delivered to his counterpart in Japan a Note that confirmed the above understanding as indicated in the said Note No. 1. The history relating to the conclusion of the above peace treaty suggests that this Exchange of Notes could be interpreted to mean that the then Government of Taiwan had already accepted, or been forced to accept, that its territory should be limited to those under its effective control at the time. In this case, the then ROC government of Taiwan did not claim to represent China.

This similar position was reaffirmed in the "1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between ROC and the United States." Article VI of the Mutual Defense Treaty stipulated that "the terms territorial and 'territories' (in Articles II and V) shall mean, in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores" and "such territories as may be determined by mutual agreement."¹⁰ It is clear that the United States only recognized that the territories of "the ROC" were limited to Taiwan proper and the Pescadores and did not include those islets along the east coast of China, such as Kinmen and Matsu.¹¹ The nationalist government

accepted this limit upon its territorial claim by concluding the Mutual Defense Treaty. Since then, the United States has, both in fact and in law, treated the government of the ROC and the government of the PRC in Beijing as having separate personalities in international affairs.¹²

When the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was founded in 1966, the nationalist government joined this intergovernmental organization as a founding member under the nomenclature of "the Republic of China." However, from the very beginning, the nationalist government made it clear that its representation was limited to the Taiwan area only.¹³ This indicated that, even under the nomenclature of "the Republic of China," the Government of Taiwan did not always claim to be the sole, legitimate government of the State of China.

Similar attitudes were taken by the ROC government on Taiwan in its foreign relations, beginning from the early 1980s. When the PRC establishes diplomatic relations with other states, it has consistently and formally claimed "the Government of the People Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China."¹⁴ Contrary to the practice of the PRC, when the Government of Taiwan establishes formal diplomatic relations with other states after 1971, it has no longer formally claimed that the ROC government is the sole legal government of China.¹⁵ For example, on August 16, 1981 Taiwan established diplomatic relations with St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Joint Communiqué Establishing Diplomatic Relations included no clause of recognizing "the ROC" as the sole legitimate government of China.¹⁶ It could be argued that the so-called ROC, as mentioned in this diplomatic communiqué, apparently referred to Taiwan area only.

A major and clearer shift occurred after the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo and the succession of Lee Teng-hui to Taiwan's presidency. Lee consistently stated that the ROC on Taiwan only included the areas that his government effectively controlled. In May 1991, President Lee Teng-hui unequivocally recognized that a "political entity" in Beijing controlled mainland China. In 1994, the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan formally announced that "the ROC government would no longer compete for 'the right to represent China' in the international arena."¹⁷

Thus, as early as 1952, the ROC government on Taiwan implicitly accepted that it controlled only Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands. As far as its international relations are concerned, the Government of Taiwan gradually confined its territorial claim to the Taiwan area and declined the claim to be the sole government of the State of China after 1971. Nevertheless, such changes only became more evident after Lee Teng-hui succeeded to the presidency in 1988.

Taiwan's Internal Political Reform and Its Implication for the "One China" Policy

Another factor that made Taiwan abandon the "One China" Policy is its democratization beginning from the late 1980s. Before 1991, all three representative bodies at the national level in Taiwan consisted mainly of people elected in China in 1948, could have stayed in their office and had their terms extended for life. The people of Taiwan elected less than 10% of the total representatives

at each body. Domestically, the nationalist government used these institutions and the ROC Constitution of 1947 promulgated in China as the political tokens to maintain its claim as the sole legitimate government of China.¹⁸ Since 1991, a series of constitutional reform has gradually redefined the constitutional identity of Taiwan (and the ROC) vis-à-vis China.

In June 1990, Taiwan's Grand Justices (the equivalent of Constitutional Court) rendered the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261, which required all those senior (mainlander) representatives elected in China in 1948 step down by December 31, 1991.¹⁹ In April 1991, a set of 10 Additional Articles were added to the ROC Constitution of 1947 to, among others, mandate reelection of the three national representative bodies.²⁰ Accordingly, a general election for the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan (LY) was held in December 1991 and December 1992, respectively.²¹ Meanwhile, the 1991 Additional Articles also redefined the territorial jurisdiction of the ROC Constitution to the Taiwan area only.²² On May 1, 1991, the then President Lee officially announced the unilateral termination of military hostility against China and formally acknowledged the effective control of China by the PRC government since 1949. In March 1996, Taiwan went on to hold its first direct, popular presidential election under another constitutional amendment, despite the missile drills and military intimidation done by China right before the ballot date.

The above developments not only marked the watershed of Taiwan's democratization process, but also reshaped the political and international identity of Taiwan. These general elections formally cut off Taiwan's self-claimed representation of Chinese people and territory, and thus based the legitimacy of the ROC government of Taiwan exclusively on the political will of the people of Taiwan. The people of China were therefore constitutionally excluded from participation in the formation of the ROC government, as were other foreigners.

On July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui pointed out the constitutional and international implications of the 1991 constitutional amendments:

The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government.²³

In light of this statement made by President Lee, it could be argued that the 1991 constitutional amendments amounted to a formal abandonment of territorial claim toward China and the formal abolishment of the ROC government's claim to be sole legitimate government of China. In this sense, the 1991 constitutional amendments not only transformed the structure and legitimacy of the ROC government but its constitutional and international identity. The ROC has evolved from a government that once represented the State of China between 1912 and 1949 to one that represents Taiwan only now. Therefore, the term "ROC on Taiwan," often used by the Government of Taiwan since the early 1990s, could be best understood as meaning "the ROC government representing (the State of) Taiwan."

*The Unequivocal Abandonment of "One China" Policy
by Taiwan after 2000*

What is more significant to note is that the current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government of Taiwan, which came to power in 2000, has repeatedly refused to accept the "One China" Policy (or "One China" Principle) even under tremendous pressure and military threats from China. On August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian clearly proclaimed that "Taiwan is an independent state.... Taiwan and China are one state on each side [of the Taiwan Strait]." ²⁴ On February 28, 2006, the DPP government finally decided to let the last two tokens of the outdated "One China" policy in Taiwan, the "National Unification Council," "cease to function" and the "Guidelines for National Unification" "cease to apply." ²⁵

*The Legal Implications of the Once-Claimed
"One China" Policy on the Current Legal Status of Taiwan*

No doubt, the "One China" Policy was once supported domestically and, to a less degree, internationally by the Kuomintang (KMT) government of Taiwan before 1988. Despite the contrary practice as indicated above, one may argue that the unilateral declaration of "One China" Policy by the KMT government should prevent it from asserting, later, for Taiwan an independent (or separate) legal personality from that of China. Two points should be made. First, we argue that the "One China" policy as espoused by the KMT government of Taiwan in the past does not foreclose the legal possibility of claiming an independent statehood for Taiwan under the name of the ROC for the present and future. We could argue that the former "One China" policy merely indicated the political willingness of the KMT government of Taiwan to unify (merge) with the State of China *in the future*. It does not necessarily imply recognition of Taiwan being part of China or having no international personality of its own *at present*. This clearly was the position taken by the KMT government as late as after 1988.

For example, Mr. P. K. Chiang, the former minister of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, once expressively declared at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Seattle on November 21, 1993 that Taiwan was pursuing a so-called "Interim Two China[s] policy." ²⁶ Back home, the then spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs further elucidated this utterance by stating:

2. The Government of the ROC has declared openly on various occasions its firm position on pursuing the *goal* of "One China". This position has never changed. The ROC also insists unwaveringly that *it is a sovereign and independent state....* ²⁷ (Emphasis added)

In other words, the "One China" policy of the KMT government, particularly after 1988, could be better understood as "'One China,' but not now," which clearly intends a separate and independent statehood for Taiwan under the name of ROC.

Just as South Korea and North Korea both adhere to the One Korea policy and commit themselves to future unification, such positions do not mean that South Korea or North Korea does not claim separate statehood for the territories currently under each respective effective control. The same is true of the two Germanys before their unification in 1990 or the case of the People's Republic of Yemen and the Arab Republic Yemen before their unification in 1990.²⁸ There is no inherent reason why the so-called "One China" policy, just like the One Germany policy, One Korea policy or One Yemen policy, should preclude the possible existence of two separate sovereign states across the Taiwan Strait. On the contrary, it might be argued, the so-called "One China" policy appears to evidence the existence of two separate states. Logically, if there is only one state now, there would be no point in emphasizing the importance of "eventual unification" in the future. The numerous utterances of "One China" policy only reinforce the possibility that there might concurrently be two separate sovereign states across the Taiwan Strait.

Second, the "One China" policy once stated by the KMT government of Taiwan, particularly after 1988, was often made under the threat or use of force by China against Taiwan. Such statements shall be deemed void and have no legally binding force in accordance with the international law. "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."²⁹ If a treaty or an agreement concluded by the threat or use of force is void, a fortiori, a declaration or policy statement delivered under the threat or use of force should also be void ab initio.

Following this line of reasoning, in the instance of Taiwan's sporadic utterance of the "One China" policy, all indications reveal that such utterances were made under the threat of force from the PRC. However important the "One China" policy might be as a matter of domestic affairs, such unilateral declarations are null and void in international law. It would raise serious legal concerns if we interpret such political policy statements made by the Government of Taiwan under the persistent threat of force from China as a binding obligation *erga omnes*. Therefore, the "One China" policy should have no legal effect upon Taiwan's current legal status. At least this policy does not, ipso facto, render Taiwan automatically a part of the State of China. Rather, it is more a political statement than a binding legal principle.

The Issue of Claiming Statehood by Taiwan

In this section, we will deal with the second issue concerning Taiwan's statehood. Many international lawyers maintain that Taiwan should not be regarded as a state because the Government of Taiwan has not claimed separate statehood for Taiwan as distinct from that of China.³⁰ This question seems to arise from a premise that establishment of sovereignty requires the presence of an *animus* (intention) to that effect.

Even if we accept that the "One China" policy does not preclude Taiwan's government from asserting a separate statehood for Taiwan, however, it does

not follow logically that Taiwan is an independent state. On the one hand, an entity which is not a state does not become a state by reason of being coerced not to claim its independence. On the other, the fact that Taiwan's government no longer claims to represent the State of China is not the same thing as its claiming to represent another State of Taiwan. In other words, it is one thing to say what you are not, yet another to say what you are.

The question, then, is how can we tell that the Government of Taiwan does or does not claim independent statehood for Taiwan? Many refer to two ways to tell the intention of the Government of Taiwan: either the commission of acts, such as the utterance of the "One China" policy or the omission of acts, such as lack of a formal declaration of independence. As discussed above, the "One China" policy does not necessarily negate the possibility of a separate statehood for Taiwan. However, the obstacle seems to remain in the absence of an express (or overt) declaration of independence. Is the absence of a formal declaration of independence, ipso facto, tantamount to absence of an animus claiming separate sovereignty for Taiwan? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of such declaration of independence and its relation to the entity concerned.

The Nature and Importance of Declarations of Independence

Generally speaking, the best evidence in proving whether an entity asserts an independent statehood for the territories concerned is a declaration of independence issued by the entity that seeks the intended status. As a matter of practice, in normal circumstances, the emergence of a newly independent state can be vividly evidenced by such declaration of independence by the authority in effective control of that territory. The declaration of independence is a sufficient proof of the entity concerned to assert a sovereign statehood and an invitation to the other states for recognition.

Even though a declaration of independence can be conclusive evidence proving the intention of the entity concerned, we should not assume that a declaration of independence is a *conditio sin qua non* to the attainment of statehood. First and foremost, as far as the criteria of statehood are concerned, the requirement of "self-recognition" (or claiming statehood) is not one of the criteria of statehood in the light of traditional international law.³¹ Furthermore, a declaration of independence can only be considered as a claim to personality and a request for recognition.³² We can see no reason why we should not regard a declaration of independence as merely evidence of the intention of the acting authority of the entity concerned.

Furthermore, the formats or modes of declarations of independence do vary from one to another in practice. The critical point is: Is there ample evidence that could prove the entity in dispute does regard itself as a full sovereign state in international law and does not recognize the existence of any other higher authority, either as regards its internal affairs or external affairs? Whether there exists an express declaration of independence is not necessarily determinative. In other words, although a declaration of independence is the most vivid and

sufficient evidence to prove an entity claiming independent statehood, it does not need to be “the only mode of claiming.” If an entity concerned has solicited foreign recognitions of its separate existence as an entity having full and complete independent international legal personality, and recognizes no other higher authority, either in relation to internal affairs or external affairs of the entity concerned, it can be argued with confidence that the entity concerned “does claim” a separate sovereignty for the territory currently under its effective control.

The Assertion of Independent Statehood for Taiwan

If we can accept the above argument, then the problem is how we can determine whether or not the Government of Taiwan has the intention to claim and “does claim” separate statehood for Taiwan? It would be a matter of appreciation of all the evidences before us. Then the question is: what is the evidence, other than a formal declaration of independence that can prove the Government of Taiwan has already claimed separate statehood for Taiwan?

In the first place, acts speak louder than words. The acts and deeds of the Government of Taiwan point to the conclusion that the Government of Taiwan has been claiming an independent statehood for Taiwan. Although the Government of Taiwan (or “the ROC Government on Taiwan” as it prefers to be referred to) no longer claims to be the Government of China, it continues to appeal to the other states to treat it as the government of an independent sovereign state. Since the so-called ROC government no longer claims to be the Government of China, then what is the state that the ROC Government claims to represent in the international arena? The answer to this question should be that the ROC Government on Taiwan does claim to be the government of “the State of Taiwan,” bearing the official title of “the Republic of China.”

Second, the Government of Taiwan has been soliciting foreign recognition and warmly welcomes the establishment of “diplomatic” relations with other states. In doing this, particularly after 1988, it has not asked them to sever their formal diplomatic relations with the PRC government. On the contrary, it has always been the PRC government that insists on severing diplomatic relations with those states that have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. From the perspective of Taiwan, the Government of Taiwan does maintain and accept that there are two separate states across the Taiwan Strait.

Third, since 1993, the Government of Taiwan has been seeking, though cautiously and indirectly, membership of the United Nations. It is worth noting that the Government of Taiwan, unlike the PRC before it was admitted to the United Nations, does not try to exclude the PRC from the United Nations. Instead, the Government of Taiwan has been seeking a UN membership separate from that of China. Since only states are qualified to apply for the UN membership,³³ such activities initiated by the Government of Taiwan amount to, at the minimum, an “implicit claim” of independent statehood for Taiwan.

Fourth, on numerous occasions, the Government of Taiwan has unequivocally claimed *Taiwan* is a sovereign independent state. Particularly after the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan’s assertion of its separate statehood has become

even clearer. For example, in a telecast speech to the annual meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations held in Tokyo on August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian unequivocally stated, “Taiwan can never be another Hong Kong or Macau, *because Taiwan has always been a sovereign state*. In short, Taiwan and China standing on opposite sides of the Strait, *there is one country on each side*. This should be clear.” (*Emphasis added*)³⁴ The claim of “one country on each side” is a concept connoting that both the ROC and the PRC are two separate states. They are not two separate governments within the same State of China. In 2006, during a teleconference, President Chen again unequivocally announced:

Taiwan is a sovereign country; its 23 million people most certainly are peace-loving; and its government is both willing and able to fulfill all of its obligations under the U.N. Charter. Hence, Taiwan should not be kept outside the United Nations’ door. Applying for UN membership under the name “Taiwan” represents the best option for the 23 million people of Taiwan to participate in the international community.³⁵ (*Emphasis added*)

Finally, Taiwan’s assertion and aspiration for independent statehood separate from that of China have also been clearly perceived by China and caused many adverse actions from China. On various occasions, China blames Taiwan for advocating “One China, One Taiwan” and “Two Chinas” in the international arena. China’s perception is clearly revealed in its 1993 White Paper that states:

The “Taiwan independence” fallacy has a complex social-historical root and international background. But the Taiwan government has, in effect, abetted this fallacy by its own policy of rejecting peace negotiations, restricting interchanges across the Straits, and lobbying for “dual recognition” or “two Chinas” in international arena.³⁶

As indicated in the said White Paper, China is perfectly aware of the clear intention of Taiwan’s government to pursue independent statehood separate from that of China.

One may argue that the above evidence can only be, at the best, regarded as circumstantial evidence. However, taking into account the repeated military threats by China and the political pressure exerted by the United States against Taiwan, we may reasonably conclude that such ambiguous statements may have been the best that the Government of Taiwan can do in asserting its own independent statehood. It is understandable that the Government of Taiwan has approached this issue with great caution.

Furthermore, this chapter would argue both the international law system and the interests in the maintenance of international peace and security would be better served if we acknowledge the independent statehood of Taiwan. Beyond any doubt, Taiwan has remained independent from the PRC-represented China for nearly six decades; it is a long-term historical fact. In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure for averting military conflicts, claiming independent statehood without a formal declaration of independence is legally tenable for that

purpose. As such, it seems that we may very well treat the acts and deeds of the Government of Taiwan as constituting a “quasi-declaration of independence.” Such an arrangement does not conflict with any established rules of international law and the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Moreover, by recognizing the independent statehood (or personality) of Taiwan, we may further refer to the relevant rules of international law to deter China from waging a war against Taiwan.³⁷

It is more realistic to regard the deeds and conduct of the Government of Taiwan as constituting assertion of independent statehood and an invitation for recognition since the instance of Taiwan has special features. If this argument is acceptable, then we can conclude that the Government of Taiwan “does claim” separate Statehood for Taiwan despite the absence of an express declaration of independence.

Recognition and Criteria of States in the Case of Taiwan

If the conduct and deeds of the Government of Taiwan can be construed as constituting a quasi-declaration of independence, then the next question is whether Taiwan is able to fulfill the criteria of statehood. In other words, if Taiwan does not fulfill the traditional criteria of statehood, then whether or not its authority “claims” statehood for it is irrelevant. An entity that is not a state does not become a state by merely “claiming” to be a state. In this section, we will further examine the issues of recognition and criteria of statehood in the case of Taiwan.

Theories of Recognition of States under Traditional International Law and Its Application to the Case of Taiwan

Many scholars and standard textbooks provide extensive discussions on theories of recognition. Two theories, the “Declaratory Theory of Recognition” and the “Constitutive Theory of Recognition,” have special prominence in the literature. The Constitutive Theory argues that international personality is created, not by fact, but through recognition by other existing states. In the words of Professor Oppenheim, “A State is, and becomes, an International Person through recognition only and exclusively.”³⁸ The Declaratory Theory argues that the legal personality of the entity in dispute has been conferred previously by operation of law.³⁹ The recognizing states merely confirm or acknowledge the previously existing facts.

The Constitutive Theory has been criticized for its violation of the principle of sovereign equality, for its logical inconsistency in the case of “partial” recognition by some states, and for its susceptibility to political manipulation.⁴⁰ In terms of legal obligations, international practice does not seem to follow the Constitutive Theory. Existing states do treat unrecognized entities as having obligations, an indicator of legal personality, under international law. For example, the United Kingdom once demanded compensation from Taiwan, whose governing authorities was not recognized by it, for damage and injuries done by Taiwanese forces to British vessels and nationals in the early 1950s. In at least two instances, the Taiwan authorities did pay compensation and the United Kingdom accepted them.⁴¹

Not surprisingly, the prevailing view among the contemporary international law scholars supports the Declaratory Theory. Also, State practice supports the declaratory theory.⁴² Article 3 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States also provides “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.”⁴³ At the very least, state practice over the last century does point to the declaratory approach as the better of the two theories.⁴⁴ According to the Declaratory Theory, “recognition does not create the state. It only confirms that an entity has reached statehood.”⁴⁵ In evaluating a certain entity which claims to be a state, the recognition of foreign states can only be of evidential value, but it is not conclusive. Recognition has little evidential value if the granting or withholding of recognition by other states is not based on the assessment of the government’s control on the said territory.⁴⁶ If the claiming entity satisfies the criteria as to statehood under international law objectively, the entity is entitled to be treated as a state regardless of whether it is totally or partially unrecognized. As Professor Henkin aptly elaborates:

Recognition is still in the language of diplomats but it does not belong in the language of law. An action or statement by other States “recognizing” the existence of a State may help signal and proclaim that a new State has in fact come into being, but the act of recognition has no legal effect. An entity that is in fact a State is a State. It has the status and capacities, the duties and rights of a State. It has to behave like a State, and has to be treated like a State.⁴⁷

Then what is the significance of the prevalence of Declaratory Theory in connection to Taiwan? As we all know, less than 30 States unequivocally and officially recognize Taiwan as a State. However, basing on the logical inference from the Declaratory Theory, even if an entity, although meeting the criteria for statehood that is totally unrecognized, the absence of state recognition would not negate its statehood in terms of international law.⁴⁸ In other words, nonrecognition of other States does not ipso facto prevent an entity in dispute from becoming a State, provided that it meets all the criteria of statehood under international law. If Taiwan meets all the criteria as to statehood under international law, then the statehood of Taiwan should not be questioned simply because of its lack of recognition. Accordingly, it is important for us to examine whether Taiwan meets all the criteria of statehood as set by international law.

The Statehood of Taiwan Measured against the Objective Criteria under the International Law

In the first place, the question is what is a “State” under international law? The most widely accepted criteria of statehood in international law are set by Article I of “1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States.” It provides that

Article 1. The [S]tate as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.⁴⁹

Despite various criticisms, it is generally accepted that the essential characteristics of a State are well settled in this Article. As a consequence, it is essential to examine whether Taiwan meets the above-mentioned criteria regarding statehood.

A Permanent Population

According to Professor Oppenheim, a permanent population means “an aggregate of individuals of both sexes who live together as a community despite of the fact that they may belong to different races or creeds, or be of different colors.”⁵⁰ However, there is no minimum population necessary for a State to exist.⁵¹ UN member states include several with fewer than 100,000 people. For example, Nauru has a population of only 10,000 or so. The United Nations has never rejected a state for membership on the basis of having too small a population.⁵² It seems that the international community is very flexible toward the requirement of a permanent population. As long as there is a population in the entity, an entity would, in principle, automatically fulfill the requirement of a permanent population in connection with the criteria of statehood. As of August 2006, Taiwan had a population around 22,832,000, which is greater than that of two-thirds of the UN member states.⁵³ There is no doubt that Taiwan can fulfill the condition as to a permanent population in respect to the traditional criteria of statehood.

A Defined Territory

States are territorial entities, and a State must have a territory.⁵⁴ Since many States have long-standing disputes with their neighbors, absolute certainty about a State's frontiers is not required.⁵⁵ Moreover, it does not matter whether the territory is small or large. No rule prescribes a minimum.⁵⁶ Monaco, for example, is only 1.5 square kilometers in size. Tiny as it may be, it is still recognized as a State.⁵⁷

The total area of Taiwan, including the Pescadores but excluding Kinmen and Matsu islets, is about 36,006 square kilometers.⁵⁸ It is about one-eighth the size of the United Kingdom and about the same size as the Netherlands. As an island, Taiwan has a clearly defined territory.

A Stable and Effective Government

By and large, a State in international law only exists if its government is sufficiently effective; a State lacking effective government would not be able to guarantee the observance of its international duties.⁵⁹ At the present time, it is generally accepted that a State need not have any particular form of government, but there must be some authority exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in international relations.⁶⁰ In the eyes of international law, a government must meet the following conditions: (a) effectiveness—the authority must be in actual control of the population and the territory, or at least a substantial part of these two elements,⁶¹ (b) stability—the authority must have a reasonable chance of remaining in power, and (c) independence⁶²—the authority must be separate from other governments and subordinate only to international law.⁶³ Whether a government of a putative State meets these criteria is a matter of evidence; it should be determined by the facts pertaining to the specific case. The

question then arises as to what sort of evidence should be taken into account. According to Professor Brownlie, “the existence of effective government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs, is the best evidence of a stable political community.”⁶⁴

Examining the present situations in Taiwan with these guidelines, there is no doubt that the Taiwan government is effective and stable. First of all, the Government of Taiwan consists of an executive, legislative, and judicial branch as its principal organs. The executive branch is headed by a democratically elected president and a premier appointed by the president, although the LY has been elected on a regular basis since 1992. The Taiwan government clearly and effectively through democratic processes governs its territory and people.

In addition to its internal effective control and its democratic legitimacy, the Government of Taiwan defeated China’s military invasion in 1954 and 1958 respectively. Despite continued military threats from China, Taiwan continues to survive in the international community. In other words, the Government of Taiwan has a reasonable chance of remaining in power despite the persistent threat from the PRC. Judging from the foregoing facts, it is undisputable that the Government of Taiwan is stable and effective, and consequently meets this criterion of statehood as required by international law.

The Ability to Enter into Relations with Other States

It is asserted that an entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other States, as well as the political, technical, and financial capacities to do so.⁶⁵ Although recognition is not a condition for statehood in international law, the capacity to enter into relations with other States is dependent upon the reciprocal willingness of each State to have dealings with the others. Therefore, we have to examine whether or not Taiwan has the capacity to enter into relations with other States. Furthermore, it is also necessary to examine if any State recognizes Taiwan as a State distinct from the State of China, due to Taiwan’s peculiar historical situations.

(i) *Foreign Relations of Taiwan* As of June 2007, Taiwan maintains full diplomatic relations with the Holy See and 23 member states of the United Nations. Taiwan has set up more than 120 embassies, consulate generals, representative offices or other offices in various names around the world.⁶⁶ Many of those States that recognize the PRC also continue to have semiofficial or “unofficial” relations with Taiwan. Such relations facilitate bilateral cooperation in trade, culture, technology, and environmental protection. To a certain extent, Taiwan’s dearth in formal relations with other States is compensated by its “substantive” relations with over 140 States.⁶⁷ In addition, at the end of 2006, Taiwan maintains formal relations with 22 intergovernmental organizations (IGO) (see annex table A4.1).⁶⁸ Though Taiwan often participates in those IGOs as non-State entity, its membership nevertheless suggests Taiwan is capable of entering into relations with other States and does enjoy a legal personality of its own, distinct from that of China that always objects to Taiwan’s participation in any IGO.

Moreover, through its full membership, Taiwan plays an active role in several international organizations including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the ADB, and APEC.⁶⁹ These memberships unequivocally prove that Taiwan has the capacity to enter into substantial relations with the other States.

(ii) *Are there any members of the international community recognizing Taiwan as a State distinct from the State of China?* As stated above, more than 20 States maintain “diplomatic relations” with the Government of Taiwan. It is well established that establishment of diplomatic relations means recognition of the counterpart as a full sovereign State.⁷⁰ It is legally unimaginable to establish “diplomatic relations” with a non-State entity or a local *de facto* government of an existing State.⁷¹

One may argue that these States recognize only “the ROC,” rather than “Taiwan,” as an independent State. In other words, they simply recognize the Government of “the Republic of China” as the Government of the State of China.

First of all, as indicated earlier, the Government of Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole legitimate government of the State of China, despite the Government of Taiwan continuing to use the name of “the ROC.” As Professor O’Connell pointed out, “a government is only recognized for what it claims to be.”⁷² By the same token, a government cannot be recognized for what it does not claim to be. Hence, how can those States having diplomatic relations with Taiwan legally recognize the Government of Taiwan as the government of the State of China if Taiwan government no longer claims to represent China?

Second, except the Holy See, the other 23 States having diplomatic relations with “the ROC” are all members of the United Nations.⁷³ These States have long recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China and do not object, explicitly or implicitly, to its existence. Under such circumstances, it would be very hard to argue that those States with diplomatic relations with “the ROC (Taiwan)” still regard the ROC government as the legitimate government of China.

Furthermore, certain States had recognized the PRC as a State and had established diplomatic relations with it before they formally established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It would be unreasonable to regard the subsequent severance of their diplomatic ties with the PRC as tantamount to derecognition of the PRC as a State and the PRC government as the legitimate government of the State of China. For these States, the fact that they no longer have diplomatic relations with the PRC is a result of the PRC refusal to maintain diplomatic relations with them, rather than their unwillingness to recognize both the PRC (China) and ROC (Taiwan).

If we can accept the above reasoning, then it follows logically that those States having diplomatic relations with Taiwan do not regard the ROC Government as the government of the State of China. Besides, they do recognize the Government of Taiwan as a government of a State, whatever the state title might be, as distinct from the State of China.

Although most States which recognize “the ROC” (Taiwan) are small in international arena, they are nevertheless “States” under international law. As long as they are States, they are entitled to be treated equally in international law, regardless of their sizes and strength. Under the principle of sovereign equality as enshrined in the UN Charter,⁷⁴ their recognition is as significant as those of big players of international politics despite their small size. Legally, it is unsound to assert that Taiwan cannot meet the criterion with respect to the capacity of entering into formal foreign relations with the existing members of international community on the grounds that the recognizing States are small players in international politics.⁷⁵

Indeed, lack of formal relations with the majority of the international community does leave Taiwan in a disadvantaged situation. However, it appears that political considerations, rather than legal barriers, prevent other States from entering into formal relations with Taiwan. It is lack of political willingness on the part of other States, not a lack of legal capacity on the part of Taiwan, that handicaps Taiwan’s international participation.

Conclusion

That only 20-some States formally recognize “the ROC” (Taiwan) as an independent State distinct from the State of China does cause many commentators to question the statehood of Taiwan. It is, nevertheless, well established that the act of recognition is of highly political nature and at the discretion of the recognizing States.⁷⁶ In other words, it is *political*, rather than *legal*, considerations that hinder the majority of other States from granting recognition to Taiwan. As Taiwan’s membership in many IGOs suggests, other States are willing to recognize Taiwan’s distinct legal personality out of their own interests, despite the PRC’s opposition. The non- or underrecognition of Taiwan is mostly a political decision, rather than a legal impossibility.

Another obstacle to an independent Taiwan lies in the absence of an unequivocal declaration of independence. However, as indicated earlier, the deeds and conduct of the Government of Taiwan are tantamount to a quasi-declaration of independence. Although unprecedented in international practice, treating the deeds and conduct of Taiwan as constituting a quasi-declaration of independence neither conflicts with any established rules of international law nor infringes the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Indeed, there are strong reasons to approach the issue of Taiwan’s statehood with a more flexible attitude, taking into account the fact that Taiwan has been under the constant threat or use of force by China.

Furthermore, apart from the neutral application of legal rules, it is also in the interests of the international community to regard Taiwan as a State. From a policy-oriented viewpoint, not regarding Taiwan as a State only leaves its legal status in an unsettled and unstable situation. Such a situation runs the risk of breeding future disputes. It is a great disservice to the common interests in international peace and security since it leaves open the possible Chinese use of force against Taiwan based on its claimed sovereignty over the island. On the contrary,

if we regard Taiwan as an independent State, we could erect a legal barrier to prevent China from solving the Taiwan issue by nonpeaceful means. This is certainly conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security. As a matter of international law, the most significant legal implication arising from regarding Taiwan as an independent State would be that China would be under an obligation not to try to “reunify” with Taiwan by nonpeaceful means. On the other hand, recognizing Taiwan as an independent State does not necessarily preclude the possibility of eventual unification of two independent States. As long as unification of two independent States is through peaceful means, the international community as a whole is in a position to recognize the legitimacy of such unification. Recognition of the independent Statehood of Taiwan only renders unification through nonpeaceful means illegal, but does not make unification impossible.

On the basis of the above arguments, the conclusion must be that Taiwan, though keeping the name of the ROC, meets all criteria pertaining to Statehood. It is legally tenable to regard Taiwan as a sovereign State in the light of international law as examined against current developments both internationally and domestically.

Annex Table A4.1 Taiwan’s Membership in Intergovernmental Organizations

<i>Official Name</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Year of Entry</i>
World Trade Organization	WTO	01/01/2002
Advisory Centre on WTO Law	ACWL	03/08/2004
World Customs Organization (Technical Committee on Rules of Origin)	WCO	Jan./2002
World Customs Organization (Technical Committee Customs Valuation)	WCO	Jan./2002
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	APEC	1991
Asian Development Bank	ADB	08/22/1966
South East Asian Central Banks	SEACEN	01/24/1992
Central American Bank for Economic Integration	SEACEN	01/24/1992
Study Group on Asian Tax Administration and Research	SGATAR	Feb./1996
Interim Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-Like Species in the North Pacific Ocean	ISC	01/30/2002
Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna	CCSBT	2002
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission	WCPFC	12/02/2004
Office International des Epizooties (World Organization for Animal Health)	OIE	10/01/1954

Continued

Annex Table A4.1 Continued

Official Name	Abbreviation	Year of Entry
International Seed Testing Association	ISTA	1962
International Cotton Advisory Committee	ICAC	1963
Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization	AARDO	1968
Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region	FFTC/ASPAC	04/04/1970
Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center	AVRDC	05/22/1971
Asia-Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions	APAARI	04/07/1999
Asian Productivity Organization	APO	05/11/1961
Association for Science Cooperation in Asia	ASCA	1994
International Satellite System for Search and Rescue	Cospas-Sarsat	06/04/1992

Note: www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=13296&CtNode=847&mp=1 (last visited December 15, 2006).

Notes

1. Unless otherwise indicated, the term “Taiwan” used in this chapter includes Taiwan proper (the Formosa), Penghu (the Pescadores), and other islets of the Taiwan archipelagic system. For a more specific definition, please refer to Article II of 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty of Peace between China and Japan. However, the legal status of both Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu will not be discussed in this chapter, though both islets have been under the effective control of Taiwanese government since 1949.
2. For example, James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 219. (“The conclusion must be that Taiwan is not a State because it still has not unequivocally asserted its separation from China and is not recognized as a State distinct from China. Its origins as a consolidated local de facto government in a civil war situation continue to affect it.”)
3. Ralph N. Clough, “Taiwan’s International Status,” *Chinese Yearbook of International Law & Affairs*, vol. 1 (1981), pp. 18–22.
4. Leland M. Goodrich, *The United Nations* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), p. 101; Lung-chu Chen, *Taiwan Independence and Its Realization* (Taipei: Yueh-Tan, 1993), pp. 83–94 (in Chinese).
5. UNGA Resolution 2758 (XXVI), reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, vol. 11 (1972), p. 561; Dusan J. Djohovich, ed., *United Nations Resolutions, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly: 1970–1971*, vol. 13 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1976), p. 358.
6. For example, Stanley K. Hornbeck, “Comment to Arthur H. Dean, International Law and Current Problems in the Far East,” *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, vol. 49 (1955), p. 100. (“Thus there are today, in China, two governments, each controlling some territory of the whole of that country. The question, then, before the world, before those who concern themselves with questions of law and policy, is not that of China’s status, but is that of choice or choosing between two competing governments.”)

7. As late as 2006, certain commentators still believed that the ruling government on Taiwan claims to be the sole legitimate government of the State of China. See Anthony Aust, *Handbook of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 19.
8. Record of Conversation between Ambassador Koo and Dulles Concerning the Japanese Peace Treaty (October, 20, 1951), in *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*, ed. Hungdah Chiu (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 236–237.
9. Exchange of Notes, No. 1 from the Japanese Plenipotentiary to the Chinese Plenipotentiary (April, 28, 1952), Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Issue*, reprint (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 225.
10. *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 248 (1956), p. 213.
11. However, the US Congress, in January 1955, passed a joint resolution that authorized the US president to “Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That Area.” As a result, Kinmen and Matsu were effectively covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty. “The US Congress Formosa Resolution” (January 29, 1955) (Joint Resolution No. 159, approved by the House on January 25, 1955 and by the Senate on January 28, 1955), available at www.cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2016.htm (last visited, May 30, 2007).
12. In 1971, before the ROC delegation was expelled from the United Nations, the then US Ambassador George Bush introduced a draft resolution to the General Assembly to the effect that the PRC should be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council and ROC be a member of the General Assembly. U.N.G.A. A/L. 635 of September 29, 1971, in *International Legal Materials* 10 (1971), p. 1102; “Letter dated August 17, 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” *International Legal Materials*, vol. 10 (1971), p. 1100. The Government of Taiwan did not officially object to such proposal.
13. Peter K. H. Yu, “On Taipei’s Rejoining the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Subsequent to Beijing’s Entry: One Country, Two Seats?” *Asian Affairs*, vol. 7 (Spring 1990), p. 7; Tzu-wen Lee, *A Research Concerning the Accession to International Conventions and Agreements by Our Country* (Taipei: MOFA, 1990), pp. 72, 74 (in Chinese).
14. For example, the 1970 Joint Communiqué between China and Canada provides that “The Canadian Government recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.” However, Canada insisted that it could only “take note” of the Chinese position on Taiwan’s being a part of China. Department of News and Culture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan), compl., *Complication of Joint Communiqués of Chinese Communist and Members of International Community* (Taipei: MOFA, 1999), p. 106.
15. It is noticeable that, during the 1970s and 1980s, Taiwan’s foreign practice was somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, the ROC government seemed not to claim to represent China when it came to establish diplomatic relations with other States. On the other, the ROC government still cut its diplomatic ties with other States for their recognition of the PRC. For details, see Bruce Jacobs, “‘One China,’ Diplomatic Isolation and a Separate Taiwan,” in *China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace*, ed. Edward Friedman (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 88–98.

16. For a full text of the joint communiqué, see Hungdah Chiu, Rong-jye Chen, and Tzu-wen Lee, eds., "Contemporary Practice and Judicial Decisions of the Republic of China Relating to International Law, 1981–1983," *Chinese Yearbook of International Law & Affairs*, vol. 2 (1982), pp. 228, 269–270.
17. "Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan, Taiwan," *Relations across the Taiwan Straits* (Taipei: MAC, 1994), p. 10. This position was also expressly confirmed by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while commenting on Taiwan's efforts in applying for the UN membership. See *Central Daily News*, International Edition, July 17, 1994, p. 1 (in Chinese).
18. In 1951, all members of the LY were due for reelection in accordance with the 1947 constitution. Nevertheless the LY adopted a resolution that extended the members' term for another year. Two similar resolutions were passed in the following two years. In 1954, the Council of Grand Justices, the equivalent of constitutional court, issued Interpretation No. 31, which allowed all members of both the LY and Control Yuan (CY) elected in 1948 to remain in office indefinitely. The delegates to the National Assembly simply stayed in office without reelection by their resolution. Hungdah Chiu, *Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Maryland: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1993), pp. 19–22.
19. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 (June 21, 1990), available at www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=261 (last visited, May 29, 2007).
20. Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (May 1, 1991), in Government Information Office, *1994 Yearbook of the Republic of China* (Taipei: GIO, 1994), pp. 103, 109, 705.
21. A new Additional Article enacted in 1992 changed the organization of the CY. Since then, the members of CY have been appointed by the president with confirmation of the National Assembly. The 2000 Additional Articles to the Constitution moved the confirmation power from the National Assembly to the LY.
22. Additional Article 10 to the Constitution, May 1, 1991; renumbered to be Additional Article 11 (1994, last amended 2005).
23. Lee Teng-hui, "Responses to Questions Submitted by Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany)," July 9, 1999. The official English translation of the full text could be found at www.taiwansecurity.org/TS/SS-990709-Deutsche-Welle-Interview.htm (last visited, May 25, 2007).
24. www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4?Rid=7264 (last visited, December 15, 2006).
25. "President Chen's Concluding Remarks at the National Security Council" (February 27, 2006), www.president.gov.tw/en/ (last visited December 15, 2006).
26. "Taiwan and China: End of a Fiction," *The Economist* (November 27, 1993), p. 80. Mr. Chiang stated on behalf of Taiwan's government in parts:

"2.... It is obvious that there are two Chinese political entities with sovereign status, not submitting to each other and both enjoying diplomatic relationships with a number of countries coexist in the international arena. It is an undeniable fact that China has since 1949 split into two zones, namely the ROC and the PRC, both equally sovereign and not subordinating to each other....
 "5.... the current ROC government policy may be construed as an 'Interim Two China Policy' leading to 'One China' in the future." (Emphasis added)

Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, "Bilingual Facsimile Copy of the Speech of Minister Chiang in Seattle APEC Summit" (Taipei: MOFA, 1993), pp. 5–6.

27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan (Department of Information and Cultural Affairs), *Press Release*, vol. 250 (November 22, 1993), pp. 1–2.
28. Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) merged on May 22, 1990 to form a unified Republic of Yemen. Both sides, before the unification, had claimed that the two Yemens were parts of *Yemeni Homeland*. See Article 1 of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Republic of Yemen, which provides, *inter alia*, that

On the 26th of May 1990 . . . , there shall be established between the State of the Yemen Arab Republic and the State of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (*both parts of the Yemeni Homeland*) a full and complete union . . ." (Emphasis added)

Reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, vol. 30 (1991), pp. 820, 822.
29. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). See also "Fisheries Jurisdiction Case" [Jurisdiction] (*UK v. Iceland*) (Judgment of February 2, 1973), *International Court of Justice Reports* (para. 24) (Hague: I.C.J., 1973), pp. 3, 14.
30. This view has been put forth as early as 1956, see D. P. O'Connell, "The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem," *American Journal of International Law* 50 (1956), pp. 405–416 ("a Government is only recognizes for it claims to be." (Since the ROC on Taiwan insists on the principle of "One China," therefore Taiwan can only be regarded as part of the State of China.) For similar views, see, Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, eds., *International Law*, 3rd ed. (New York: Aspen, 1999), p. 477; James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 151; 2nd ed. (2006), p. 219 ("Taiwan is not a State because it still has not unequivocally asserted its separation from China.") (Emphasis added); Malcolm Shaw, *International Law*, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Grotius, 2003), p. 211; American Law Institute, *Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States* (Washington, DC: American Law Institute, 1987), section 201, n. 8 ("since the authorities on Taiwan do not claim that Taiwan is a state of which they are the government, the issue of its statehood has not arisen").
31. American Law Institute, *Restatement*, n. 8; Virginia K. Demarchi, "United States-Taiwan Relations," *Harvard International Law Journal*, vol. 33 (1992), p. 640, n. 47.
32. Vesa Golland-Debbas, "Collective Responses to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine: An Application of the Legitimizing Function of the United Nations," *British Yearbook International Law*, vol. 61 (1991), pp. 138–139; D. J. Devine, "The Status of Southern Rhodesia in International Law: Part I," *Acta Juridica* (1973), p. 68 (contending that a declaration of independence is "merely the making of a claim to new territorial status and new representative capacity in international law").
33. Article 4 of the UN Charter: "1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations" (Emphasis added).
34. "President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations via Live Video Link," August 3, 2002, www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105496660 (last visited, May 25, 2007).

35. "President Chen Speaks for Taiwan's Bid to the UN," in www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/document_content.php?id=1105499239&pre_id=1105496762&g_category_number=145&category_number_2=145&layer=&sub_category= (last visited, October 31, 2006).
36. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed., *The International Legal Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations* (London: Kluwer, 1996), p. 275.
37. As rightly pointed out by two international law scholars that "in the absence of an armed attack on China, its [Taiwan's] rights under Article 51 would not be triggered. Consequently, the current international status of Taiwan, the right of Taiwanese self-determination, and Taiwan's right of self-defense would appear to make a PRC-imitated attack on Taiwan based merely upon a Taiwanese declaration of independence a violation of international law 'inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'" See Jonathan I. Charney and J. R. Prescott, "Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between China and Taiwan," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 94 (2000), pp. 453, 477.
38. Lassa Oppenheim, *Oppenheim's International Law: Peace*, vol. 1, 8th ed., ed. H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, 1955), p. 125.
39. Ian Brownlie, *Principle of Public International Law*, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 86–87; Martin Dixon, *Textbook on International Law*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 119.
40. For example, the recognition of former Yugoslav Republics indicates that state recognition was clearly used as a political tool, by both the United Nations and the members of the European Community. See Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 86 (1992), pp. 569, 587.
41. Although regarding the de jure sovereignty of Taiwan undetermined, the United Kingdom, since 1949, has not recognized the nationalist authorities on Taiwan as the government, either de jure or de facto, of the ROC. The United Kingdom's claiming and accepting compensation from Taiwan authorities indicated that the United Kingdom regarded Taiwan having some sort of international personality of its own, without giving the latter any formal recognition of State. See Elihu Lauterpacht, ed., "The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law—Survey and Comment, IV," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 6 (1957), pp. 506, 507–508.
42. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, pp. 86–88; Hans Blix, "Contemporary Aspects of Recognition," *Recueil Des Cours*, vol. 130 (1971–II), pp. 587, 609–610; John Dugard, *Recognition and the United Nations* (Cambridge, UK: Grotius, 1987), p. 9.
43. "The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States," reprinted in *American Journal of International Law: Supplement*, vol. 28 (1934), pp. 75, 76. See also "Resolution Concerning the Recognition of New States and New Governments," adopted at Brussels in 1936 by the Institut de Droit International. Article 1 of this resolution provides "Recognition has declaratory effect; the existence of a new State with all the judicial effects which are attached to that existence, is not affected by the refusal of recognition by one or more States." Reprinted in *American Journal of International Law: Supplement*, vol. 30 (1936), p. 185.
44. Malcolm N. Shaw, *International Law*, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 370; John Dugard, *Recognition*, p. 9.
45. Jochen Abr. Frowein, "Recognition," in *Encyclopaedia of Public International Law* 10, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987), pp. 340, 342.

46. Michael Akehurst, *A Modern Introduction to International Law*, 6th ed. (New York: Routledge, 1987), p. 61.
47. Louis Henkin, "International Law: Politics, Values and Functions," *Recueil des Cours* 216 (1989–IV), pp. 9, 31. It is interesting to note that Professor Henkin does not agree that Taiwan is an independent State because, in his view, Taiwan does not claim to be an independent State. However, Professor Henkin does agree that Taiwan can be a State if it declares independence and successfully secedes from China. *Ibid.* at pp. 31–32.
48. Shaw, *International Law*, p. 371. Crawford, *The Creation of States* (1979), p. 24; J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace*, 6th ed., ed. Sir Humphrey Waldock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 139.
49. "Convention on Rights and Duties of States," signed at Montevideo, December 26, 1933; reprinted in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 165 (1933), p. 19; *American Journal of International Law: Supplement*, vol. 28 (1934), p. 75. This Convention was adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States (including 15 Latin American States and the United States).
50. Oppenheim, *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 118.
51. D. J. Harris, *Cases and Materials on International Law*, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), p. 103; Crawford, *The Creation of States*, (1979), p. 40; Shaw, *International Law*, pp. 178–179.
52. Rosalyn Cohen, "The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, vol. 109 (1961), pp. 1127, 1133–1134.
53. www.info.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=17817&ctNode=1823 (last visited, October 25, 2006).
54. Crawford, *The Creation of States* (1979), p. 36; James Crawford, "The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon," *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 1 (1991), pp. 307, 309; Malcolm N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 146; R. Y. Jennings, *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963), p. 2.
55. Akehurst, *A Modern Introduction to International Law*, p. 53; Shaw, *International Law*, p. 179.
56. Oppenheim, *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 118.
57. Monaco was admitted to the United Nations as a member state in 1993.
58. www.info.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19860&ctNode=2836 (last visited, October 25, 2006).
59. Karl Doehring, "Effectiveness," in *Encyclopaedia of Public International Law* 7, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), pp. 70–71.
60. American Law Institute, section 201, Comment (d).
61. In the *Tinoco Concession Arbitration*, Arbitrator Taft pointed out: "The question is, has it really established itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government usually does, respected within its own jurisdiction?" in *International Law Reports*, vol. 2 (1923–1924), pp. 34, 37.
62. Professor Crawford elaborates on the notion of "independence": "Essentially that notion embodies two elements—the existence of an organized community on a particular territory, exclusively or substantially exercising self-governing power, and second, the absence of the exercise of another state, and of the right of another state to exercise, self-governing powers over the whole of that territory" Crawford, (1991), p. 309.

63. Siegfried Magiera, "Government," in *Encyclopaedia of Public International Law* 7, ed., Rudolf Bernhardt (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), p. 208.
64. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, p. 71.
65. American Law Institute, section 201, Comment (e); J. G. Starke, *Starke's International Law*, 11th ed., ed. I. A. Shearer (London, UK: Butterworth, 1994), p. 86. However, Professor James Crawford argues that such capacity "is not a criterion, but rather a consequence, of statehood..." Crawford, *The Creation of States*, (2006), p. 61.
66. www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/public/Data/6816973571.doc. (last visited, October 30, 2006).
67. Deon Geldenhuys, *Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 129.
68. www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=13296&CtNode=847&mp=1 (last visited, December 15, 2006). For a detailed list, see annex table A4.1
69. www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/public/Data/6816973571.doc (last visited, October 30, 2006).
70. Though establishment of diplomatic relations is distinguishable from recognition of States, the former is universally comprehended as implicit recognition of States, but not vice versa. A State can recognize another State without establishing diplomatic relations with it. See J. Mervy Jones, "The Retroactive Effect of the Recognition of States and Governments," *British Yearbook of International Law*, vol. 16 (1935), pp. 42, 53; Fred L. Morrison, "Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal," *University of Chicago Law Review*, vol. 34 (1967), pp. 857, 870; Hans Blix, "Contemporary Aspects of Recognition," *Recueil des Cours*, vol. 130 (1971-II), pp. 589, 600; D. P. O'Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970), pp. 154-155.
71. It is worth noting that the Republic of Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides) had expressly maintained dual recognition of both ROC and PRC as two separate sovereign States from 1992 to 2004. On March 26, 1982, Vanuatu recognized the PRC. On September 24, 1992, Vanuatu signed a communiqué, expressly recognizing the ROC as an independent State without establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In late 2004, Vanuatu once briefly switched its diplomatic ties from Beijing to Taiwan.
72. O'Connell, "The Status of Formosa," pp. 405, 415.
73. The Holy See has not yet applied for the UN membership. Out of the remaining 23 States, 13 established their diplomatic ties with ROC after 1971.
74. Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."
75. For a different view, see Crawford, *The Creation of States*, (2006), p. 219, n. 79 ("it is still the case that there is no general international recognition of Taiwan as a separate State").
76. See Dugard, *Recognition*, p. 9; Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, p. 89; O'Connell, *International Law*, p. 132; Branimir M. Jankovic, *Public International Law* (Leiden: Brill Academic, 1984), p. 100; Joseph Modeste Sweeney, Covey T. Oliver, and Noyes E. Leech, eds., *Cases and Materials on the International Legal System*, 3rd ed. (Westbury, NY: Foundation, 1988), p. 894; Colin Warbrick, "The New British Policy on Recognition of Governments," *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 30 (1980), pp. 569-570.

CHAPTER 5

THE STATEHOOD OF TAIWAN: A STRANGE CASE OF DOMESTIC STRENGTH AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE

Cal Clark

The issue of Taiwan's sovereignty and statehood is certainly paradoxical, to say the least. Domestically, the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan has a strong and successful state, and it exercises all facets of sovereignty. In the 1990s, it completed a model democratic transition; and earlier its state-led development strategy was widely termed an "economic miracle." Yet, there is limited official recognition of Taiwan's statehood and sovereignty internationally because of pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC), which claims that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

Taiwan's quest to preserve its statehood has followed two tracks. In terms of *de jure* recognition, it has competed vigorously but not very successfully to preserve or maintain official diplomatic recognition by other nations and to participate in international organizations, such as the United Nations and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Its more informal pursuit of *de facto* recognition through the "pragmatic diplomacy" of establishing and expanding informal and quasi-official relations with other nations and international organizations has been quite a bit more effective. In addition, foreign policy has been called a "two-level game" because external relations and domestic politics are very often inextricably intertwined.¹ In the case of Taiwan, the interactions between the domestic and international levels unfortunately appear to be challenging Taiwan's ability to preserve hard-won successes.

This chapter, therefore, examines the major issues related to the question of Taiwan's statehood and sovereignty. The first section on "Internal Strength" examines the record of Taiwan's government, which has exercised full sovereignty for the last half century. The second section on "External Challenge" then describes how, despite this record, Taiwan's statehood still remains problematic

because of China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Finally, the last substantive section on "Destabilizing Feedback" argues that current political conflict in Taiwan has become so divisive that it is undercutting the country's position to defend its international status.

Internal Strength

The founding of the current Taiwan government in the aftermath of World War II was beset with conflicts and ambiguities that created the current controversies over the country's statehood and sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite these problems, the state in postwar Taiwan has been quite effective. The first part of this section describes the beginnings of the Taiwanese state, and the second discusses its perhaps surprising successes in promoting economic development and political democratization.

The Controversial Founding of the Taiwanese State

The questions about Taiwan's international status arise from three distinct sets of factors. The first and most widely recognized is the somewhat ambiguous ending in 1949 of the civil war on the Chinese mainland between the victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong and the previous ruling Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek. When the CCP won the war on the Chinese mainland, Chiang and the KMT evacuated to Taiwan, retaining control over that island as well as some smaller ones in the Taiwan Strait, such as the Pescadores, Quemoy, and Matsu. Although it initially seemed that it would be only a matter of time before the communists could conquer these islands, the outbreak of the Korean War dramatically changed the situation as the United States extended its containment policy to Asia and brought Taiwan under its strategic umbrella, despite continued strained relations between Chiang and the Truman administration. For example, the US Seventh Fleet was interposed between Taiwan and China, which effectively ended the threat of a communist invasion. In the diplomatic realm, the United States strongly supported Chiang's claim to represent the sole legitimate government of all China by, for example, retaining China's membership in the United Nations (including a permanent seat on the Security Council) for the ROC. This created what Ralph Clough has called the "unfinished civil war" over diplomatic status between Beijing and Taipei.²

Second, questions about Taiwan's sovereignty are also deeply tied to the island's own historical development. Although the first people in Taiwan were aborigines, the island has primarily been settled by Han Chinese, primarily from Fujian Province. The initial Chinese settlement occurred in the late sixteenth century as the result of growing commerce along the Chinese coast. Short-lived Dutch and Spanish colonies were established during the first half of the seventeenth century, but control by China was reestablished during the latter half of that century. Taiwan remained a fairly isolated and undeveloped part of the Chinese Empire until the late nineteenth century when Beijing decided to

promote rapid development in the face of imperialist threats. However, Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895 when China lost the Sino-Japanese War and it remained one until after World War II.³

Taiwan's incorporation into Chiang Kai-shek's ROC after the defeat of Japan was far from felicitous and soon turned tragic. Chiang's government primarily saw Taiwan as a source of resources for pursuing its civil war against the CCP and imposed a corrupt, brutal, and exploitative rule. Furthermore, when the ROC government evacuated to Taiwan in 1949, the top levels of the government were dominated by mainlanders (i.e., 15% of the population who came from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek); and the KMT imposed a repressive regime under the martial law that was justified by the continuing civil war with the communists on the mainland. This created a bitter legacy of what came to be called the "white terror," most especially the tragedy of the February 28, 1947, or 2-2-8 Incident, in which a limited popular uprising brought a massive retaliation that resulted in an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 deaths, mostly by execution.

The ROC's claim to be the government of all China exacerbated this situation. In the political realm, this claim was used to prevent change in "national" political institutions that, along with martial law restrictions, perpetuated KMT rule. Moreover, education, language, and cultural policy emphasized the importance of China and the very secondary nature of Taiwan. Consequently, the KMT was seen by many Islanders (i.e., the huge majority of longtime residents) as treating the Taiwanese (who are also almost entirely Han Chinese) as "second class citizens" in their own land, creating another set of questions about Taiwan's sovereignty concerning the legitimacy of the ROC government and the national identity of Taiwan's citizens that could only bubble to the surface after democratization ended restrictions on freedom of speech.⁴

Third, the challenges to the sovereignty claims of the government of the ROC on Taiwan, from both the PRC and Taiwanese Nationalists, were exacerbated by legal ambiguities concerning Taiwan's status after World War II. The United States and Britain promised Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference in December 1943 that Taiwan would be returned to the ROC. However, the real legal basis for Taiwan's sovereignty remained somewhat undefined when Chiang's administration replaced the Japanese in the fall of 1945, especially because there was no actual peace treaty until 1952.⁵ Consequently, advocates of very contradictory interpretations of Taiwan's current sovereignty status can cite legal aspects concerning the ending of Japan's colonial regime.

Despite this problematic beginning, the government of the ROC in Taiwan very quickly manifested all the characteristics of statehood and sovereignty. The government controlled a definite territory (even if it was only a minuscule fraction of the whole of "China"); it governed this territory in the manner of a normal state; and it participated actively in international affairs, even holding one of the five permanent memberships on the United Nations' Security Council. Its legitimacy was challenged and denied by the PRC, but Taipei likewise denounced Beijing's claims to be the legitimate government of China.

The Success of the Taiwan State in Promoting Development

Despite its somewhat inauspicious beginning, the state in Taiwan soon proved to be quite successful, first in promoting economic development and second, after considerable delay, in negotiating a peaceful democratic transition. In particular, four periods of major structural transformation in the country can be discerned: (1) the 1950s—when the transformation away from an agricultural economy was consolidated, (2) the early 1960s to the mid-1970s—when the “export boom” revolutionized the economy and set off significant social changes as well, (3) the mid-1970s to the late 1980s—when substantial industrial upgrading occurred that was accompanied by the emergence of a middle-class society and significant political liberalization, and (4) the late 1980s and 1990s—when democratization and the “mainland revolution” in economic orientation raised new challenges for Taiwan.

These four transformations in Taiwan’s political economy followed a similar pattern or model. At each stage, significant economic, social, and political changes occurred, which resulted in the creation of new societal resources. In the next stage, these resources formed the basis for the upgrading of the island’s political economy. The observance of such a recurring pattern, however, should not be taken to mean that Taiwan has followed an explicit grand design since the early 1950s. Instead, Taiwan’s development appears to be much more open-ended, with the resources created at one stage permitting more sophisticated responses when subsequent economic challenges arose.

During the first stage in the 1950s, a dramatic land reform and a decade of import-substitution enhanced the ROC’s production capabilities in agriculture and light industry; mass education created human capital; and the government substantially increased its economic leadership capability by bringing skilled technocrats into the top levels of the regime. Despite the initial success of this transformation, import-substitution soon reached its inevitable high point with the saturation of the local market for light industrial goods, setting off a new challenge for the ROC.⁶ Given the determinative role of government policy in all these areas, Taiwan appeared to be creating a “developmental state” on the Japanese model.⁷

The resources accumulated during this first stage then formed the foundation for a new transformation to exporting light industrial products in the 1960s. The technocrats conceived and implemented the major policy changes that made this transformation possible, although its success rested on the human capital that had been developed in the work force and business community. This had the, perhaps, ironic consequence of undercutting the role of the developmental state in the overall economy by forcing Taiwan’s small businesses to become highly independent and entrepreneurial on their own in the face of stiff international competition. In ethnic terms, Islanders or native Taiwanese were the primary beneficiaries of this “economic miracle” because they dominated the small-business sector. Although the regime remained highly authoritarian, the Islanders gained very significant resources. Overall, the state guided this transformation, but the actual leading actors in Taiwan’s economy came from the private sector.⁸

Just as with import-substitution, the success of Taiwan's export-led strategy contained the "seeds of its own destruction" in the sense that the island's rising prosperity and wages began to price it out of the niche of low-cost manufactured products in the world economy. Economically, Taiwan responded to this new challenge with two somewhat disparate transformations. First, there was a state-led push into heavy industry (e.g., steel and petrochemicals); and, second, the small-scale business sector began to upgrade its production.⁹ Considerable change occurred in the political and social realms as well with the development of a strong middle class,¹⁰ and with a growing push for political reform from an emerging opposition movement and from "electoral politicians" within the KMT. All these trends represented an upgrading of Taiwan's economic and political capabilities. Thus, despite a partial reemergence of the ROC's developmental state, there was definitely a growing balance of power and of resources between the state and the society.

The final structural transformation commenced in the late 1980s and, similar to the preceding ones, was based upon the resource capabilities that had been built up during the earlier stages. Economically, Taiwan emerged as a major player in the global high-tech industry (e.g., ranking third in world semiconductor production as the new millennium opened) and, correspondingly, saw a massive movement to offshore production in its traditional labor-intensive industries, primarily to the PRC.¹¹ Unlike earlier eras, economic change was probably dwarfed by the transformation of the polity, as the ROC went through a very successful democratic transition.¹²

Perhaps because this final structural transformation is not yet complete, it appears more problematic than the first three in that increases in some capabilities (i.e., high-tech industry, integration into international production networks, and democratic politics) are offset by decreasing capabilities in other areas (i.e., growing economic dependence on the rival PRC externally and political corruption and gridlock domestically). In structural terms, the political economy is marked by a "growing interdependence of state and society" that has both positive (the development of the high-tech fields) and negative (the burgeoning of corruption or "black and gold" politics) consequences.¹³ Hence, the success of this latest response to the challenges of structural transformation remains something of an open question.

Taiwan, in sum, has undergone four major periods of "structural transformation" over the past five decades. Each of these four periods included substantial changes in both economic and political institutions. The first three clearly resulted in an increased capacity for Taiwan's political economy to be productive and competitive, and their various elements worked together quite well. However, many of these interactions and synergisms appear to have been fortuitous, rather than the result of a predetermined "grand strategy." In addition, the roles of market, state, and society varied considerably in each of the four transformations. Thus, Taiwan's remarkable ability to go through major structural transformations obviously involves a complex set of circumstances and forces. In contrast, there is no question that a Taiwan state exercised sovereignty in promoting a very successful project of economic and, with some delay, political development.

External Challenge

Throughout the postwar era, the sovereignty and statehood of Taiwan have remained under strong challenge from the PRC. The nature of this rivalry changed dramatically over time, as described in the three parts of this section. For the first two decades, China appeared to be a “divided nation” like Germany and Korea, with two rival governments, each supported by one of the competing camps in the Cold War. In 1971, China gained the support needed to replace Taiwan in the United Nations. Subsequently, though both governments claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China (including Taiwan), China used its much greater international support to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. During the 1990s, this rivalry was transformed once again. Taiwan became more adept at using pragmatic diplomacy to upgrade its more informal standing in the international community. In addition, Taipei gave up its claim to exercise sovereignty over the mainland, but Beijing intensified its pressures against “Taiwan Independence.”

A Fairly Even Competition for Diplomatic Status, 1950–1971

As noted in the earlier section, the outbreak of the Korean War led the United States to create an alliance with the ROC on Taiwan and to support it strongly in the international arena. For example, during the early 1950s, the United States was able to mobilize a huge majority (43 to 11, with 6 abstentions in 1954) in support of a moratorium on Soviet and communist demands to have the PRC replace the ROC in the United Nations. American support for Taiwan also created a stalemate “on the ground.” The Seventh Fleet protected Taiwan; and the overwhelming power of the CCP on the mainland made any call to “unleash Chiang Kai-shek” empty rhetoric. The two regimes, hence, were secure and implacably hostile toward each other. They did, however, share a common position on Taiwan’s sovereignty (or, more accurately, lack thereof). Both staunchly argued that Taiwan was an integral part of China, that each represented the legitimate government of China, and that a “Two China” or a “One China, one Taiwan” arrangement was totally unacceptable.

The PRC challenged this status quo twice during the 1950s with attacks on the “offshore” islands near the mainland that the ROC still controlled in 1954–1955 and 1958, presumably out of frustration over Taipei’s consolidation of its statehood and diplomatic status. Chinese military aggression proved rather counterproductive, though, since it resulted in the reaffirmation of American support for Taiwan in the form of a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. After the 1958 crisis in the Taiwan Strait, relations between Taiwan and China became frozen in an armed but nonaggressive hostility, in part because a military stalemate existed and in part because the two governments must have realized that a new crisis might have led to the imposition of a “Two China” resolution that they both abhorred.¹⁴

The major competition between the ROC and PRC then turned to the realm of securing international recognition for their claims of sovereignty over all of

China, including Taiwan. This diplomatic rivalry occurred in two distinct areas. One was in gaining formal diplomatic recognition from other governments. The ROC began the postwar era with an approximately two-to-one lead over Beijing (53 to 26) in 1950. By the early 1960s, though, China had narrowed the gap considerably to 58 to 42 in 1963; and a major victory for China occurred in 1964 when France recognized the PRC.¹⁵

The attempt of Beijing to replace Taipei in the United Nations also heated up as Taiwan's comfortable lead in support dwindled in the 1950s, as memories of the Korean War faded, and as more new nations, primarily from the Third World, joined the United Nations. In response, the United States then switched its tactics from preserving a moratorium on the China seat to declaring it an "important question" that required a two-thirds majority, an initiative that passed with a very comfortable majority of 61 to 34 in 1961. Over the 1960s, Taiwan's support in the United Nations continued to slip, but this was somewhat counterbalanced by China's retreat into diplomatic isolation during the Cultural Revolution. A much more serious threat emerged, with the *rapprochement* between the United States and PRC as the 1970s opened, culminating in the summer of 1971 with the dramatic announcement that President Nixon would visit China. As the Fall 1971 UN session approached, America announced that it would support the seating of the PRC in the UN Security Council but that it would also seek to prevent the expulsion of the ROC. This "compromise" proved to be unacceptable to either party, and in the end the PRC simply replaced the ROC in the United Nations.¹⁶

Losing International Status from Self-Deterrence

The loss of the ROC's seat in the United Nations was devastating in terms of its international status because Beijing used the reversal of UN membership to solidify its claim to sovereignty over all of China, including Taiwan. That this occurred is cruelly ironic because the early 1970s also witnessed increasing international acceptance for the, at least temporary, legitimacy of both governments in the other two "divided nations" created by the Cold War (Germany and Korea). Some of this success can certainly be attributed to China's power and persistence. However, Taipei unfortunately contributed to its diplomatic isolation by its refusal to compromise on its "One China" principle. Consequently, it appeared to be "self-deterred" from challenging the PRC's assertion that it exercised sovereignty over Taiwan. For example, if Taiwan had retained a seat in the United Nations, which US diplomats at the time thought was feasible had the Chiang Kai-shek government been more willing to compromise on the "One China" principle,¹⁷ there would have been no basis for excluding it from the diplomatic community.

Clearly, the change in UN representation constituted a dramatic tipping point in the diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China since it was followed by a collapse of the ROC's formal diplomatic ties with other countries. In 1970, Taipei led Beijing in diplomatic recognitions by a margin of 68 to 53. Just three years later, the PRC had a more than two-to-one advantage of 86 to 39; and by 1977 this had become an overwhelming margin of 111 to 23. Since then, Taipei

has generally been recognized by 20 to 30 nations, most of them fairly small. Moreover, because membership in many international organizations is tied to the United Nations, the PRC was quite successful in forcing Taiwan's expulsion from most of them as well. For example, Chinese pressure even excluded Taiwan from compendia of UN statistics.¹⁸

Probably the most devastating loss of diplomatic recognition in the early 1970s was Japan's establishment of official relations with the PRC in 1972. However, this "defeat" turned out to be quite positive in the long run because it established an institutional model for the maintenance of informal relations between Taipei and Tokyo that undergirded Taiwan's later effects to reemerge diplomatically. Japan wanted to protect its extensive economic relations with Taiwan and neither the PRC nor ROC objected too vehemently. Accordingly, Taiwan and Japan signed an agreement creating "private organizations" that conducted bilateral relations between the two countries and were primarily staffed by government officials temporarily detached from their official positions. Thus, the "Japanese model" created "informal" diplomatic relations that, in reality, differed from formal ones in name only but proved sufficient to save face in Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo.¹⁹

The Japanese model proved to be invaluable when the Carter administration in the United States switched America's official recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. Carter evidently wanted to follow the Japanese model of having formal relations with the PRC and substantively similar but informal ones with the ROC. The administration also came under strong pressure from Congress to protect Taiwan's interests. The result was the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. The TRA established the mechanism for informally maintaining government-to-government relations with Taiwan and pledged that Taiwan's security was of "grave concern" to the United States.²⁰ In the short run, this proved to be a very workable solution. For the longer term, however, it had ambiguous and contradictory implications about the statehood and sovereignty of Taiwan. On the one hand, the United States's normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing appeared to support China's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other, the TRA certainly implied that Taiwan was a sovereign entity that strongly deserved the support of the United States. This ambiguity in the United States's position on Taiwan's sovereignty can be seen, for example, in America's abrogating its Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC when it recognized the PRC while also keeping all other treaties between the two countries in force.

Pragmatic Diplomacy: Upgrading Taiwan's International Status at the Cost of an Increased Threat from the PRC

During the 1970s and 1980s, Taipei evidently was self-deterred from changing its "One China" policy by the fear that any such shift would contradict the legitimacy of its political claims, both internationally and domestically. Yet, such a strategy was clearly counterproductive in the face of the PRC's campaign to almost literally "wipe Taiwan off the map." Initially, the ROC responded by conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations over the creation of informal or private

bodies, such as the ones developed with the United States and Japan, to maintain “substantive relations” with a large number of countries and some international organizations. By the late 1980s, these efforts had become more public and of a higher profile in what came to be called pragmatic diplomacy at the beginning of the presidency of Lee Teng-hui. Although Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy made little progress in terms of regaining official recognition, it clearly led to a significant upgrading in the ROC’s informal status. For example, officials from several advanced industrial societies visited Taiwan in the early 1990s in what could only be taken as a *de facto* recognition of its autonomy and statehood; Taiwan was able to join APEC and made considerable progress in its negotiations to enter the WTO; and the PRC seemingly acquiesced, albeit not always with good will, to the ROC’s reemergence in the international community.²¹

Pragmatic diplomacy also involved a more relaxed stance on the sovereignty issue. Although Taiwan remained officially committed to a “One China” policy and to eventual reunification with the Chinese mainland, it became much more willing to compromise on practical matters to promote its participation in international affairs. In May 1991, President Lee implicitly took this one step further with a proclamation ending the civil war with the communists under ROC law and indicating that Taipei no longer claimed sovereignty over the rest of China.²² While Lee did not assert that Taiwan had a separate sovereignty at that time, a stronger basis had certainly been laid for rejecting China’s challenge to Taiwan’s statehood.

Indeed, China became increasingly critical of what Beijing called the “creeping officiality” in Taiwan’s international status, while Taipei remained quite frustrated over the PRC’s ability to exclude it from much of normal international life (i.e., by totally thwarting President Lee’s campaign to win readmission to the United Nations). Cross-Strait tensions then erupted in the summer of 1995 following a trip by Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater, Cornell University, which he had pressured the United States to allow him to make up for the failure of Taiwan’s UN campaign. China reacted unexpectedly and in an extreme manner to Lee’s visit, arguing that this represented a major change in American policy supporting Lee’s alleged effort to turn “creeping officiality” into Taiwan Independence. Consequently, China went ballistic (almost literally) during 1995–1996 with a series of war games and missile tests close to Taiwan that were clearly aimed at intimidating voters in the December legislative elections and March presidential elections. The crisis quickly de-escalated after Lee handily won reelection, but China kept the military pressure on with a continuing long-term build up of short-range missiles across the Strait from Taiwan.²³

The next eruption in cross-Strait relations came from the Taiwan side in July 1999 when Lee put forth a theory that Taipei and Beijing were connected by “special state-to-state relations.” Although he denied that he was asserting Taiwan Independence, the PRC responded very strongly to what it claimed to be Taiwan’s first direct and explicit challenge to the sovereignty of “One China.” The United States reacted with considerable alarm as well. Initially, US efforts (and ire) were directed toward Taipei, which was seen as potentially challenging China without giving America any forewarning. When the PRC began

to make implicit threats about minor military retaliation, US policy turned toward explicit military deterrence aimed at Beijing. This crisis faded by the fall, but the March 2000 presidential election in Taiwan soon turned up the heat again. The election involved a neck and neck race among three major candidates, one of whom (Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party) was seen as pro-independence in Beijing and by many elsewhere as well. Given the close race, China again tried to intimidate Taiwan's voters with several threats in the months leading up to the election, culminating in Premier Zhu Rongji's finger-jabbing threat that Taiwan might not get another chance if it elected a pro-Independence candidate.²⁴

These two Taiwan Strait crises highlighted the mutually incompatible sovereignty positions held by China and Taiwan, as well as the depth of the commitment to these positions by each government and the bulk of the populations in each country. To the PRC and most of its citizens, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, whose reunification with the mainland is necessary to complete the recovery of China from the "century of humiliation" at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists. To Taipei, and most Taiwanese, in stark contrast, Taiwan is a sovereign country whose ultimate fate should be decided by its own citizens in the face of a new imperialism emanating from Beijing. Given this clash, the series of confrontations across the Taiwan Strait that followed is far from surprising as first one side and then the other would assert a sovereignty claim that the other found totally unacceptable.²⁵

The net result has been paradoxical in that Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy has certainly expanded the acceptance of its *de facto* sovereignty in the international community, especially in its relations with the United States early during the George W. Bush administration,²⁶ but at the cost of escalating the challenge, including the threat to use military force, to its *de jure* sovereignty from a large and powerful neighbor. China, for its part, may have deterred Taiwan from pushing further toward formal independence (although this is certainly debatable), but it too has incurred a considerable cost in the form of alienating most of Taiwan's citizens, thus making any agreement that would even hint at undercutting Taiwan's sovereignty unthinkable for that country's democratically elected leaders.

Destabilizing Feedback

Taiwan, therefore, faces a major threat to its sovereignty and statehood from the PRC. This threat, unfortunately, is exacerbated by the domestic dynamics of Taiwan's politics that have prevented the country from developing a unified and coherent strategy for responding to Beijing during this decade. The internal debate over Taiwan's sovereignty and statehood has passed through a very distinct cycle. Early in the country's democratic transition, the Kuomintang and the opposition appeared quite divided about Taiwan's sovereignty and national identity. Over the course of the 1990s, though, the two major forces in Taiwanese politics moved toward each other on this key issue. However, the seeming consensus that emerged proved short-lived and was destroyed by the highly polarized

political conflicts that erupted after the election of the DPP's Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000. The first part of this section, hence, charts the changing nature of the partisan division over the sovereignty question in Taiwan's politics over the past 15 years; and the second examines the current polarization and gridlock in more detail.

The Changing Partisan Division Over the Question of Taiwan's Sovereignty

During the authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang from the late 1940s through about 1990, the KMT and the national government were dominated by the 15% minority of "mainlanders" who had come to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek, creating substantial resentment among the majority of Taiwan's residents. The opposition, which was formalized with the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party or DPP in 1986, therefore, appealed both to democratic norms and to the right of the majority of Taiwanese to exercise political sovereignty. Although the DPP was primarily concerned with domestic politics, it did include a plank supporting Taiwan Independence in its party charter in 1991. Over the 1990s, though, many DPP leaders moderated their support for Taiwan Independence both because it appeared to be a loser at the polls and because the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 demonstrated that China would never permit Taiwan to declare *de jure* Independence. Consequently, some (but certainly far from all) in the DPP took the position that Taiwan was already an independent nation, hence making a declaration of Independence unnecessary.²⁷

For its part, as noted in the previous section, the KMT under President Lee Teng-hui, its first Islander leader, changed its position very significantly as well, from hard-line support of a "One China" principle to a much more ambiguous position that combined the goal of reunification in the very distant future with a decided effort to upgrade Taiwan's separate international status.²⁸ By the end of his administration, he had clearly indicated support for Taiwan's separate sovereignty, somewhat in line with the DPP position noted above. For example, he wrote in 1999 that he opposed declaring a Republic of Taiwan because such an act "would endanger Taiwan's sovereign independence and, ultimately, its existence."²⁹

Indeed, a surprising consensus on cross-Strait relations emerged among the three major candidates in the March 2000 presidential election (Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, Lien Chan of the KMT, and KMT defector James Soong who ran as an independent). All indicated that they would protect Taiwan's sovereignty against threats from China, but all three also rejected an open proclamation of Taiwan Independence as too provocative. Chen did begin his campaign by appealing to Taiwanese Nationalism. However, he moved back to the middle of the spectrum on cross-Strait relations fairly quickly, both to appeal to the "moderate middle" of the electorate in Taiwan and to calm fears in Beijing and Washington that his victory would constitute a pro-Independence revolution.

After narrowly winning the election, Chen was surprisingly conciliatory toward China in his inaugural speech, promising not to do anything to change

the status quo, unless the PRC attacked Taiwan, based on the “Five No’s” that he would not (1) declare Independence, (2) change the Republic of China’s official name, (3) hold a referendum on Taiwan’s national status, (4) add Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state relations” to the Constitution, or (5) abolish the National Unification Council or the *Guidelines for National Unification* that Lee had created in the early 1990s. For its part, the PRC refused to acknowledge his conciliatory policy and quickly changed its prime demand from Taiwan’s not declaring Independence to Taiwan’s accepting the “One China” principle. For example, the Chinese leadership refused to meet with Chen or representatives of his government, thereby continuing the freeze in cross-Strait relations.³⁰

Chen shifted away from his conciliatory policy toward China in July 2002 in a fairly radical fashion. He warned that Taiwan might “go its own way” and argued that “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” existed. This dramatic change in policy probably reflected several factors in Chen’s thinking: Frustration in the face of continued Chinese intransigence, growing self-confidence because of support from the Bush administration, and a desire to appeal to his pro-Independence “base constituency.” This set off what was becoming a familiar set of diplomatic interactions. China claimed that Taiwan was pushing the envelop on declaring Independence; Chen Shui-bian (like Lee Teng-hui before him) declared that his new policy did not really alter the diplomatic *status quo*; and the United States tried to calm down both Beijing and Taipei.³¹

Partisan Polarization on Taiwan’s Sovereignty

President Chen’s new, more assertive policy toward cross-Strait relations also solidified a partisan polarization on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty, which has made it hard for the ROC to be proactive in dealing with the threat from the PRC. As noted in the previous subsection, the major candidates in the 2000 presidential campaign, while vigorously denouncing each other, differed surprisingly little in their positions on cross-Strait relations. The aftermath of the election soon created a major polarization on this issue. First, the party system went through a significant transformation with the emergence of two new major parties. James Soong formed the People First Party, which soon became allied with the KMT in the Pan-Blue coalition; and Lee Teng-hui, who was pushed out of the KMT by its losing candidate Lien Chan, became the godfather of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which aligned with the DPP in the Pan-Green coalition. The two new parties were generally more pro-Unification and pro-Independence than their larger allies, so their competition helped push the KMT and DPP toward more confrontational stands. Second, the Pan-Blue majority in the Legislative Yuan soon reached a nasty gridlock with President Chen and the executive.³² Consequently, Chen’s more aggressive policy stimulated extreme polarization over Taiwan’s sovereignty and national security policy.

The harsh and viciously divisive debate over cross-Strait relations and national identity has come to dominate Taiwan’s politics. The Greens argue that they must “stand up for Taiwan” and accuse the Blues of selling Taiwan out to China. In stark contrast, the Blues argue that the Greens are needlessly provocative and

that a more accommodating policy can defuse the threat from China. Taken to the extreme (which they sometimes are), these positions imply that one side is the savior and the other the destroyer of Taiwan and its statehood. Unfortunately, both critiques seem to have some merit. President Chen's periodic appeals to his pro-Independence "base constituency" for primarily domestic purposes have both infuriated China and at times strained relations with the United States, thereby threatening to undermine Taiwan's position in the Taipei-Beijing-Washington "triangle." Conversely, the Blues' attempts to "do business" with Beijing undermine Chen's ability to deal with China; and there are even fairly credible rumors that Blue leaders have urged both the PRC and United States to "get tough" with the Chen administration, which in itself might create a security threat to Taiwan.³³ Overall, the gridlock and polarization in Taiwan's politics prevent Taipei from exercising almost any initiative in meeting China's challenge to its sovereignty.

A More Optimistic Scenario

Over the last decade, cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan have been marked by periodic crises. In particular, the competing Chinese and Taiwanese Nationalisms on the two sides of the Strait appear to be driving both governments to be more provocative and confrontational than they ordinarily would be due to their perceived need to appeal to domestic constituencies regarding their totally incompatible positions on Taiwan's sovereignty. Clearly, as Edward Friedman argues, China's harsh popular nationalism has pushed its government to a much more uncompromising and aggressive stance toward Taiwan.³⁴ Besides, the vicious internal partisan polarization in Taiwan undermines the government's ability to promote its statehood and sovereignty. These dynamics in both China and Taiwan, therefore, would suggest that the Taiwan Strait could become a very dangerous place.

Still, the less pessimistic interpretation that the two sides have learned to live with each other and that cross-Strait relations are fairly stable strikes me as reasonable. For example, neither China's Anti-Secession Law in 2005 nor Taiwan's shutting down the National Unification Council (NUC) in 2006 really created much of a crisis atmosphere, despite what appeared to be significant threats for it. In fact, by the summer of 2006, both United States-Taiwan relations and cross-Strait relations in general had become more tranquil. At a meeting between President Chen Shui-bian and the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in early June in Taipei, Chen reiterated his support for the "Four No's" (without the continuation of the NUC) that he had proclaimed in his 2000 inaugural speech. The State Department responded positively, tacitly acknowledging the reduction of the "Five No's" to the "Four No's" and, moreover, urged the PRC "to take parallel steps to fulfill its obligations for regional peace and stability, including by reaching out to Taiwan's duly elected leaders."³⁵

For its part, China appeared to be moving toward a less aggressive position as both diplomats and scholars began to note a subtle but significant change in the PRC's position from demanding Unification to indicating acceptance of the

ambiguous status quo as long as Taiwan does not make President Hu “lose face” by irrevocably declaring Independence. The Chinese evidently were satisfied with the prospect of a more accommodating Taiwan president after 2008, while President Chen indicated that Beijing and Washington should not be worried even by policy initiatives that cross the PRC’s “red line,” such as a New Constitution that specifies Taiwan Independence, because the Pan-Blue controlled-legislature will prevent them from becoming law.³⁶ Although Taiwan’s statehood and sovereignty still remain controversial, the immediate threat to them may be much less than is often assumed.

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PART III

TAIWAN IDENTITY AMID
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CHAPTER 6

NATIONAL IDENTITY, INTERNATIONAL IMAGE, AND A SECURITY DILEMMA: THE CASE OF TAIWAN

Hans Stockton

Introduction

A considerable amount of scholarly effort has been dedicated to understanding the character and evolution of national identity on the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan. Most research has treated national identity as the dependent variable explained by Taiwan's separation from the mainland, 1949 arrival of the ROC capital, economic development, and democratization process. The key exception is studies that examine the linkage between elite manipulation of national identity and Taipei's cross-Strait policy. Less research has been devoted to developing a broader theoretical understanding of the effect of the identity debate on Taiwan's international image and subsequent relationships.

This chapter seeks neither to establish the veracity of any particular claim to Taiwan's "true" national identity, nor predict what a future identity will be. Instead this chapter acknowledges that ruling elite's signals on national identity and sovereignty have been and are in flux. Changes, real or rhetorical, in Taiwan's national identity have consequently affected the ability of Taiwan's elites to project a national image of Taiwan to the international community that facilitates the island's security. This chapter then seeks to understand how the process of national identity construction and ongoing debate over identity reconstruction may be increasing Taiwan's insecurity by generating instability in Taipei's relationship with Washington, DC. Taiwan's only immediate military threat is China's irredentism; Taiwan's primary defense against that irredentism is the United States.

While securing good relations with neighbors and protection from external threats central to national security, security also entails the consolidation of

internal components that are essential for maintaining a viable state. Two such components are national identity and national process. Ideally, there must be a shared vision of identity within the polity of what constitutes the nation that is to be developed and promoted for the sake of protection. A new emphasis on identity has emerged with the Constructivist perspective. Essentially, constructivists argue that Realist and Liberalist perspectives fail to take sufficient account of actor-identity construction and the subsequent effect of that construction on state interests. States, as social actors, may not hold their political identities constant. If identities change, then this alters political interests, state interactions, and national security policies.¹

Running parallel to the domestic challenge of building a nation's identity with the state is the challenge of projecting an image of the state to external actors in order to facilitate that state's admission to desired communities. Membership in these communities acts as an external legitimization of the image and national identity. The processes of defining and redefining domestic norms and structures then shape international interaction and treatment.

This chapter argues that national identity has been central to Taiwan's image projection and, although a civic enterprise, conducive to Taiwan's security and external relations. Although the process was ongoing, demands to open discussion of Taiwan's national identity gave rise to democratization, which in turn bolstered the regime's internal and external legitimacy. Upon democratization, the national identity enterprise has moved to a debate on the reconstruction of identity, driven by the Chen administration in a more cultural direction. Until the late 1990s, democratization was an appropriate and embraced expression of Taiwan's civic nationalism. Into President Chen's second term, "Taiwan consciousness" appears to be the desired expression of a Taiwanese cultural nationalism. Chen's efforts and the ensuing public debate has created incongruities between Taiwan's intended national image and perceived national image.

This chapter will first briefly review the basic theory of national identity and national image. A brief summary of the evolution of national identity on Taiwan since 1949 will then be presented. Finally, the effect that these changes have had on national image congruence and incongruence will be addressed.

National Identity

During the state-building effort, elites sought to overlay nation and state to gain mass identification with their particular program to obtain political authority over the nation. In reference to democracies, Hertz states that "the nation is the possessor of sovereignty, the state is the machine for implementing its will, and the government is the management of the state appointed by the nation."² Anderson writes that a nation is an "imagined community" defined by its members within their own conceptualized boundedness.³ The nation is an imagined community, not constant, and subject to gradual change. It is premised on "ethnic, state, cultural, and socioeconomic traits that emerge over time as a result of events."⁴

The focal point of nation-building and thus collective identity is often identified as a shared history of struggle that unites those involved in a common cause.

It is the struggle of an “in group” against an “out group” to create political institutions appropriate for the rule of the “in group.” This process also results in the framing of what Cruz refers to as “a collective field of imaginable possibilities.”⁵ In essence, it is an understanding of what is possible and permissible in the future evolution of the identity.

Haas proposes that nationalism be defined as “a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation or that they are already one...and is a doctrine of social solidarity based on the characteristics and symbols of nationhood.”⁶ These symbols are most often manipulated by elites to mobilize mass support in their own interelite power struggles. Nationalism is then a doctrine that seeks to ensure self-rule and state legitimacy through the rationalization of its goals. In other words, elites convey to mass actors the material benefits of a nationalist agenda in terms of economic, political, and strategic security, and convince the masses that the agenda justifies the means.

Nationalism is most often dichotomized into civic (liberal or political) nationalism and cultural or ethnic nationalism.⁷ Civic nationalism is an effort to secure a sovereign representative state for the community and to secure its members’ rights of citizenship. It bases its appeal on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective and is akin to the rationalization process of modern state-building discussed by Weberian scholars.⁸ As defined by Haas, rationalization is the process of making coherent and aligning values and institutions. For Haas and others, successful modernizers rely upon the construction of rational state-building programs that ultimately resemble the Western experience. Civic nationalism most often contains a liberal or internationalist aspect in that the elite efforts to satisfy their citizens extend into building stronger connections with other states and state communities. This form of nationalism is far more inclusive than cultural nationalism, which restricts membership to those of shared ethnicity or blood ties.

A selective adaptation of Haas’ indicators of rationalization is presented in table 6.1. The indicators for a rationalization emphasize the importance of popular participation and general consensus on regime, institutions, and domestic and foreign policies.

Second, there is emphasis on the consolidation of institutionalized and constitutional expressions of state power and leadership succession. Third, there is a general consensus on the place of religion and education in the promulgation of a “national myth.” States that fail to satisfy these conditions through progressive or liberal means are considered derationalized. This checklist is useful in identifying the progress of state and national identity construction, and therefore understanding the likely national image (discussed below) to be projected and when incongruence of identity and image occurs.

The process of national identity construction is an elite struggle to implement an agenda to ensure self-rule and civic or cultural allegiance to the state. This sequence is initiated in the elite hopes of securing their own legitimacy and may take liberal form with a goal of institutionalizing popular sovereignty, or illiberal form with the goal of elites consolidating their political dominance over a society lacking political pluralism. Illiberal or irrational nationalism allows elites to rule

Table 6.1 Haas' Indicators of Rationalization and Derationalization

	<i>Rationalized Successful Nation-State</i>	<i>Derationalized Disintegrating Nation-State</i>
Regime	Mass support and allegiance	Lack of mass support and/or allegiance
Legitimacy		
Administrative	Clearly defined mandates and	Ill-defined mandates and
Coherence	jurisdictional boundaries; rule of law applies	jurisdictional boundaries; weak rule of law
National Myth	General agreement on origin of core values	Dispute over origin of core values
Economic	General agreement on participants and policy	Disagreement on participants and policy
Armed Forces	Military personnel willing to fight	Military personnel evade fighting
Foreign Policy	Public willing to accept government's definition of external role; accepts changes in policy	Public disputes government's policies and routinely challenges

Source: Adapted from Ernst Haas, *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 27–28.

for the people in the name of the state with little credence granted to rule “by” the people. Virulent nationalism will also seek to legitimize the exclusion of segments of a population from effective participation. Such excluded groups may lack the proper “nationalist credentials” for participation and/or, lacking such credentials, may not be sufficiently trustworthy.

National identity is an outcome, the character of which depends upon whether the goal has been to create a civic or cultural nationalism and through the character of that process. In the years after 1949, Taiwan's national identity reconstruction began as a cultural nationalism through the Chiang presidencies, leaned toward civic nationalism under President Lee Teng-hui, and has moved back toward a cultural variant under President Chen Shui-bian. While ethnicity plays a role in elite mobilization of the electorate during elections, there is a shared sense of allegiance to the state and regime that are the ROC—a democratic polity that governs only the island of Taiwan and is ultimately held politically accountable by the citizens on that island.

If one accepts the premise that states behave as social actors, then the issue of identity becomes an important determinant in setting the manner in which states behave, both within and outside, their territories. Internally, state elites seek to gain sufficient political support to capture government by promoting their own versions of who the nation is and what values should underlie and legitimize state actions on behalf of the nation. In many cases, such competing visions share a common foundation of historical events that tie the nation together, yet vary in their interpretations of the impact of history on the territory's people and the state-building process. In other cases, these competing visions may be so

polarized that the very basis of a unified sense of national identity are debated. The distance between competing visions may then exacerbate conflict between the extant or “imagined” divisions within a society.

National Image and Identity Congruence

An oft-relied upon definition of national image is that provided by Boulding—“the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.”⁹ Of importance to international systems are images “which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.”¹⁰ Such images provide cognitive structures such as schema or “mental models” that decision makers use to interpret the behavior of international actors.¹¹ In cognitive security studies, decisions about conflict and cooperation are generally calculated by one actor’s calculations about (1) relative capabilities/strengths of the other; (2) threat or opportunity presented by the other; and (3) perceived culture of the other.¹²

This chapter links the third variable, perceived culture of the other, as emerging from national identity, and thus the gateway assessment determining most state relationships. The focus here is broader than state-to-state or interstate governmental organizations. Instead, whether a liberal or illiberal culture emerges from the national identity debate largely determines the placement of a state into other “imagined communities” of liberal/illiberal states, democratic/authoritarian, market/transitional economies, and integrationists/isolationists, to name a few. As identity builds the credibility of a state to call upon certain communities for cache, reliance upon these communities should constrain future changes in identity that would jeopardize them.

State elites then seek to externalize or project a strategic image abroad. Ideally, the perceived realities of this internal image will overlap with the image being projected. This national image is used to place the state within communities of states such as alliances, trade blocks, security umbrellas, and other multilateral structures that preserve and promote that state’s security. Such efforts externalize on a larger scale the essence of any nation-building project, and that is to place a state within “in groups” and distinguish it from “out groups.” The rewards for such integration are both tangible (e.g., increased trade and protection) and intangible (improvements in national image as a cooperative or “responsible” economic, military, or democratic power). Ultimately, the state receives a “popular mandate” by supportive states that legitimizes its identity and image among the community. This external reward is then utilized internally to further legitimize the bundle of identity and domestic policies promoted by ruling elites. The anticipated domestic payoff to elites would be electoral support, and the “mandate” can be leveraged by a head of state against opposition to foreign and security policies within the home legislature.

National image projection can be positive, in the sense that it is intended to place the state within a community, but can also be negative. Image projection can be negative in the sense that it may be intended to create friction with the

“out group.” Elites may seek to rally their populace not around integration, but rather threat from the other. Thus, a national image may be projected with the very intention of drawing condemnation or isolation from neighboring states to create or exaggerate an external threat; hence placing the state even more firmly within the “in group” as well as facilitating the further consolidation of the internal components of the state image. Use of the negative projection may, however, raise charges from the target actors of irresponsibility or provocation, thus potentially decreasing the commitment of the target actors to the state in question.

Incongruence between the internal national identity and externalized national image will result in mixed signals to target states and communities. This creates doubt in the states receiving these signals as to the sender’s ability to align with the community’s values and norms. It would be naïve to assume that the overlap of identity and projected image in any way guarantees a perfect alignment of a state’s desired outcomes with those of its community partners’ willingness to grant them. This alignment, however, acts as a legitimate leverage for a state to interact with others actors as well as legitimizes others’ interactions with it. This overlap facilitates the state’s search for entry by making rejection philosophically more difficult.

Targets of national image are assumed to have some information about the sending state’s domestic environment and elite and mass support for such changes. Theoretically, changes in national identity should be reflected by adjustments to national image, not the other way around. Should elites seek to alter the national image without corresponding changes in the rational attributes of which the state is composed, they then risk internal political backlash and a resurgence or intensification of nationalist conflict at home. If, on the other hand, elites seek to alter national identity without corresponding changes in national image, then ruling elites not only exaggerate nationalist conflict, they also jeopardize the veracity that target states grant to the projected national image.

National Identity on Taiwan

Political development and new historical conditions have created a situation in which the prevailing sense of national identity (civic and cultural), linked to the mainland, is under reconsideration. In such a situation it “is necessary for the participants of the system to redefine who they are and how they are different from all other political and social systems.”¹³ In the case of Taiwan, democratization and localization have allowed for public consideration of what defines the nation-state of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

At the start of the twenty-first century, this nation-building effort on Taiwan attempts to reconcile the ethnic divide between mainlanders and Taiwanese, and thus mandates the construction (or reconstruction) of a localized national political identity that is inclusive of Taiwanese and Chinese ethnic identification. This divide can be overcome because “the crisis of nationalism and national culture transcends ethnicity simply because in principle it is trying to construct a radically different kind of bounded community called the nation-state.”¹⁴ Rigger also

sees the struggle for national identity accommodating the ethnic divide within a “distinct political identity since nationality is not the same as ethnicity.”¹⁵

During the period of Kuomintang (KMT) hegemony on Taiwan, the integration of Chinese cultural and political identification was actively promoted by the state and party structures of the ROC. From 1945 to 1965, the KMT conducted a vigorous Glorious Restoration (*guang fu*) campaign to legitimize mainlander rule on Taiwan. From 1966 to 1976, a campaign of Cultural Renaissance was carried out to localize Chinese culture on the island. Although important to legitimizing KMT rule on the island, this also legitimized Taiwan as “China” at a time when the mainland was experiencing the antitraditionalism of the Cultural Revolution. After Chiang Kai-shek’s death, Chiang Ching-kou carried out his own campaign of cultural reconstruction that sought to embrace some local Taiwanese cultural distinctions while depoliticizing others. As the successor to China’s cultural heritage, the KMT sought to legitimize the ROC claim to China in the eyes of its citizens and those of the international community.

These programs had several unintended consequences. First, they aggravated the ethnic divide on the island. KMT emphasis on Chinese high culture may have actually created the impression that there was a distinction between what was Taiwanese and what was Chinese. Some argue that due to their early “motel mentality” toward Taiwan, the KMT did little to convince Taiwanese that Taiwan enjoyed a significant future role in a unified China.¹⁶ The island-wide massacre of local inhabitants in 1947, known as the 2.28 Incident, has been at the center of the mainlander-Taiwanese rift even prior to the nationalist government retreating to Taiwan in 1949. Second, the virulent anticommunism espoused by the KMT aimed at “fellow Chinese” worked against its own efforts to convince Taiwanese that a common identity with the mainland existed. Third, mainlander rule (identified as Chinese rule) so alienated the populace that political opposition aimed at the KMT was also inclined to oppose the very Chinese symbols that it represented. Taiwan Nationalism based on “Taiwan for Taiwanese” was an inevitable consequence of KMT authoritarianism. Nevertheless, what is culturally “Taiwanese” is still subject to consideration.

President Lee’s promotion of a “New Taiwanese” identity during the 1998 Taipei city mayoral elections was indeed an effort to find a vehicle for national political unity on the island with which to induce people to localize their sense of cultural identity regardless of place of origin. It was the idea of nation-state as it exists on Taiwan that Lee was seeking to convey across ethnic lines. As “New Taiwanese,” citizens would seek to define and construct, not the nation-state of Imperial China or the ROC founded on the mainland almost a century ago, but that of contemporary ROC on Taiwan. This entails that the people of Taiwan are indeed free to redirect the debate on national identity away from the policies of the old KMT if so desired.

The election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000 initiated new state efforts to promote a Taiwan identity. National funds have been redirected to support Taiwanese history and language education. Efforts to replace some China-oriented classes or class modules with Taiwan-based curriculum in public schools have caused quite a stir. One example of this was the reform of high school history curriculum

previously dedicated largely to Chinese history and some world history. Since 2002, the content has been spread between Taiwan, China, and world history.¹⁷ In his 2006 New Year address to the nation, President Chen called on citizens to uphold “Taiwan consciousness viewed as a taboo by the immigrant regime of our past . . . that breaks away from the shackles of historical bondage and political dogma.”¹⁸ Chen went on to acknowledge that democracy and Taiwan consciousness were vital to the country’s security. In the face of very low approval ratings, allegations of corruption, and faltering relations with the United States, President Chen’s language has become increasingly specific.¹⁹ In early October 2006, he made several speeches in which he clearly stated that “Taiwan is not a part of China, nor is it subordinate to China.”²⁰ The UN membership petition for Taiwan in September 2006 mentioned the ROC once, and the remainder promoted Taiwan as the applicant. In 2007, Taiwan will apply for its UN membership under the name of “Taiwan.”

A typical indicator of nationalism on Taiwan has been mass orientations toward unification or independence. Some have pointed to this approach as a “false dichotomy” that is unable to account for the majority preferences over time for the status quo.²¹ Cultural fundamentalists, composed of Chinese and Taiwanese variants, are characterized by an overlap of Chinese/Taiwanese acculturation and stance on Taiwan’s future status. The largest group over time, however, has been the “both” category, in which respondents are “both Chinese and Taiwanese” and prefer the status quo into the future, or indefinitely. Whether this is due to ideological dispositions and/or fear of People’s Republic of China (PRC) retaliation is subject to debate. Surveys in 2006 have periodically placed “Taiwanese” identification as the plurality opinion. Understanding this shift in identity, the KMT has moved from a Chinese acculturation and China-oriented position to a more “localized” acculturation and China-oriented position. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has retained a Taiwanese and Taiwan oriented position. Left out of the equation appears to be the bulk of ROC citizens who prefer a mix of cultural identification and a safe status quo in relations with the mainland.

There are three primary schools of thought on the question of national identity on Taiwan. Taiwanese Nationalists promote Taiwanese uniqueness and separation from the Chinese state in the strongest of language. These separatists use a mixture of historical, cultural, and legal revisionism to support their claim that seeks to establish a Taiwanese nation separate from that of China. A second group is that of the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. This group is identified with the status quo of Taiwan as part of China, but interpretation of this varies. One subgroup argues that Taiwan is in fact part of greater China. A second subgroup argues that Taiwan is China in the sense that the island has been home to the sovereign government of the ROC since 1949. This group remains largely pragmatic and seeks to avoid antagonizing decision makers in Beijing. They avoid historical revisionism and rely on the national myth of the ROC claim to China and the Chinese state. Regardless of local adjustments to Chinese culture, political reunification remains desirable and possible. A third group is that of civic or liberal nationalists. This group is composed of “flexible

pragmatists" and recognizes the ascendance of a new localized national identity on Taiwan that is a synthesis of Chinese and Taiwanese. This group is more likely to accept that democratization has encouraged a broader consideration of potential avenues for Taiwan's future ranging from unification to independence. Nevertheless, as long as Taiwan remains under military threat from the mainland, no outcome is pragmatic other than the status quo. As new generations are born on Taiwan, increasingly removed from the experience of their parents and grandparents, the salience of these divisions should likely decrease. How these changes might influence the nation-building project is an important question for future research.

What may be problematic is that Taiwanese identification has often been constructed as a reaction against "the other" as much as a consideration of what "is" Taiwanese. Taiwan identity has indeed emerged as a reaction against foreign domination, in response to American influence, and in reaction against China's irredentism. In the social science literature, there is less investigation of the particular cultural attributes that qualify Taiwanese as a discreet culture apart from an imagined Chinese or provincial culture.²²

Can a separate nationalism on Taiwan emerge from a mutually exclusive political allegiance to the ROC government or must its realization wait until a clearly distinct cultural identity arises from the whole society? Research indicates that growing numbers of people can identify themselves culturally and racially as Chinese, but politically (civically) as Taiwanese.²³ An emerging culture on Taiwan may not be distinct from China, but incorporates Chinese and local traditions to arrive at a new synthesis. Hence, shared origins dating back to Cathay had, by the turn of the century, developed along different paths and arrived at different outcomes on each side of the Strait.

In Taiwan, civic nationalism impedes political unification as two diametrically opposed identity elites of the Blue and Green camps seek to elevate their claims over Taiwan sovereignty through often unfortunate manipulations of the democratic regime.²⁴ Taiwan people do not wish to jeopardize their democratic institutions under the "one country, two systems" approach. Reunification under shared cultural national identities has been the saving grace for reunification on Taiwan. Cultural nationalism, as long as it is Chinese cultural nationalism under the KMT, is welcomed by Beijing and facilitates unification. Clearly, a Taiwanese cultural-political nationalist challenge would diminish prospects for unification and is partially blamed by both Beijing and the Blue parties for the deterioration of cross-Strait relations since 2000.

Civic nationalism through democratization has successfully ingrained Taiwan people to hold sovereignty and self-determination as core values, and all major political parties accept this important point. The role of the culture debate on Taiwan, although divisive, has been to keep the population focused on the false dichotomy of being Chinese or Taiwanese rather than working toward constructing and enunciating a truly shared sense of their local identity—that is both Chinese and Taiwanese. This debate works against rationalizing national identity, but may actually bolster Taiwan's security vis-à-vis the mainland by keeping Taiwan's China culture in the foreground.

Should cultural nationalism become marginalized or take on a predominantly Taiwanese Nationalism and civic nationalism steer identity construction, prospects for unification will diminish further regardless of political change on the mainland. Simply because two states might share aspects of rationalized civic identities, this is insufficient grounds to merge in a state union. There must be an element of cultural identity that mandates one group's need to sacrifice its de facto sovereignty to the "motherland."

Taiwan's National Image

Table 6.2 indicates significant progress in most indicators of rationalization of the identity and state on Taiwan. Through the 1990s, Taiwan enjoyed remarkable progress in identity formulation and regime consolidation in mutually reinforcing ways. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, President Chen has attempted to redirect identity formulation with rhetoric and actions that seek to expand the "limits of the possible." The passage of a popular referendum law, 2004 cross-Straits referendum, abolition of the national assembly, and future constitutional revision have all been used to stretch the public's imagination. This has resulted in polarized political discourse, heightened tensions between Taipei and Beijing, and drawn uncommonly harsh cautions from the United States.²⁵

In light of the above discussion, one can see three broad periods in the development of Taiwan's national identity and national image projection: 1952–1979 (constrained–certain ROC), 1980–1995 (constrained-in flux Taiwan), and 1996–present (less constrained-in flux Taiwan). The national image projected from Taipei has been instrumental in securing for the ROC indirect partnerships with states via nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and "membership" in state communities. Obviously, Taipei's lack of diplomatic recognition by all but 25 states limits most interstate relationships to partnerships with capital cities and limits "membership" in state communities to non-International Government

Table 6.2 Rationalization of Identity and State on Taiwan

	<i>1952–1979</i>	<i>1980–1995</i>	<i>1996–Present</i>
Regime	Authoritarian	Transitional	Democracy
Basis of Legitimacy	Anticommunist	Liberalization Third wave transition	Constitutionalism
Administrative Coherence	ROC	ROC on Taiwan	Taiwan
National Myth	China	China and localization	Localization
Armed Forces	Allegiance	Allegiance	Some flux?
Cross-Straits Relations	Consistent and predictable	Consistent and minor flux	Inconsistent and flux
Economy	Developing Capitalistic	Newly Industrializing Economy (NIE) Capitalistic	Mature/China dependent

Organizations (IGOs). Taiwan's successful modernization has led to its national image as a rationalized state. Whereas democratization first bolstered the process of rationalization, it has introduced the political and periodic ethnic turbulence that threatens a derationalization of the national identity. This has not gone unnoticed by the international community and has introduced incongruence between the projected national image and the national identity agenda on Taiwan.

Table 6.3 presents the images projected with the images received by an external actor, say the United States. There is high congruence of images for the first two time periods. I argue that this is largely a result in the first period of consistency in the China myth (state and cultural) on Taiwan. Congruence during the second period of diplomatic isolation was facilitated by the civic identity agenda. Taiwan was a nascent democracy and consolidating relatively smoothly through the expansion of participation to previously marginalized groups. Incongruence during the third period is the result of a move toward cultural nationalism that has misaligned the perceived national image with that being projected.

Since 1952, Taiwan has relied upon the United States as security guarantor. During the bulk of the Cold War years, the KMT had to juggle the dual tasks of building a national identity that legitimized the regime, while also keeping that identity in line with a national image that placed Taiwan securely in the Cold War security paradigm of the United States. As such, an important consequence of Taiwan's elite-driven nationalism was regime legitimation internally and externally. With the outbreak of the Korean and Vietnam wars, fears of monolithic communism, and American need for developing labor, consumer,

Table 6.3 National Identity, Image, and Image Congruence

	<i>1952–1979</i>	<i>1980–1995</i>	<i>1996–Present</i>
Image	(1) Cold War ally (2) Free China (3) Stable elite control (4) Developing	(1) Third Wave democracy (2) ROC on Taiwan (3) Stable elite control (4) Miracle economy	(1) Consolidated democracy (2) Taiwan ROC (3) Elite accountability (4) Mature economy; Taipei-Beijing interdependence
Perceived Image	(1) Cold War ally (2) “Free” China (3) Stable elite control (4) Developing	(1) Third Wave democracy (2) Taipei (3) Stable elite control (4) Miracle economy	(1) Unstable democracy (2) Taiwan provocative (3) Confused accountability, unstable elite control (4) China-dependent economy
Identity Image Overlay	High Congruence	High Congruence	Low Congruence

and investment markets, the anticommunist, market-leaning, and developmentally minded KMT regime found close congruence with the security interests of the United States. Taiwan was a rational, modernizing, and capitalizing state within the “free” world.

The United States and ROC maintained diplomatic relations until President Carter’s unilateral move to switch diplomatic recognition to the PRC in 1979. The change in American policy toward ROC was not the result of a sudden shift in Taiwan’s image projection, it was rather the result of a change in American policy produced by a shift in the PRC image projection from closed to more open, and the perception of the PRC as a leverage against the former Soviet Union.

Since 1979, Taipei has had to adjust to the reality of almost total diplomatic isolation. In conjunction with Taiwan’s mounting diplomatic losses, the double de-recognitions in the 1970s (United Nations in 1971 and United States in 1979) elevated the need for the KMT to redefine the image it projected and the nature of nonstate “memberships” it sought. The new reality was confirmed in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that expressed the new nature of Washington-Taipei relations. Section 2(c) of the TRA justifies American policy in part by emphasizing the protection of human rights on Taiwan. “The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.”²⁶ This was in line with the regime-softening beginning to take shape on the island. The process of change had already begun with Chiang Ching-kuo’s Taiwanization of the KMT, but accelerated with broader liberalization through the 1980s and democratization in the early 1990s.

KMT elites understood that state membership in the most influential interstate governmental organizations was no longer possible and sought membership in functional organizations and the liberal communities of states. This would keep Taipei aligned with American preferences, project Taiwan as a peaceful sister and responsible economic partner in a growing democratic community, and maintain a stark contrast with Beijing’s illiberalism. The KMT retained anticommunism, developmentalism, and market orientation, and eventually modified this with membership in the community of democratic states by 1992. By this point, the KMT no longer promoted forced reunification with the mainland, it rather emphasized a national image dedicated to a responsible and peaceful process. Improving Taipei-Beijing relations in the first years of the 1990s, culminating with the Wang-Koo talks, was illustrative of this. These moves were embraced internally and abroad as they were in alignment with Taipei’s image shift from a Cold War developing state to post-Cold War developing liberal state. As a result, Taiwan could claim a proud place in the Third Wave democracies, and one of only few in East Asia.

Economically, Taiwan gained the label “Miracle Economy” by the early 1990s and was celebrated in a now infamous 1996 World Bank report as a model for other developing societies. Taiwan retained its position as a leading trading partner with the United States and became the primary source for much of the computer hardware that enabled the globalization boom in the 1990s. Taiwan’s status as a newly industrialized economy gave rise to a Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) per capita that would qualify Taiwan as an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economy, with an increase in its outgoing direct foreign investment, and claims of dollar diplomacy. In essence, domestic elites sought to further their internal legitimacy through economic development and external significance through economic integration. Taiwan was, however, a member of only 11 IGOs in 1991.

By the end of the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the internal political dynamics on Taiwan led to the increasing localization of identity and the state to the island of Taiwan. Whereas this process began in the previous period under civic nationalism, it has begun to assume more cultural aspects in the last decade. This has proved to be extremely divisive and, while not posing an immediate threat to the regime, has exposed weaknesses in Taiwan's democratic framework and what appear to be partisan attachments to democratic political culture. In combination, this turbulence may be altering the image of Taiwan's democracy from one of dynamism and progression to gridlock and conflict. The culprit appears to be the switch from an agenda of civic to cultural nationalism.

The demise of Taiwan's liberal image is far from sure as the Chen administration has rather vigorously projected soft power through a variety of organizations. By 2002, the number of IGO memberships enjoyed by Taiwan was up to 31, albeit under a variety of names and status.²⁷ President Chen's efforts to mobilize grassroots DPP supporters through "Taiwan consciousness" are an effort to offset his party's declining electoral prospects. This is creating the perception in some circles of Taiwan as an aggressive or provocative democracy. By holding the sovereignty of the Taiwan people as the reason for a more assertive policy toward Beijing, Chen has also held sovereignty of the people as a shield against concerted efforts by the United States to temper the president's rhetoric and actions.

The rise of democracy on Taiwan that has allowed a free and freewheeling debate on Taiwanese identity has certainly complicated the promotion of "One China" favored by Beijing. Citizens on Taiwan hold a clear regime allegiance to the Taipei government, not to Beijing. The identity discourse certainly has not brought Taiwan people closer to a contemporary Chinese acculturation, although it has brought Taiwan people a recognition of clear historical and cultural roots in the mainland. These two developments work against near-term acceptance of Beijing's "One China" or "One Country, Two Systems" approach to unification.

Economically, Taiwan is still one of the wealthiest societies in the world, although experiencing lower growth rates more akin to mature economies. It still retains top 10 trading status with the United States, although this has slipped closer to the bottom of this cohort in the last several years. Driving much of Taiwan's growth is the increasing economic interdependence between Taiwan and the mainland. On one hand, this is supportive of Taiwan's peaceful integrationist and trade image. On the other hand, increasing trade and investment in the mainland runs counter to the political isolation of the two sides and this casts doubt on Taiwan's desire to establish itself as an entity truly independent of the mainland.

Strategically, Taiwan's geopolitical importance remains unchanged, but the identity debate has also created turbulence in this regard. Chen's actions have

prompted numerous stern warnings from Beijing culminating in China's passage of the Anti-Secession Law and American admonitions to be less provocative. Based on international reaction to the 2004 referendum issue and the 2006 National Unification Council (NUC) decision, elites in Taipei had become more provocative in their management of cross-Strait relations. This, in conjunction with the Blue camp's blockage of the special arms procurement package, presents a mixed signal of a provocative cross-Strait policy from the executive branch and a lack of legislative will to go to all extremes to defend the island. Blockage of the arms procurement also works against American interests, which in turn further aggravates the political turbulence between Washington and Taipei.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the nexus between the domestic agenda of national identity formation and a state's efforts to project that identity to secure the support of an external actor, or actors. National identity determines the range of the "possible" and thus progress toward building a rationalized state. The degree to which this is accomplished determines the type of national image a state can project. As long as the two are congruent, the probability of that state entering into the reaffirming and protective umbrella of state or community relationships is high and remains stable.

Problems may arise when the elite identity agenda and image do not align. We have seen this in Taiwan over the last decade due to a shift from civic nationalism to a mix of civic and cultural nationalism. Conditions that had previously rationalized—administrative coherence, national myth, foreign policy (cross-Strait policy), and armed forces—have unraveled somewhat. Although the civic nationalism of state-building bolstered regime legitimacy and the above factors, the messy business of reconstructing the nation has resulted in intense polarization, cross-Strait tension, and a bumpy Washington-Taipei relationship. Hence, the framing of Taiwan's national image is forced to adjust or face continued poor reception by targeted actors, in particular the United States. If an image is not well received, then this calls into question the forces that have led to incongruence and this can be traced directly back to the identity agenda of the incumbent elite. This dual process empowers opposing elites' identity agenda domestically and externally. Nationalist conflict is exacerbated and the cycle continues.

Clearly, leaders must often balance their desired goals with a sense of pragmatism with regard to how much they can expect to stretch the imagination of the image recipients. In addition, trade-offs are often made between pursuing sovereign policy and making policies that compromise some sovereignty in exchange for certain payoffs. President Chen was elected largely on a platform that would ultimately witness a revisitation of national identity on Taiwan, and his desire to see a much more localized revision of that identity was no mystery in Taiwan or elsewhere. As stated in the introduction, this chapter seeks neither to advocate an "answer" to the identity debate nor to reach into more normative evaluations of policy. Rather, this has been an exercise in providing a model to enable us to examine the process of identity and image projection and understand the diplomatic consequences.

The above discussion is not only conceptual but holds very real policy implications, as revealed during interviews in Taipei from November 16 to 24, 2006. During interviews with officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Information Office, and Ministry of Education, the author was told repeatedly of the ongoing effort to “brand” Taiwan in order to facilitate the consistent projection of international image. Clearly, there is little new that is of use for public diplomacy as a means of branding a country, its policies, and its people. Germane to this chapter is the fragile character of this process on Taiwan and its consequences. What was made clear to the author was that there is considerable ongoing debate about what Taiwan’s identity is even prior to deciding how to project that identity to the world in the form of literal and conceptual images. In addition, the political turbulence on Taiwan has somewhat inhibited a coordinated and unified cross-ministry approach to this important project of public diplomacy.

The point here is not to say that change is inherently counterproductive. Instead, elites should anticipate changes in identity that affect image and proactively address this dynamic. This would entail more cautious management of the identity agenda and/or image. This is, of course, if elites find it desirable to maintain extant relations and community memberships.

Notes

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CHAPTER 7

ETHNIC AND CIVIC NATIONALISMS: TWO ROADS TO THE FORMATION OF A TAIWANESE NATION

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Around the time of democratic transition starting from the late 1980s, national identity has surfaced as the most salient issue in Taiwan's politics; since then it has come to dominate the political discourse.¹ The issue has greatly contributed to ethnic tension and political division in national politics and is also an important factor in the international politics of the area. Based on data collected in nationwide surveys over a period of more than a decade, this chapter will analyze trends of national identity among Taiwan's general public. It focuses on changing trends in national identity among Taiwan's two main ethnic groups, namely native Taiwanese, and first and later-generation immigrants from the Chinese mainland, whom we here refer to as mainlanders. During four decades of the Kuomintang's (KMT's) authoritarian rule, tension between two groups had been a latent force contributing to the prevailing social animosity. Although the political domination of minority mainlanders had crumbled with democratization, the identity issue surfaced to continue the tension. By probing deeply into the identity of the two ethnic groups, this chapter shows that, contrary to popular belief and conception, the two groups are in fact converging in Taiwanese identity. Nonetheless, they seem to uphold the same identity on different bases. Although the difference has caused some political tension within the society in the postdemocratization politics, it however is much more malleable than the opposition of identity. Another finding in our research is the important fact that although people in Taiwan are still holding competing national identities, they do however have high consensus in demanding autonomy to decide their own future.

The native Taiwanese denoted in this chapter are those whose ancestors immigrated into the island from southern China from the early seventeenth century

to 1895, the year the island was ceded to Japan. The island was under the rule of Japanese colonial regime for 50 years, until Japan relinquished claims to the territory in 1945, at which time Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist government took possession. The native Taiwanese are composed of two groups, Hakka and Holo (or the more popular *benshengren*). Although Hakka and Holo use different mother languages, they share the same historical experience and memory. As Weber pointed out, ethnic groups in some cases are based on, and consolidated by, the historical "memories of colonization and migration."² This point is often neglected by students of ethnic politics. A previous research found that their political attitudes, including party support, self identity, national identity, and distrust of the mainlanders, are nearly identical between the two groups.³ In our discussion of "ethnic politics," we thus include Hakka and Holo as "native Taiwanese" vis-à-vis mainlanders.

Chinese mainlanders are those who moved with the KMT to the island after the nationalist government was defeated by the Chinese Communists in 1949; they now constitute about 15% of the population. During the four decades of authoritarian rule by the KMT, the Chinese mainlanders controlled all governmental, military, and cultural apparatus, including schools and mass media following their arrival. The government's cruel repression during and following the uprising on February 28, 1947 added another factor to the tension and hostility between native Taiwanese and mainlanders. Although they no longer dominate national politics, they are still influential in mass media and educational institutes.

Since the 1990s, while ethnic tension has lessened due to democratization and social mingling over the past four decades, the identity issue has emerged to continue to create tension. A previous research finds that close to half of the native Taiwanese have a negative image of the mainlanders for their "not loving" Taiwan, and the distrust of the latter among those who uphold Taiwanese national identity is shockingly high. Worse still, this distrust of mainlanders among native Taiwanese is not offset by close social mingling, measured in terms of having marital relatives.⁴ It is true that the main constituency supporting Taiwanese independence consists of native Taiwanese, while the mainland group leans toward Chinese national identity.⁵ But this depiction of the inclinations of the two ethnic groups presents an oversimplification that ignores certain important facts. Oversimplification and misconception contributes greatly to increasing ethnic tension. It overlooks the fact that, as revealed in this study, a significant segment of mainlanders have come to accept the idea of Taiwanese independence. This segment of mainlanders is different from native Taiwanese in that its members can accept the idea of an independent Taiwan without giving up their Chinese identity. This finding leads us to a very important theoretical speculation. If we are currently in the formative stage of a new Taiwanese nation, then these two ethnic groups seem to conceive of the new nation as having a different basis. For native Taiwanese, the new nation is the political expression of "Taiwanese-ness," which bears a unique cultural legacy and unique historical memory. With the exception of the mainlanders, the new nation is defined more in the political terms of citizenship. If the striving of native Taiwanese for an

independent Taiwan falls into the genre of "ethnic nationalism," then mainlanders' acceptance of an independent Taiwan is a "civic nationalism."

To elaborate further, here is a summary of the findings and arguments of this chapter. First, attitudes of national identity among Taiwan's general public are currently undergoing a rapid change. The unquestionable major trend is the rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of Chinese national identity. Nevertheless, contrary to the popular contention that mainlanders are the inconvertible antagonists of Taiwan independence, we have found that they are not immune to the impact of rising Taiwanese identity. In fact, a consensus on an independent Taiwan actually seems to be emerging between the two groups.

The second finding of this chapter concerns the different patterns of change between native Taiwanese and mainlanders. The two groups are in fact converging in accepting the idea of Taiwan independence, yet each has a different basis for conceiving of a new nation. For native Taiwanese, the new nation is conceived as representing a "Taiwanese" people, who bear a totally different historical heritage from that of the Chinese and are culturally different from them. This congruence of culture/ethnicity and political nationhood is usually termed "**ethnic nationalism**."⁶ Admittedly, the typology of ethnic versus civic nationalism is contentious among the students of nationalism. But, as the following discussion and survey data will show, this distinction does properly depict these two groups' separate conceptions of a new Taiwanese nation. While native Taiwanese base their national idea on Taiwanese culture and historical legacy, mainlanders view it more as a political entity. More and more mainlanders have come to accept the idea of an independent Taiwan and have no objection to being a citizen of a Taiwanese state, whatever its name. They, however, do not reject, as their native Taiwanese counterparts do, their Chinese-ness. For them, "Taiwanese" is a political term denoting political citizenship, and the Taiwanese state is composed of citizens rather than members of any ethnic group. Their notion of defining a political community is one of "**civic national identity**." So while these two groups converge in accepting an independent Taiwan, their different conceptions of the new nation cause tension and conflict between them. For mainlanders, native Taiwanese's emphasis on local culture which they cannot share, and historical memory of which they can never be a part of, actively excludes them from the process of nation formation. For native Taiwanese, the People's Republic of China (PRC), with its perpetual military threats and appeals to Chinese unity, constitutes the single most extreme threat to Taiwanese Nationalism. Thus for them, mainlanders' persistence in maintaining an ethnic-cultural Chinese identity becomes a threat to Taiwan, if not a betrayal of it.

Thirdly, although Taiwanese identity has undergone a rapid rise to become the position of many Taiwanese, the force of Taiwanese Nationalism seems to have reached a point of stagnation in the last decade. The portion of the population that is still open to the issue of Taiwanese independence and unification with China in fact remains the largest plurality. But what is most important is the fact that, regardless of how people in Taiwan vary in their inclinations toward national identity or their desires for the future, they are very much in consensus

on one thing, namely demanding autonomy in deciding that future. This consensus may be the result of democratization or modernization. Whatever its ideological base, this fact should be taken into consideration by foreign powers in their approaches for achieving stability and security in cross-Strait relations.

Trends of Change Compared

Before we embark on an analysis of the changing views on national identity among Taiwan's general public, a few words about the quantification of national identity are in order. Measurement of subjective attitudes is often a serious problem in polls. Given the complicated nature of national identity, its measurement is even more problematic. An appropriate measurement of the variable, however, is the first step in sound theoretical analysis. Because of its importance in Taiwanese politics, national identity has gained much attention in most of the social surveys in Taiwan since it surfaced after the transition to democracy in the late 1980s. In measuring views on national identity, we took an approach different from that of other pollsters. As this has been presented in more detail in another work, we will restate it only briefly here.⁷

Most social surveys have gauged views on national identity by asking the simple question: "Are you for Taiwanese independence, unification with China, or the status quo?" This way of posing the question may be good for finding out how respondents stand on the issue of Taiwanese independence versus unification with China, but it may not be revealing concerning national identity per se. What polls using this question actually reveal are respondents' opinions concerning whether to declare independence or to unify with China in the foreseeable future. To be sure, national identity is highly related to these options for the future. A Taiwanese Nationalist would be unlikely to opt for unification with China, while a Chinese Nationalist would not be likely to choose Taiwanese independence. But the two attitudes are not perfectly complimentary and should not be taken as two sides of the same coin. It is not uncommon for the expression of one's national identity to be revised, constrained, or impinged upon by unfavorable, external political circumstances. Under such circumstances, views on national identity may be modified into a more practical standpoint when it comes to the issue of independence or unification, at least in the short term.

For example, a Taiwanese Nationalist may prefer the status quo because he or she believes that moves toward independence will provoke military action from the PRC, which has threatened several times in the past few years to take military action if Taiwan declares its independence. This Taiwanese Nationalist may be very proud of being Taiwanese and desire an independent Taiwanese state as a final goal, but these sentiments may not be so strong as to force him or her to ignore the likelihood of waging war with a strong enemy. The risk of war may induce a Taiwanese Nationalist to opt for the status quo in the short run. Likewise, a Chinese Nationalist may also opt for the status quo because of the disparity in political, social, and economic development between two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As a Chinese Nationalist, he or she may believe that the Chinese on two sides of the Strait should eventually be united into one single state but still

prefer that unification happen only after China catches up with Taiwan. For such Chinese Nationalists, unification is desirable, but only, as contemporary political discourse so commonly puts it, in the "future tense."

The attitudes of both Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalists can thus be modified into more practical positions by political conditions, not unlike the way romantic love can be modified by pragmatic considerations. As a result, people with opposing views on national identity can converge in preferring the status quo. This explains why the proportion of those preferring status quo is always very large in surveys. But at the same time, there is no theoretical ground for arguing that those preferring the status quo are without any particular views on national identity. As tables in the Appendix show, those opting for status quo actually consist of three different groups. In 2000, for example, over half the respondents preferring status quo were either Taiwanese Nationalists (31.3%) or Chinese Nationalists (21.9%). Unfavorable political conditions thus seem to have forced those holding opposite views on national identity to converge in opting for the status quo. It would be a big mistake if these choices were interpreted as coming from individuals who either opposed Taiwanese or Chinese Nationalism, or had no particular view on national identity.

In addition, we argue that a good measurement of national identities in Taiwan must take into account the facts that some people may not be inclined toward any particular national identity or that some people may see themselves as holding two national identities at the same time. It may seem strange that the people of a country may not hold any particular national allegiance or else conceive of themselves as belonging to two different nations at the same time, but this seems to be the case in Taiwan. Chinese identity, constructed and imposed by the KMT regime through education and the mass media in the past several decades, is fading away. But a new Taiwanese identity has not had much time to grow, or to be "invented" or "imagined," by the public. Hence it is possible that some people may claim Taiwanese identity without forsaking Chinese identity. The existence of such individuals may have important implications for both the theoretical study of nationalism and the framing of policy and political strategy.

To probe people's hidden views on national identity, we posed the following two questions in our surveys: (1) *If Taiwanese independence would not precipitate a war, then would you agree that Taiwan should become an independent country?* (2) *If Taiwan and China were to become comparably developed economically, socially, and politically, would you agree that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be united into one country?* By removing the factors constraining the expression of true identity, these two questions give respondents an opportunity to express their inclinations.

The second step in measuring national identity was to cross-tabulate the answers to these two questions. In doing so, four main categories of nationalist groups emerged. The first group agreed that Taiwan should become independent if it could do so peacefully, but did not want reunification with China even if China caught up in terms of economic, social, and political development (Cell I in the upper right of table 7.1). They seemed to oppose unification not on account of the disparities between two sides, but because, for them, Taiwan and China are two different nations. Similar levels of development do not constitute

Table 7.1 National Identities in Taiwan, 1992–2005

		%(<i>N</i>)			
	<i>Taiwan Independence If No War</i>	<i>Chinese Unification If No Disparity</i>			
		<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Answer</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Total</i>
1992.02	Agree	II 311(25.0)	29(2.3)	I 116(9.3)	456(36.7)
1993.03		510(25.7)	40(2.0)	196(9.9)	746(37.6)
1994.07		346(25.2)	78(5.7)	135(9.8)	559(40.7)
1996.03		548(39.9)	31(2.3)	298(21.7)	877(63.9)
1998.07		637(35.6)	83(4.6)	396(22.1)	1116(62.3)
2000.08		485(35.2)	32(2.3)	338(24.5)	855(62.0)
2004.08		435(23.9)	65(3.6)	525(28.8)	1025(56.2)
2005.04	No Answer	385(30.6)	61(4.9)	348(27.7)	794(63.2)
1992.02		45(3.6)	82(6.6)	12(1.0)	139(11.2)
1993.03		84(4.2)	379(19.1)	27(1.4)	490(24.7)
1994.07		88(6.4)	229(16.7)	16(1.2)	333(24.3)
1996.03		34(2.5)	161(11.7)	18(1.3)	213(15.5)
1998.07		66(3.7)	156(8.7)	27(1.5)	249(13.9)
2000.08		29(2.1)	107(7.8)	6(0.4)	142(10.3)
2004.08	Disagree	36(2.0)	190(10.4)	31(1.7)	257(14.1)
2005.04		34(2.7)	127(10.1)	26(2.1)	187(14.9)
1992.02		III 472(38.0)	39(3.1)	IV 37(11.0)	648(52.1)
1993.03		560(28.2)	38(1.9)	49(7.5)	747(37.7)
1994.07		355(25.9)	41(3.0)	85(6.2)	481(35.0)
1996.03		237(17.3)	5(0.4)	40(2.9)	282(20.6)
1998.07		297(16.6)	27(1.5)	102(5.7)	426(23.8)
2000.08	Total	272(19.7)	16(1.2)	93(6.7)	381(27.6)
2004.08		273(15.0)	46(2.5)	222(12.2)	541(29.7)
2005.04		167(13.3)	18(1.4)	91(7.2)	276(21.9)
1992.02		828(66.6)	150(12.1)	265(21.3)	1243(100.0)
1993.03		1154(58.2)	457(23.0)	372(18.8)	1983(100.0)
1994.07		789(57.5)	348(25.3)	236(17.2)	1373(100.0)
1996.03		819(59.7)	197(14.4)	356(25.9)	1372(100.0)
1998.07		1000(55.8)	266(14.9)	525(29.3)	1791(100.0)
2000.08		786(57.0)	155(11.2)	437(31.7)	1378(100.0)
2004.08		744(40.8)	301(16.5)	778(42.7)	1823(100.0)
2005.04		586(46.6)	206(16.4)	465(37.0)	1257(100.0)

a legitimate reason for unification, not unlike the situation between Canada and United States. We may even go as far as to say that for them, even if China were to become a country like the United States or Switzerland, in other words a model country as defined in local political discourse, they would still oppose unification. Like one’s real mother, the motherland is forever, even if it is poor and ugly. It is what provides the basis of national identity. The group that believes in this motherland consists of what we call the “Taiwanese Nationalists.”

The proportion of Taiwanese Nationalists in our sample groups stayed quite stable in 1992 and 1993, but rose considerably from 1994 (9.8%) to 1996 (21.7%). In the past decade or so, the proportion of Taiwanese Nationalists rose, but seemed to stop short of a 30% ceiling. A spike in 1996 seemed to be an effect of a PRC missile exercises, which signaled a warning against possible moves toward Taiwanese independence during Taiwan's first ever popular presidential election in 1996. It seems to be an example of nationalistic sentiments aroused by a war with or threats from foreign powers.⁸ The questionnaire of the 1996 survey however neither provides no data to confirm our speculation on this missile effect, nor does it help us to answer another theoretically important question: At the loss of which other group did this Taiwanese Nationalist group expand? Since these surveys were not panel studies, there is no way to analyze the shifts in national identity among various groups. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the Taiwanese Nationalists (as well as the parallel rapid shrinking of Chinese Nationalists that will be shown later) does have some important theoretical implications. In many works on nationalism and national identity, terms such as "ethnicity," "culture," and "historical memory" have become keys of understanding. Underlying these perspectives is the assumption that forming a nation is a relatively long-term historical process. Even if culture and history are taken only as raw materials that are then molded into some national identity by cultural and political elites, the making of that identity is still presumed to be a relatively long-term process. Brubaker and Beissinger have however recently called this paradigm into question with convincing arguments for the case of nationalism in Eastern Europe.⁹ The fluctuation of Taiwanese views on their own national identity revealed in table 7.1 seems to further confirm the view that the formation of national identity can be a short-term event rather than a long-term historical process.

The second nationalist group in our survey is composed of those who gave a negative answer to the first question, but a positive one to the second one (Cell III in the lower left). They agreed with unification with a compatible China but opposed even peaceful Taiwanese independence. For them, the idea of Taiwanese independence was morally wrong, and we categorize this group as the "Chinese Nationalists." Their proportion has declined steadily from 38% of the total sample in 1992 to 28.2% in 1993 and then to less than 15% after 2004. A comparison of trends through all groups in table 7.1 suggests that the most conspicuous changes during the past decade have been the rise of Taiwanese Nationalism and the decline of Chinese Nationalism.

In addition to the polar opposites found in these two nationalist groups, there was a significantly large group in all surveys during this period whose existence was rather intriguing. Those included here gave positive answers to both questions (Cell II in the upper left). This third group consists of those as having what could be construed as having either a dual identity or no particular national identity. They are willing to accept an independent Taiwan if their security is not endangered, and they are likewise willing to accept unification with China if there are no negative economic or political repercussions. We've assigned them the tentative label, "pragmatists." As to the question of whether they envision themselves as having dual identity or no particular identity, this awaits further

study. For now, suffice it to say that with this group's large size, both politicians and theoretical speculators would have much to gain from deeper analysis. The proportion of these pragmatists grew as the issue of national identity gained more attention in the political arena and became more openly debated, increasing from roughly one quarter of the sample in both 1992 and 1993 to 39.9% in 1996; it sized as large as one third of the total sample thereafter.¹⁰

As the data shows, the proportions of the three groups already mentioned—Taiwanese Nationalists, Chinese Nationalists, and pragmatists—changed greatly during the course of this study. The fourth group consists of a relatively insignificant number of respondents who gave negative answers to both questions (Cell IV in the lower right). They seemed to prefer the status quo, so we tentatively term them the “conservatives.” Due to the group's small size, we will leave them out of the rest of this study.

An overall rise in Taiwanese identity along with a leveling-off in Chinese identity can also be seen by looking at responses to the questions by themselves—Independence with no war? Unification with no disparity?—in the side and bottom margins of table 7.1 in which raw totals are given. Although the Chinese Nationalist group was in great decline (from 38.0% to 13.3% over 14 years), a large proportion consistently continued to accept the possibility of unification with China, as the figures in the lower margin show. This proportion has declined from 66.6% in 1992, to around 57% in 2000, but the latest data shows that close to half of the sample would still accept unification under the right conditions. On the other hand, the rise of Taiwanese identity has been accompanied by a rise in the proportion of those who would reject unification even on favorable terms, which was around 40% in 2004 and 2005. The figures on the right-hand margin show that the percentages agreeing with a peacefully independent Taiwan had a total net increase from 36.7% to 63.2%, while those disagreeing with Taiwanese independence under any circumstances decreased greatly, from 52.1% in 1992 to 21.9% in 2005. So the idea of Taiwan independence seemed to gain ground, but only at the moderate expense of Chinese identity.

Since it has often been argued that native Taiwanese are the main constituency of Taiwanese national identity, one is apt to assume that the rise of Taiwanese national identity occurred mainly among native Taiwanese. Mainlanders, on the other hand, widely depicted as the staunch supporters of Chinese identity, are seen as fierce antagonists of Taiwanese identity. However, a preliminary analysis of the attitudes of the two ethnic groups shows this popular belief to be far too simplistic, if not totally wrong. As figure 7.1 shows, the national identity of mainlanders has also undergone a radical change. It may be true that the proportion of Taiwanese Nationalists among the mainlanders has remained small; what is more important and contrary to popular belief is the fact that the proportion of Chinese Nationalists in the mainlanders group has also declined significantly. In 1992, when we started to conduct the survey, close to 80% of mainlanders could be classified as Chinese Nationalists. Nevertheless, the figure had declined to less than 50% in 2000 and around 40% in 2005. The decrease of Chinese Nationalists was offset by an increase in pragmatists. Mainlanders have displayed a clear

tendency of shedding orthodox Chinese Nationalism for pragmatism, or dual identity. In other words, mainlanders have been willing to adopt a Taiwanese identity without giving up their Chinese identity. Although they are seldom converted to Taiwanese Nationalism, more and more of them have come to accept the idea of an independent Taiwanese state while also upholding strong Chinese identity.

The pattern of change among native Taiwanese however is quite different. As figure 7.2 shows, among native Taiwanese, Chinese Nationalism has declined *along with*, or likely as a consequence of, the rise of Taiwanese Nationalism. The proportion of Chinese Nationalists among native Taiwanese who responded to both questions with clear answers has declined from close to 50% in 1992 to around 20% in 2000, and continued to decline toward the 10% level in 2005. The proportion of Taiwanese Nationalists has meanwhile risen from 14.5% in 1992 to 46.2% in 2003 and stayed at around the same level since. It seems that among native Taiwanese, Chinese Nationalism is being replaced by Taiwanese Nationalism. Comparing the patterns of change in national identity of the two ethnic groups, we arrive at the conclusion that *mainlanders are picking up a new Taiwanese national identity without giving up their Chinese national identity, while native Taiwanese are shedding Chinese national identity for a new Taiwanese national identity.*




Figure 7.1 National Identity of Mainlanders, 1992–2005




Figure 7.2 National Identity of Native Taiwanese, 1992–2005

Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

As figures 7.1 and 7.2 show, the ethnicity or ethnic background of respondents is an important factor in Taiwan's changing perceptions of national identity. There is disagreement among students of nationalism on the basis of nation formation. Some see the nation as a modern project, formed either to meet the needs of modern capitalism and functional to its development,¹¹ or as a consequence of modern print capitalism.¹² From this perspective, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist."¹³ Others however emphasize the importance of an ethnic base in nation formation. As this theory's most energetic advocate puts it, "not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of preexisting *ethnie* and their ethnocentrisms, but that in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to 'nation-building' (Smith 1986, 17)."¹⁴ The data we have assembled from Taiwan, which shows both changes in perception of national identity as well as different trends in its development among its two main ethnic groups, seems to suggest the importance of ethnicity at least in the case for the formation of a new Taiwanese nation.

Next we will take another step in analyzing the relationship between nationality and ethnicity by going beyond ethnic background to individual identity. We have made the assumption that a respondent's individual ethnic identity, and not his or her objective ethnic background per se, may be what accounts for different views on national identity. Here we followed the conventional way of assessing ethnic identity, a formula quite popular among pollsters in Taiwan, by asking the following question: "*In Taiwan, some people think of themselves as Chinese, while others think of themselves as Taiwanese. How do you think of yourself, Taiwanese, Chinese, or otherwise?*" Three responses were given: *Taiwanese, both Taiwanese and Chinese, and Chinese.*

By comparing individual identities found in the two groups, we also see significant differences in the patterns of change similar to those we found with national identity. The trend of change in individual identity among mainlanders is shown in figure 7.3. The proportion of mainlanders willing to call themselves Chinese but not Taiwanese radically decreased from 74% in 1992 to 26.4% in 2000, the year the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election. In the meantime, the proportion of mainlanders thinking of themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese increased from 24% to 67.6% during the same period. At the same time, the percentage of those identifying themselves as Taiwanese only also increased, though the difference is less striking than the two transformations just mentioned. The trend continued after 2000. The percentage of those identifying themselves as "Chinese only" dropped to 9.7% in 2005, while the "both Taiwanese and Chinese" segment rose to 74.5%. These patterns of change are very similar to those in attitudes toward national identity presented earlier. Just as few mainlanders converted to Taiwanese Nationalism, few rejected their Chinese identity by calling themselves Taiwanese. The main pattern of change seems to be the addition of a Taiwanese identity to the old Chinese identity. More and more mainlanders are thinking of themselves as

“both Chinese and Taiwanese.” *The trend of changing identity among mainlanders’ is that they are picking up a new Taiwanese individual identity without forsaking their old Chinese identity.*

Changes in individual identity among native Taiwanese have happened according to quite a different pattern. As we see from figure 7.4, an increasing number of native Taiwanese have shed Chinese identity, and with this decline, both Taiwanese identity and dual identity have been on the rise. After 2000, close to half of native Taiwanese have been saying that they are Taiwanese, not Chinese. *The trend of changing individual identity among native Taiwanese is that more and more are casting off Chinese identity for dual identity or unique Taiwanese identity.* This pattern of change is also similar to the trend in national identity.




Figure 7.3 Ethnic Identity among Mainlanders, 1992–2005




Figure 7.4 Ethnic Identity among Native Taiwanese, 1992–2005

On the other hand, what are the implications for both Taiwanese politics and theories of nationalism, of these patterns of change in national and individual identity, among these different ethnic groups? In answering this question, we will first examine how identity changes in the two groups are interrelated to show how each conceives of its own distinct notion of nationality. Table 7.2 is a cross-tabulation of ethnic and national identities among mainlanders. Two facts appear when the figures for different years are compared: The first is the disconnectedness between individual Chinese identity and Chinese Nationalism. In 1992 those identifying themselves as Chinese were also predominantly Chinese Nationalists. This congruence between Chinese identity and Chinese Nationalism is not surprising, as there had always been a dense cultural-ethnic content to Chinese Nationalism.¹⁵ Moreover, in the official propaganda throughout the duration of over four decades of authoritarian rule, “Chinese-ness” was a term loaded with heavy nationalist meaning: “All Chinese should belong to only one Chinese state”; “Taiwanese independence is a betrayal of [our Chinese] ancestors.” During this period, the idea of a Chinese nation with one and only

Table 7.2 Ethnic Identity and National Identity among Mainlanders, 1992–2004

		% (N)			
	<i>Ethnic Identity</i>	<i>Taiwanese Nationalism</i>	<i>Pragmatist/ Dual Identity</i>	<i>Chinese Nationalism</i>	<i>Total</i>
1992	Taiwanese	33.3(2)	33.3(2)	33.3(2)	2.7(6)
	Both	—	33.3(15)	66.7(30)	20.0(45)
	Chinese	5.2(9)	12.1(21)	82.8(144)	77.3(174)
					100(225)
1994	Taiwanese	25.0(6)	41.7(10)	33.3(8)	10.1(24)
	Both	11.3(9)	25.0(20)	63.8(51)	33.6(80)
	Chinese	4.5(6)	19.4(26)	76.1(102)	56.3(134)
					100(238)
1996	Taiwanese	18.2(2)	54.5(6)	27.3(3)	7.7(11)
	Both	8.8(7)	46.3(37)	45.0(36)	55.9(80)
	Chinese	3.8(2)	38.5(20)	57.7(30)	36.4(52)
					100(143)
1998	Taiwanese	31.6(6)	52.6(10)	15.8(3)	10.6(19)
	Both	13.7(16)	40.2(47)	46.2(54)	65.0(117)
	Chinese	2.3(1)	36.4(16)	61.4(27)	24.4(44)
					100(180)
2000	Taiwanese	55.6(15)	25.9(7)	18.5(5)	16.0(27)
	Both	15.29(15)	35.4(35)	49.5(49)	58.6(99)
	Chinese	4.7(2)	23.3(10)	72.1(31)	25.4(43)
					100(169)
2004	Taiwanese	45.5(10)	45.5(10)	9.1(2)	14.8(22)
	Both	12.5(13)	36.5(38)	51.0(53)	69.8(104)
	Chinese	8.7(2)	26.1(6)	65.2(15)	15.4(23)
					100(149)

one Chinese state was the main theme of attack against the idea of Taiwanese independence in the official propaganda and public discourse of Taiwan's tightly controlled mass media.

In recent years, the notion of "Chinese-ness" had far fewer connotations for a Chinese national identity. Among the mainlanders who identified themselves as "Chinese" in 1992, 82.8% of them also upheld Chinese Nationalism. The figure declined to 65.2% in 2004. On the other hand, more and more of them were coming to accept the idea of an independent Taiwanese state. In 1992 among those claiming a Chinese identity only 12.2% of them accepted the idea of an independent Taiwanese state. In 1996 and 1998, that total had risen to 38.5% and 36.4% respectively, and then declined to 26.1% in 2004. The declining congruence between Chinese identity and Chinese Nationalism among mainlanders seems to suggest that the term "Chinese" has fewer and fewer connotations of nationality. The same trend can be found among those with dual identity. In 1992, 66.7% of those claiming dual identity still admitted sympathies for Chinese Nationalism, but by 2004 this proportion had dropped to 51.0%. All these figures suggest that among mainlanders, Chinese identity, once an ethnic-national concept, is now losing its "nationality" component (see table 7.2).

If, among mainlanders, the notion of *Chinese* is being turned from identity with a nation to identity with a cultural-ethnic group, then what is the content of their newly adopted Taiwanese identity? Does *Taiwanese* merely represent a status of local residence, as is now the case with *Cantonese*? We assume that for mainlanders, the notion of being a Taiwanese does not describe local origin or provincial residence. The notion contains a much deeper political meaning. As figures in table 7.2 show (see also figures 7.1 and 7.3), those mainlanders claiming Taiwanese identity are more inclined toward pragmatism and Taiwanese Nationalism than those claiming only Chinese identity. The fact that Taiwanese identity makes one more inclined to accept an independent Taiwanese state seems to suggest a nationality component to that identity. When a mainlanders thinks of himself or herself as Taiwanese, he or she is more likely to say he or she is a citizen of Taiwan, rather than a resident of Taiwan.

This argument is also supported by other data more directly related to the issue. The surveys of 1996 and 2003 included the question: "*If the issue of independence or unification is to be decided by a referendum, who do you think is entitled to vote?*" Answers allowed in 1996 survey were: "resident citizens of Taiwan only" and "all people in Taiwan and China," while answers allowed in the 2003 survey were "people with Taiwanese citizenship" and "all Chinese in Taiwan and China." As table 7.3 shows, those identifying themselves as Taiwanese overwhelmingly thought only Taiwanese citizens in Taiwan should have any say in the matter of independence or unification. More importantly for our purposes is the fact that among those claiming Chinese identity, as high a proportion as 67.3% thought the same way. One of the main tenets of nationalism is congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the political community.¹⁶ If *Chinese* were conceptualized as a nation, then those who identified as Chinese would not only object to an independent Taiwanese state, they would also see all Chinese as members of the same political community and consequently deserving the same

Table 7.3 Ethnic Identity and Boundary of Citizen among Mainlanders, 1996, 1998, 2003

		% (N)				
	<i>Ethnic Identity</i>	<i>ROC Citizen</i>	<i>Chinese in Mainland</i>	<i>Overseas Chinese</i>	<i>NA</i>	<i>Total</i>
1996	Taiwanese	75.0(9)	8.3(1)	—	16.7(2)	7.3(12)
	Both	67.7(63)	24.7(23)	—	7.5 (7)	56.4(93)
	Chinese	58.3(35)	28.3(17)	—	13.3(8)	36.4(60)
						100(165)
1998	Taiwanese	76.0(19)	0(0)	8.0(2)	16.0(4)	10.8(25)
	Both	78.8(115)	4.8(7)	14.4(21)	2.1(3)	62.9(146)
	Chinese	68.8(42)	9.8(6)	13.1(8)	8.2(5)	26.3(61)
						100(232)
2003	Taiwanese	72.4(42)	3.4(2)	6.9(4)	17.2(10)	23.3(58)
	Both	76.0(92)	0.8(1)	5.8(7)	17.4(21)	48.6(121)
	Chinese	71.6(48)	3.0(2)	4.5(3)	20.9(14)	26.9(67)
						100(246)

say in deciding Taiwan's future. But in 1996, only 28.3% of those who identified themselves as Chinese were willing to include PRC citizens in their political community. These data seem to suggest that for most mainlanders, Chinese-ness is taken less and less as a national concept; instead, it is becoming a cultural-ethnic notion.

Although Chinese identity for mainlanders is becoming less of a national identity, its cultural content is still valued highly by them. The adoption of a Taiwanese identity does not prevent many from maintaining a strong Chinese identity. For those mainlanders who moved to Taiwan with the KMT regime, their lives, fortunes, and pains have been closely intertwined with the history of modern China. Younger generations meanwhile received their family histories, historical memory, and Chinese consciousness from their families in a process of socialization. As one mainland writer remembered his childhood,

One evening on the dining table I angrily asked, 'Who am I, a mainlander or a Taiwanese?' Both my father and my mother put down their sticks and bowls and were silent for a long while. I bent down my head as I had made a great trouble. Then I heard the answer I would never forget for my whole life, 'We are all Chinese.'¹⁷

This Chinese identity created through family socialization would later be reinforced by the official ideology as propagated through mass media and educational curriculums.

Historical developments of the last five decades have significantly impacted Chinese identity, both decreasing its strength and divesting it of its nationality content. During this period, China and Taiwan have experienced quite different courses of development in terms of politics, economy, and culture. It seems that the opening up of contact between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the early 1990s has only worked to create feelings of difference between people on either side rather than consolidate any sense of belonging to the same national group. As one mainland songwriter recalled, "My enlightenment began at my contact with 'real' Chinese... When I talked to those Chinese from my 'father country' about Taiwan, I was at once forced into being a Taiwanese."¹⁸ Furthermore, mainlanders born or raised in Taiwan have developed closer social connections with people in their local societies than those relatives they've left behind in mainland China. A nation, even if "imagined," has to be based on the realities of everyday life, including the social, political, and cultural. One young mainland with a native Taiwanese mother recalls meeting his relatives from mainland China thusly, "I finally realized that the people really have affection for me, really love me are my maternal relatives, whom I can go to for help."¹⁹

Another factor contributing to the formation of Taiwanese identity among mainlanders may be the experience of living for five decades in Taiwan's political entity. If this is in fact the case, it seems to be an instance of national identity being forged within a short period of time. As Weber noted, "a group of people under certain conditions may attain the quality of a nation... within short spans of time."²⁰ If a nation is "a daily plebiscite,"²¹ it is the general public who make the *decision* to form or remain a nation. It has been pointed out that ethnicity, although important for the formation of national identity, is not necessarily the only basis for national identity. In some multiethnic nations, national identity may be based more on particular historical experiences or other "civic" factors.

Another no less important factor in forming mainlanders' national identity may be the establishment of a democratic regime. It has been noted by some students of nationalism that the civic constitutionalism may serve as a strong base for national identity in a multiethnic society. As Kohn points out, "Swiss national identity is based largely on the bases of constitutionalism, its particular historical process, and memory of fighting for individual liberty against the repression of tyranny." Pestalozzi, a liberal educator, expressed this liberal Swiss Nationalism best: "Tell me, Fatherland: was it not the will of the people, the confidence of the people and free elections, which founded Switzerland."²² The United States, composed of various ethnic and racial groups, is often taken as another case of civic nationalism. Various authors have pointed out that the national identity of the United States, which lacks a common religion, historical territory, and common cultural heritage, is based largely on the universalism of democracy and human rights.²³

The contribution of democracy to the formation of national identity may not only lie in providing a base for combining different races and ethnic groups into equal citizenry, but also forges a sentiment of common destiny among its citizens. Living in a political community as citizens and having vested interests in that community would develop a national consciousness. If national identity is a daily plebiscite, the people may cast their imaginary votes for membership

in one particular nation based on certain disposition, not unlike voters in real elections who cast votes based on certain dispositions, such as party identification. This predisposition may be the notion of “we,” which is constantly forged through daily political practice. If national identity is often based on the past, the present that people live through is no less important. Every people have their own problems to solve and issues to discuss, such as pollution, education, corruption, and social welfare. The people may be frustrated by the ill-performance or inaction of their government, but what matters is the fact that they see these problems as happening within the boundaries of the state, because it is only within these boundaries of community and within the state institutions framework that the solutions are to be found. Their daily lives and social relations are all delimited by these boundaries. Everyday they hear statements from their politicians addressing these problems, which are particular to their community. As one author put it, these speeches “appealed to ‘us’, the people, the country, the nation. A common national identity was being invoked” by this daily experience.²⁴

It is this “banal nationalism” we must pay more attention to. It may explain the rise of Taiwanese Nationalism among both native Taiwanese and mainlanders. It may also explain the decline of Chinese Nationalism, which is removed from the context of people’s daily and political lives. One mainland academic put it this way, “bearing a Taiwanese consciousness does not mean eliminating a Chinese consciousness. Taiwanese consciousness arises from the fact that we were born here, or have grown up here, or have been living here. It also arises from the fact that we do not want to be ruled by Chinese Communists, that we want our collective dignity.”²⁵ As another author argues, “for nationalism to be persuasive to people it has to reflect their personal and local experience.”²⁶ This may be an important factor that contributed to Chinese Nationalism’s failure to hold people, even those mainlanders bearing a strong Chinese cultural identity.

But neither can we ignore the contributions from the political elites in forming and transforming national identity. If the DPP should be credited for promoting Taiwanese Nationalism among its native Taiwanese supporters, the former president Lee Teng-hui should definitely be as well for helping transform the national identity of the mainlanders. Although the DPP has been vigorously advocating an ethnic version of Taiwanese Nationalism, it was Lee who tried to incorporate the mainlanders into his nation-building project with the idea of civic nationalism. As the first native Taiwanese president, who played a significant role in Taiwan’s democratization, and at the same time the chairman of the KMT, he was quite popular among both ethnic groups. On many occasions, especially when he campaigned for James Soong in the election for Taiwan Provincial governor in 1994 and Ma Ying-jeou for Taipei City mayor in 1998, both being mainlanders, he propagated the idea of “community of common destiny,” and termed mainlanders as “new Taiwanese.”²⁷

Ethnic Nationalism for Taiwanese (?)

Native Taiwanese, who bear quite a different historical legacy from that of mainlanders, seem to conceive of the new nation on a very different basis. They have gone through quite a different historical trajectory, and for them ethnicity

forms an important basis for the new nation. Taiwanese Nationalists have always agitated for the creation of a Taiwanese nation on the basis of culture and ethnicity. The uniqueness of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the Chinese has been claimed under various guises, including blood, historical legacy, and cultural tradition. All of these are based on a notion of Taiwanese ethnicity. In the early 1950s, an exiled leader of the Taiwanese Nationalist movement claimed that "We [Taiwanese] have inherited the blood of Indonesians, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Cantonese, and Japanese. In other words, our blood is a fusion of various nations, including those of [Taiwan's] aborigines, Han, Japanese, Latin and Teutonic peoples."²⁸ As recently as the 1990s, another Taiwanese Nationalist claimed that "about 88% of the residents of Taiwan have a different bloodlines from Chinese on the mainland."²⁹

Taiwan's unique historical experience over the past several hundred years constitutes another major theme of the Taiwanese Nationalist's arguments. An exiled Taiwanese professor in Japan once said, "The demand by Taiwanese for independence did not begin with the tyranny of the KMT regime. It was the necessary outcome of its 400 year history."³⁰ This theme has been echoed in the writings of many other Taiwanese Nationalists. Shi Ming, who spent most of his life in exile in Japan, produced a tremendous quantity of work on Taiwanese history before finally returning to Taiwan. He similarly claimed, "During the past 400 years, Taiwan experienced immigration and cultivation, and later the modernization and capitalist development, under the colonial rule of various regimes. All these [historical experiences] have made Taiwan a society totally different from China, and made Taiwanese a people totally different from Chinese."³¹

Aside from theories of blood and history, culture is also chosen as a battle ground by the elites of the Taiwanese Nationalist movement, although they so far seem unable to decide whether Taiwanese culture is already different from Chinese culture or if a unique Taiwanese culture awaits to be built. Up to the present, no one seems able to show persuasively what exactly Taiwanese culture is, and how different it is, or would be, from Chinese culture. The attempt to define this Taiwanese culture, the success of which remains to be seen, only supports what Eriksen rightly points out, namely that it is often the case that cultural differences are the result of identity and not its creator.³²

The attempts among native Taiwanese cultural and political elites to claim a unique Taiwanese culture and to emphasize a distinct Taiwanese historical memory in the formation of a new nation seem to indicate a case of ethnic nationalism. As Anthony D. Smith argues, "[m]odern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to the earlier ethnic ties and memories, and, in some cases, to premodern ethnic identities and communities."³³ The importance of ethnicity in forming a nation cannot be overestimated, as many nations were indeed formed on that very basis. Barring a fact that cannot be ignored is that, among more than 100 nations in the contemporary world, less than half were formed by either one single ethnic group or a core ethnic group constituting more than three quarters of its population.³⁴ If this fact shows the limitations of the ethnic theory of nationalism, then it also points to the importance of ethnicity in nation formation. As Hroch rightly points out, if it is nationalism that created nations, as Gellner argues, then "why [has] nobody...launched a campaign to persuade for example the Irish

that they were in fact Germans, or to win over the Hungarians to the notion that they were actually Chinese.”³⁵ In order for the masses to imagine a new nation, or in order for the Taiwanese Nationalists to successfully forge a new nation, that new nation must be based on relations and ties that unite people.

On the other hand, does the cultural elites' ethnic vision of a new nation also represent the general republic? So far, we have seen that the pattern of changing attitudes among native Taiwanese is that Chinese identity is being replaced by Taiwanese identity. More and more native Taiwanese have refused to identify themselves as Chinese. But it is a truth that Taiwanese culture is very closely affiliated with, if not a part of, Chinese culture. Virtually all Taiwanese citizens, except the aborigines constituting about 4% of the population, are Han immigrants from China in different periods. They use forms of Chinese language—either a dialect from southern China or the official language of Mandarin—and worship the same Chinese Gods and Goddesses that are found in China. With this close cultural affinity and the still dominant Chinese consciousness, the denial of Chinese identity by some Taiwanese represents a radical change.

To what extent does this new Taiwanese identity lead to Taiwanese Nationalism? Or, to put the question another way, to what degree is the new Taiwanese Nationalism based on Taiwanese ethnic identity? Table 7.4 is a cross-tabulation of attitudes on both ethnic and national identities among native Taiwanese. Examining the composition of the Taiwanese Nationalist group, we see the proportion of those who identify themselves as Chinese has declined from 22.3% (40 out of 179 cases) in 1992 to 1.8% (9 out of 490 cases) in 2004. At the same time, the proportion of respondents in the Taiwanese Nationalist group that identified themselves solely as Taiwanese, expanded. The congruence between Taiwanese ethnic identity and Taiwanese national identity has also risen tremendously during the same period. In 1992, 32.9% among those identifying themselves as Taiwanese were classified as Taiwanese Nationalists. In 2004, it rose to 61.9%. Native Taiwanese are seemingly developing a new concept of Taiwanese-ness to demand a new and separate state. Their nationalistic ideas put them close to the typology of ethnic nationalism.

Although native Taiwanese and mainlanders are converging in their national identity, each seems to conceive of the new nation as having a different basis. Many native Taiwanese are shedding their Chinese cultural identity for a new Taiwanese ethnic identity and, based on this new identity, demanding a new nation and an independent state. Many mainlanders on the other hand, although accepting of an independent Taiwan, prefer to maintain a Chinese cultural identity and also to remain open to unification with China. These different paths toward an independent state may account for Taiwan's ethnic conflict in recent years. Mainlanders' persistence in maintaining a Chinese identity has become a convenient weapon for the DPP in differentiating itself from their representative political body, the conservative KMT, and accusing the latter of having “no love for” Taiwan. This accusation, also echoed by native Taiwanese cultural elites in their writings, has caused animosity between the two groups, especially since Taiwanese identity began to rise and its representative political body took

Table 7.4 Ethnic Identity and National Identity among Native Taiwanese, 1992–2004

		% (N)			
	<i>Ethnic Identity</i>	<i>Taiwanese Nationalism</i>	<i>Pragmatist/ Dual Identity</i>	<i>Chinese Nationalism</i>	<i>Total</i>
1992	Taiwanese	32.9(94)	53.5(153)	13.6(39)	29.4(286)
	Both	13.0(45)	50.9(176)	36.1(125)	35.6(346)
	Chinese	11.7(40)	34.9(119)	53.4(182)	35.0(341)
					100(973)
1994	Taiwanese	29.7(66)	54.1(120)	16.2(36)	39.9(222)
	Both	15.6(35)	53.3(120)	31.1(70)	40.4(225)
	Chinese	9.1(10)	30.0(33)	60.9(67)	19.7(110)
					100(557)
1996	Taiwanese	47.0(190)	45.0(182)	7.9(32)	44.1(440)
	Both	21.1(82)	56.4(219)	22.4(87)	42.4(388)
	Chinese	8.9(11)	56.5(70)	34.7(43)	13.5(124)
					100(916)
1998	Taiwanese	46.3(232)	43.9(220)	9.8(49)	44.3(501)
	Both	23.1(124)	54.7(293)	22.2(119)	47.3(536)
	Chinese	11.6(11)	45.3(43)	43.2(41)	8.4(95)
					100(1132)
2000	Taiwanese	49.3(321)	43.2(281)	7.5(49)	58.6(651)
	Both	18.3(70)	53.7(205)	28.0(107)	34.4(382)
	Chinese	10.4(8)	41.6(32)	48.1(37)	6.9(770)
					100(1110)
2004	Taiwanese	61.9(343)	29.8(165)	8.3(46)	52.4(554)
	Both	30.9(138)	42.7(191)	26.4(118)	42.2(447)
	Chinese	15.8(9)	36.8(21)	47.4(27)	5.4(57)
					100(1058)

the presidency in 2000. As early as 1996, a group of young mainlander activists working in the DPP published several articles in a collective effort to denounce the “Taiwanese chauvinism” of the Taiwanese Nationalist camp in its emphasis on speaking the Taiwanese dialect and propagating Taiwanese history. This Taiwanese history, which Taiwanese Nationalists have been so fond of stressing in their nationalist discourse, is precisely a history that mainlanders can never be a part of. Worse still, incidents of the mainlander KMT regime slaughtering and repressing native Taiwanese serve as severely traumatic historical memories, and ones that Taiwanese Nationalists keep reminding their compatriots of. In this nationalist agitation, mainlanders feel not only excluded, but also degraded.

Native Taiwanese, however, are not without some misery of their own. For them, mainlanders’ strong Chinese identity constitutes a serious threat to their nationalist project. In the highly competitive Taipei mayoral election of 1998, the DPP’s incumbent candidate, Chen Shui-bian alleged that there was

a “traitor-of-Taiwan clique” (*mai-tai-ji-tuan*) behind the KMT’s Hong Kong-born candidate, Ma Ying-jeou. If Ma were elected, so the accusation went, the Taiwanese people had only to wait for the Chinese Communists to take over Taiwan.³⁶ This distrust of politicians from the mainland seemed to be a reflection of the feelings of many native Taiwanese. Moreover, with the continuous military threat from China as well as the persistence in a strong Chinese identity among mainlanders, this distrust is unlikely to go away easily. As mentioned earlier, it was found by a nationwide survey that close to half of native Taiwanese think that mainlanders have comparatively less “love for Taiwan.” Furthermore, the stronger the Taiwanese identity among those native Taiwanese respondents, the more distrust they have for mainlanders.³⁷

Although differences in conceiving a new Taiwanese nation has contributed greatly to the conflict and distrust between native Taiwanese and mainlanders, there is some convergence between two groups beyond the acceptance of an independent Taiwanese state. As already saw, Taiwan’s general public holds various concerns about national identity and the nation’s future, yet there is wide agreement concerning how to arrive at that future, namely a major emphasis on the autonomy of the residents in Taiwan. As table 7.5 shows, people in Taiwan may have different views on national identity and different preferences for future relations with China, but they nearly all agree that it is only for them to decide. Even among the Chinese Nationalists, who will not accept an independent Taiwan under any circumstances, fewer than 10% wanted to include citizens of the PRC in deciding future relations between Taiwan and China. Though these Chinese Nationalists see the peoples of Taiwan and mainland China as belonging to the same nation, they still want autonomy and freedom from PRC’s intervention in deciding Taiwan’s future. It is a pity that this strong and significant agreement in the society is seldom included in political discourse. For politicians, dividing “we” and “they” may be necessary as required by the logic of political mobilization, either for votes

Table 7.5 National Identity and Boundary of Citizenship, 1998, 2003

		%(N)				
National Identity		Taiwanese		Chinese		Others
		Nationalist	Pragmatist	Nationalist	Conservative	
ROC	1998	95.4(375)	88.4(558)	74.8(214)	86.1(87)	85.3(262)
Citizen	2003	93.0(494)	90.2(333)	91.6(272)	88.3(273)	98.6(68)
Chinese in	1998	1.0(4)	2.9(18)	8.4(24)	4.0(4)	2.6(8)
Mainland	2003	1.3(7)	1.9(7)	3.0(9)	4.2(13)	0(0)
Overseas	1998	3.6(14)	8.7(55)	16.8(48)	9.9(10)	12.1(37)
Chinese	2003	5.6(30)	7.9(29)	5.4(16)	7.4(23)	1.4(1)
Total	1998	100(393)	100(631)	100(286)	100(101)	100(307)
	2003	100(531)	100(369)	100(297)	100(309)	100(69)

Note: Who are qualified to vote in the referendum to decide unification or independence?

or for loyalty. But agreement on the Taiwanese people's right to self determination may be the only basis, at least for the time being, on which Taiwan society can be united.

Concluding Remarks

Both the national identity and ethnic identity of people in Taiwan have undergone radical changes in the past 15 years. The orthodox Chinese identities have declined considerably, while the competing Taiwanese identities, thought to be on the rise, have yet to acquire a mainstream status. We are currently witnessing an initial stage of nation formation. The data presented in this chapter shows that, contrary to popular belief, Taiwan's two major competing ethnic groups, native Taiwanese and mainlanders, have experienced similarly radical changes in their national identities such that their identities are in the process of converging. More and more native Taiwanese are converting from Chinese Nationalism to Taiwanese Nationalism. Mainlanders, on the other hand, although refusing to give up Chinese identity, are becoming more willing to accept an independent Taiwan. This convergence in a new Taiwanese identity explains largely the consensus among all major political parties in defending the status quo when dealing with China.

The patterns of change in these two groups however are quite different. These differences have contributed to tension between the two ethnic groups. Among the native Taiwanese, the rise of Taiwanese identity has been accomplished at the cost of Chinese identity. Rejecting the term "Chinese," they envision a new Taiwanese nation on the basis of a Taiwanese cultural-ethnic identity. Many mainlanders however accept the idea of an independent Taiwanese state on the basis of political citizenship, while also retaining their Chinese identity. Tension between the two ethnic groups seems to originate from this difference. From mainlanders' perspective, native Taiwanese's emphasis on ethnicity excludes them from the process of nation formation. Different notions of nation lie at the core of current ethnic relations in Taiwan. After five decades of social integration in employment, residence, and marriage, conflicts of national identity, or rather differences in the notion of nationality, have become the only factor that contributes to ethnic relations in contemporary Taiwan.

Despite these differences, there is great consensus among these different nationalist groups. People in Taiwan may vary in their inclinations toward national and ethnic identities, but most of them agree that they and only they, not foreign powers or the people of China, should have any say in deciding the future of Taiwan. This high consensus among the people in Taiwan should be taken into account by national leaders to work for a unified political community. It should also be well recognized by foreign powers in dealing with the cross-strait issue to work for a peaceful solution. National identity to a great extent is also the reaction of a "bent twig" like a soul in its suffering from humiliation.³⁸

Appendix

Attitudes to Independence/Unification and National Identity 1992–2004

		% (N)			
		<i>Taiwanese Nationalism</i>	<i>Pragmatism/ Dual Identity</i>	<i>Chinese Nationalism</i>	<i>Total</i>
Independence	1992	44.7(71)	50.9(81)	4.4(7)	18.8(159)
	1995	59.5(178)	37.1(111)	3.3(10)	24.7(299)
	1998	71.6(179)	28.4(71)	0(0)	21.0(250)
	2000	59.4(180)	38.3(116)	2.3(7)	25.3(303)
	2004	77.0(87)	20.4(23)	2.7(3)	10.7(113)
Status Quo	1992	14.8(26)	43.2(76)	42.0(74)	20.8(176)
	1995	16.0(104)	51.2(334)	32.8(214)	53.9(652)
	1998	22.5(183)	53.1(432)	24.4(198)	68.3(813)
	2000	31.3(222)	46.8(332)	21.9(155)	59.3(709)
	2004	39.3(358)	37.8(344)	22.9(209)	85.9(911)
Unification	1992	1.8(9)	45.1(129)	82.2(375)	60.5(513)
	1995	1.2(3)	33.6(87)	65.3(169)	21.4(259)
	1998	2.3(3)	46.9(60)	50.8(65)	10.7(128)
	2000	3.8(7)	41.8(77)	54.3(100)	15.4(184)
	2004	5.6(2)	30.6(11)	63.9(23)	3.4(36)

When one's autonomy is denied, a strong and passionate claim for one's worth and identity is likely to emerge.

Notes

We began this joint venture over a decade ago. The main theme of this chapter was first contained in a Chinese-language paper we coauthored and presented at a conference in Taipei. The paper circulated widely and was often cited thereafter. We rewrote it in English and presented it at the United States and Cross-Straits Relations Conference, sponsored by the Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, October 6–7, 2000. We are grateful to Professor William Parish for his comments at the conference. Our analysis proposed a decade ago was largely supported by the political developments of recent years, particularly the intensifying tensions between native Taiwanese and mainlanders. The authors are grateful for the invitation from the editor of this anthology and to have a chance to update and revise it. We also very much appreciate the helpful comments from an anonymous referee for this publication.

1. National identity has been the most dominant issue in all national elections following democratization, namely 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, the first presidential election of 1996, and the presidential election of 2004 when the ruling DPP campaigned for a second term. The election campaigns concluded with the

dramatic act that the challengers, an alliance between the nominee for president by the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, hereafter KMT) and nominee for vice president by the People First Party, knelt down on the street to kiss the land to ward off the fierce attacks from the opponent that they did not identify with, or “love” Taiwan. It was a presidential election in which the main issue in the campaign was not the performance of the incumbent, but the identity of the challengers.

2. Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 389.
3. Wu Nai-teh, “Identity Conflict and Political Trust: The Core Issue of Ethnic Politics in Taiwan,” *Taiwanese Sociology*, vol. 4 (December 2002), pp. 75–118.
4. Ibid.
5. Wu Nai-teh, “Party Support and National Identities: Social Cleavages and Political Competition in Taiwan,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology*, vol. 74 (Fall 1993), pp. 33–61 (in Chinese); Hsu Huo-yan, “National Identity and Partisan Voting in Taiwan,” *Taiwanese Political Science Review*, vol. 1 (1996), pp. 85–128 (in Chinese).
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8. Michael Howard, “War and the Nation-State,” *Daedalus*, vol. 108, no. 4 (1979), pp. 101–110; for an example of British Nationalism in such circumstances, see Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
9. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
10. The existence of this group may have important implications for the controversy around the nature of national and ethnic identities: Is group identity rational-instrumental or otherwise? For the time being, we cannot tackle this problem. For the rational theory of group identity, see Russell Hardin, *One for All* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Mary C. Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). For the contrary view, see Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). For a pilot study based on data collected in a panel study (1998–2000) exploring the impact of China’s economic

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11. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
 12. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Press, 1991).
 13. Ibid., 6.
 14. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1986), p. 17.
 15. For works, among many, analyzing the ethnic-cultural base of Chinese Nationalism, see Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953) and P. Duara, "De-Constructing the Chinese Nation," in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. J. Unger (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).
 16. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 3; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 1.
 17. Ku Ling, *Mainlanders' Homeland* (Taipei: Hsi-dai Publication, 1988), p. 1 (in Chinese).
 18. Duan Chen-yu, "Taiwan Independence in the Right Brain," in *Mainlanders with Taiwanese Hearts*, ed. Mainlanders Association for Taiwan Independence (Taipei: Avant-garde Publication, 1992), pp. 165, 172 (in Chinese).
 19. Cheng Kai-chong, *The National Identity and Ethnic Imagination of the Taiwan-Born Mainlanders*. MA thesis of Political Science Department at Soochow University 1996, p. 105. Most of the mainlanders who immigrated to Taiwan with the KMT regime around 1949 were males and, after arrival, encountered a shortage of women in the marriage market. Most mainland male thus had no choice but to marry native Taiwanese women. As a result, close to half of all second-generation mainlanders have Taiwanese mothers. Their cultural behavior and ethnic identity, however, are dominantly Chinese, not unlike those with two mainland parents. See Fu-chang Wang, "Ethnic Assimilation and Mobilization: Analysis of Partisan Support in Taiwan," *Bulletin of Ethnology Institute*, vol. 77 (1994), pp. 1–34 (in Chinese).
 20. Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 924.
 21. Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990).
 22. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 62.
 23. For examples, see Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957) and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Some authors, however, have cast some doubt on the notion of civic nationalism epitomized by the case of the United States: Steven Grosby, "The Nature of the U.S. Nation and the Vision of Ancient Israel," in *Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism*, in *Liberal Democratic Societies*, ed. Roger Michener (New York: Paragon House, 1993); Susan-Mary Grant, "When Is a Nation Not a Nation?" *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1996), pp. 105–129. Some even challenged the plausibility of the typology by arguing that all national identity is a combination of both elements. For the latter example, see Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," *Critical Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 193–211; Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 19 (1993), pp. 211–239.

24. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 97.
25. Ma Yi-gong, *Tiger Eating Butterfly* (Taipei: Business Week Publication, 1995) (in Chinese).
26. Anthony P. Cohen, "Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of Some Rites, Rights, and Wrongs," *American Ethnologist*, vol. 23, no. 4 (1996), p. 810.
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28. Cited from Huang Chao-tang, *Taiwanese Nationalism* (Taipei: Qian-wei Press, 1998), p. 78 (in Chinese).
29. Huang Wen-hsiong, *Pig, Dog, and Bull: Chinese Pig, Japanese Dog, and Taiwanese Bull* (Taipei: Qian-wei Press, 1997), p. 81 (in Chinese).
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PART IV

THE DILEMMA OF
“ONE CHINA” POLICY

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CHAPTER 8

AN END TO EUROPE'S “ONE CHINA” POLICY?

Edward Friedman

Introduction

An old American political adage has it that “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Europe, after World War II, was far from Taiwan, China, and Japan, and lacked the military involvement in Asia that the United States had. America, after leading the coalition that defeated the aggression of Hirohito’s Imperial Japan, democratized Japan and kept military bases in Japan. It would, of course, see neighboring China/Taiwan in ways that differed from a distant Europe recovering from a devastating war. Beyond differences in economic strength, geographical distance, and military responsibilities, large global changes such as the end of the Stalin-Mao alliance, Mao’s détente with Nixon, the economic rise of East Asia, the enrichment of petroleum exporters, and the rise of China as a great power would reshape Europe’s understanding of its interests on Taiwan/China relations in ways that reflected both particulars unique to Europe and also general tendencies of virtually all the industrialized democracies. In sum, European attitudes toward China’s claim to Taiwan would at times, but not always, be Japan’s or America’s.

The Mao Era

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conquered power and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, Britain, hoping to stay in step with the other Commonwealth nations and to protect its large investments in China did not move its embassy from China to Taiwan where Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China (ROC) government relocated upon losing a civil war to Mao Zedong’s red armies. Britain, instead, tried to maintain diplomatic relations with the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Mao’s PRC, however, would not allow Britain to send an ambassador to China if Britain also maintained a consulate in Taiwan, home to Chiang’s remnant army which

insisted that China's civil war was not over. In contrast, both America and Japan maintained full ambassadorial relations with the ROC government on Taiwan and had no official relations with Mao's PRC.

In 1964, DeGaulle's France established full diplomatic relations with China in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. France sought room for maneuver against Soviet Russia so as to limit France's military dependence on America. In establishing ambassadorial relations with China, France did not promise to remove its embassy from Taiwan. But Chiang's ROC on Taiwan, still legitimating itself as the sole legal government of all of China, rejected diplomatic relations with a France that would maintain ambassadorial relations with Mao's PRC, with the CCP regime imagined by Chiang as an alien imposition on the Chinese people, an anti-China entity that hated China's glorious Confucian civilizational ethos and, instead, was loyal to Western concepts such as class struggle and communist utopianism.

Richard Nixon followed DeGaulle's lead in 1969. As president, Nixon sought to normalize relations with Mao's China so as to have more leverage in dealing with Brezhnev's Russia, now China's threatening enemy. In 1971, America tried to persuade Chiang's ROC on Taiwan to agree to the CCP government, now a friend to America because China stood up to Brezhnev's militarism, assuming China's permanent seat on the UN Security Council while Taiwan left that seat and became an ordinary member nation of the General Assembly. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Taiwan agreed. It understood that such a deal was the best Taiwan could hope for. Instead, an obdurate Chiang had his government walk out of the United Nations rather than sit as an ordinary member nation in a body that treated the alien CCP as the legitimate government of China.

Immediately after the trauma of losing UN membership, in 1972, the ROC on Taiwan accepted a new formula for diplomatic relations with both it and China that was devised by Japan. When Tokyo normalized relations with the PRC in 1972, it moved Japan's embassy from Taipei, Taiwan to Beijing, China. In place of its embassy in Taipei, Japan established an unofficial office to manage its relations with Taiwan, which is, in fact, an embassy in all but name. For the first time, substantive relations for the ROC on Taiwan trumped legitimating forms that could not be sustained. This was a way to maintain Taiwan's autonomy in an era where the major powers did not wish to offend Mao's China. This policy path is known as the "One China" policy.

Post-Mao China

As Nixon copied the policy of DeGaulle's France, so Carter mimed Japan when his administration normalized relations with the post-Mao PRC (Mao died in 1976) headed by Deng Xiaoping on January 1, 1979. That is, the unofficial US office in Taiwan, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) would be headed by Department of State personnel who maintained all their career benefits even while dubbed nonofficial representatives of the United States. This diplomatic innovation was meant to maintain the peace and to keep Taiwan from being absorbed by the PRC. Europe, Japan, and America agreed that there was "One China," that the Deng government in Beijing represented that China, and that relations with Taiwan

would be unofficial. The shared expectation was that Europe, Japan, and America would follow a "One China" policy in which a *de facto* independent Taiwan would not become *de jure* independent and the CCP government would not use military means to incorporate this *de facto* independent Taiwan into China. Peace was premised on an expectation that China would abjure war and Taiwan would abjure *de jure* independence. Actually, the latter expectation was easily achieved since, in fact, Taiwan was powerless to achieve *de jure* independence. No major power would upset an economically robust and rising great power China by extending official diplomatic recognition to the ROC on Taiwan.

This "One China" peace policy assured Taiwan's *de facto* independence throughout the 1980s. Meanwhile, a great European Union (EU) emerged that was democratic, prosperous, and expanding to incorporate all of Europe. The European way and democracy seemed, in Europe, the wave of a better future. Imagining itself as the world leader in peaceful democratic progress that guaranteed universal human rights, Europe was shocked when China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, ordered the CCP's military, on June 4, 1989, to bloodily crush a nationwide democratic movement that had been headquartered in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. For the prior decade, China had seemed the world leader of reform among Communist Party (CP) dictatorships.

France quickly took the lead in sanctioning the butchers of Beijing. China's democrats in exile were invited on Bastille Day, July 14, 1989, to lead the great march commemorating the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, imagined as the harbinger of universal rights and constitutional liberties. France and Europe were the unique carriers of emancipatory political values, and they imposed an arms embargo on China.

In contrast, both Japan and America were leery of sanctioning China economically. They preferred to continue building economic ties with China. Japanese worried that a China in economic distress would prove regionally destabilizing; it became the world's leading aid-giver to China. US President George H. W. Bush declared that it was economic ties with a reforming Chinese economy that facilitated China's marketization, economic growth, and the rise of a middle class that were, in turn, responsible for China's 1989 democracy movement. With more economic engagement and growth, modernizing transformations would eventually lead to China's democratization, Bush declared. Both Tokyo and Washington made clear to Beijing that, in contrast to Paris, they wanted to resume normal relations with Deng's China as soon as possible. Hence, despite Beijing's June 4 massacre, Washington and Tokyo were against hurting the Chinese economy. From a European point of view, for a couple of years, only the Europeans were principled. But then, sudden and extraordinary changes in China in the post-Cold War era led Europe in a different direction in its relationship with China and Taiwan; China and Europe would grow closer.

China's Post-June 4 Transformation

China enjoyed an extraordinary economic rise after Deng Xiaoping reignited economic reform in January 1992. European nations swiftly renormalized

relations with China. Anxious that the Americans had imploded the Soviet bloc, CCP leaders turned China into the EU's largest trading partner. It was a counter to dependence on America. European governments, led by France, in 1997 abandoned a priority commitment to an agenda of human rights and democracy. They stopped asking the UN body in Geneva that investigates human rights abuses to look into the CCP dictatorship's cruel treatment of Uighur Muslims, Falungong spiritualists, and Chinese actively trying to assist internal victims of the CCP regime. Such Chinese human rights activists became victims of local thugs and the CCP's repression of anything imagined as a challenge to its monopoly of power. A private dialogue on human rights issues between China and Europe largely became an empty ritual.

In fact, European governments even limited democratic rights at home to accommodate visiting Chinese leaders. The Europeans agreed to keep people protesting authoritarian China's continuing abuses of human rights out of the sight or hearing of high level PRC guests to Europe. The post-June 4 EU hope that Europe could spread its democratic way universally was defeated by the rise of an authoritarian China and Europe's privileging of its economic interest. The EU looked ever more like the supposedly unprincipled Japanese government of the 1950s, so fixated on growth that Japanese were caricatured as mere Sony salesmen.

As part of this surrender of its own principles, European governments and the EU made concessions to China on the matter of Taiwan. Soon after the June 4, 1989 Beijing massacre, France had agreed to sell weapons to Taiwan. Nonetheless, in 1994, to gain good business deals in the China market, France promised Beijing it would no longer sell weapons to Taiwan. The EU, at France's urging, even moved to end the embargo on arms sales to China that had been imposed in the wake of the June 4, 1989 CCP massacre of Chinese peacefully promoting political reform.

This mattered very much to Taiwan. After the June 4, 1989 massacre in Beijing, and the democratization of Eastern Europe, and the implosion of the USSR, the Deng government in China opted to use military means to coerce a now democratic Taiwan (dictator Chiang Kai-shek had died in 1975) to surrender to annexation by the PRC as had Tibet and Hong Kong. In 1991–1992, the CCP regime decided to build missiles to threaten Taiwan into surrendering, and in 1994, the missiles were placed across from Taiwan; in 1995 and 1996, they were used in military exercises against Taiwan.

Nonetheless, European nations, with the exception of new East European democracies, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, where there was more sentiment identifying with the plight of Taiwan, seeing its potential sad fate under an authoritarian CP China as similar to what they had suffered from the USSR, convinced themselves that this threatening China, somehow, was not a threat to use weapons against Taiwan. Consequently, it was alright for Europe to end the arms embargo against China. The PRC was seen as integrating with global norms. It was supposedly being bound by silken threads of multilateral commitments that served its economic rise. Consequently, China could not be a revisionist power trying to destabilize the international status quo even though

CCP leaders time and again insisted that they wanted the international order changed so as to better serve Chinese interests.

Japan and Taiwan didn't view China as did Europe. Of course, they too wished to participate in and benefit from China's economic rise by maximizing business engagement with China. But they saw a strategic logic behind the CCP's involvement with international organizations, other than the WTO and similar purely economic or functional bodies. China manifestly sought to strengthen organizations that maximized the Chinese voice and minimized an American one. The CCP had no interest in seeing a strong APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) led by America and including democracies such as Taiwan, Australia, and India become yet stronger in Asia. Instead, the CCP worked with APT (ASEAN plus three), a grouping of Southeast Asian nations, plus China, Japan, and South Korea. No Taiwan. No America. No India. No Australia. China also sought bilateral trade agreements with the ASEAN member nations. ASEAN, in contrast, seeking to maximize its room for maneuver, very much wanted all the democracies, including Europe, involved in the region.

In Central Asia, China set up its own organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China pressed the SCO to push American military bases out of Central Asia. It backed antidemocratic efforts of member nations and presented itself to regional authoritarian leaders as superior to America and the democracies since China would not press tyrants to respect the human rights of their citizens as required by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to which China was a signatory.

Far from integrating with global norms, the CCP government tried to shape the international world so as to further entrench its monopoly of power at home and to build an international order where China was at least the equal of America. When China acted to constrain North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, it did so not to conform with the international norms of US President George W. Bush but to advance its own very specific interests. CCP leaders wished China to be the only nuclear power in the region. They did not want North Korea's nuclear program to prod Japan and others in the region also to build nuclear weapons. This Chinese strategic vision of being the predominant power in the region included incorporating Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, the energy rich East China Sea and Senkaku islets (claimed by Japan), and the energy rich South China Sea, and Spratley islets (claimed by members of ASEAN).

The CCP government had no intention of allowing itself to be incorporated into an international order dominated by democracies and democratic values. This was brought home to the EU in 2005 when the CCP government promulgated an Anti-Secession Law, announcing its right to seize Taiwan by force. The EU swiftly backed away from ending its arms embargo on China. By 2006, the EU showed signs of understanding why Taiwan, Japan, and ASEAN had some concerns about where authoritarian China was heading. Even though Europe had no immediate strategic interests in Asia, it began to pay a bit more heed to the voices of democratic Japan and Taiwan.

In 2007, the EU even tried to get serious about China's systemic abuses of human rights. Instead of continuing a meaningless private dialogue, the EU

invited representatives of European organizations that monitored the CCP's violations of the UDHR to participate in its private human rights dialogue with China. Rather than face the facts, when the Chinese delegates' reading of lies would this time be challenged, the CCP representatives walked away from the human rights dialogue. Such Chinese actions highlighted that Taiwan, in contrast, was a vibrant democracy with a robust civil society.

China's Irresistible Economic Magnetism

Nevertheless, won't the economic interests of Europe trump European concerns for democratic Japan and Taiwan, and for human rights victims in China? To be sure, many legislators in West European nations, as well as East European governments that once suffered CP dictatorships, privilege the issue of democracy and human rights, and therefore support policies to maintain Taiwan's democratic autonomy. The European Parliament has been uniquely outspoken on China's systemic abuses of human rights. But presidents and prime ministers in the major European powers are more concerned with being in the good graces of the CCP government so as to benefit maximally from economic dealings with a rapidly rising China of 1.4 billion people. These governments are responsible for job creation and maintaining Europe's generous welfare system. Those issues matter very much to voters in Europe.

As a result, Paris and London and Berlin do not even support some associate membership for Taiwan in the World Health Assembly (WHA) for which nation-state status is not a requirement. These democratic European governments are well aware of the Chinese government's irresponsibility on contagious diseases that the forces of globalization can spread worldwide in hours. They know that it is in the interest of the human species that Taiwan has access to World Health Organization (WHO) information and assistance through participation in the WHA. And yet the Europeans will not challenge China, which insists on excluding Taiwan from WHO benefits that Taiwan is guaranteed by the terms of UN agreements. Europe accepts Beijing's power to impose its ever more constrictive and ever-changing interpretation of China's "One China" principle (Taiwan is a local government of the PRC) instead of their own "One China" policy that acknowledges Taiwan's right to full nonofficial relations with all the countries and organizations of the world. The "One China" policy, the basis of a secure democratic autonomy for Taiwan, is under siege because of the bullying of a rising great power—China.

These European governments understand that if the Chinese people merely achieve the annual income of the EU's poorest member, Portugal, then China's economy will be larger than America's. China makes Europe economic offers that Europe cannot refuse. Ruling groups in Beijing resist the Tokyo-Washington-Canberra goal of inclusive Asia/Pacific international organizations that preclude authoritarian Chinese domination of the region. Ruling groups in China therefore wish to not be dependent for China's growth on Japan and America. They prefer dealing with a distant Europe without strategic responsibilities in East Asia, a Europe that is a mere economic animal and does not insist on a politics that

maximizes space for maneuver for Taiwan and the ASEAN. Consequently, an ever richer and economically more weighty China tends to privilege Nokia over Motorola, VW over Toyota, and Airbus over Boeing. Europe appreciates these benefits and seems, in return, willing to accept a weakening of the "One China" policy that protects Taiwan.

Given the serious economic challenges confronting European governments, they can hardly walk away from Chinese economic deals merely out of concern for the 23 million people on the vibrantly democratic island of Taiwan. So they tend to give ground and slide away from their own "One China" policy and toward the PRC's "One China" principle. It is not impossible, therefore, that with a bit more diplomatic tact China can even get Europe to end its arms embargo against China. After all, Australia, a major trade and investment beneficiary of China's economic rise, has already backed away from prior commitments to a peaceful resolution of cross-Straits relations, thereby abandoning the core meaning of the "One China" policy that has protected Taiwan's democratic autonomy.

A realistic approach to international politics suggests that European democracies, even further away from Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea than is Australia, would tend in the direction of Australia's accommodating approach to China rather than to neighboring Japan's approach of defending non-Chinese territorial rights in the region. Therefore, one key question in understanding European policy on the "One China" principle versus the "One China" policy is how Europeans imagine their present and future relations with China.

Is the European perspective becoming ever more mercenary? After all, Europeans experience their union as a joining of democracies. They experience the peace and prosperity that they have enjoyed since the end of World War II as the result of that democratization. The EU has been the world's most successful promoter of democracies. Peoples in central Europe, east Europe, and the former Soviet Union are attracted to democratization, among other reasons, so that they can be welcomed into the EU and share in European peace and prosperity. Some of the post-1989 democracies of that region have been most friendly to democratic Taiwan, until the CCP authoritarians showed these leaders of new democracies with fragile economies that accommodating Taiwan would, because of threatened Chinese actions, prove costly. Latvia, Macedonia, and others consequently backed away from Taiwan. In the Czech Republic, the interest in making money from selling arms to China that could be used against Taiwan is too powerful to resist.¹ If even European nations, almost instinctively, friendly to Taiwan cannot keep from giving in to Chinese pressure, why expect others in Europe to adhere to a "One China" policy that protects Taiwan's democratic autonomy and the peaceful status quo? Won't Europe merely focus on its economic interests to the exclusion of virtually everything else, persuading itself that politically "Europe is irrelevant in Asia."² Or, to put it another way, in contrast to Japan and America, Europe's policy on China can ignore Asian "strategic and security responsibilities" and Taiwan.³ A growing China will simply be seen as a billion person supermarket to buy European goods.⁴

This change in Europe's policy orientation to China since 1989 is most obvious to democratic Chinese in exile who remember their prominence in 1989 at the 200th anniversary celebration of the French Revolution. As one such exile, Chen Kuide, put it,

The greatest cause for tears was the [Bastille Day 1989] opening ceremony [in Paris], when Chinese artists and students played three huge Chinese drums decorated with the six Chinese characters for 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.' The scene caused the whole audience to rise in a standing ovation. French people applauded and wept. Where is the enthusiasm of the French [for Chinese human rights] today?⁵

In contrast to Chen's idealism that expects the Government of France to care about democracy in China, Chalmers Johnson sees France and Europe continuing DeGaulle's realism that, mistrusting American power, seeks a multipolar world, even to the point of cooperating with China on "the EU's Galileo Project to produce a satellite navigation system not controlled by the American military."⁶ It seems logical to China's hard-line policy analyst Yan Xuetong that Europe also sell arms to China, evincing "a common interest" in Europe and China to combat world domination by America.⁷ If that, plus benefiting from economic dealings with China, defines Europe's strategic priority, concern for Taiwan's autonomous democracy pales into insignificance. Europe could move away from the "One China" policy that protects Taiwan and surrender to the PRC's "One China" principle that legitimates the incorporation of Taiwan into China. Policy toward Taiwan in Europe is contested.

Worries about China's Economic Rise

Nevertheless, the economic factor holds negatives as well as positives for Europe-China relations. China could come to seem to be a cheating destabilizer of European societies. There are already some strong indications of such an experience in Italy, Spain, and France, European countries with an especially acute welfare state crisis, or a strong left or powerful unions, or deep concerns about China as a source of European hollowing out, polarizing Europe by taking away previously well-paying jobs whose taxes are needed to undergird social welfare policies.

Since there was no real European stake in China before the recent rapid rise of post-Mao China, Europeans have tended to underestimate the extraordinary impact of this huge transformation in global wealth and power caused by the mind-boggling rise of a China of 1.4 billion people, a nation four times

the population size of Europe. Europeans themselves have described the prior European "discourse [on China] as exercises in window-dressing, opportunism, and free-riding...."⁸ Dismissing any realistic prospect of a Chinese rise to superpower status,⁹ Europeans do not yet seem ready for the impact of China's amazing rise. But it is here. And it will intensify.

In 1998, the EU classified China as an "economy in transition," meaning that dumping and other complaints would be considered on a case by case basis. Europe resisted Chinese pressures that it be granted market-economy status so that China not be subjected to antidumping tariffs. Serious trade frictions gradually intensified and finally exploded over Chinese apparel exports in 2005. In October 2006, "the EU applied a 16.5% extra tariff on leather shoes from China."¹⁰

As EU-China trade grows, and China wants it to grow, so does Europe's trade deficit with China. Europeans increasingly conclude that China cheats. It prevents market access, uses nontariff barriers, and does not protect European intellectual property.¹¹ Some Europeans say that Europe's high-tech arms exporters actually are not unhappy with the continuing embargo on sales to China because they fear they have a lot to lose from a cheating China copying their technology. In 2006, for the first time, the EU took a complaint against China to the WTO, claiming that the PRC had not fulfilled its obligations to open its US\$19 billion auto parts market.¹²

But it is the explosion of forces in Spain, Italy, and France¹³ over a loss of jobs and businesses to China that, potentially, is most jolting. In May 2005, the president of France commented on the loss of jobs to China, "We have a real problem in Europe.... we cannot accept a death blow to the jobs of a significant number of workers in our countries."¹⁴ Is it possible that the economic rise of China holds out a prospect for a souring of China-European relations? In 2004, "disgruntled" [Spanish] shoemakers burnt down a factory stacked with Chinese shoes."¹⁵ In 2007 Chinese merchants pushing "cheap shirts, shoes and jeans" violently clashed with Italians in Milan, sparking a diplomatic incident.¹⁶ And problems are only beginning because China's extraordinary rise is still zooming ahead.

The economic misery left behind by the irrational economic policies of the Mao era was so extreme that, despite the amazing post-Mao growth, there are still many, many millions of Chinese willing to work for minimal wages, or risk their lives to get abroad in search of a better life. These illegal immigrants in Europe, especially Italy, are networked back into China from where they import goods into Italy that are undercutting local manufacturers who have been integral to Italian culture for centuries. Subsequent competitive advantages are moving up the value-added ladder in sector after sector. *Financial Times* business correspondence James Kynge, watching the Chinese take designs from Italy home to China, copy them, and then underprice the Italians, thereby destroying Italian businesses, sees the pattern in Italy as part of a larger China-Europe trend.

Kynge asks, "What was Europe going to do when it did not have much industry left? Could you really run an economy on services alone?"¹⁷ He concludes that the firms of European social welfare states "cannot compete in the long run"

with China across the board in manufactures.¹⁸ Europeans will have to confront a China whose challenge seems to undermine the socioeconomic system that makes Europe what it is. The negative aspects of the new globalization may come to be defined by Chinese practices.

China has risen so quickly, I believe, not because it has cheated, but because of its ability to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by post-Bretton Woods era globalization. It has been uniquely open to foreign direct investment and joint ventures in an age of unregulated global finance. It has been willing to seize the advantages of the New Industrial Division of Labor, a maximal disaggregation of previously vertically integrated production processes. It has made itself welcoming of tourists at a moment when an entire generation of healthy, retired people in the industrialized democracies are looking for adventures. It has embraced the openness of an age of rapid transportation and information technologies (IT), allowing its entrepreneurs, workers, students, and scholars to travel and seize opportunities all around the world. It has managed its currency brilliantly, invested heavily in most advanced infrastructure, and promoted deals (and steals) with anyone, including Taiwan, that have allowed China to rapidly rise in high technology and value-added production. The impact of such a huge success for a nation of 1.4 billion is something that, in speed, scope, and scale, the world has never experienced. And it comes at a particular historical conjuncture, the new globalization. Europeans cannot help but feel the pain intensely, increasingly. The negatives in Europe-China relations will become ever more weighty. The future of Europe-China relations may be contradictory and complex.

In addition, superpower China runs a global foreign policy. By the twenty-first century, agents of the PRC were very active in Africa, a region in which Europe has been deeply involved, an area that Europe follows closely. The Chinese would not join the European-initiated multilateral organization on transparency in energy deals, instead strengthening cruel and corrupt regimes that Europeans were trying to reform. While Europeans may not be focused on the impact of CCP support for some of the worst tyrannies in Asia (Burma, North Korea, Uzbekistan), Europeans do pay attention to Africa. They have been appalled by the policies of the PRC and of Chinese energy firms in the Sudan and Zimbabwe. Criticism of China's irresponsible arms transfers impacts on how Europeans think about arms sales to China and their significance for democratic Taiwan. The European Investment Bank, which has tried to use loan leverage to improve good governance in Africa, has complained that Chinese banks facilitate the continuation of bad practices in Africa.¹⁹ Europe may read China in Asia from its experience of China in Africa.

In short, Chinese policies cannot help but make Europeans more sympathetic to the plight of a democratic Taiwan whose autonomy is threatened by the PRC's "One China" principle, the insistence that democratic Taiwan was, is, and ought to be a local government of the authoritarian CCP regime. But given a high European priority of making money in the China market, it is still not obvious, despite all the negatives about China just sketched, why sympathy for Taiwan should translate into strong European support for the "One China"

policy of opposing Chinese military action against Taiwan, a policy that has long sustained a peaceful status quo in Taiwan-China relations.

Perhaps Europeans will heed the concerns of Asian democratic leader, Japan, or of America on maintaining Taiwan's democratic autonomy. But why should they? The Cold War is long over. China seems an extraordinary economic opportunity as it rises at double digit rates. China is not experienced as a military threat to Europe as Stalin's Soviet Empire seemed to be at the outset of the Cold War. Given a priority concern for Europe of making the most economically out of its dealings with China, why would Europeans complicate those economic concerns by riling China by initiating official diplomatic relations with Taiwan? The best Taiwan can hope for from the Europeans is their not completely caving in to the CCP's "One China" principle, the notion that ignores Taiwan's separate identity, and, as with Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau, finds Taiwan to be a lost Chinese territory that rightfully should be returned to China.

It is easy to point out that the CCP's constructed historical, nationalistic narrative legitimizing China's claim to Taiwan is a tissue of half-truths and lies that obscures the basic historical fact that before the end of World War II, when Japan was defeated by an American-led coalition, and Japan's colony of Taiwan was ceded to Chiang's Republic of China, no Sinicized regime on the continent of Asia had ever ruled Taiwan. The constructed nationalist narrative of Taiwanese seems closer to the truth than do the CCP's presentations of Taiwan history.

It is not even true that Taiwanese culture is completely Chinese. Since Taiwan's modernization occurred in a Japanese colonial age, Japanese culture has deeply infused Taiwanese values and attitudes. Taiwan is profoundly multicultural.

But so what? China's claim to Taiwan is not about a debate over the historical past. It is about the CCP government's attempt to incorporate territory to facilitate establishing China as the predominant power in Asia and a global superpower in the twenty-first century. Why should Europe hurt its economic chances with China by opposing that project? Or will that projected Chinese future lead Europe to agree with Japan, and Taiwan, and Australia, and ASEAN, and India, that Asia and the world would be better off if an autonomous and democratic Taiwan were part of an open Asian order where all had room for maneuver rather than being dominated by an authoritarian Chinese colossus? Pure realists might imagine that Europeans would see China as inevitably imposing its will on the region and then conclude that the best hope for Europe is to appease and conciliate China, whatever the impact on Taiwan. But democratic Europe often takes democracy more seriously than realists expect.

None of us know the future; it is inherently contingent and unpredictable. But there is no substantial basis for concluding with absolute certainty that China's courting of Europe so as to complicate and defeat the open, Asian project of Japan et al. is not going to achieve its goal. In sum, Taiwan's independent democratic future is made less secure because of certain aspects of China's policies toward Europe.

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CHAPTER 9

NIXON AND TAIWAN IN 1972: THE WEEK THAT DIDN'T CHANGE THE WORLD

Arthur Waldron

Introduction

Almost forty years ago the United States astonished the world with a dramatic shift in Asian policy. Washington would abandon its long-time ally Taiwan, fully expecting that, after such a setback, the island would have no choice but to join China. China, at last able to act on the interest in containing the USSR that she shared with the United States, would become Washington's chief interlocutor and partner in the Pacific.

No question exists that in tactics and execution what President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger did was a tour de force. Secrecy was maintained. Surprise, in the United States, in Europe, in Tokyo, and in Taipei, was complete.

But tactical brilliance is not to be confused with strategic success. Forty years later it is clear that almost nothing of what the Americans expected has come to pass. China is not our partner; she is, if anyone's, Russia's. Taiwan is an independent state, shunned by most of the world, but almost certain to continue as such. Japan and our other allies have still not quite recovered from this deep blow to mutual trust. Asia is by no means more secure now than it was before all this diplomatic activity.

This chapter takes a critical look at the legacy of what is often called "the week that changed the world," particularly with respect to Taiwan.

Initial Circumstances

A few minutes into his meeting in Beijing with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai on February 22, 1972, American President Richard Nixon announced to his Chinese counterpart: "Principle one: There is one China, and Taiwan is part

of China.” He added that talk from the State Department to the effect that Taiwan’s status “remained to be determined” would also be stopped.¹ That was Nixon’s personal view and as will be seen, it never became American policy. Notwithstanding, the fact that Nixon, long an avowed anticommunist, would utter such words tells us a great deal about the hopes he placed in his mission and the price he was willing to pay to make those hopes reality.

A small, top secret White House group, outside the State Department and the rest of the regular government bureaucracy, had decided that drawing closer to China was the best way to counterbalance the Soviet Union. So high was the priority that Nixon and his advisers accorded such a connection with China they had concluded before the trip that no choice existed but to pay the price China demanded: namely, the sacrifice of Taiwan.

In 1971 the government in Taipei was recognized by the United States as the seat of the legitimate government of all of China. Since 1953 Taipei and Washington had been joined by a military alliance. A US Embassy functioned in Taiwan’s capital and US forces were stationed on the island. When Taiwan’s new ambassador, Shen Chien-hung, arrived in Washington in 1971, he met Henry Kissinger, who personally “guaranteed” him, face to face, that the administration would “absolutely support the Republic of China.”²

As Kissinger later admitted, he had lied. For his and Nixon’s real plan was to secure relations with China by breaking with Taiwan. The island was considered essentially an American client state that would expire without our support, the dictatorial leaders of which, moreover, identified far more with China than with the Taiwanese. Without US backing, Taiwan would have no option but to come to terms with China. The plan took this for granted. The new American connection with China would fundamentally rebalance power world wide, offsetting Russia with a new counterweight—even as the Russian threat would keep China from behaving aggressively.

Geopolitics would be remade at a single stroke. As Moscow became ever more preoccupied by the dangers of a China effectively allied with the United States, she would have to pull in some of the more distant outposts of her power and influence. Hence, Kissinger expected that Soviet influence might be drawn out of the Middle East in response to the imperatives the new balance would present. As William Burr puts it, “Kissinger saw limitless possibilities for subtly influencing both [Moscow and Beijing] and balancing one against the other so that Washington could keep its options open while preserving its influence.”³

Circumstances Today

This initiative failed almost entirely. China and Russia are today military and political adversaries of the United States. Contrary to expectation, the government in Taipei did not seek terms with Beijing after the United States broke relations in 1979. Instead, the island democratized, which created an entirely new situation that no one in Washington had seriously considered. Taiwan is still with us, albeit much changed from what she was in the 1970s. For example, her population has grown, from about 15 million in 1971 to 23 million in 2006; per capita

income has increased from US\$372 in 1971 to US\$15,690 in 2005; GNP moved from US\$6.237 billion to US\$355.4 billion.

The only real change is that the United States and China now have embassies in one another's capitals—something that, arguably, could have been achieved at less cost. The greatest changes have been in words and in protocol. Facts on the ground have changed far less. Some new problems have, moreover, been created.

Whatever the demerits of the official American relationship with Taipei that was broken, the alliance had the advantage of freezing the potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. An explicit American alliance with Taiwan and the presence of American forces on the island effectively removed the issue from Chinese domestic politics and rendered an actual attack almost unthinkable: Why provoke war with Washington? That stable situation was overturned by the Nixon diplomacy. The end of the alliance and the clarity with which Nixon and Kissinger had promised Taiwan to China encouraged Beijing to adopt a dangerous new policy that combined with a variety of peaceful offers, notably of autonomy under the "One Country, Two Systems" concept, an arms build up to intimidate Taiwan, and the development of naval and air assets to threaten American forces should they choose to intervene (as they were no longer committed to do). As former Chinese President Jiang Zemin told the publisher of the *Asahi Shimbun* at Beidaihe on August 12, 1995, "If we abandon the threat of force against Taiwan, *then it is not possible that peaceful reunification will be achieved*"⁴ (Emphasis added).

Far from being conclusively resolved, the issue of Taiwan's future was unfrozen and became increasingly pressing, and more tempting to China. When the United States broke the alliance, the island was put "in play" to use the language of Wall Street. At the same time, however, the island itself has become stronger and more attractive. After President Carter made the break with Taipei, China's leader Deng Xiaoping sent a very polite letter to Taipei, to the then president Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, born in China. But the younger Chiang declined to answer and instead undertook the first steps toward ending the Nationalist Party dictatorship and fully democratizing the island, a process completed by his successor Lee Teng-hui—a reaction that caught both Washington and Beijing completely by surprise, and which both still find unwelcome and unfamiliar.⁵

Intellectual Origins of the Policy

Nixon's visit to China is often very highly rated. The distinguished scholar Margaret Macmillan refers to American trip in 1972 as "The Week that Changed the World."⁶ One suspects that this diplomatic visit is the only one in American history about which a serious opera has been composed: *Nixon in China* by the American minimalist John Adams, premiered by the Houston Grand Opera in 1987. But was it really a success? Certainly not in its own terms. And how important was it? China today is a very different country to what she was in 1971, but that is largely owing to Mao Zedong's demise in 1976 and changes made by the

Chinese themselves thereafter—and not to the American initiative. Not for the first time, a diplomatic strategy has led to unexpected results.

This chapter will not tell the story of Nixon and Kissinger yet again. That has already been done many times.⁷ Rather it will analyze its origins, specifically looking for the sources of the defects in the plans that contributed to the outcomes with respect to the USSR and Taiwan. The chapter will conclude by looking at the present situation, and asking, rather as Nixon and Kissinger did in the 1970s—and with no greater assurance of accuracy—where the future lies.

The purpose of the Nixon policy was to divide the Soviet Union and China, thus creating a new balance of power and enabling the United States to leave Vietnam. The diplomacy carried out with the USSR is beyond the scope of this chapter, but one must bear in mind that as the China policy was undertaken, a parallel approach was being made to Moscow, through the process called “*détente*.” When Nixon came to power in 1969 he opened a series of summit talks with east European powers and the Soviet Union that led to, among other things, the conclusion in 1972 of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and in the same year the Biological Weapons Convention and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In the same year talks began on SALT II. The year after Nixon resigned from office, the capstone of this process was put in place by the Helsinki Accords of 1975. The hope, never to be realized, was that as the USSR realized that she had far greater long-term interests in dealing with the West and the United States, she would reduce her aid to North Vietnam and diplomatic support. These developments are beyond the scope of this chapter, but must be borne in mind—for given that the USSR actually collapsed, the Soviet component of the policy may be seen, in certain respects, as the greatest failure of all.⁸

The diplomacy toward Beijing was directed toward the capital of a state, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), that the United States did not recognize and the influence of which it attempted to contain—not least because it considered Mao and his policies abhorrent. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger knew much at all about China. But they seem to have believed that they did know one big thing—which was that this negative view of China prevalent at the time and that had guided Washington’s policy since the 1950s was misguided, culturally insensitive, and failed to grasp the true historical significance of Mao’s revolution. A revealing fact is the degree to which, in planning the trip, they consulted exclusively with those who had a positive evaluation of Mao and his contribution to China, seeing him as the builder of an enduring and stable system, while systematically ignoring experts whose views were different, and books that did not support their preconceptions.

A good example of this stacking of the intellectual deck was the decision to invite the French author André Malraux (1901–1976) to the White House in February 1972, to share with Mr. Nixon his understanding of China and recollections of Mao Zedong. Malraux was always a bit of a fantasist in his own life and his recollections may or may not have been accurate.⁹ He claimed to have met Mao, and as we will see, his insights were embraced enthusiastically by Kissinger in particular. Kissinger pronounced Malraux’s “a stunning performance,” adding

significantly that it was “not fully appreciated by an audience still imprisoned in the stereotypes of a decade.”¹⁰

Correspondingly, some prior notion of what China was really like seems the best explanation for the oddly one-sided reading list that the group around Kissinger had earlier drawn up. They consulted Malraux, as we have seen, and Richard H. Solomon, a member of government who had written on Chinese negotiating behavior. They had also read books by “Edgar Snow, Ross Terrill, Dennis Bloodworth, John Fairbank, C. P. Fitzgerald, Stuart Schram, and Andre Malraux.”¹¹

One of these authors (Malraux) was a novelist, one (Solomon) an official, and two (Snow and Bloodworth) were journalists. The rest were or are scholars. What they shared at the time was a positive evaluation of China and of Mao Zedong in particular. Missing entirely from the list are any of the books and experts, of which there were some even then, that would have challenged the views on which the China portion of the venture was premised. Ironically, the next few years saw a flood of such books appear.

For China to serve the role Kissinger and Nixon had in mind for it, with respect to the Soviet Union and the world, required that it be a stable and politically mature state. Many scholars and journalists believed that it was just as they believed that the USSR was a stable and mature polity. The group that Nixon and Kissinger consulted believed that Mao had made great achievements in feeding, housing, and educating the Chinese people, and had created a model health care system for them when they were sick. He was popular and fundamentally legitimate; reports of massacres, famines, destruction, and so forth were either wrong or grossly exaggerated, or had little bearing, even if true, on either the stability or the future course of the state.

This approach was very similar to that regularly taken by Soviet specialists. In a celebrated article that began circulating in the mid-1970s and summed up much popular wisdom, Harvard's Edward L. Keenan had argued that, after a period of volatility, the USSR had witnessed, by the end of the 1930s, the “beginning of a time of greater stability and ‘normalcy’ of political culture . . . marked by so many features of the previously traditional political culture—in a new synthesis—that the new may be seen, in long historical perspective, as the continuation of the old.”¹²

Another Harvard professor, Benjamin Schwartz, had made similar arguments about China at the end of the 1960s.¹³ The thrust was that communism provided a new content for a continuing political structure: that just as Stalin was, in effect, Tsar, so Mao was, in effect, emperor; the Party replaced the imperial civil service in China, and in both countries the texts of communism filled the void created by the abolition of Orthodox Christianity in Russia, and of Confucianism in China. Political scientists of the mid-twentieth century were much enamored of the concept of revolutionary change and likewise of the ability of such change to be made stable by an appropriation and transformation of earlier traditions. They largely discounted not only the cruelty, but also the dysfunctionality of communism—an error that has caught up with them with respect to the USSR, and may do the same with respect to China before long.

In fact, of course, China in 1971 was no more stable and mature than was the Soviet Union of the time—an impoverished and oppressive country having, however, formidable military might. China was in fact desperately poor, chaotic, divided politically, and in no way the sort of state that the planned policy required. *Any number of American and foreign experts could have explained this to the White House but they were not consulted.* Such consultation might not have affected ultimate strategic choices, but they would have been better informed.

Perhaps the best example of one not called upon is Edward E. Rice, who had served as Consul General in Hong Kong from 1964–1967, a true China hand, just completing the manuscript of his superb study *Mao's Way*, a book that nearly forty years after its publication is still worth reading for its wealth of information and insight, nearly all of which has stood up well to the many revelations of the post-Mao period.¹⁴ Whereas Malraux, an amateur, was summoned, Rice, a seasoned authority, was not. Nor was the German scholar Juergen Domes who was then immersed in research for his definitive study, based almost entirely on Chinese sources, *The Internal Politics of China*.¹⁵ We can also mention Professor Ivan and Miriam London who at that time were at work, with their colleague Ta-ling Lee, on the first thorough debriefing of a Red Guard who had escaped to Taiwan and given a firsthand account of his harrowing experiences, published in 1972, the year Nixon made his visit.¹⁶ Like that of Rice, the work of Domes and of the Londons has stood the test of time. It has not been upended, for example, by official Chinese revelations of the human cost, in the tens of millions of dead, of the Great Leap Forward, or of the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution, and other Maoist policies.

No experts on Taiwan were consulted; Taiwanese opinion was discounted. Few even inside government took any interest at all in Taiwan at the time of which we are speaking. The island and its people were largely ignored. It was the refugee government from China that was the focus of Washington's attention. Few people specialized in the history and culture of Taiwan, as many do today. Nevertheless, the information that Nixon and Kissinger needed *was available*, but as is usual in cases of scripting, it was systematically ignored. Presbyterian missionaries and others knew something of the local culture, even the difficult Taiwanese language. The former Consul General George H. Kerr had published some important books about the aspirations of the native Taiwanese. So too had Taiwanese in the United States, among them Li Thian-hok.¹⁷ Li's essay, indeed, is as relevant today as it was when written 40 years ago. But the island and its government were seen above all through the lens of the Chinese civil war, with Chiang, the corrupt and incompetent loser, defeated by the incomparable Mao Zedong, and pathetically yet defiantly ensconced in an island backwater. No clue existed to what would really happen to Taiwan.

The tendency to select evidence that favors one's ideas was not limited to Nixon and Kissinger. It is widespread, although very difficult to explain psychologically. Besides, early on, one of Kissinger's colleagues identified in him the tendency toward abstract thinking and inattention to empirical information that led him astray in this case.

Kissinger had devoted his solitary academic book to the diplomacy of the period immediately following the defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna.¹⁸ France, for more than 15 years the all-conquering superpower, had been defeated by a powerful coalition of European powers and brought to negotiate at Vienna. There, amidst all the pomp and glamour of the Habsburg capital, negotiations took place in which the French representative, the matchless and unspeakable Prince Talleyrand (1754–1838) managed to divide the victorious coalition by taking advantage of their internal disagreements and rivalries over the future shape of Europe, by so doing making his own country, France, appear appealing as an ally for one side or the other. In other words, by means of a skillful diplomacy of dividing the opposition, Talleyrand created the opportunity for France to regain her place in the European balance of power. It was a remarkable achievement. Clearly it impressed Kissinger and guided his thought as he considered the problems faced by the United States at a low ebb of her power and influence in the 1970s. This was the rough draft for the China policy.

The intellectual weakness of Kissinger's approach to Vienna had been clearly revealed by Quincy Wright in his 1958 review of Kissinger's *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, And The Problems of Peace, 1812–1822* in the *American Historical Review*. Wright had called attention to its intellectually shaky non-empirical approach. As Wright wrote, Kissinger's book was "less a history of Europe's defeat of, and reconstruction after, Napoleon, than it is an interpretation of history in universal terms." Current events were reflected in what was presented as a historical mirror. As Wright points out, for Kissinger, Stalin's Soviet Union was, in its ambitions, not unlike the Russia of Alexander I.¹⁹ How had those concerned deal then with Russia at Vienna? By negotiating a secret treaty among the French, Austrians, and British designed to restrain Russia and Prussia. A balance of power was created that endured until the forces of social change, ignored at Vienna, erupted in the revolutions of 1848. Arguably, then, without even considering what the facts might be with respect to China and the Soviet Union, Kissinger was inclined to look to the Vienna model, and to seek for ways, secret if required, to restore the United States to her position of power (as Talleyrand had done for France) as part of the process of creating balance in the world system.

"The author recognizes that history does not repeat itself exactly, but he insists that the problems of different periods, the methods of dealing with them, and the motivation of the actors may be similar. Consequently, 'generalization' may be 'abstracted from the uniqueness of individual experience'"²⁰ (emphasis added). The idea that a generalization can be made on the basis of a single unique experience is extraordinary, and Quincy Wright is absolutely correct to pounce on it in the third sentence of his review. No practicing diplomat would ever say such a thing, nor would a historian, nor I think would a political scientist today. Kissinger and Nixon, however, were entranced.

After the reality of a "new China," the second desideratum for the policy based on Vienna was a permanent estrangement of that China from Russia. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger seems to have given much attention to the possibility that China and Russia might patch up their relationship as they have. Instead,

they took the split between the two powers effectively a permanent international reality from which the new policy flowed logically.

As Kissinger put it, speaking of Malraux, the Frenchman's "intuitions proved than an artist's insight can often grasp the essence of problems better than experts or intelligence analysts can." Many of Malraux's judgments proved remarkably incisive. The rapprochement between China and the United States was inevitable, he argued; "it was *inherent* in the Sino-Soviet split"²¹ (emphasis added). Policymaking under such circumstances was not so much a matter of making choices. Rather, it was like what logicians and mathematicians do when they deduce theorems that necessarily follow from postulates they have assumed.

The Sino-Soviet split was the postulate. What followed? First, that China faced an imminent threat from the USSR. Second, that because China was relatively weak, she would have little choice but to come to terms with the United States. Third, that both the Soviet Union and China were mature polities, unlikely to change significantly for many decades, and that therefore one was not simply playing tactics, but operating strategically. As late as 1980, Mr. Kissinger was contributing to a volume entitled *Nato, the next thirty years: the changing political, economic, and military setting*.²² Finally, that a price would have to be paid, in the form of an American abandonment of Taiwan, an act that would lead, fairly quickly, to that island's incorporation into China. We have each of these points in Kissinger's own words.

Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Split

With respect to the Soviet threat, here is what Kissinger told Huang Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, in New York, on August 4, 1972:

Our analysis is that there is a deliberate Soviet policy to isolate you, and that the many agreements the Soviet Union has made in the last two years and the patience they have shown in the face of setbacks in the West, can only be explained to us in terms of aggressive intent in the East... This is our analysis. We believe the period of greatest danger in this respect is likely to come in the period 1974–1976. We believe also that it is against our interests to permit the establishment of an hegemony in Eurasia dominated from Moscow. And therefore, it is in our interest to resist this without any formal agreement (with the PRC) simply out of our own necessity.²³

The Soviet Union was very threatening in the 1970s, to be sure. But just as Nixon and Kissinger failed to grasp the real nature of Chinese society and politics, so they failed in the same way with respect to the USSR. Andrei Amalrik published his book *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984* in the same year that Kissinger made his first trip to Beijing.²⁴ Alexander Solzhenitsyn had received the Nobel Prize the year before. Dissent and change were evident in the USSR, and given the tumultuous history of that country, should have caused policymakers to examine their assumptions with more care than they did. The consensus within

both the academic establishment and the US intelligence agencies was of course that the state was stable and growing stronger—though the picture Kissinger's presented to the Chinese of a bellicose Moscow, intent on Eastern conquest, was outside the realm of conventional wisdom.²⁵

Did Nixon and Kissinger genuinely expect that the USSR was going to attack China? This is a difficult question to answer, although my suspicion is that the answer is "no." The Chinese, as will be seen, found the idea implausible.

As for China being the weaker party, here is how Kissinger explained China's role as preparations were being made, early in 1972, for the presidential visit.

China was not important to us because it was physically powerful; Chou En-lai was surely right in his repeated protestations that his nation was not a superpower. In fact, had China been stronger, it would not have pursued the improvement of relations with us with the same single-mindedness.²⁶

Above all, Nixon and Kissinger were persuaded that the Chinese had no choice but to turn to Washington to deal with the Soviet Union—according to Kissinger "Peking needed us to break out of its isolation and as a counterweight to the potentially mortal threat along its northern border"²⁷—and also believed that the Chinese rulers somehow shared their analysis of the global situation and placed local issues within it. This misperception led to some awkward moments.

When Nixon and Kissinger met Mao on February 21, 1972, neither American seemed to doubt either the Chairman's greatness, or the fundamentally constructive nature of his rule. Kissinger observed: "I used to assign the Chairman's collective [*sic*] writings to my classes at Harvard." But Mao batted the compliment aside: "Those writings of mine aren't anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote." Nixon tried to recoup: "The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world." Mao slapped him down with oft-quoted words: "I haven't been able to change it. I've only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Beijing."

The Americans had arrived prepared for a solemn tour d'horizon in which the Chinese and the Americans would deal with the world's problems rather as Metternich, Talleyrand, and the others had at Vienna. Thus an earnest beginning from the American president:

President Nixon: For example, I hope to talk with the Prime Minister and later with the Chairman about issues like Taiwan, Vietnam, and Korea.

I also want to talk about—and this is very sensitive—the future of Japan, the future of the subcontinent, and what India's role will be; and on the broader world scene, the future of US-Soviet relations. Because only if we see the whole picture of the world and the great forces that move the world will we be able to make the right decisions about the immediate and urgent problems that always completely dominate our vision.

Mao didn't want to play:

Chairman Mao: All those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much. I think your topic is better—philosophic questions.²⁸

Kissinger tried to jolly things along but was clearly frustrated. In one discussion he admonished the Chinese leader:

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is really important that we understand each other's motives. We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China.

Chairman Mao: (interrupting) No, that's not so. Your aim in doing that would be to bring the Soviet Union down.

Dr. Kissinger: That's a very dangerous thing. (laughter)

Chairman Mao: (using both hands for gestures) The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia, the two continents.

Dr. Kissinger: We want to discourage a Soviet attack, not to defeat it. We want to prevent it. (Prime Minister Zhou looks at his watch.)²⁹

China, it seemed, had all the time in the world. But Kissinger was deeply worried that the unique window of opportunity within which he imagined himself to be dealing, would close.³⁰ The American diplomats opened themselves to Chinese pressure and manipulation.

Breaking with Taiwan

We now know that when Kissinger met with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for the first time, he pledged acceptance of "five principles." Nixon reiterated these the following year.

"Principle one," as already mentioned, was that "There is one China, and Taiwan is part of China. There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined." The others were nonsupport for Taiwan independence, and discouragement of Japan from "moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less."

(That is the first sentence of the paragraph. What follows, perhaps six or seven lines of typescript, effectively a full paragraph, appears to remain so sensitive even today that it has been obscured by opaque black ink—"sanitized" as the rubber stamp on the text puts it—in the recently declassified materials. One possibility is that the redacted material dealt with some sort of offer to withdraw not only from Taiwan but from South Korea as well. Kissinger told Deng Xiaoping in 1974 that "On Korea, we are now talking with the South Koreans about the removal of the UN Command." Or, given the sentence about restraining Japan that immediately precedes the long passage that has been blotted out, it is also possible that the pledge had something to do with our military alliance with Japan. If so, that would explain why even today, 35 years on, the passage is considered too sensitive to be made public).³¹

The fourth point indicated that the United States would "support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out." It added that "we will not support any military attempts by the government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the mainland." It did not say, however, that we would oppose the use of force against Taiwan. "Finally" the pledges concluded, "we seek the normalisation

of relations with the People's Republic. We know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalisation [i.e., the establishment of full ambassadorial relations—ANW], but within the framework I have previously described we seek normalisation and we will work toward the goal and will try to achieve it.”³²

On the day he was leaving for China, Kissinger happened to encounter James Chien-hung Shen, the Ambassador of the ROC (Taiwan) to the United States. Shen attempted to say a few words about the vote gathering campaign, which the United States ostensibly supported, to keep the Taiwan in the United Nations General Assembly even if the People's Republic joined. But Kissinger was preoccupied with his upcoming trip. “No government less deserved what was about to happen to it than did Taiwan,” he recalls in his memoirs, shedding the obligatory crocodile tears. “I found my role with Shen particularly painful, since I knew that before long his esoteric discussion of UN procedural maneuvers would be overtaken by more *elemental events*” (emphasis added).³³

Although the United States, in theory, supported Taiwan's continuing membership in the United Nations, in fact Nixon and Kissinger wanted a complete break: the disappearance of Taiwan as a state independent of China, and they therefore worked behind the scenes to frustrate efforts by others in the administration to keep Taipei in. Kissinger's undermining of US efforts at the United Nations contributed to the loss of a very close vote to keep Taiwan as a member. He furthermore showed no interest in keeping Taiwan in the international community by changing its name and claims, as some in Taipei were proposing.³⁴ Clearly he had decided to sacrifice it, and wanted the unpleasant business to go as smoothly as possible.

The Americans had hoped that the Chinese would renounce the use of force against Taiwan, but this they stubbornly refused to do. Instead, Zhou Enlai made clear that Beijing expected her quid pro quo without too much delay. He told Kissinger in 1972:

...[i]t is our hope, it would be good if the liberation of Taiwan could be realized in your next term of office... But also, Mr. President, you should be aware that there are not too many days left to Chiang Kai-shek. I said very frankly that when Dr. Kissinger said that it would take ten years (to solve the Taiwan question) that would be too long. It is better not to mention any date. I can't wait ten years. You have ten years.³⁵

Nixon and Kissinger promised to cut all ties with Taiwan by 1976, which by the timetable Zhou had laid out, would have meant the island's incorporation into China no later than 1986. This was difficult to swallow, not least because such a policy direction was not remotely supported by the American people, whom both Nixon and Kissinger went to great lengths to mislead. Still, what had to be done had to be done. As Kissinger wrote,

The Chinese have been farsighted and patient on this question. Their willingness to ease our predicament is now most dramatically shown in their setting up a liaison office in Washington while we maintain diplomatic relations with the GRC [Government of the Republic of China]. On the other hand, we have largely bought their public reasonableness with your own private assurances—to normalize

fully our relations by 1976 and to withdraw our forces from Taiwan now that the Vietnam War is over. Taiwan is a problem we should be able to control, both internationally and domestically, as we continue to add to the handwriting on the wall and condition our audiences. However, we should be under no illusions that our final step will be anything but painful—there are few friends as decent as our allies on Taiwan.³⁶

Neither Nixon nor Kissinger expected the sacrifice to be frustrated. So deep was the conviction that Taipei would have no choice but to give in that no one in the US government gave serious consideration to what might happen if they did not.

Often Mao toyed with the Americans as a cat might toy with a mouse. Thus, in October 1975, 11 months before his death, he professed not to understand America's eagerly proffered sacrifice of Taiwan. The Chinese Chairman had upbraided the American Secretary of State for his transparent scheming to play Moscow and Beijing off against one another.

Dr. Kissinger: We come to Beijing because we have a common opponent and because we think your perception of the world situation is the clearest of any country we deal with [*sic*] and with which we agree on some . . . many points,

Chairman Mao: That's not reliable. Those words are not reliable. Those words are not reliable because according to your priorities the first is the Soviet Union, the second is Europe, and the third is Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: That is not correct. . .

Chairman Mao: So then we quarrel.

Dr. Kissinger: We quarrel. The Soviet Union is a great danger for us, but not a high priority [*sic*].

Chairman Mao: That is not correct.³⁷

The American attempted to recoup:

Dr. Kissinger: We have nothing to gain in Moscow

Chairman Mao: But you can gain Taiwan in China

Dr. Kissinger: We can gain Taiwan in China?

Chairman Mao: But you now have the Taiwan of China

Dr. Kissinger: But we will settle that between us

Chairman Mao: In a hundred years

Dr. Kissinger: That's what the Chairman said the last time I was here

Chairman Mao: Exactly

Dr. Kissinger: Much less. It won't take a hundred years.

Chairman Mao: It's better for it to be in your hands. And if you were to send it back to me now, I would not want it, because it is not wantable. There are a huge bunch of counter-revolutionaries there. A hundred years hence we will want it (gesturing with his hand) and we are going to fight for it.

Dr. Kissinger: Not a hundred years.

Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand and counting) It is hard to say. Five years, ten, twenty, a hundred years. It's hard to say. (Points toward the ceiling) And when I go to heaven to see God, I'll tell him it's better to have Taiwan under the care of the United States now.

Dr. Kissinger: He'll be very astonished to hear that from the Chairman.³⁸

Mao was not being foolish. He understood that, from a Chinese point of view, having Taiwan part of an American sphere of influence was better than having the island join with perhaps the Soviet Union or Japan. Still, one wonders what Dr. Kissinger felt when the discussion departed a great distance from what he had imagined and hoped for.

Meanwhile, the Chinese grew impatient as the hoped for break with Taiwan was postponed owing to domestic problems in America. In 1976 Huang Hua gave Kissinger a tongue lashing over his failure to deliver what he had promised. Kissinger had pleaded for understanding of the situation in the United States. Huang was adamant:

Huang: “[N]ormalizing relations is entirely the responsibility of the United States. The method and the time for liberating Taiwan is an internal affair of China and is not discussible. The Chinese position was clear to you even before you sought to reopen relations with us. Now Americans are saying that China’s liberation of Taiwan will cripple the development of Sino-U.S. relations. They (Americans) are saying that Sino-U.S. relations will prosper only if the Chinese side takes into account US concerns. This is a premeditated pretext. It is a flagrant threat against China, and we cannot accept it.

Dr. Kissinger: I should point out that the statement about taking U.S. views into account doesn’t apply principally to the Taiwan issue but rather to our broader cooperation.³⁹

Yet again, it seemed, the Chinese were simply failing to grasp the larger picture and its implications. The expectation of fairly prompt change in Taiwan was still strong eight years later when the Carter administration finally cut, as they imagined, the Gordian knot, and ended all official ties with Taiwan. Reassuring words notwithstanding, there was a sense in some quarters that Taipei would not recover from the seismic shock. “The United States,” said the communiqué, “expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.”⁴⁰ Some in the US government expected settlement in as little as three years.⁴¹ But as we have seen, that did not happen.

Actual Outcomes and Future Issues

We started with Nixon’s straightforward personal statement that Taiwan was part of China. That never became US policy; quite the opposite. To this day the United States has never agreed what the Chinese wanted above all: agreement that they had sovereignty over Taiwan; that legally the island belonged to them, and seems unlikely to do so now.

The Shanghai communiqué of 1972 did not “recognize” any such Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan but rather “acknowledged” that it was the Chinese view that they held it. By its choice of words, the United States reserved its position on the ultimate sovereignty of Taiwan, although this fact is often misunderstood. Nor does it seem that Kissinger later considered it wise to accept the Chinese view that it held sovereignty over Taiwan. Consider, for example, the discussion at a meeting on October 29, 1976.

The Secretary: “[Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State] “If Taiwan is recognised by us as part of China, then it may become irresistible for them. Our saying we want a peaceful solution has no force. It is Chinese territory. What are we going to do about it?”

Mr. [William Henry Jr.] Gleysteen [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs]: The legal position is not tight. We would have recognized Taiwan as part of China not as a Province of the PRC

The Secretary: For us to go to war with a recognized country where we have an ambassador over part of what we would recognize as their country would be preposterous.

Mr. [Arthur] Hummel [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs]: Down the road, perhaps the only solution would be an independent Taiwan.

The Secretary: The ideal solution would be if Taiwan decided to rejoin Beijing. If they worked out something between themselves; from our point of view this would be absolutely the ideal solution.

Mr. [Oscar Vance] Armstrong [Director, Bureau of East Asian And Pacific Affairs, People's Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs]: The likelihood is small.

Mr. Gleysteen: Yes. Unlikely⁴²

This meeting came five years after Kissinger's first trip to China and more than two years after Richard Nixon's resignation as president.

In April 1982 President Ronald Reagan closed the issue with the promulgation of his official “Six Assurances” with respect to Taiwan, of which the last two were, reportedly:

5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.

6. The United States would not formally recognise Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.⁴³

In September 1994, Mike McCurry, who served as State Department spokesperson during the Clinton administration was asked if his government considered Taiwan a part of China. He replied: “Absolutely. That's been a consistent feature of our ‘One China’ policy.” An uproar ensued. The statement was retracted and replaced with the assertion, standard since the Shanghai communiqué, 22 years before, that the United States “acknowledged” the PRC's position that there was only “One China.”⁴⁴

Much of great importance has happened since Kissinger met Ambassador Shen on the morning of his trip in 1971, not least the end of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991, and the rise of China economically and militarily, which continues apace. But the “elemental events” that Kissinger was thinking of have *not* occurred and Taiwan, though internationally isolated, has not, I think, been “overtaken” by them in the terminal way that Kissinger had in mind. Nothing like what Kissinger expected has occurred and many of the fundamental issues he expected would be resolved in fact remain.⁴⁵

What in fact has happened in the Pacific is that one order has been dismantled, but no new order has taken its place. The old order was the Eastern version of the

Cold War: Containment of China, opposition to communism, and support of a mostly offshore-alliance system that included, explicitly, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as well as Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. That has now degraded substantially, with the expulsion of Taiwan, growing ambivalence in South Korea, the departure of US bases from Philippines and Thailand, and the new foreign policy of New Zealand. The old structure was archaic and dysfunctional in many ways, to be sure, but it was a structure having a rationale. No structure has replaced it, nor any coherent rationale.

As long-time intelligence insider Robert L. Suettinger writes, “[T]he notion that American policy is directly driven by strategic considerations, or that explanations can be found for specific American policies in theoretical speculations about the actions of nation states in certain circumstances is grossly inaccurate.”⁴⁶ The incoherence of our Asian policy since the old structure was discarded certainly proves Suettinger’s point.

Nor did Kissinger have any sense of the economic dynamism and consequent social and political disorder that they were unleashing. In the case of the USSR, Reagan had insisted that concessions on security *had* to precede any agreement about economic access and cooperation. For Kissinger the order was precisely the reverse. Economic relations were intended to support political.

Dr. Kissinger: Our interest in trade with China is not commercial. It is to establish a relationship that is necessary for the political relations we both have. [Note that US computers, useful for seismic analysis but also for nuclear design, were on offer].⁴⁷

Perhaps the easiest answer is to say that like many before him—and after (this author included)—Kissinger became captured by a certain vision of China, one that was accurate in some respects but deeply misleading in others. With their power in government, he and Nixon (who was similarly bedazzled) attempted to put that imaginary China at the center of US policy—just as his predecessors in the American State Department had been doing at least since the 1920s.⁴⁸

For purposes of this volume, however, the failure with respect to Taiwan is the most important. The issue of Taiwan is far more complex and perhaps dangerous now than it was in the 1970s. Then, the island’s government could probably have abandoned its claims to China and remained in the international community, as our ambassador in Taipei was urging. Furthermore, the presence of American forces on the island and an explicit defense treaty provided a convenient excuse for Beijing to do nothing. The Soviet Union still existed in those days too, which means that the United States had some real leverage with Beijing. More darkly, then either Chiang Kai-shek or his son Chiang Ching-kuo possessed the personal authority to make a deal with Beijing over the heads of the Taiwanese people. No one on the island has possessed that sort of power since. A less visionary and more deliberate approach, with plenty of patience, would perhaps have yielded a far better outcome than was in fact the case.

Today, all that has changed and the remaining issues have been rendered far more difficult to resolve not only by the unexpected internal developments in Taiwan, and the distrust aroused in Japan and other countries by American

secrecy, but also by the very decisiveness with which Nixon, and later Carter, burned bridges and closed off routes away from what they were convinced must happen. Their legacy of 35 years is difficult to reverse: at least as difficult as was the legacy of 22 years of an American quarantine of China in 1971.

Kissinger like many others thought Mao's system would endure. In fact the process of dismantling it got under way a little more than a month after his death. Today the country is transformed economically if not politically. The sum total of all these failed expectations is an Asia that, rather than settling into stability after the China anomaly was resolved in the 1970s, has been moving in the direction of greater volatility and risk. Rarely does a policy so carefully crafted by people, so well qualified—not only by the highly intelligent theorist Kissinger but also by the pragmatic Nixon—produce such unexpected results.

A Road Forward?

Today it is growing ever clearer that the new future envisioned by Nixon and Kissinger not only has not arrived, but that it will never arrive.

China is by no means a friend; potentially she is an adversary. She is far more friendly with Russia than with the United States. Taiwan remains an independent country, though more isolated diplomatically than any other on earth. The question of her future is every bit as challenging now as it was in the 1970s: more so, in fact, as a new generation is in charge, decisions are made democratically, and popular aspirations cannot be ignored.

On July 1, 2007 Sue Bremner, Deputy Director of the United States "Taiwan Coordination Office," responded to an inquiry addressed to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan. She wrote:

The United States has never claimed to have acquired title to Taiwan by law, treaty, or conquest. Our relations with Taiwan are governed by the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relation Act. The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintains there is but 'one China' and that Taiwan is a part of China." Although the United States recognises the PRC Government as the sole legal government of China, we have not formally recognised Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. In fact, we have not made any determination as to Taiwan's political status. Our consistent position remains that sovereignty of Taiwan is a question to be decided peacefully by *the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait* (emphasis added).⁴⁹

But are there "Chinese people" on the Taiwan side of the Strait? Increasing numbers of Taiwanese identify themselves as ethnically Taiwanese, not as Chinese. In 1998, a survey found that 45% of respondents self-identified as Chinese, 38% as "both Taiwanese and Chinese," and 18% as Taiwanese. In 2003, respondents who self-identified as Chinese had fallen to less than 10%, whereas those who self-identified as "Taiwanese alone" had climbed to 41.5%, and those who self-identified as both Chinese and Taiwanese stood at 43.8%.⁵⁰

This means that the last remaining conceptual glue that holds the whole 1970's approach together, namely, the belief that somehow people on both sides of the Strait consider themselves "Chinese," is coming unstuck.

Historians may well look back on the late summer of 2007 as the time when the flawed 1970s policy began its final unraveling. The government in Taipei proposed applying for UN membership as “Taiwan” and wanted to hold a referendum about whether to do so. Washington’s wisest course would have been to say: “This is an internal matter that we expect will be democratically resolved by the people of Taiwan.”

China evidently exerted strong pressure on Washington. However, the result was that, seeking to appease Beijing while warning Taiwan away from a course that nearly every democratic country has embedded in its constitution, no less than the Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, speaking in Hong Kong, called the proposed referendum a “mistake” and cautioned that it would be seen as violating Washington’s policy against any attempt by Taiwan to alter the status quo with China.

As Negroponte puts it later in the interview:

I would recall that in the past, President Chen Shui-bian, of Taiwan has made commitments to the American president, to the international community, and to the people of Taiwan not to take any kind of steps that would represent a unilateral alteration of the status quo, such as a change in the official name of Taiwan.⁵¹

But where was the change in the official name?

The *CIA Factbook*, presumably authoritative, gives the following for “Country Name”:

conventional long form: none
conventional short form: Taiwan.⁵²

That is American usage. Why were the Taiwanese not permitted to follow American usage? The reason was that Taiwan had another name that Mr. Negroponte dared not utter. That was Republic of China (ROC)—the name brought by the nationalist government when it fled China for the island starting in 1945, never acknowledged by China, and after 1979 expunged from all official American usage. Oddly Washington seems to have assumed that the Kuomintang dictatorship would continue, and with it the assertion of ROC identity, and thus a link to China. But by 2007, the Kuomintang had been out of power for seven years. Now Taiwan threatened to follow China and the United States and abandon a name that looked to spell only trouble. It fell to the unfortunate Douglas Wilder, a long-time CIA analyst then working at the National Security Council to explain:

The position of the United States government is that the ROC, Republic of China, is an issue undecided, and it has been left undecided, as you know, for many, many years.⁵³

His words immediately lead to the question: “Well, then, how is the issue to be decided?” Normally the population of a contested area is asked to vote about its political future, and who, if anyone, it wants to join another state. Official

America will have a tough time answering that. We are, after all, descended from the people who made their principles clear in the Declaration of Independence.

We may now look back wistfully to a time when, fairly easily, Taiwan could have been kept in the United Nations and an official American presence maintained on the island—if only the Nixon administration, and the Carter administration that followed, had not been so convinced by their own scripts for what was going to happen, and so intent on acting not with prudence but with speed and a specious decisiveness.

Ambassador Hummel suggested in 1976 that “Down the road, perhaps the only solution would be an independent Taiwan.” The Ambassador was correct. That is the road that events are now moving along. But it is not the future that Nixon and Kissinger attempted to prepare for us. Far from it. This is precisely the future that Kissinger and Chou and Nixon and the others sought to close off absolutely, completely, and for good. Such is the cunning of history. Like it or not, we, China, and the world must now deal with it.

Notes

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1. The statement is found in www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/nixzhou document 2, page 5, transcript of February 22, 1972 Memorandum of conversation with Zhou Enlai and others. My thanks to Frank Januzzi of the Council on Foreign Relations for directing me to these materials.
2. Shen's obituary—he died at the age of 99 in 2007—appeared in the Taiwan press on the day this manuscript was completed. Kissinger subsequently told him that the most painful thing he had to do was to visit Beijing secretly. See *World Journal*, July 13, 2007, p. A6 (in Chinese).
3. William Burr, ed., *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1998), p. 2.
4. *Shijie Erbao* [*World Journal*] August 13, 1995, p. A1. Quoted in Arthur Waldron, “Back to Basics: The US Perspective on Taiwan-PRC Relations,” in *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait* ed. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 326–347, at p. 333 n. 18.
5. See Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); also *Taiwan Yearbook 2006* (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2006), pp. 538 ff.
6. Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007).
7. Probably still best, though with much omitted, is Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, but see also, among others, Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes, *War and Peace With China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States* (Bethesda, MD: Dacor-Bacon House, 1995). Also see, Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao*.
8. For the USSR, see Jack F. Matlock Jr., *Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995).
9. See W. M. Frohock, *André Malraux* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

10. *White House Years*, p. 1052.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 1051.
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18. Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
19. *The American Historical Review*, vol. 63, no. 4 (July 1958), pp. 953–955. Quote is at 953.
20. Wright, *review*, p. 953. See note 19, above.
21. *White House Years*, p. 1052.
22. Kenneth A. Myers, ed., *Nato, the Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).
23. *Kissinger Transcripts*, pp. 72–73.
24. Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984* (New York: Perennial Books, 1971).
25. See n. 8.
26. *White House Years*, p. 1049.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 1049.
28. *Kissinger Transcripts*, p. 62.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
32. See n. 1. Transcript of February 22, 1972. Memorandum of conversation with Zhou Enlai and others, p. 5. The accuracy of the speculations provided here will not be known until the text is declassified. They are the author's, though shared by some others, including former officials.
33. *White House Years*, p. 733.
34. See John J. Tkacik Jr., *Reshaping the Taiwan Strait* (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2007), especially pp. 197–202, which contain proposals conveyed by the American ambassador in Taipei for preserving an international status for the island.
35. *Kissinger Transcripts* p. 67.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 392.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 407–408.
40. William B. Bader and Jeffrey T. Bergner, eds., *The Taiwan Relations Act: A Decade of Implementation* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1989), p. 159.
41. Author's personal information. In a Washington lecture, Senator Jesse Helms (1921–) noted "at that time, most countries of the world ignored Taiwan. And,

like some in the United States, these same people assumed it was only a matter of time before the communists on the mainland consumed tiny Taiwan.” Senator Jesse Helms, “Entering the Pacific Century,” in *The B. C. Lee Lectures* (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1996), p. 6.

42. *Kissinger Transcripts*, pp. 416–417.
43. www.fapa.org/generalinfo/sixassurances.htm It has recently transpired that the original text of the “Six Assurances” is held in the Reagan Presidential Library, kept secret by order of the State Department, and variant texts are in circulation. One suspects, however, that had the assurances moved in the direction of recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, the State Department would not be insisting that they be kept from public knowledge. October 1, 2007.
44. www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/12/21/2003341352 October 1, 2007.
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CHAPTER 10

TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY AMID LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

Lowell Dittmer

The China-Taiwan-US relationship may for analytical purposes be conceived as a “strategic triangle”¹: It is “triangular” in the sense that each bilateral relationship is contingent on relations with the third power; it is “strategic” in its prioritization of the security dimension; indeed, one of its most striking features has been the relative irrelevance of changing economic variables in the strategic balance. In this respect it superficially resembles the Great Strategic Triangle (GST) between the United States, People’s Republic of China (PRC), and USSR. But what we might call the Taiwan minitriangle is otherwise quite distinctive—the imbalance of power among the three actors being only the most obvious. At least, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the consistent pivot of this triangle, on the one hand due to its disproportionate economic and strategic weight, on the other because of the (relatively) disinterested “swing” role it has played in determining the relationship between the other two.² Washington has throughout the postwar period consistently been the principal guarantor of Taiwan’s national security, and during certain crucial periods the United States has also interceded on behalf of China’s national security (while at many other times it has been the main threat to PRC security). These asymmetrical interdependencies—Taipei’s need for US support to retain its independent existence, Beijing’s need for tacit US support to be able to pressure Taiwan, Washington’s need for a balance between the two in order to retain its advantageous pivot position—have locked the three together in a complex, ambivalent embrace.

Since the nationalists retreated to Taiwan after their loss of their second civil war with the CCP, the triangular strategic interaction between the United States, Taiwan, and the People Republic has gone through two distinct phases. In the first, Washington supported Taipei vis-à-vis Beijing as a bastion of free enterprise (if not freedom), providing military aid and rising to its defense when the mainland threatened to use force in 1954–1955 and 1958 (though never supporting reciprocal

nationalist aspirations to “recover the mainland”). In the second phase, while giving what Beijing might interpret as rhetorical support for PRC sovereignty claims to the island, Washington attempted to download the unification conundrum to the two principals who had most at stake in the relationship, encouraging Beijing and Taipei to improvise a solution as they wished—stipulating only that it be peaceful. The first period coincides with the international ascendancy of the nationalist regime in Taiwan, when it could claim (with crucial US diplomatic and military support) to represent all of China in the United Nations and most other International Governmental Organizations (IGOs). The second period coincides with the rise of the PRC to a dominant diplomatic position in the international arena corresponding to its growing economic and military power, claiming recognition of most countries in the world as well as full membership in virtually all IGOs and International Nongovernment Organisations (INGOs) and pushing Taiwan out of most of these forums and indeed to the very margins of the international arena, using intensive political pressure to induce the island state to abandon its pursuit of independence and to negotiate reunification with the mainland.

The American attempt to download responsibility for a solution to the divided nation dilemma to the two principals in the early 1970s was partly successful but incomplete. The partial success consisted of opening the way to diplomatic and strategic coordination with Beijing on the global chessboard without abandoning Taiwan or abetting Chinese recovery of the island, thereby enhancing relations with both “Chinas” by balancing each against the other. Yet it also proved frustratingly incomplete. Taiwan’s embrace of democratization at the end of the 1980s coincided with its *de facto* relinquishment of efforts to unify China under nationalist auspices, leaving the initiative for integration in the hands of the larger and potentially more powerful but economically less advanced side of the Strait. Under these circumstances PRC efforts at peaceful reunification, while largely successful at promoting economic integration and initiating diplomatic contacts in the early 1990s, proved unable to surmount the barriers of mutual suspicion or offer a sufficiently enticing political formula to instigate serious bilateral negotiation. Disappointed and frustrated, Beijing periodically revived its option to resort to force, with two adverse consequences: a backlash against the mainland among the Taiwanese electorate, and an American reinsertion into the dispute on behalf of Taipei for the sake of preserving regional peace. The PRC leadership would then blame its frustration on American intervention, resulting in a deterioration of Sino-US relations. Thus Washington’s opt-out solution was unsatisfactory from either Beijing’s perspective (as the island remained politically autonomous) or from Taipei’s (as all forms of participation in international politics became elusive). Nor was it entirely successful from an American perspective: although Washington was able to cultivate positive relations with both sides when relations polarized between them, the prospect of war escalated, drawing in the United States and even implicating Japan. As bilateral relations grew more complicated, both sides needed and yet resented the United States’ balancing role, and the American promise to extract itself from the Strait tangle proved illusory.

This chapter reexamines the relationship between three principals since the elections of George W. Bush and Chen Shui-bian in 2000, followed two years later by the succession of Hu Jintao. All three leaders have experimented with ways to transform the triangle, resulting in significant and sometimes surprising changes in its dynamic. Chen Shui-bian's dramatically oscillating political fortunes since his narrow election in March 2000 have usually been attributed primarily to domestic considerations, but he himself continued to raise the cross-Strait issue with new demarches at pivotal moments. George W. Bush has undergone an evolution, from the most unambiguously pro-Taiwan president since Reagan to a far more ambiguous position. And Hu Jintao, after sponsoring legislation mandating "nonpeaceful" means in the event of secession, has launched a concerted (if circumscribed) "smile" campaign toward the island. The chapter consists of three sections. In the first, we present a very cursory sketch of the chronological evolution of the triangle, to put the postmillennial period in its historical context. In the second, we consider the most recent period in greater detail, coinciding with the rise of new leaderships in Taipei, Washington, and (slightly later), Beijing. We conclude with some reflections about the triangle's likely future in the light of recent political, economic, and cultural trends.

Evolution of the Taiwan Triangle

The opening to China in 1971–1972 marked the beginning of the triangle as a strategic game for the first time, including Beijing as an autonomous rational actor while at the same time thrusting a modernizing Taiwan into a more autonomous role. During the last 20 years of the Cold War (namely 1971–1991), Washington's realignment with Beijing against Moscow entailed an eclipse (if never an abandonment) of Taiwan's security interests in the interest of Sino-American collaboration against an overweening Soviet threat.

With the collapse of European Communism in 1989–1991, Taiwan was emancipated from its sidelined role in great power politics and the Taiwan minitriangle became an autonomous strategic configuration. The collapse of the Soviet Union made the China "card" redundant in Washington, just as it made the American nuclear umbrella unnecessary for China's security, and the Great Strategic Triangle collapsed. Even though the new Russian Federation and China sought periodically to revive it (strategic partnership, friendship treaty, etc.), this no longer excited great American security concerns. At the same time, the shock of Tiananmen aroused American moral misgivings about collaboration with the PRC, and by the early 1990s Sino-American relations had run into serious difficulties, as incoming president Bill Clinton tried in 1994 to extort Chinese compliance with Western human rights norms by threatening withdrawal of most-favored nation treatment to Chinese imports. Meanwhile the advent of democracy in Taiwan gave the small island state crossover appeal to Western liberals as well as hard-line cold warriors, and Lee Teng-hui took advantage of Taiwan's economic and political success story to launch a bid for diplomatic recognition based on "pragmatic diplomacy," "vacation diplomacy," "UN diplomacy," and "dollar diplomacy." Thus the early 1990s witnessed

Taiwan's diplomatic revival, building a new democracy at home while pursuing new opportunities abroad. At the same time it was a relative heyday for cross-Straits relations as economic liberalization unleashed Taiwanese capitalism to go offshore (augmented by US pressure in the last half of the 1980s to revalue its currency and alleviate the bilateral trade imbalance), and Taiwan businesses began to respond to Beijing's invitations to engage in economic exchange with the mainland (indirectly, through Hong Kong), resulting in an economic integration that has accelerated through the turn of the millennium. Chafing under human rights trade sanctions in the wake of Tiananmen, Beijing welcomed economic exchanges, which have survived political vicissitudes with only a few temporary lapses. Taipei responded diplomatically to Beijing's diplomatic opening under Deng Xiaoping by establishing a separate semiprivate hierarchy under a National Unification Council (Mainland Affairs Council and Straits Exchange Foundation) under National Unification Guidelines, stipulating a three-stage timetable to negotiate reunification. The mainland established counterpart organizations about a year later, and delegations from Taipei's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) conducted 24 rounds of negotiations in Singapore, culminating in a document-signing meeting in 1993 between SEF Chairman Koo Cheng-foo and ARATS chairman Wang Daohan.

Nevertheless, the longer-term agendas of the two sides diverged, ultimately ending the thaw. To the mainland, cross-Straits talks based on diplomatic equality was a strictly bilateral concession, while in its pursuit of international recognition Beijing demanded exclusive sovereignty (as Taipei had done before), relegating Taipei to the status of a local government. Taiwan fought back with "pragmatic diplomacy," designed to expand its diplomatic space, enraging Beijing. Tiananmen and the collapse of European Communism left an ideological vacuum on the mainland that the Communist Party of China (CCP) sought to fill with a revival of Chinese Nationalism, generating a demand for the recovery of irredenta only partially satisfied by the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999. The rapid increase in economic growth rates unleashed by Deng Xiaoping's 2002 "southern journey" bolstered a sense of national self-confidence and entitlement. Meanwhile in Taiwan, the new democracy's electoral emancipation of a popular majority of hitherto politically oppressed natives (*benshengren*, whose families had lived on the island since the Ming) helped stimulate a growing trend toward subethnic identification as "Taiwanese" that seemed to correlate with declining interest in future reunification and a greater sense of distinct national identity.³ The advent of a burgeoning, mutually profitable cross-Straits commercial relationship seemed to reduce the threat to Taiwan's security in the short term, giving Taipei the political space to expand national identity claims propelled by competitive electoral mobilization. The economic opening to the mainland counteracted the separatist political thrust of democratization somewhat, offering the island its first realistic avenue to peaceful unification since the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. Yet fierce international diplomatic competition culminating in Beijing's resort to coercive diplomacy in 1995–1996 counteracted the positive effects of economic integration.

The upshot is that the 1989–2000 period was one of political emancipation for Taiwan but also one of profound ambivalence, as a now liberated economy seemed to pull the island into mainland’s dynamic economic orbit while the birth of Taiwan Nationalism and the post–Cold War global democratizing trend lured the electorate in search of autonomy and international recognition. In the face of a collapsed GST and an autonomous Chinese minitriangle animated by the irrepressible economic upsurge of China and the widened array of options available to Taiwan, Washington exhibited ambivalence. Post–Cold War triumphalism and outrage over Tiananmen led to China’s diplomatic ostracism, though strong revival of Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 1992 based on an unprecedented opening to world markets quickly made that a commercially unviable option. Meanwhile democratization in Taiwan enhanced the island’s appeal, particularly in Congress. The Clinton administration handled this situation with a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” refusing on the one hand to say what the United States would do if the mainland invaded and on the other how it would respond if Taiwan declared independence.⁴ In the wake of the 1995–1996 Strait crisis, this policy came under fire. Critics pointed out that ambiguity had the unintended effect of inducing both Beijing and Taipei to probe the limits of uncertainty: Beijing did so with its war games and missile shots in 1995–1996, while Taipei employed a salami-slicing approach to independence (Taiwan, as the Republic of China [ROC], was already sovereign since the successful 1911 revolution, meanwhile a series of constitutional amendments reduced the ROC’s legal claim to—and identification with—the mainland). Although the immediate response of the Clinton administration to the Strait crisis was to bolster Taiwan’s security, in the wake of 1998–1999 Sino-US summitry the administration adopted the view that Lee’s tactics were unduly provocative. Thus, during the waning years of the 1990s there was a growing rift between conservative opposition, which continued to regard China as the major threat to peace, and the administration’s determination to muzzle Lee as a troublemaker and mollify Beijing (e.g., Clinton’s public “three nos,” Washington’s repudiation of Lee’s “*liang guo lun*” and reaffirmation of the “One China” policy).

George W. Bush, Chen Shui-bian, and Hu Jintao Take Command

The turn of the millennium presaged a new departure for the Taiwan minitriangle as new leadership coalitions took command in the United States, Taiwan, and later in China. The election of George W. Bush brought to power a new team that quickly departed from its “humble” campaign rhetoric to launch a new foreign policy antithetical to perceived weaknesses in the Clinton approach across the board. With regard to China and Taiwan, the initial concern was to redress a perceived China “tilt,” and in its first 18 months, the administration thus leaned toward Taiwan, disavowing Clinton’s “three nos,” allowing officials on both sides to visit each others’ buildings and fly their national flags, and letting Taiwan’s leaders conduct longer transit visits (including speeches) on American soil. China was no longer a “strategic partner” but a “strategic competitor,” and

the new defense minister, in a revival of the Shultzian geopolitics of relying on allies on the Asian rimland to contain mainland threats, proposed a strategic redeployment of US military forces from Europe to Asia. The China-Taiwan standoff was redefined in terms of “strategic clarity,” as Bush promised in his first press conference that the United States would do “whatever it takes to defend Taiwan” in the event of a Chinese invasion (subsequently rephrased as whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, bringing the statement back into line with previous policy). This new policy climaxed in April 2001 with the Hainan incident at the beginning of the month and an arms sale of unprecedented size and expense (estimated at US\$16–18.3 billion, depending on the exchange rate) at the end of it. Hainan was seized upon as a pretext to discontinue further military-to-military cooperation with China, and Chinese opposition to the arms sale resulted in concealing future such transactions from public scrutiny (though Beijing continued to voice objections). Opposition to this downward-spiraling relationship might have been anticipated from the business community, but unlike Clinton’s 1994 gambit threatening trade on behalf of human rights, Bush’s policy reorientation focused on security without directly impinging its economic interests.

The election of Chen Shui-bian in a close race in which opposition was split by the defection of James Soong and his People’s First Party from the Kuomintang (KMT) resulted in Beijing’s worst nightmare—the rise to power of a party whose heritage and constitution committed it to Taiwan independence. This outcome was greeted warmly by the Bush administration, which shared the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP’s) suspicions of the PRC if not his commitment to independence. The triangle was prevented from transforming its romantic configuration to a Taiwan-American marriage by three factors. First, China promptly joined the War on Terror after 9/11, and it also joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and numerous other multilateral forums, reorienting its foreign policy toward what became known as a “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” (*heping jueqi*), meant to assure the international community that China’s arrival was not intended to challenge the status quo (as had the previous rise of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union). Indeed, Beijing became actively involved in reinforcing the regional status quo by hosting the Six Party Talks in 2003 to negotiate the divestiture of North Korea’s nuclear weapons project. Second, Chen Shui-bian inaugurated his new administration by renouncing (under heavy US pressure) in his “Five Nos” any attempt to revise the constitution or declare independence except under emergency circumstances (e.g., PRC invasion),⁵ also proclaiming his readiness to engage in bilateral talks without preconditions, thereby preserving the option of a Beijing-Taipei deal. Third, the Bush administration, announcing clearly that none of its policies was intended to threaten China’s interests, engaged in active political summitry and consultation with the PRC leadership. Hence, rather than an anti-China marriage, what emerged could be characterized as a romantic triangle tilted toward Taipei, as Taiwan-American military consultations became more active than at any time since abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty (with hundreds of US military officers stationed in Taiwan at any given time) while Sino-US military

relations were suspended in temporary abeyance. What gave it the tilt was the large pending arms-sales package and the ideological affinity between Chen and Bush; and what gave it the continuing romantic configuration was the irreconcilable antagonism between Beijing and Taipei, allowing Washington to play *tertius gaudens* at pivot.

This configuration remained stable throughout the first two years of the Chen administration, despite Chen's (cautious and hedged) attempts to brook the gulf with a series of cautious proposals—a European-style common market, “three small links.” Bush encouraged Beijing to accept Chen's offer to talk, without however insisting that Taipei accept Beijing's “One China” precondition (or the 1992 compromise version thereof, under which auspices the 1992–1994 Singapore talks had been held). Beijing did not however respond directly to Chen's various proposals, with the minor exception of Three Small Links, apparently because it did not trust Chen and did not want to provide him with any concessions he could use to electoral advantage. In any case Beijing was at this time preoccupied with stage-managing its own generational succession.

As Chen's 2004 reelection approached he found himself in a vulnerable position, facing a reunited opposition amid a dismal economic outlook, and desperately needed to change the subject from economics to politics. Therefore, he began more and more boldly to infringe on PRC-imposed red lines. In late 2002 he announced his *yibian yiguo* (one country on either side of the Strait) formulation, and announced his intent to resolve Taiwan's future status through national referendum. When the KMT-led “Pan-Blue” opposition majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY) pointed out that this contravened his promise in the “Five Nos” to have “no referendum or plebiscite on sovereignty issues” unless there was a national emergency, Chen agreed in November 2003 to limit referendums to issues of national security, approved a referendum law on that basis, but then promptly introduced a “defensive referendum” focusing on the Chinese missile buildup (at that time around 500 missiles) aimed at Taiwan from across the Strait. The KMT-PFP (People First Party) fusion ticket, apparently considering Chen's resort to the national security issue too politically appealing to ignore, opted not publicly to oppose Chen's proposed defensive referendum. Chen's campaign tactic again highlighted the China threat as the central issue in a domestic election. Once again Beijing rose to the bait, warning that if Taiwan's leadership held a referendum it could cause war.⁶ Beijing also appealed to the United States, with which Beijing was then cooperating in the Six Power Talks. When George W. Bush stood with Premier Wen Jiabao in a joint appearance in December 2003 to publicly denounce Chen's move as a unilateral attempt to change the status quo, “which we oppose,” this marked a major shift in the triangular dynamic.⁷ Other, more discreet diplomatic warnings were also relayed to Chen—the United States, now fully engaged in Iraq, did not need another Strait crisis—but Chen quietly ignored them. Although both propositions ultimately failed in the election (KMT voters boycotted the referendum ballot), the China threat issue may well have been decisive in Chen's very narrow victory.

Although Chen's 2004 victory margin was very narrow it was politically more impressive than his 2000 victory, for while in 2000 he had been able to

take advantage of the split between Lien Chan and James Soong, in 2004 Lien and Soong ran on the same Pan-Blue ticket and Chen had to win an absolute rather than a simple majority to win. Thus, he triumphantly reaffirmed his November 2003 timetable to hold a national constitutional referendum in 2006, to come into force in 2008, taking advantage of the mainland's preparations for the 2008 Olympics, which any use of violence might derail. Beijing reasserted its determination to put national unity ahead of the Olympics. Washington was so apprehensive about these diverging agendas that prominent public officials began to assert a "dual deterrence": US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly said that "US support for Taiwan on constitution revision is limited," while Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage publicly denied any legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to defend Taiwan in the event of attack. Of course a constitutional referendum also presupposed a majority in the LY, which the Pan-Green coalition expected to win in the December 2004 elections. But this it failed to do, making any referendum politically infeasible. Indeed, the March 2004 victory seems to have been Chen's high-water mark, as the KMT won the 2005 mayoral and magistrate elections in Taiwan by comfortable margins at both levels and Chen Shui-bian's personal popularity began a long and deep descent.

Though now sailing against the political wind, Chen continued to pursue his crypto-Taiwan independence agenda. In October 2005, in his National Day address, he called for a "new political order" via a new constitution, now through a "bottom-up, outside-in revision process." In his New Year's (January 2006) address, increasingly concerned about the continuing escalation of cross-Straits trade and investment, he attempted to decelerate that trend by reformulating his "effective liberalization and positive management" policy as "positive management and effective liberalization." In February 2006, anticipating Hu Jintao's Washington summit, Chen announced that the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines (created by the KMT in 1991) would be abolished. These were relics of the oppressive mainland (KMT) dictatorship [*sic*] that had foreclosed freedom of choice about the national future. When Washington pointed out Chen's breach of the fifth of his "Five Nos" (affirmed in 2000, reaffirmed in 2004), he reformulated the English translation to say that these institutions would "cease to function" (not that they had been "abolished"). Meanwhile a financial scandal emerged involving Chen's wife and son-in-law, stimulating widespread demands for his resignation, which he has steadfastly withstood.

Beijing's Taiwan policy has changed significantly since the 2000 election, when it was still striking an intimidating, nationalistic stance on cross-Straits issues, asserting for example in its first White Paper on Taiwan that the Taiwan government is only a local government while the People's Republic is the only legal government of China and imposing in its "three ifs" a vague deadline for reunification talks as one sufficient condition to use force. Zhu Rongji, in his press conference on the eve of the election (March 15, 2000), warned that: "if the pro-independence force comes into power, it may trigger a war between the two sides of Taiwan Straits," urging Taiwan's electorate to cast its votes accordingly. The warning however seemed electorally counterproductive. At its Beidaihe

meetings in July–August 2000, the CCP leadership squarely faced the questions: Can we in fact take Taiwan by force? Do we really want to do so? To both questions the answer was no. Thus a consensus emerged that so long as Chen did not declare independence (which now seemed unlikely), there was no immediate need to take military action against Taiwan.⁸ In response to Chen’s “Five Nos” and early peace proposals, the mainland ignored the proposals but moderated its tone to a “listen to what he says, watch what he does” stance. Beijing’s formulation of the “One China” principle was also amended, from the 2000 assertion that there was only “One China” of which Taiwan was a local government to the statement that there is but “One China” of which both the mainland and Taiwan are part. At the same time the conclusion stood that reunification would ultimately require a resort to force (and an effective deterrent to US interference), entailing continuing arms buildup on the PRC side of the Strait.

Beijing’s leadership has since Deng Xiaoping adopted a regent-like overlapping succession arrangement in which the retiring incumbent remains politically potent well into his successor’s term, minimizing the likelihood of radical policy innovation, particularly on an issue as sensitive as Taiwan. But since the rise of Hu Jintao in late 2002, Beijing has subtly modified its Taiwan rhetoric. The new focus has been on preventing a move toward formal independence rather than trying actively to promote immediate reunification. Beijing committed only one costly diplomatic misstep during Hu’s modulation. Beginning December 2003, reading Chen’s campaign to conduct a “defensive referendum” as a credible threat to revise Taiwan’s constitution to proclaim an independent Republic of Taiwan (and alarmed by the failure of explicit US warnings to arrest Chen’s referendum campaign), Beijing secretly inaugurated a “Small Group for Drafting a Special Law on Taiwan,” which was authorized to proceed upon Chen’s presidential reelection. Although the initial draft “Law of Reunification with the Motherland” was moderated to avoid creating a “commitment trap” (i.e., a legal “red line” that Beijing would have to defend with force if Chen defied it, even if that meant war with the United States), the Anti-Secession Law was completed and formally ratified on March 14, 2005 by an overwhelming National People’s Congress (NPC) majority (to prolonged applause), notwithstanding the DPP’s narrow defeat in the December 2004 legislative elections. The Anti-Secession Law did not set any new conditions or a deadline for reunification, though it did threaten nonpeaceful means if Taiwan declared formal independence, thereby precipitating reproof from Washington, demonstrations in Taipei, and helping dissuade the European Union from rescinding its 15-year embargo on arms sales to the PRC. Yet the law also enabled Beijing to move from a proactive position demanding “early settlement of the Taiwan issue” to a more reactive position, invoking violence only in the event of secession.⁹ At the same time the ASL enabled the PRC to detach itself from the distasteful (and electorally counterproductive) role of strict monitor, threatening violence whenever Taiwan politicians approached China’s “red lines”: now danger reposed in the law, not in the CCP leadership, which could warn “separatist forces” against endangering peace by breaking the law. Indeed, Beijing has begun to upbraid Chen’s deviations from the “One China” principle by invoking the ROC Constitution

(omitting of course that the united China to which that constitution referred was under KMT rule). Thus Beijing's rhetorical position has improved without much substantive change in its actual Taiwan policy: In the international arena, Beijing has continued to deprive Taipei of diplomatic recognition or participation in any forums for which statehood is required (and in many for which it is not), Beijing still shuns the elected government of Taiwan, and the threat of force (never disavowed) continues to mount (e.g., nearly 1,000 missiles by late 2007).

In a March 5, 2006 speech to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Hu Jintao encapsulated Beijing's new look in "Four Points": (1) never wavering from the "One China" principle, (2) never giving up seeking peaceful reunification, (3) never changing the guideline of placing hope in the Taiwan people, and (4) opposing separatist activities aimed at Taiwan independence. To Washington, Beijing now depicts itself (like Bush) as supportive of the cross-Strait status quo, no longer using coercive diplomacy to promote "early settlement of the Taiwan issue," retaining the threat of force only as an insurance policy against the unpredictable vicissitudes of Taiwan politics. This play for Sino-US collusion was underscored in the publicity accompanying Hu Jintao's April 2006 Washington summit, when PRC media conveyed the image of Beijing and Washington agreeing "to take joint steps to safeguard peace and stability across the Strait."¹⁰ Toward Taipei, Beijing deployed united front tactics, continuing to freeze relations with Chen's administration while attempting to co-opt the three opposition parties in a policy of "internal trouble and external pressure" (*neiwai jiaokun*). This policy's high-profile inauguration came immediately after passage of the Anti-Secession Law (namely in April–May 2005), when Lien Chan and then James Soong were invited to visit the mainland, where they received highly publicized red-carpet welcomes along with several minor policy concessions they could not accept as party representatives (though the offer for direct cross-Strait flights eventually bore fruit). Beijing followed this with a series of unilateral concessions to the Taiwan electorate, most of which Taipei refused or ignored: a gift of two pandas to the Taipei Zoo (refused), opening access to 22 categories of fruit from Taiwan's fruit farmers, 15 of which were granted zero tariffs (accepted), cutting tuitions for Taiwan students at Chinese Universities (the degrees are denied accreditation in Taiwan), credit loans to small and medium enterprises operating on the mainland (tolerated), and opening Chinese tourist travel to Taiwan (refused on security grounds).

Although Taiwan's political scene has become increasingly self-absorbed, our argument here is that triangular dynamics have continued to play a decisive role, particularly in the rise and fall of Chen Shui-bian. Certainly his 2004 victory is hard to explain by conventional political criteria, having presided over a decidedly lackluster economic performance (compared to an average annual GDP growth rate of 8.1% during 50 years of KMT rule),¹¹ without being able to get much of his agenda through the KMT-dominated legislature (see figure 10.1). A conviction politician dedicated since adolescence to Taiwan's independence, Chen has repeatedly returned to the unresolved national identity issue (or Future Nation Preference, FNP) of reunification or independence. This issue has, since the advent of democratization in the late 1980s, become a primary basis of electoral




Figure 10.1 Taiwan GDP and Cross-Straits Trade

cleavage. Since 1990 the ascriptive factor of subethnicity has reemerged from its officially repressed status during the Chiang era to become a second primordial basis of cleavage, as Lee Teng-hui proceeded to mobilize his fellow *benshengren* on the basis of shared historical grievance against the February 28 Incident and other symbols of the era of KMT dictatorship. The period of Japanese occupation, for example, was reconsidered more favorably in invidious comparison to the era of martial law. Beginning with the 1995–1996 Strait crisis and the concurrent March 1996 presidential election, Lee also discovered that being bullied by the PRC could play to his electoral advantage. While Lee was thus the first Taiwan politician to link the subethnic and the FNP cleavages effectively, as chair of a mainlander-based party, he took a fairly ecumenical view of subethnicity, including “new Taiwanese” like Ma Ying-jeou (born in Hong Kong), for example. As a “son of Taiwan” from Tainan leading a largely nativist coalition, Chen Shui-bian has been more inclined to draw a direct correlation between subethnicity and FNP, referring to the KMT as a “mainlander” party and tacitly identifying it with the contemporary PRC—reconciliation with which it was in fact somewhat more amenable. This helps to account for the DPP’s fierce anticommunism, otherwise puzzling in a party well to the left of the KMT on domestic issues, such as welfare transfer payments and the environment.¹² This has proved a politically profitable tactic, as the percentage of Taiwanese of “native” subethnic backgrounds is far larger than the percentage of descendants of recent (post-1949) immigrants, and since the early 1990s the consciousness of being “Taiwanese” and not simply “Chinese” has grown inexorably, as measured in a series of polls. Saddled with this symbolic equation, whenever the mainland could be depicted as oppressive or threatening this image could then profitably be transposed to “red-cap” the opposition party. Thus while Beijing made no further conspicuous attempts at coercive diplomacy after March 1996, the PRC White Paper on Taiwan and Zhu Rongji’s public warning to the Taiwanese electorate played into Chen’s hands in 2000, and in 2004 he again succeeded in using his “defensive referendum” device to provoke threats of violence from Beijing. This clearly put the Pan-Blue candidates at a rhetorical disadvantage, as indicated by their agreement to a referendum which they then boycotted (in the event, they blocked the referendum but lost the election).

Having thus engineered a very surprising if marginal win in 2004, Chen Shui-bian seemed in a reasonably strong position to gain majority control of the legislature and consolidate a protracted era of Pan-Green rule: his southern-Taiwan nativist demographic constituency seemed secure and he retained the support of his fundamentalist ideological base, the mainland seemed locked into its electorally unpopular “One Country, Two Systems” formula for him to continue to use as a foil, and he now had control of the government’s publicity and educational portfolios which he could use to reorient the island-nation’s subjective sense of identity from Chinese to Taiwanese (by changing street and park names, holidays, school history textbooks and curricular requirements, passport covers, academic research funding budgets, and so forth). This rosy scenario may yet come to pass: the DPP has resurged before, and the 2008 presidential election remains too close to call. Yet as figure 10.2 indicates, FNP preferences




Figure 10.2 Changes in the Unification—Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1994–2006)

after 2000 have veered away from a preference for either immediate or eventual independence toward a clear majority preference for the status quo of *bu tong bu du* (neither unification nor independence). Meanwhile, Chen Shui-bian's personal popularity has gone into a tailspin, from approximately 50% in 2004 to below 20% in 2006. How can this reversal of fortune be explained? Certainly allegations of corruption, to which Taiwan's electorate seems unusually sensitive, have been very damaging. Such *hei jin* (black and gold, i.e., criminal and money politics) allegations have haunted Taiwan politics for decades, but hitherto they have been conventionally associated with the KMT, one of the richest parties on earth, while the DPP was assumed to be "clean and green." Though Chen has not personally been legally convicted, for such allegations to be credibly affixed to family members leads to the popular surmise that "if he cannot run his own family how can he run the country?"

Here again, the cross-Strait issue also plays a significant role, in at least three ways. First, since Chen's 2000 election, there has been a major upsurge in cross-Strait investment and trade, now including high-tech production including microchip fabs and IT manufacturing, not merely light manufacturing or sunset industry. This paradoxical development can be attributed to two factors: the global 2000–2001 downturn in the high-tech sector, forcing Taiwan corporations to shift offshore to cut labor costs and meet competition, and the reduced prestige and authority of Chen Shui-bian vis-à-vis Lee Teng-hui, impairing his ability to sustain Lee's *jieji yongren* (no hurry, be patient) policy, which ultimately had to be rescinded. Hitherto this growing overseas component of Taiwan industry (now including nearly a million permanent mainland residents) has been able to maintain its political neutrality, but by 2005 there were signs that the mainland had finally begun to make some progress turning this community to its political advantage: the March 28, 2005 public letter of Xu Wenlong, founding chairman of the Chi Mei Corporation (and erstwhile supporter of Taiwan independence) declaring his support for the "One China" policy, was a widely noted wake-up call. Second, since the spring of 2005, Hu Jintao's new policy of "winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwan people," and no less important, his painstaking avoidance of threatening rhetoric (since spring 2005 mainland media have been prohibited from editorializing on Taiwan without central authorization), despite Chen's provocations (e.g., abolition of the National Unification Guidelines and National Unification Council), have cleverly deprived Chen of a rhetorical foil. Rather, the PRC now relies on Washington, whom Chen cannot afford to offend too much or too long, to discipline Chen. Beijing's resort to the classic Chinese stratagem of removing the obvious threat places Chen in the awkward position of "hitting a fist into cotton" (*quan da mian hua*). Third, Beijing's more amicable presentation has emboldened several Pan-Blue politicians to articulate more positive mainland policy proposals: thus Ma Ying-jeou, erstwhile KMT chair and 2008 presidential candidate, has acknowledged that the KMT's ultimate goal is still reunification (with the prerequisite of Chinese democratization, rehabilitation of Tiananmen protesters, etc.), calling for cross-Strait negotiation based on the 1992 formula to reach an interim peace accord, for opening the island to mainland tourists and university students, and other concessions. Thus

far, given Beijing's relatively benign response, such proposals have not proved electorally catastrophic.

Conclusions

During the Cold War, the Taiwan minitriangle was essentially a corollary of the Great Strategic Triangle (GST): when the United States was anti-China it supported Taiwan, after the United States opening to China it more or less abandoned Taiwan. The collapse of the GST at the end of the Cold War allowed the minitriangle to become autonomous, dependent solely on its internal dynamics. Various bilateral relationships within the minitriangle have also changed. The three "wings" became, at least initially, somewhat more equilateral (as Taiwan's ideological attractiveness and diplomatic freedom of maneuver enhanced its weight, while Tiananmen and the collapse of the GST diminished that of the PRC); but most notably, the China-Taiwan wing became more substantive in its own right with the opening of cross-channel trade, investment, tourism, even diplomatic links through nonofficial agencies. Washington became ensconced in the position of "pivot," attempting to maintain good relations with both wings, to whom it made various commitments, including, most importantly, the maintenance of regional peace and stability.

Since the Cold War, the minitriangle has actually been structurally stable, despite the loss of an external framework and considerable domestic variability within all three. But what has given it stability—the persistent antagonism between the two Chinese wings, maintaining the United States as pivot—has also made it dangerous, with recurrent crises and risks of war. Cross-Strait polarization makes the triangle difficult for the pivot to manage and threatens an outcome in none of the player's interest. Thus it would enhance security on both sides of the Strait (and in the East Asian region) if tension could be reduced, the most focal point being at the China-Taiwan wing. As the party most interested in revision of the status quo, Beijing has usually taken the initiative in such efforts, to which Taipei in turn responds. In quest of a major national asset, Beijing plays the ardent suitor in this romantic triangle, Taipei the coy mistress, sometimes put off by what amounts to a "marry me or die" proposal.

Three typical triangular patterns have emerged since the Cold War. The first is for Beijing to launch an initiative to which Taipei responds to Beijing's satisfaction, resulting in mutual concessions, in turn creating momentum for progress toward further improved relations. The best example is the three links, which Taipei initially denounced but eventually allowed with the proviso that the links be indirect (e.g., through Hong Kong), leading to economic cooperation that has continued to burgeon beyond all expectations.¹³ The second pattern is for Beijing to launch an initiative that then gathers momentum for a time but then for various disagreements and suspicions to arise resulting in its extinction. It is difficult to say who is responsible for these derailments (probably both), as each side typically claims to be proceeding in good faith and blames the other. The best example is perhaps the "unofficial" talks between the SEF and ARATS negotiating teams in Singapore in 1992–1993, which culminated in a number

of technical agreements but then broke down in the wake of Lee Teng-hui's alumna visit to Cornell University in the spring of 1995, prompting Beijing's indignant resort to missile diplomacy. An attempt by Beijing to restart talks by inviting SEF chairman Koo Cheng-foo to the mainland in 1998, resulting in a scheduled return visit by ARATS counterpart Wang Daohan, was similarly derailed (apparently deliberately) by Lee's introduction of "two-state theory" (*liang guo lun*).

Since 2000, a third pattern has emerged, derivative of the second, in which Taipei takes the initiative, not however on behalf of improved cross-Straits relations but in the role of electoral entrepreneur. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Jiang Zemin raised the issue of Taiwan reunification from a peripheral to a central issue in connection with his campaign to strengthen regime legitimacy by evoking Chinese patriotism as highlighted in his 1995 Eight Points.¹⁴ This involved offering new concessions but also, given the issue's high public profile (and personal identification with Jiang), sharply repudiating any movement toward "separatism." What "separatism" actually involved remained vague however, in view of the fact that the island was already *de facto* separate. Lee Teng-hui's Six Point counterproposal and ensuing resort to "alumna diplomacy" at Cornell was, under the circumstances, construed in Beijing as a blatant repudiation of Jiang's proposal; so for the first time since the Maoist era the PRC revived the threat of force. While the resort to coercive diplomacy demonstrated Beijing's ability to disrupt the island's trade lifeline and financial network, the fact that Lee still won the election and that Beijing's intimidation yielded to US counterintimidation damaged Jiang's credibility, both on the mainland and on Taiwan. Beijing had created a moral hazard dilemma: the cross-Straits economic relationship was too lucrative to jeopardize, the US Navy too big to fight, ergo Beijing was bluffing. Enterprising Taiwan politicians started engaging in a game of "chicken," making public proclamations defying Beijing and appealing to Taiwanese Nationalism—"two countries with special characteristics," "one country on either side," and so on—formulations designed to assert Taiwan's sovereignty while skirting explicit defiance of Beijing's "red lines." Beijing typically became enraged, as much because of the public provocation as any serious risk of a declaration of independence.¹⁵ Whether such provocations actually expanded Taiwan's room for diplomatic maneuver is debatable, but they proved profitable in domestic elections. By 2005, Beijing finally seems to have caught on that the most effective response to such provocations is simply to ignore them.

In sum, despite a promising beginning in the early 1990s, both sides of the Straits have since preferred to engage in dramatic cross-Straits dueling jousts for the benefit of domestic constituencies rather than engage in serious negotiations. Jiang transposed the duel to central stage to ensure his precarious succession to Deng Xiaoping,¹⁶ Lee and Chen learned how to joust back and win domestic elections. These threats and counterthreats poisoned the atmosphere for constructive proposals. The lower profile recently adopted by Beijing, along with forthcoming responses from the Taiwan side, offer the first serious prospect since the early 1990s of developing a more solid and constructive cross-Straits relationship.

Whether Beijing is interested in seriously developing such a relationship with Taipei, or merely in engaging in united front tactics designed to undermine a regime it detests, is still unclear. It is also conceivable that both possibilities apply: Beijing is implacably dedicated to the defeat of the Chen leadership, whose credibility has been in Chinese eyes irreparably compromised, but is also seriously interested in a deal with a successor government willing to negotiate under the “One China” principle (namely, the 1992 formula of “One China,” different interpretations) on which it has long insisted.

If Beijing is willing to engage in serious negotiations with representatives of an eventual Taiwan government, and to move from the cosmetic appearance of peaceful and amicable relations toward interim agreements renouncing the use of unilateral force, while offering certain minimal diplomatic concessions to the Taipei regime, the cross-Straits relationship could become far more substantive. The advantage to Beijing would be a resolution of the sharpest and most explosive exception to its all-round policy of peaceful development—one that now still poses serious risk of war with the “hegemon” that remains Beijing’s most dangerous potential adversary. Whereas in the near term, triangular stability would be best served by continuing adherence to the TRA, Jiang’s 2001 suggestion of cross-Straits arms reduction talks also deserves more serious consideration than it has received. To the extent that the threat of cross-Straits war can be reduced, this could shift the triangular dynamic from the old “two-against-one” pattern in which any bilateral rapprochement entails the deterioration of the other bilateral relationship to one redounding in mutual benefit to all three players—a true *ménage à trois*. Yet all this is of course still very speculative and contingent in a part of the world never short of unpleasant surprises.

Notes

1. On triangular analysis, see inter alia, L. Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” *World Politics*, vol. 33, no. 4 (1981), pp. 485–516; for its application to the China-Taiwan issue, see L. Dittmer, “Policy Implications of Cross-Straits Relations for the United States.” Paper presented at Cross-Straits Relations and Policy Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region, Conference sponsored by Institute for National Policy Research, International Convention Center, Taipei, March 27–29, 1995; Yu-Shan Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles: The Development of Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations,” *Issues & Studies*, vol. 32, no. 10 (December 1996), pp. 26–52; and Yu-Shan Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage?: Washington-Beijing-Taipei Relations in Historical Comparison,” *Issues & Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1 (March 2005), pp. 113–161.
2. Because the Taiwan triangle is an analytic construct whose existence is unacknowledged, and perhaps unrecognized among policymakers, there is no consensus on the US preference for its pivotal role in it. Thus Wu refers to the United States as an “unintended” pivot (which can be subjectively verified on the basis of interviews with US diplomatic officials). Yu-Shan Wu, “The Unintending Pivot: The United States in the Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle.” Paper presented at the 28th Sino-American Conference on Contemporary China, Duke University, June 12–14, 1999. There is indeed a

school of thought that in view of the recurrent pressure placed upon Washington by each wing-player for support against the other wing, if the triangle were to collapse into a bilateral relationship between the United States and a Greater China (namely peaceful reunification) this would, *ceteris paribus*, be far less trouble and no loss to US interests.

3. See, inter alia, Stephane Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Alan Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); and the special issue of *Asian Survey*, "Taiwan's Search for National Identity," vol. 44, no. 4 (July–August 2004).
4. Alan D. Romberg, *Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and US-PRC Relations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 111–112.
5. Chen's "Five Nos" were (1) no declaration of Taiwan independence, (2) no change of Taiwan's official designation as the Republic of China, (3) not to insert the "state-to-state theory" (*liang guo lun*) into the constitution, (4) no referendum or plebiscite on sovereignty issues, (5) no plan to abolish the "Guidelines for National Unification" and the National Unification Council.
6. Ramon H. Myers and Jialin Zhang, *The Struggle Across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Inst. Press, 2006), pp. 89–90.
7. As quoted in Michael D. Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), pp. 39–49.
8. Ching Cheong, "Why China Is Going Easy on Taiwan for Now," *Straits Times* (Singapore), August 18, 2000, as cited in Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian* (New York: Zed Books, 2002), as amplified by conversations with policy intellectuals in Beijing.
9. See Jing Huang (with Larry X. Li), *Inseparable Separation: A Study in China-Taiwan Relations* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2007), Chapter 5.
10. "China, US More than Stakeholders but Constructive Partners: Chinese Foreign Ministry" *Xinhua*, April 22, 2006, as cited in Alan D. Romberg, "The Taiwan Tangle," *China Leadership Monitor*, vol. 18, accessed October 30, 2006.
11. Su Chi, *Brinkmanship: From Two-States Theory to One-Country-on-Each-Side* (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Group, 2003), p. 249, as cited in Myers and Zhang, *The Struggle Across the Taiwan Strait*, p. 83.
12. See Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," *The China Journal*, vol. 53 (January 2005), pp. 35–60.
13. By 2003, Taiwan had become the mainland's fifth largest trade partner and second largest source of imports, while the mainland (including Hong Kong) had become the largest destination of Taiwanese exports (17.6% of the island's total trade). Although Taiwan has enjoyed the highest trade surplus among mainland trade partners (*Renmin ribao*, January 2, 2001, as cited in Lijun, 75), the mainland unquestionably benefits economically from the relationship, particularly by attracting high-tech investment. With estimates ranging from US\$ 50 to 100 billion, Taiwan is officially the fifth largest investor in China, but when sub-rosa investments circuited through the Caymans and British Virgin Islands are also taken into account, Taiwan may be the second largest (after Hong Kong), and 34% of Taiwan's *officially reported* investment in China (again, probably understated) is in information technology.

14. See Guoguang Wu, "Passions, Politics and Politicians: Beijing between Taipei and Washington," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (June 2004), pp. 179–198.
15. Also, lacking empirical experience with democratic politics, mainland politicians (I think) tend to overestimate the truth-value of such programmatic statements as Chen's announced intention (say) to have a constitutional referendum by 2006 and a new constitution by 2008.
16. Wu, "Passions."

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CHAPTER 11

STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF BEIJING'S TAIWAN POLICY: CHINESE NATIONALISM AND THE MAKING OF THE ANTI-SECESSION LAW

Suisheng Zhao

China's Taiwan policy has faced a strategic dilemma in the recent decades. On the one hand, Beijing cannot allow Taiwan to declare independence because this would threaten not only national security interest of China but also nationalist credential of the communist regime. To deter Taiwan drifting toward independence, Beijing has never given up its threat of using military force to achieve national reunification. On the other hand, since China started reform and opened up in the late 1970s, pragmatic Chinese leaders have set peace and development as China's overriding goals. For this purpose, they have attempted to prevent military conflict across the Taiwan Strait because they would not want to sacrifice China's modernization efforts as long as Taiwan does not constitutionally declare independence. To find a solution to this dilemma, China has developed a *liangshou celue* (literally "two hands") strategy. It is a two-pronged stick and carrot approach, involving an oscillating pattern of military coercion and peaceful offence. Coercive strategy relies primarily upon the use or the threat of force. It could be military actions aiming at the conquest of Taiwan or brinkmanship using military force in an exemplary and demonstrative manner. Peaceful offense appeals to cross-Strait political negotiations, and economic, and cultural exchanges to bind Taiwan's hands of seeking independence and to build goodwill and momentum for eventual national reunification.

Although this two-pronged strategy has not brought Taiwan closer to Beijing's goal of national reunification, it has served the dual purposes of preventing Taiwan from explicitly declaring independence and preventing war from erupting. This perspective has been a solution to the strategic dilemma. The recent

rise of Chinese Nationalism, however, has become a new variable in the making of China's Taiwan policy. After the rapid decay of communist ideology in the post-Cold War era, legitimacy crisis has become a grave concern of Chinese new leadership. In the search for a means to deal with the declining faith in communism and the lack of confidence in the communist system, the new leadership quickly repositioned itself as the representative of Chinese national interest and the defender of Chinese national pride against the Western pressures. Taiwan has been a very sensitive issue involving the sentiments of Chinese Nationalism because territorial integrity and national unity, which were at the core of the Taiwan policy, has a symbolic value in Chinese Nationalism. Recovering the territories lost to the Western powers and Japanese imperialists during the so-called century of China's humiliation has always been the declared goal of the communist government. Taiwan is one of the lost territories that has been claimed by Beijing based on this nationalist conviction although Taiwan has pursued independence in everything but name since the early 1990s. Taiwan's continued separation from the mainland has been a constant indictment of party leaders in Beijing. Consequently, taking action to reunify with Taiwan played a special role in maintaining the nationalist credentials of the communist regime.

This development has fed the roiling sense of anxiety in many political capitals of Asian and Western countries that a virulent nationalism has emerged from China's "century of shame and humiliation" to make China's Taiwan policy more irrational, by that means making it more difficult for the Chinese leadership to cope with the strategic dilemma in its Taiwan policy. It has come to the attention of many observers that under the watch of the Hu Jintao leadership, China's National People's Congress passed an Anti-Secession Law on March 14, 2005. The law officially prescribes the conditions for "nonpeaceful" actions against Taiwan. Although Beijing has insisted that making the Anti-Secession Law is intended to keep the peace across the Taiwan Strait, some people have described the law as a war authorization law, mainly driven by Chinese Nationalism, to set a benchmark against nationalist pressure and show Chinese leaders' willingness to risk war across the Taiwan Strait at all cost. It thus signifies greater irrationality of China's policy toward Taiwan. The passage of the law triggered not only massive protest in Taiwan but also sharp criticism from the US government because they saw article 8 of the law about authorizing the use of nonpeaceful measures as provocative. Upon the passing of the Anti-Secession Law, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded in an interview that the Law "increased tension from the Taiwan Straits not diminished it."¹ China paid a price for it. Before the law was passed, the Bush administration criticized Taiwan's President Chen as a troublemaker for pushing the envelope with uncalled-for initiatives against Beijing. The Anti-Secession Law at least temporarily switched the focus from Taipei to Beijing for changing the status quo "by introducing the new law authorizing the use of force against Taiwan just when relations looked ripe for repair."² In the meantime, the Anti-Secession Law made it more difficult for the European Union to lift the arms embargo that many suggested could happen in the summer of 2005 in spite of strong US lobby against its lifting.

In light of these responses, why was the Anti-Secession Law made and passed at the time? Has the rise of Chinese Nationalism made the Chinese leadership more difficult to deal with the strategic dilemma? To find answers to these questions, this chapter starts by examining how China's Taiwan policy has evolved in response to the strategic dilemma and goes on to analyze the case of making of the Anti-Secession Law. It argues that the new generations of Chinese leaders have been pragmatic nationalists in the sense that they want to use nationalism as a tool but are very cautious about international as well as domestic reactions to their nationalist rhetoric because of the awareness that nationalism is a double-edged sword. Although the rise of Chinese Nationalism was expressed in the tough rhetoric of Chinese policy statement, it has not changed the two-pronged approach to deal with strategic dilemma of Beijing's Taiwan policy.

Beijing's Dilemma and Two-Pronged Strategy

The strategic dilemma of Beijing's Taiwan policy is a very complicated issue with roots in China's modern history. Before the arrival of the Western imperialist powers, territorial boundaries along China's frontiers had little significance under a tributary system in which China was at the center. After China's defeat in the Opium War, Western powers took over many of China's tributaries and pushed the frontiers forward into areas that China would have preferred to control by itself. These territorial losses were institutionalized in what China called "unequal treaties."³ Because of decolonization in the first half of the twentieth century, many of these former tributary countries gained national independence. China was not able to claim those former tributary states where the inhabitants were non-Chinese people. The Chinese government has been very firm, however, on its claim over Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan since people in these territories, according to Beijing's definition, were ethnically and historically Chinese in addition to other more compelling reasons. The Chinese Communist government was committed to taking back these lost territories since reclamation involved not only the maritime security interest of China but also the nationalist legitimacy of the communist regime. Beijing recovered Hong Kong from British colonial rule on July 1, 1997 and Macao from Portugal on December 20, 1999. Taiwan has been left as the focus of China's claim over lost territory. To satisfy the nationalist aspiration, Beijing has made it clear of China's willingness to fight a war if necessary for the recovery of Taiwan.

Although the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has never ruled Taiwan, Beijing sees the historical complexity of the Taiwan issue from the perspective that involves the bitter legacy of Japanese imperialism and China's resentment of the US role in the civil war between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). Taiwan was once ceded to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, which sealed China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Japan's half century of colonization over Taiwan was a humiliating chapter in modern Chinese history. Taiwan was returned to the KMT government following Japan's defeat in the Pacific War in 1945, but was cut off from the mainland again in 1949 when the KMT was defeated by the CCP and

subsequently fled to Taiwan. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) made extensive military preparations to "liberate" Taiwan in early 1950, yet the outbreak of the Korean War on June 23, 1950 and President Harry Truman's consequent order to the US Seventh Fleet to prevent the conquest of Taiwan by the PRC, eventually forced the PLA to call off the attempt. The PRC never ceased threatening the use of force to take back Taiwan and, in the 1950s till the 1970s, continued shelling two small islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazhu (Matsu) close to the mainland still occupied by KMT troops.

Beijing began a new strategy of peaceful reunification by promoting economic and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait in the 1980s, although it never ruled out the use of force. Beijing's peaceful reunification offense started with the publication of a "Message" to the Taiwan people from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) on January 1, 1979 and was further elaborated on September 30, 1981 by Ye Jianying in a nine-point proposal for peaceful reunification. Ye suggested talks between the CCP and the KMT, and specifically proposed *santong* (three links: commercial, postal, and travel) and *siliu* (four exchanges: academic, cultural, economic, and sports) as the first step to "gradually eliminate antagonism between the two sides and increase mutual understanding."⁴ Later, Deng Xiaoping posed a formula of "One Country, Two Systems" as a viable way for reunification. Beijing's peaceful offensive reached a new stage when Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the CCP and president of the PRC, made an eight-point proposal on January 30, 1995, suggesting that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait begin negotiations "on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides and accomplishing peaceful reunification step-by-step."⁵

For Beijing, the most formidable barrier for taking back Taiwan is the possible intervention of foreign forces, especially those of Japan and the United States. Beijing is apprehensive that these foreign countries would want to prevent China from rising as a powerful competitor by keeping China divided. The Taiwan issue, therefore, involves not only China's territorial integrity but also China's national pride. Beijing has always been suspicious about Japan's intentions regarding Taiwan as Taiwan was a colony of Japan for 50 years in 1895–1945. Beijing has also been suspicious about American intentions due to the fact that the United States has been involved in the dispute over the status of Taiwan since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In Beijing's eyes, the US government has been playing double-dealing tricks since the normalization of Sino-US relationship in 1979. Washington has pledged unequivocally in the three joint communiqués that the Beijing government "is the sole legitimate government of China" and acknowledged that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are parts of China. However, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) at the same time, a law that recognizes Taiwan's position as a quasi-sovereign state and directly contravenes the communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington.

After the end of the Cold War, Beijing has suspected the US attempt to sabotage China's national reunification in order to prevent China from rising as a peer competitor. Beijing's suspicion was seemingly confirmed when the US

government decided to issue an entry visa to President Lee Teng-hui in May 1995. This decision openly changed the policy that forbade Taiwan leaders from visiting the United States, a policy that had been successively upheld by past administrations for nearly 17 years. This event was seen as a manifestation of a new Cold War mentality in Washington in which the United States took actions to encourage the Taiwan independence against China. Nationalism and anti-American sentiment ran high in China following Lee's visit to the United States. Two months later, the PLA conducted waves of military exercises aimed at areas near Taiwan between July 1995 and March 1996. The military exercises created a serious international crisis since Beijing and Taipei engaged in conflict over the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazhu (Matsu) in 1954–1955 and 1958.⁶ Taipei was on high alert and declared that it had made all necessary preparations to deal with possible invasion. The United States got involved by sending two aircraft carriers battle groups toward the Taiwan Strait to monitor Chinese military actions. This was the largest naval movement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.⁷ Chinese Nationalism was thus viewed as the cause of aggressive military action resulting in international crisis across the Taiwan Strait.

Subsequent development, however, shows that military exercises did not mean a change in Beijing's *liangshou celue* (the stick and carrots approach), and pragmatic and prudent peaceful offense has continued as the preferred approach for national reunification despite the inflamed nationalistic rhetoric. The underlining consideration has been the high economic and political cost of taking Taiwan by military force. Peaceful offensive as a prudential and pragmatic approach to national reunification vigorously promotes economic and cultural exchanges as well as peaceful negotiations to end the possibility of military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing would allow socialism in the mainland and capitalism in Taiwan to coexist with each other for an extended time. Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, which would include administrative, legislative, and independent judiciary power; the right to keep its own troops; and certain powers of foreign affairs including the right to sign commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries. However, "only the PRC represents China in the international arena."⁸

It is a testimony to Beijing's preference for a peaceful offensive that even after Beijing's most unacceptable candidate, Chen Shui-bian, was elected as the president in 2000, Beijing still decided to refrain from using force. Because of the strategic dilemma, pragmatic Chinese leaders would not sacrifice China's modernization efforts as long as Taiwan does not explicitly declare independence. China needed time to modernize first and deal with many other urgent problems both domestically and internationally. They do not want to see any disputes to trigger a cross-Strait war as this would hamper the execution of their primary task. In this case, the possibility of using military force against the Taiwan is the last choice that they would not want to resort to unless they have exhausted all other options to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence.

It was under these circumstances that Beijing adopted an ambiguous wait-and-see policy, which was elaborated in the first official response by the Taiwan

Affairs Office of the PRC State Council five hours after Chen's election victory. This policy stated that Beijing would never allow independence for Taiwan but was willing to wait and see the words and deeds of new president Chen Shui-bian. Although this statement firmly reiterated Beijing's "One China" principle, it purposely left room for further maneuver. In particular, it was very ambiguous about what action it would take to cope with the Chen administration.⁹

The two-pronged wait-and-see policy showed that Beijing was not ready to carry out its harsh threat of war and wanted to open the door for possible reconciliation with Chen Shui-bian if Chen was willing to accept Beijing's term of "One China." It was reported that Jiang Zemin proposed a 16 character guideline in response to the victory of Chen in the election: "*rezhen guancha, naixin dengdai, buji buchao, baochi gaoya*" (careful observation, patiently wait, no haste, and keep heavy pressure).¹⁰ This strategy of combining military pressure and peaceful offense together was to make the threat of military force a credible one in the physical sense while avoiding a war and keeping the danger and huge cost of real military conflict within limits.

In the meantime, the "One China" principle was officially rephrased in August 2000 when Vice-Premier Qian Qichen for the first time stated that "there is only 'One China' in the world, Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China, and China's territory and sovereignty brook no division."¹¹ This new official statement is different from the long-standing official statement that "there is but a single China that is represented by the PRC and Taiwan is part of China." At his meeting with Wu Po-hsiung on November 23, 2000, Qian stated that "saying the mainland and Taiwan are both a part of "One China" shows that Beijing is pragmatic and accommodating." Indeed, this rephrase softened Beijing's insistence on a single definition for the "One China" principle and suggested a "One China" of the future that was ambiguous enough to allow a resumption of relations based on the 1992 understanding between Beijing and the KMT administration.

In fact, this new and ambiguous phrase of a "One China" principle is not entirely new. Wang Daohan made a trial balloon in his November 1997 meeting with Hsu Li-nung, head of Taiwan's preunification New Alliance, when he said, "the so-called 'One China' concept does not refer to either the ROC or the PRC." The "One China" idea indicated a unified China that will be created by the Chinese people of the two sides in the future."¹² Meeting with Lin Yang-kang, former vice-chairman of the KMT Central Committee, in May 1998, Wang repeated this new phrase: "'One China' should refer to a unified China that is jointly built by compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and that the motherland does not mean the mainland but the country owned by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait."¹³ Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not agree with this rearticulation and called Wang's interpretation of "One China" "inaccurate" at the time, the Beijing government eventually adopted this new interpretation at Qian's meeting with the KMT politicians in August 2000, three months after Chen came to power in Taiwan.

Continuing the two-pronged policy, Hu Jintao leadership made new guidelines on Taiwan policy in September 2004: "Strive for negotiation, prepare for

war, and have no fear of Taiwan's procrastination." These guidelines have showed both flexibility and persistency of the new generation of leadership. In other words, they have become softer on its peaceful offensive and harder on coercive threat. Chongpin Lin, former deputy minister of defense in Taiwan, acknowledged this flexibility of the Taiwan policy by the new generation of leadership when he concluded that "Hu's Taiwan policy is going to be more flexible, persistent, proactive, patient, subtle, and even more comprehensive." To support his conclusion, he summarized the following five new features of the Hu leadership's policy toward Taiwan. First, Hu has been more patient without a timetable for unification. Second, Hu has set the first option to deal with Taiwan as "annexing Taiwan without war" and emphasizing a nonmilitary strategy. Apart from launching psychological, legal, and media warfare on Taiwan, Hu also engaged Taiwan in diplomatic, economic, cultural, and even religious warfare. Third, Hu has placed emphasis on winning over the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people, such as the proposal to facilitate direct charter flights, to aid the overseas Taiwanese in need, and to import agricultural goods from Taiwan. Although trying to prevent Taipei from declaring *de jure* independence, Hu has tacitly acknowledged its *de facto* independence. Fourth, although Hu will support the use of military force to "deter the US and seize Taiwan," he has preferred the option of "coercion to the brink," which entails striking without bloodshed or destruction, and without missiles falling on the enemy's territory. The goal is to give the enemy a psychological feeling that great misfortune could appear unexpectedly. Fifth, Hu has handled the sovereignty issue with flexibility.¹⁴

Chinese Nationalism and the Making of Anti-Secession Law

The evolution of Beijing's policy toward Taiwan has demonstrated that this two-pronged approach has been considered the best solution to its strategic dilemma and, therefore, never given up by the Chinese leadership. The rise of Chinese Nationalism in recent years has not altered this policy because the Chinese political leaders, including the communist leaders, have taken a pragmatic attitude toward nationalism.

As a set of modern ideas that centers people's loyalty upon the nation-state, either existing or desired, nationalism did not exist in China before the nineteenth century because China was an empire, not a nation-state. Chinese political elite begin to embrace modern nationalist doctrines for China's defense and regeneration, only after China's disastrous defeat by British troops in the 1840–1842 Opium War, which not only led to the eventual disintegration of Chinese Empire but also the loss of national sovereignty to imperialist powers. Since then, a recurring theme in Chinese politics has been a nationalist quest for China's regeneration to blot out humiliation at the hands of imperialists. All those who wanted to rule China have to propound and implement a program of national salvation. Almost all the all-powerful Chinese political leaders since the early-twentieth century, from Sun Yatsen, Chiang Kai-shek, to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, have shared a deep bitterness at China's

humiliation and determined to restore China to its rightful place in the world of nation-states.

As the CCP came to power through a popular, anti-imperialist revolution, the very essence of the legitimacy of the communist state was not communism but nationalism. During the early years of the PRC, the CCP successfully recovered economy torn by the wars in the 1940s and built a centralized state hierarchy. Any third world nationalist regime would have made these typical nation-state building efforts. Mao once experimented the use of communist ideology as an integrative force to rule China but ended with a total failure. As market-oriented reform resulted in the decline of communist ideology, post-Mao leaders rediscovered the utility of nationalism, which they found, remained a most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value shared by both the regime and its critics. Facing Western sanctions after the Tiananmen crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations, Chinese leaders moved quickly to position themselves as the defender of China's national pride and interests. Their nationalist credential has been bolstered in the fight against Western sanctions and for China's entry into the WTO, stopping Taiwan independence, and winning the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Nationalism is an effective instrument of the communist state as a historical sense of injustice at the hands of foreign countries is deeply rooted and all walks of Chinese people sincerely shared a *qiangguomeng* (the dream of a strong China).

The discovery of nationalism has coincided with the prevailing pragmatism among Chinese people as well as their leaders. Pragmatism, which by definition is behavior disciplined by neither a set of values nor established principles, was vividly expressed by Deng's "cat theory," that is, "a cat, whether it is white or black, is a good one as long as it is able to catch mice." Pragmatism has clearly characterized the attitude of Chinese political elites toward nationalism. The important feature of this pragmatism is the communist state's emphasis on the instrumentality of nationalism for rallying support in the name of building powerful and prosperous Chinese nation-state. Led by the state, pragmatic nationalism identifies the Chinese nation closely with the communist state. Nationalist sentiment is officially expressed as *aigu* (loving the state), or *aiguo zhuyi* (patriotism), which is love and support for China, a China always indistinguishable from the communist state. As Michael Hunt observes, "by professing *aiguo*, Chinese usually expressed loyalty to and a desire to serve the state, either as it was or as it would be in its renovated form."¹⁵ From this perspective, Chinese pragmatic nationalism is state-centric. The communist state as the embodiment of the nation will seek the loyalty and support of the people that are granted the nation itself.

Reinforcing Chinese national confidence, and turning past humiliation and current weakness into a driving force for China's modernization, nationalism has become an effective instrument to enhance the legitimacy of the communist state. The nationalist card is particularly effective when China faces challenges from hostile foreign countries. As a Chinese official said, if Chinese people felt threatened by external forces, the solidarity among them would be strengthened, and nationalism would be a useful tool for the regime to justify its leadership role.¹⁶ It is interesting to see that although corruption, and some other social and

economic problems have undermined the legitimacy of the communist regime, many Chinese people have sided with the communist government when foreigners criticized it. No matter how corrupt the government, foreigners do not have the right to make unwarranted remarks about China and Chinese people. Many Chinese have been upset by US pressure on issues of human rights, intellectual property rights, trade deficits, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan, since they believe that the United States has used these issues to demonize China in an effort to prevent it from rising as a great power. Concurring with the government's portrayal of Western hostility, a ranking official told a Western reporter, "We won't allow anyone to come and tear us apart. This is the deepest part of the Chinese soul." He went on to say, he remained in the Communist Party only because "it is the best vehicle for his nationalist sentiments."¹⁷

Although popular expression of nationalism has supported the communist state in its fighting against foreign pressures, holding high expectations for the government to fulfill its promise of safeguarding China's national interests, popular nationalists have also called for popular participation in the government, and particularly in the foreign policymaking arena that has long been a monopolized domain of the state. Popular nationalists have routinely charged the communist government as too chummy with Japan and soft in dealing with the United States in the recent years. The communist state is criticized as neither confident enough nor competent enough in safeguarding China's vital national interests.¹⁸

In this case, nationalism has become a double-edged sword, both a means for the CCP to legitimize its rule and a means for the Chinese people to judge the performance of the state. If Chinese leaders could not deliver on their nationalist promise, they would become vulnerable to nationalist criticism. Pragmatic leaders, therefore, have taken a two-pronged strategy toward nationalism. They have used nationalism to bolster faith of the Chinese people and hold the country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a communist to a postcommunist society. In the meantime, pragmatic leaders have set economic prosperity as the overarching objective of China and the foundation for China's rising nationalistic aspirations. To pursue economic prosperity, peace, and development is emphasized as China's major international goals. Although pragmatic nationalism is assertive in defending China's national security and uncompromising with foreign demands involving China's perceived vital interest, such as the preservation of national sovereignty and the reunification of China, pragmatic leaders have tried to avoid confrontational relations with the US and other Western powers since it would not be in the interest of China's modernization. In this case, they have emphasized principles of peaceful coexistence, peaceful rise, and peaceful development when China is rising to the status of a great power. Acting upon these principles, *pragmatic leaders* have been very cautious to prevent the popular nationalist sentiment from getting out of hand and make sure that Chinese foreign policy, including its Taiwan policy, is not dictated by emotional expression of nationalism at the societal level.

As a result, although nationalism has set the rhetoric as well as the bottom line of Beijing's policy toward Taiwan, Beijing's policy at the operational level has

not been dictated by emotional nationalist rhetoric on the streets. Instead, it has been constructed on prudence and pragmatism. Nationalism has not prevented Beijing's pragmatic leadership from adopting a peaceful strategy, rather than costly military action, as the most desirable approach. From this perspective, to look at the making of the Anti-Secession Law, it is not difficult to find that the law does little more than codify long-standing policy and does not expand the conditions under which force might be used.

Looking back at Beijing's threat of using force in the last decade, we have seen a typical pattern of talking tough but acting prudently. During the crisis following President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in 1995, China threatened using military force by launching missiles close to Taiwan's coasts. However, it was proved only a military brinksmanship, using the threat of war to ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait. The logic is that: China would have to wage a war against Taiwan if it declares independence; so military threats would reduce the likelihood of a declaration of independence; and so military threats would make a war less likely.¹⁹ Another case was the military threat during Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. One month before the election, China published a White Paper noticeably to put forward the "*shange ruguo*" (three ifs) to clarify the premise for the mainland to use force against Taiwan. Before this White Paper, China had threatened military action only if Taiwan declared independence and/or in the event of foreign invasion of the island. The White Paper added the third "if": if Taiwan indefinitely refused the peaceful reunification through negotiations.²⁰ Three days prior to the election, in his NPC news conference on March 15, Premier Zhu Rongji threatened the Taiwan voters that Taiwan independence victory would spark a cross-Strait war. In the end, although Beijing was unhappy to see its most unacceptable candidate, Chen Shui-bian, elected as the president, weighing options, pragmatism prevailed as Beijing decided to refrain from using force: instead, it formulated a wait-and-see policy.²¹

The Anti-Secession Law is just another case of making a war threat to win peace. It grew out of Beijing's frustration by President Chen pushing the envelope, particularly his attempt to change the ROC constitution. In response to Taiwan's independence movement, Beijing has been mostly on the defensive and reactive position in the recent decade. When the fourth generation of leadership under Hu Jintao came to office and began to consolidate their power, they looked for ways to change this passive position not only due to rising Chinese Nationalism has blamed Beijing's leaders for being too soft toward Taiwan's independence movement but also because they became very concerned about the real danger of Taiwan's formal declaration of independence via a constitutional change.

Initially intended as a response to Taiwan's enactment of a Referendum Law in December 2003, China began talking about making an Anti-Secession Law after Chen won the marginal victory of reelection in March 2004 and announced a highly provocative *zhengmin* (name correction) campaign, such as changing the name of state-owned enterprises to emphasize "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China" and inserting the name "Taiwan" in official correspondence from the Foreign Ministry. Beijing was very worried that the December Legislative Yuan (LY) election would give Chen the majority necessary to move toward amending

the constitution later on. The pro-independence ruling Pan-Green coalition, led by President Chen Shui-bian, however, failed to win the crucial LY elections. The defeat was interpreted as a signal by the majority in Taiwan to maintain the status quo rather than risking a war with the mainland by pressing for formal independence. Chen's position, therefore, began to soften. The Anti-Secession Law, widely publicized in China's state media, had worked its way through the party bureaucracy and was ready for the approval of the NPC. The domestic political cost would be too high to stop the momentum.

Passing the Anti-Secession Law, Beijing certainly did not want to see it fuel tensions across the Strait. In spite of its temporary setback, Beijing tried to accentuate positive and eliminate the negative effects in its follow-on treatment of the Law. Just as the concerns over the statement of non-peaceful means were mounting, the leadership started plotting a series of initiatives to show its more benign side. A *People's Daily* editorial stressed, "This law fully embodies our consistent stand on striving for peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and the greatest effort" and that "it is not a law of war, but is a law for the peaceful reunification of the country." At a press conference, Wang Zaixi, Deputy Minister of the State Council Taiwan Affairs office, is loaded with reassurances of peaceful intent by emphasizing that the passage of the Law does not mean the toughening of its attitude toward Taiwan, and the law is meant to promote peaceful reunification rather than undermine bilateral relations.²² In a speech the day before the law was passed, Hu Jintao attempted to show his goodwill by expressing China's willingness to relax restrictions on agricultural imports from southern Taiwan. Weeks after the law was passed, Beijing undertook the historic reconciliation with Taiwan's main opposition parties, including its long-time foe, the KMT. President Hu shook hands with KMT leaders in the Great Hall of the People in front of the international media, greatly easing global concerns sparked by passage of the law.

It is worth noting that although the Anti-Secession Law codifies China's determination to achieve national unification under the "One China" principle, and the military option is clearly included among the nonpeaceful measures to deter Taiwan independence "under any name or by any means," the law does not add any new provisions or contents to change Beijing's policy position in the past White Papers nor does it establish a time-deadline for unification, after which military action would occur, as some Chinese officials in recent years had advocated. Against this background, the law is less threatening. Under the fictional assumption that Taiwan is already legally part of "One China," there is no ultimatum for reunification, only an interdiction against a formal declaration of independence.

Although people have focused on the nonpeaceful means statement, one needs to pay equal attention to the emphasis on the peaceful means as the most preferable approach to reach the long-standing objective of national unification, to be achieved through phased consultations, conducted on an equal footing as long as there is a "glimmer of hope" of success in reunification. It is interesting to see two last minute changes in the text before the law was finally passed. The wording of the third "scenario" that would compel China to employ nonpeaceful

means in Article Eight was originally “that *conditions* for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” In the final text, it becomes “that *possibilities* for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”²³ According to a Chinese scholar, this change implies that China would “exhaust all possibilities to achieve peaceful unification.” Article Two in the final text added a sentence that Taiwan and the mainland together make “One China” and reconfirmed the position that talks between Beijing and Taiwan would be on an equal basis. An *Asia Times Online* article indicated that “China’s Anti-Secession Law is neither as inflammatory as many had feared nor as bombastic as Beijing’s previous statements on cross-Straits issues.”²⁴

In this case, it is reasonable to argue that the Anti-Secession Law not only does not signify greater irrationality of China’s policy toward Taiwan but also may not shift the cross-Strait balance in any fundamental way. As a *South China Morning News* reporter noted, the law “changes nothing in the cross-Strait balance, and serves no practical legal purpose, domestically or internationally.”²⁵ Although Chinese law now reinforced the existing Taiwan policy, it does not create any authority that did not exist, and its effect on decision making is not clear. As one American analyst indicated, “Passing a law—in a country where the rule of law is applied selectively, often at the leadership’s whim—hardly makes an attack any more (or less) likely.”²⁶

It is interesting to take note that although the incumbent DPP leaders made negative responses to the passage of the Anti-Secession Law, the reactions from Taiwan on the whole were restrained. Whether or not realizing the rationality behind the making of the law, Taiwan’s leaders must have realized that overreactions from Taiwan might amount to further escalation, prompting China’s further reactions, thus producing a vicious chain-action reaction. The people of Taiwan have every right to express their opposition to the military threat prescribed by this law. However, as Richard Bush indicated, it is prudent for Taiwan’s leaders “to avoid steps that inflame the situation further or foreclose the possibility of more positive cross-Strait steps when and if the political atmosphere changes for the better.”²⁷ That is what US Secretary of State Rice warned the leaders across the Strait, “You do an Anti-Secession Law, then they react, then you react to that and they react to that and pretty soon we’re all up here.”²⁸ Although the Anti-Secession Law generated a drawback in the relationship, Taiwan’s leaders were aware that Beijing could not be pushed into a corner where the only option it was left with was a military one. As a *South China Morning News* reporter indicated, “You do not need legislation to govern this divide while reason prevails, and when reason is gone, no legislation is going to make a difference, anyway.”²⁹

As a result, Taiwan’s reaction was largely restrained. The DPP leaders were walking on a thin line between allowing Taiwan people to vent their feelings of grievance, at the same time not allowing those impulses to be translated into imprudent actions by the government. Although the Taiwan government made clear that the law already damaged relations and disrupted a tenuous detente begun early that year, the Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, upon China’s passage of the law, suggested that the push for charter cargo flights

could resume if public anger in Taiwan over the Chinese law subsided, and reconfirmed President Chen's intention to stick to an earlier pledge to make "peace and development" the core of his policy toward China.³⁰

Instead of initiating a referendum in response to the law, Chen cautiously chose to demonstrate in the streets of Taipei. Rather than calling for Taiwanese independence, the massive protest rally emphasized Taiwan's desire for continued peace and democracy. Although Chen participated in the rally, he did not speak to the masses, a contrast to previous occasions when the independence-minded president has used party gatherings to make provocative remarks. Chen also resisted the TSU legislators' push for counterlegislation, which would likely trigger an escalation of hostility.

Chen's restraints were in line with the domestic political dynamics that called to steer cross-Straits relations back toward the earlier relaxation. Although the opposition Pan-Blue coalition blamed Chen's pro-independent actions for provoking the law, the KMT, Taiwan's biggest opposition party, sent a high-level delegation led by Vice-Chairman Chiang Pin-kun to China only two days after the March 26 rally. This was the first official KMT delegation since the party fled to Taiwan amidst China's civil war in 1949. The trip paved the way for a visit by KMT Chairman Lien Chan and explored new venues for improving relations. Lien's historical visit in April marked a formal reconciliation between the CCP and KMT after more than 50 years of hostility. Almost immediately, PFP Chairman James Soong made a visit to the mainland in May. Before these high profile visits of oppositional parties, Taiwan's Chi Mei Group founder Hsu Wen-long, whose support to Chen was crucial for Chen's winning the 2000 presidential election, published an open letter on the front page of the Taiwan's *Economic Daily News* hours before the March 26 rally, warning that "Taiwan independence will only lead Taiwan to war and drag people to disaster." He also stated that Taiwan and the mainland both belonged to "One China" and the Anti-Secession Law made him at ease to invest in the mainland. These developments within Taiwan certainly helped to restrain Taiwan's negative reactions to the Anti-Secession Law.

Conclusion

The two-pronged strategy toward Taiwan and the making of the Anti-Secession Law demonstrate that Chinese Nationalism has not altered Beijing's approach to deal with the strategic dilemma. Prescribing the conditions for possible use of force, the Anti-Secession Law has not changed Beijing's rationality of threatening war for peace. This seemingly contradictory strategy of talking tough but acting in a calculated manner showed that pragmatic leaders were aware of the danger of being a victim of emotional nationalism. China's Taiwan policy has not been dictated by the emotional voice of nationalism but based on careful calculation of China's national interests.

Beijing's rationality to cope with the strategic dilemma, however, does not mean that China's threat of the force against Taiwan is in any way justifiable. Though the rationale of the Anti-Secession Law is to deter what Beijing perceived

as a challenge to its fundamental interests and to discourage what it calls separatism, it has not found a way to make its national unification more attractive to Taiwan because it has failed to understand why many people in Taiwan do not accept the "One Country, Two Systems" approach to reunification. To finally resolve the strategic dilemma, Beijing has to work with not only the opposition parties but also the democratically elected Taiwan leaders, whoever they are, to expand communication across the Strait, aiming at increasing political, economic, social, and cultural exchanges with a view to establish a formal, negotiated, and enduring framework for cross-Strait relations.

Notes

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PART V

NATIONAL SECURITY
AND DEFENSE STRATEGY

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CHAPTER 12

“ONE CHINA” AND THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Richard D. Fisher Jr.

Summary

Considerations of the military balance across the Taiwan Strait remains critical to the consideration of the issue of “One China,” as force of arms remains a key tool for Beijing to achieve its goal of unification under its terms. During this decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could achieve comfortable superiority in almost all military indices versus Taiwan. The PLA may even for the first time be able to mount a credible invasion threat although at the same time able to deter US intervention. Although the issue of Taiwan’s future relationship with China is one that most residents on Taiwan would prefer be settled peacefully, China’s military buildup against the island is creating pressures, limiting Taiwan’s ultimate room for strategic maneuver, and raising the stakes for Washington. In Taiwan, the fact of the PLA’s continuous buildup exposes the insufficiency of Taiwan’s defensive preparations, as it also exposes weaknesses in the Pan-Blue arguments that it can ensure Taiwan’s security and “enshrine” the status quo with China. Finally, the PLA’s buildup challenges assumptions that the United States can always successfully save Taiwan from Chinese attack, an assumption that is critical for defense decisions in Taiwan, and for Washington to exert leverage in Taipei.

Introduction

As long as the issue of “One China” or the status of Taiwan is not resolved to the wishes of the Communist Party (CP)-led regime in Beijing, it is likely that China will prepare for military contingencies to achieve “unification.” China regularly reminds the world that it has never “forsworn the use of force” to achieve unification.¹ In March 2005 China created a legal framework for the

decision to use force against Taiwan in the Anti-Secession Law passed by the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC). Even if China truly does not intend to attack Taiwan, it remains committed to a rapid buildup of its forces on the Taiwan Strait as a key element of its broader strategy to settle the question of "One China" in its favor. This makes necessary constant reviews of the military balance across the Taiwan Strait.²

At the beginning of 2008, as China nears the end of its second five-year planning period for this decade, it can look with satisfaction at a military balance against Taiwan that is now accelerating in its favor. In practically all areas of comparison the PLA is at least superior, and is moving toward positions of decisive superiority over Taiwan. In addition, the PLA can be expected to continue its trends of acquiring weapon systems and military competencies designed to defeat the regional forces of the United States and Japan. Despite China's ability to intervene in Taiwan politics to its favor, and even achieve "peace agreements" in which Taiwanese forego "independence," these military trends may only serve to increase Chinese confidence in its ability to attack Taiwan while deterring US intervention, which may become attractive if Taiwan refuses to unify under China's terms and timeline.

Since its 2000 election victory, Taiwan under the administration of President Chen Shui-bian has pursued critical military-political reform. But it has been unable to gain legislative passage of funding for any of the major weapon systems offered by President George W. Bush in April 2001. The Kuomintang (KMT) and People's First Party (PFP) majority (known as the Pan-Blue coalition) have opposed military expenditures as a means of calling attention to their vision of "One China," which holds that it is possible for China and Taiwan to safely "defer" the ultimate resolution of what is "One China" for 30 to 50 years. Some in the Pan-Blue coalition argue that Taiwan should concentrate on building a "defensive defense" that would fund military base hardening over submarine purchases. It is not clear that a majority of Taiwanese accept this vision, or one offered by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (the Pan-Green coalition), of a Taiwan that would eventually be independent. Nevertheless, the Pan-Blues have used their legislative power to veto new major weapons purchases, thus significantly increasing the PLA's margin of superiority on the Taiwan Strait.

The United States, which provides the key deterrent (armed force) that underpins Taiwan's survival, is increasingly frustrated by Taipei's political gridlock that blocks a much needed defense buildup. On October 26, 2006, Steven Young, who as director of the American Institute on Taiwan (AIT) is also the de facto US ambassador, issued a strong public rebuke to the Pan-Blue political leaders who had produced successive refusals to allow full funding for the 2001 package of weapons offered for sale to Taiwan. Young stated that "Taiwan needs to pass the robust defense budget in this fall's legislative session."³ The unstated implication of his warning, which drew loud protests from Pan-Blue leaders, was that the Bush administration might consider withdrawing unfunded weapons on offer, which would mark an historic downgrade in US strategic support for Taiwan.

Shifting Military Balance on the Taiwan Strait

In the 1990s there was little question that China could blockade, attack, or invade Taiwan if it was prepared to accept grievous losses from Taiwanese and US forces, with only a slight chance of success. By early 2007 Taiwan's assessment had changed radically. On February 6, 2007 President Chen Shui-bian stated, “This year, (China) will have the readiness to respond to an emergency military conflict. By 2010, it will be prepared to fight a large-scale war, and before 2015, it will achieve the decisive capability to win a war.”⁴ This followed a November 2006 assessment by the United States-China Economic Security Review Commission (USCC):

The cross-Straits military balance of power current substantially favors the mainland. China possess advanced aircraft, submarines, surface vessels, and ballistic missiles in greater quantity and, in many cases, equal or greater sophistication than Taiwan's. In an all-out conflict between the two, Taiwan, if relying only on its own capabilities, would be unable to prevent China from ultimately realizing its objectives.⁵

Indeed, it can be assessed that by the end of 2006, China had achieved some degree of local military superiority over Taiwan in key measures such as air-power and missiles and was on its way to achieving a credible invasion capability early in the next decade. Furthermore, China is also achieving success in developing new asymmetric weapons designed to attack potential US naval and air intervention support for Taiwan, like antiship ballistic missiles, as it also builds new power-projection capabilities for use in East Asia or beyond. Even if Taiwan were to quickly purchase the 2001 weapons systems offered by Washington, that would not now be sufficient to cause a decisive shift in the China-Taiwan balance of power to Taiwan.

By the mid-to-late 1990s both Taiwan and China were in the midst of efforts to acquire and absorb “fourth generation” military technologies. Taiwan had just taken delivery of 150 US-built Lockheed-Martin F-16 *Falcon* and French-built Dassault Mirage-2000 jet fighters, plus six then state-of-the-art stealthy French-made *LaFayette* class naval frigates. These weapon systems, though complex, fit well into existing Taiwanese doctrine and operational concepts, and represented the latest move in Taiwan's consistent effort to sustain a margin of technical superiority over the far more numerous Chinese forces. By the turn of the decade, however, politics took center stage as the DPP government succeeded the KMT after its 51 years of rule, and immediately began to fashion legislation to “professionalize” the Taiwan military and end its loyalty to the KMT party. The Ministry of Defense under President Chen has succeeded in pushing for the adaptation of new “joint forces” doctrines and the incorporation of new information technologies, but funding for the weapons systems offered by the then incoming Bush administration was not considered a high enough priority. After the legislative elections in 2004 it proved to be even less of a priority for the Pan-Blue controlled Legislative Yuan (LY). Although the United States steadily increased its private urgings culminating in AIT Director Young's October 26

public warning against further delay in funding defense programs, it is not clear that Taiwan's political leaders, in particular the Pan-Blues, will support defense spending sufficient to fund all of the weapons offered by Washington.

One key measure of the political priority placed on defense in Taipei and Beijing is their respective defense spending. The chart below illustrates in gross terms that defense spending in Taipei has declined from 2000 to 2006, both in total terms and in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This decline has also been steady, save for 2005, where there was a slight rise, only to see a reduction in 2006. Taiwanese from both sides of the political arena have long listed reasons for this: an inability to afford high defense budgets during a time of economic recession; a higher priority place on funding social and welfare budgets; and a bipartisan desire to negotiate lower purchases prices from the United States. In contrast, China's defense budget, even when represented in official figures, shows a marked increase in terms of total expenditures and shows a rising per capita expenditure—this even at a time of sustained GDP growth. Estimates of China's real defense spending are acknowledged by most security analysts to far exceed official defense numbers. In July 2006 the Pentagon's annual report on PLA modernization estimated that China's actual defense spending could reach US\$105 billion for 2006 (table 12.1).

Sustained Chinese military spending increases have had their desired effect. During the 1990s China began a slow effort, though soon to accelerate, to understand and absorb a generation of foreign military advances that had passed it by during the 1970s and 1980s. Stopgap purchases of new weapons, mainly from Russia, soon evolved into a concerted effort to formulate a new overarching PLA doctrine to better exploit emerging information technologies that have driven China's weapons technology development choices. China's military expenditures focused on expanding air and naval forces with both foreign-purchased and new indigenous systems during the period from 1995 to 2005. Besides, early this decade, ground troop and reserve components began to receive greater funding, albeit from an expanded budget "pie" that did not take away from the other services. The latter part of this decade has seen an additional investment in new naval and airborne

Table 12.1 ROC and PRC Military Spending Compared, 2000 to 2006

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
ROC Military Spending							
USD (millions)	12,920	7,980	7,540	6,970	7,520	7,821	7,740
ROC Spending as %							
of GDP	4.17	2.84	2.68	2.48	2.41	2.50	2.39
PRC Military Spending							
(1) USD (millions)	14,570	17,415	20,460	22,380	25,054	29,580	32.98
PRC Spending as %							
of GDP	1.35	1.46	1.65	1.68	1.72	1.86	1.92

Source: *Jane's Sentinel*, China and Northeast Asia, 2006.

Note: PRC spending based on official figures, widely acknowledged to be far lower than real figures.

power-projection systems. This decade has also seen China pursue modernization and expansion of its nuclear missile arsenal as it has increased its investment in both manned and unmanned military-space programs. China is also investing heavily in advanced military technologies like energy weapons to remain competitive

Balance of Transformation

By 2006 there had been substantial defense transformation in China and Taiwan. In contrast to Taiwan, the PLA remains firmly a “Party Army,” loyal to the dictates of the Communist Party of China (CCP). But the CCP’s increasing reliance on the PLA to keep its power position has in large part propelled its pushing for and funding PLA transformation in terms of doctrine, capability, and missions. For the PLA, 15 years of effort culminated in the unprecedented August 2005 “Peace Mission 2005” (PM 05) combined-arms exercise with Russian forces in and around the Liaoning Peninsula. Although some have dismissed PM 05 as little more than “firepower” exercises,⁶ such a perspective misses several important points. PM 05, however simple in comparison to US or even Japanese military capabilities, represented China’s effort to transform the PLA from the pre-1990s defensive and inward-focused doctrinal era of “People’s War” to the current period doctrines that stress offensive action and the high-tech aspirations of “Informationalization.”⁷

At the heart of this effort has been a wrenching struggle to reform the PLA’s organization, personnel system, defense industrial sector, and to leverage new and constantly evolving information technologies to achieve ever higher military effectiveness. By 2005 the PLA was near to completing its latest 200,000 personnel cutback, with many transferred to the enlarged People’s Armed Police, as it was also making progress in establishing a new Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps to operate new technologies, while achieving higher education levels for officers and NCOs. PLA logistics was being rationalized within the seven Military Region structure with greater civilian “outsourcing” for basic services, while the larger defense industrial sector was responding to greater “market” incentives by becoming more agile at making new systems. These reforms have helped to enable the PLA’s transformation by marrying a new doctrine that stresses the offensive and combined-arms joint service warfare, with new high-technology weapons and better educated people to employ them.

For Taiwan there were several ominous portents in PM 05. The first is that Russia has for the first time extended its military cooperation with China to the transference of “software” to compliment its more extensive hardware sales, giving the PLA a near-real “experience” that Taiwan cannot replicate. The Soviet Union and subsequent Russian Federation armed forces have developed competencies in the areas of coordinated air-ship-submarine naval missile strikes, offensive-defensive air operations, airborne-armor infantry assault, and amphibious armor assault, all of which the PLA would dearly like to master as it contemplates how to attack Taiwan. All of these activities were part of the PM 05 exercise schedule⁸ and allowed the PLA to measure their new weapons against those of a true “peer” military. There was even a missile and space dimension, as Russia

launched intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles just before the exercise, and China bracketed the exercise with satellite launches.⁹ The fact that the PLA forces operated with those of a major foreign power for the first time since the Korean War also conveys the PLA's new confidence in its emerging capabilities. Inasmuch as some reports noted that China paid for this exercise, and soon afterward rewarded Russia with an order of 36 Il-76/78M transport/tanker aircraft,¹⁰ one can expect that PM 05 will lead to larger future exercises.

Additionally, the PLA has its eye on the future, and is continually investing in new military technologies. The 2006 Zhuhai Airshow saw the Shenyang Aircraft Company reveal a concept for a supersonic stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) as well as a similarly configured fifth generation manned fighter concept. Although the Chinese reveal almost nothing in open sources, Taiwanese sources note that China is making progress in fielding laser or other energy weapons.¹¹ The PLA has fielded initial nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse warheads on some short-range ballistic missiles and is making progress in fielding novel antiship ballistic missiles.¹² Although the PLA will be challenged to incorporate these new technologies into modern doctrine and operations, it is likely this effort is underway.

Taiwan's Defense Transformation

Since 2000 Taiwan's defense transformation has had a political and a military component. Taiwan's National Defense Law and the Organization Law of 2002 codified strict civilian control over Taiwan's military, whereas during the era of Chiang Kai Shek's (until 1975) and Chiang Ching Kuo's rule, the Taiwan military was under their direct control, after which it was largely under the authority of its Chief of General Staff.¹³ Military loyalty to Chiang and the ruling KMT Party was largely synonymous and there was little transparency in military matters. The establishment of clear civilian control over Taiwan's military has won praise, especially in Washington, whereas the Chinese government has had to campaign against the notion that the PLA should undergo "de-partification" or "nationalization" that would divorce the PLA from direct CP control.¹⁴

Ironically, new requirements for transparency and legislative review of defense programs enabled the now-opposition KMT and PFP to use their post-2004 LY majority opposition to many important defense modernization programs as a means to promote an alternate view of Taiwanese identity and security. Many KMT and PFP leaders reflect the view that economic relations with China are key to Taiwan's future and that a new negotiated political relationship is both possible and preferable to one of military competition.¹⁵ In March 2006 KMT Chairman and then presumptive presidential candidate Ma Ying Jeou proposed that Taiwan and China could negotiate a 30 to 50 year "peace accord."¹⁶ For some in the Pan-Blue, Taiwan's military expenditures in themselves serve to undermine the prospects for such a new relationship with China.¹⁷ Some, like KMT LY member and foreign affair spokesman Su Chi, have described KMT defense policy as favoring a "defensive defense," or funding for military base hardening over purchasing "offensive" systems like new submarines.¹⁸ The DPP-led

administration, although having toned down its pro-independence rhetoric, is not prepared to entrust China with Taiwan's future security, and has campaigned strongly for greater defense spending.

In contrast to the Chiang era to the end of the 1980s, Taiwan is now firmly committed to a “defensive” strategy in which there is no longer any intention or consideration to invade or “retake the mainland.” However, the PLA's accelerating buildup has forced Taiwanese leaders to consider “offensive” capabilities to deter PLA attack capabilities, which have in the past been opposed by Washington, like ballistic and cruise missiles. Taiwanese frustration can be illustrated by the case of the Hualien tunnels. These tunnels were built at great expense in the late 1980s and 1990s, near Jiashan Airbase, near the city of Hualien, to protect most of the Taiwan Air Force from PLA attack.¹⁹ By early this decade, however, knowledge of PLA development of very accurate ballistic and cruise missiles made these tunnels less secure. So for Taiwan, a concentration on pure “defensive” means did not produce additional security. As a consequence, Taiwanese leaders from both Green and Blue camps support the development of a limited offensive nonnuclear deterrent capability.²⁰

Like the PLA, Taiwan has also sought to use successive reductions in defense personnel to help fund more important transformations such as devising and implementing new combined-arms doctrines, acquiring the critical command and control technologies to make this possible, personnel reform to include more noncommissioned officers to replace conscripts, and new technology acquisitions. Taiwan's total military manpower was 400,000 in 2001, which declined to 290,000 by 2005.²¹ Key to this is the hope that by 2008 about 60% of this force will be volunteers and only 40% conscript,²² meaning more technically proficient personnel who chose to make the military a career. Taiwan has also made progress formulating its own Joint Operations Command Center to develop and exercise new joint forces operations concerning joint surveillance, joint infrastructure protection, joint air defense, joint counterblockade operations, and joint counteramphibious landing operations.²³ An essential element to realizing greater joint operations was to be an ambitious Po-Sheng digital command and communication system that would have linked all major Taiwanese defense platforms, but this has only been funded in a reduced version. Meanwhile, at the end of 2006, it only appeared that the opposition-controlled legislature would approve funding for new Lockheed-Martin P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, while funding for eight new conventional submarines and new Patriot PAC-3 missile interceptors remains denied. And ominously, at least in part due to Pan-Blue funding opposition, in August 2006 President Bush reportedly decided not to accept Taiwan's request for 66 new Lockheed-Martin F-16C/D fighters to replace its obsolete Northrop F-5E/F fighters.²⁴

Furthermore, it appears that stifling politics is also preventing Taiwan from seeking to exploit a variety of new revolutionary military technologies. Taiwanese military officials occasionally mention the intention of starting to replace F-16s with stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, perhaps later in the next decade, but it seems like a distant ambition without real commitment. Taiwan would benefit immensely from new technologies like rail guns, which could

shoot down short-range ballistic missiles and fire shells out to 200km. However, there does not appear to be efforts underway to approach the United States, which is developing this technology, to investigate how Taiwan might eventually acquire or codevelop such systems.

Balance of Information Exploitation

Both the PLA and the Taiwan military have sought to exploit new ways of employing information to increase the capability to organize warfare, gather and process information, and increase the capabilities of weapons. The PLA's aspirations in this area seem to be summed up by the new buzz word "informationalization," which relates to the PLA's ability to adopt information technologies to command, intelligence, training, and weapon systems. Evidence of the PLA's efforts would include broad investment in new automatic command systems linked by fiber-optic Internet, satellite, and new high-frequency digital radio systems, which allow for more efficient joint service planning and command, while also enabling a reduction in layers of command. The PLA can also better contest the information battle space with its new space-, airborne-, naval-, and ground-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems, and its new antisatellite, antiradar, electronic warfare, and information warfare systems. Training and education is also becoming more "informationalized" as the PLA rapidly increased the use of advanced computer-driven simulators in all services, and encourages greater online training and education for officers and NCOs. And there is increasing "information content" for new PLA weapons as it moves to link new space, airborne, and electronic intelligence (ELINT) "sensors" to missile-, air-, naval-, and ground-based "shooters" to enable all its services to better use new precision-strike weapons.

Space and Information Attack

A major element of the PLA's drive to exploit information technologies, and to be able to fight "information warfare," has been an expensive effort to build military capabilities in outer space. The PLA will soon have new surveillance, communication, and navigation satellites to serve its warfighters and new capabilities to combat enemy space assets. At the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, China announced that in 2007 the PLA plans to launch a constellation of three new surveillance satellites: two HJ-1A electro-optical and one HJ-1C radar satellites. This will be followed by a series of four: two HJ-1B electro-optical and two HJ-1C radar satellites.²⁵ These will be based on Russian NPO Machinostroyenia electro-optical and radar satellites.²⁶ One Chinese official stated the electro-optical satellites would have a 1/10 meter resolution.²⁷ Although this will be a small surveillance constellation compared to that of the United States, it will be the largest in Asia and will be sufficient to give PLA warfighters a twice-daily revisit by both types of satellites. This plus an expected larger number of UAV-based reconnaissance systems may be sufficient to give the PLA detailed imagery of an evolving Taiwan campaign. At the 2004 Zhuhai show, Chinese companies

revealed designs for two US Predator-1 class surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), one of which was in testing by the 2006 Zhuhai show.

The PLA currently has three Zhongzhing-22 communication satellites in orbit, and is known to use many Chinese “civilian” communication satellites. The PLA now has four “Beidou” navigation satellites in orbit but this system is limited by its reliance on ground stations for navigation signal broadcast. But at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, China made clear that it would expand the initial Beidou constellation to five satellites, and then loft a second constellation of over 30 true navigation satellites. This later system is sometimes referred to as “Compass.” But to guarantee access to navsat signals like those broadcast by the US Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system, China is now a full partner in Europe’s “Galileo” navsat system, which plans to have 30 satellites in orbit by 2008. China will also use its experience with Galileo²⁸ to build its own navsat network and, reports indicate, it will begin to loft its own network early in the next decade.²⁹

In addition, the PLA is also expanding its ability to compliment satellites with long-range UAVs for surveillance missions. At the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, Chinese companies revealed two very long-range surveillance UAV concepts: one from the Chengdu Aircraft Company that bore a close resemblance in shape and size to the US Northrop Grumman Global Hawk and a slightly smaller surveillance UAV by the Guizhou Company. Company officials did not offer any real information on these concepts, but it can be assumed that they are serious programs. If successful, they will expand the PLA’s ability to monitor areas of concern at great distances, or even mount 24 to 48 hour patrols over areas where US naval forces might seek to assist Taiwan.

On January 11, 2007 the PLA fulfilled US Department of Defense predictions from 2003 that it would achieve a “direct ascent” antisatellite (ASAT) capability before the end of the decade.³⁰ The PLA apparently used a version of the KT-1 mobile solid-fueled space launch vehicle to destroy a FY-1C weather satellite about 530 miles above the earth. With the expected use of the KT-2 and KT-2A for higher altitude targets, China may soon have the ability to threaten most critical US military satellites, as well as the new surveillance satellites of Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and India, which use lower Polar Earth Orbits. In 2006 and before the PLA has also used powerful ground-based lasers to “dazzle” some US satellites, a capability the Pentagon fears could be developed to destroy the same satellites.³¹ More ominously, the PLA may envision manned military-space platforms inasmuch as its first manned space flight, the Shenzhou-5 of October 2003, was primarily used for military surveillance. It cannot be dismissed that future Chinese-manned space stations planned for the next decade could perform defensive and offensive military-space missions.³²

China is also making progress with other forms of information attack. Perhaps most significant are US fears that China has perfected the development of non-nuclear radio frequency warheads for missiles³³ designed to produce the effects of “electromagnetic pulse” (EMP) to destroy electronics and electronic power systems. It can be expected that DF-15 and DF-11 SRBMs may carry these warheads to essentially “fry” electronic communications and electric power

networks, or to even bracket US warships deploying to the Taiwan area. In addition, the PLA is investing in radar attack missiles like the Russian Kh-31P, and perhaps a new Chinese missile that uses the ramjet engine of the Kh-31 with a new radar seeker developed in cooperation with Israel. Israel has already sold the PLA its HARPY antiradar drone, which can loiter above Taiwan and attack a radar station when switched on.

Information Warfare

On top of this the PLA has devoted great resources toward developing the ability to conduct other forms of Information Warfare (IW) like computer network attack (CNA).³⁴ IW and CNA are viewed by some US officials as part of a wider PLA effort to attack Taiwan's civil infrastructure and to accelerate victory in a direct military campaign. In an October 2004 speech, then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless stated: "China is actively developing options to create chaos on the island, to compromise components of Taiwan's critical infrastructure—telecommunications, utilities, broadcast media, cellular, Internet and computer networks... These threats range from computer network attacks to compromising Taiwan's public utilities, communications, operational security, and transportation."³⁵

Taiwanese military officials have monitored the PLA's development of IW capabilities since the mid-1990s. In 2001, the then Lt.-Gen. Abe Lin, Director of the Taiwan Ministry of Defense Information and Electronic Warfare Directorate, noted that the PLA was developing soft methods, like CNA, and hard methods like EMP weapons, to attack Taiwan.³⁶ Lin was largely responsible for developing Taiwan's cyber defenses as well as its own offensive computer network operation capabilities. During its annual "Han Kuang" military exercise in July 2005, for the first time Taiwanese forces simulated offensive PLA CNA.³⁷

In September 2003 a Taiwanese Cabinet spokesman stated: "National intelligence has indicated that an army of hackers based in China's Hubei and Fujian provinces has successfully spread 23 different Trojan Horse programs to the networks of 10 private high-tech companies here to use them as a springboard to break into at least 30 different government agencies and 50 private companies."³⁸ In September 2005 the Taiwan National Security Council was attacked by hackers sending Trojan viruses³⁹ and in July 2006, for two weeks, the Taiwan LY was under attack from Chinese hackers, with the fear that "insiders" had provided China with IP addresses that would otherwise have been denied by computer protection programs.⁴⁰

Then in June 2006, Chinese hackers escalated their attacks by penetrating the Taiwan Ministry of Defense computers and issuing a false press release, seeking to manipulate public opinion regarding an ongoing bribery scandal. This apparently was the first time Chinese "hackers" had done so, at least giving some preview of a far more pervasive attempt to manipulate or even control the media during wartime. As part of their attack, the hackers also penetrated Taiwan's Chunghwa Telecom Co.'s webmail system, also used by the Ministry of Defense, and stole account numbers and passwords.⁴¹ Taiwanese have long complained

that China targets the island for cyber-crime. In 2003, Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation issued a formal letter of complaint to China about its computer network attacks. In July 2005, China rejected an approach by a Taiwanese official under the aegis of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization to seek assistance in preventing Chinese cyber-crime attacks.⁴²

American analyst James Mulvenon contends that China is especially attracted to using IW strategies against Taiwan for two reasons: (1) Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to psychological attacks and attacks against its critical infrastructure, and (2) IW stratagems present the PLA with a low-cost means of preventing US reinforcements to Taiwan, or at least delaying them for a period sufficient to determine the war's outcome.⁴³ During a 1999 political crisis throughout which Taiwan and China were increasing their fighter sorties over the Taiwan Strait, an Internet rumor that China had shot down a Taiwan fighter caused an immediate decline in Taiwan's stock market. Taiwan's efforts to “export” its computer industry to China creates unknown vulnerabilities to the degree that the PLA and Chinese Ministry of State Security intelligence services can blackmail Taiwanese into giving data about Taiwanese software or network vulnerabilities. In addition, Taiwan's electrical power and communications sectors have critical bottlenecks that can be easily attacked by fifth column infiltrators, Special Forces troops, or EMP/radio frequency weapons. The PLA also may consider US forces, especially computer networks critical for logistic support, to be ready targets for CNA. In using CNA against Taiwan and regional US forces, the PLA may also calculate that a relatively low loss of life would diminish the US desire to aid Taiwan and decrease the chances of a wider international backlash.

Taiwan's Information Warfare Efforts

Taiwan has made belated but significant progress in also seeking to apply new information technologies to enable new doctrines and enhance its military capabilities. The Po-Sheng C4ISR program was designed to provide secure digital linkages within, and between discreet Army, Navy, and Air Force units. However, to date Po-Sheng has only been funded to about 40% of its potential coverage of major units.

Washington has long supported Taiwan's independent strategic reconnaissance capabilities. There have been long-standing joint ELINT and signals intelligence (SIGINT) gathering facilities on Taiwan.⁴⁴ In a delay following its approval for sale in 2000, in early 2004, Taiwan and the United States reached formal agreement on the sale of a new Raytheon long-range radar capable of detecting ballistic and cruise missiles. It is based on the AN/FPS-115 *Pave Paws* but degraded from the latter's 5,000km range. In May 20, 2004 Taiwan launched its French Astrium-made and US *Taurus* SLV-launched ROCsSat-2, now called FORMOSat-2. Taiwan switched to Astrium in 1999 after Germany's DASA/DSS was forced by Chinese pressure to end cooperation. This single satellite has a resolution of 2m in panchromatic and 4m in multispectral, making it capable of providing Taiwan with imaging of strategic and tactical utility. However, ROCsSat-2 is due to expire by 2009, and in late 2005 Taipei was reportedly

undecided over whether to invest in a higher resolution electro-optical satellite, or a new radar satellite dubbed ROCSat-6. Washington was apparently willing to sell Taiwan electro-optical satellite with a higher .5m resolution.⁴⁵

Chinese information attack and space warfare capabilities pose a double threat to Taiwan. If the PLA is able to destroy or neutralize a significant portion of the US space surveillance, communication, and navigation satellite network on the eve of hostilities against Taiwan, it might grievously delay or even deter an American military response. American military reliance on satellites is very high and will only grow.⁴⁶ In addition, the PLA low-earth orbit antisatellite systems pose a real threat to Taiwan's and Japan's nascent space surveillance systems.

Missile and Precision Weapon Balance

For terror-political as well as military missions, the PLA targets Taiwan with hundreds of ballistic missiles and has started to deploy less expensive and more accurate Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) against Taiwan. But its missile forces may soon be eclipsed by the advent of thousands of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) that would arm hundreds of tactical fighter and bomber aircraft. Back in early 1999, leaked US intelligence figures indicated that by 2005 the PLA might have 650 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) pointed at Taiwan—what seemed to be an outrageous figure at that time. But in the 2005 issue of its congressionally-mandated China Military Power Report, the Pentagon estimated that number had reached 650 to 730, with a growth potential of 75 to 120 a year. Then in January 2007, Taiwan's Ministry of Defense disclosed this number had reached 880 ballistic missiles.⁴⁷ Should this rate of production be sustained, it is possible to consider 1,300 SRBMs being aimed at Taiwan by 2010. As a force-in-being Beijing hopes that its accumulating missile force will serve as a main military-political tool to intimidate Taiwanese political leaders and populace. But when China strikes, these missiles will be used in large-wave attacks coordinated with cruise missile, electronic warfare, air, and Special Forces strikes. Some of the 600 to 1,000km range DF-15s may have nuclear warheads. Just as important is the PLA's growing number of medium-range ballistic missiles, which will be targeted against Japan, Okinawa, and Guam. These include about 20 to 30 older, liquid fueled 2,800km range DF-3As, and about 50 to 100 newer solid-fueled DF-21A missiles.⁴⁸

LACMs: Since the 1970s the PLA has placed a high priority on developing indigenous LACMs. This effort has been aided by the PLA's success in obtaining advanced cruise missile technology from Russia, Israel, Ukraine, and the United States.⁴⁹ In early July 2005 an Internet-source photo appeared of a new Chinese cruise missile with unmistakable LACM characteristics that was later identified as the 280km range YJ-62 antiship missile, which arms the new LUYANG II/Type 052C destroyer.⁵⁰ However, Asian sources indicate this missile will serve as the basis for a family of Navy and Air Force LACMs, while a second company is developing a LACM for the Second Artillery.⁵¹ In January 2007 Taiwan's Ministry of Defense disclosed that the PLA was targeting Taiwan with 100 new ground launched LACMs.⁵² With their very high accuracy such

cruise missiles allow strategic targets to be destroyed with nonnuclear warheads. Asian sources also note that new LACMs will first be deployed by the Second Artillery, with a Brigade forming as early as 2006.⁵³ An earlier LACM, the 200km range optically guided YJ-63, arms some H-6 bombers.

PGMs: While largely carried by PLA Air Force and Naval Air Force (PLAAF and PLAN) aircraft, it is appropriate to mention the PLA's development of precision guided munitions in this section as they may come to eclipse missiles in terms of cost efficiency and accuracy.⁵⁴ The PLA's already mentioned investment in space surveillance and navigation satellites makes possible its new investment in PGMs. At the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, the PLA revealed that two companies, the China Aerospace Industries Corporation (CASIC) and Louyang, under the AVIC-1 consortium, had developed aircraft-carrier navigation satellite-guided bombs. Louyang's LS-6 has apparently been in testing since 2003,⁵⁵ while CASIC's FT-2 was shown being carried by a JH-7 fighter-bomber. It is likely that China will develop smaller PGMs with dual guidance systems to enable destruction of moving targets. Navsat-guided PGMs have the advantage over laser-guided PGMs—which Louyang is also building—in that they can be used during bad weather. They are also much cheaper to produce than ballistic and cruise missiles, and can be sized to reduce collateral damage, an important political consideration. In addition, such PGMs also give new life to older aircraft like the obsolescent Xian H-6 bomber, which can now potentially carry scores of new PGMs and perform “aerial artillery” missions to support ground troops.

Taiwan's Missiles

Taiwan purchased about 200 Patriot PAC-2 missile-intercepting missiles during the 1990s, but the Pan-Blue majority in the Legislature Yuan has prevented funding for more advanced PAC-3 missiles through the end of 2006. In addition, at the end of 2006 it was not clear that the KMT would support upgrade for existing PAC-2 missiles.⁵⁶ Although Taiwan also has its indigenous Tien Kung antimissile program, these will not be as capable as the PAC-3.

Growth in the PLA's missile forces have had the effect of forcing Taiwanese leaders in the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue to conclude that they cannot mount an effective defense, so the only logical security alternative is to attempt to deter the PLA threat by obtaining “offensive” missiles of their own. In early 2003, then ROC Deputy Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Fu Wei-ku told a reporter that defense against a ballistic missile cost nine times the cost of the offensive missile.⁵⁷

There does appear to be bipartisan support in Taiwan for a land-attack cruise missile program called Hsiung Feng-IIE.⁵⁸ This LACM was tested over the summer of 2005, and while it reportedly requires additional development, it may also be slated for a production run of 500.⁵⁹ Chinese sources indicate there is an air-launched Hsiung Feng-IID for use from F-CK-1 fighters.⁶⁰ In addition, Taiwan's reported development of a long-range supersonic antiship missile, the Hsiung Feng-III, is just as significant; Such missiles are necessary moves for Taiwan. Although acquisition of a LACM force, presumably with nonnuclear

warheads, does not approach the future numbers of PLA missiles aimed at Taiwan, it does offer deterrent aspects that could prove decisive. Should Taiwan also acquire the means to provide accurate targeting for these LACMs and anti-ship missiles, it could hold hostage PLA airborne and amphibious units, thereby threatening the PLA's larger strategy. Assuming that some kind of occupation is absolutely necessary for the PLA to fully defeat Taiwan, it may not try to attack Taiwan for many more years until it can counter Taiwan's missiles.

Air Forces Balance

By 2010 the PLA's air forces may be able to deploy integrated strike packages of multirole fighters with modern support elements like airborne radar, electronic warfare, and aerial refueling platforms that are able to undertake autonomous or joint force offensive missions. These will be able to undertake all-weather air superiority missions and could shoulder the majority of the PLA's long-range precision-strike missions. By the end of this decade this force could reach a point of qualitative and quantitative air-superiority over the Taiwan Strait and pose a real threat to one or more US carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific or to US and Japanese air forces on Okinawa. In 2005 the Pentagon estimates that 700 PLA aircraft could conduct operations against Taiwan without refueling.⁶¹ By 2010 this number could include 200 or more all-weather Russian and Chinese-designed fighter-bombers capable of precision-strikes against Taiwan or long-range strikes against US naval forces. These could be backed by about 200 or more Russian and Chinese-made fourth generation fighters plus hundreds more third and second generation Chinese-made fighters.

By 2006 the PLA may have about 250 Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters and Su-30MKK/MKK2 fighter-bombers. Su-27s are being upgraded to be able to fire modern medium-range self-guided R-77 air-to-air missiles (AAMs). In addition, PLA is now pressing ahead with plans to build a new version the Shenyang J-11/Su-27 that features increasing domestic content like radar, weapons, and new WS-10A turbofan engines. About 76 Su-30MKK fighter-bombers are in the PLA Air Force and 24 Su-30MKK2s are in the PLA Naval Air Force in 2006. Additional PLANAF Su-30MKK2 orders were expected⁶² but did not materialize. Instead, the PLANAF may order 50 to 100 Su-33s for future aircraft carriers. These fighter-bombers are armed with a range of Russian precision guided munitions (PGMs) like the 3,300lb KAB-1500. When it is available in 2006, China is also expected to buy the 288km range Kh-59MK antiship missile for the Su-30MKK2.⁶³

Both the PLA Air Force and Navy are buying the Xian JH-7A fighter-bomber, which features modern radar, precision weapons, and supersonic antiship missiles, and is powered by a modified version of the British Rolls Royce Spey turbofan engine.⁶⁴ Recent reports note China's desire to double engine-output, which may enable up to 30 JH-7As to be built a year.⁶⁵ At the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow a very simple brochure illustrating the history of AVIC-1 consortium's aircraft design history revealed what may be a previously unknown Xian program to develop a stealthy fighter-bomber. Little is known about this fighter-bomber, which was likely developed during the 1990s.

China's first domestic fourth generation fighter, the Chengdu J-10, is now in production, with 150 to 350 to be powered by the Russian AL-31FN turbofan before being supplanted by the indigenous WS-10A turbofan engine.⁶⁶ Reports indicate that Chengdu is also developing an advanced version of the J-10 with thrust-vectoring engine for enhanced maneuverability.⁶⁷ The J-10 will start its career armed with self-guided Louyang PL-12 medium-range AAM and new Chinese laser and navsat-guided PGMs. China may also be interested in the 300km range Russian Novator KS-172 AAM, which is intended to counter AWACS and other critical support aircraft.⁶⁸

Both Shenyang and Chengdu are working on advanced fifth generation fighter designs that could enter service by the middle of the next decade. Both designs stress very high maneuverability, perhaps reflecting an operational assumption that long-range support aircraft may not survive, meaning aircraft combat capabilities remain paramount. The Shenyang design was once estimated by the US Office of Naval Intelligence to resemble the Boeing F-15 fighter. But at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow, Shenyang's 601 Design Institute displayed a model with unique stealthy flat fuselage and forward swept wing. This design likely assumes heavy usage of composite materials, active electronically scanned radar (AESA), and internal weapons carriage. Chengdu's design is less stealthy but optimized for high maneuverability. But with highly likely Russian design assistance, Chengdu may also be considering novel Russian "plasma stealth" technology for this fighter. Chengdu is also studying whether to build a competitor to the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which would indicate a stealthy but low-cost and capable fighter design.⁶⁹ The probable Russian design help for Chengdu's large fifth generation design augurs well for Russian participation in its smaller "F-35" design.⁷⁰

Another area of potential PLAAF growth is unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). At the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow the Shenyang Aircraft company unveiled a concept model of its "Dark Sword" stealthy supersonic UCAV, for which it offered no details except to note it was designed for air-to-air missions. Although the United States has invested heavily in UCAVs over the past decade, it has found them very difficult to develop; computer, control, and radar technologies may not be mature enough to support counterair missions. However they are envisioned for dangerous ground attack missions such as eliminating SAMs. Though it is not known whether China is meeting success where the United States has encountered difficulties, its commitment to this new next-generation technology indicates that the United States and Europe will not dominate this new military technology. In the meantime, Taiwanese and US sources remain concerned about the PLA's conversion of about 200 older J-6 fighters into unmanned aircraft. These could serve as missiles, relatively simple UCAVs, or they could be used as decoys to force Taiwan to waste valuable anti-aircraft missiles.

Bombers are also experiencing a revival in the PLA. The Xian Aircraft Co. has resumed production of the Soviet-era H-6 (Tupolev Tu-16), with these new aircraft armed with new cruise missiles.⁷¹ New H-6 bombers may also be modified to carry new navigation satellite-guided PGMs, giving a tactical role to these strategic bombers, much as the United States had done for the Boeing B-52 and

Northrop Grumman B-2. However, China may be designing a new advanced long-range bomber, as it considers recent Russian offers to sell Tupolev Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE supersonic bombers and Tupolev Tu-95/142 BEAR long-range subsonic bombers.⁷² Both Russian bombers were high profile participants in the Peace Mission 2005 exercises, and the Tu-22M3 was being marketed at the 2004 Zhuhai Airshow.

The PLA is also developing new families of critical support aircraft. China reacted to the US affront in June 2000 of stopping Israel's sale of its advanced Phalcon active phased-array airborne radar by starting a crash program to build its own active phased-array airborne radar.⁷³ Asian sources indicate the PLAAF may build up to four A-50 like AWACS and note that its radar signals are consistent with the Israeli Phalcon, meaning they have perfected a large AESA radar.⁷⁴ These have been joined by a new version of China's Shaanxi Y-8 transport outfitted with linear shape active phased-array radar, a prototype of which has been in testing since 2001. Large AESA arrays are important as they can be developed into weapons capable of damaging enemy electronics with powerful microwave spikes. In addition, Shaanxi has developed two other Y-8 support aircraft. One features large "cheek" arrays, very likely AESA, on the fuselage; their mission is not known but speculation ranges from electronic jamming to ground-mapping radar. A second Y-8 variant may be a new airborne command and control aircraft, giving campaign commanders a secure airborne location.

The PLA has already converted a small number of H-6 bombers to serve as aerial refueling tankers for J-8D fighters used by the PLAAF and PLANAF. When the PLAAF takes delivery of its six Russian Ilyushin Il-78 aerial tankers it will allow greater persistence for Su-30s over Taiwan and the South China Sea, or allow a small number to strike as far as Guam.

The PLA is also purchasing large numbers of advanced Russian S-300 SAMs.⁷⁵ These advanced SAMs present a formidable obstacle to Taiwan and US air forces that may seek to interdict PLA air and naval forces attacking Taiwan. In August 2004 the PLA was reported close to buying 8 new batteries of S-300PMU-2 (SA-20) missiles, on top of 12 batteries of S-300PMU and S-300PMU-1 missiles.⁷⁶ Russian reports from October 2006 indicate that China may purchase 8 more batteries.⁷⁷ A battery may contain 38 to 48 missiles, meaning the PLA is on its way to acquiring over 1,000 of this deadly SAM family. The 200km range of the S-300PMU-2's 48N6/2 missile enables coverage of most of the Taiwan Strait, and should they be based on Peng Hu Island, most of Taiwan as well. This missile may also be able to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000km.⁷⁸ As the PLA is a reported investor in Russia's latest 400km range S-400 SAM, it can be expected to be an early customer for this highly advanced SAM capable of targeting cruise missiles.⁷⁹ In addition, the PLA is developing its own new advanced SAMs like the FT-2000 family.

Taiwan's Diminishing Air Defenses

At the end of 2006, the Taiwan Air Force had 381 third to fourth generation fighters: 57 Dassault Mirage 2000-5E/-5D1; 146 F-16A/B; 128 Aerospace

Industries Development Co. (AIDC) F-CK-1A/B fighters, Indigenous Developed Fighters (IDF); and about 50 Northrop F-5E/F fighters. All except the F-5s carry self-guiding medium-range air-to-air missiles: Matra Mica AAMs for the Mirage 2000s; Raytheon AIM-120s for the F-16s; and indigenously developed TC-2 AAMs for the F-CK-1. However, Taiwan's fighters lack a helmet-sighted or helmet-display-sighted air-to-air missile like the US AIM-9X, whereas all PLAAF Sukhoi fighters and some J-7 and J-8 fighters are equipped with helmet-sighted AAMs. Helmet-display-sighted AAMs confer a decisive advantage during short-range combat engagements. Currently, only the F-CK-1s has any potential to carry offensive weapons, whereas the F-16s can carry Harpoon antiship missiles.

Current PLA offensive forces pose a considerable threat to the Taiwan Air Force. Those Taiwanese fighters that survived initial PLA missile, aerial, and Special Forces attacks, would then face a larger number of comparably equipped PLA attack fighters. As they flew further into the Taiwan Strait to attempt to carry the battle to China's side, they would then confront a phalanx of modern S-300 SAMs. A greater vulnerability for the Taiwan Air Force is its 6 E-2T Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, which the fighters will be relying upon for air battle management. This small number of AWACS will be heavily targeted by the PLA, and when eliminated would make Taiwan vulnerable to low-level PLA air strikes. The PLA can also be expected to heavily target Taiwan's fixed radar facilities early in its air campaign. Taiwan is interested in developing larger UAVs for surveillance and targeting missions but has so far only developed, but not deployed, smaller tactical mission UAVs.

Since the mid-1990s delivery of the final of the earlier order of 150 F-16s, Taipei has not attempted any significant new fighter purchases until its mid-2006 attempt to buy 66 F-16C/D fighters that was rebuffed by the Bush administration. In 2006, AIDC promoted the F-CK-1C/D, an upgraded version of their fighter that emerged from a program that started in 2000. Essentially, its engine and radar would be unchanged, but it would be able to carry over 700 kg more fuel and payload, effectively doubling from 2 to 4 the number of TC-2 missiles carried.⁸⁰ This would only constitute a modest increase in capability for an aircraft already outclassed by the PLAAF Su-27/30/J-11 and J-10 fighters. The F-16s are preferred because they would be modern Block 50/52 models with superior radar and the ability to carry a range of defensive and attack weapons—if the United States were to allow their sale. Taipei and Washington have not even started to formally consider Taiwan's ambition to purchase the advanced stealthy fifth generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Due to existing US production commitments, this fighter might not even be available for delivery until the end of the next decade.

Naval Balance

The naval balance is also tilting steadily against Taiwan. This decade the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could purchase and produce up to 40 new conventional and nuclear submarines. These acquisitions will not only stress Taiwan's 4 air defense destroyers and 22 frigates, but they also pose a steadily

greater threat to US and Japanese naval forces that may have to support Taiwan. A PLAN submarine-led blockade force will also have increasing support from new Russian and indigenous destroyers with modern medium- to long-range air defense systems, 10 of which could be in service by 2006–2007. In addition, the PLAN and PLAAF will be able to mass new Su-30MKK, Su-30MKK2, and JH-7A fighter-bombers, plus new H-6 bombers to attack ship and shore-naval targets. Naval engagements could also be supported in the future by new anti-ship ballistic missiles, plus ballistic missiles and new land-attack cruise missiles, which can attack Taiwan's naval facilities. In addition, the PLAN's long-standing stress on mine warfare presents a serious threat to military and civilian shipping around Taiwan. Finally, the increasing likelihood that China will soon start building its first indigenous aircraft carrier in the next decade raises the prospect of the PLA being able to reinforce omnidirectional attacks against Taiwan, and being able to counter US and Japanese forces at greater distances.

Growing Submarine Force

While the Bush administration's 2001 offer to sell Taiwan 8 new conventional submarines has been stalled by Pan-Blue legislative opposition as of late 2006, the PLAN is well on its way toward buying and building about 35 new conventional and nuclear powered submarines from the period of 1995 to 2010. Today most PLAN submarines are of the obsolete and noisy Type 033 (about 20) and Type 035 SSKs (about 20) that are being supplanted. The PLAN has built 13 of the modern Type 039 Song class conventional submarine, which are comparable to the French Agosta. The Type 039 has benefited from some foreign assistance, to include Israeli electronic and design assistance, German diesel engines, and very likely, German design assistance to correct the Israeli assistance. It incorporates modern quieting technology like a seven-blade skewed propeller, anechoic tiling, and is equipped with extensive digital command and sonar processing equipment, and is armed with the 40km rangeYJ-81Q, and perhaps the 120km rangeYJ-82Q antiship missile (table 12.2).

Having purchased four Russian Kilo class submarines in the late 1990s, by mid-2006 the PLAN had taken delivery of all eight Project 636M Kilo submarines ordered in 2002. Known for their quiet and combat-survivable design, the 636M will be armed with the formidable Novator CLUB-S antiship, land-attack, and ASW missile system. There could be follow-on orders for more Kilo submarines. On the contrary, in 2004 the PLAN launched the first of its new Yuan class, which bears a suspicious resemblance to Russia's new Project 677 Lada class SSK. A second Yuan is reportedly under construction.⁸¹ Asian military sources indicate this new Yuan is being built in Shanghai, indicating that two yards may be building this class.⁸² Inasmuch as the 677 incorporates improved crew-reducing automation, better sonar, and in the future, AIP systems, it can be surmised that the Yuan may benefit from all these technologies. This analyst estimates that by 2010 the PLAN could be armed with at least 30 new and far more capable SSKs.

Far less is known about the PLAN's second-generation SSN, known as the Type 093, or Shang class by its US Navy designator. According to Asian sources

Table 12.2 PLAN Submarine Growth Estimates

	2000	2005	2010
Type 094 JIN SSBN	0	1	3–4
Type 092 XIA SSBN	1	1	1
GOLF SSB	1	1	1
Type 093 SHANG SSN	0	2	@5
Type 091 HAN SSN	5	4	3
(Type 041 ?) YUAN SSK	0	2	@7
Type 039/039A SONG SSK	2	12–14	@13
Type 035 MING SSK	19	17	@17
Type 033 ROMEO SSK	@35	@20	0
Project 887 KILO SSK	2	2	2
Project 636 KILO SSK	2	2	2
Project 636M KILO SSK	0	@5	8
Totals	@68	@74	@62

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships*; International Institute for Strategic Studies; www.sinodefense.com; press reports; author interview data. Numbers count launched, not commissioned submarines. Kilo numbers for ships in China. SONG projection assumes 2–3 annual production.

two were launched by late 2003, with a third being built at that time. Some sources estimate five will be built, but inasmuch as the PLAN is believed to be building a second nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island, it stands to reason that more Type 093s, or a successor class, could be built. US sources have noted the Type 093 will benefit from extensive Russian assistance, especially in its nuclear power plant.⁸³ Although US sources note it will approximate the capability of the Soviet/Russian Victor III SSN,⁸⁴ it could also be possible that the Type 093 may benefit from better SSN technologies Russia is developing for its new fourth generation Project 885 Severdovinsk class SSN. This is suggested by Russia's increasing propensity to sell China its most advanced military technologies, and the fact that Project 885 production has seen a recent revival, raising the possibility that this was made possible by Chinese funding. Should the 093's performance exceed that of the Victor III it would present a new and serious challenge to the ability of new US SSNs to contain the PLAN.

Naval Air Defense

At the beginning of this decade Chinese destroyers and frigates only had limited short-range air defense, in the form of naval SAMs like the 10km range HQ-61 or 13km range HHQ-7 derived from the French Crotale SAM. By 2006 the PLAN could have 10 new destroyers that could bring about 480 medium to long-range SAMs to the battle. For the first time, these could provide credible air defenses for naval blockade forces deployed against Taiwan. China has purchased two Project 956 Sovremenniy DDG armed with the formidable supersonic Moskit ramjet-powered, supersonic antiship missile, 48x SHTIL (25–32km range SA-N-7 or 60km range SA-N-12) SAMs and Kamov Ka-28 ASW targeting

helicopters. By mid-2006 Russia delivered two additional Project 956EM with better 200+km range Moskit missiles and new Kashtan combined gun/missile close-in defenses.

In 2003 the PLAN produced two new types of DDGs that were armed with Russian or foreign influenced weapons. Two Type 052B/Luyang I DDG are armed with the 48x SA-N-12 SHTIL SAM and Russian/Ukrainian designed radar systems. Its helicopter hanger can also accommodate the Ka-28. Two Type 052C/Luyang II is equipped with a new vertical-launched SAM and "AEGIS" configuration phased-array radar that is likely derived from systems developed by the Ukrainian Kvant company.⁸⁵ The SAMs on this ship are a new type, not yet revealed, but could be based on the SA-N-7 or the FT-2000/HQ-9 family. In addition, the Dalian shipyard has completed two new Type 051C DDGs based that are slightly larger versions of the Luhai design, but outfitted with the Russian 120km long-range RIF SAM, based on the S-300 SAM. These ten DDGs, when they enter service, will significantly expand anti-air coverage for PLAN submarines and their ability to deploy Ka-28s adds a new ASW dimension to PLA naval capabilities. It can be expected that the PLAN will decide that at least one of its three new indigenous DDGs is deserving of follow-on production.

After a two-year hiatus, in 2006 the PLAN resumed construction of the new stealthy Type 054 JIANKAI frigate, this time to be armed with 32x of a new vertical-launched version of the 9M317ME SHTIL SAM, which has a Mach 4 speed and a range of about 60km. It is also outfitted with the Ukrainian Mineral E active/passive targeting radar and the Russian Fregat E search radar, and is expected to carry the Ka-28 ASW helicopter. This new version, called the Type 054A, will be built in multiple shipyards to enable a rapid buildup. These new ships are expected to replace older PLAN frigates, but will also offer a great increase in capability.

Antiship Missiles

The PLAN is now fielding new antiship missiles (ASMs) with greater range and sophistication than its 40km range YJ-81 (C-801) ASMs. China is now marketing its 280km range YJ-62 (C-602) antiship missile,⁸⁶ which may also form the basis for a longer-range Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) family for the PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF). In PLAN service this missile's range is likely greater than 300km. This missile most likely arms the Luyang 2/Type 052C DDG and may arm new versions of the Xian H-6 and JH-7A bombers. Although the 40km range YJ-81Q submarine-launched antiship missile is well-known, there may also be a submarine-launched version of the 120km range YJ-82. The PLAN may also be fielding a longer-range 180km range version of the YJ-82 called the YJ-82A.⁸⁷ An air-launched version would have slightly longer range. This missile may also be the reported but not confirmed YJ-83 (C-803). Of particular concern are the PLAN's new 240km range Russian Raduga 3M-80MBE Moskit on its Sovremenniy 956EM destroyers and the 220km range Novator 3M-54 CLUB-S supersonic antiship missiles that will arm the 8 Project 636M Kilo submarines now being delivered to China. Both missiles are capable of high-speed

“jinxing” maneuvers, which greatly complicate ship defenses. Novator will start offering an air-launched version of its 3M-54 antiship missile in 2007.⁸⁸

Taiwan's Naval Vulnerabilities

These new PLAN antiship missiles out-range US and Taiwanese ASMs and may be very difficult to defeat with existing ship defense systems. The most widely used antiship missile is the 130km range US Harpoon, which US, Japanese, and Taiwanese ships, Japanese and Taiwan submarines, and US and Taiwan aircraft. Reportedly, US SSNs no longer carry the submarine-launched Tomahawk or Harpoon antiship missile.⁸⁹ Both Japanese and US naval Close In Weapon Systems (CIWS), centered on the 20mm gatling gun phalanx system, can deal with subsonic missiles but may not be capable of defeating the PLAN's newer Russian maneuverable supersonic missiles. In contrast, three new PLAN DDGs, the Luyang I/II and the Type 051C, are armed with the 30mm gatling gun Type 730 CIWS, which combines optical and radar guidance with a larger gun for greater missile kill assurance.

One hopeful development for Taiwan is its Hsiung-Feng 3, a ramjet-powered, Mach 2–2.5 supersonic antiship missile.⁹⁰ The HF-3's range is variously reported as 300km, 180km, or 120km for a shortened version intended to arm the new Kuang Hua-VI stealthy fast-attack craft.⁹¹ The HF-3 entered production in 2006 and has been deployed on some of Taiwan's Perry class frigates. If the HF-3 is also capable of sharp evasive maneuvers, and Taiwan is able to provide these missiles sufficient targeting (data), then it may provide Taiwan with an effective naval deterrent provided it is produced in sufficient numbers. Though this missile may be too large to be carried by Taiwan's F-16 or Mirage-2000 fighters, its range, when launched from mobile shore or ship batteries, is sufficient to attack PLAN amphibious units in the coastal redoubts along the Fujian Province coast—especially if launched from the mid-Strait Peng Hu Islands. This missile can also serve to deter a close-in PLAN blockade, which would force the PLAN to carry out its blockade operations further from Taiwan's coastline, increasing their vulnerability to US naval-air and submarine forces. For this reason, one would expect that the PLA would place a high priority on targeting HF-3s with its missile, precision air and Special Forces. Taiwan's *LaFayette*, Perry and Knox class frigates are armed with the 80km range domestic Hsiung Feng-2 antiship missile, derived from the Israeli Gabriel SSM.

In 2006 Taiwan took delivery of the last two of four US Kidd class air defense destroyers. Though launched in the late 1970s, it considerably redresses the Taiwan Navy's long-standing lack of dedicated air defense ships. Although Taiwan has in the past requested the more advanced AEGIS phased array radar-equipped destroyer, that is for now out of Taipei's financial reach. Part of Taiwan's reason for seeking AEGIS equipped ships has been their ability to be upgraded for missile defense missions, which Taiwan requires even more given the PLA's development of antiship ballistic missiles.

Taiwan's lack of submarines, beyond the two Walrus class subs purchased from the Netherlands in the 1970s, remains another key weakness in its naval defenses.

Due to legislative opposition from the Pan-Blue, the Taiwan Navy has lacked funds to begin the process of engaging the US Navy in selecting conventional submarine designs and building a conventional submarine design, a process that may take a decade to complete. Washington's 2001 offer of eight submarines, to be based on either a purchased European design, or on a highly modified version of the 1950s vintage US Barbel class, has not been strongly supported by the US Navy, which fears that building less expensive submarines in US yards may diminish domestic American political support for its all-nuclear submarine fleet. However, should Taiwan obtain these new submarines it would be able to maintain a constant patrol of three submarines, which would provide a powerful deterrent to growing PLA amphibious invasion forces.

Invasion and Counterinvasion Balance

The PLA has taken to heart the hard-learned US lesson of the Persian Gulf and the Balkans: airpower can only win wars or compel adversaries if backed by the use of or the credible threat of ground invasion. To make military suasion credible against Taiwan, Korea, India, or potential Central Asian targets, the PLA has in recent years been strengthening its Airborne, Amphibious, and Special Forces strike capabilities. These forces alone could comprise over 80,000 troops. All of these specialized troops have become increasingly mechanized in the past decade. In addition, the PLA is making regular Army units more mobile and lethal by developing new families of wheeled armor, APC, air support, and logistic support vehicles to enable the creation of Light Mechanized units. These are more easily transported by new PLA Navy transport ships, and in the future, will be made even more mobile by new large transport aircraft.

In 2006 the Pentagon noted that the PLA maintains 400,000 troops in the three Military Regions nearest to Taiwan, a 25,000 increase over 2005.⁹² This available force would consist of 8 group armies, 2 Marine brigades, 3 Airborne troop divisions, up to 2,700 tanks and 3,200 artillery pieces.⁹³ By early in the next decade, this analyst concludes the PLA may be able to lift over 1,000 tanks to Taiwan with just formal amphibious lift available to the PLA, not counting the hundreds of other "civilian" ships that would be pressed into service. Taiwan only has 1,000 tanks to defend its whole island, a number that may be significantly degraded by air and missile strikes. Once derided by some Western experts as the "million-man swim," early in the next decade, PLA "invasion" forces may be able to capture ports and airfields on Taiwan, leading to the capture of a large city, like Taipei, forcing a rapid surrender.

There are now new shipbuilding and aircraft acquisition programs to address PLA sealift and airlift deficiencies. In 2006 the PLA started building a new 15,000 to 20,000 ton LDH class amphibious ships, called the Type 071, that will use new hovercraft tank and troop conveyers similar to the US LCAC, and large helicopters, allowing assaults from greater distance and against more difficult shore terrain. This ship could potentially carry about 50 armored vehicles and up to 800 troops. Asian sources suggest that the PLA may build up to six Type 071 ships. The PLA may also purchase six to eight Russian Zubr large hovercraft

that can carry three main battle tanks or up to 10 APCs and 230 troops.⁹⁴ The PLA Navy is now building 2 new types of LSM medium tank and troop landing ships, a total of about 12 since 2002, added to 20 or so ships of the same class. These ships can carry an average of about 10 tanks and 250 troops. In addition, the PLA has access to 200–300 smaller specialized landing ships and to a much larger number of civilian fast ferries and large roll on-roll off (RO-RO) cargo ships that can use captured ports. For example, China can mobilize over 150 “civilian” fast ferries that could carry 100 to 500 troops each.⁹⁵ Taiwan’s MND estimates that the PLA may be able to mobilize 800 civilian merchant ships, enough to transport 5 to 7 infantry divisions (table 12.3).⁹⁶

To fully exploit their growing lift capacity the PLA is also introducing more specialized combat equipment into its Marine and Army amphibious units. The goal is to make these forces more powerful and mechanized in order to secure objectives and contribute to follow-on attacks. Army and Marine forces may soon receive a family of fast-moving amphibious assault vehicles apparently based on the new ZBD-97 infantry fighting vehicles. So far, Internet imagery has shown three version of this vehicle armed with a 105mm cannon, a 23mm cannon, and a machine-gun armed troop carrying version. This vehicle uses powerful pump jets and planning surfaces to achieve high speed similar to the new US Marine’s Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) fast amphibious APC. This family of vehicles is apparently designed for the new Type 071 class LPD, to enable assault operations to begin far out of the range of shore-based artillery.

Since the late 1990s Marine and Army amphibious units have received about 600 of the new Type-63A amphibious tank, armed with a 105mm gun that fires new 5km range laser-guided missiles based on the Russian BASTION, which

Table 12.3 Estimated PLA Formal Amphibious Lift against Taiwan in 2010–2012

<i>Ship Type</i>	<i>Displacement (tons)</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Tanks</i>	<i>Troops</i>
Type 071 LPD	14,000–15,000	6 planned	50	800
Type 072 Yukun LST	4,170	7	10	250
Type 072 IV Yuting 1 LST	4,800	10	10	250
Yuting 2 LST	4,800	10	10	250
Yunshu LSM	1,800	10	6	250
Type 073 Yudeng LSM	2,000	11	6	150
Yubei LCU	NA	10	10	150
Type 079 Yuliang LSM	1,100	32	3	150
Type 074 Yuhai LSM	799	13	2	250
Type 271 LCU	800	25	3	200
Type 068/069 Yuchin LCM	85	20	NA	150
Zubr Hovercraft	550	6–8 planned	3	10 APC + 230 troop
Estimated Totals		131	1,011	33,250

Sources: *Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007*; www.sinodefense.com; author estimates.

Note: Data for Type 071 estimated; totals represent estimated maximum for either main battle tanks or troops, not a combined estimate. Tank numbers much higher if light tanks or APCs used.

outranges the 105mm guns on Taiwan's tanks. Both have also received the new Type-63C armored personnel carrier (APC) and Army units are receiving a new family derived from the larger Type-89 family. Though only capable of slower speeds, nonetheless, these new tanks and APCs can be launched from miles offshore to reduce ship vulnerability. Armor units will have better logistic support now that the PLA has devised new rolled mesh surfaces to lay on sand or coral beaches to better allow LSTs to land trucks. The development of such highly specialized amphibious assault equipment demonstrates how serious the PLA takes this mission.

In addition, the PLA Army is investing in the creation of new Light Mechanized units that use new wheeled armored vehicles. The PLA has long made some use of wheeled armored personnel carriers for infantry and antitank missile carriage. In 2004 the PLA revealed a new wheeled light tank based on the WZ551 APC. Its export name is the *Assaulter*, and it is armed with a 105mm gun that fires a coproduced version of the gun-launched Bastion missile.⁹⁷ In 2006 a second family of 8x wheeled armored vehicles was revealed in tank, infantry fighting vehicle and 122mm gun artillery versions. In 2004 the PLA revealed its Yitian, a combination of 25mm cannon and missile armed wheeled APC able to provide mobile air defense for Light Mechanized units. During the PM 05 exercise, the PLA amphibious beach assault featured a second wave of "Army" units that used wheeled APCs, an indication that new Light Mechanized units may become an important new contribution to an amphibious assault on Taiwan. However, they could also be transported by Il-76 cargo aircraft. Such light units are ideally suited to exploit Taiwan's extensive network of roads.

In addition, it should be expected that the PLA would put its new heavy tanks on Taiwan as soon as it was able. The new Type-99 (or T-98G, ZTZ-99) is an upgrade of the T-98 first seen in 1999. The upgrade is primarily in the form of new modular turret armor and likely improved electronic systems. But its 125mm gun fires high explosive and armor piecing rounds, in addition to a coproduced version of a 6km range Russian Reflex gun-launched missile. The Type-99 may be in production in at least two factories. PLA armored units have already taken delivery of over 1,400 less expensive T-96 that also uses the same 125mm gun. The T-96G apparently entered production in 2006 with turret armor upgrades similar to that of the T-99. Currently, the Type-99's 125mm gun is larger than the 120mm gun on the US M-1A2 Abrams, and the Chinese tank uses removal and upgradable turret armor "cheeks" to respond to new threats. The US Army is now developing a gun-launched missile for the Abrams, decades after the Russians have done so.

PLA Airborne Capabilities

PLA airlift now comprises about 20 Russian Il-76 heavy jet transports that can carry 120 paratroops, or three KLC-2000 light tanks, or a 47 ton payload and about 50 Y-8 transports which can carry 90 paratroops or about 20 tons of cargo. An agreement in September 2005 to buy 30 more Il-76 transports represents a 150% increase. But with the help of the Ukraine's Antonov, the PLA may build a

new turboprop powered version of the Antonov An-70 transport able to lift 50 to 60 tons of cargo.⁹⁸ This is about the same capacity as the Boeing C-17 transport. The latest 2006 to 2010 Five Year Plan devotes special funds to developing large transport aircraft. Antonov is also helping Shaanxi perfect its new Y-9 transport, a radical upgrade of the Y-8, copied from the Antonov An-12. The Y-9 is due to fly in 2007, but Shaanxi has already started producing modified Y-8s with Y-9 technology to create new electronic support aircraft. There have also been discussions with the Ukraine about acquiring or even coproducing its very large Antonov An-124 that can carry over 150 tons. However, once airfields are captured and secured the PLA can mobilize over 500 “civilian” Boeing and Airbus airliners to ferry soldiers and material. There is increasing coverage on Chinese television of PLA exercises that test the reserve transport mobilization of civilian airliners.

The PLA is also accelerating its acquisition of foreign and domestic helicopters for transport and attack missions. The PLA Army now operates about 220 of the Russian Mil Mi-17 transport helicopter family and may be buying about 20 a year. These can easily carry 20 fully equipped soldiers across the Taiwan Strait. There are suggestions in the Chinese defense media of PLA interest in the Mi-26, currently the world’s largest transport helicopter, which can carry 20 tons of cargo or 80 fully equipped soldiers. China is also working with Eurocopter to develop a new six-ton class transport helicopter that is due to be produced in China and France.⁹⁹ Internet source imagery indicates that the long-awaited WZ-10 attack helicopter shows a resemblance to the Italian August A-129 attack helicopter.¹⁰⁰ The WZ-10 is expected to be armed with modern low-light and automatic targeting systems, new guided antitank missiles, plus a range of unguided munitions and a 30mm gun, making it a world-class helicopter gunship. A new version of the HAIG WZ-9 attack helicopter, called the WZ-9G, is now entering PLA Army Aviation units. Also, an attack/scout version of the Z-11 helicopter has been tested and is likely now in production.¹⁰¹

The 15th Airborne Army has about three divisions of 35,000 troops¹⁰² and there is some concern that the PLA is building a second airborne army. There is now a major effort underway to buildup airborne units into mechanized formations similar to those of the Russian airborne forces.¹⁰³ Since 2004 PLA airborne units have started to receive a new family of 10-ton air-mobile armor vehicles after the failure of attempts to manufacture the Russian BMD vehicle. With the initial designation ZLC-2000, they will come in 30mm cannon armed infantry fighting vehicle, HJ-8 antitank missile vehicle, and command vehicle versions.¹⁰⁴ Airborne units are also receiving new Italian-designed IVECO light trucks, some of which are armed with HJ-9 antitank missiles and that give airborne troops added mobility.

PLA Special Forces can also be expected to play a key role in a Taiwan invasion, from the assassination of key civilian and military figures and key personnel like pilots, to general sabotage and preparatory attacks for airborne and amphibious assaults. The PLA has invested heavily in expanding the size, training, and specialized equipment for Special Forces. For example, the PLA is experimenting with a “Mechanized” Special Forces unit in the Chengdu Military Region in

southwest China. This unit features new jeeps armed with automatic 120mm mortars or with twin 25mm anti-aircraft guns, plus new light-weight all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), all of which are designed to be transported by helicopters. Such a unit might be used to secure critical areas of an airfield or a port that would open the way for heavier airborne or amphibious forces.

Taiwan's Counterinvasion Effort

If the Taiwan Air Force and the Taiwan Navy cannot prevent the PLA from occupying invasion points, then Taiwan's defense will rest on its 130,000 strong Army and Marine forces, which would be armed with up to 1,800 tanks, 3,200 artillery pieces, and 101 attack-capable helicopters.¹⁰⁵ To its credit, Taiwan's investment in the Po-Sheng C4ISR system, and its development of joint doctrines and operations, increases the chances that the Taiwan Army would be able to organize a joint forces response—provided its communication and force concentrations would sufficiently withstand intensive PLA missile and airstrikes. Identifying and mobilizing against initial PLA air or beachheads would be the critical battle for Taiwan—if the PLA can ensure the delivery of heavy follow-on ground forces—then Taiwan's prospects for holding out are diminished.

But even if Taiwanese ground forces were to survive to confront initial PLA invasion forces, it is not certain that the battle would be easy. The PLA would likely count on heavy electronic attacks against both civil and military electronic infrastructure in Taiwan, and against US communication assets in East Asia, to paralyze decision making in both Taipei and Washington. Furthermore, even lighter amphibious armor that would support the first major wave of invasion forces would have advantages over Taiwan's T-60 and T-48 main battle tanks, which are armed with 105mm guns. PLA T-63A amphibious tanks can out-range Taiwan tank guns with their 5km range gun-launched antitank missiles.

Taiwan's Army has received the last priority for modernization compared to the other arms of the military over the past decade, but not for want of trying. Earlier this decade it tried to obtain a small number of US M-1 Abrams main battle tanks. Although some in Washington criticized this initiative as reflecting outmoded doctrine, the PLA's investment in invasion force does give urgency to such a purchase. Even a small number of the modern 120mm gun armed Abrams might have a deterrent effect against the PLA. However, since 2004, little has been heard of this plan as it may have fallen to budget restraints. Another victim of insufficient budgets has been the Taiwan Army's desire to purchase a new heavy attack helicopter, prompting a competition between Boeing AH-64 Apache and the upgraded Bell AH-1Z Super Cobra. Both helicopters offer greater weapon payloads than Taiwan's AH-1W Cobras and the AH-64 can be equipped with a microwave radar that would confer an all-weather and counternaval capability. Taiwan has developed an indigenous large 8x8 wheeled armored fighting vehicle called the CM 32 Cloud Leopard. Despite developmental difficulties, it appears that 500 will be funded between 2007 and 2017. The CM 32 would give added speed to Taiwan Army reaction capabilities, which is sorely needed.

Preventing American Military Support for Taiwan

Since the Clinton administration's move to deploy two US Navy carrier battle groups near Taiwan during the March 1996 PLA exercises intended to intimidate Taiwanese from voting for then presidential candidate Lee Teng Hui, the PLA has worked to steadily acquire the means to prevent future US military support for Taiwan. It is the certainty of the US commitment to defend Taiwan that girds the islands leaders to behave like a de facto independent country, and inspire Taiwanese that they can have a future free from Chinese political control. It has thus been the PLA's goal to be able to convince a future US leader that Americans would have to endure an awful burden to defend Taiwan. Part of this strategy has been to occasionally threaten to use nuclear weapons against the United States if it aids Taiwan, while the PLA modernizes its nuclear missile forces to make such threats credible. Another element of PLA strategy has been to gather submarine, aircraft, missile, and counterspace forces to attack US aircraft carrier groups that come within threatening range of Taiwan. A third element has been to begin developing power-projection forces that could potentially challenge more US interests, which may make Washington more willing to allow it a sphere of influence in East Asia.

Nuclear Blackmail

At the end of 2006, China provided its most succinct statement of nuclear doctrine in its 2006 National Defense White Paper. It states that China's

fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances... China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs... China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission. China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear forces. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.¹⁰⁶

Although China has repeatedly affirmed a “no first use” policy regarding its nuclear weapons arsenal, there is good reason to believe that it seeks to promote an ambiguous stance about its nuclear doctrine in order to use a “small” nuclear force to deter US intervention should China attack Taiwan. A desire to sustain this ambiguity is likely the main reason behind General Zhu Chenghu's response to *Asian Wall Street Journal* Editor Danny Gitting's July 2005 question about “possible Chinese tactics in the event of a conventional war over Taiwan.” General Zhu stated: “If the Americans interfere into the conflict, if the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition into the target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.” Zhu went on to say this could lead to the destruction of “hundreds of, or two hundreds” of American cities.¹⁰⁷ After these remarks were published on July 18, 2005 the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a July 21, 2005 statement affirming of its “no

first use” policy regarding nuclear weapons. As China does not provide a full description of its nuclear doctrine, Zhu’s statement can be taken as a strong indication that it contains elements that stress defensive “nuclear deterrence,” but may also envision the use of nuclear threats for blackmail and coercion.

To maintain its use for a broad range of deterrent or coercive missions, the PLA is building up its nuclear forces in ways that will enable it to defeat current and future US National Missile Defenses. By 2006 China was credited with having completed deployment of 20 silo-based 8,640+km range liquid fueled DF-5 Mod 2 (CSS-4) ICBMs, which replaced the older Mod 1 version. Currently, China is either deploying or close to deploying at least three new solid-fuel nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles: two land-based ICBMs, and one new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). In 2004 the Pentagon stated that ICBM numbers could reach 30 by 2005 and 60 by 2010. This seems to assume the deployment of one unit each of similar size for the 7,250km range solid-fuel and mobile DF-31, which entered service in 2006, and the 11,270km range DF-31A, expected to enter service in 2007. But this number must soon include new SLBMs, because in July 2004 the PLA launched its first Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which carries 12 JL-2 SLBMs each.¹⁰⁸ If one assumes that the PLA will produce three Type 094 SSBNs by 2010, with 36 SLBMs, then by that year the PLA could have up to 96 nuclear-armed missiles capable of attacking the United States.

China is also working on new technologies to ensure its new missiles can defeat US missile defenses. One such technology would be multiple warheads to saturate missile defenses. The Cox Report noted that if China were to aggressively develop multiple warheads for its missiles it could have 1,000 by 2015.¹⁰⁹ China has tested a multiple warhead version of the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile, meaning it may be technically capable of putting multiple warheads on longer-range ICBMs. In 2002 the Pentagon also suggested the DF-5 Mod 2, about 20 of which would be deployed by 2006, could be armed with multiple warheads.¹¹⁰ This large ICBM could easily carry five or more new-type smaller nuclear warheads developed with the benefit of technology stolen from the United States, though Russian ICBMs of the same size carry 10 warheads.¹¹¹ The road-mobile DF-31 is believed to carry only one warhead, but may employ penetration aids like decoys to complicate interception. The follow-on 12,000km range DF-31A may carry up to three warheads.¹¹² Should the three stages of the JL-2 be of unitary diameter, then there is a good chance it will eventually carry multiple warheads, perhaps as many as three. Conservative estimates previously mentioned could potentially add up a warhead count of 288: 20 DF-5 Mod 2 x 5 warheads + 20 DF-31 x 1 warhead + 20 DF-31A x 3 warheads + 36 JL-2 x 3 warheads by 2010. It is also very possible that these new missiles will use “penetration aids” to include maneuvering warheads, decoys, balloons, and chaff.

Anti Carrier Forces

Since the mid-1990s the PLA has been seeking to assemble requisite space, missile, air, and naval forces to deter or attack US carrier battle groups that might

come to Taiwan's aid. There may even be sentiment in the PLA that by sinking a US carrier, the PLA could succeed in deflating the US national will to contest a Chinese attack against Taiwan. In May 2002, Major General Huang Bin of the Chinese National Defense University told a Hong Kong newspaper:

Missiles, aircraft, and submarines all are means that can be used to attack an aircraft carrier. We have the ability to deal with an aircraft carrier that dares to get into our range of fire. Once we decide to use force against Taiwan, we definitely will consider an intervention by the United States. The United States likes vain glory; if one of its aircraft carrier should be attacked and destroyed, people in the United States would begin to complain and quarrel loudly, and the US president would find the going harder and harder.¹¹³

Although Maj.-Gen. Huang's logic may be flawed, the PLA has made great progress in gathering the very forces he mentions. By 2006 the PLAN had taken delivery of the last of 12 Russian Kilo submarines, 8 of which are armed with the CLUB antiship missile system, and 12–13 Type 039 Song class submarines. A Song-class submarine was reported to have approached within five miles of the USS Kittyhawk in October 2006, undetected until it surfaced.¹¹⁴ The PLA Navy's 24 Su-30MKK2 fighter-bombers, plus the PLAAF's 76 Su-30MKK, and growing numbers of Xian JH-7As can potentially coordinate with submarines to launch volleys of long-range antiship missiles. New PLAN air defense destroyers can also provide some degree of air-cover to allow its submarines to get closer to US ships.

Another developing area of PLA superiority may be in the area of antiship ballistic missiles. In 2004 the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) warned that "... Chinese writing state China intends to develop the capability to attack ships, including carrier strike groups, in the waters around Taiwan using conventional theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) as part of a combined-arms campaign."¹¹⁵ This fear was also echoed in the 2005 Pentagon report on PLA modernization. ONI fears the PLA is developing a maneuverable ballistic missile warhead that also contains a terminal guidance system that apparently may use both active and passive radar.¹¹⁶ According to US and Asian sources, the PLA has tested antiship ballistic missiles in 2005 and 2006. Asian sources note the main missile being developed for this mission is the 2,000+km range DF-21C solid-fuel mobile ballistic missiles. Although the PLA may be capable of building such a missile, its successful deployment would require very advanced guidance and surveillance systems.¹¹⁷ However, today neither the Taiwan, Japanese, or US Navy has the means to defend against antiship ballistic missiles.

Future Power Projection

The forces the PLA is now building with the intention of preparing for a possible conflict over Taiwan are also preparing the PLA to project power at ever greater distances and in various directions. For example, when new Type 093 SSNs are armed with new long-range LACMs, the PLA may acquire its first nonnuclear power-projection platform with global reach. PLA communication,

surveillance, and navigation satellites will make it possible for the PLA to target its LACMs globally, when deployed on its new SSNs. Although the ability to project a few hundred kilograms may seem insignificant, the difference is that it will soon be targeted accurately enough to take out potential political challenges to any littoral regime in Asia or worldwide that Beijing decides to defend.

Another future power-projection tool for the PLA may be aircraft carriers. In mid-2005 the long-standing debate over whether China may build aircraft carriers took new turns toward the affirmative.¹¹⁸ It is growing more and more likely that the PLA is going to modify the ex-Soviet/Ukrainian aircraft carrier *Varyag* for initial missions, to include training, doctrinal development, and propaganda. This carrier has recently emerged from a drydock in Dalian harbor painted in PLA Navy grey and appears to have benefited from significant work on its hull and internal systems.¹¹⁹ Adding to the likelihood that China would build carriers has been its interest in purchasing Russia's main carrier combat aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-33. In mid-2005 Russian sources first noted Chinese interest in purchasing this fighter,¹²⁰ which by October 2006 led to Russian reports of PLA interest in purchasing 50 to 100 of these carrier fighters.¹²¹ Chinese Internet sources also indicate the possibility that China is developing a small AWACS aircraft suitable for an aircraft carrier, a key element for a carrier air wing. PLAN deployment of an aircraft carrier, even of medium size like the *Varyag*, would allow the PLA to undertake omnidirectional attacks on Taiwan, expand amphibious assault options, and further complicate US and Japanese strategic naval planning. The new destroyers and logistic support ships the PLAN is now building, plus new Type 093 SSNs, would provide escort for the new carrier, giving China the option to begin to exercise naval diplomacy as has the United States for more than 50 years.

Impact of PLA Pressure

Although the issue of Taiwan's future relationship with China is one that most residents on Taiwan would prefer be settled peacefully, China's military buildup against the island is creating pressures, limiting Taiwan's ultimate room for strategic maneuver, and raising the stakes for Washington. In Taiwan, the fact of the PLA's continuous buildup exposes the insufficiency of Taiwan's defensive preparations, as it also exposes weaknesses in the Pan-Blue arguments that it can insure Taiwan's security and "enshrine" the status quo with China. Finally, the PLA's buildup challenges assumptions that the United States can always successfully save Taiwan from Chinese attack, an assumption that is critical for defense decisions in Taiwan, and for Washington to exert leverage in Taipei.

PLA Challenge to the Pan Blue

For at least some degree, it can be inferred that assumptions about the inevitability of Chinese military superiority serve to encourage those in the Pan-Blue who would oppose their own military expenditures as futile. Some in the KMT seem to believe that negotiations with China, even toward a future interim accord

avored by Ma Ying Jeou, is the better way of ensuring Taiwan's security as opposed to sustaining a credible military deterrent. But what if the Pan-Blue continue their defense funding obstruction, win the presidential election in 2008, but then discover that China has come to view them with as much suspicion as the last KMT government of President Lee Teng Hui? Following the December 2006 mayoral elections, KMT leader Ma Ying Jeou was put under immediate pressure to play up its “Localization” faction in order to gain ground against the DPP in 2008.¹²² Although, considering a range of relationships with China may be possible, it would be expected that at a minimum even a KMT administration would start from the premise that Taiwan citizens, not Chinese, should govern the people of Taiwan. This may then become the fundamental bone of contention, for which force of arms remains as much a solution as it does currently. But a KMT government that continued to oppose significant weapons purchases, like enhanced missile defenses and new submarines, would then be less prepared to defend Taiwan, increasing the chance that Taiwanese would lose their democratic freedoms if cross-Straits negotiations were conducted under threat of attack.

The Pan-Blue preference for negotiations is also often accompanied by the assumption that Taiwan could successfully engage in confidence building measures (CBMs) with China, like increased transparency and Chinese force withdrawals.¹²³ But President Chen Shui-bian proposed CBMs in his National Day speech in October 10, 2004, to include “establishing cross-Straits CBMs; reviewing cross-Straits Armaments policies; establishing a ‘code of conduct’ across the Strait.”¹²⁴ However, Beijing's refusal to respond to President Chen's offer to negotiate CBMs does not create confidence they would do so for a KMT administration. There may even be a danger that China would use the opportunity of such negotiations to lull Taiwan into making real defense reductions while China only makes cosmetic reductions. For example, the Taiwan Ministry of Defense points out that China has built many new roads and rail lines in its regions near Taiwan to increase mobilization speed.¹²⁵ This makes any grand troop withdrawal an empty gesture as they can now be shipped back quickly.

PLA Challenge to the DPP

For the DPP the challenge of China's continuous military buildup is twofold. It must continue to advocate defense policies that “stay the course” in the face of rising public anxiety that allows Beijing to foment divisions, through the use of its growing “Soft Power” and through its United Front tactics that seek to legitimize “peace now” proposals. The DPP must find ways to rationalize continued high defense spending while its own internal party factions wrestle with relaxing commercial and cultural relations with China, which in turn may undermine support for raising defense spending. But the DPP is also in some part to blame for the increasing imbalance of power on the Taiwan Strait. Its failure to “lock in” the purchase of all the systems offered by President Bush in 2001 before 2004 now decreases the likelihood that these programs will be successful.

In the meantime, the 2001 Bush arms package is in danger of being overwhelmed. In 2006 China took delivery of all of its eight Kilo submarines purchased from Russia, whereas it is unclear when the first of eight US subs will be delivered to Taiwan. Although 800 to 900 PLA missiles and cruise missiles are being supplemented by new PGMs, there is no telling when Taiwan will order Patriot PAC-3 missiles that can better address the SRBM and LACM threat. Although Taiwan took delivery of the last of four Kidd class air defense destroyers in 2006, by that year the PLAN took delivery of 10 new air defense destroyers. Although in late 2006 it did appear that the Pan-Blue would allow the purchase of 8 P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, the PLA is on its way to introducing 35 new submarines by 2010, when the P-3Cs might start arriving in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, Taiwan has taken some necessary and even risky steps in its defense. The early reforms designed to put Taiwan's military under firm civilian leadership and to consider moving toward a better educated/paid volunteer force should serve the longer term goals of giving Taiwan's military leaders more freedom to exploit new ideas if they so choose. In addition, Taiwan's investment in modern C4ISR like the Po-Sheng system would allow Taiwan's military to exploit new joint force synergies. However, it requires full funding that allows all major Army, Navy, and Air Force platforms to be linked effectively.

PLA Challenges for Washington

For Washington, the challenges of a stronger and farther-reaching PLA are multifold. The concentration of PLA power against Taiwan makes it imperative that Taipei takes corrective measures lest Taiwan comes to rely too much on US forces to deter attack. Taiwan's decreasing inability to withstand a PLA mass attack means that even more US armed forces would need to be committed, US forces that are today committed to the Global War on Terror. Although the United States has moved to increase the number of operational SSNs based in Guam to three, and has also started rotating bomber groups there, and may move an additional aircraft carrier battle group to Hawaii or Guam, this may not be sufficient. The speed of a potential PLA mobilization and attack may mean that only the US forces in Japan, Guam, and in Western Pacific may be on hand to respond. Should this be the case, then at its current pace, the PLA will be able to overwhelm US air forces in Okinawa and a single US Navy carrier battle group that may deploy from Yokosuka.

There are additional tactical pressures. The PLA's ability to use missiles and follow-on precision airstrikes creates the prospect of rapid attrition for air forces on Taiwan, Okinawa, and Guam, lacking adequate missile and antiaircraft defenses. Taiwan, the United States, and Japan require sea-based antimissile defenses to compliment shore-based defenses. Okinawa and Guam require THAAD-like missile interceptors to defend against new PLA medium-range ballistic missiles. Such a level of defense is also required by US Navy carrier task groups that will be targeted by new PLA antiship ballistic missiles. In addition, the PLA's ability to field larger numbers of fourth generation fighters with PL-12

or R-77 active-guided missiles and helmet-sighted short-range AAMs creates the prospect of one-for-one air combat exchanges with existing Taiwan F-16s and United States, and Japanese F-15s and F-16s.¹²⁶ Both the US and Japanese air forces require the all-around advantages conferred by the stealth, advanced electronics, and supercruise engines of the Lockheed-Martin F/A-22 RAPTOR. But current US budget-driven plans to limit procurement to about 183, allowing only two squadrons or about 48 F/A-18s to be based in Alaska, will limit US deterrent potential.

Similar US budget-driven decisions may also force a sharp reduction in the US Navy's SSN force, potentially to between 30 and 40 by the year 2020. The United States would have to meet global security commitments with this reduced number, meaning an even smaller proportion of US SSNs would be available to respond to Chinese maritime aggression. The current 54 to 55 US SSNs are deemed adequate to meet the current Chinese submarine/naval threat, but this threat is also growing. Should new PLAN SSNs succeed in incorporating advanced Russian fourth generation quieting and sonar technologies they may stretch US submarine capabilities to an unacceptable level.

In addition, China's proliferation of nuclear and missiles technologies to North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran, plus China's intention to build an aircraft carrier and larger airborne power-projection forces, raises larger questions about the viability of both US nuclear and conventional deterrent capabilities. A nuclear North Korea, plus China's build up, is already helping to stoke Japan's new nuclear weapons debate. Japan and South Korea have developed space-launch vehicles that could be developed into medium-range ballistic missiles. South Korea and Taiwan are developing long-range LACMs.¹²⁷ Seoul and Taipei have concluded that it is necessary to develop "offensive" missile capabilities to hedge against major threats that US forces may not be able to deter. Although Washington continues to oppose Taiwan's missile development, it was forced to relax its previous opposition to South Korean missile programs after Seoul's urging. In the face of continued Chinese military growth, if the United States is not able to field adequate responsive capabilities, it may be forced to consider the necessity of future missile or even nuclear capabilities by its East Asian allies.

Conclusion

Although the issues of national identity and ultimate relationship with China that comprise the larger issue of "One China" in Taiwan await resolution through a future democratic process, so far, the Chinese government remains committed to a unification process that leads to its ultimate control of the island. Furthermore, in the face of ideas of "interim agreements" and enshrining the status quo, promoted by the Pan-Blue and other segments of Taiwan society, China reminds the world that it has not "forsook the use of force" to settle its issues with Taiwan.

The other objective reality that cannot be denied is that in the face of the Pan-Blue's repeated denial of funding for major Taiwanese defense programs, China's PLA is moving toward a position of superiority on the Taiwan Strait.

As late as the mid-1990s, Taiwan had a technological military edge to support an adequate margin of deterrence on the Taiwan Strait. However, by 2006 that margin of technical superiority is almost gone, if not already gone. If this trend remains unchallenged, by early in the next decade the PLA may have the confidence that it can succeed with limited military actions, or even a more ambitious rapid invasion of Taiwan, while believing that it is capable of deterring US intervention.

These trends place new pressures on Taiwan and the United States. For the Pan-Blues, China's consistent military buildup undermines the credibility of its expectation that China will negotiate an "interim agreement" that is broadly acceptable in Taiwan. For the Pan-Greens, the PLA buildup calls attention to its failure to "lock in" major defense programs prior to 2004, as it makes more difficult the job to politically defend additional defense expenditures amidst increasing economic interdependence with China. For the United States, the PLA buildup creates greater challenges of leadership: in Taiwan to promote political consensus on the need to fund an adequate defense; and in Washington to sustain a defense effort sufficient to allow adequate forces to support deterrence on the Taiwan Strait, and to convince US allies they need not hedge against a possible US inability to provide assurance, with their own future missile or nuclear missile forces.

Notes

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CHAPTER 13

A NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR TAIWAN IN THE NEW CENTURY

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang

In late April 2007, Taiwan news agencies reported that the country's military had employed newly developed shore-based land-attack cruise missiles in a computer-simulated war with China to take out military installations across the 70 nautical mile-wide Taiwan Strait.¹ This was the first time Taiwan military publicly admitted its development of offensive weapons systems after decades of speculations. A week later in a press conference, the de facto US ambassador in Taiwan Stephen Young expressed the American government's opposition to Taiwan's development of offensive missiles.²

Taiwan's decision to reveal its intention to acquire capability to project power against the mainland reflected a long-standing concern over the growing imbalance of military power across the Taiwan Strait; and the challenge brought about by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for Taiwan's defense in the twenty-first century. As Taiwan gets ready for its presidential election in 2008, the general public and policy specialists are given another chance to debate the issue and choose the best approach for dealing with the growing Chinese military threat.

Evolution of Taiwan Defense Strategy

Since the Republic of China (ROC) government retreated to Taiwan after losing the civil war to the Chinese Communist forces in 1949, its defense strategy has gone through several adjustments due to the changes in the international environment, domestic politics, and more importantly the US-Taiwan security relationship.

Chiang Kai-shek (On Taiwan: 1949–1975)

Throughout his life since restoring the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT) rule in Taiwan, President Chiang Kai-shek had never given up his goal of

“recovering the mainland by force” (*fangong dalu*). On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also upholds a policy of “liberating Taiwan by force” (*wuli jiefang*). During that period of political and military confrontation under Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan maintained a large armed forces and an offensive defense policy, believing that the armed struggle with the Chinese Communist forces would continue until a final resolution. The US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954 provided a critical security guarantee for Taiwan, but it also prevented Chiang Kai-shek from military adventure against the PRC. From early 1950s to about mid-1960s, Taiwan military only conducted several small-scale military actions against the offshore islands near Fujian, and some onshore military raids and sabotage without clear victory. When Washington improved its relations with Beijing and started the normalization process in the early 1970s, Chang Kai-shek’s long-time objective of recovering the mainland faded away rapidly.

Chiang Ching-kuo (1978–1988)

As the military option was shattered, President Chiang Ching-kuo revised Taiwan’s political strategy to “reunification with the three principles of the people” (*sanmin zhuyi tongyi zhongguo*). Parallel to Chiang Ching-kuo’s presidency (1978–1988), the PRC also shifted its policy toward Taiwan from unification by force to “peaceful unification” (*heping tongyi*). Military confrontation was replaced by political offensive across the Taiwan Strait. During that period, however, Beijing maintained that it would not renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Under such a threat, Taiwan adopted a defense concept of “converging offense with defense” (*gongshou yiti*),³ emphasizing mobilization, readiness, and military modernization.⁴ Although Chiang Ching-kuo realized the diminishing possibility of a military solution on the unification issue, he did not rule out a possible military offensive against the mainland. Under this concept, Taiwan maintained that a large number of ground forces were necessary for possible offensive military actions.

Lee Teng-hui (First Term: 1988–1996)

Following the footsteps of Chiang Ching-kuo, President Lee Teng-hui modified Taiwan’s political strategy to “unification under freedom, democracy, equal prosperity” (*ziyou, minzhu, junfu tongyi zhongguo*). The end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy movement around the world, and Beijing’s continued focus on economic development provided a relatively peaceful environment for Lee to initiate his constitutional reform and political liberalization. In 1991, he pronounced the end of the “period of mobilization in suppressing communist rebellion” and indirectly recognized the legality of Beijing’s rule over the mainland. Cross-Strait relations was further stabilized when representatives of both sides held their first semiofficial talks in Singapore in April 1993, testifying that both Taipei and Beijing would prefer peaceful means in dealing with the unification issue. At the same time, under the pressure of the opposition Democratic

Progress Party (DPP), Taiwan's defense strategy was modified to "pure defense" (*shoushi fangyu*).⁵ In other words, Taiwan would not seek preemptive military actions against the mainland, but would focus on homeland defense of Taiwan and the smaller offshore islands under its administration.

Lee Teng-hui (Second Term: 1996–2000)

Unlike his first term in office, when Lee Teng-hui preserved the remote goal of China unification, he gradually revealed his reluctance to deal with an agenda set by the Beijing government, especially after the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 when PRC forces conducted a series of large-scale military exercise along China's southeast coast and lobbed missiles against Taiwan. Since then, Taiwan's political agenda has shifted to "status quo with separated identity," while its defense strategy was changed to "resolute defense, effective deterrence" (*fangwei gushou, youxiao hezu*).⁶ Cross-Strait military tension reached a new height in the wake of Lee's remarks of "special state-to-state relations" as he redefined the Beijing-Taipei relationship in July 1999. Although relations across the Taiwan Strait remained generally peaceful with continued political quarrels, the PRC Air Force fighters began conducting small-scale intimidation across the middle-line of the Taiwan Strait without real war-fighting. This tension brought Taiwan to change its defense guideline to "effective deterrence, resolute defense" (*youxiao hezu, fangwei gushou*),⁷ a more confrontational position than before.

The Presidential Campaign 2000

The 2000 presidential campaign highlighted a change in perceptions of Taiwan defense requirements. By examining the defense strategies of campaign platforms of all three major presidential candidates, one could find clear tendency that a new proactive national defense concept would replace Lee Teng-hui's "pure defense" strategy. KMT candidate Lien Chan advocated the concept of "active defense" (*jiji fangyu*);⁸ independent candidate James Soong preferred a strategic concept of "forward defense" (*qianjin fangyu*);⁹ and the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian created the term "preemptive defense" (*xianzhi fangyu*).¹⁰ All of these defense strategic perspectives were considerably different from the defense strategy previously pronounced.

Nonetheless, by examining the defense policies outlined by all three major presidential candidates, one can find some commonalities among them:

1. The logic behind their defense policies appears to be more offensive in nature than that in the Lee Teng-hui era.
2. They agreed that Taiwan should actively seek the initiative in military operations against the PRC.
3. In a future war with the PRC, preemptive and/or retaliatory measures are not excluded in their policy options.
4. They all agreed that the areas of military operations in a future cross-Strait military conflict should be kept as far away as possible from the main island of Taiwan.

5. They all gave more emphasis on naval and air power, and information warfare in Taiwan's future force built up.

These common perceptions do not, however, suggest that some of these conceptual consensuses would translate into policies no matter who got elected president. But they do reflect some general trends in defense thinking among political leaders in Taiwan.

President Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008)

When Chen Shui-bian took office as president in May 2000, he did not immediately focus on changing Taiwan's defense strategy, but rather adopted the KMT defense concept of "effective deterrence, resolute defense." According to the 2006 National Defense Report, since 2002 Taiwan's defense strategy has entered a phase of "active defense" (*jiji fangwei*). With the emphasis of effective deterrence, according to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Taiwan will focus on "building of counter-strike and defensive capabilities with deterring effects, and actively research and develop long-range, precision, deep strike capabilities to effectively disintegrate or stagnate enemy forces or firepower advancements," and consequently, dissuade the Chinese attempt to wage war against Taiwan.

Understanding the challenges of modern warfare and the nature of advanced technology, Taiwan started with organizational reform by defining the Chief of the General Staff as commander of joint operations in the National Defense Act. On such basis, the Taiwan military began placing an emphasis on developing joint warfare capabilities under four guidelines: technology advancement, information and electronics superiority, joint interception, and homeland defense (*keji xiandao, zidian youshi, lianhe jieji, guotu fangyu*).¹¹

Seven Competing Paradigms in Global Security

Taiwan's defense strategic thinking in the new century has been significantly influenced by the changing global security environment and US security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. President George W. Bush came into office in January 2001 with an emphasis on American interests and leadership, on fighting rogue states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and on strengthening relations with allies and friends. Regarding the Asia-Pacific region, the Bush administration committed to consolidating relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other traditional allies, to reexamining US policy toward the Korean nuclear issue, to viewing China as a "strategic competitor," and to improving relations with Indonesia and India.¹²

The tragic event of the terrorist attacks in New York City and in Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001 has been widely regarded as the defining factor in the Bush administration's vision on dealing with national security threats and on American foreign policy priorities. One might admit that even without the 9/11 attack, the Bush administration would still have gone to war with Iraq and sought to improve its relationship with China. Nonetheless, Washington's post-9/11 emphasis on homeland security, preemptive doctrine, and defense transformation

have already raised the concerns of many regional countries, especially allies and friends, on the purposes in and approaches to the Asia-Pacific region.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the transnational nature of global security threat have dominated the post-Cold War international politics. In search of ways to deal with these challenges, there are at least seven paradigms of competing concepts that have surfaced in the past decade, and all of them would have certain implications for the US security strategy, while indirectly influencing Taiwan's assessment of its national defense.

1. Preventive Diplomacy versus Preemptive Defense

In the 1990s, many believed that international and regional conflicts could be prevented through effective diplomacy.¹³ Others thought that conflicts would be best deterred by preemptive actions usually associated with the use of force.

2. Strategic Ambiguity versus Strategic Clarity

Ambiguity in the eyes of many national policymakers can provide the necessary room for maneuver in the course of preventing an impending crisis. Other policymakers consider that only strategic clarity can escape misperception and misunderstanding by protagonists.¹⁴

3. Incentives versus Coercion

The idealism school of international affairs argues that persuasion and reward could gradually change national behavior and bring about long-lasting peace between states. Alternatively the Realist (or Power Politics) School believes that rogue states would only behave as peaceful "normal states" through dissuasion and punishment.

4. Multilateralism versus Unilateralism

The end of the Cold War raised the hope of a new international order regulated by international organizations and multilateral forums. But for the great powers, national self-interests would be compromised if they cannot act unilaterally in defense of their vital interests.

5. Peace-Making versus Regime Change

Peace-keeping and peace-making have been major approaches when the United Nations and international organizations are favored vehicles for resolving conflicts. A counterargument considers "regime change" of rogue states is a better approach for long-term peace.

6. Traditional Allies versus Coalition of the Willing

Some defense specialists believe that only traditional allies can provide sufficient and meaningful security assistance. Others argue that treaty alliances are too much bureaucratic and inflexible to respond to crisis. A flexible combination of stakeholders, based on shared interests can be a better alternative.

7. Overwhelming Force versus Military Transformation

In conducting warfare, the absolute superiority of force deployment is viewed by many as the only way to avoid the American mistakes in Vietnam. Rapid-responding and lighter forces are considered by other war-planners as the better way to respond to future crisis.

Taiwan's evolving defense strategic concept in the new century may not be directly associated with the above-mentioned international paradigms. However, politics among great powers in the current global strategic environment have had a significant impact in the minds of Taiwan's defense planners and policymakers.

Key Debates on Taiwan's Security and Defense

In the fast-changing international security environment, with growing imbalance of military power across the Taiwan Strait, many have asked legitimate and important questions about Taiwan's security and defense policy that need to be debated and clarified. Answers to those questions may reflect diversified threat perceptions and different policy options. The following are the most asked questions by observers in Taiwan and overseas.¹⁵

Is security in the Taiwan Strait a political issue or military issue?

Some observers argued that there is a gap between Taiwan and US policymakers, especially between senior military officers, on the issue of whether Taiwan Strait security is primarily a military issue or a political issue.¹⁶ They describe senior officials in Pentagon and in the US Pacific Command (PACOM) as having spent most of their energy and efforts to contemplate potential military contingencies across the Taiwan Strait. War games, exercises, and other preparations have reflected that US defense planners, when they think of situations in the Taiwan Strait, are more concerned about military planning and solutions.

Recognizing that the Taiwan military has prepared for decades to deal with possible Chinese invasion scenarios of the island, those observers argue, however, that most senior officials in Taiwan's MND have considered the security in the Taiwan Strait a political issue.¹⁷ Accordingly, they argued that Taiwan defense officials have not been proactive enough to address the problems of the current Chinese military buildup.

In reality, security in the Taiwan Strait is both apolitical and a military issue. Different perceptions might exist between military officials in Taipei and in the US PACOM at Camp Smith (Hawaii), but they are basically due to the scope of responsibility. US war-planners, and fighters of course, need to focus on potential military scenarios, while Taiwan military leaders understand that mainland policy is part of the authorities of the president. Cross-Strait issues, political and security, should be primarily dealt with by the political leadership, not military commanders.

Has the balance of military power tilted in China's favor?

With China's robust military modernization in the past decade, many foreign observers has worried, if not, concluded, that the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait has already shifted to China's favor, and the Taiwan military can no longer compete against China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). They contend that China has gradually changed its "junkyard army" image due

to its lack of training and modernization during the Cultural Revolution years (1966–1976) with its defense modernization program in the late 1970s. China's military power has been significantly upgraded in the wake of the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s as the PLA devoted a great amount of energy in the inquiry of revolution in military affairs.¹⁸ Consequently, the balance has been shifted a long time ago, and Taiwan can never regain the equilibrium.

The counter argument, however, has been that the balance of military power should be calculated by two equations: force (*li*) and posture (*shi*). Those who consider the military balance has moved to China's favor are simply counting the beans, that is, the comparison over military manpower and hardware. In fact, a true balance would include calculation of both military force and security posture. The translation of "balance of power" therefore should be *shi jun* plus *li di*. For inferior military force, gaining or maintaining a balance, posturing is more important. Taiwan may not be able compete with China on the tank-to-tank, aircraft-to-aircraft, or submarine-to-submarine basis. But Taiwan's growing links with the US force in Asia-Pacific, as well as developments in asymmetric capabilities, can create a "posture" that balance out the disadvantage of military "force."

Can Taiwan win an arms race with China?

The short answer is no. In the past decade, with double digits annual growth in defense expenditure, China has (1) improved its MIRV and second-strike capabilities in both land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles, and land-attack cruise missiles, (2) engaged in robust naval procurement for both surface combatants and submarines, focusing on distant water operations and imported energy sea lanes protection, (3) expanded Marine Corps and amphibious capabilities, and (4) extended air force missions from homeland air defense to more offensive missions.¹⁹ If looking at China's gigantic military buildup, one may easily conclude it would be extremely unwise for Taiwan to think of engaging in a straightforward one-on-one arms race with China.

In reality, Taiwan policymakers and defense planners have long discarded the idea of competing with China in military hardware and systems acquisition. The key, in the minds of Taiwan defense officials, is acquiring an increased capability of dissuasion. The PLA has always followed Mao Tse-tung's instruction of "never engaging a war without confidence of victory" (*buda meiyou bawo dezhang*).²⁰ Therefore, Taiwan's defense modernization has focused on building the military capabilities that can disrupt and complicate China's calculation of using force against Taiwan. The development in modern and high-tech weapons systems, and in revolution in military affairs have enlightened the Taiwan defense community to think "outside of the box" and try to find new measures to dissuade and deter China at an acceptable political, military, and financial cost.

Can Taiwan maintain its security through arms procurement?

Given the fact of massive Chinese military modernization programs, many foreign friends, especially American friends, have argued that Taiwan must drastically

increase its defense investment in order to meet the challenges posed by China. Criticism over Taiwan's delaying in passing the current "special defense budget" to procure approved weapons systems from the United States has dominated the talk in Washington for several years since President Bush's decision in April 2001.²¹ This simplistic "buy or no security" logic seemed to suggest that Taiwan can only ensure its security through heightened defense procurement.

In reality, in Taiwan there has been strong opposition to the "special defense budget" for buying American armaments. The antiprocurement activists have argued against this arms sales case for a variety of reasons from disagreement with the weapons systems on the procurement list to an outright preference for the funds to be invested in national social welfare programs. Those antiprocurement activists in Taiwan have asked whether buying 8 submarines, 12 P-3C maritime reconnaissance airplanes, and PAC-III missile defense batteries would be only 50% solutions. It has been argued that the people in Taiwan, in general, support continuing defense modernization, but they disagree with the American/foreign arms sales process and the hefty price tags for the weapons systems that are being offered by the Bush administration.²²

Does Taiwan deliberately try to be a free-rider in its defense?

In connection to the criticism of Taiwan being slow in its response to arms sales, many foreign friends blamed Taiwan for trying to put its defense burden onto the American armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and being a free-rider in defense spending for its own national defense.²³ Many argued that in addition to its slow military acquisition, Taiwan's defense spending has been in a downward slide for consecutive five years since 2001, adding to the suspicion of a free-rider attitude. Both domestic and foreign critiques have blamed Taiwan's opposition parties in the parliament for blocking the "special defense budget" from being sent to the Legislative Yuan's (LY's) defense committee for review and debate; and the Chen government's inability to be flexible enough in responding to the opposition political parties.²⁴

Taiwan politicians have argued that if the United States wanted to defend the island democracy, and was aware that the military balance had tilted into China's favor, Washington should provide Taiwan with more and inexpensive defense systems and services.²⁵ But no one has expected that the United States will give Taiwan a free ride for its own national defense. In fact, in private conversation and in exercise plans, Taiwan's top defense officials have never suggested that they want to bet on the assistance of American forces in time of war. On the contrary, they were suspicious about the willingness of US government to engage in a war against China on Taiwan's behalf.²⁶ In general, people in Taiwan believe that current political football over major defense procurement items should not be equated to the alleged free-rider accusation.

Do Taiwanese people have the will to defend and to fight?

The slow process of defense procurement, the decline in defense budget, and the suspicion of the free-rider attitude have made many foreign friends worried

about Taiwan's ability to defend itself.²⁷ In addition, they are concerned that the more than one million Taiwanese now living on the mainland in China, the increasing investment across the Taiwan Strait, and the rise of China's economy and military power may have generated a huge psychological impact on Taiwanese—and may have preempted the national will to defend.

There are people in Taiwan who counterargued that the will of fighting an enemy cannot be tested, or would not surface before armed conflict actually occurred. They contend that American and international friends should be confident that it will be inconceivable that Taiwan people will compromise their freedom to accept the communist rule over the island.²⁸ Moreover, the continuing defense modernization and transformation efforts should be recognized and commended as the Taiwan military try very hard to upgrade their defense capabilities with limited resources, underpolarized party politics, and growing Chinese security challenges.

What has been done to address the issue of jointness?

Observers of Taiwan defense development have long criticized that Taiwan's military structure and defense policy were dominated by the ground war-minded Army commanders.²⁹ Interservices rivalries, as are found in most other countries, have created problems in allocation of defense budgets and resources, as well as obstructing the development of joint operations concept.

Understanding the challenges of modern warfare and the nature of advanced technology, Taiwan started its organizational reform by defining the Chief of the General Staff as the commander of joint operations in the National Defense Act of 2000 (*guofangfa*).³⁰ In recent years, the Taiwan military has engaged in curriculum reform toward jointness in war colleges, sent senior officers to study joint warfare courses in the United States, appropriated funding to procure systems that enable datalink connections among services and platforms, and emphasized advancement in the areas of command and control. These have highlighted new efforts in defense modernization.³¹

Is it appropriate for Taiwan to develop offensive capabilities?

Facing increasing security challenges from mainland China, foreign observers have long worried that Taiwan may have to choose to develop offensive capabilities to counter such mounting military threats. In recent years, academics as well as politicians in Taiwan reopened the argument on developing nuclear and other offensive weapons systems.³² Therefore, a debate over whether offensive capability is a solution to address the China military threat or an unnecessary provocation to the stability in the Taiwan Strait have been alive for years.

Acknowledging Taiwan's current development of a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capable of hitting the Chinese mainland, the United States sent a strong message to Taipei indicating that "the focus should be on defensive, and not offensive, weapons."³³ However, one must understand that Taiwan knows quite well that the uses of LACM against targets on the Chinese mainland can

not only bring limited result in military operations in the Taiwan Strait, but will also ignite massive military retaliation from China. Taiwan's development of offensive capability might be considered as a provocative move by China and by some Western observers; from Taiwan's standpoint however, it can be seen as an indigenous effort in defense modernization, and a reflection of Taiwan's will in strengthening her homeland defense.³⁴

Has shortened terms of compulsory military service compromised Taiwan's military capabilities?

Taiwan has reduced its terms of compulsory military service from 2 years to 14 months in the past decade. Many worried that the shortened military service time could have compromised young servicemen's skills in handling high-tech weapons systems, particularly in a combat situation. Others argued that shortening the service term was a measure to attract young voters for political gains but at the expense of warfighting capabilities.³⁵

In reality, the defense reorganization and streamlining has significantly reduced requirements in personnel, and brought about the first wave of shortened service term. The high-tech nature of newly acquired weapons systems needs more skilled operators and longer learning curve. Even with two full years of service, young compulsory recruits might still not be able to operate those systems. The Taiwan military has consequently shifted to expanding the portion of voluntary service, providing more incentives such as salary and benefits, to retain the young talents to stay in the service, and release more manpower into the reserve forces.³⁶

Has Taiwan achieved true civilianization in defense leadership?

The democratization process in Taiwan ensures that the ROC commander-in-chief (the president) enjoys the majority of the popular support. The National Defense Act and the Ministry of National Defense Organizational Act (*guofangbu zuzhifa*)—enacted in 2000—defined two civilians, namely the president and the Minister of National Defense as the National Command Authority. In addition, the convergence of policy staff and military service commands under the defense minister ensured all armed forces is subjected to civilian control.³⁷

Some may argue that since the defense reorganization in 2000, ministers of national defense remained in the hands of retired generals and admirals; civilian employees in the ministry, though increased in numbers, are not in important senior decision-making positions.³⁸ However, one should understand that in the initial phase of civilianization, Taiwan needs some time to nurture sufficient numbers of civilians who are encouraged to understand the history and mindsets of the uniformed services, and to study military affairs, and related professional knowledge in order to earn the trust from experienced military commanders. Moreover, in the face of mounting Chinese military threats, the transition of key defense policymaking positions from the hands of military to that of civilians requires extra caution.

Basic Principles of National Defense Strategy

In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the US Department of Defense called for a transition of a “threat-based” force planning—focusing on “who” might threaten us, and “where” we might be threatened, to a “capability-based” force planning—focusing on “how” we might be threatened, and “what” we need to do to deter and defense such threats.³⁹ For decades, Taiwan’s defense planners has precisely known that Chinese PLA (who) has been the biggest threat, and the locations (where) on Taiwan that the Chinese forces will most like to attack. It seems that the Chinese military threat to Taiwan has not changed much. However, the Pentagon’s call for a shift to the capability-based force planning can still provide invaluable reference to Taiwan’s ongoing defense transformation.

The Chinese PLA commanders learned many lessons from the American military operations in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. With an emphasis of “revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics” (*zhong-guo tese de xin junshi biange*), the PLA has not only modernized in weapons systems and in operational doctrines, but it has also devoted significant resources toward developing asymmetrical capabilities to threaten Taiwan and deter foreign military interventions in a future military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.⁴⁰

Borrowing from the capability-based force planning concept and applied to local scenario at different level and scale, Taiwan should contemplate a shift of defense planning and focus more on how Taiwan might be threatened by the PLA’s asymmetrical capabilities. In addition, Taiwan needs to consider how to defend against the more technologically advanced and doctrinally changed PLA.

In view of future military requirement and the increasingly high-tech nature of Chinese military threat, Taiwan should have new national defense strategic guidelines for policy planning and army-building. In the author’s view, Taiwan’s future defense guideline should be focused on two major conceptual components: prevention and sustainability.

Prevention

Victory can only be achieved without a war

Conflict and war prevention in the Taiwan Strait should be the first priority of Taiwan’s national security planning in possible military contingencies. If Taiwan loses in a future military campaign, it would be the end of its democratic system of government and society. Even if Taiwan’s military forces can prevail in one or two battles in the initial phase of armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait, a victory still cannot be secured easily because China would commit more follow-up forces into the war. In addition, the rapid pace of modern warfare and relations among major powers in the region would not allow the Taiwan military to exercise its war plan to the very end. Major powers in the region, especially the United States, would not tolerate a lengthy war of attrition, and would force a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait and may force Taiwan to the negotiation table with China. In other words, once China and Taiwan engage in armed conflict, Taiwan would be on the losing side. Therefore, the first best strategy for Taiwan

is to prevent a military conflict from taking place. To support the objective of prevention, Taiwan military must be able to acquire two important elements:

- Capability: strong warfighting capability that cannot be easily destroyed and can dissuade and deter a possible invasion.
- Posture: take advantage of international environment and shape a posture of quasi-military links with the United States and its allies.

Sustainability

Best deterrence relies on sustainable warfighting capability

If a military conflict cannot be prevented, Taiwan must build a military capability to sustain the island's defense for considerable long period of time. China's guideline in a future war against Taiwan is fighting fast and winning fast. If the military assault against Taiwan cannot create a swift victory for China, international intervention and domestic pressure would build up and center on the shoulders of the Chinese leadership. In other words, Taiwan's guideline for army-building is to construct, train, and acquire the sustainability of its warfighting capabilities. Sustainability by Taiwan is the best deterrence against China's intention. To support the objective of prevention, Taiwan military must move toward the following directions:

- Asymmetry: military capability that can protect against the strength of enemy forces, and project force against the weakness of enemy forces.
- Interoperability: military capabilities that can link and operate with friendly forces that may operate in the Western Pacific vicinity around Taiwan.

In the author's view, Taiwan's defense planners have not been ignorant to the concepts of prevention and sustainability; however, the two concepts have not been given the position as the ultimate guidelines for all policies: planning, procurement, logistics, and mobilization practices. It is hoped that future Taiwan leaders can make it clear that the two concepts should be integrated in all defense-related policymaking efforts.

Rationales for Force Planning and Army Building

Threshold Plus

Changing security threats in the new century requires Taiwan to undertake fundamental defense transformation in four areas simultaneously, namely military technology and equipment, defense reorganization and force restructuring, reform and refinement in military strategy and operational doctrines, and advancement in professional military educations. The defense transformation is aimed at both shaping a favorable security environment to prevent military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and raising the punishment threshold for China's intended invasion of Taiwan.

Taiwan's military modernization should aim at raising the threshold of tolerance in terms of anticipated Chinese losses in the war. But more importantly is for Taiwan to build an armed forces that can shape the environment in which war can be prevented from happening. Taiwan's military modernization should be targeted at a function that can shape a favorable environment in which China would not choose a military option on the so-called Taiwan Issue. In addition, Taiwan military should engage in a full-fledged transformation that can make China's intended invasion of Taiwan very costly.

Armament Plus

Taiwan's military modernization should not be limited to only purchasing advanced armaments. It is more important to secure a firm US commitment through arms sales to Taiwan. Taiwan should continue its military modernization focusing on weapon system upgrades and procurement of advanced technologies and systems. However, weapons systems upgrade and large defense investment may not be enough in safeguarding national security. Moreover, the PLA generals and admirals may not be easily deterred in giving up their hope of resolving the Taiwan issue by force only because Taiwan decides to procure advance submarines and missile defense systems.

Buying defense weapon systems from the United States and continued military modernization cannot deter the Chinese. What the Chinese top military commanders really concerned about is the technical and operational links that may associate with American arms sales to Taiwan.⁴¹ The US security assistance and defense commitment are the real deterrent that can compromise or at least hinder the Chinese intention to seize the island by force.

Homeland Plus

Taiwan's military modernization should not only build the capability in defending its homeland, but also be able to provide assistance to its regional friends and allies. The primary mission of Taiwan military is to protect and defend Taiwan, the offshore islands of Pescadores, Quemoy, and Matzu, and the territorial sea and space. Nonetheless, the objective of Taiwan's defense modernization and transformation cannot and should not be limited to its own defense.

Even after acquiring the military capability to defend its homeland, this is not enough to ensure Taiwan's national security. Taiwan must be able to provide assistance to its regional democratic friends and allies in times of war in the Taiwan Strait, or other potential armed conflict in the region. To defend the shared values among regional democracies, Taiwan's defense strategy should be based on a natural linkage between homeland defense and regional security, and make Taiwan's military force an indispensable part that can contribute to the security of regional democratic allies.

Center of Gravity for Force Modernization

In view of the "tyranny of geography," Taiwan is strategically located at the center position between Shanghai and Hong Kong in economic terms, between

Yokosuka (Japan) and Cam Ran Bay (Vietnam) in military terms, between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Strait of Malacca in terms of sea lanes of communication. If Taiwan fell under China's control, the island can be used as the PLA Navy's unsinkable aircraft carrier further projecting its power into the Western Pacific. If Taiwan maintains its status quo, its military can be an early warning system and frontline defense for the regional democracies. Consequently, force modernization in Taiwan should concentrate on the following capability-building focuses.

Sustainability at Home

Sustainability in modern warfare does not mean the capability for engaging in a lengthy attrition ground campaign on the island of Taiwan, after losing sea control and air superiority over the Strait; it means preserving a war-fighting capability that can persuade the PLA commanders that the Taiwan armed forces cannot be quickly annihilated.

In responding to China's emphasis on revolution in military affairs and swift attack-quick victory campaign doctrine, Taiwan should specifically make the defense of its command, control, and communication (C³) nodes and protection of critical infrastructure facilities as the supreme priority in its defense modernization. Other critical areas, such as defenses against decapitation assault, passive and active ballistic and cruise missile defenses, and others are also of importance to sustain Taiwan's survival and security.

ASW for Island Chain

To prevent and deter foreign intervention in the Taiwan contingency, the PLA commanders have long discussed—if not already implemented—an antiaccess or area-denial strategy by contemplating actions to neutralize American forces and facilities based in Okinawa and to attack US aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific. In the vision of the PLA Navy Commander, the Chinese naval forces are confined by the strongholds of the US Navy along the first island chain from Yokosuka, to Okinawa, to Subic Bay (the Philippines), to Singapore. In this arc line of defense, the only critical way for the PLA Navy to sail into the Pacific is through the northern and southern tips of Taiwan.

Taiwan military should acquire a joint antiblockade capability that can sustain Taiwan's economy, while also denying access to Chinese naval and air forces from using the sea areas surrounding Taiwan. In this way, Taiwan serves as a critical point linking the American armed forces in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Necessary investment by Taiwan in antisubmarine warfare and in anti-blockade capabilities is essential to reduce the vulnerability of allies' armed forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region.

Early Warning for Allies

In regard to cultural and geographical characteristics, Taiwan military has advantages in understanding the Chinese language, and the PLA logic in thinking, and

probably operational patterns better than any other country. Force modernization with a focus on improving its capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) would assist its American allied forces and other friends in the region in elevating the battle space awareness, and make Taiwan a critical network within regional security networks in Asia-Pacific.

In addition, Taiwan's competitive human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and capability can also play an important role by contributing as part of a collective strategic and tactical intelligence assessment that is important to safeguard regional security.

Conclusion

In China, Hu Jintao will begin his second five-year term as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in September 2007. In Taiwan, citizens will elect a new parliament and a new president in early 2008 both with four-year terms. The seemingly parallel and overlapping terms of next governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait presents a window of opportunity for a new era of engagement between 2008 and 2012.

The rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power has made some people wonder whether the time is on the mainland side. However, Beijing also encounters mounting challenges in areas of agriculture, energy, banking, environment, and social safety net. If China is at a crossroad of either becoming a dominating but benign regional power or turning itself into a source of instability in Asia-Pacific, Taiwan is in urgent need of a smart and comprehensive strategy to deal with future challenges.

In the management of future relations with China, strong defense capability and national resolve will enable Taipei to say "no" to Beijing when it must; but more importantly, the military capability will empower Taipei to say "yes" to Beijing in a negotiation when it can. With continuing modernization and transformation, and with a focus on prevention and sustainability, the Taiwan military can be confidently seen as an armed force to defend democracies not only for itself but for regional countries as well.

Notes

1. The missile was identified by Taiwan Minister of Defense Lee Jye as Tactical Shore-based Missile for Fire Suppression (TSMFS or *zhanshuxing anzhi huoli zhiya feidan*) with a range of 1,000km. See *Taipei Times* (April 27, 2007), p. 1.
2. AIT Press Conference, May 3, 2007. See www.ait.org.tw/en/news/officialtext/viewer.aspx?id=2007050301 (last visited, June 15, 2007).
3. Huang Huang-hsiung, *National Defense White Paper (guofang baipishu)* (Taipei: Taiwan Research Foundation, 1989), pp. 91–92. Chen Shui-bian and Ko Chen-heng, *White Paper on the Black Box of Defense (guofang heihezi yu baipishu)* (Taipei: Formosa Foundation, 1992), p. 251. Huang Huang-hsiung, *Strategy: Taiwan Marching Forward (zhanlue: Taiwan xiangqianxing)* (Taipei: Qianwei Publisher, 1995), pp. 169–170.

4. Chi-heng Yang, "The Evolution and Adaptation of Taiwan's Military Strategy." Conference paper, International Conference on Future Vision of Taiwan's Defense Policy and Military Strategy, Taipei, January 18, 2001, p. 6.
5. Reason for such change in defense policy is discussed in Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report—1994* (Taipei: Li Ming Publisher, 1994), p. 73.
6. Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report—1996* (Taipei: Li Ming Publisher, 1996), p. 54. Defense guideline for the offshore islands Quemoy and Matzu was "isolated defense" (*duli gushou*), which means the offshore islands have to be self-sufficient in time of war and should not expect support from forces based in Taiwan.
7. Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report—2000* (Taipei: Li Ming Publisher, 2000), p. 64. The change of defense guideline, emphasizing more on deterrence than on defense was a response to Lien Chan's advocacy of "active defense" in December 1999.
8. The author was in the audience of that conference. See Presidential Office News Release, December 8, 1999, and Lien Chan, *Lian Chan's Policy Views* (*Lian Chan de zhuzhang*) (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 2000), p. 12.
9. James Soong and Chao-hsiung Chang, *Soong-Chang National Policy Guideline for the 21st Century* (*Soong-Chang kuashiji guojia zhengce gangling*) (Taipei: Soong-Chang Presidential Campaign Headquarters, 2000), pp. 43–46.
10. Chen Shui-bian, *New Century, New Future: Chen Shui-bian's Blueprint for the Nation—Volume 1: National Security* (*xinshiji xinchulu: Chen Shui-bian guojia lantu—diyice: guojia anquan*) (Taipei: Chen Shui-bian Presidential Campaign Headquarters, 1999), pp. 50–51.
11. Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report—2006* (Taipei: MND, 2006), p. 99.
12. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, US Department of Defense, 2001, p. 4. See www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf; *The National Security Strategy* (White House, 2002), p. 27. See www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html (last visited, June 15, 2007).
13. Warren Christopher, David A. Hamburg, and William J. Perry, "Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense in South Asia: The U.S. Role," *Preventive Defense Project publications, Occasional Paper*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation [CISAC]), August 1999. See www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Preventive_Diplomacy.pdf (last visited, June 15, 2007).
14. Nancy Tucker, "Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?" *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2005), Chapter 8.
15. Since 2000, in his capacity as private scholars as well as government official (2003–2004), the author has been personally involved in countless events and occasions receiving foreign personnel and delegations visiting Taiwan. The following 10 issues are considered most asked questions in the author's personal assessment. In the author's view, it would be inappropriate to name names or to directly quote visitors comments when discussing these sensitive defense and security related issues.
16. The author's conversation with a specialist who works for the RAND Corporation in November 2002.
17. The author's discussions with many Taiwan military planners in private conversations and closed-door seminars from 2002 to 2007.

18. David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119–133. *The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA, (July 21, 2005), p. 6. See www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf (last visited, June 15, 2007). Bernard D. Cole, "Shifting Balance of Power in the Taiwan Strait," *China Brief*, vol. 27 (May 2004), Jamestown Foundation. See www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=2931&article_id=23659 (last visited, June 15, 2007).
19. *China's National Defense in 2006*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 2006, Beijing. See www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm (last visited, June 15, 2007).
20. Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," December 25, 1947. See www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_24.htm (last visited, June 15, 2007).
21. Kerry Dumbaugh, "Taiwan: Recent Developments and US Policy Choices," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 1, 2006. See www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70328.pdf (last visited, June 22, 2007). Alan Romberg, "Taiwan: All Politics, All the Time," *China Leadership Monitor*, vol. 19 (2006). See www.stimson.org/china/pdf/clm19_adr.pdf (last visited, June 22, 2007). James A. Kelly, "Overview of US Policy toward Taiwan." Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 21, 2004. See www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm (last visited, June 22, 2007).
22. The author's presentation at Carnegie China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on "Security through Procurement? The Debate Over Taiwan's Defense Spending," Thursday, October 27, 2005. Can be accessed at: www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=822&&prog=zch,zgp&proj=znpp (last visited, June 22, 2007).
23. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Taiwan's Free Ride on US Defense," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 2007. See www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8203 (Last visited, June 22, 2007) and Denny Roy, "U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales: The Perils of Doing Business with Friends," *Asia-Pacific Security Studies*, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 3 (April 2004). See www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/Roy-TawainArms.pdf (last visited, June 22, 2007).
24. Alan Romberg, "Taiwan: All Politics, All the Time," *China Leadership Monitor*, vol. 19 (2006). See www.stimson.org/china/pdf/clm19_adr.pdf (last visited, June 22, 2007).
 Kerry Dumbaugh, "Taiwan: Recent Developments and US Policy Choices," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 1, 2006. See www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70328.pdf (last visited, June 22, 2007).
25. These arguments have been mostly from the opposition politicians in Taiwan. Those comments have been numerous, and can be found in the records of the LY between 2002 and 2007.
26. Based on the author's private discussion with senior defense officials in Taiwan.
27. Carpenter, "Taiwan's Free Ride on US Defense."
28. See n. 22. The author's presentation at Carnegie China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on "Security through Procurement? The Debate over Taiwan's Defense Spending," Thursday, October 27, 2005. Can be accessed at: www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=822&&prog=zch,zgp&proj=znpp (last visited, June 22, 2007).

29. Ibid.
30. National Defense Act, See www.law.mnd.gov.tw/FLAWDAT0201.asp?lsid=FL005392 (last visited, June 22, 2007).
31. *2006 National Defense Report*, Republic of China, See www.report.mnd.gov.tw/english/catalog.htm (last visited, June 22, 2007).
32. In the 1970s, Taiwan had intended to conduct nuclear weapons research program and did attempt to produce medium-range ballistic missiles. Due to strong objections from the United States, Taiwan was forced to halt both programs. Discussions on nuclear and offensive military systems were quieted down since. In recent years, the debates resurfaced as the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has increasingly tilted into China's favor.
33. AIT Press Conference, May 3, 2007. See www.ait.org.tw/en/news/official-text/viewer.aspx?id=2007050301 (last visited, June 22, 2007).
34. Wendell Minnick, *Defense News*, May 4, 2007.
35. The author's conversation with a specialist from the Center for Naval Analyses who visited Taiwan in the spring of 2007.
36. *2006 National Defense Report*, Republic of China, See www.report.mnd.gov.tw/english/catalog.htm (last visited, June 22, 2007).
37. *2006 National Defense Report*, Republic of China, See Appendix 6–1, pp. 205–216. www.report.mnd.gov.tw/english/catalog.htm (last visited, June 22, 2007).
38. See n. 22. The author's presentation at Carnegie China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on "*Security through Procurement? The Debate Over Taiwan's Defense Spending.*" Can be accessed at: www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=822&&prog=zch,zgp&proj=znpp (last visited, June 22, 2007).
39. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, US Department of Defense (2001), pp. 13–14. See www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf (last visited, June 22, 2007).
40. Paul J. Bolt and Carl N. Brenner, "Information Warfare across the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 13, no. 38 (February 2004), pp. 129–150. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang and Gwendolyn Stamper, "Asymmetric War? Implications for China's Information Warfare Strategies," *American Asian Review*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Winter 2002).
41. "The Bo Sheng Project, the Key Platform for Taiwan-US Joint Operations," *China Times*, July 6, 2007, p. A4.

CHAPTER 14

A NEW IMBALANCE IN THE EQUATION OF MILITARY BALANCE ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

York W. Chen

The cross-Strait military balance is shifting in the mainland's favor as a result of Beijing's sustained economic growth, increased diplomatic leverage, and improvements in military capabilities based within striking range of Taiwan. (US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People's Republic of China, Washington, 2006)

Such an assertion is neither novel nor one-sided. The rapid speed of China's acquisition of many advanced weapons systems and its improvements in training and doctrine have rendered Taiwan's relative qualitative advantage in weapons and personnel to be no longer sustainable. In the past, this was regarded as Taiwan's critical advantage for counterbalancing China's quantitative superiority. Many analysts, both in Taiwan and the United States, believe it is only a matter of time before China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) outpaces their Taiwan's counterparts in quality as well. Besides, the US Department of Defense (DoD) repeatedly expressed its concerns over this emerging imbalance; many American scholars have reached the similar conclusion. For example, Dr. David Shambaugh claimed in 2002 that the PLA would complete its preparations to present a credible threat to Taiwan by 2007.¹ In Taiwan, several key national security policymakers also gradually realized this embarrassing fact. Former Chairperson Tsai Ing-Wen of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council even argued that Taiwan might lose its military superiority in 2005.² According to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND), the PLA's air and naval capabilities might "qualitatively surpass that of ours by 2010."³

The PLA's significant progress in quality has brought about freshening changes in the equation of military balance across the Taiwan Strait that policymakers and defense planners in both Washington and Taipei need to cope with

in the near future. Among a baffling array of changes, this chapter will examine how the element of time, the most critical factor in the equation, is affected by the PLA's modernization and its strategic consequences. The author argues that, because of the PLA's modernization, Beijing is now getting control of the element of time in a full spectrum of cross-Straits military confrontations.

In the past, the PLA had to break Taiwan's layered defense in a traditional mode of amphibious invasion before it could strike Taiwan's center of gravity and inflict damage on Taiwan's major political, military, economic, and psychological assets. This was deemed to be a time-consuming and risky military operation. The PLA had to destroy Taiwan's air force and naval fleet as well as to overrun Taiwanese-controlled offshore islands, Penghu Island, and finally the coastline of Taiwan Island. In such a scenario, Taiwan and the United States would have sufficient time to respond. But, as a result of the PLA's rapid modernization, China now possesses ever-increasing capabilities of force-projection that can overcome the geographical obstacles and pierce Taiwan's defense line. The PLA will soon not only be able to launch a paralytic, knockout strike against Taiwan's center of gravity by surprise, but also neutralize Taiwan's defense, and achieve its desired political objectives long before the United States can come to the rescue. If such a peril remains unchecked, it will soon render the required time necessary for both Taiwanese defenders to maintain "strategic sustainability" and American regional forces to respond with credible forward forces inadequate. In a word, the very imbalance in the equation of cross-Straits military balance is caused by Beijing obtaining a military capability that can achieve a fait accompli via a swift, decisive battle outcome.

The Strategic Significances of Time

"Of all the disasters soldiers of the past have encountered," as one military affairs writer has credibly argued, "the most pervasive is the loss of time." In a military sense, time constitutes the primary dimension of war—"an aspect that is ultimately more important than one founded on length, width, or height. Time defines the limits of political and military power. It defines the possible and impossible."⁴ Poor performance in one aspect of preparing or conducting war—for example, technology, politics, military preparation—can be improved or even offset by excellence in others. But the sole exception is time; time lost is literally irretrievable.⁵

The imperative of acting in time encourages offensive military actions. "Centuries of conflict have proven that offensive action provides the greatest control in any dimension of warfare, and time is no exception," as one defense writer concluded, "in fact, considering the potentially destabilizing nature of time warfare [the element of time], favors the offensive more than any other dimension."⁶ Indeed, the offensive can determine the timing, location, and manner of attack, in order to create time-gap of the defensive's response actions. Unless the defense—which stands in a relative reactive position and probably lacking warning time—can rapidly redeploy its reaction forces, the strategic loss of advantage and the domestic chaos caused by such a surprise attack can be

tremendously fatal for a country without sufficient strategic depth—which the island of Taiwan lacks.

The element of time is particularly sensitive to the military situation across the Taiwan Strait. Dr. Robert Ross might have been slightly exaggerating when he claimed that “deterring China’s use of force [against Taiwan] has never depended on Taiwan’s capabilities; Taiwan alone cannot deter the mainland.”⁷ However, it is plainly true that facing determined, all-out attacks by Chinese PLA forces, Taiwan alone cannot hold indefinitely because Taiwan is relatively weaker in size, and lacks sufficient strategic depth to trade territory for time. If China attacks Taiwan, the reasonable option for Taiwan’s defense planners is to try to win the war politically through not losing the battle militarily. If the PLA attacking forces can defeat Taiwan’s reactive forces or coerce Taiwanese leaders to capitulate in a short period of time, China will win decisively. Then, even if the United States is willing to come to the assistance of Taiwan, it becomes irrelevant. Unless the United States is prepared to take on an all-out military operation against China and risk a possible nuclear showdown, Washington has virtually no other significant options but accepting the *fait accompli*. Conversely, if Taiwan can resist long enough, the morale of Taiwanese populace can be bolstered, the reservists can be mobilized, and most importantly, the US military assistance may arrive in time. As Taiwan’s former Chief of General Staff from 1981 to 1989, General Hau Pei-Tsun once told President Chiang Ching-Kuo, “the most important thing for the operation [of defending Taiwan], is to withstand a [enemy] first-strike. The situation will change if we are able to withstand the first-strike successfully.”⁸ Consequently, the pivot of Taiwan’s military doctrine is based upon so-called strategic sustainability that is, by definition, “to preserve combat power, to avoid a premature campaign with the enemy, to wear down the enemy’s combat power piecemeal...in order to buy time and direct the strategic situation favorable to us.”⁹ General Hau further suggested four principles of “strategic sustainability”: “preserve the strength, maximize gains by minimizing the costs, avoid being committed in full strength at the early campaign, and engage the enemy at the most advantageous time.”¹⁰

Such an operational concept of “strategic sustainability” can be exemplified by the denial of early air or naval engagements with the PLA invading forces and the prominence of layered ground defense in the Taiwan’s military doctrines. It is generally believed by the Taiwan military that its air or naval assets—the former in particular—should not be gambled on the struggles of command of the air and the sea at the early stage of war. Rather, aircraft and warships should be preserved for supporting the upcoming ground battle. To General Hau and to most of the senior officers in Taiwan Armed Forces, ground defense is the only chance that can defeat the invading PLA or at least prolong the fighting until the US assistance comes. For them, the coastline of Taiwan Island is the most favorable perimeter for defense. The most advantageous timing to commit Taiwan’s major defensive forces and to engage the PLA is when the invading enemy just land on the beach of Taiwan. Even today, such an army-centric operation concept persists. Ground defense has received greater attention in Taiwan’s military establishment doctrinally and institutionally.¹¹ As a result, if military conflict erupts in

the Taiwan Strait, most aircraft of Taiwan's air forces will immediately withdraw to two large underground bases in the eastern Taiwan and come out again only when the PLA amphibious attempt is imminent. In a word, the essence of the "strategic sustainability" is buying time.

Therefore, it naturally turns to two fundamental questions: how long Taiwanese can hold up Chinese attacks and how soon Americans will rush to the scene. Both questions are time-sensitive. The answers depend on many interacting factors: geographical conditions, Taiwan's defense capabilities vis-à-vis the PLA, and the US military presence in the East Asian region are the most important. In the past, these factors were all favorable to Taiwan.

Good Old Days

In 1948–1949, the Chinese civil war entered its final stage. Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang (KMT) forces were losing the war on the mainland. In November 1948, the communist forces seized Manchuria and with it 400,000 KMT's best-equipped troops were wiped out. Then in January 1949, another battle in the heart of the mainland ended in catastrophe for KMT with 500,000 of Chiang's strategic reserves and most of his capable generals being annihilated. At the same time, the KMT garrison in Beijing surrendered with a further 500,000 nationalist forces responsible for defending northern China being killed or captured. In April, the communist forces crossed the Yangzi River, Chiang's final defensive line, and routed the KMT commanders' 400,000 press-ganged troops. Within one year, Chiang lost approximately 1,800,000 troops and the fate of KMT regime was sealed with any organized armed defense on the mainland virtually ceasing to exist. By the end of 1949, it appeared that the PLA could easily crush Chiang's remaining KMT troops on Taiwan in no time.

However, it was initially Taiwan's geographical features that gave Chiang the badly needed time to reorganize his demoralized KMT forces on Taiwan and saved them from total annihilation. The island of Taiwan is separated from mainland China by the Taiwan Strait, which is about 220km at its widest point and 130km at its narrowest. This awesome natural obstacle meant that any PLA invasion against Taiwan must inevitably involve large-scale amphibious operations backed by significant numbers of combat aircrafts and naval vessels.

Although the PLA successfully conducted several joint amphibious attacks against KMT-controlled offshore islands, like Hainan Island (1950) and Yijiangshan Islands (1954), the operational requirement for attacking Taiwan posed a very demanding, if not impossible, task for the land army-centric PLA. Meanwhile, the PLA's operational difficulties were complicated by the fact that several chokepoint island groups off the Chinese coastline, such as Quemoy (Kinmen) Island and Matsu Island, were held firmly by Chiang's KMT troops. Chiang had stationed sizeable forward-based troop deployments (about 150,000–170,000 men) on these tiny offshore islands and adopted an offensive posture from them to raid China's coastal area. Therefore, for the PLA, these offshore islands had to be taken first before any military invasion against Taiwan could be attempted. Although some authors argue that the PLA was capable of conducting

skillful joint amphibious operations,¹² any attacks against KMT-controlled offshore islands were still risky. For example, two PLA amphibious attacks against Quemoy Island and Tenggü Island in 1949 were both appallingly defeated. In the Quemoy Battle of 1949 (Kunintou Victory in Taiwan's terms), nearly 9,000 PLA landing troops were totally crushed in a three-day intensive fighting. The Quemoy Battle of 1949 clearly demonstrated the operational difficulties of mounting an amphibious landing against determined defenders even on a small island located only few miles away from the mainland, let alone against the more distant and heavily defended island of Taiwan itself.

Later, the US security commitment to Taiwan greatly increased the PLA's operational difficulties for mounting any amphibious attacks against Taiwan. Immediately after the outbreak of Korea War in 1950, the US government changed its stand toward Chiang's KMT regime and announced it was committed "to neutralize the Taiwan Strait" by the US Seventh Fleet. Although the very purpose of the US policy was to prevent another war in the Taiwan Strait to distract the Korea War, the policy of "neutralization of the Taiwan Strait" did provide a security umbrella to Chiang's KMT regime. Later in 1954, the signing of the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty and US congressional authorization of the Formosa Resolution further strengthened the US-Taiwan security link. Until 1979, the US naval vessels of the Seventh Fleet patrolled in the Strait and American soldiers, aircrew, and intelligence personnel were stationed in Taiwan. The chance for the PLA to break through US-Taiwan defense forces without risking nuclear escalation was slim. In addition, Taiwan also reorganized and modernized its military into a US-style armed force, equipped with American frontline weapons, and received training by US military consultants in order to jointly operate with the American troops.

Both the US deterrent and Taiwanese defense capabilities passed the "test of conflict" twice—first in 1954 and then in 1958. In the latter case, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taiwan's troops on Quemoy were surprised at the outset of the PLA onslaught. But, with the US timely military support, Taiwanese defenders utilized their weapon and geographical advantages and successfully held the island.

Traditionally, the PLA commanders had used an offensive strategy of so-called Banana Peeling by taking the defending outposts first and then making the main defense line impossible to defend. Similar to the PLA targeting on Ichiangsan Island and Tachen Island in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, China established two objectives in its bombardment of Quemoy: first, to drive the KMT forces out of Quemoy and even Matsu; and then, to test the bottom line of US defensive policy toward the Taiwan Strait.¹³ Also, as in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PLA used deception to confuse Taiwanese defense deployment. Although the defenders were alarmed by some tactical warnings and the combat skirmishes in the air were already intensive in late July, the PLA heavy bombardment on August 23, 1958 still achieved surprise. The first salvo of 57,000 shells in two hours inflicted severe damage on Chiang's troops on Quemoy with three capable senior officers including two deputy commanders-in-chief killed instantly. Then, Taiwan's Defense Minister on an official inspection on Quemoy,

was wounded. All command and communication channels on the island were immediately disrupted, and one fifth of defenders' casualties during the crisis occurred in the first day of bombardment. The sea and air resupply lines were cut. The situation on Quemoy seemed to be pessimistic.

Within the framework of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, Taiwan and the United States formulated a number of joint war plans for the defense of Taiwan. Among them were the Rochester Plan and the Aries Plan—both were signed in 1956. The latter involved the United States assisting Taiwan to defend the Quemoy and Matsu islands from invasion if such an invasion was in aid of, and in preparation for, an armed attack on Taiwan Island itself. During the 1958 crisis period, the Aries Plan was promptly brought into effect. The US government responded to the crisis with strong military posture linked to a Taiwanese determination to cede no land area. Before the bombardment, the United States deployed 600-nautical-mile nuclear-capable surface-to-surface MATADOR missiles in Taiwan and provided Taiwan's Air Forces with the latest SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles. When the crisis erupted on August 23, the US Seventh Fleet escorted Taiwan's resupply naval convoys for Quemoy. In addition, it immediately deployed at least five squadrons of combat fighters (including F-100s, F-104s, and F-4Ds) together with a *HERCULES* surface-to-air missile battalion to Taiwan and took over the responsibility of air defense over Taiwan and Penghu Islands. Within one month, the United States delivered new RF-100A and RF-101A fighters, more F-86 fighters, battle tanks, air defense missiles, and eight-inch nuclear-capable howitzers to Taiwan.¹⁴ With the US timely assistance and safeguarding the rear areas, Taiwan's Air Force and Navy had a free hand to deal with the PLA attacking forces. According to Taipei source, in the 13 major air engagements and 6 major naval encounters during the crisis period, the PLA lost 32 MIG-17 fighters and 27 torpedo boats or gun boats while Taiwan only lost 3 F-84 and F-86 fighters, one civilian supply ship, and one landing ship.¹⁵ Since the PLA failed to seize local air superiority and sea control, the resupply line for Quemoy was kept open. With no possibility of expelling Chiang's troops out of Quemoy, the Chinese Communist leadership decided to back down and de-escalate the crisis on October 6.

The case of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis exemplified a favorable military balance—a product made by a perfect combination of geographical conditions, Taiwan's capabilities, and a major US military presence. Even when the PLA launched a surprise attack in overwhelming numbers, Taiwan, with the US immediate support, was able to defeat the PLA forces on the spot or, at worst, defended itself for a long period of time until the large US force arrived. During the 1950s to 1970s, although Chinese leadership often adopted a comparatively aggressive rhetoric and action toward Taiwan at that time, these same favorable factors have helped to stabilize the status quo and maintain a largely military equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait for decades.

Turning Tide

The breaking of diplomatic relation with the United States, and the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, marked a turning point in Taiwan's defense

planning. Meanwhile, China's military modernization—launched in the mid-1980s and later accelerated in the 1990s—continued to transform the PLA forces from a continent-confined army to an air and ocean-going force with significant force-projection capabilities. As a result, all previous favorable factors, including geographical conditions, Taiwan's defense capabilities vis-à-vis the PLA, and the US military presence in the region, became increasingly questionable.

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was immediately legislated in the US Congress as a compensation for the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty to safeguard Taiwan's security. Seen from Taiwan's view, the TRA was by no means an equal replacement for the previous formal military alliance. The US troops and advisors were withdrawn from Taiwan and the US naval patrol missions in the Strait were officially terminated. There are now no more American troops stationed in Taiwan to take charge of the defense of the rear areas of Taiwan and Penghu, and Taiwanese forces has to bear full burden for defending all the ROC-controlled territory including the offshore islands. More importantly, it implies that even though the United States has deployed some forces in Japan, South Korea, and Guam, any possible US reinforcement of significant size may still have to come from Hawaii; the transit time from Hawaii to the Taiwan Strait takes 9–14 days.¹⁶ This meant that Taiwanese defenders not only must fight alone at the outset of China's attacks but also need to withstand the attacks and to sustain an effective defense for at least two weeks.

Furthermore, although the US promise of providing Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character" and "defense articles and defense service... [that] may be necessary to enable Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,"¹⁷ the scale of its arms sales and military cooperation was in fact downgraded. In comparison with the practices back in the "good old days" when Taiwan could acquire frontline US equipment and had various accesses to joint field exercises with the American troops, Taiwan's defense needs were largely ignored in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1982, the US refusal to sell Taiwan FX fighters—but agreed to coproduce relatively inferior F-5E fighters instead—and the US statement "to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan" in the August 17th Communiqué fueled Taiwanese suspicions of a drop in US military support. Although the successive US administrations chose to interpret the August 17th Communiqué selectively, President George Bush Senior finally approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992. Nevertheless, many Taiwanese felt that the US arms sales were not because of full-hearted friendship or a shared course of action for containing the communist China, but rather it was US domestic interests at stake. Or perhaps the US arms sales were caused by the fact that Taiwan can produce equivalent equipments indigenously or access to other countries acquire arms. In the case of F-16s sale, Bush's domestic constituency interests, Taiwan's own Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs) and the French sale of 60 MIRAGE-2000 fighters were all seen as the key factors supporting the US sale. A decade later, this disbelieving sentiment together with other political motivations triggered local opposition political parties—namely the KMT and People First Party—to continue foot-dragging in Legislative Yuan (LY) discussion of President George W. Bush's April 2001 proposed arm sales package of PATRIOT

antimissile batteries, P-3C ORION maritime patrol aircraft, and conventional submarines.

Moreover, the wording of “arms of a defensive character” in the TRA immediately causes considerable confusion. The definition of “defensive” also lacks clarity. Before President Bush (Junior) suddenly agreed to Taiwan’s procurement of new submarines in 2001, Taiwan’s procurement requests for conventional submarines had been rejected repeatedly since submarines had been regarded as “offensive” weapons by the US officials. The defense of Taiwan is, of course, defensive by nature. However, the consequence of overemphasizing defensive has created a serious window of vulnerability and doctrinal stagnation in Taiwan. Taken by way of illustration, since the “good old days,” Taiwan’s military has been deliberately built into a US style force with all its equipments, logistics, organization, and even clothing. However, Taiwanese forces have rarely been allowed to take the military offensive as the US troops have done when facing similar, outnumbered situations. When facing short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) threats such as during the 1990 Gulf War, the US troops, according to their operational doctrines, would not rely only on the PATRIOT for engaging incoming missiles. In addition, they had operational orders to seek to eliminate the missile threat at source, such as hunting the Iraqi SCUD launch vehicles on the ground deep inside Iraq. However, Taiwan’s Armed Forces is prohibited from taking such a dual approach to neutralize China’s missile threat. By rejecting Taiwan’s repeated request to obtain high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) or joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) as well as by suppressing Taiwan’s efforts to develop indigenous long-range cruise/ballistic missiles—so-called countermeasure weapons or Tactical Shore-based Missiles for Fire Suppression (TSMFS)—the United States has in fact limited Taiwan to relying only on the rather static and expensive option of missile defense. Without countermeasure to eliminate the missile threat at source, a missile defense may easily be overwhelmed by China’s estimated 1,000 multitype SRBM and cruise missiles targeted on Taiwan.

Another drawback was the reduction of Taiwan-US military cooperation since 1979. Before the 1995–1996 Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US military and civilian defense officials had little contact with their Taiwanese counterparts except on few occasions relating to arms sales discussions. The lack of mutual understanding during the 1995–1996 crisis highlighted the need to enhance communication and pushed both sides to establish a multilayered framework for security/military dialogues—the annual Monterey Talks (established in 1997) is the most important one among them.¹⁸ However, the progress of US-Taiwan military cooperation, according to many Taiwanese, is still confined in terms of low level and scope. The US general officers are prohibited from visiting Taiwan; and Taiwan’s Defense Minister is not allowed to enter Washington, DC. Although more than 1,000 Taiwan military personnel receive military education or training in the United States every year, the United States still does not agree to have Taiwanese “participate” in US exercises in the Asian region, which, as some observers believe, is the only way to ensure that American and Taiwan forces could cooperate effectively in the event of a cross-Strait crisis or conflict.¹⁹

PLA Flexible Options against Taiwan

On the other side of the Strait, China reoriented its national military strategy from continental to peripheral defense in the mid-1980s. Under the defense guideline, the PLA's operational concept accordingly shifted from "people's war" to "local, limited war under high-tech conditions." Consequently, an ocean-going oriented force structure started to take shape in the 1980s and 1990s.²⁰ With steady growth in defense spending, the PLA modernization has obtained a solid progress since then. As a result, in addition to its long-established quantitative superiority, the PLA, with major state-of-the-art weapons acquisitions from the Russian Federation, now possesses ever-increasing advanced weapons that may suppress Taiwan's defense and deny the US military forces access to the area around the Taiwan Strait. The PLA currently has the ability to undertake intensive, short-duration air, missile, and naval attacks on Taiwan, as well as more prolonged invasion scenarios.²¹ Several key PLA force-projection capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwanese defense are the following.

Air capabilities

China's acquisition of advanced SU-27 fighters from Russia during the 1990s was a leaping progress in terms of equipment for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Some observers believe the SU-27 is superior to Taiwan's F-16 in overall performance.²² More importantly, the combat radius of this heavy fighter is up to 800 nautical miles, which presents the PLAAF with more operational options, including attacking Taiwan from its eastern coast to overthrow Taiwan's western defense front. As for the more recently introduced SU-30, its performance is even superior to the SU-27—hence further broadened the gap between Taiwan and PRC's air-to-air combat capability. Moreover, the SU-30 has powerful air-to-surface and air-to-ship attacking capabilities. Due to its operational flexibility, the SU-30 will play a key role in the leading echelon of attacking Taiwan. The recent Chinese indigenous J-10, being referred to as a duplicate of Israeli fighters, has begun deployment at a PLAAF airfield on the southeast coast of China in 2007.²³ The performance of the PLAAF J-10 is said to be equivalent to that of the American F-16. These three types of main fighters are estimated to be over 270 in numbers, with more than half being deployed within 600 nautical miles of Taiwan—the remaining can arrive in a brief period of time. Currently, the PLA deploys more than 700 aircraft within 600 nautical miles (and 150 aircraft within 250 nautical miles) of Taiwan's western coast to confront Taiwan's 331 frontline fighters (including 146 F-16s, 57 MIRAGE-2000s, and 128 IDFs).²⁴ In the upcoming years, the number of SU-27 and J-10 fighters deployed within this range will noticeably increase due to the mass production of the J-11 (China's indigenous copy of the SU-27) and J-10. Furthermore, in order to confuse and complicate Taiwan's air defense and to further exploit its advantage in aircraft number, the PLAAF's large but obsolete J-6 fleet (estimated at 36 to 300 aircraft) is now considered to be refitted as kamikaze-style unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and will be employed together with more sophisticated

Israeli-made HARPY UAV and Russian-made antiradiation missiles at the outset of air operation against Taiwan.²⁵

Naval capabilities

China has as many as 150 main combatant ships (of which 78 are submarines), in comparison with Taiwan's 28 ships (of which 2 are operational submarines). The PLA Navy (PLAN) clearly holds a quantitative advantage in both naval surface and underwater combat power. Although Taiwan's four recently purchased KIDD-class destroyers have slightly improved the naval balance, it is not possible to command the sea if one cannot command the airspace over the fleet. The "most troublesome [factor] for Taiwan's naval defense is, quite simple, geography. The island's propinquity to the [Chinese] mainland will make it difficult for Taipei to counter-balance Beijing's air power."²⁶ Since Taiwan and China have deployed a large number of land-based long-range antiship missiles on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Strait has become extremely unfavorable for big fleet action. On one hand, this will force the already disadvantaged Taiwanese Navy to divide its fleet to both the northern and southern operations. On the other hand, Taiwanese Navy will have to face the dilemma of sailing far away from Taiwan to become a fleet-in-being, or remain near Taiwan and act as a fortified fleet. Although Taiwanese Navy will have better chance of survival in the former alternative, some critics believe that such a distant maneuver is unhelpful to the defense of Taiwan—the PLA attacking echelon may just ignore its existence and go straight toward targets on Taiwan. Other critics believe that the latter alternative, however, will lose the mobility of the fleet and can be entirely destroyed by PLA's consistent air attacks. It is evident that both alternatives and arguments expose Taiwan's naval operational dilemma without the assurance of air superiority in the Taiwan Strait.²⁷

Missile capabilities

Due to the technological uncertainties of missile defense as well as Taiwan's insufficient investment in PATRIOT batteries, China's missile (both ballistic and cruise missiles) deployment is to be seen as the most critical factor in the cross-Strait military balance. Indeed, Chinese missiles may be not precise enough to strike Taiwan's point targets. However, from the perspective of Chinese leaders, these missiles are not merely a perfect tool for political coercion, but also have actual combat value. As for the latter, missiles, because of their short warning time and high penetration rate, are definitely one of the most significant weapons for the PLA to carry out a surprise attack against Taiwan. It is believed that a Chinese PLA missile raid together with follow-on air strike can inflict considerable damage on all existing airfields in Taiwan and neutralize Taiwan Air Force on the ground. "The main task of the PLA tactical missile forces is to gain air superiority at the outset of war," as one Taiwan Air Force officer convincingly pointed out:

The most likely targets [of the PLA missile strike] would be our airfields, land-based air defense missiles, radar sites, and C4I centers. These targets may have been

well-protected, but if one enemy missile scores a direct hit, it could break a hole in our air defense network. The PLAAF aircraft would immediately exploit that hole and, by continuous intense air strikes, tear it up into a huge gap...and cause our overall air defense network to collapse.²⁸

Dr. Jonathan Pollack therefore concluded, “the SRBM force is expected to provide the PLA (in conjunction with other capabilities) [with] appreciable military advantage for which Taiwan has no effective response or defense.”²⁹ After the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–1996, the PLA Second Artillery has received great recognition from Chinese civilian leadership and continued to enlarge its organization and equipment. At present, the PLA Second Artillery is divided into seven corps-level bases; besides one used for training, the other six operational bases are in command of three to four missile brigades. However, there is one exception: the 52nd base in charge of attacking Taiwan has seven missile brigades under its command.³⁰ Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian recently announced that the number of China’s ballistic missiles against Taiwan has increased from 200 in 2000 to 988 in 2007—with a continuing growth rate of 100–120 each year.³¹ The US DoD asserted that the PLA is developing first- and second-generation land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) which have hard-target strike and increased stand-off capability.³² A Taipei media source indicated that the 1,500km-range Dong-Hai 10 LACMs have been deployed in the Second Artillery brigades.³³ In comparison, Taiwan’s missile defense capability is virtually trivial. Taiwan has only three PATRIOT-2 missile bases with the capacity of only providing basic antimissile protection to the Taipei capital area. The result is that the areas outside of Taipei (including Hsingchu which plays a significant research and development role in the world’s information technology industry) have absolutely no missile defense. Not only are these handful of PATRIOT bases facing the danger of being the primary target of PRC’s antiradiation missiles and special operations forces, but also the limited-numbers of missiles that Taiwan possesses cannot take down all the potential incoming PLA missiles. However, with such grave threat at hand, the procurement budget for the purchase of new PATRIOT-3 missiles is still boycotted by the Opposition parties, and is not likely to be passed until 2008 (if at all).

Furthermore, the United States neglecting Taiwan’s need to develop its own missiles deprives Taipei of a sensible tactical solution to counterbalance China’s awesome missile threats. Even Dr. Pollack concludes that the value of missile “though triggering initial and widespread civilian terror, seldom yielded the desired long-term effects. If anything, missile attacks ultimately stiffened domestic resolve, and the military effects (despite sometime producing significant casualties) have rarely proven decisive.”³⁴ Since Taiwan’s limited missile defense is hardly capable of neutralizing China’s missile threats and the United States does not agree with Taiwan deploying TSMFS to strike back, the question of Taiwan’s people and armed forces morale after China’s continuous missile attack becomes questionable.

Space capabilities

Space-based sensors are the most critical assets in modern warfare. China recognizes the strategic significance of space-based sensors and has placed military

satellites as a top priority of its military technology development program. Currently, China has the space-based capabilities including all-weather target reconnaissance, secure military communication, and signal intelligence collection, which will effectively support any possible military operations against Taiwan.³⁵ In January 2007, China launched a ballistic missile in a test to destroy its own old weather satellite as a manifestation of its space ambition and capabilities. At present, Taiwan does not own any military-specific satellites because no countries are willing to launch them for Taiwan. Due to the fact that the United States believes having a launch capability for satellites is equivalent to developing ballistic missiles, it therefore prohibits Taiwan from doing so. Taiwan currently only operates civil-military dual-use satellites for communications and local satellite imaging.

Conclusion

One of the key findings proposed by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its 2006 annual report stated that "the cross-Straits military balance... currently substantially favors the mainland. China possesses advanced aircraft, submarines, surface vessels, and ballistic missiles, in greater quantities and, in many cases, equal or greater sophistication than Taiwan's." Therefore, the report concluded that "in an all-out conflict between the two, Taiwan, if relying only on its own capabilities, would be unable to prevent China from ultimately realizing its objectives."³⁶ As previously mentioned, in a plausible cross-Straits conflict, the PLA has the advantage in the element of time. The PRC leaders may believe that, by a decisive first-strike, the PLA is able to defeat Taiwan's defense before a US military assistance can arrive; or, in a prolonged confrontation, break down the American will to intervene and Taiwan's determination to resist. In comparison to the traditional, prolonged scenario, a PLA blitzkrieg against Taiwan to deprive the United States' and Taiwan's time to respond will be more deadly to a small country like Taiwan.

Recent development indicates that the PLA possession of such a knockout capability is no longer a remote matter. In order to prevent PRC leaders from adopting dangerously optimistic assessment of using force against the island, Taiwan and the United States can neutralize or reduce the PLA's advantage in the element of time through following measures:

- A. Harden: Given the fact that Taiwan's key civilian and military facilities are mostly fixed, the question of whether their hardening site protection is capable of surviving PRC's first-strike indeed raises grave concerns. Many Taiwan's critical (civilian or military) infrastructures lack of hardening protection and redundancy, and thus become easy targets of the PLA air, missile, or special operations. Taiwan should do its best to reduce its current vulnerabilities of (civilian or military) critical infrastructure. In the military aspect, the improvement of airfields is imperative since the airfields will definitely be one of the priority targets in the PLA first-strike. The speed of restoring airfield operation after the PLA missile raids will decide the outcome of air superiority over Taiwan.

- B. Military crisis management: Taiwan needs to establish a sound inter-agency military crisis management in order to overcome the likely chaos under the PLA first-strike. If Taiwan government cannot recover from the shock and panic at the outset of crisis and maintain its vital functions during the whole period of crisis, it will unlikely have a well-organized and concerted response to China's surprise attacks. Currently, Taiwan is now establishing some highly confidential programs to improve its capability of military crisis management and continuity of government. A related national-level exercise and war-game, code-named Yu-Shan Exercise, is held every year.³⁷
- C. Early strategic warning: Although Taiwan recently acquired an early warning radar from the United States that helps Taiwan defense planners to have a few more seconds to detect the incoming missiles, a mechanism of early detection and warning for issuing strategic warning alarm is still needed. This is not only the matter of hardware procurement, but also related to built-in procedure in Taiwan's military crisis management mechanism.
- D. Taiwan should have the capability to disturb the operational tempo of the PLA: The United States ought to allow Taiwan to possess some precise counterforce capabilities in order to neutralize PLA's command and control facilities, airfields, force assembly areas, and missile sites, hence drive the PLA to separate its forces in carrying out defensive missions, disturb its attack operational tempo, and by doing so, buy Taiwan more time.
- E. Hotline: In order to prevent misperception and miscalculation in times of crisis, the United States has proposed to establish a military hotline between the PLA and the Pentagon, United States.³⁸ Based upon the same reason, a hotline between Taiwan and the United States is also needed. An emergency communication channel during times of crisis between Taiwan and the United States should not be merely limited to the operational level, but should be upgraded and include the policy level as well. Moreover, this channel should be secured, confidential, and contain multiple redundancy systems. Through a hotline, Taiwan and the United States can instantly communicate in times of emergency, reduce time pressure, and facilitate concerted actions.
- F. Mutual understanding of crisis actions: Taiwan and the United States should improve implicit consensuses or arrangement regarding likely crisis actions through exercises and discussion. Both sides should strengthen information sharing, reduce the chance of misunderstanding each other's intention, and minimize the need to speculate in times of crisis.
- G. Attitude of the Japanese: As soon as the US military forces decide to intervene in a cross-Strait conflict, whether and how much Japan will support that US action will profoundly influence the effectiveness and sustainability of US military presence or operation in the conflict area. Currently, United States and Japan share a sturdy security cooperation mechanism under the US-Japan Security Treaty. However, at present, there is not even a basic crisis management channel between Taiwan and Japan. The United States should encourage separate and direct line of bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan.

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CHAPTER 15

JAPAN AND THE SECURITY OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT

June Teufel Dreyer

Although Japanese interest in Taiwan's security did not totally disappear after Tokyo formally relinquished control of its former colony, it was informal and conducted largely out of public view. Both Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan were under American protection, and Japan was constitutionally barred from maintaining a military force. In addition, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) remained essentially a continental force with little ability to project power beyond the country's borders. After months of hostile PLA actions in and around the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996 that looked like they might be a prelude to invasion, Tokyo became more concerned with ensuring the stability of the Strait and has gradually assumed a more active posture in tandem with Washington. It agreed to provide the United States with logistics support in contingencies involving “the areas surrounding Japan,” and in February 2005, the two sides issued a statement that a peaceful Taiwan Strait was a common strategic objective.

Taiwan between China and Japan

Geographically situated between China and Japan, Taiwan was basically ignored by the two governments for most of its history. In the late seventeenth century, after the Qing (Manchu) dynasty conquered a regime founded by a half-Chinese half-Japanese pirate, who had himself expelled Dutch colonialists from the island several decades before, there began a debate in the Qing court about what to do with Taiwan. One faction advocated abandoning it, on the grounds that the island was isolated, far away from China, and a hideout for pirates, escaped convicts, deserters, and ruffians. Having no value, Taiwan should be left to its own devices. Ethnic Chinese currently living on the island should be shipped back to China. This faction did, however, recognize the strategic value of the Penghu (Pescadores) islands, which lie between Taiwan and China, arguing that they would have to be retained.

The other faction argued that China could not be defended from the Penghu islands alone: Taiwan was a natural shield for the country's southeastern provinces. Moreover, the dynasty could profit from its rich soil and other natural resources. Faction members felt that the policy of shipping migrants back to China was impractical; they would simply flee to the mountains that form the spine of the island, where they would join with the escaped convicts and aboriginal peoples who already lived there. This motley group would soon be tempted to attack coastal China. Hence, any attempts at repatriation ran the risk of creating greater problems in the future. Furthermore, abandoning Taiwan might tempt the Dutch to return there and to extend their interest to the Penghu islands.

The retention side won out, although Qing rule tended to be nominal. Since the island was considered an undesirable posting, the officials Beijing sent to Taiwan were typically of low quality; they were poorly paid as well. The result was corruption and bribery even beyond the levels that existed in China. Rebellion was endemic, with records indicating about a hundred major and minor uprisings during the 212 years of Qing administration, however nominal this administration might have been. This, plus the diseases that thrived in Taiwan's subtropical climate and its reputation as a home to poisonous snakes, combined to keep Beijing's interest in the area low. Only government officials and approved merchants were legally allowed to go to Taiwan, but their families were not permitted to join them. Quite a few intermarried with the aboriginals. Other immigration from China was forbidden, though it took place to some extent.¹ Schools existed to teach the Confucian classics to the sons of elite families, and a number of their students sat for the imperial civil service examination. Nevertheless, the veneer of Chinese civilization was thin. In the 1880s, the literati totaled less than half of 1% of the population, well below levels on the mainland.²

In the mid-nineteenth century, Western ships began to appear in Asia, aggressively seeking trade and, often, territorial acquisitions. Wishing to counter their incursions, both China and Japan adopted self-strengthening movements: China failed badly, while Japan succeeded impressively. Emulating the Western powers, the Tokyo government embarked on an expansionist policy of its own. Noting Japanese interest in Taiwan, the Qing sought to protect the territory by making it a province of China. However, the Japanese defeat of the Qing in the Sino-Japanese War spelled the failure of this attempt at retention. Under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, Taiwan became a colony of Japan. It had been a province of Qing China for less than 10 years.

The Japanese Colonial Era

As the era's only non-Western colonial power, it was important for Japan to produce a model colony worthy of the Empire of the Rising Sun. After suppressing armed resistance, Japan announced that those who were unhappy with the new government would be given two years to leave the island. Only a very small number, estimated at 0.16% of the population did.³ These presumably included most of those who would have actively opposed Japanese rule had they stayed.

After the expiry of the two-year period, Tokyo imposed strict controls on trade across the Taiwan Strait, even refusing the Qing government's request for a consulate on the island. The colonizers arrived equipped with mandarin-speaking translators, but quickly discovered that most people did not understand the language. Substitutes were located who could communicate in Hoklo, Hakka, and the aboriginal tongues of the inhabitants. In sharp contrast to the indifferent administration of the Qing, the efficient Japanese established police controls, carried out a thorough land survey, and introduced standardized measurements and currency. Census data were collected, an ethnological survey of the island's people conducted, and monopolies set up for the manufacture and marketing of the island's major products. The winding, dusty streets of major cities were straightened, rationalized, paved, and given Japanese names. Impressive edifices were constructed for the use of the colonial bureaucracy, many of them designed by leading Japanese architects. A transportation system was created: railroads and paved roads linked the island's major cities, and streetcars carried urban dwellers to destinations within cities.

The educational system was revamped in line with reforms instituted as part of Japan's own modernization efforts. Both girls and boys would be taught basic literacy, mathematics, and loyalty to the new government. Although education focused on the masses, the most promising students were trained as scientists, engineers, physicians, and civil servants. Care was taken to see that Taiwanese were not educated beyond their station in life, which was understood to be well below that of the Japanese colonizers. The inevitable frictions arose, as Taiwanese resented being disadvantaged in competition for jobs in their own country. Demands for greater equality grew, but were not fully granted until the closing days of World War II, when it was too late to do the Taiwanese any good.⁴

Taiwan Becomes the Republic of China

The claim of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan elicited mixed reactions on the island. A number of Taiwanese were happy to see the Japanese, whom they privately referred to as "dogs, go." But they were, nonetheless, reluctant to "rejoin" a China they had never really felt part of, or which they felt had long ago rejected and abandoned them. Some Japanese army officers were sympathetic to this view. Within hours of Emperor Hirohito's public declaration of surrender, a small group of Taiwanese met with two Japanese military officers to proclaim an independent nation. The movement did not last long, partly because provincial governor Ando Rikichi, acting on orders from Tokyo, opposed it. Ando was also concerned that the movement might endanger the safety of the half-million ethnic Japanese on the island, and that if Japan were perceived as supporting it, the United States might be offended. The abortive attempt at independence, nonetheless, confirmed the KMT government's suspicions that the Taiwanese were less than loyal.⁵ This would soon lead to tragedy, and also to create a significant degree of nostalgia for the days of Japanese rule.

KMT and Japanese governments coordinated in the difficult tasks of demobilization and repatriation. Tens of thousands of Taiwanese soldiers and civilian

workers in the Japanese military who were serving in Japanese-occupied China and Southeast Asia had to be returned to the island. The Japanese population of Taiwan was expected to leave the island. About two hundred thousand of them expressed reluctance to leave, since it meant abandoning homes, property, and a relatively secure existence. In Japan, by contrast, American bombing had leveled most major cities and there were severe food shortages. Although Taiwan too had been bombed, the level of war destruction it suffered was well below that of the Japanese home islands. Since the colonial economy had concentrated on developing agricultural products for the mother country, food stocks were more than adequate. Although Chiang Kai-shek's government took pains to avoid retaliation against the Japanese, Chiang, already suspicious of the allegiance of the Taiwanese, did not want to allow such large numbers of them to remain on the island. In the end, about 460,000 were repatriated, with an estimated 28,000, whose skills were deemed useful to the KMT government, being allowed to stay.

Unlike the Japanese when they took over Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek's government provided no grace period during which those who were opposed to it could leave, and hence there existed no escape mechanism for pressures. In contrast to the Qing dynasty's largely passive rule, the KMT regime was determined to turn the Taiwanese into good Chinese. Talk of independence was strictly forbidden, with the leaders of the aforementioned abortive independence coup receiving long prison sentences. People were required to learn Mandarin and penalties imposed on those who spoke Japanese or their native languages. Radio, film, and, when they arrived, television programs, were required to have a high mandarin content; parts for speakers of Hoklo, for example, tended to be confined to such roles as maids or menial laborers. A KMT Youth Corps provided indoctrination in the party's principles and endeavored to instill loyalty to the ROC.

The pleasure that a number of Taiwanese took in being liberated from Japanese colonialism was short-lived. The KMT treated the island's residents as collaborators, and their economy as a prize of war to be looted. Many of its functionaries were exceedingly corrupt. Initially viewing their stay on the island as temporary, they tried to extract as much wealth as they could in order to create a comfortable existence for themselves when they returned to the mainland. In the process, the infrastructure that the Japanese had created was destroyed. Railroad tracks, for example, were torn up and shipped to China, where they were sold as scrap. Once-high standards of sanitation sank to abysmal levels. Exorbitant prices were set for inoculations, which had been free under the Japanese, and diseases unheard of for decades began to return. Despite the imposition of numerous taxes, civil services deteriorated.

The tensions created by these policies exploded in the February 28, 1947 incident, which Chiang Kai-shek responded to with a bloody campaign of retribution that seemed to aim at wiping out an entire generation of Taiwanese intellectuals. Many thousands lost their lives; the survivors were intimidated into silence.⁶ What could not be spoken of openly, nonetheless, remained in the public consciousness and was discussed quietly among trusted groups of friends. The days of Japanese colonialism began to be remembered warmly. The less

nostalgic complained that “the dogs [Japanese] have gone, but the pigs [mainland Chinese] have come.” An American scholar who visited Taiwan in the late 1950s for a research project found many of his most valuable contacts by walking the city streets at night and saying, in Japanese, “Taiwan under the pigs is hell” and “Taiwan is a police state, but Japan is a democracy.” Although mainlanders did not understand, Taiwanese did, and would invite him into their homes and offer to introduce him to other like-minded individuals.⁷

Despite the KMT’s restrictions, some Taiwanese dissidents were able to leave the country; many of them went to Japan. While some chose to withdraw entirely from public life after they arrived, others became part of activist groups that plotted to overthrow the KMT government and establish a Taiwan for the Taiwanese. They recruited followers among Taiwanese students who were pursuing their education in Japan, prompting the KMT government to send spies to infiltrate the Taiwanese community in Japan. With the passage of time, Japan became less important than the United States as a meeting place for dissident groups, as young people increasingly opted to study in the United States.

Ironically, while working to extirpate all vestiges of Japanese influence on the Taiwanese, the KMT government enjoyed good relations with the Tokyo government. Chiang Kai-shek had tried to ensure that the Japanese troops could depart from both mainland and Taiwan in a dignified manner. Given the hatred that existed against the Japanese government on the Chinese mainland, this was no easy task, and the Japanese leadership was appreciative. A pro-Taiwan faction within Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party served the ROC’s interests well. Chiang had, its adherents pointed out, returned Japan’s wartime cruelties with magnanimity. They cited four particulars:

- Chiang had opposed the abolition of the Imperial Household after the war.
- he had been “strict but generous” toward Japanese soldiers and civilians in China after Japan’s surrender, thus greatly facilitating their repatriation.
- he had strongly opposed suggestions that Japan be divided into zones of occupation.
- he had turned down the opportunity to exact reparations from Japan.⁸

Both prior ties to Taiwan developed during the colonial era and hostility to the communist ideology of the Mao Zedong government that had taken over the mainland contributed to the level of Japanese support for the ROC. Cooperation occurred in a variety of ways; one of the more surprising was in the military sphere. Although it would have been treasonous to say so in the 1930s and 1940s, many KMT members admired the Japanese system of military and police, and in particular its ability to suppress communism. Chiang, as well as many other KMT officers, had studied at Japanese military academies; Chiang’s younger son had a Japanese mother. On the mainland, 2,600 Japanese troops, wearing KMT uniforms but under the command of their presurrender Japanese officers, fought with KMT general Yan Xishan against Mao’s army until 1948. In 2006, a left-wing Japanese filmmaker gained prominence for a documentary critical of this.⁹ The Tokyo government responded that the men had left their units and

volunteered to join the KMT army; the surviving soldiers maintain that being told to volunteer by a Japanese officer was the same as being given an order, and that throughout their service in the KMT army, they continued to be bound by Japanese army regulations.¹⁰

After Chiang had consolidated power in Taiwan, a Japanese military presence of sorts returned. Like the force that fought with Yan Xishan, it was informal and its activities were conducted out of public view. Retired imperial military officers began arriving in Taipei in the 1949–1950 period. Known as the White Group, possibly because the Chinese surname of their leader, Tomita Naosuke, was Pai (Bai), meaning white, the officers helped to create the Yuan Shan Training Institute north of Taipei. General Peng Mengji, known as the Butcher of Kaohsiung for brutality of his actions in the February 28 massacre, was named the institute's director. Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's elder son and heir, was also active in the institute. Ching-kuo was reportedly more comfortable with those who, like Peng, had studied in Japan than with those who had studied in the United States. However, the Japanese purview was limited to supplying military advice. Taiwanese were shielded from contact with the former colonial rulers who focused on their professional duties and eschewed involvement in political matters.

The Japanese government had no formal role in cross-Strait security at this time, apart from providing bases for the US military from which American forces could, if needed, repel an attempted invasion by Mao Zedong's PLA. Though Chinese troops fought hard in Korea, they were basically a ground force. A serious Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan would have to wait the development of still nascent maritime and air force assets. Moreover, Japan was restricted by Article Nine of its American-inspired constitution from maintaining military forces. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington began to rethink the wisdom of this policy, but the die was cast. In 1954, a modest military-equivalent called the Self-Defense Force (SDF) was established, though constitutional challenges to its right to exist remained for decades thereafter. Itself under the protection of the United States' military umbrella, Japan was hardly in a position to contribute substantively to the defense of the Taiwan Strait.

Several Japanese leaders felt strongly that, as a sovereign state, their country should certainly have the right to defend itself and its vital interests. Notwithstanding the horrors of war, fresh in the public consciousness at the time the constitution was drafted, pacifist sentiments were strong. It was politically dangerous to express pro-defense views openly. Those holding them succeeded in adding the innocuous-sounding phrase "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph"—a paragraph that contained a clause stating that the Japanese were determined to preserve their peace and security—so that the nation could exercise the right of individual self-defense and maintain forces to that end. It was through this loophole that, its supporters argued, the SDF could legitimately exist. Previous drafts of the constitution had specifically prohibited using force in self-defense and maintaining any kind of military establishment.

Under the influence of US policy, Japan accorded diplomatic recognition to Taipei rather than Beijing. Japanese corporations had lucrative investments

in Taiwan, where rapid economic growth was creating increasing demand for Japanese products. Through the so-called dummy companies, these corporations were able to trade with the PRC. Given the hostility between the two sides of the Strait, this involved a delicate balancing act: Taiwan continued to be an irritant in relations between China and Japan, and China an irritant in relations between Taiwan and Japan. These remained after Japan broke formal relations with the ROC in 1972 and recognized the PRC as the sole government of China. So did the sizeable Japanese investments in Taiwan and the trade relations between the two countries. Japan remained the largest foreign investor in Taiwan from 1952 through the 1990s, and the two-way trade between them remains robust.

Unofficial, but substantive, Taiwan-Japanese diplomatic relations were conducted through interactions between Japan's Interchange Association (*Jiaoliu Xiehui* in Chinese; *Koryu Kyokai* in Japanese) in Taipei and Taiwan's Association for East Asian Relations (*Yadong Guanxi Xiehui* or *Yato Kankei Kyokai*) in Tokyo. A pro-Taiwan group, *Nikka Kankei Giin Kondankai*, better known by its abbreviated name, *Nikkakon*, was formed in 1973 within the Diet. It lobbied on behalf of Taiwan on such issues as rerecognition, and whether the property of the ROC should be turned over to the PRC. Another, *Seirankai* (Young Storm Association), was founded by staunch nationalist Ishihara Shintaro, who would later become governor of Tokyo. Consisting of 31 young, adamantly anticommunist LDP members who strongly opposed the PRC, *Seirankai* described the derecognition of the ROC as an "act of unforgivable betrayal through the acts of shameless ingrates and diplomatic Quislings."¹¹ Unfortunately for Taiwan, *Seirankai* was short-lived. From the mid-1970s, *Nikkakon*'s focus changed from promoting the ROC and calling for its rerecognition to its current function as an informal mechanism for contacts between political figures from Japan and Taiwan.

In the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), however, the so-called China School held sway. Composed of Chinese-speaking diplomats, school members generally favored an accommodationist policy toward the PRC. It is reasonable to suppose that there were others within MOFA who argued against a policy that they believed to be tilted too far toward China—that is, more in tune with former prime minister Sato's views than those of former prime minister Tanaka.¹² But, in general, MOFA appeared to have little interest in, or sympathy for, Taiwan.

Nor, apparently, did the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), as illustrated by the following anecdote. Meeting with high-ranking defense officials in 1996, a politically active Taiwanese pointed out that, because hundreds of Japanese merchant ships sailed through the Taiwan Strait every day, it was in the best interests of the Japanese government to help defend the waterway. The JDA head, he reported, replied, "we have the Beijing government's permission to use the Taiwan Strait." He believes that this attitude may have begun to change after the Chinese began testing missiles in the Strait.¹³

Japanese Influence Increases

Taiwan's Chiang dynasty ended with the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. Long groomed as Chiang Kai-shek's successor, elder son Ching-kuo had

ascended to the presidential office following his father's death in 1975. Ching-kuo, who had already taken important steps toward democratization, was in turn succeeded by the vice president he had personally chosen as his running mate. Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwan-born Hakka whose first language was Hoklo, had been educated under Japanese rule and received his undergraduate degree from Japan's prestigious Kyoto University as well as a doctorate from America's Cornell University.

Lee carried on the democratic reforms begun under his mentor, but quickened the pace and scope thereof. Given the far larger number of native-born vis-à-vis mainland-born citizens in the population, democratization inevitably involved Taiwanization. Beijing, eager to absorb Taiwan but realizing that non-mainland-born Taiwan leaders would be loath to agree to such an arrangement, opposed many of Lee's reforms, suspecting that they aimed at establishing Taiwan's de jure independence. Stating that it wished to solve what it referred to as "the Taiwan problem" peacefully, Beijing warned that it would invade if Taiwan declared itself independent. Though Lee never publicly stated that this was his intent, independence could easily be construed as the motive for many of his actions. Whether his goal was formal independence, continued separation from the mainland, or establishing a stronger bargaining position on the terms for unification, Japan was to become an important part of Lee's strategy.

In 1991, Lee's administration succeeded in changing the name of its de facto embassy in Tokyo from the potentially misleading Association of East Asian Relations to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO). Japanese culture, already very popular in Taiwan despite Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to replace it with Chinese forms, got a boost when, in 1993, the ban on Japanese language programming was lifted. An outspoken advocate of Taiwan's right to independence and a popular Japanese television figure, Jing Mei-ling, also known as Alice King, did much to enhance contacts and the interchange between the two countries. Like a number of other such figures, King was born in Taiwan but educated in Japan.

While the older generation had a great deal of nostalgia for Japanese colonial days—no doubt selectively forgetting its less pleasant aspects—the younger generation of Taiwanese was attracted by Japan's trendy new culture. Japanese fashions gained wide favor. Parents dressed toddlers in the latest designs from Miki House and themselves in the haute couture of Kenzo and Rei Kawakubo. Preteens and teenagers purchased a full array of Japan's popular Hello Kitty merchandise ranging from backpacks and lunchboxes to customized Kitty credit cards. When cable television arrived in Taiwan—it had been resisted by KMT interests, since the three major network channels were all owned by party or party-affiliated interests—Japanese offerings increased markedly. Most of Taiwan's popular variety shows are copied from Japanese models. In Taiwanese slang, *harizu* means "Japan freaks," and the April 1997 cover of the widely read Taiwan magazine *Hsin Hsin-wen* (*The Journalist*) showed two pretty teenagers dressed in the latest fads from Japan under a headline that roughly translated "Watch out: your children are turning into Japanese." Cultural exchanges occurred in both directions. Films from Taiwan played to enthusiastic audiences in Japan, and several of the

island's pop stars were sensations there as well. Theresa Teng Li-jun, whose songs in Japanese were regulars at the top of the Japanese hit parade, was a particular favorite.¹⁴

The "Japan Connection" and Cross-Strait Tensions

While *Hsin Hsin-wen* did not intend its warning about the younger generation turning into Japanese seriously, not all of Taiwan's citizens were happy with Lee's reforms, including the increasingly close ties with Tokyo. Many of those who had emigrated from the mainland to Taiwan in the 1945–1949 period were resistant to what amounted to desinicization. Not only was their culture being uprooted, but their personal status as members of the elite was also being undermined.

In 1991, Lee's administration announced that the ROC no longer claimed the right to rule the mainland. The two entities were separate and coequal part of China. As time went on, Lee went further. His policy of *bentuhua*, or localization, included such measures as reducing the Chinese content of history and geography classes, so that students would no longer have to memorize long lists of ancient emperors, and the names of rivers and rail lines in a country they had never been to. The history and geography of Taiwan were taught instead. Although mandarin remained the medium of instruction in schools, classes in Hoklo, Hakka, and aboriginal languages were also made available. Lee described his goal as the creation of a "new Taiwanese" who would be a blend of the many cultures that had impacted Taiwan over the years. Unstated but clearly understood by all, including the Beijing leadership, was the message that this was to be a separate identity that was only partially Chinese in nature.

Although Lee served both as ROC president and head of the KMT, his policies were opposed by a powerful and well-organized group within the KMT. Most of them had recent mainland origins and included the former head of the ROC armed forces. Referred to as the nonmainstream KMT, they, at one point, had threatened to run a rival slate of candidates against Lee, headed by the aforementioned general. The president had, however, moved skillfully to outmaneuver them.

Adroitly using his Japanese as well as American connections, Lee advanced his reform agenda in a variety of ways. An avid golfer, he was able to address political issues while playing with Japanese officials, many of whom shared his passion for the game. In addition to this "vacation diplomacy," Lee sought to avail himself of Japan's excellent medical facilities for treatment. Beijing, which wanted to confine what it referred to as "the Taiwan authorities" to the island, protested. It reacted sharply to an interview Lee gave to Japanese history professor and well-known writer Shiba Ryotaro in spring 1994. Among other statements that aroused Beijing's ire was Lee's comment that he had been a Japanese citizen for 22 years. Since that is how old Lee was when Japan renounced its annexation of the island, the statement is true. However, Beijing chose to interpret it as evidence that Lee had always thought of himself as a Japanese rather than a Chinese, and that he continued to do so. When Lee praised what Japan had done for its former colony, which is also true, the Chinese press accused Lee of ignoring the hardships of the Taiwanese people under Japanese rule.

Even more disturbing to Beijing was Lee's comparison, as a devout Christian, of himself to Moses, leading Taiwan into the promised land. The Chinese leadership construed this as an attempt to assert the island's independence from the captivity of Egypt/China.¹⁵

Besides being of intense annoyance to Beijing, in 1994, Lee told Tokyo University of Foreign Studies professor Nakajima Mineo that it was no longer necessary for the Japanese prime minister to apologize for World War II: of more importance was that Japan should acquire a clear view of the future with itself as the natural leader of Asia. China's official *Xinhua* news agency accused Lee of unburdening himself to Japanese friends who were "keen on splitting up China" and "prostrating himself in praise of Japanese rule."¹⁶

Members of Taiwan's other major political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) went even further. In April 1995, a leading DPP politician, who would later become the nation's first female vice president, hosted a commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki at the very same Japanese inn in which the document had been signed. Celebrants, including political figures from each country as well as Japanese raised in Taiwan and Taiwanese educated in Japan, noted that China had ceded Taiwan to Japan "in perpetuity" and emphasized the shared history of the two island nations.¹⁷

Japan Officially Enters the Security Equation in the Strait

Although Beijing expressed great annoyance at these events, they essentially amounted to an informal venting of emotions and had no official content. Taiwan was to cause even greater tensions in Sino-Japanese relations during 1995 and 1996 that would lead Tokyo into direct official involvement in the Taiwan Strait. After the United States issued a visa to Lee Teng-hui so that he could receive Cornell University's distinguished alumnus award, Beijing expressed its displeasure by staging eight months of war games and missile launches that resembled scenarios for an invasion of Taiwan. China's behavior was profoundly upsetting to Japan, with its concern for maritime security, important investments in Taiwan, and feeling that, like Taiwan, it was a democratic island-nation dependent on international trade for its survival and living in the shadow of a rising China. Japanese analysts noted that, should Taiwan be annexed by the People's Republic of China, the PRC's territorial waters would be extended perilously close to Japan, and that shipping lanes through which much of Japanese imports and exports flow, might be constricted. Moreover, the crisis indicated that Chinese military aggression was a realistic possibility that could threaten the peace and stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region.¹⁸ It was subsequently revealed, but never officially confirmed, that the JDA had plans to provide noncombat support to American forces if an armed conflict broke out in the Strait.¹⁹

At some point in this crisis, Tokyo approached Washington to explore an upgrading of the security relationship between the two. Barely a month after the arrival of two US aircraft carrier battle groups in the waters off Taiwan and

the subsequent cessation of Beijing's war games, the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance For the Twenty-First Century was issued. In it, the two countries agreed to cooperate "in dealing with situations in the areas surrounding Japan which would have an important influence in the peace and security of Japan."²⁰ Beijing demanded, but did not get, Tokyo's assurance that the phrase "areas around Japan" did not include Taiwan. In China, there was no public acknowledgment of how the PRC's behavior might have contributed to this change on Japan's part.

Despite Japanese and American disclaimers that the agreement was not directed at any third country,²¹ Beijing issued a statement that any act that included directly or indirectly the Taiwan Strait in the framework of the new guidelines was an interference in and violation against China's sovereign rights.²² The accord was "not defensive, but offensive," and whereas the original US-Japan relationship "was simply a bilateral agreement under which the United States provided nuclear protection to Japan, the new accord tends to poke its nose into regional affairs."²³

After reaching agreement with the United States on the new defense guidelines, the Japanese government had to draft legislation to implement them. Two issues were particularly contentious: the exact nature of the assistance Japan was to render to the United States, and the precise geographic area in which it was to be rendered. Critics within Japan argued that the Foreign Ministry might not have been aware of what it had done by pledging to review defense cooperation guidelines with regard to contingencies in "the areas surrounding Japan." It had pushed China out of a previously fairly balanced triangular relationship, and risked trapping Japan within American plans, to the detriment of its relationship with Beijing.²⁴ Other sources argued that it was childish to think that security agreements were not reciprocal: if Japan refused to help the United States, then the United States would have no reason to continue to protect Japan.²⁵ Not surprisingly, circumlocution was used to work around differences of opinion. For example, it was decided that Japan could not "supply" weapons to American forces, but could "transport" them to American forces so long as the transport remained outside the battle zone.²⁶

Subsequent events tended to advance the agenda of those Japanese who had long felt that the country needed a normal military and a defense posture that was unconstrained by the 1947 constitution. Differences between China and Taiwan were one of many contributing factors. To name just a few, North Korean missile launches in 1998 and 2006 that had the potential to hit Japan, and Pyongyang's detonation of a nuclear device in 2006, drew public attention to the fact that their country lacked countermeasures. The Tokyo government announced its interest in participating in Theater Missile Defense (TMD), prompting an order from Beijing that it must not do so. Beijing accused Tokyo of using North Korea as a surrogate for China: the real reason it wanted missile defenses was its desire to contain China. The order not to participate in TMD angered many Japanese, who reasoned that acquiring the ability to shoot down incoming missiles was the equivalent of installing a burglar alarm in one's home. Hence, the only ones who could possibly object were those contemplating burglary.²⁷ Though scarcely

mentioned by either side, there was in fact a link between TMD and the Taiwan issue, since its ship-based upper-tier component could be used not only to defend Japan but Taiwan as well.²⁸

Tokyo also had disputes with Beijing over the ownership of the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyutai and to the Japanese as the Senkaku. There were additional issues involving the intrusion of Chinese ships into Japanese territorial waters. China's insistence on repeated apologies for the country's behavior in World War II annoyed a generation of Japanese who were not yet born when the war ended; they suspected that Beijing was using the issue as leverage to gain concessions on other issues. Beijing's oft-repeated orders to Japanese officials not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the memory of Japan's war dead—a controversial issue in Japan itself—seemed to stiffen the determination of then-prime minister Koizumi Junichiro to pay his respects there.

In 1998, having already extracted the “three nos”—no support for “Two China,” no support for “One China, One Taiwan,” and no support for Taiwan's entry into international organizations for which sovereignty is a prerequisite—from US president Bill Clinton, China sought the same assurances from Japan. This was expected to occur during the then-president Jiang Zemin's visit to Tokyo. The Japanese Foreign Ministry stated pointedly beforehand that it would not do so, and would not go beyond the language of the 1972 communiqué in which Tokyo said it “understands and respects” the Chinese position on Taiwan. Either ignoring or disbelieving these statements, Jiang delivered a 25-minute diatribe in which he demanded a number of concessions, including that Tokyo accede to Beijing's position on Taiwan. His hectoring had a sharply negative effect on Japanese public opinion;²⁹ more than a year later, approval ratings for China had not yet recouped the levels they had before Jiang's visit.³⁰

The complementarity of interests between Japanese conservatives who favored rearmament and Taiwanese who favored a strengthened national identity was expressed through various unofficial channels. The TT (Taiwan-Tokyo) Forum exchanged visits with like-minded academics and retired Japanese diplomats and Self-Defense Force (SDF) officers. By 1999, there was quiet talk of ensuring Taiwan's security through its ties with the United States on the one hand and the US-Japan Security Treaty on the other.³¹ In fall 2006, President Chen Shui-bian called for a “constructive quasi-military alliance with Japan,” in partnership with the United States, in an open meeting with the head of Tokyo's unofficial embassy in Taiwan.³²

In May 2002, armed Chinese police entered the Japanese consulate in Shenyang and forcibly removed North Korean nationals who were attempting to apply for asylum there. This was a clear breach of international law under which embassies and consulates of foreign governments are regarded as part of the sovereign state itself.³³ These and similar instances of what many Japanese regarded as arrogant behavior caused Japan to complain that China was treating their country like the tributary state it had been for part of the imperial era. The phrase *dogeza gaiko*, “kowtow diplomacy,” was applied not only to the Chinese government, but also to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its accommodative stance. It is generally considered that the influence of MOFA's China school significantly

diminished in the wake of the Shenyang incident.³⁴ At about the same time, Japan's leading liberal newspaper, *Asahi Shimbun*, which was known for its generally favorable views of China, hired a deputy managing editor who was much less so and who was sympathetic to Taiwan's position.³⁵

A few years previously, Ishihara Shintaro, the founder of Seirankai, had been elected mayor of Tokyo. Shortly after he assumed office, and in defiance of Beijing's wishes, Ishihara paid an official visit to Taiwan, where he referred to the island as the Republic of China—thereby implying his endorsement of its sovereign status.³⁶

Prime Minister Koizumi was succeeded by another hard-liner of China, Abe Shinzo. Abe is the grandson of a previous prime minister who, like him, favored a stronger defense posture for the country. After an upper house election in which his party fared poorly for reasons unrelated to either China or defense policies, Abe was replaced in September 2007 by Fukuda Yasuo, who pledged efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations. Mutual visits have been arranged and exchanged between the two sides, as have placatory statements. So far, however, there is consensus that, although the atmospherics of relations have been better, no substantive issues have been solved. And plans to upgrade the Self-Defense Forces continue.

Even business interests, which had heretofore been wary of a military buildup, have backed changes. In April 2003, the research group of *Keizai Doyukai*, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, proposed that the constitution, including Article Nine, be revised. In an interview with *Asahi*, the organization's head argued that while the constitution may have sounded attractive at the time it was adopted, the world had changed, and it was not proper for the world's second largest economy to leave it to others to look after its safety. Moreover, the constitution had not even been written by the Japanese people of their own accord.³⁷ In the following year, another influential business organization, *Keidanren* (Japan Business Federation) urged the government to rethink its ban on the export of weapons,³⁸ and in 2006, an influential think tank headed by former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro advocated that Article Nine be revised.³⁹ Prime Minister Abe, though eager to improve ties with China—a visit to the PRC was among his first overseas trips after assuming office—has endorsed this revision. In January 2007, the JDA formally became the Japanese Ministry of Defense. A generational change appears to have taken place that favors a stronger security role for Japan.

Whereas the upgraded SDF capabilities that have characterized this higher Japanese defense profile were not specifically aimed at protecting Taiwan, they would undoubtedly be relevant, should a conflict erupt. Relations between Japan and Taiwan remained warm, with various manifestations of this warmth drawing angry ripostes from Beijing. In February 2005, the United States and Japan reaffirmed their commitment to the treaty of security of Taiwan as a common strategic objective,⁴⁰ reiterating it again a year later.⁴¹ In August, the Diet dropped visa requirements for Taiwan tourists, and Lee Teng-hui made his third trip to Japan since retiring from the presidency.⁴² In the furor that erupted after Lee's successor, DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) leader Chen Shui-bian, announced in May 2006 that the National

Unification Council would cease to function, Tokyo expressed no misgivings. According to Taiwan's former de facto ambassador to Japan, "Japanese officials understand Taiwan's stance."⁴³ Quietly, the equivalent of a military attaché has been dispatched to Japan's de facto embassy in Taipei. Cautious when interviewed, the attaché said he participates in meetings with Taiwanese government and military officials, and sends dispatches to Tokyo.⁴⁴ Conversations touching on the military are likewise a regular part of the activities of Taiwan's embassy-equivalent in Tokyo. The Japanese government apparently provides advice on foreign relations: the head of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council reported on his return from a June 2006 visit to Tokyo that he had been warned to be cautious of the united-front tactics that Beijing was using.⁴⁵

Just as there is an undercurrent of misgivings in Tokyo about closer ties with Taipei, there is an undercurrent of misgivings in Taipei about closer ties with Tokyo. Some Taiwan residents, most of whom are of recent mainland descent and members of the KMT, are concerned that the island will become a pawn in the rivalry between the PRC and Japan, and that closer ties between Taipei and Tokyo will complicate rather than soothe tensions between Taipei and Beijing.⁴⁶ In 2006, the magistrate of Taipei County, a KMT member, ordered the demolition of a memorial to Taiwan aborigines who had died fighting for Japan during World War II. Funded by donations from Japan and inaugurated by Lee Teng-hui only a few weeks before, the scenic spot on which it was built had been a favorite of Japanese tourists for many years.⁴⁷ Such hesitancy over ties with Japan would, however, seem to be a minority view.

Conclusions

Despite these advances in Taiwan-Japanese relations and Japan's improved military capabilities, Tokyo is still restrained from action by its 1947 constitution, albeit one now interpreted in a much modified form. Understandably, Tokyo does not wish to be drawn into a conflict over Taiwan. It has important economic interests in the nations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and would prefer a peaceful resolution to the sovereignty differences between the two. Like the United States, it cautions each side to avoid changes to the status quo that might upset the other. Yet, if the PRC does seek to annex Taiwan by force, important Japanese strategic interests would be adversely affected. That fact and its security ties with the United States make it difficult to believe that Japan would not intervene in time of conflict. Peace constitution notwithstanding, Japan has become a major stakeholder in the Taiwan Strait.

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