



THE ORIGINS OF THE LEBANESE NATIONAL IDEA

1840-1920

CAROL HAKIM

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*To Beirut and to all whose lives have been
shaped by its singular history*

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Arabic words and names have been transliterated according to a simplified system based on that used in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. All diacritical marks have been omitted, except for the letter *ayn*. Names adopted by authors who write either in French or English have not been changed. Names of prominent personalities, as well as place names and Arabic words commonly found in Western literature, appear in their familiar forms.

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Introduction

Of all the ideologies that have marked the modern era, none has left a deeper imprint on the Arab world than nationalism. No other ideology has aroused as much emotion, passion, and devotion, engendered as much hope and exhilaration, despair and bitterness, and no other ideology has inspired, enthralled, and animated as many people. All the major events that have marked the history of the Arab world in the twentieth century—the wars and the revolutions, the bitter rivalry and antagonism among Arab states, the infighting among ruling elites within the same state, down to the quarrels that have at times divided one same family—have been underpinned by nationalist ideals and sentiments and at times fiery rhetoric.

Yet, in spite all the clamor and fervor that nationalism has aroused in the Arab world, the history of nationalism in the region has been marked by inconsistency, fluidity, contingency, and multiplicity. Several strands of nationalism, running the full gamut from local, regional, linguistic, communal, religious, and state based to nation based, have surfaced since the beginning of the twentieth century, vying and clashing with each other at times or overlapping and combining at other times. The national dreams and grand schemes devised by the leaders and peoples in the region, however, dashed against recalcitrant and intractable realities and their promise of freedom, unity, and better futures, remained ever more elusive. As the high hopes raised by nationalism faded, some sank in disillusionment and apathy; others cast around for alternative ventures and ideals; still others, seemingly impervious to adverse conditions, strove to keep the illusion alive. National allegiances

and agendas in the Arab Middle East have hence remained tangled and ambivalent, and they have shifted and fluctuated over the course of the century according to changing contexts and circumstances.

The historiography of nationalism in the Arab Middle East has witnessed similar shifts and turns. Like the nationalists of the region, the historians and scholars who have studied the evolution and import of nationalism in the Arab Middle East have been influenced by contemporary conditions, dominant views, ideologies, and paradigms. For the most part, scholars have focused their attention on Arab nationalism, which dominated political discourse and rhetoric in the postindependence period. Scholars hence tried to trace the genesis of Arab nationalism, to determine its basic tenets and features, and to follow its evolution and its gradual dissemination. They initially scrutinized and analyzed the texts produced by Arab nationalist writers and then wove grand narratives that retraced the march of Arab nationalism from its earliest formulation to its ultimate political ascendancy through a long chain of publicists, activists, heroes, and martyrs. Thereafter, as the glow of Arab nationalism seemed to fade, historians sought to reexamine and revise their earlier narratives. Arab nationalism still captured their attention, but they sought to devise more critical approaches to its rise and development, giving further consideration to the social profile of the nationalist activists and publicists, to the differing experiences of the core Arab countries, to the political and socio-economic transformations underlying the emergence of Arab nationalism, and to the nationalization of the masses.¹

The focus of scholars and historians on Arab nationalism has generally overlooked other national and communal representations, allegiances, and identities. Admittedly, the perception of historians has been clouded by the hustle and bustle of political developments in the region. The early postindependence period was characterized by political instability, social mobilization and polarization, and sharp conflicts over the nature, and indeed the very existence, of Arab states and regimes. Local and state nationalisms were written off as inconsequential, illegitimate, or transient phenomena that would inevitably be wiped away by the spirit of the time—and as such little worthy of scholarly attention. Thereafter, the fading of Arab nationalism in the latter part of the twentieth century paradoxically coincided with the withering of most rival territorial strands of nationalisms in the region as the consolidation of authoritarian regimes dashed altogether earlier hopes of freedom and self-determination raised by nationalism.

This book attempts to fill in a gap in the literature on alternative local nationalist strands. It focuses on the early history of Lebanese nationalism, which has only

been partly and indirectly addressed by studies on the history of Lebanon and the region. These have conventionally perceived and presented the establishment of a separate Lebanese entity as a special case in which a small Christian minority, the Maronites, living in compact territory, Mount Lebanon, gradually developed a nationalism of their own, an ideal that might be called “Lebanism.” Historians may disagree on the significance of this development, on the nature of Lebanese nationalism, and on its authenticity and legitimacy, but, by and large, most agree that a Lebanist ideal had crystallized in Mount Lebanon by the nineteenth century at the latest. The Maronite Lebanists, we are told, had by then developed clear nationalist inclination and were therefore striving to establish an independent state. Serious problems arose when, in the post–World War I period, they strove to include in their projected *patria* territories inhabited by a Muslim majority that refused to be incorporated in the separate Lebanon of the Maronites, dreaming instead to unite with their fellow Arab Muslim brothers within the framework of an independent Arab state. But in the end, due to the Maronite Lebanist determination, and French help, a Greater Lebanon fitting the ambitions of the former was established.

Recent studies on Lebanese history have provided new details and perspectives that have significantly enriched this traditional narrative.² Nevertheless, basic assumptions have not changed, and the general impression one gets from recent books on Lebanese history in this period is still by and large the same. In the first two chapters of Zamir’s book, covering the pre-1920 period, for instance, the Maronites are rarely mentioned without their traditional adjunct, Lebanist—that is, Maronite Lebanist. The establishment of a Lebanese state is portrayed as the fulfillment, for the Lebanese Christians, of “their centuries-old dream of a state of their own.”³ This aim, Zamir goes on, was achieved thanks to the efforts of the Maronite Patriarchate and the Administrative Council of the Lebanese *mutasarrifiyya*, who “steadfastly pursued their objective,” in accordance with the “genuine aspirations” of the Maronites.⁴ For his part, Salibi begins his account of the establishment of Lebanon by warning us that among the Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire, by the end of World War I, a “national consciousness, to the extent that it existed, was blurred and confounded by traditional loyalties of other kinds which were often in conflict with one another.”⁵ Nevertheless, further on in the text, Salibi seems to single out the Maronites as the only exception to this pervasive confusion in national sentiment among the rest of the population of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire: “In Mount Lebanon and the adjacent parts of the old Vilayet of Beirut, the Maronites . . . were one party whose demands

the French were prepared to listen to. Of all the Arabs, barring only individuals or politically experienced princely dynasties, they appeared to be the only people who knew *precisely* [my italics] what they wanted: in their case, as they put it, a 'Greater Lebanon' under their paramount control, separate, distinct and independent from the rest of Syria."⁶

In the end, Salibi continues, the Maronites who had "willed it [Greater Lebanon] into existence were fully satisfied with what they got and wanted the country to remain forever exactly as it had been finally constituted."⁷ Akarlı's book is limited to the history of the *mutasarrıfyya* period. Nevertheless, in the concluding parts of his book, which deals with the last years of this regime until the creation of the state of Lebanon, he asserts that a sense of "Lebanese-ness had emerged among the residents of the *Mutasarrıfyya*," by the beginning of the twentieth century that, "unlike many other nationalisms on the rise in the non-Western world . . . was not an intellectual construct alone, but was rooted in fifty-odd years of political experience."⁸ Finally, Trabulsi presents a more nuanced picture, warning his readers at the beginning of the book that "the reduction of identity of the Lebanese to one unique form of identity—their sectarian affiliation—is too simplistic and reductionist an approach to an extremely complex situation," and that politicized religious sects should be seen as "historical products rather than historical essences."⁹ He also acknowledges the existence of different national currents within the Maronite community in the crucial 1915–20 period, but his general history of modern Lebanon does not dwell much on the earlier development of these different national orientations.¹⁰

In sum, the general sense one gets from the literature on Lebanon is the existence of a well-articulated, widespread, and popular Lebanese nationalism, at the very least within the Maronite community, by the time of the establishment of the Lebanese state. Evidence of this fact can be adduced, for instance, from the seemingly unanimous claim by the Maronites for the establishment of a Greater Lebanon in the 1918–20 years. However, the emergence of nationalist claims in Mount Lebanon and some adjoining districts in the period preceding the establishment of the Lebanese state needs to be accounted for and elucidated. It needs to be historicized and contextualized with a view to determining the origin, nature, and salience of nationalist inclinations among the population of Mount Lebanon. Similarly, the conventional representation of the development of Lebanese nationalism as a linear and gradual process, dating back a few centuries or less, needs to be probed and assessed. This book addresses some of these issues and questions. It critically reassesses the existence, nature, and scope of a Lebanese national

movement before the establishment of the Lebanese state in 1920. In doing so, it addresses two separate issues. On the one hand, it seeks to probe and revise previous assumptions and perspectives that have characterized the study of the early history of Lebanese nationalism; on the other hand, it engages the more general debate on the rise of nationalism in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

Nationalism is an especially complex and fraught concept that has generated countless and endless debates among historians and social scientists. Some aspects of these debates that are particularly relevant to this study have centered on the nature and origins of nationalism. In contrast to nationalists who claim that nations are ancient, natural, immutable, and enduring entities, most scholars today are agreed that nationalism is a relatively modern phenomenon that first emerged in western Europe by the end of the eighteenth century in conjunction with the rise of the modern state and the expansion of market relations, and then spread in successive waves, and in several modular forms, across the globe until the nation-state model became the accepted and mandatory international norm for the political organization of societies.¹¹ Furthermore, recent scholarship has moved away from the notion that nations are the natural development of communities based on abstract criteria such as language or religion and tend to view nations as contingent historical constructs or in line with the seminal metaphor of Benedict Anderson as “imagined communities.” However, historians differ on the significance of pre-modern formations, memories, and solidarities for the development of nationalism. For some, modern nations are not totally rootless and arbitrary entities, and some elements of continuity can be discerned between premodern groups and modern nations as the latter derive some of their features and vigor from ancient solidarities, traditions, and myths.¹² Others assert that modern nations are fundamentally different entities from premodern formations and that apparent continuities between both should not be seen as evidence of historical continuity and evolution as much as an illusive effect of nationalist ideology and history that “secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time.”¹³ Hence, nationalists draw on previous histories, traditions, myths, and symbols, but they do so very selectively and thoroughly transform them, obscuring or disregarding parts of their past and traditions that might be at odds with their ideal visions of the nation, and constructing or reconstructing new myths and traditions to weave new, seamless, and epic histories tracing the evolution of their nation from the origins of time to the present in line with their nationalist objectives. In sum, “beneath a supposed continuity,” nationalism

“involves not the reproduction of a given identity or tradition so much as the selection, reformulation and, if necessary, invention of symbols and narratives to suit present purposes.”¹⁴ This study concurs with this latter view; it gives special attention to the formulation of an idealized history by several Maronite authors since the mid-nineteenth century to support particular schemes and agendas, and it illustrates instances when myths and legendary historical episodes were interwoven into an emerging nationalist narrative to fit contemporary concerns as well as the different emphases of these histories in relation to the inclinations of their authors and their particular context.

Scholars of nationalism have also stressed the importance of socioeconomic, cultural, and political transformations brought about by capitalism and the emergence of the modern state for the rise and development of nationalism. Hence, the expansion of market relations and the consolidation of the modern state contribute to the breakdown of premodern social structures and the dissolution of ancient ties and values, and their reconstitution along new and more uniform lines favoring the appearance and spread of nationalism. Scholars have tended, however, to place different emphases on cultural, socioeconomic, and political transformations. This might be attributed partly to the fact that these scholars have tried to explain different moments and aspects of the nationalist dynamic, from the structural and historical factors that underlay the development of nationalism to the cultural reconstructions that have accompanied them.¹⁵ In any event, similar transformations underlay the emergence of nationalist representations and agendas in the Arab world in the nineteenth century following the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy and the vast movement of reforms initiated by the Ottoman government, which concurrently contributed to strengthen the authority of the central state, to integrate, albeit unevenly, the various provinces of the empire, and to bring more closely together the diverse communities of the Empire. All these transformations “prompted the transition from a social system that was not conducive to nationalism to one that was apposite to the ideology.”¹⁶ And indeed, the first stirrings of nationalism began to show in the Lebanese and Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century, as several parallel and overlapping strands of nationalist representations and agendas ranging from Ottomanism, to Arabism, to Syrianism, to Lebanism began to appear.

The appearance of fledgling national representations and agendas did not, however, presage their subsequent development in an orderly, linear, and predictable fashion. As a matter of fact, nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire did not evolve in a neat, staged way, in line with contemporary

developments in certain parts of eastern Europe and the Balkans, from a preliminary national revival phase during which historians, linguists, and other members of the intelligentsia formulated and propagated studies on the history, language, and culture of the prospective nation, to an intermediate phase that saw the formation of nationalist movements that started to organize and agitate, to a final stage during which the national movement succeeded in mobilizing the rest of the population and turned into a mass national movement.¹⁷ In the Syrian provinces of the Empire, no large-scale nationalist movements emerged before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I—if we take a national movement to mean one that develops a clear and coherent agenda and aims to mobilize the population in view of the establishment of its own particular state. Elements of nationalist thinking, identifications, and projects appeared every so often, but they never crystallized into coherent ideologies or movements. As argued in the following chapters, nationalist agendas for the most part remained articulated around the necessity of the reform of the Empire, not its dismemberment or demise, and the different strands of nationalism that emerged in the Empire remained closely connected to the fortunes of the various reform movements and the differing visions of reform that emerged in the Lebanese and Syrian provinces. Nationalist agendas aimed mostly at informing and complementing the general movement of reform implemented by the Ottoman state and at inflecting its development in a direction more in line with the aspirations and interests of local forces in the Arab provinces. Elites in the Lebanese and Syrian provinces displayed, however, great reluctance to follow through on the implications of these national visions and programs, and when in the first decades of the twentieth century developments in the Ottoman Empire threatened more directly the interests of local elites, the latter ratcheted up their opposition by promoting decentralization plans within the framework of the Empire that eventually fizzled out. Nationalist agendas and representations in the Arab provinces hence remained ambivalent and in flux up until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of War World I. It was only then that the ambivalent and inchoate reformist and nationalist programs of the elite crystallized into full-fledged nationalist agendas. The terms Ottomanism, Syrianism, Arabism, and for our purpose, Lebanism, aim hence to denote the development of national ideals and representations among the local populations of the Empire, which displayed some elements of modern nationalism but had not developed into articulate and coherent nationalist ideologies or movements.

A central contention of this study is that, contrary to conventional accounts, the appearance and evolution of nationalism in the Lebanese province followed in

its broad lines developments in the rest of the Syrian provinces. In a similar vein, nationalist agendas and representations emerged and fluctuated in the Lebanese Mountain in conjunction with various schemes and reformist programs developed by the Maronite clerical and secular elite in Mount Lebanon to take advantage of, circumvent, or check the efforts initiated by the Ottoman government by mid-nineteenth century to reassert its authority in the Syrian provinces and to reorganize the Empire along new principles of government. These endeavors, accompanied by the growing intervention of the European powers in the domestic affairs of the region, initially led to a period of profound instability and protracted disturbances in the Lebanese Mountain, which culminated with the massacres of 1860. During this troubled period, schemes to establish a semi-independent Christian entity in Mount Lebanon were mooted by some Lebanese clerical circles in conjunction with French Catholic and liberal circles. These schemes, however, foundered, and the Ottoman government ultimately succeeded in its efforts to reestablish its authority over Mount Lebanon, which was granted a limited autonomous regime, known as the *mutasarrifiyya*, in 1861. Thereafter, the population of the Mountain accommodated to the new regime, which provided sixty years of “long peace” but failed to bring prosperity and stability. Dismal socioeconomic and political conditions in Mount Lebanon eventually led some members of the Lebanese elite and activists to devise, by the beginning of the twentieth century, reformist political projects and programs to cope with the growing problems of the Mountain. At the same time, they envisioned national representations in line with their reformist projects. Like their counterparts in the remaining Syrian provinces, however, Lebanese activists and members of the elite wrestled with several nationalist agendas and representations, which notably encompassed Ottomanism and Syrianism. However, in addition to the agendas contemplated by the other inhabitants of the Syrian lands, activists from the Lebanese provinces benefited from and considered another alternative, namely Lebanism, which presented an additional option to Syrianism and Ottomanism and denoted distinct projects to address the particular problems of their own province. And like their counterparts in the Syrian provinces, their national representations appeared and evolved in relation to the lines of the various political programs they formulated. The reform projects and national representations of the Lebanese elites varied according to the delicate fluctuations in the general situation of the Ottoman Empire, accounting for frequent shifts in political agendas and representations. The different national representations envisioned by local Lebanese and Syrian elites, notwithstanding

strong assertions about the historical and actual reality of the purported nations they envisaged, represented potential ideals to be fulfilled in some undetermined future. During this period, this future was not as yet distinctly perceived by the elite and in any case did not appear as immediate. Furthermore, at the time, it still seemed possible to envision the association and coexistence of different national communities within the confines of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, members of the secular Lebanese elite remained reluctant to choose between their different political and national ideals, often combining several nationalist agendas and identities, which for them remained, until the end of the period under study, political options and potential alternatives that could be changed and revised.

Hence, the period preceding the demise of the Ottoman Empire did not witness the development of nationalist movements, Lebanese or otherwise, but a shifting and tentative quest for national representation among some members of the Maronite elite, as well as their Syrian counterparts, that evolved and fluctuated in relation with their diverse reformist agendas. Nevertheless, during this period, some core ideas and basic historical myths around which Lebanese nationalism eventually crystallized were formulated by members of the Lebanese clerical and secular elite. They only matured into coherent nationalist claims in the few months that preceded the establishment the Lebanese state.

The book reconstructs the complex process that led to the appearance of Lebanese nationalist agendas and representations among certain clerical and secular circles within Mount Lebanon by the middle of the nineteenth century. It then follows the subsequent development and fluctuation of such ideas and attempts to assess their impact on the rest of the population. It deals with other national representations adopted by certain actors hailing from the Mountain, such as Ottomanism and Syrianism, underscoring the interaction of these differing views with, and their impact on, Lebanism itself. At the same time, the book examines the diverse forces and personalities who promoted such agendas within and without the Mountain. Indeed, as the nineteenth century unfolded, large numbers of the population of the Mount Lebanon began to move outside the Mountain, settling in the neighboring town of Beirut, in Egypt, and in the Americas. Their views greatly influenced those expounded by part of the elite within the Mountain and therefore need to be incorporated in this study. Hence, although this study concentrates on Mount Lebanon proper, and more particularly on the Maronite community, it follows

the activity of certain Lebanese groups and personalities outside the confines of the Mountain, in Beirut, Egypt, or farther away, when and where their views are relevant to the analysis of the formulation of national ideals.

Chapters 1 to 3 cover the period stretching from 1840 until 1861, which witnessed a critical situation in the Mountain following the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali from Syria, the demise of the Emir Bashir II, and the reestablishment of Ottoman rule in the Syrian provinces. At that time, the aspirations of some local Maronite clerical circles to establish the dominance of their community in the Mountain converged with the romantic fantasies and projects of some French Catholic and liberal circles who dreamed of a Christian regeneration of the East in agreement with prevalent Western civilizing and expansionist presumptions. The interaction between these Maronite and French circles gave birth to vague political projects aiming at establishing a semi-independent Maronite entity in Mount Lebanon. The most elaborate formulations of such schemes surfaced in the years 1860–61, when projects supporting the establishment of an enlarged Christian Greater Lebanon and portending the entity established in 1920 were devised. At the same time, the interaction between some Maronite and French circles generated historical narratives depicting the Maronites as an historical nation, striving to attain self-determination and deserving to be helped by the Western, and especially French, powers to fulfill their objective.

The diverse political projects devised between 1840 and 1860 failed to materialize and were replaced by other political ambitions following the establishment in Mount Lebanon, in 1861, of the *mutasarriḡyya* regime. At the same time, the ideals and views that had sustained such schemes faded away; as the Maronite Church accommodated to the new regime, it revised and altered its political views and policies. It gradually abandoned its former semi-separatist schemes and aspirations and began to promote more conservative political views, articulated around the safeguard of the spiritual, social, and political autonomy of the Maronite community within the framework of a multinational and multireligious Empire along with a staunch commitment to the preservation of the special regime of Mount Lebanon that fairly secured this basic aim.

Chapter 4 deals with the revised views and aspirations of the Maronite Church during the *mutasarriḡyya* period, whereas chapter 5 to chapter 7 cover the views of the secular political and intellectual elite during this same period. By the beginning of the twentieth century, a new secular Maronite elite took the lead in addressing the growing political and socioeconomic problems of the Mountain. The main drive of this secular elite throughout this period remained reformist, and

its claims focused on political and economic reforms to improve a dismal situation in the Mountain. Its activity and mode of thinking were deeply influenced by the reformist movement that had emerged by the mid-nineteenth century in the region and should be seen within the framework of this reformist activity.

The projects devised by the Lebanese activists during this second phase remained mainly articulated around a large autonomy for Mount Lebanon within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. They evolved into more explicit claims for the independence of an enlarged Lebanon only in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Chapter 8 covers this troubled period and the circumstances that led to the establishment of a Lebanese state.

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CHAPTER ONE • The Emergence of Lebanism

The Lebanese Setting

Periods of crisis are often associated with turmoil and disarray; at the same time, they represent fertile ground for reformation and innovation. It was during such a troubled period, stretching from 1840 to 1860 and marked by social, political, and communal strife in Mount Lebanon, that projects advocating the establishment in Mount Lebanon of a semi-independent entity, ruled by a indigenous Maronite governor, made their first appearance.

These projects, which marked the earliest signs of the emergence of Lebanism, came about as the result of a specific and intricate conjuncture when internal factors intersected with foreign influence and interference. Locally, they corresponded with deep social and political changes and dislocations that prompted the Maronite Church to engage in a bid to assert the dominance of its community in Mount Lebanon and to secure for it a certain political autonomy within its boundaries. At the same time, the aspirations of the Maronite clergy converged with the romantic fantasies of some French Catholic and liberal circles who envisioned the establishment of an independent Christian entity in the Levant under the aegis of France, with a view to regenerating the declining Orient, emancipating the Christians of the east from Muslim domination, and upholding French interests in Syria. The political aspirations of the Maronite clergy and those of these French circles became closely intertwined as both sides drew support and inspiration from each other.

This chapter and the next one reconstruct the intricate circumstances that spawned the first appearance of elementary nationalist ideas and schemes among

some clerical Maronite circles. The present chapter focuses on the local setting, examining the various factors that underlay the emergence of the idea of establishing a Christian entity, the clerical forces that upheld it, and the confused reaction of the local population to this new ideal. Chapter 2 deals with the convergence and interaction of these local ideas with those of some official and unofficial French circles and the impact these foreign inferences had on the views of local groups and personalities.

SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN MOUNT LEBANON AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The social and political structure of Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century has been depicted in detail and thoroughly analyzed by many historians.¹ While not all of its characteristics are relevant to this study, some need to be mentioned.

The geographical entity known as Mount Lebanon, that is, the western range of mountains running parallel to the Mediterranean coast between the towns of Tripoli and Sayda, has not historically constituted a separate political entity with a lasting formal political system evolving within unchanging boundaries. Since the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516, Mount Lebanon enjoyed a limited *de facto* autonomy under the rule of local notables, a system referred to by Lebanese historians as the “Lebanese Emirate.”² The Emirate originated in the southern districts of Mount Lebanon—roughly to the south of the Beirut-Damascus road—known as Jabal al-Shuf or Jabal al-Duruz, where local Druze chiefs, who acted as tax farmers for the Ottoman government, first established a *de facto* autonomous social and political organization headed by a local leader, known as “Emir.”³ By the end of the seventeenth century, the central districts of the Mountain, extending north of Jabal al-Shuf up to the Ma‘altayn River, near Juniya, and known as Jabal Kisrawan, were included in the region farmed by the Druze Emirs. The governorship of the uppermost northern districts, called Jabal Lubnan or Bilad Jbayl, was secured on a lasting basis by the governors of Lebanon around the middle of the eighteenth century. Only then was the whole Lebanese mountain range brought under the rule of one governor and began to be called in its entirety Jabal Lubnan, or Mount Lebanon.

The unification of Mount Lebanon under the rule of one Emir did not entail any change in the administrative status of the Lebanese province within the framework

of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this period, Mount Lebanon remained formally part of the Empire, and its administration conformed with that of some surrounding provinces, where the responsibility of tax collection was often attributed to local leaders who had managed to acquire some authority. Mount Lebanon was part of the administrative districts of the *walis* of Sayda and Tripoli, who allocated the tax farming, or *iltizam*, of this region to the local Emir on an annual basis. The farming of the southern and central districts, that is, Jabal al-Shuf and Jabal Kisrawan, had to be obtained from the *wali* of Sayda, whereas that of the northern districts was leased from the *wali* of Tripoli.⁴

The Emir was thus assigned the task of collecting a lump sum, known as *miri*, and was granted some administrative and judicial rights. In turn, the Emir reallocated some of his prerogatives to local chiefs, known as *muqata'jis*—rulers of a fiscal district or *muqata'a*. Traditionally, the governors of the Mountain were selected from one family, the Ma'ans until 1697 and the Shihabs from 1697 to 1841. The formal investiture of the Emir by the Ottoman *walis* had to be renewed on an annual basis, and his tenure was never secure. He had to contend with the continual schemes of rival emirs and shifting coalitions of *muqata'jis* who sought to curb his authority. If skilful, he could circumscribe the powers and ambitions of rival emirs and *muqata'jis* by playing off one coalition against another or by himself leading one of the major coalitions.

The Emir was hence not an absolute leader in his domains. He had to secure the collaboration of the *muqata'jis* who were the effective rulers of land and people. It was they who directly controlled the people in their district and who generally held most of the land.⁵ They were responsible for levying the taxes on their *muqata'as* and generally took advantage of this prerogative to skim off part of the levy and to exempt themselves from their share of the land tax, which consequently had to be borne by the peasant. They leased their domains to tenants on a share-cropping basis, often leaving their tenants with barely enough to sustain themselves and their families. They also enjoyed some judicial prerogatives over their subjects, as well as customary privileges, including traditional gifts offered by the peasant to his lord on feast days and other special occasions. Each *muqata'a* was held conjointly and generally on a hereditary basis by one family, which then subdivided the various areas of its district, or *'uhdas*, among its members.⁶

The Lebanese political system broadly sketched here thus combined specific local social customs and an internal political organization with the broader practices and regulations of the Ottoman Empire. Within the general framework of *iltizam*, which mainly entailed tax-collecting duties, the Lebanese chiefs developed

a locally organized and recognized authority. However, contrary to the idealized picture of the Emirate presented retrospectively by local historians by the mid-nineteenth century, the local system developed by the notables in the Mountain did not evolve into an orderly and stable formal dynastic principality. Furthermore, the semi-autonomous local organization of Mount Lebanon was not specific to the Mountain, since other regions of the Ottoman Empire equally developed peculiar social and political structures with parallels to the Lebanese system.⁷

The local political system in Mount Lebanon was closely interwoven with a social structure organized according to kinship ties that supported it. Its basic element was a cluster of families grouped together into one family lineage, or *jubb*, claiming descent from “a more-or-less legendary ancestor . . . thus allowing its members to feel a ‘familial’ solidarity with each other.”⁸ The solidarity of the *jubb* was further strengthened by a tradition of living together and an endogamous tendency that reinforced its feeling of distinctiveness. The social structure of Mount Lebanon has often been described as resting on a tribal *‘asabiyya*, or group solidarity, kinship, and alleged blood ties constituting then—and, to a certain extent, still doing so today—a basic and fundamental element of the social and political structure. While definitions of “tribe” and criteria for tribeness have varied to the point of rendering the use of such a term almost meaningless,⁹ it is within a broad definition of the term, as a group distinguishing itself from the Other by reference to an alleged, more-or-less legendary, common ancestor, that a useful category of analysis may be found for Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century. Kinship ties, real or imagined, in this case underpinned the solidarity of the group and the loyalty of its members. At any rate, we can safely profess that a “tribal ethos,” or a conception of the tribe viewed as “a state of mind, a construction of reality,” and the pervasiveness of kinship and descent as principles of social and political organization prevailed in the Mountain,¹⁰ so much so that a contemporary author depicted Lebanon as “the greatest of the tribal lands.”¹¹

The underlying organization of society in Mount Lebanon at the beginning of the nineteenth century, characterized by a strong emphasis on principles of kinship and descent, pervaded and molded the whole political system. Family lineages represented basic units of social, economic, and political organization. Ownership and exploitation of land, repartition of water rights, divisions of labor, and allocation of taxes due were apportioned among family lineages, which thus operated as homogeneous production units upholding the rights and responsibilities of their members.¹² They also imprinted on each individual the primary elements of his identity, of his inherited culture and traditions, and represented

his main sphere of socialization and support. Lebanese society by the turn of the nineteenth century can thus be represented as an association of family lineages rather than a conglomeration of individuals. Indeed, the latter could hardly defend and support their rights, as such, outside the scope of their own kinship groups, since it was the family lineage that claimed and defended the common rights of its members.

Family lineages also acted as political units. One family lineage would usually form one compact group inside the village vis-à-vis other such formations, living in a separate quarter or *hara*. Local politics and conflicts evolved around authority prerogatives, division of land and water rights, frequently leading to a marked division of the village into two distinct factions. Such divisions cut across a single family lineage, if the village contained no other, or, where more variety obtained, divided the village into two principal factions, each faction headed by one leading family.¹³ These village leading families formed the first level of a hierarchy of families covering the whole Mountain, based on the extent of land controlled and the number of their followers.¹⁴ Hence, above the village leading families were found the notable families, *manasib* or *a'yan*, who controlled larger territorial units, including several villages at the time, or who could alternatively rally the support of followers from different villages. Notable families were not necessarily bound to their followers by kinship ties but were commonly linked to their followers in the regions under their control by economic and political ties. Finally, the notable chiefs themselves rallied to one of the major confederations of the Mountain, which acted as political factions supporting or opposing the governing Emir according to circumstances or engaged in other kinds of power struggles. Hence, family lineages, village coalitions, notables' client networks of peasants and followers, and confederations of notables formed the building blocks and dividing lines of political coalitions. The fluidity of family lineages and of political alliances among the notables tempered the apparent rigidity of the system, allowing for the appearance of new groupings within and among family lineages and for some changes in the hierarchy of local families.

The Ottomans traditionally acknowledged this hierarchy of families in Mount Lebanon and the authority of the notables over the local population that it entailed. They relied on such families for the collection of taxes and the maintenance of order and security. The relative isolation of the Mountain and its difficulty of access favored such an arrangement instead of more direct Ottoman control, which was deemed too costly or irrelevant. The Ottoman authorities could always intervene militarily if need be or use internal rivalries in order to constrain local power.

Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the segmentation of society and politics and sporadic communications between the various regions fostered a parochial and fragmented political identity among the commoners who identified primarily with their kinship groups and local and regional communities. The unity and cohesion of the political system lay at higher level, at that of *muqata'jis*, *manasib*, and Emir, who, by forming regionwide coalitions established the basis of local politics. They thus became more aware of the existence of a local order and, to varying degrees, of a wider regional and Ottoman world.

The political organization of the Mountain also rested on cultural and social norms and customs, vindicated and condoned by dint of repeated practice, which gave added legitimacy to the system. Religion was part of this worldview, giving solace from a hostile and distressing external world and providing some meaning to and protection from the vagaries of life. Several religious communities—including most notably Druzes, Shi'ites, Sunnis, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholics who had settled at different times in the Mountain—maintained a presence in the province by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Among these predominated the Druzes, by virtue of their historical political supremacy, and the Maronites, by virtue of their growing numbers and assertiveness. While it is difficult to ascertain with precision and certainty the meaning and prevalence of communal identities among the various religious groups in the Mountain by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the differing religious communities appeared to carry some sense of communal distinctiveness tempered by shared worldviews, customs, and interests that cut across sectarian divides. Hence, public and collective religious rituals and practices, as well as particular communal social and moral norms, contributed to impart some sense of communal identity to the members of the various communities. Communal identities and cohesion were furthermore fostered by a distinct historical evolution, a legacy of separateness, and common myths reinforced by kinship and group solidarity. At the same time, communal identities intertwined with shared social and political worldviews, customs, and interests among the local population, blurring the boundaries between the various communities of the Mountain. Such common outlook and interests underpinned the coexistence of the diverse communities in the Mountain, if not in total harmony, at least without apparent inconsistency, and accounted for the establishment of political alliances among notables and for regular relations among commoners, which cut across communal divides.¹⁵

Several social and political changes accounted for the crystallization and politicization of communal identities and loyalties by the beginning of the nineteenth

century.¹⁶ These included social dislocations and transformations following the integration of the Ottoman Empire in the world economy, which intensified tensions between notables and commoners and disrupted the political balance between the various communities. At the same time, the reformation of the Ottoman Empire according to principles mixing old and new concepts of governance, and the emergence of foreign Western powers as new and influential protagonists on the local scene, exacerbated local tensions and contributed to the outbreak of local conflicts that hardened communal divisions.

Before moving on to these developments, one last actor, namely the Maronite Church, which played a central role in mid-century events, needs to be introduced. Until the eighteenth century, the Maronite Church had remained dependent on, and subordinate to, Maronite notables for protection and the means of subsistence. Its parochial organizational structure, scarce resources, and dependence on Maronite secular authority limited its influence and its ability to meet the spiritual needs of its community. These constraints had become all the more apparent after the Maronites, who had formed a small and secluded community in the northern sectors of the Bsharri, started to spread out throughout the Mountain after the sixteenth century.¹⁷ Eventually, the influence of the Roman See, as well as changing circumstances within the Church and the wider community, converged in the eighteenth century to generate momentum in favor of the reformation of the Maronite Church. Hence, after the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century, the Vatican sought to strengthen its authority over the Oriental Christian communities and to amend dogmatic and ritual divergences, initiating a policy of gradual rapprochement with and tighter oversight of the Maronite Church. At the same time, certain factions within the clergy, including disaffected bishops and members of the new and dynamic Lebanese Order of monks, led a movement within the Church for a more effective structure to serve the needs of a more diversified and dispersed community. As a result, the Maronite Church held a series of councils, starting with the Council of Luwayza (1736), and it adopted several measures to rationalize the internal structure of the Church and improve its performance while shielding this institution from interference by the local notables.¹⁸

The implementation of these measures was slow and difficult but eventually led to a thorough reform in the Church and the gradual emancipation of the Maronite clergy from the tutelage of notable Maronite families. The new regulations, encompassing most significantly the acquisition by the Church of the means of its administration, such as Church lands, monasteries, and regular income as well as a more independent and formal organization, provided it with the financial

and organizational basis of its independence. At the same time, they generated a certain tension between clergy and traditional notables, who resented the loss of their patronage of the clergy as well as their own gradual impoverishment and loss of land to the Church, which gradually emerged as one of the richest institutions of Mount Lebanon.¹⁹ The reformation of the Church also improved its performance among its flock and consolidated its position and influence within the Maronite community. The increased influence of the Church within its community manifested itself in the regular presence of the clergy in villages, its supervision of various schools in the Mountain, and the foundation of religious societies for the lay population, all of which allowed the Church to stimulate religious life among its flock, promote stricter norms and morals, and to enhance communal awareness among members of the community.²⁰

The reformation of the Church finally enhanced its role on the Lebanese scene and altered its parochial outlook. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the scholastic works of the Church remained remote from the concerns of commoners and notables. Like most Eastern Christian sects, the Maronite clergy was very jealous of its denominational specificity. This concern of the Maronite clergy with its own image, its past, and that of its community developed after the renewal of its contacts with Rome, in the face of rivalry with the other Christian sects before whom the Maronites portrayed themselves as faithful upholders of the Orthodox Christian faith. "Maronite historians wrote in defence of their community, stressing its importance, and refuting real or imagined disparagement. In most cases, their aim was not so much to establish its history as to vindicate its claims."²¹ This traditional ecclesiastical historiography of the Maronites, where historical accuracy was often sacrificed for the sake of alleged dogmatic coherence, has mainly concentrated on the defense of the perpetual orthodoxy of the Maronites.²² The motivation of the Church in defending this view varied according to circumstances and ranged from Ibn Qila'i's attempt to bring Maronite dissidents to support union with Rome, at a time when the community was seriously divided over the issue, to Patriarch Istfan Duwayhi's proclaimed intention in the seventeenth century, when the union of the Maronites with the Catholic Church was already a foregone affair, to "silence the charges against it by Western and Eastern Christian writers."²³ The insistence of Maronite clerics on the perpetual orthodoxy of their community aimed mostly at demarcating advantageously the Maronites from rival communities. More specifically, it aimed at improving and amending the image of the Maronites in the Christian world, and especially in Rome. Since many leading Maronite historians were graduates of the College of Rome, they were influenced

by the negative perception of all heresies and schisms in the Roman See. They therefore endeavored to correct their previous image by wiping out any evidence of dogmatic deviation among the Maronites and elaborated a new historical myth matching their revived Catholic inclinations.²⁴ The image of the Maronites living in a “hostile” Muslim environment also reflected similar views held in the Western world at the time.

The traditional writings of the Maronite clerical scholars hence reflected particular communal concerns emanating from prevailing ecclesiastical controversies and rivalries between Christian communities. It was only in the nineteenth century, in the midst of profound instability, that some of the elements of this traditional lore were then reused and revised while being integrated into a political communal ideology. The elaboration and propagation of these idealized mythological views of the past, with increasing emphasis by the middle of the nineteenth century, aimed at legitimizing certain specific political projects of the Church during the troubled period of 1840–60. They also catered to a need for foreign protection and support.²⁵

BASHIR II'S RULE AND HIS LEGACY

By the turn of the nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon came under the rule of Emir Bashir II al-Shihabi (1788–1840).²⁶ The first years of his long rule did not differ much from the customary trend of events in the Mountain, except that this time the new Emir was an ambitious, ruthless, and a practiced schemer who maneuvered with dexterity the ambitions of Ottoman *walis*—among whom figured the notorious al-Jazzar, *wali* of Acre—the intrigues of other Shihabi emirs, and the incessant schemes of competing coalitions of *muqata'jis*. At the same time, Bashir II benefited from ongoing fights among local *muqata'jis* and various socio-economic changes in the Mountain to consolidate his power more firmly and to extend his direct authority over various fiscal districts. His schemes culminated in 1825 with the elimination of his main rival—and old ally—the paramount Druze leader, Bashir Jumblatt, and the subsequent subordination or exile of many Druze *muqata'jis* and some of their Maronite allies, as well as the sequestration of their lands.²⁷ Most of the Druze positions and lands that were thus seized were allotted to Christian relatives and adherents of the Emir or to recently enriched Christian merchants and peasants.²⁸ The local political system was hence notably modified. The nature of the authority of the Emir evolved from a sort of paramount arbitrator and manager of local affairs who held barely more power than the *muqata'jis*

over whom he was supposed to preside toward that of a ruthless despot. Bashir II managed to eliminate or neutralize potential challengers and opponents as well as intermediate powers and other checks on his authority. However, the basic social structure of family lineages was not dislocated. Bashir II removed only the upper link in the hierarchy of family lineages, temporarily associating most of the client networks more closely to his person.

The removal or subordination of some of the most prominent *muqata'ji* families by Bashir II had another significant consequence. It unsettled the old balance of power between the religious communities in the Mountain in favor of the Maronite community. The Druze community, who had perceived itself as a ruling and fighting caste, suddenly found itself leaderless, humbled, and disorganized.²⁹ Its political supremacy in the Mountain had been severely curtailed, and many of its members had taken the way of exile. Those who remained did not enjoy a more enviable lot. After the occupation of Syria in 1831 by Egyptian forces under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, son of the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, several attempts at conscripting them led to their rebellion in the Shuf, in the Hasbaya-Rashaya districts, and especially in their stronghold in the Hawran. They were finally subdued by Ibrahim Pasha with the assistance of Maronite contingents armed by Bashir II. The resentment of the Druzes against Bashir II, already perceived as a personal enemy of their community, was henceforth enhanced, and an element of discord between the Druze and Maronite communities was thus introduced.

In comparison, the political and social status of the Maronites improved during the same period. The removal of Druze *muqata'jis* by Bashir II led him to rely more on the Maronite community to establish his authority. His Christian relatives and followers were entrusted with the administration of some the most important districts, including Druze ones. For the first time in the history of the Emirate, Christian officials nearly monopolized the highest political positions. This general promotion of the Maronites inside the Emirate was consecrated by the unprecedented close relations established between the Emir and the Maronite Patriarch, Mgr Yusuf Hubaysh (1823–45).³⁰ In need of some alternative power to that of the *muqata'jis*, Bashir II strove to enhance the position of the Patriarch in his own community by bestowing on him arbitration prerogatives and assigning him other diverse political tasks. This policy was welcomed by the Patriarch, who was looking forward to some political role after the reformation of the Maronite Church and the weakening of the *muqata'jis*. A relationship of “mutual support” thus ensued between the two men, and the Patriarch tried as hard as he could to rally the Maronites behind Bashir II.³¹

These political developments coincided with demographic and economic changes that magnified their importance. For more than a century the Maronites had witnessed a remarkable increase in their numbers, due to improved security and health conditions, new economic opportunities, exemption from conscription, and the salubrity of the mountain climate, which protected them from the recurrent waves of epidemics that periodically decimated the population of the towns and plains. They thus came to constitute, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a sizeable majority of the Mountain's population and a relative majority in nearly all districts.³² This situation was all the more critical since the demographic dynamism of the Maronites was not matched by a similar process among the Druzes. The latter had seen their numbers dwindle over the years due to continual infighting and periodic waves of emigration to the Hawran. Their numerical importance was further curtailed under Egyptian rule due to harsh conscription measures and a new wave of emigration to Hawran.³³ The imbalance between both communities during the last years of Bashir II's rule was thus further accentuated.

These demographic changes also corresponded to economic alterations triggered by the intensification of Western trade in the Mediterranean. This process altered the old social and economic structures of the Syrian provinces and diversely affected the local population. Overall, the balance of trade between the Syrian provinces and the West favored the latter: an influx of cheap manufactured Western goods drained away local gold and silver reserves. It also undermined local textile production and manufacturing and marginalized the old regional merchant networks of the main cities of the interior, thus impoverishing the urban population. At the same time, the Ottoman treasury, in continual need of money, resorted to periodic depreciations of the Ottoman currency and increased tax demands. Tax rates thus began to rise, intensifying the pressure on the local population. However, the Syrian population was not altogether negatively affected by this process. Some groups benefited from it, particularly local Christian merchants of the coast with links to foreign trade.³⁴

The economy of the Mountain was also affected by these economic changes, albeit in its own way. Lebanon had traditionally cultivated silk, which was sold mainly to the interior Syrian markets. Small quantities also reached Italy and France. With the rise of Western demand and the relative decline of textile manufacturing in the interior Syrian towns, sales of Lebanese silk were redirected toward the Egyptian and European, and more particularly the French, markets, providing the Lebanese with an exportable cash crop. Commercial exchanges between the Lebanese Mountain and the West were thus slightly balanced. The Mountain paid

the price in another form: its integration in the international silk market laid it prey to fluctuations over which it had no control whatsoever. Moreover, if this orientation toward foreign markets and the consequent support it gave to the local silk industry temporarily sustained the demographic dynamism of the Maronites, providing guaranteed markets for the peasants in addition to jobs and money, the limits of the absorptive capacity of this productive sector were quickly reached. By the end of the nineteenth century, the lack of lands and work opportunities in the Mountain prompted the Lebanese to emigrate by the thousands. By this time, silk had become a monoculture, and close to “80 percent of the cultivable land of Mount Lebanon was covered with mulberry trees.”³⁵ The economy of the Mountain was dramatically altered, shifting from a partial subsistence economy to the intensive cultivation of silk for export.³⁶

These economic changes had significant social and political consequences. They further weakened the *muqata'ji* class and again accentuated the interior imbalance between the Druze and Maronite communities since control over the production and sale of silk lay largely in Christian hands. The *muqata'ji* class, who remained tied to the land, becoming dependent upon Beirut merchants and the agents of the manufacturers in the Mountain, suffered a relative collective impoverishment. This phenomenon, compounded with egalitarian inheritance laws inside the notable families, which favored the continual division of their properties, led increasing numbers of impoverished *muqata'ji* families to sell their lands to merchants and entrepreneurs or to their old tenants. Their prestige and standing, already undermined by Bashir II's policies, was thus negatively affected, and their traditional exactions and haughty demeanor became all the more unjustified and unbearable to the peasants. Simultaneously, a new class of merchants emerged in the Mountain, one whose recently acquired wealth and rising self-confidence and expectations contributed to undermine further the local political and social order based on the supremacy of the *muqata'ji* families in the hierarchy of family lineages. Finally, the new economic situation allowed a measured emancipation of the peasants from their *muqata'jis* and landlords, as silk merchants, or the agents of the French manufacturers, became a source of loans and payments, in cash or kind. These changes led to peasant and commoner restlessness against the exactions of the *muqata'jis* and the ever-rising level of taxes under Bashir's government and initiated a series of peasant uprisings, starting in 1820 and stretching until 1860.³⁷

All of these overlapping economic, social, political, and communal changes and contradictions led to a period of protracted instability and conflict, lasting some

two decades after the demise of Bashir II in 1840, when socioeconomic factors intermingled with political and communal issues.

No attempt is made here to retrace the chronology of this period. Instead, this study concentrates on selected events, their impact on some of the main actors, and the emergence of new Lebanist ideas that arose concurrently.

THE 1840 REVOLT

In May 1840, a popular uprising erupted in Mount Lebanon against Bashir II and his ally and overlord, the governor of Egypt Muhammad Ali, who, in a gesture of open defiance of the Ottoman Sultan, occupied Syria and Lebanon in 1831, sparking off an international crisis that consumed Ottoman and European diplomats for nearly a decade. The rebellion was triggered by an Egyptian demand for a general disarmament of the Mountain and a local fear of ensuing conscription. The Maronites, who were primarily affected by this measure, which had already been applied to the Druzes, accordingly initiated an insurrection on hearing of this resolution.³⁸

The rebellion started in Dayr-al-Qamar, where the inhabitants refused outright to surrender their arms and incited the remaining population of the district to follow suit. Soon the rebellion spread to the central districts of Matn and Kisrawan. Two foci of insurrection subsequently formed: one in the neighborhood of Sayda, gathering insurgents from the Shuf; and another in Hursh, not far from Beirut, for the rebels of the northern Christian districts. Some Shihabi and Abillama emirs, as well as few Christian and Druze *shaykhs*, joined the rebel camps or secretly encouraged them.³⁹ No real coordination seemed to exist between the two camps, although exchanges between both sides took place. Before long, the rebels of the Shuf were wooed by Bashir II's promises and surrendered, abandoning their allies in the north.⁴⁰ The latter, amounting to "some few thousand individuals,"⁴¹ held out for nearly two months in the outskirts of Beirut, flouting Egyptian authorities there. At the same time, their claims multiplied as all the other grounds for resentment against Bashir II's rule and Egyptian occupation came to the fore to sustain their determination. Over and above their initial demand for the revocation of the disarmament measure, they raised claims for a fairer rate of taxation, exemption from anticipated conscription, the abolition of forced labor, and the institution of a *diwan*, or council, to assist the ruling Emir.⁴² At this point, Bashir II and his Egyptian overlord decided that only force could bring them to yield,

and the rebels rapidly disbanded when an Egyptian campaign against them was undertaken at the beginning of July, followed by the arrest of the leaders and the heavy-handed disarmament of the mountaineers.⁴³ However, the insurgents were barely disarmed when a joint Ottoman-British fleet appeared off the coast of Beirut, sparking the revolt anew.⁴⁴

The rebels now joined forces with the Ottoman and Allied British and Austrian forces in an offensive to expel the Egyptian army from Syria. They obtained a swift and startling victory over Ibrahim Pasha, compelling him to retreat with his army from all of Syria. Bashir II, who had linked his fate to that of the losing side, surrendered to the British forces in Beirut and was hence exiled first to Malta, and later to Istanbul, where he died some years later. However, his name was not easily forgotten, and his shadow continued to hover over Lebanon for a long time. Soon enough, the Church began to bitterly regret the loss of the advantageous position the Maronites had won for themselves under his rule and militated for his restoration. However, Bashir II had left an intricate legacy: the old order that he had tried to bend to his own advantage, and the structures and hierarchies that he had displaced to secure his own rule, could not be restored with impunity after such a long time, and the situation that obtained by the end of his rule could not endure. Attempts to institute a new order amid the intertwined tensions and contradictions that had emerged under his long rule plagued the Mountain in the years following his removal. His successor, the Ottoman appointee, Emir Bashir Kasim, a distant cousin of Bashir II also known as Bashir III, failed to assert his authority and was in turn quickly demoted, bringing to an end the Shihabi Emirate.

Some details of these dramatic events, relevant to this study, such as the aims and claims of the rebels, some foreign activity and influence, and their impact on local forces, need to be examined.

The insurgents did not raise explicit claims for the independence of Mount Lebanon or for the granting of privileged status to the Mountain within the framework of a larger Empire during the 1840 rebellion. Their demands focused on some local and specific grievances, especially the high level of taxation, which had risen manifold during Bashir II's reign and was further increased by Ibrahim Pasha, as well as other exactions such as forced labor imposed during the Egyptian occupation, and no claims regarding the overall status of the Mountain as such were made by the population of Lebanon. In one of their clearest and longest statements, the rebels, after repeating their usual complaints, asserted: "We have lost our children, lost our liberty and we no longer possess anything; in short we are living in appalling degradation. We have thus decided to rise to abolish [this]

injustice and seek our tranquility and liberty. If the authorities take this [fact] into consideration and eliminate injustice we are ready to obey its orders, *because our revolt does not aim at taking over the government but at eliminating this untenable injustice*" [my italics].⁴⁵ When the rebels failed to obtain satisfaction from the Egyptian authorities, they readily accepted the helping hand of the Ottomans and their European allies who promised to alleviate their grievances under a restored Ottoman administration. This reversal of allegiances came about all the more easily since the Ottoman Sultan had by then issued a *firman*—the *Hatt-i-Sherif* of Gulhané of 1839—"enjoining the end of injustices and the curbing of every oppressor"⁴⁶ and promising fairer assessment and collection of taxes. Hence the rebels came to ask "to be allowed to return under the protection of our legitimate sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred years. We only ask to partake of the privileges and the rights of the *Hatt-i-sherif*, which our gracious emperor had granted to all his subjects without exception, without distinction."⁴⁷

However, it seems that ideas of independence and emancipation were promoted among the Lebanese during this period. These ideas and concepts were propagated at that time by some members of the foreign community in Beirut who supported and incited the rebels to stand firm. It is difficult to gauge the real impact of these foreign exhortations on the population or their elementary importance in the appearance of emancipative inclinations among some Lebanese circles. However, since they concurred with the articulation of such claims and concerns in Mount Lebanon, they are reported here, leaving some margin of uncertainty about their immediate impact and essential significance.

In his report to the French minister of foreign affairs on the 1840 rebellion, the French consul in Beirut, Prosper Bourrée, mentioned that the Greek consul in Beirut, "a young man of 19 years, who had turned [his consulate] into a branch of the Russian consulate,"⁴⁸ as well as the British consul Moore, were inciting the Lebanese to rebel, extolling the virtues of "liberty, glory, religion"⁴⁹ and quoting the example of the Greek people who had managed few years earlier to liberate themselves from Turkish domination by force of arms.⁵⁰ These exhortations were apparently not totally ignored by the Lebanese rebels. At about the same time, vague mention of the Greek revolt appeared in the proclamations of the insurgents who enjoined the population of Lebanon to follow the example of the Greek insurgents who "have preceded you and already rebelled, and obtained full liberty."⁵¹ In the same context, Bourrée and his successor often insisted on the role of a Jesuit priest, Father Rylo, a Lithuanian who had joined the Polish revolt against Russian rule in 1830 and who was favorable to the establishment of a "Christian

homeland”⁵² in Mount Lebanon. During the revolt, he encouraged the insurgents to take arms and helped them to organize, earning for himself the reputation of being “one of the motors of the . . . insurrection.”⁵³ Egyptian authorities in Beirut at the time corroborated these contacts between the rebels and some members of the foreign community in this town, reporting continual movement between Beirut and the rebel camp by foreign nationals.⁵⁴ Driven by a romantic enthusiasm, the European community in Beirut seemed animated by a deep sympathy for the cause of the rebels, prompting the then-French prime minister, Adolph Thiers, to comment wryly about “the coterie of young French and foreign men, who consider the insurgents very interesting, and who perhaps, in this perspective, want to encourage and support them.”⁵⁵

At the same time, Ottoman and British agents greatly contributed to the fanning of local expectations and to substantiating ulterior claims. Among these figured Richard Wood, a special envoy of the British ambassador to Istanbul, Lord Ponsonby, who accompanied the Ottoman forces in order to support and organize the revolt against the Egyptian presence in Syria and who, “in the anxiety and eagerness of the contest going on . . . , made *frequent and extensive promises* [my italics] . . . to the Maronites to induce them to rise” on behalf of the Ottoman government.⁵⁶ British and Ottoman pledges for assistance included the preservation of the “ancient rights and privileges enjoyed by the inhabitants of the Mountain”⁵⁷ and an exemption from illegal taxes.

Reappraising in 1842 the role of foreign parties in sowing ideas of independence in Lebanon, Bourrée judiciously affirmed: “Until last year, the idea of independence did not exist among the Arabs. The allied expedition has brought the seed, but for a number of reasons, its development will be very slow.”⁵⁸

When he wrote these lines, Bourrée may also have had in mind his own role during the events of 1840. Trying hard to conciliate the contradictory terms of French policy in the Levant, at the time divided between its traditional protectorate over the Catholics, which he deemed greatly endangered by a French stand opposed to the Maronite rebellion against Egyptian rule, and the French government’s decision to safeguard the Egyptian hold over Syria,⁵⁹ Bourrée came up with a proposal that he conveyed to Paris. The importance of this “plan,” as he called it, lay in the fact that the idea of establishing an independent Catholic principality in Mount Lebanon, under the protection of France, apparently then made its first and explicit appearance on the local scene. “These dangers,” he wrote, “would all vanish with the recognized independence of the Prince of Lebanon, with the creation, finally, of a Catholic principality that would be independent or merely

required to perform a few acts of vassalage.” Such an entity, he added, would allow France “without convention or treaty or title but by the very necessity of things, to become the natural protector of the Christian Catholic emir.”⁶⁰

Bourrée then expounded personally, and on his own initiative, this idea to Emir Bashir II, who, quite practically, objected to his exalted interlocutor that Mount Lebanon could not become independent without the adjunction of a port and the Bekaa Valley for its supply of grain.⁶¹ Bourrée did not mention whether he ever communicated his “plan” to any representative of the Maronite clergy or to other Lebanese parties. Given his enthusiasm for the cause of the Maronite rebels, it is quite probable that this project was conveyed to other Lebanese parties directly by him or by Father Ryllo, who, according to Bourrée, attended the meeting between Bashir II and the French consul at which this idea was advanced. At any rate Bourrée was firmly disavowed by his government, Thiers qualifying his project as “chimeras . . . which are insignificant next to the interest that we have in seeing Syria subdued and brought back under the authority of Muhammad Ali.”⁶²

Bourrée was immediately recalled to Paris.⁶³ But the idea of creating a semi-independent Emirate, or at the very least securing a “privileged status” for Mount Lebanon to accommodate its largely Christian population, had made its first appearance, and it was to have many later ulterior consequences.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEBANIST IDEAL

One of first to capitalize on these kind of ideas was the Maronite Patriarch himself, Mgr Yusuf Hubaysh,⁶⁴ who soon after the demise of Emir Bashir communicated to the Ottoman government a petition followed by a full-fledged plan for a Maronite Emirate on behalf of the Maronite community. In these texts, the head of the Maronite clergy insisted that “the Hakim of Mount Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon should always remain, in accordance with ancient custom, a Maronite [sic] of the noble Shihabi family.”⁶⁵ The Patriarch thus strove to twist matters to the advantage of his community by misrepresenting a historical reality. He obscured the fact that the Shihabi ruler had always been a Muslim Sunnite, that Bashir II had been the first Maronite Shihabi governor, and that he had never openly flaunted his religious affiliation. Nonetheless, the unusual situation that obtained during the final years of the reign of Bashir II was adopted as a model, projected onto a mythical past, and adhered to as a norm for the future. The favored status enjoyed by the Maronites

during the last years of Bashir II's rule, as well as the relationship of the Maronite Patriarchate with this Emir, came to be viewed by the Maronite Church as an ideal situation that should be at all costs preserved. For the first time in the history of the Mountain, the ruling Emir had been a Maronite Christian, albeit ambiguously so. The Maronites, who had up until then constituted a second-rank community in the Emirate, witnessed an unexpected improvement of their condition. The Patriarch hence engaged in a bid to consolidate and perpetuate the recently established Maronite ascendancy in the Mountain by securing the confirmation of the rule of a Christian Emir. The Patriarch seemed nevertheless to have appreciated that his claims did not stand on very firm ground and so deemed it necessary, in order to strengthen his position, to add another point to his argument, mentioning that the Emir should be Maronite in view of the fact that "the Maronites inhabitants of Lebanon . . . are larger [in number] than all the rest."⁶⁶

These two petitions from the Patriarch, the first of which was written as early as October 1840, marked the first expression of a Lebanist ideal that developed out of one basic claim: the establishment in the Mountain of a self-ruled entity whose links with the central government in Istanbul should be virtually nominal. They also represented the first appearance of the founding myth of this Lebanist ideology: an idealized portrayal of the history of the Mountain. The exceptional situation that obtained in the Mountain during the last years of the reign of Bashir II, projected into an ideal past, came to be viewed and presented as a set of established "rights" and inviolable "privileges and traditions." This constructed tradition would become typical of most Maronite, and later secular, Lebanist literature promoting the establishment of an autonomous or semi-independent entity in Mount Lebanon. With a view to basing their claim on legitimate historical grounds, many Maronite and Lebanist writers reproduced and elaborated on the theme of an idealized traditional Emirate. A process of rewriting history, involving the obscuring of certain historical facts in order to convey an ideal picture or the misrepresentation of certain historical situations, was hence initiated.⁶⁷

These idealized historical constructions were meant to support specific political plans and programs. They thus reflected the different claims and the specific contingencies to which they corresponded, varying, as will be shown, according to circumstances and to the audience they were meant to reach. Hence, the nature of the relationship between the projected—and allegedly historical—Lebanese entity and the central government in Istanbul fluctuated between virtual independence, when prospects seemed promising, or when the targeted audience appeared receptive, to integration into the Ottoman Empire accompanied by some degree

of autonomy, when the outlook for such plans seemed less assured or the targeted audience more discerning.

The Maronite Patriarch was induced to formulate his demands for the confirmation of Shihabi rule in Lebanon by the planned Ottoman reorganization of the recovered Syrian lands. The political void prevailing in the Mountain after the demise of Bashir II encouraged Mgr Hubaysh to raise crucial political issues directly with the Porte. He was hence challenging the prerogatives of the old political class and introducing himself as a major political figure, since he claimed to represent the majority of the population of the Mountain. His claim, moreover, could not be separated from his bid to preserve the status quo ante, the legal confirmation of which would have constituted a victory for the Maronites, sanctioning the ascendancy they had managed to gain during the last years of Bashir II's reign. As already mentioned, this situation had obtained under specific circumstances, and the head of the Maronite Church seemed to have realized that it was greatly endangered by the demise of Bashir II, the return of the exiled Druze *muqata'jis* who aspired to restore their former rights and powers, and by the plans for Ottoman reorganization. The Maronite prelate was also availing himself of promises advanced to the insurgents by British and Ottoman officials on the ground during the 1840 rebellion, guaranteeing the preservation of the "ancient rights and privileges of the Mountain."⁶⁸ In this context, mention may be made of the exhortations of the foreign consuls and nationals mentioned previously, as well as Bourrée's plan, which might well have influenced the program advanced by the Patriarch.⁶⁹

Three obstacles, however, hindered the Patriarch's project. (1) The Ottoman government had conflicting aspirations for a general centralization of the Syrian provinces, aiming at the abolition of local centers of power. Mgr Hubaysh tried to counter this policy in Lebanon by regularly addressing to the Porte petitions similar to the one mentioned, or others countersigned by as many Maronites as he could mobilize, in an attempt to convey the impression that his aspirations genuinely represented those of the Maronites. He also sent a special political envoy to Istanbul, Abbot Nicolas Murad, and relied extensively on French diplomatic support in the Ottoman capital.⁷⁰ (2) At the same time, the return of the Druze *muqata'jis* claiming their old rights in the Mountain and the confirmation of their previous political supremacy directly threatened Mgr Hubaysh's plans. To thwart their ambitions, he struck at the root of their power by challenging their political and judicial rights over their Christian tenants. (3) Finally, and more important, the Patriarch had to grapple with the disunity of the Maronites who, in spite of his

assurances to the contrary, still needed to be constituted into, and directed toward, a political community claiming its rights.

Up until then, as has been seen, the Maronite feeling of identity had not carried political significance. It did not constitute in itself a rallying force or a recognized basis for effective political solidarity. While the process of growing communal antagonism that emerged during Bashir II's rule had exacerbated feelings of differentiation and competition between Maronites and Druzes, it did not constitute in itself a sufficient incentive and appropriate framework for the unification of the Maronite community. The Maronites had not, over previous centuries, acted as a united political community, and no regionwide channels for the mobilization of the whole community existed. In the segmented political system that had prevailed until then the Maronites of the northern, central, and southern districts had had different historical and political experiences and were included in separate client networks. Furthermore, the dislocations that had affected this community for more than a century had engendered new interests and lines of divisions within the community. Several forces in the community had divergent projects and ambitions: the Maronite *muqata'jis* aspired to restore the "old order of things" and sympathized therefore with the Druze *muqata'jis*, whereas the power of the latter was contested by the Maronite clergy and peasants. Finally, Maronites were divided on the more specific issue of restoring Bashir II. Some Maronites, like the clergy, the family and supporters of the Shihabi Emir, and some enriched merchants and peasants, had indeed benefited from the rule of Bashir II and developed vested interests in the system that then obtained.⁷¹ However, other Maronite parties, like the *muqata'jis* who had lost their estates and the Maronite peasants, overburdened with heavy taxes and afflicted by other forms of extortion, were more preoccupied with their own problems and interests than with a unification of the community in order to confirm or restore the rule of the Shihabs—and, more specifically, Bashir II.⁷² The question of unifying and conciliating, as much as possible, these different regional, social, and political interests remained therefore unaddressed. Clearly, a Maronite political community, identifying itself as such and collectively defending its threatened interests, as perceived by the Church, still needed to be forged. For that, a political program, based on a Maronite sense of identity, needed to be elaborated and a feeling of solidarity geared toward a recognized general interest developed.

The Patriarch hence undertook to present such a program and rally his community around it. On March 29, 1841, he assembled the main leaders of the community and had them sign a pact, promising that they would henceforth

“form one body, act towards one sole aim and work as a single hand in all matters relating to our interests and to the general welfare.” Toward this aim, the pact specifically tackled the issues dividing the Maronite community, providing for a more equitable distribution of taxes, respect for the authority and rank of notables and *shaykhs* in return for fairer treatment of commoners, and the selection of representatives, or *wakils*, for each district in order to facilitate contacts and coordination between all. The signatories finally swore that “their present union will last forever. [None] should seek to break it or alter it; . . . nor time, nor the succession of the days, nor the great questions of the century, nor the misfortunes or the disasters. . . .”⁷³

So much insistence on the henceforth everlasting unity of the Maronites and their unbreakable solidarity could only point to an attempt to conceal the divisions of the community and the deep concern and apprehensions of the Patriarch. By March 1841, the fate of the Shihabi Emirate was seriously compromised by the defiance of the Druze *muqata'jis* who challenged the principle of the selection of a governor from the Shihabi family,⁷⁴ hence contesting the legitimacy of the whole system, by the schemes of the Ottoman government that was trying to reimpose its direct rule over the Mountain, and by the weakness of the Emir Bashir III himself. Furthermore, the attempt to mobilize the Maronites prompted, in reaction, Druze commoners to rally around their traditional leaders,⁷⁵ thus forming an internal front lobbying against the Patriarch's plans and an internal danger to his community. In comparison, the Maronites lacked leadership and cohesion. By summoning all the Maronite notables and having them sign this convention under his supervision, the Patriarch was responding to these developments by presenting compromise solutions to the issues dividing the Maronites and striving to impart on them a higher sense of solidarity and responsibility in defense of the general interest. To bolster this projected Maronite unity, Mgr Hubaysh made public the text of the convention through the clergy in the villages and mobilized the Church apparatus to mobilize Maronite commoners and awaken their awareness to the ongoing contest and the need to identify and rally with their coreligionists.

The principle of such a pact between all the Maronites was in itself quite new. It rested on principles alien to the organization of the Mountain, aiming to supplant old parochial allegiances and clientele by a preeminent communal political identity and loyalty. More specifically, it challenged the traditional organization of the Mountain by contesting the legitimacy of the authority of the Druze *muqata'jis* over their Maronite tenants on the basis of communal differences. The Patriarch

was thus acting to thwart all Druze attempts at reestablishing their old privileges by undermining the basis of their authority.⁷⁶

THE END OF THE EMIRATE

Mgr Hubaysh's plans, however, came to none, and his project faced, shortly thereafter, a first and capital setback in November 1841, when the Druze *muqata'jis*, infuriated by the policy of the new Christian Shihabi Emir, Bashir III, besieged the town of Dayr-al-Qamar, seat of the governorate. The Patriarch immediately called upon the Maronite notables and commoners of the northern and central districts to gather an army to save "their" threatened Emir.⁷⁷ He financed the campaign from Church funds, supplying the Maronite army with provisions, arms and ammunition, and used the Church apparatus to mobilize his flock. However, in spite of all the efforts and authority of the Patriarch and the clergy, which often reached the point of threats of excommunication,⁷⁸ the Maronite army did not go to the rescue of the Emir at Dayr-al-Qamar. Instead, it dallied at Baabda arguing over leadership and organizational issues⁷⁹ and finally attacked the neighboring Druze village of Shuwayfat before disbanding.

The Maronite army lacked cohesion and purpose. The leadership of the campaign had been assigned to a Shihabi Emir whose orders and directives were never heeded. Furthermore, the Maronite *muqata'jis* were more inclined to support their Druze counterparts than the Maronite Emir since they felt equally threatened by the insubordination of the commoners, while the commoners were more preoccupied with asserting their power against that of their *muqata'jis* than with rushing and saving "their" threatened Emir and coreligionists in the town of Dayr-al-Qamar. Finally, the Maronite army, composed of separate parochial groups, made any coordination between these separate bands and cliques impossible. This lack of coordination and mutual support among the diverse groups underscored the absence of any effective networks for the mobilization of the whole community as such and the originality of such an initiative.

The division of the Maronites seemed also connected to an apparent lack of motivation and concern for the issue at stake. The narrative of Tannus Shidyaq is replete with accusations of "treachery" by several groups and notables, underlining the lack of motivation and solidarity as well as the conflicting interests of the Christians as a group. Thus, all the pledges of "everlasting union and solidarity" between the Maronites failed to materialize at this critical time and on this critical issue. Their performance discredited the Patriarch's attempt to establish a firm

Maronite political front backing his political program. It led him thereafter to pursue a more selective policy, relying more on behind-the-scene diplomatic and political channels to reach his aims than trusting the aptitude of his community.

In the meantime, Bashir III, abandoned to his fate, was expelled under humiliating conditions from Dayr-al-Qamar to Beirut, where an Ottoman special envoy dismissed him and sent him to Istanbul. The Shihabi Emirate thus ended ingloriously, and an Ottoman governor was appointed to rule Lebanon directly.

CHAPTER TWO • The Emergence of Lebanism

The French Connection

The end of Shihabi rule came as a blow to the Maronite clergy and represented a serious setback to its ambitions. As a result, the Patriarch immediately dispatched to Istanbul a special envoy, Abbot Nicolas Murad, who was assigned the delicate task of “earnestly requesting the immediate return of Emir Bashir II, the only [person] able to put an end to the disasters of Lebanon.”¹ Thus, the Maronite Patriarch, who for a year had tried strenuously to uphold the Emirate, was conceding defeat. Without Bashir II, he was unable to maintain the status quo that had obtained in 1840 or to control the situation on the ground.

The Maronites’ rout and their failure to rescue the last governing Shihabi Emir were followed by communal clashes during which some Maronite villages were attacked and devastated. The new Ottoman governor, ‘Umar Pasha, seemed unable or unwilling to stop the fighting, and, disapproving of his appointment, the Patriarch was loath to ask his help. The only conclusion he came up with was that the old Emir alone—he was by then nearly eighty years old—could remedy this sorry situation. Hence, Mgr Hubaysh added a new element to his former claim. He now wanted not only confirmation of the autonomous status of the Mountain under a Maronite governor but clearly and simply the return to the 1840 status quo through the restoration of Shihabi rule with Bashir II. Given the reserved reaction of the Ottomans to his first proposal, the Patriarch faced certain failure had he not benefited from an unhoped-for support.

Unexpected assistance came in the form of determined and steadfast French support for the Maronite position in the Mountain, in Istanbul, and in the other European capitals. The French government sanctioned the Maronite claim for the restoration of the Shihabs between 1842 and 1845. At the same time, it followed a sufficiently ambiguous policy to feed the aspirations of the Church. Additionally, some circles and personalities in France, directly and indirectly, fanned the expectations of the Church by advocating the Maronite cause. French support and influence was thus not only limited to political and diplomatic support by the French government. It also came in the form of political ideas promoting Christian emancipation from Ottoman rule. The multifaceted nature of French support needs to be elucidated before we resume our narrative.

THE FRANCO-LEBANESE DREAM

In 1840, the French alone, and against all the other European powers and the Ottoman government, backed Muhammad Ali's claim for confirmation of his rule in Syria.² France refused to associate itself with the London Convention of July 15, which enjoined the Egyptian Pasha to withdraw from Anatolia and most of the Syrian provinces in return for recognition of his hereditary rule in Egypt. If Muhammad Ali refused to submit, the Ottoman government, with the assistance of the signatory powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, would take adequate measures to force him to yield.

Until the last minute France tried to prevent a joint military intervention against its Egyptian ally, and when the intervention ultimately occurred, secretly hoped that the Egyptian Pasha would be able to hold his ground honorably. The total rout of the Egyptian forces in Syria came as an unpleasant surprise. Not only was France's ally badly defeated, but the French position and influence in Europe, Syria, and Istanbul was badly damaged. By bluntly refusing to associate itself with the other European powers in the solution of the Eastern crisis, France lost its position inside the Concert of Europe that had been established after 1815. It had to wait until the signature of the Straits Convention of July 13, 1841, to recover its former rank among its peers. France's influence in Syria, which had rested for the past ten years on French patronage of Egyptian rule and on its informal protectorate of the Maronites, looked seriously comprised. Ottoman rule was reestablished against France's apparent will in these provinces, and the Maronites were embittered by the position of the French government, which had preferred to support unconditionally their Egyptian oppressor instead of backing up their rebellion.

As a result, François Guizot, who replaced Adolphe Thiers as minister of foreign affairs after these French setbacks, decided to send back Prosper Bourrée as consul in Beirut to revive French influence in Syria. The consul had warned his government some months earlier about the eventual threat to its position in Lebanon if it chose to side unconditionally with Muhammad Ali.³ He thus gained the gratitude of the Maronites, who had received the news of his recall with concern. He was therefore considered the best choice to amend the tarnished image of France with them.

Bourrée returned to Beirut in August 1841 and soon reached the conclusion that the Maronite Patriarch had emerged from the last crisis as the “real leader” of the Mountain: “Speaking of the Mountain, I should have first mentioned the patriarch, who is today its real leader. Over the past year, the patriarch has gathered into his hands all the powers and influence formerly held by the Emirs and shaykhs, who have either fallen or left with the old Emir Bashir.” Bourrée added, however, that Mgr Hubaysh, who had inherited these charges unexpectedly, was unprepared to shoulder these responsibilities without foreign assistance, and, since the Maronite prelate represented the “most powerful support for our influence in Lebanon,” the French consul henceforth endeavored to back him while relying on him to advance France’s position in Lebanon.⁴ This approach was welcomed by the Maronite prelate, who was desperate for some assistance, especially in Istanbul, where lay his only chance of salvaging the situation and obtaining a political victory, through the restoration of Bashir II, which would compensate for the latest internal political and military setbacks. During a meeting with the French consul some days before the demise of the Shihabi dynasty, Mgr Hubaysh, in a desperate tone, implored the French diplomat to uphold the Maronite cause, stating, according to Bourrée: “Let France take our cause in hand, this cause is just, let her settle it in Constantinople, and we shall do whatever you instruct us.”⁵

The foundations of a solid and lasting alliance based on mutual interest between France and the Maronite Patriarchate was thus laid. The Patriarch was hence accepted by France as the “real leader” of his community, and Paris promoted and supported his position and influence within his community and on the local political scene. In return, France could rely on a powerful ally within the Mountain. The close association of France with the Maronite Patriarchate remained, in spite of some vicissitudes, a central feature of French policy in the Levant until the end of the Ottoman period.⁶

France’s support of the Patriarch tallied with the new policy toward the Empire adopted by the new French foreign minister, François Guizot. The withdrawal of

Muhammad Ali from Syria had delivered the Ottoman Empire of its most serious internal threat and allowed for the reestablishment of Ottoman rule in Syria. The Ottoman government had, however, to pay a heavy price for the Allied support then obtained. Ottoman officials had to endure henceforth continual intervention by the European powers, ostensibly anxious to assist and supervise the restoration of Ottoman rule in Syria on new and sound grounds and, indeed, to see a comprehensive reform of the Ottoman Empire. The Western powers had, however, serious misgivings about the Ottoman government's ability to regenerate the Empire and had opted for the preservation and reform of the Ottoman Sultanate for want of any better solution. Their main aim was to prevent a general scramble for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, which might lead to a generalized European conflict. It was hence European peace they first had in mind in seeking to uphold the integrity of the Empire and promote its reform. At the same time, in view of their misgivings about its fate, they began to prepare for an eventual collapse of the Empire and a consequent intervention.

This undeclared scramble for the informal partition of the Ottoman Empire, fanned by a climate of acute rivalry and suspicion among the European powers, involved multifarious pressures on the Ottoman government in order to obtain economic or political benefits and enhance their future options and prospects. Syria was especially coveted by France and Britain, who engaged after 1840 in an intense competition to consolidate their current and prospective future positions. At that time, the best asset of the French government in Syria was the Maronite community, whose support loosely overlapped with France's protectorate of the Catholics in the Empire. Moreover, Mount Lebanon then represented a key strategic asset, and as the recent Egyptian crisis had revealed, whoever controlled this "impregnable citadel" could dominate the rest of Syria.⁷

So, after Guizot took over the helm at the foreign ministry, he opted for a more cautious and conciliatory, but nevertheless ambiguous, policy than that followed by his predecessor. He moved to reintegrate France in the Concert of European powers, aligned France with the general European consensus aimed at upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and worked closely with the other European powers in Istanbul on the formulation of new arrangements for the administrative reorganization of Syria and Lebanon.⁸ At the same time, he emphasized more diligently the promotion of the protectorate of Catholics in the Empire and sponsored the extension of the educational activities of the Catholic missionaries, initiating a sustained cultural policy that greatly contributed to foster French influence in the Ottoman lands and more particularly in Mount Lebanon.⁹ Finally, Guizot endorsed

the claim of the Maronite Patriarch for the restoration of the Shihabi dynasty and earnestly lobbied his peers to reestablish the 1840 status quo in the Lebanese Mountain.¹⁰ The ambiguity of Guizot's policy was well summarized in his instructions to his ambassador in Istanbul, just after the Egyptian rout:

I draw your attention in particular to our religious interests in the Ottoman Empire. The glorious patronage that France has extended for centuries to the Catholics of the East, the missions which she has established there and which are successfully carrying on an honorable task of Christian civilization in those lands, are for her a matter of influence and illustration that it is imperative to keep intact, for that patronage and the salutary action of those missions, by accustoming the populations to look upon France as the source of the benefit and comfort that come from the West, can only *plant seeds that will favor our political designs in future eventualities* [my italics].

At the same time the French minister was enjoining his diplomats on the ground to preserve “as much as possible” the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to give to the Porte “advice in conformity with a provident and generous friendship.”¹¹

However, the latitude of the French government to pressure the Ottoman government on the Mount Lebanon issue was constrained by the often conflicting interests of the other European countries—especially Great Britain, who imposed itself as the patron of the Druzes in the Mountain—the net refusal of the Ottoman government to consider French proposals, as well as the limits of France's protectorate of the Catholics, which in no way entitled it to press for the adoption of a special political status for the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.¹²

Guizot's cautious and ambiguous stance did not, moreover, satisfy the vocal Catholic and legitimist opposition in France who, along with some liberal and republican politicians and publicists, advocated a more forceful policy to support the Maronites in Mount Lebanon, while at the same time advancing French international position and interests.¹³ Their stances were inspired by a Romantic enthusiasm, fostered by a wave of religious revival and a fascination with the Middle Ages and the Crusades that followed the restoration of the monarchy in 1815. They were also animated by news of the conflict in the Lebanese Mountain that accompanied the reestablishment of Ottoman rule and by exaggerated and at times fanciful Maronite petitions emphasizing their trials at the hands of the Druzes and the Ottomans. Throughout the 1840s, the Catholic, legitimist, and liberal opposition mounted a sustained campaign in favor of the Maronites and repeatedly criticized the policy of the government in the press and in the Parliament, where

they advocated stronger French support by diplomatic, and even military, means for the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.

In one stormy parliamentary debate on the Lebanese question in 1847, for instance, sparked off by a set of Maronite petitions from the mixed districts presented by a Maronite priest, Father Jean 'Azar, and which presented a dramatic account of the exaggerated misfortunes of Maronites, the Catholic opposition once more pressed the government for some firm French action in line with France's "secular right" to protect the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire, which they felt entitled, and indeed obligated, France to support the Maronites. "Would you renounce an ancient policy espoused by every French ruler from Charlemagne to Napoleon, including Saint Louis, Francis I, Henry IV and Louis XIV? . . . You are retreating from the protection of Lebanon's Christians, who might ask you for a single ship and a few hundred sailors!" asked the Catholic and legitimist deputy, Comte de Quatrebarbes, addressing his peers before vehemently adding: "No, you will not want the only Christian people that for eight centuries has remained independent and free in the midst of the Ottoman Empire, in the very cradle of Christianity, in the places where one cannot take a step without treading on French bones—no, you will not want that people to vanish. Sooner or later, you will force the powers that be to protect them."¹⁴

Another eloquent exponent of the Maronite cause was the French poet and politician Alphonse de Lamartine, who as early as 1835 advocated the emancipation of the diverse nations of the Ottoman Empire from a decaying Ottoman Empire "in the name of humanity and civilization." For him, the dislocation of Ottoman Empire was inevitable, and sooner or later the diverse populations and nations it was oppressing would replace it. Europe, and more specifically France, had a central role to play in the emancipation of these oppressed nations and their guidance on the path of civilization. In this *mission civilisatrice* aiming at regenerating the East, Europe could rely on the various Christian populations, and France could rely especially on the Maronites, "one of the finest, purest, and most bellicose people on whom France can, someday, depend to bring part of the Orient under its legitimate influence." Lamartine repeatedly urged the French government to adopt a more assertive policy to support the "unfortunate" Maronites, who were subjected, since the demise of Emir Bashir II in 1840, to a campaign of "annihilation, oppression and devastation."¹⁵

The repeated interpellations of the French opposition did not, however, perturb Guizot, who tried as best as he could to dampen their enthusiasm and who reminded his critics of the confines of the French protectorate of the Christians in the

Ottoman Empire and the limits of French influence and authority on the Lebanese question: "We should not believe that our Capitulations have granted us in the Ottoman Empire sovereignty rights; we should not believe that they have granted us the right to decide on the administration of these provinces. Nothing of the kind had ever been written, or claimed or practiced. The Porte has remained and remains today sovereign over the populations, even the Catholics among them, that we protect; The Porte has never ceased one instant to exercise over them the rights of sovereignty." The help and assistance that traditions entitled France to lend to the Maronites, added the French minister of foreign affairs, "stemmed not by virtue of a special and direct right of protectorate but by way of influence and in a way of recommendation."¹⁶ Nevertheless, the French minister decided to dispatch, in response to his critics, a commission of inquiry, presided by the Comte de Lallemant, attaché at the French embassy in Istanbul, and Eugène Borée, an eminent Orientalist close to the French Catholic circles who maintained tight relations with the Lazarists he eventually joined, to investigate the situation in Lebanon. The commission toured the Mountain and presented a report that vindicated the conciliatory Lebanese policy of Guizot and tempered for a while the ardor of the French opposition on the Lebanese issue.¹⁷

The subtleties of the French official position with regard to Lebanon were not clearly discerned by the Patriarch and the Maronite clergy. In their opinion, as the Patriarch put it, their cause was just, and it was only natural that Catholic France should uphold and back their aspirations. The sudden celerity of the French officials to defend their cause and support them materially and politically as of 1841 only reinforced their conviction. This misguided appreciation of the French stance by Maronites clerical circles enhanced their expectations and confirmed their determination to obtain the confirmation of the rule of a Maronite governor.

The Patriarch and clergy's misreading of the French official position was also influenced by the stance of French Catholic, legitimist, and liberal opposition, whose views were beginning to filter through to the Maronite clergy by way of missionaries, travelers, and French residents. Their views, directly and indirectly, fanned the aspirations of the Maronite Church. A sort of mirror game was established between some clerical Maronite circles and these French groups whereby an idea was put forward by one of the two sides, adopted and reproduced by the other, and thus gained credibility and authority through this process of mutual confirmation. The image of "persecuted Christians groaning under the weight of Ottoman tyranny" circulating among French Catholic opposition circles in France was adopted by some Maronite clerics who readily reproduced it. In their turn,

the Maronites nourished this view with their own imaginations and added their own particular visions to it. The image of Maronites oppressed by their Muslim overlords, as well as the “dream” of some French opposition circles to uphold a Christian principality in the Levant approximately matched, and sometimes even exceeded, the Maronite clergy’s views and ambitions. At any rate, they could easily be adapted to the pretensions of the Church for the Maronites and rearranged to fit its own project.¹⁸ Nicolas Murad stands out as a representative figure and a typical product of this ongoing process. He was the first Maronite to publish a pamphlet in French responding to and reproducing these inferences while adding other original features to the French “dream,” which henceforth became a sort of “Franco-Lebanese dream.”¹⁹

The mirror game between some French parties and Maronite clerical circles gave birth to a vague political project aimed at establishing a Christian entity in the Levant under French aegis, as well as a whole concordant legitimizing history. The fantasies entertained by part of the French opposition and the Maronite clergy produced a prolific literature, celebrating the glorious deeds of the Maronites throughout history, praising their historic steadfastness in the middle of an hostile Muslim environment, remembering their close collaboration with the Franks during the Crusades and their ancestral devotion to France, and magnifying and romanticizing the extinguished “Emirate of the Maronites,” which had allegedly allowed them to preserve their distinct identity throughout the centuries. In sum, some in France began to portray the Maronites as a full-fledged nation that had throughout the centuries managed to survive in virtual independence under the protection of their own Emirs and according to their religion and traditions, and who had been treacherously overpowered by a Muslim Ottoman–Druze conspiracy.²⁰ They were thus presented as an already established and deserving “nation” that had earned its right to a guaranteed peaceful and independent existence and that furthermore was devoted to France. “The truth is that European readers have been served a Lebanon of fantasy, a monarchy and dynasty of fantasy . . . *entitled* [my italics] to proclaim forthrightly the legacy of a Christian governor . . .,” exclaimed Bourrée, who denounced the erroneous, and at times fanciful, views regarding the Maronites and Mount Lebanon entertained in France. He therefore insisted on the necessity of putting “history in the place of, I would not say poetry, but of lies.”²¹

More concretely, the French consul was deeply concerned about the political implications of such idealized representations for the Maronites themselves: “If the only outcome of all this was greater sympathy for unfortunate populations who deserve every compassion, it might be better to foster the error than to eradicate

it, but the error would bring a great danger, of which they would be the first victims, for those populations would be credited with a strength that they do not have and would be thought easily capable today of a task that would overwhelm them; that is, the child would be taken for a man, and there would be speculation about his current staying power, while, left to his own devices, he would perish under the load.”²²

In the same vein, the Lallemand-Boré Commission of Inquiry sent to Lebanon in 1847 deplored the fact that “the most amazing pretensions have been raised in the name of the Christians of Lebanon, and statistics and history have been used for political purposes.” The good faith of “sincere [French] Catholics. . . [has] been surprised by misleading stories and ridiculous information,” it added, expressing the hope that this “visible erudition . . . would not cause fatal harm when the error would be exposed.”²³

The bewilderment of the Maronite Church in the midst of all these intricacies is understandable: the views and support of unofficial French circles became confused with the already equivocal position of the French government itself. Misplaced expectations and many misunderstandings ensued regarding the real intent and substance of the latter, which was never totally clarified and which led to frequent disappointments.

THE CONFIRMATION OF LEBANESE AUTONOMY

In the first months of 1842, however, the Patriarch, still oblivious to the subtleties of the French stance, could only congratulate himself on earnest pledges of French support. His satisfaction was further enhanced by French espousal of his claim for the restoration of the Shihabs. Guizot had strongly reacted to the appointment of an Ottoman governor in Mount Lebanon, considering that it “crowned the malevolence and duplicity of the Porte” in its policy toward the Maronites since the reestablishment of its rule in Syria.²⁴ He had instructed his ambassador in Istanbul to support the restoration of the Shihabs, whom he saw as having an acquired “right” to govern the Mountain.²⁵ Therefore the French ambassador and the special envoy of the Patriarch, Abbot Nicolas Murad, urgently dispatched to the Ottoman capital to request the return of the old Emir, worked closely together, although the impetuous demeanor of this “sly levantine”²⁶ often annoyed and irritated the French diplomat. However, they were defending the same cause, and the French ambassador could only welcome the mission of Murad, which served

to reinforce his own stand by substantiating it with the claims of the Maronites themselves, as expressed by Murad, in the intricate negotiations then taking place in the Ottoman capital.

Indeed, intense and contentious negotiations had opened in Istanbul between the Western powers and the Porte over the future administration of Mount Lebanon.²⁷ They were prompted by the demise of the Shihabi family and the appointment of an Ottoman governor to rule directly the Mountain, which provoked at first a common European initiative for the revocation of this last Ottoman measure and the restoration of the Shihabs.²⁸ Discussions focused on the opportunity to preserve the previous *de facto* semi-autonomy of the Mountain, on the basis of its former vaguely and variously perceived self-administrative traditions, and on the basis of the pledges made by British and Ottoman officials to its inhabitants in 1840 to preserve “their ancient rights and privileges” with the restoration of Ottoman rule.²⁹

These pledges came to the fore of discussions between the European powers and the Porte. Based on these promises, and on the repeated assertions of the special British envoy, Richard Wood, that he had been formally entrusted by Reshid Pasha, the then-minister for foreign affairs, to advance such pledges to the Lebanese, the European ambassadors tried to hold the Ottomans true to their word.³⁰ The Ottoman government vehemently denied having made any such promises to the Maronites, asserting that it had only offered some guarantees to Emir Bashir II personally, had he accepted to join its camp, and that this offer had been annulled by Emir Bashir’s refusal to cooperate. ‘Izzet Pasha, who then commanded the Ottoman forces, and who became Grand Vizier in 1842, asserted for his part that these “promises were only general promises of good-will and protection, which he was ready to renew, or special and conditional promises to the old Emir Bashir.”³¹

The issue was complicated by the fact that there was no clear or agreed consensus among the Western powers themselves as to what these “ancient rights and privileges” represented. Some pretended that they included the “ancient right” of the local inhabitants to be ruled by a Christian prince, while others maintained that they only represented an unspecified local autonomy. As for the Ottomans, they always denied the existence of such ancient privileges.³²

In the confused talks that ensued, the Western unanimity that had emerged at first for the reestablishment of the Shihabi family soon broke out. While the French stood firm on this position, the British began to falter in view of the staunch opposition of their Druze protégés and the Ottoman officials to any restoration of the Shihabs. What the Ottomans had in mind was a greater integration of

Mount Lebanon in the new administrative system being introduced in Syria, and they were in no mood to examine requests for a confirmation of its former semi-autonomous status, for the reestablishment of the Shihabs or Bashir II. From the Ottoman perspective, Bashir II was an official—an appointed *multazim*—who had exceeded his prerogatives; he exemplified an old and bygone order that the new policy they embarked upon after 1840 quickly rendered obsolete.³³ Moreover, the Ottomans saw in Bashir II a traitor who had defected to the Egyptian side, and they considered his “degenerate Shihabi descendants” to be “incompetent” and unfit to govern henceforth Mount Lebanon.³⁴ Reshid Pasha, expressing the state of mind in the Ottoman capital bluntly stated: “The erection of an independent principality in Lebanon is out of the question, given the fact that there was no point to have taken this country from Muhammad Ali in order to remove it again from the domination of the Porte.”³⁵

In the face of the definite opposition of the Ottomans to the restoration of the Shihabs, the Austrian Chancellor, Klemens von Metternich, who had at first endorsed the common European claim in favor of the restoration of the Shihabs,³⁶ submitted, after several months of intense haggling, a way out to the diplomatic dead end reached in Istanbul. He suggested dividing the Mountain into two separate districts, a Christian one and a Druze one, each administered by an official of its own community, under the general supervision of the Ottoman *wali* of Sayda.

This compromise, adopted in 1842 and refined later in 1845, had the advantage of satisfying the many contradictory demands of the European powers, which pressed the necessity of granting the Mountain some degree of autonomy in accordance with its former ill-defined privileges, and of the Porte, who was firmly opposed to such a principle. The latter had finally had to give some ground. By an official proclamation of the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs, Sarim Pasha, to the European ambassadors, the Porte agreed to Metternich’s plan, conceding some self-administrative prerogatives to the local populations.³⁷ The Ottomans nevertheless managed to save face and could congratulate themselves on having succeeded in thwarting Western attempts to consolidate the previous autonomy of the Mountain, since formally the new administration remained under the authority of the *wali* of Sayda. The British were also satisfied to have secured for their Druze protégés a self-administrative district while at the same time redeeming the pledges made in 1840 by their agents to the Maronites, since the latter too had obtained a self-administrative district of their own.³⁸ The French, isolated in their lone insistence on the restoration of Shihabi rule, finally had to yield, gratifying

themselves with the fact that they had partly succeeded in upholding the principle of Maronite self-rule in a large part of the Mountain but expressing reservations as to the future success of the experiment.

An interesting development occurred during the 1842 negotiations, when a tentative attempt to consult the local population on its wishes for its future government was applied for the first time in Mount Lebanon. It was initiated due to the need of the Ottoman government and the European powers to support their positions in the ongoing negotiations in Istanbul by establishing them on allegedly popular wishes. As a result, a real “battle of petitions” unfolded in the Lebanese Mountain.

The custom of subjects sending petitions to the central government relating to certain specific grievances was not unusual in the Ottoman Empire, where the Porte represented the highest recourse in judicial matters and political affairs. It was this traditional device that was applied to sound out the opinion of the population, unaccustomed to being consulted on political matters and unfamiliar with voting processes. However, in a social structure in which individual opinion was conditioned and determined by the familial environment, the principle of polling public opinion, which rests on the sum of independent, individual wills, was basically flawed. As a matter of fact, most of these petitions were signed only by the *shaykhs* or the heads of certain family lineages, who thus engaged their whole clientele or descendance. If we add to this the fact that in 1840 the overwhelming majority of the population did not know how to read and write—an ability mostly monopolized by the higher clergy, monks, and a small number of their students who acted as secretaries to political dignitaries—the dubious representative value of the signatures assembled in these petitions becomes clearer.³⁹ Nevertheless, these considerations did not impede the interested parties engaged in this battle who seemed more concerned to use these petitions as propaganda tools than to bother about the authenticity of their reflection of any popular will.

The “battle of petitions” was initiated by the Turks who, confounded by the firm European reaction to the appointment of an Ottoman governor for the Mountain, tried to justify their move.⁴⁰ Soon after his appointment, the new Ottoman governor of Mount Lebanon, ‘Umar Pasha, began to circulate ready-made petitions expressing the satisfaction of the local population with the establishment of direct Ottoman rule and its opposition to any idea of restoring Bashir II or the Shihab family. In his endeavor, he could count on the support of most of the Druze *shaykhs*, some of whom had already made such claims even before ‘Umar Pasha’s

appointment, and on traditional divisions among Maronites *shaykhs*, to gather a respectable number of signatures. However, these did not seem to fully satisfy the Turkish governor, who decided to force matters and exert pressure on the remaining notables to have them sign petitions prepared by his agents. Reports of threats, bribery attempts, promises of future official positions, and the counterfeiting of seals reached the Ottoman capital, where the Western ambassadors, availing themselves of consular dispatches from Beirut, totally rejected the Ottoman allegations that they were acting according to the wishes of the population.

In the Mountain, the Church immediately understood the significance of the Ottoman campaign and launched a counter-campaign of petitions, denouncing the appointment of an Ottoman governor and claiming the restoration of Emir Bashir II. Soon the whole Mountain was engaged in this battle of pro-Ottoman and pro-Shihabi petitions, with notables sometimes signing one or another petition according to their sincere convictions, but more often affixing their seals to both petitions in order to please everybody or denouncing the forced extortion or counterfeiting of their signature on one type of petition and sanctioning the other. An analysis of these petitions as genuine representations of public opinion is therefore an elusive affair. What seems to be practically established is that the campaign for the restoration of Bashir II was not the result of a spontaneous initiative of the local population nor an expression of its genuine sanctioning of the content of the supplications. The Maronite bishop of Beirut himself, Mgr Tubiyya Awn, admitted to the British consul in Beirut, Colonel Rose, that “the party or faction (*Hosb*) of the Shihabs were composed of servants of the late Emir, who naturally wished for his return, but that the people of Lebanon did not care for them.”⁴¹ The pro-Shihabi campaign was instigated by the Church, which also often used quite unorthodox methods to gather as many signatures as possible. Even so, they were unable to present a unanimous Maronite espousal of their aspirations, because many of their communicants signed, willingly or unwillingly, opposite petitions.

The “battle of petitions” of 1842 was an innovation in the Mountain, and it well illustrates the process of composing such petitions allegedly representing the “will of the people.” It inaugurated an era in which similar campaigns were continually being instigated by some party or another and used as propaganda tools to back or justify certain claims or to promote or oppose certain policies. As such they represented more the opinion of their authors and instigators than that of their signatories, seriously impairing their value as a manifestation of the aspirations of the local inhabitants.⁴²

This fact was shrewdly perceived by the French consul, Bourrée, who in response to an inquiry by his minister about events, facts, and figures reported in the 1847 petitions by the Maronites of the mixed districts, prepared by Mgr ‘Abdallah Bustani, bishop of the Shuf and presented to the French Parliament by Father ‘Azar, which contained inflated estimates of the Maronite population and a dramatic account of the devastation allegedly wrought on them by the Druzes, lamented the credulity of the French politicians: “It is Arab exaggeration, proportional to the distance separating the site of production from the site of destination . . . [and which] . . . supposes no doubt that one is as ignorant in France of the affairs of Syria that the Arabs are about affairs in France.”

Then reminding his minister of the terrible confusion that prevailed during the 1842 “battle of petitions,” he warned him that these supplications should be treated with great caution: “It is not on documents of this kind that one can appreciate the state and the wishes of the populations.”⁴³

MOUNT LEBANON IN DISARRAY

While the negotiators in Istanbul could congratulate themselves on having found a solution to the Lebanese predicament, the new regime adopted in 1842, or the *Dual Qaimaqamiyya* as it came to be known, served only to exacerbate tensions in the Mountain. Its main problem lay in the fact that the Lebanese population was not neatly divided geographically between a Christian and a Druze sector. In the Christian sector, which covered two-thirds of the Mountain, only the northern districts and part of the central districts were inhabited solely by Christians. In the Matn, attached to the Christian sector, lived a small Druze minority, while in the southern Druze sector the Christians formed a slight majority.⁴⁴ For the next three years the Porte and the Western chancelleries debated whether the Christian *qaimaqam* should have authority over the whole Christian population, or only over the Christian sector, leaving the rest of the Christian population under Druze rule. This controversy was stimulated and accompanied by periodic fighting in Mount Lebanon between the Druzes and the Maronites trying to enhance their position on the ground. The focal point of conflict lay in the mixed sectors, that is, the Druze sector and the Matn, where the returning Druze *muqata’jis* strove to fully recover their former political authority over the Christian population, whereas the latter, backed by the Maronite Church, opposed the political clout of Druze *muqata’jis* over them.⁴⁵

The mixed districts thus represented the real battleground in the ongoing contest for supremacy in the Mountain. The Druze sector was the last stronghold of the Druzes, and they were adamantly determined to defend it. For the Maronite Church, it was the last region of the Mountain where Christian rule needed to be secured, the central and northern districts being already governed by a Maronite *qaimaqam*. Ensnared in the middle, the Christians of the mixed districts were the main victims of this battle for supremacy, since it exposed them to continual Druze reprisal without any effective support from the Maronites of the north.

The growing divide between the Druzes and the Christians in the mixed districts was furthermore fueled by a set of interlocking political and socioeconomic problems that affected the whole Mountain but took on a more specific communal hue in the mixed areas. The attempt by the *muqata'jis* to restore their former authority in the Mountain came up against the new realities that had emerged during the long reign of Bashir II, precipitating a deep crisis of authority and legitimacy. The relentless campaign of Bashir II against the *muqata'jis* had undermined the authority of the latter and favored a relative emancipation of their tenants and clientele. The weakening of the power of the *muqata'jis* had moreover been accentuated by the economic changes triggered by the intensification of trade with the West, which had in the main impoverished the traditional ruling class and promoted the rise of a new class of merchants, middlemen, and bankers as well as well-to-do peasants and villagers, who staunchly opposed the restoration of *muqata'jis*' privileges. The problem was furthermore compounded by tax issues, as the *muqata'jis* insisted on their right to apportion and collect taxes, on which rested their authority and wealth, whereas tenants and villagers wanted to strip the *muqata'jis* of their prerogatives and privileges in order to check their exactions and to impose a more equitable distribution of taxes. In the mixed districts, these overlapping political and socioeconomic disputes pitted the Druze *muqta'jis* and their clientele against Christians peasants, villagers, and townsmen, accentuating communal differences and promoting communal realignments and mobilizations. In the Christian district, similar issues set the Maronite *muqata'jis* against their former tenants and clientele, accentuating divisions within the Maronite community and paralyzing the efforts of the Patriarch to unify his community. The whole explosive conjuncture was exacerbated by the lingering negotiations between the Ottoman government and the European powers over the finalization of the new regime for this province, which, in the meantime, left the Mountain with no effective constituted authority.

The negotiations in Istanbul for the finalization of the *Dual Qaimaqamiyya* regime lingered on until 1845, when they were prompted to their conclusion by a renewal of communal clashes in Lebanon. A new protocol, the *Shakib Effendi R glement*, was adopted, addressing the pending issues that had plagued the implementation of the new regime. It provided mainly for the appointment of agents, or *wakils*, for the Christians of the mixed districts and allowed for the formation of administrative and judicial councils to advise and assist the Christian and Druze *qaimaqams*, in which the six main communities of the Mountain were to be represented each by a deputy and a judge. The councils, which were to assist the *qaimaqams* in the apportionment of taxes and in the adjudication of judicial cases, struck at the root of the fiscal and judicial powers of the *muqata'jis* without, however, altogether eliminating their local authority. Once more, this arrangement was adopted because it constituted an acceptable compromise to all the negotiating parties in Istanbul. In the Mountain, it did not really satisfy anybody. In spite of the relative calm that prevailed for nearly fifteen years, underlying tension persisted until the final conflagration of 1860, which eventually forced the abrogation of the *Dual Qaimaqamiyya* regime.

The *Shakib Effendi R glement* further aggravated the crisis of authority in the Mountain. It provided for the division of political, judicial, and fiscal authority among several officials—Ottoman governors, *qaimaqams*, *muqata'jis*, judges, and *wakils*, notwithstanding domineering consuls—whose powers were not always neatly defined and who vied with each other to define to their own advantage, alter, or obstruct the implementation of the new regime. Hence, the new councils, which were meant to limit the fiscal and judicial authorities of the *muqata'jis*, were undermined by the latter, who took advantage of their remaining local authority to hinder the working of the councils by thwarting plans for a cadastral survey aiming to apportion taxes on a more equitable basis. For their part, the peasants and villagers strove to eliminate altogether the judicial and fiscal prerogatives of the *muqata'jis* and to put an end to their exactions. Finally, Ottoman *walis*, officials, and special envoys, trying to sort out all of the conflicting claims of local parties, adopted at times measures at odds with each other in an attempt to conciliate everyone; at the same time, their tentative attempts to reassert the control of the central government were frustrated by the local consuls who pulled in different directions to protect the interests of their prot g s. Under the circumstances, the new regime tottered on the brink of paralysis, and in the absence of any effective authority to settle all of the conflicting claims and counterclaims, the Mountain slowly descended into near chaos and anarchy.

Festering political and socioeconomic disputes spurred realignments and mobilizations that fed into a developing process of communal crystallization and regrouping. The intertwined conflicts that pitted Christians against Druzes in the mixed districts, inconsistently backed by the Christians in the northern districts, as well as the underlying contest between both communities for overall dominance in the Mountain, hardened the boundaries between the Druze and Christian communities in the Mountain. Claims and counterclaims started to emerge in defense of the putative rights of the contesting communities, highlighting their divergent interests and enhancing the communal awareness of the members of each community.

The process of communal regrouping was furthermore buttressed by the *Shakib Effendi Règlement*, which formally introduced for the first time the communal factor at the political and institutional levels. The principle of allocating political and administrative charges on a communal basis, which henceforth became an enduring feature of the Lebanese political system, was adopted by the negotiating parties in Istanbul as a trade-off between the Ottoman attempt to centralize and rationalize local administrations and the concern of the European powers, characteristic of the reform period, to grant equal powers to the various religious communities. In the Mountain, the organization of the political and administrative system along communal lines activated the politicization of communal allegiances and solidarities and contributed to the gradual political identification of the people of the Mountain along communal lines.

However, the process of communal regrouping unfolded slowly, unevenly, and inconsistently. It was confounded by the many horizontal and vertical social and political divisions that drove, for instance, some Christian *muqata'jis* to side with their Druze counterparts against the pretensions of the peasants and villagers. At the same time, the process of communal regrouping was hindered by local and kinship ties and solidarities that highlighted the lingering and countervailing significance of such ties and complicated the process of communal mobilization and integration. Finally, the process of communal regrouping stirred up intracommunal contests in which various actors and groups vied with each other over the leadership of each community, the interpretation of communal identity, and the objectives of communal mobilization. These intracommunal divisions and contests were more pronounced within the Maronite community than the Druze, which by virtue of its geographic concentration, its smaller size, and close kinship and social ties succeeded in overcoming more easily internal tensions and rivalries and in unifying its ranks.⁴⁶ For the Maronite community, attempts at unification

exposed and exacerbated diverse overlapping vertical and horizontal divisions. Local and kinship ties and solidarities encumbered efforts to rally the community in defense of its putative interests, and in the 1841 and 1845 clashes, for instance, the Maronites mobilized along parochial lines in small quasi-independent and at times rival groups that defied attempts at coordinating their efforts. Moreover, the community remained racked by disputes between *muqata'jis* and increasingly assertive peasants, villagers, and townsmen, determined to put an end to *muqata'jis* privileges and abuse. Even the Maronite Church, which strove to unify the ranks of the community, found itself paralyzed by internal divisions, as the Patriarch and various bishops and priests bickered over policies and priorities.⁴⁷ Eventually tensions boiled over in 1958, when the peasants of Kisrawan revolted against their Khazin lords. The peasants expelled all the Khazin *shaykhs*, along with their families, from the district and established for several months a peasant commune, precipitating a intense contest within the community that underscored once again the inability of the Church to act as an effective leader of its community, or even as an arbitrator and mediator between the conflicting parties.⁴⁸

The Peasant Revolt of Kisrawan ended in a final conflagration in the Mountain in 1860. The massacre of thousands of Christians in the clashes, as well as the slaying of more in Damascus, prompted a firm Western reaction and a French military intervention. These developments revived the “dream” of some French and Maronite circles to establish a semi-independent Christian entity in Mount Lebanon. But before moving to this new episode in the development of the Lebanist ideal, two texts of significant importance to this study need to be examined.

MURAD'S NOTICE

In the year of 1844, a brief pamphlet entitled *Notice Historique sur l'Origine de la Nation Maronite et sur ses Rapports avec la France, sur la Nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban*,⁴⁹ by Mgr Nicolas Murad, Archbishop of Laodicea and representative of his nation to the Vatican, was published in Paris. Its author was none other than the special envoy of the Patriarch sent to Istanbul in 1842, who had since then moved to Paris in an attempt to obtain French help for the restoration of the Shihabs.⁵⁰ His treatise is of special importance to our subject. It is a pure product of the post-1840 period, and it illustrates and epitomizes many of the events, ideas, and processes already observed. Murad's treatise embodied the Church's stance at this crucial stage and endorsed its political

project aiming at the establishment of a Christian Emirate in the whole of Mount Lebanon under the leadership of the Shihabis. At the same time, this pamphlet, written and published in French,⁵¹ was meant to reach and influence French public opinion. It was therefore a perfect example of the “mirror game” between some French and Maronite circles, which it typically reflected. More so, it summed up some of the views and ideas that arose from this interaction between both sides in 1844; at the same time, it served as a future reference and starting point in the ongoing operation of the process.⁵²

Murad’s book also constituted the first piece of literature by a Maronite defending fledgling national ideas and aspirations. His attempt to legitimize and defend, on historical grounds, the idea of a Christian Emirate constituted a foundation and a source of significant value for future Lebanist nationalist thought. It was the first attempt to conceptualize ideas along the lines according to which Lebanism later developed, and, in this sense, represented a milestone in the evolution of this nascent ideal. It thus became a model for future Lebanese nationalist thought. Not that all the authors who embraced and upheld Lebanism adopted altogether the views and opinions expressed by Murad, but most of them later reproduced some basic legitimizing historical concepts of this pamphlet for the establishment of a semi-independent or independent Lebanese entity.

The pamphlet itself is quite short. It consists of a brief introductory letter to the French king, Louis Philippe I,⁵³ to whom the whole book is dedicated, reminding him that “since the days of King Louis [IX], of sainted memory, all the very-Christian kings had honored the Maronites with their powerful protection.” Therefore, Murad goes on, he allowed himself to present to the French monarch “this work destined to make known and appreciated this devoted [Maronite] nation in France,” and most important, in the hope that “His Majesty, will not only do for us what his august predecessors did; we would like to expect even more from his high ability and personal influence.”⁵⁴ Then the essay proper, which consists of only thirty-seven pages, is followed by two brief annexes, one on the “Genealogy of the Princes of Lebanon” and the other containing a statistical survey of the populations inhabiting the Mountain.

The essay begins with an historical note on the formation of the Maronite community, reproducing what had become a leitmotif of the Maronite Church, namely the definite assertion of its perpetual orthodoxy.⁵⁵ Only this time, over and above the usual specifically particularistic intent and significance of this profession,⁵⁶ a new dimension was added. It was meant to emphasize the shared community of faith between the French and the Maronites, which in itself represented, in Murad’s

view and in the opinion of many contemporary Frenchmen, a pertinent enough basis of solidarity between these two “nations.” The traditional self-image of the Maronites thus acquired a political meaning and purport. A shared religion and a shared cause linked the Maronites and the French, according to Murad, in the general contest with the Muslim Ottoman Empire. This position did not represent the official Western stance at the time, but it did seem to constitute for Murad and for some French Catholic circles, with which he had then become acquainted, a potent and significant cause to uphold. Murad thus treated this question at length and devoted one-third of his book to it. An association and confusion between a religious and a national basis of identity and appeal can thus be discerned from the beginning of Murad’s treatise. The Catholic faith of the Maronites was, for Murad, the basic characteristic of their distinct nationality, and his appeal to the Catholic French monarch and nation was based on religious grounds that, in his mind, denoted political and “national” implications.

Murad then shifts to a description of the condition of the Maronites in his days and gives some details about the size of the Maronite population, the territory of Mount Lebanon, and the situation and organization of the Maronite Church. In this context he asserted that the Maronite nation, which used to count more than a million souls, then only numbered 525,000, of whom 482,000 lived in Mount Lebanon.⁵⁷

As can be seen from a comparison of the figures given by Murad with those from other contemporary sources of the time, the Maronite Archbishop had very generously inflated numbers, with the obvious purpose of overstating the importance of his community. The Maronites had, definitely, never reached anything near the million mark, nor even the 482,000 they had allegedly shrunk to. Murad did not give any detail as to the source of the precise figures he so meticulously reproduced. It is not clear whether these were already in circulation or whether he was responsible for them, purposely or unintentionally. At any rate, inaccurate and often exaggerated estimates about the size of the Maronite community were commonly reproduced in those days, when reliable statistics on the region were so scarce that French opinion could easily accept them at face value.⁵⁸

The treatise then touches on the question of the frontiers of Mount Lebanon, an issue carefully avoided by the Maronite Patriarch in his petitions to the Porte. Mount Lebanon, Murad wrote, “stretches from the region of Sayda, in the West, until that of Damascus, to the East.”⁵⁹ It consisted then of the two mountain ranges—Mount Lebanon proper and the Anti-Lebanon—plus the rich plain of the Bekaa, to which Emir Bashir II had already pointed as being

essential for the survival of a Christian entity. Hence, for the first time, the region claimed by the Maronite clergy was delimited geographically, albeit vaguely. An organic relation between the Maronites and the territory of Mount Lebanon proper, in which they were established since the end of the seventh century, and which in his own view allowed them to resist steadfastly throughout the centuries all foreign encroachments and to preserve their special identity, can be discerned in the historical account of Murad. However, no justification was given for the inclusion of the Bekaa Valley and Anti-Lebanon in this entity, where the Maronites had had no significant historical presence. Nor were the boundaries thus presented precisely demarcated and justified. This brief and timid mention of the boundaries of the entity claimed by the Maronite clergy therefore emphasized once more the immaturity of the project of the Church. Its central and exclusive preoccupation at that time was to restore Bashir II personally. Issues of frontiers, which had varied constantly throughout the centuries, were of secondary importance and could always be settled through the usual bargaining procedure with the Ottomans.⁶⁰

The Maronite Archbishop then tackles the specific issue of the Emirate. Murad depicted the history of the Emirate and the political system that then prevailed in Mount Lebanon in such a way as to suggest a timeless, disciplined, and orderly organization of the Maronites, under the governance of their own legitimate princes, throughout the entire Mountain range. The historical role of the Maronites and the Druzes in the Emirate were totally reversed. His account of the history of the Emirate gives the impression that the Maronites had always been politically and demographically preeminent in the Mountain. All the princely and *shaykhly* families cited by name were Maronites, although Murad conceded that “some of these Druzes, as a price for their services to the Shihabi family, have had conferred upon them the title of *shaykh*.”⁶¹ The religion of the Ma‘ans, as well as that of the Shihabs and the recent conversion of prominent members of the latter family to the Maronite rite, was totally obscured, conveying thus the view that these two dynasties, who had ruled over Lebanon “for six hundred years,” were really fervent Catholics. Finally, the Maronites were represented as an industrious people, educated and familiar with all the trades practiced in Europe or, in short, “civilized.” In contrast, the Druzes were depicted as marginal intruders in Mount Lebanon. It was only in the fourteenth century that, according to Murad, they decided to settle in this Mountain, where the governing princes “tolerated their residence”⁶² following some services that they had extended to them. Their population was implausibly

reduced to 18,000, compared to the 482,000 Maronites. The historical hegemony of the Druzes over large parts of Mount Lebanon, as well as their central role in initiating and developing the so-called Lebanese Emirate, which they had dominated until quite recently, was obscured. Furthermore, to preclude totally any possibility of attributing some importance to them, the Druzes were represented as ignorant, illiterate, immoral, idolatrous, lazy, only capable of agricultural work, and ignorant of any other occupations. In short, Murad implied, without the Maronites, the Druzes would have been unable to manage on their own.⁶³

According to Murad, this Emirate survived in the midst of the Ottoman Empire for nearly five hundred years in total independence, and it was only a hundred years earlier that the princes of Lebanon began to pay a symbolic tribute to the Ottomans in order to ward off the torments and vexations of the *wali* of Sayda. However, this did not impair at all the independence and sovereignty of the Shihabi prince, whose authority and power remained absolute over his subjects.⁶⁴

The entity claimed by the Maronite clergy thus gained with Murad a complete legitimizing history. Most of the events and figures presented had been altered, twisted, and revised in order to form a coherent composite. The timid claim of the Patriarch to the Porte soliciting a confirmation of the rule of a Maronite governor in 1840, "in accordance with ancient custom," had acquired much more substance. In Murad's representation, Mount Lebanon had survived virtually independently since the establishment of the Maronites in the seventh century. Moreover, this independence was substantiated and institutionalized through uninterrupted rule of the Ma'an and Shihabi princes for the past six hundred years. Finally, the Maronites were legitimately entitled to this Emirate because they represented the overwhelming majority of the population and because they had always lived there and constituted themselves into a self-governing and sovereign political society, ruled by their own princes, that had managed to preserve and defend its independence in a hostile environment. The central thesis of Murad, namely the uninterrupted existence of an independent polity in the whole of Mount Lebanon since the days of the Ma'ans, was to become a main tenet of Lebanism. It developed into the main legitimizing core of this nascent ideal. However, the insistence of Murad on the virtually exclusive Maronite character of the Emirate evolved with time to include many variations. Its principal incongruity lay not only in the fact that it did not agree with historical facts, but that it often contradicted contemporary reality and prospective objectives and had therefore to be toned down in order to allow more vital historical space to "Others." Hence, later historians or activists aiming

to associate other communities to the national Lebanese project were compelled to alter accordingly the history of the Lebanese Emirate and to insist more on the coexistence of diverse communities in Mount Lebanon.

Why then had this entity perished? And why did Murad ask for the help of the French to restore this independent Christian entity? It is because, Murad explained, this valiant nation had been overwhelmed by a deceitful Ottoman plan to occupy Lebanon. This design had finally succeeded when the Ottomans, realizing that they could only achieve their aim by excluding the Shihabs, took advantage of the reestablishment of their rule in 1840 to dismiss Bashir II. Since then, the poor Christians of these regions were suffering all kind of torments and persecutions under Ottoman rule: "What change has been wrought in this land in just the last four years! Insulted daily by the infidel, tormented by the cruellest abuse, the most disgusting humiliations, deprived of her princely protectors, for whose return she continually pleads, the Maronite nation thought that those times of persecution, of sad, horrible memories, had returned; many of those sons, snatched from their country, are moaning amid the infidels, in oppression and slavery, happy if, in their pain and suffering, they remain loyal to the true faith, the religion of their brothers!"⁶⁵ This image of persecuted Christians appealed to Catholic circles in France and probably matched their own views and fantasies. But Murad was not only seeking to preach to the converted. He was seeking an effective French intervention, and he elaborated a full argument to substantiate his appeal for official French help, which he indirectly presented as an unfulfilled French commitment.

The French and the Maronites, in Murad's account, had maintained strong relations since the time of the Crusades and had helped each other in times of need. Hence, for instance, the Maronites had welcomed among them the last Crusaders of the region of Antioch, when that town was conquered by the Mamluks.⁶⁶ These links between the French and the Maronites had evolved into an effective "*moral alliance*, [my italics] the recollection of which has remained profoundly engraved on the spirit of these populations," since the Crusade of St. Louis.⁶⁷ When the latter landed in Cyprus, Murad wrote, he recruited Maronites who advised him to land in Beirut and conquer Syria instead of Egypt and thus benefit from their support. Instead, Louis IX chose to attack Egypt and met disastrous consequences. When he finally managed to reach Acre, "the prince of Lebanon send to King Louis . . . twenty five thousand men . . . led by one of his sons, laden with all kinds of presents and provisions."⁶⁸ In recognition of his gratitude, the august king sent a letter to the Emir of Mount Lebanon and to the bishops of his nation promising henceforth

the protection of the Maronites by the French monarchs.⁶⁹ More so, the French king even adopted the Maronites, assimilating them to the French nation itself: “We are convinced that that nation, established under the name of Saint Maron, is part of the French nation, for its friendship for the French people resembles the friendship that French people feel for one another. It is therefore just that you and all the Maronites should enjoy the same protection that the French enjoy near us, and that you should be accepted into employment as they are themselves.”⁷⁰ It is necessary here to make a brief digression to examine more closely the issue of this letter of protection from St. Louis to the Maronites, which is today generally recognized as apocryphal.⁷¹ Murad asserted in a footnote of his *Notice* that “this letter is from a very old Arabic manuscript in the Maronite archives; the manuscript’s author claims to have translated it from Latin to Arabic.”⁷² However, no copy of the Latin original was presented or has ever been found.⁷³

The absence of documentary evidence raises some questions about the role of Murad in initiating the “St. Louis legend,” which was long considered as an established fact reproduced by many eminent historians and publicists, and which merits some further examination. A study of other letters by Murad to King Louis Philippe reveals that in an earlier petition dated February 1840, Murad, soliciting French intervention in favor of the Maronites of Aleppo, reminded the king of the traditional protection of his community by the French monarchs, according to “traditions based on authentic documents.” Murad then textually quoted the letters of Louis XIV and Louis XV without any mention of a letter by St. Louis.⁷⁴

It is only in a letter dated April 30, 1844, and addressed to the French king, that Murad mentioned for the first time the letter of St. Louis that, according to him, “our historians found in our archives.”⁷⁵ Hence, it seems plausible to suggest that he might have been one of the first to initiate the St. Louis “myth,” or at least that he was one of the first to reproduce it.⁷⁶ In this case, the mystery remains as to who so fortuitously “discovered” or penned this letter, and, if it was Murad, what factors or persons influenced and incited him in this direction. It must be remembered that Murad was then visiting Paris, where he was in close contact with Catholic circles and where “he appears to have found an abundant supply of aliment for that overheated zeal which he had previously displayed in service of the House of Shihab.”⁷⁷

This assumption can be further substantiated by the fact that in his text Murad reproduced, along with St. Louis’s letter, two other letters of protection by Louis XIV and Louis XV—duly authenticated this time. However, the protection

promised by these two kings was much more modest than that of St. Louis. The two monarchs committed themselves only to protect and defend the spiritual and religious liberty of the Maronites, in line with the general protectorate of the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. This may explain why Murad was in need to produce, or at least reproduce, the much stronger moral commitment found in the letter of Louis IX. He also aimed to relay the impression of an effective and continuous protection of the Maronites by French kings since the days of St. Louis.

Murad moreover situated the origin of the “moral alliance” between the French and the Maronites at the end of the period of the Crusades, when the Franks were in need of the help of the Maronites. Given that Murad intended to ask for French help this time, he might have “selected” to date the beginning of their alliance during this period in order to present his request for French help as a kind of reciprocated service. This view is substantiated by a letter of the Maronite bishop to Louis Philippe, in February 1840, in which he asserts that “the powerful protection which France used to bestow upon the Maronites was a reward for the services they had done them.”⁷⁸

In the same way, Murad elaborated on an imagined confirmation of this protection by Napoleon Bonaparte, whom the Maronites used to consider an “enemy of the Church.” The French general, Murad added, had allegedly declared to a delegation of Maronites coming to meet him near Acre: “I recognize that the Maronites have been French from time immemorial; I too am Roman Catholic; you will see that through me, the Church will triumph and extend its domain far and wide.”⁷⁹ Pushing this argument of an identification between Maronites and the French, Murad asserted that even the Turks acknowledged this fact by forwarding their messages to the Maronites with the following formula: “To the Maronite-Frankish nation, to the Frankish-Maronites.”⁸⁰ The Maronites themselves had also come to assume that they were a “French nation, by sentiment as well by religion.”⁸¹ The Maronite nation thus imperceptibly turned into the “French of the Levant,” an expression found since then in some French and Maronite texts.

Thus, in Murad’s narrative, the ties between the Maronites and the French had evolved through history into a total identification between the French and Maronite “nations.” However, the two partners in this relationship were not equal. It was more of an affiliation between a patron owing protection to his younger relative, due to obligations imparted on him for moral and religious considerations. Hence, for Murad, the Maronites were at one and the same time “the allies and the protégés of the French.”⁸²

This moral obligation of the French to protect the Maronites is one of the main underlying themes of Murad's book. It aimed at reinforcing his appeal for French help. Indeed, the whole of Murad's book is directed toward this final aim, and the bulk of it is only a mandatory preamble to this objective. So, after relating the history of his community and that of its historical links with France, Murad finally comes to the point. For four years, the Maronite nation had been overwhelmed by the "worst torments," he asserted. Since it lost the protection of its legitimate princes and that of France, it had been overpowered by a hostile Muslim Ottoman army and was in dire need of French assistance. If France did not want to help them any more, the Maronites were ready to die in defense of their religion. However, they hoped that France would not abandon them to this dreadful fate: "France, we hope, will not remain indifferent to our plight, deaf to our entreaties and our prayers; *on more than one account, she owes the Maronite Christians her effective and powerful protection* [my italics]. As a Catholic country, could she watch her brothers in Jesus Christ oppressed, slaughtered in cold blood? As a Great Power, is she not bound by the most formal assurances, by treaties, by letters from her kings? Would gratitude not suffice for her to see this protection as a duty?"⁸³

This is why Murad finally appealed to France to fulfill the "commitment reiterated by Guizot to . . . do her utmost to restore to the Maronites of Lebanon the government they had lost and yearn for with all their heart."⁸⁴

Murad did not specify in his treatise the kind of French help he had in mind. For that, we have to consult his personal correspondence, among which two letters addressed to Guizot, one dated March 27, 1842, and the other November 27, 1842, explicitly solicit a French military intervention "in the name of Christendom, with a view to re-establishing Shihabi rule."⁸⁵ Thus, the political project of the Maronite Church of establishing a semi-independent Emirate in Mount Lebanon became tied to and, more so, dependent upon, French military intervention. After the collapse of the plans of the Maronite Patriarch to mobilize his community and to impose its dominance on the ground, and following his reliance on French diplomatic support in Istanbul and the failure of such policies, the Church was slowly turning toward the only solution left: foreign military intervention. The recent military operation of the Allies and the Ottomans to reestablish Ottoman rule or, more probably, the intervention of the European powers that contributed to the liberation of the Greeks some years earlier, as well as the numerous exhortations of some French circles, may have inspired and instigated such designs. But the main reason for this plea for foreign military intervention was the acknowledgment by

the Church, after its reversals locally and in Istanbul, that it did not possess the means required to fulfill its ambitions. Or, to use Murad's own words in a personal letter to King Louis Philippe, "[The Maronites] know that they must await their deliverance from the King of France . . . after God."⁸⁶

The aspirations of the Maronite Church to establish an autonomous Christian Emirate hence became tied to French designs in the region. However, if the French government needed the Maronites to secure its influence and a foothold in the region in case of an eventual intervention, should the Ottoman Empire disintegrate, it was not willing as yet to take any initiative toward the realization of the Maronite project, a fact that generated much friction and misunderstanding between both sides as well as some frustration among some Maronite circles.

The legacy of Murad was therefore twofold. First, he laid the basis for the historical legitimization of the Lebanist project and ideal. Many Lebanese and foreign publicists would follow in his footsteps, refining his initial blueprint. The second aspect of Murad's legacy is more ambiguous. Murad's views concerning the religious affinity and the identification of the Maronites with the French were more rarely integrated into the core of the Lebanist ideology. Future advocates of a Lebanese identity preferred to tone down such an association, or to appeal to more secular grounds of affinity between the Lebanese and the French, but they did often refer to Murad's vision of France's "moral obligation" to assist in the liberation of the Lebanese without encroaching on their independence and identity.⁸⁷

More concretely, Murad was to have a successor in the person of Father 'Azar, who, in 1846–47, undertook a mission to France similar to that of Murad, with the aim of requesting France's support for the Maronites. Less distinguished than his eminent predecessor, and speaking barely a few words of Italian and no French at all, Father 'Azar seems to have endured many difficulties before being introduced to members of the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul, to whom he presented apparently outdated, and greatly exaggerated, petitions regarding the distressful situation of the Maronites and their urgent need for French support. These supplications ended up in the French Chamber of Deputies through the intermediation of a Catholic deputy, provoking strong criticisms of French governmental policy concerning Mount Lebanon.⁸⁸

Ultimately, 'Azar's political mission, like that of Murad before him, ended in failure; both discovered that the policy of the French government was in effect much more circumspect than that of the French circles they used to frequent. More important to this study is that 'Azar, like Murad before him, apparently scribbled

some notes on the history of the Maronites that were then translated into French in the form of a brochure and circulated, along with 'Azar's petitions, in Catholic and colonial circles.⁸⁹ The brochure was duly published some five years later in France, in the form of a book entitled *Les Marounites, d'après le manuscrit arabe du R. P. Aṣar*.

'Azar's book was clearly rewritten by a Frenchman who interjected himself into the text by frequent reference to "us" or "our country" when mentioning the French and France. Moreover, the text was updated to fit changing circumstances and governments. The publication of the book corresponded with the proclamation of Napoleon III as Emperor, and it was addressed to him, enjoining him to carry on the great deeds of his uncle and all his eminent royal predecessors and to save and protect the Maronites: "Prince, turn your gaze upon Lebanon, and see the blows that have been dealt against France, against humanity, against the Catholic faith. . . . Associate your name with the names of St. Louis, Louis XIV and Napoleon; let us have our life, let us have our faith, you can do it: when France wants to do something, it can—especially when she is governed by those Napoleons."⁹⁰ Moreover, to strengthen this plea the small phrase allegedly attributed by Murad to Napoleon himself, to the effect that the Maronites were French "since immemorial times," is continually reiterated throughout the text.

Most themes dealt with by Murad on the history of the Maronites, their historical Emirate, their close association with the French, and the traditional French protectorate of the community are reproduced in 'Azar's book, with some slight alterations and stronger emphasis. For example, the identification of the Maronites with the French is pushed even further in 'Azar's book, and the Maronites are not only the French of the Levant, or even the protégés of France, but clearly and simply French since the time of the Crusades: "The Maronites, then, are indeed French; they mix their blood with French blood on the battlefield; a noble fraternity of arms exists between them and the French. They also mix their blood through marriage; French blood flowed and still flows in Maronite veins."⁹¹ Similarly, the moral obligation, and indeed duty, of the French to succor the Maronites in their time of suffering is strongly underscored in 'Azar's text. Moreover, the advantages France could reap from such an endeavor, and indeed the identity of interests between the French and the Maronites, are more clearly highlighted. Hence, the author discussed at length why it was in French interest to help these "400,000 Maronites ripe to form a nation."⁹² The Ottoman Empire was collapsing, and "the political eventualities which might arise in the Orient required that we protect the Maronites,"⁹³ "this European colony transplanted in Asia."⁹⁴ In short, as the author

asserted: “In the East, there is only one people that has virtue: the Maronite people; the Maronites are destined for greatness; on their own they will be able to revive and reinvigorate Asia: all of civilization’s hopes rest upon them.”⁹⁵

‘Azar’s book, like that of Murad, had more immediate impact in France than in Mount Lebanon, where both works seem to have remained unknown for a long time. They were, however, rediscovered, along with many other French works of the same epoch, by some Lebanese intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century who drew much inspiration from them. Bulus Nujaym, also known as Jouplain, for example, often referred to ‘Azar’s manuscript in his major work, *La question du Liban*.⁹⁶

CHAPTER THREE • The 1860 Massacres and
Their Aftermath
A Map for Lebanon

The massacres of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and Damascus represent a watershed in the history of the Syrian provinces in general, and of Mount Lebanon in particular. Their scope and magnitude ended a long period of crisis and instability that had marked the region since its occupation by Ibrahim Pasha in 1831, its reintegration into the Ottoman Empire in 1840, and the subsequent movement of reforms initiated by the Ottoman government. Underlying fears, expectations, tensions, and contradictions that had been building throughout this troubled period were brought to such an extreme limit, and expressed in such an appalling way during the events of 1860, that they left all involved in a state of shock and dismay. These prevailing feelings, as well as the ensuing stern repressive measures adopted by the Ottoman authorities, facilitated the reassertion of Ottoman control and reform in the Syrian provinces, which were henceforth accepted in a more conciliatory spirit by their inhabitants.

At the same time, the events of 1860 represent a momentous episode in the collective memory of the people of the region. They symbolize a rupture in the history of Syria, a moment when the normal order of things broke down, when underlying animosities and fervor were violently exposed and tested. In this sense, they remained thereafter a continual point of reference for local inhabitants, representing their most intimate fears and anxieties and a somber emblem of potential upheavals.

Moreover, the significance of these momentous events reaches beyond their factual dimension. The thorough consideration they generated of the fate of the Syrian provinces had a direct bearing on the future development of nationalist ideas in the region. The diverse solutions considered in the wake of these events helped to shape future local nationalist claims and assertions and set the terms of nationalist thought and debate throughout the following century.

The massacres and the Western and Ottoman reaction they provoked raised anew the issue of the Syrian and Lebanese provinces, first opened by the Egyptian crisis. Intense negotiations followed between the main European powers and the Sublime Porte in order to devise guarantees against the recurrence of such events. An impressive variety of political and administrative projects were envisioned or contemplated by local and foreign, official, and unofficial circles. In the case of Lebanon, the joint Ottoman–European search for a political solution involved a thorough inquiry, with a special commission convening in Beirut. The commission took particular pains to examine the economic, social, and political issues that led to the crisis and made genuine efforts to address all sides of the question. However, the final solution consisted, as usual, in a general compromise between the diverging views and interests of the powers concerned, who sought to defend the conflicting interests of the local population as they thought best.

Alongside this official and diplomatic activity, several French agents and publicists promoted projects for the future of Lebanon articulated around the establishment of an independent Christian principality. Many local parties and personalities from the Mountain became involved in this activity. Thus, the “Franco-Lebanese dream” was revived, and, in this new episode, gained much in consistency and scope. The frontiers of the projected Christian principality were extended by its proponents well beyond the confines of Mount Lebanon. A detailed map was drawn by the headquarters of the French army, and historical, political, economic, and communal justifications were advanced to sustain these magnified pretensions.

In short, a project for the establishment of a Greater Lebanon *avant l’heure* took form. And, if this whole project did not materialize at the time, its significance should not be measured by this failure, or by the apparent oblivion into which it fell for the rest of the century. Some decades later, Lebanese nationalists and the Maronite Patriarch claimed an identical entity in 1919, before the Paris Peace Conference, making use of the map drawn by the French army in 1860 to vindicate and impart legitimacy on the enlarged “natural and historical” frontiers of Lebanon that they demanded. And the Greater Lebanon that ultimately emerged in 1920 looked strangely in shape like the one already devised in 1860.

The present chapter reviews the intense diplomatic, as well as unofficial, activity triggered by the 1860 massacres and the impact of all these factors on the development of the Lebanist ideal.

THE 1860 MASSACRES

By the end of the 1850s, Mount Lebanon was again in a state of turmoil. The 1845 *Shakib Effendi Règlement* had imposed an unpalatable political system on all parties in the Mountain, who hardly concealed their ill will toward any genuine implementation of its terms.¹ The new representative institutions designed to regulate and deflate the prevailing tensions in the mixed sectors—the councils and *wakils*—failed in their task in view of the irreconcilable claims of the Druze *muqata'jis* who sought to reassert their authority over Christian tenants, villagers, and townsmen and the blunt refusal of the latter to yield to their former overlords, thus accentuating communal tensions in the Mountain. At the same time, the Druze notables and their Christian counterparts did their best to prevent a fairer redistribution of taxes, thus disappointing peasants in the Druze and the Christian sectors alike, and exacerbating the horizontal tensions in society. Things came to a head in the Christian sector when a peasant revolt against the Maronite Khazin *shaykhs* broke out in 1858. Soon, the whole Christian central sector was in a state of turmoil, with an angry and unchecked peasantry in arms.

Unrest eventually reached the Christians of the mixed sectors. The latter resumed their complaints about the intolerable tyranny of the Druzes.² At the same time, the Maronites of the central districts, driven by an overconfident enthusiasm following the success of their movement against their own *muqata'jis*, “dispatched letters couched in the most inflated and bombastic terms to the great Christian centres calling on them to rise fearlessly against their oppressors, and promising them immediate assistance.”³ They incited their Christian brethren in the mixed districts to rise against their own *shaykhs*, boasting of their 50,000-man force. In the mixed sectors, therefore, the social dimension of the conflict intertwined with the ongoing battle for political dominance in the Mountain.

These Maronite designs prompted the indignant reaction of the Druzes. The Druze *muqata'jis*, determined to come to terms with a question that had plagued relations with their Christian tenants for the past twenty years, began to mobilize their own Druze tenants and followers. Christian boisterous threats against the Druze population in general facilitated this process, the social dimension of the conflict becoming totally overshadowed by the more essential struggle for mere

existence. "The Druzes, in fact, felt it to be a struggle for successful and lasting ascendancy, or irremediable ruin and humiliation. And they declared war to the knife."⁴

In such an explosive atmosphere, trying to determine who fired the first bullet that inflamed the whole Mountain is a futile exercise. The seeds of the conflict were sown some two decades earlier, and by 1860 both parties were equally determined to come to blows. The 1860 conflagration was a repetition and sequel to the inconclusive 1841 and 1845 contests, "distinguished by circumstances of more than usual brutality."⁵ The contradictory logic of the two parties had only been exacerbated by the failure of either to impose its own views, leading each party, imbued with a feeling of self-righteousness, to perceive the "Other" as an aggressor, and its fight as a legitimate act of self-defense.

The exceptional ferocity of the ensuing fight can be attributed to the force each party drew from these intense perceptions of the conflict. "To depict therefore the quarrel between the Druzes and the Maronites as an onslaught of savage heathens on the inoffensive followers of Christian religion is a simple misinterpretation. It was a feud between two equally barbarous tribes in which the victors inflicted on their enemies the fate with which they themselves had been threatened."⁶ Only total victory could satisfy the ambitions of either side.

Hostilities in Dayr-al-Qamar, Zahla, Rashaya, and Hasbaya led to the massacre of some 6,000 Christians, the displacement of 20,000 others, and the devastation of 200 villages, including the two most prosperous Christian towns, Dayr-al-Qamar (8,000 inhabitants) and Zahla (7,000–10,000 inhabitants).⁷ It was the Christians of the mixed districts who paid the heaviest price. Abandoned by their brethren in the north, they had once more taken the brunt of the Druze attack. The northern Christian sector was spared any military confrontation, and the contribution of its Maronite inhabitants was limited to one or two unsuccessful sallies at the start of the conflict. Thereafter, the young popular leader, Yusuf Karam, gathered a small force and rushed to the Matn, but he confined himself to a policy of cautious expectation and procrastination. The Comte de Paris, who was visiting the northern regions of Mount Lebanon at the time, described the bellicose preparations and demonstrations of the Maronites of this sector, but he regretted that they did not make use of their ardor under the walls of Zahla and Dayr-al-Qamar. In his view, they were "thoughtless and light-minded," and totally oblivious of "*the duties that in a nation each should observe in order to ensure the welfare of all*" [my italics].⁸

This lack of determination to defend the "Maronite cause" among the Christians of the north was aggravated by the absence of any generally recognized leadership

and total disorganization. The Christian troops consisting, as in 1841 and 1845, of small bands organized along parochial lines by village, family groups, or region balked at any sort of coordination of their efforts around some basic strategy. During one of their first assaults they were even reported to have shot at each other. As for the traditional political and military leaders of the community—the Emirs, *shaykhs*, and *muqata'jis*, many of whom had already been expelled from the Mountain by their peasants—they remained mostly aloof, secretly hoping for a Druze victory, which in their eyes represented the triumph of the old order of things.⁹ The clergy tried as hard as it could to organize and unify the efforts of their flock. But, the Church was apparently overwhelmed by the disunity and anarchy prevailing in the Christian camp, and soon after the first military reverses it tried as hard as it could to seek peace.¹⁰

Nor were the Christians in the heat of battle more united. The Maronites of Dayr-al-Qamar, who had been the most vociferous in denouncing the intolerable tyranny of Druze dominance, “found themselves perplexed and utterly at variance with each other on how to act . . . when . . . the storm suddenly gathered round them. . . . Thus, even in the extremity of their distress, the Christians were wavering and divided.”¹¹

Hence, in 1860 as in 1841 and 1845, it was in great part the divisions of the Maronites and their conflicting interests, their lack of solidarity and concern for an alleged Maronite cause that accounted for their military defeat. This time, though, their military rout was decisive and their presence almost obliterated from the mixed districts. The hope of the Christians of these regions, vainly encouraged by their northern brethren and the clergy, to abolish Druze dominance had totally miscarried, and the project of the Church to establish Christian ascendancy over the whole Mountain had seemingly received a deadly blow. The disunity of the Maronites once more demonstrated the discrepancy between the ambitious plans of the clergy and concrete realities. Expressing this general conclusion, the French consul in Beirut, Bentivoglio, wrote on July 15: “The time to dream of unattainable independence has passed. The Christians have suffered a major setback and have to start over. But it is to be hoped that they will be wiser in the future and that they will not be forced to wage pointless, ruinous wars.”¹²

Paradoxically, however, it was to their devastating defeat and the consequent general Western outrage aroused by the massacres perpetrated by the Druzes that the Maronites owed their rescue. Once more, Maronite military reverses were turned into qualified political victory by Western, and especially French, intervention.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

News of events in Lebanon began to reach Europe in the first days of July 1860, arousing the indignation of the Western public, the press, and official circles. The French government, which acted as the motor for European intervention during the whole crisis, quickly took the initiative. On July 6, the French minister for foreign affairs, Edouard Thouvenel, suggested setting up a European commission that would meet to reexamine and eventually revise the 1842–45 arrangements for Mount Lebanon and adopt measures guaranteeing against the recurrence of hostilities.¹³ This first limited proposal of Thouvenel was, however, quickly overshadowed by a much bolder one following reports of massacres in Damascus, which occurred shortly thereafter, between July 9 and 12.

The Damascus massacres altered the scale and significance to the whole crisis. Matters were no longer confined to a small portion of the Ottoman Empire, where the trials of two warring factions had formerly warranted the intervention of the European powers and the formulation of a special kind of administration. This time the tranquil and unarmed Christian population of one of the main towns of the Ottoman Empire had been slain without warning. The European reaction, public opinion and official circles alike, was at first indignant. Doubts were raised about the ability of the Ottoman authorities to govern these provinces, and indeed about the viability of the whole Ottoman Empire. The awakening of Muslim fanaticism was loudly denounced and its consequences feared.

The French minister again took the initiative, proposing the dispatch of a joint European military force to protect the Christian presence, contain the perceived Muslim fever, and restore order. With a deep sense of urgency and a hint of panic, he wrote to the other European courts: “At this time, do we know whether the carnage . . . will extend farther and whether Christian blood may be flowing in Aleppo, Diarbekir, Jerusalem, everywhere, in a word, where populations are confronted by fanaticism, stirred up by what has happened in Damascus and in Lebanon?”¹⁴

In such an inflamed atmosphere, Thouvenel was able to gain consent for his two proposals, albeit with serious misgivings by some, from the five European powers and the Porte for the establishment of a European Commission entrusted with the task of investigating the causes of the latest events and proposing measures guaranteeing against their recurrence, as well as for the dispatch of a French force to

Syria to help the Ottoman authorities restore order and security. A convention for the deployment of a French force for a limited duration of six months was signed in Paris on August 3, and some 6,000 French soldiers left France for Syria.¹⁵ The Porte gave its consent to the convening of the commission on the condition that its deliberations be confined to revisions of the status of the Mountain. At the same time, the Ottoman government dispatched Fuad Pasha, minister for foreign affairs, as special envoy to Syria with full powers to adopt any measure he deemed fit in order to restore order and peace in the hope that such measures would undercut European intervention. He would fulfill this task impeccably.

The Damascus massacres had an equally critical effect on a more conceptual level. They altered and blurred the general perception of the events of 1860 in Mount Lebanon. The specific causes and origins of the latter became identified with those of Damascus and were solely attributed to an outburst of Muslim fanaticism aiming at eradicating the Christian presence in the region. In other words, the Damascus massacres obscured the specific political and socioeconomic factors of the outbreak of hostilities in Lebanon and vindicated the view attributing them exclusively to the baleful designs of an inflamed Muslim fanaticism. In simple terms, this view translated, in the case of Lebanon, into an Ottoman–Druze conspiracy to slay the innocent Maronites in the Mountain. Many French circles and publicists adopted this interpretation of events, conjecturing about the main intricacies and instigators of this baleful Muslim plot.¹⁶

These perceptions of the nature of the Syrian–Lebanese events altered accordingly the formulation of a solution for Lebanon. The ill-defined privileges of the Mountain, which some European powers, and especially France, had striven to defend in the early 1840s as a safeguard to the Lebanese or as an acquired right warranted by alleged historical antecedents,¹⁷ were now vindicated by new factors requiring more radical solutions. These alleged privileges were presented by many in Europe, and especially in France, as an essential guarantee against the failures of the Ottoman administration and a necessary protection for the Christians of this region against the perceived fanatical Muslim population. Their confirmation was not only solicited, but claims for their extension formulated, often reaching fantastic dimensions, such as the establishment of a Christian kingdom governed by a European prince.¹⁸ Naturally, the question arose as to why the Christians of Mount Lebanon alone should benefit from these guarantees and privileges, since the same causes and origins were attributed to the Damascus massacres. But for considerations soon to be examined, the solutions devised under the specter of

these latter massacres were adopted only for Mount Lebanon. Thus, the Lebanese alone ultimately reaped the fruits of the horror provoked by the Damascene Vespers.

Yet, it is important when dealing with contemporary perceptions of the Lebanese and Syrian crisis to distinguish among the differing approaches and conclusions drawn in Europe by unofficial circles and by governments. If, very often, officials shared the general public outrage and its dismal views with regard to the ability of the Ottoman government to regenerate the Empire, their official stances were much more reserved and cautious. Edified by their former experience, and cognizant of the complexity of the issue, they realized that no simple solution existed to the Ottoman predicament. The essence of the problem lay in the fact that the fate of the Syrian provinces was closely linked to that of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. Any misstep could risk opening the whole Eastern Question, a prospect that all the European powers preferred to avoid.

These kinds of considerations constrained the action of the European governments, compelling them to avoid confrontations and seek compromises. Their basic determination to hold on to the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the only and best guarantee against their own conflicting ambitions and aspirations and a potential European war, led them to water down initial proposals to restructure the whole Syrian province and to agree on a more limited and conciliatory objective. The 1861 *Règlement* for Mount Lebanon was the result of this general compromise.

In contrast, European unofficial circles were less sensitive to the petty constraints of international politics, which were quite often misunderstood and denounced by the press, especially so in France. French commentators and publicists who had extolled the bold and firm measures adopted by its government at the beginning of the crisis were eventually disappointed by their poor results. High expectations of a decisive and comprehensive solution for the Christians of Lebanon contrasted sharply with the semi-autonomous status stipulated by the *Règlement* of 1861, which was thus perceived as a French defeat and a joint Turkish–British victory. Several commentaries and pamphlets appeared condemning the dictates of the diplomats and their lack of discernment. In short, they were accused of having failed the Christians of the Levant.¹⁹

The differing approaches of the French official and unofficial circles to the crisis once more had immediate repercussions in Mount Lebanon, which were, in turn, further complicated by the fact that local French officials on the spot were themselves at variance with one another. Local parties discerned with difficulty

these nuances and variations in French attitudes, which they often confused, thus generating many misunderstandings and disappointments. The following sections follow the impact in Mount Lebanon proper of official and unofficial French views and their interaction with those of the Lebanese themselves, focusing on three different but interlinked types of activities, which distinguished official French action: the working of the European Commission in Beirut, the action and impact of the French Expeditionary Force, and the policy adopted by the French government. Although all three were supposed to translate one same orientation, they differed in approach and conclusions.

THE WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission began its work in Beirut on October 5, 1860.²⁰ The five European commissioners,²¹ who had received similar instructions from their governments, were directed, first, to determine the causes and origins of the latest events in Syria, to ascertain the responsibility of the chiefs of the insurrection and of the Ottoman officials and bring the culprits to justice; second, to determine the extent of the losses of the Christian population and to devise the appropriate means to indemnify the victims; and, finally, to prevent the recurrence of such events, through whatever modifications deemed necessary to the organization of the Mountain.²² Furthermore, they were enjoined to devise a common final report, thus encouraging some conciliation and cooperation in their work.²³ At the same time, they had to defend the contradictory views and policies of their governments and the interests of their local protégés, which limited flexibility in their delicate negotiations.

By the end of the day, serious disagreements among all parties and especially France, on the one hand, and Great Britain and the Ottoman government, on the other, obstructed the formulation of one common report. This situation compelled the commissioners to present to their ambassadors and to the officials of the Porte, who were to have the final say on the issue, two different projects for the reorganization of Lebanon, each one accompanied by the particular reservations of the French and British commissioners. The first, based on the 1842–45 arrangements, provided for the establishment of three separate districts, one for each of the Maronite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox communities, and the segregation of the populations of the Mountain in order to fit these new administrative units. It was opposed by the French commissioner, Leon Bécлар. The second one, inspired

by the pre-1840 situation, stipulated a reunified Mount Lebanon administered by a Christian governor. It was strongly criticized by the British commissioner, Lord Dufferin.

These two plans did not represent the option favored by the European representatives, who aimed at a complete reorganization of the Syrian provinces. But, they were brought, against their own better judgment, to abandon this initial stance and to fall back reluctantly on the two projects designed for Lebanon alone.

Therefore, the significance of the workings of the European Commission should not be judged solely on the basis of the two resulting projects presented to Istanbul. A fair assessment of its labors should rather include the representatives' analysis of the situation and the different alternatives they considered, which represented a unique attempt at the definition, analysis, and solution of problems of the region. The meetings of the commission also had a critical impact on the local population and a significant effect on the subsequent development of local nationalist ideas.

Indeed, the meeting of the commission in Beirut was in itself an unprecedented occurrence for the local inhabitants. They were aware of the purpose of its mission, and they indirectly joined in its workings. Even though the commissioners did not try to consult them, local parties closely followed the various alternatives proposed, which were apparently widely circulated; they carefully considered them, and rejected or supported them, to the best of their abilities. All kinds of projects were circulated, ranging from some minor reforms in the Ottoman administration of Syria to the virtual independence of this province from the Ottoman Empire. Imaginary prospective maps were drawn and redrawn. Several candidates were examined to fill in the eventual positions of prince, viceroy, governor. The question of Mount Lebanon and the issue of its closer assimilation with the other Syrian provinces, or the extension of its administrative autonomy and boundaries, were closely scrutinized.

If we take into consideration the diverse alternatives examined by the commissioners, those suggested by the press and the pamphleteers, and those that circulated among the inhabitants, it is remarkable to note that all the nationalist ideas and options that would be adopted by some local party or other, from 1860 until 1920, were formulated and examined at this time. A regenerated and strengthened Ottoman Empire, a semi-independent Greater Syria or Greater Lebanon, an independent or only autonomous Smaller Lebanon within a Greater Syria, an Arab kingdom in the whole of Syria or a Muslim Arab kingdom in the interior, and a Christian principality on the coast: all of these alternatives, to mention only the most prominent, surfaced then.²⁴

The terms of the nationalist quest and debate that occupied the elites of this region until the outbreak of World War I were thus all set during the two decisive years of 1860 and 1861. Future Arab, Syrian, Lebanese, and Ottoman nationalists did not develop any new alternatives out of those that had been elaborated then, and only fell back upon, pondered, and developed the ones already at hand during the half-century that separated them from the date when their ultimate fate was decided. Similarly, the European powers often recalled the options examined then, when subsequent crises led them to envisage alternatives to the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, the impact and significance of the meeting of the European Commission for the future of the region largely transcend its mere workings or its final conclusions. It represented the first serious examination of the Syrian and Lebanese questions and served as a source of inspiration and reference for the future. Its deliberations deserve, therefore, close scrutiny.

Initially, the European representatives devoted a considerable time—twenty-five out of twenty-nine sessions—to determining the responsibility for the latest events and the retribution and indemnities to be assigned.²⁵ They did not formally begin their examination of the reorganization of Lebanon before March 1861. However, during that time, important informal negotiations did take place between the commissioners on the future of Syria and Lebanon.

The tone was set in the first days of November by the British commissioner, Lord Dufferin, who elaborated a plan for the reorganization of the whole of Syria.²⁶ Attributing the causes of the events first and foremost to a deficient and weak Ottoman administration in Syria, linked to a sorry state of things in Istanbul, Dufferin's project confronted this issue outright. He proposed the establishment of a strong and centralized administration in Syria, virtually independent from Istanbul, and under the supervision of the European powers. The whole of Syria was to be unified into a single administrative district and entrusted to one governor-general chosen by the Porte in conjunction with the great powers. In order to shoulder his responsibilities, the governor-general of Syria would have to be empowered with adequate means to fulfill his mission. The financial policy of the administration would need to be locally determined and controlled and sufficient troops permanently quartered in this province. The Ottoman minister for foreign affairs, Fuad Pasha, Dufferin believed, represented the most appropriate candidate for the position of governor-general.²⁷

Rightly suspecting that the main objection to his plan lay in the fact that the reorganization of Syria into a single province and the investment of the governor-general with such extraordinary prerogatives might be construed as inaugurating

the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the British commissioner emphasized the fact that the new governor of Syria was to remain “the servant of the Sultan, and the governor, not the viceroy of the Province.” Furthermore, he added, with a touch of skepticism, “the disconnection of Syria from the Porte ought to be of a nature to admit . . . its reincorporation in the Empire, *should the day arise when a strong and capable government shall be established at Constantinople*” [my italics]. At any rate, this solution, Dufferin asserted, was the best suited to ensure the welfare and security of the Syrian population, consisting of “ten distinct and uncivilized races . . . again split into very fanatical sects.”²⁸

Dufferin’s proposal, as he explained, stemmed from his basic belief that the principle of fusion of these diverse populations was the proper panacea to their former divisions and trials: “As a general rule when you have to deal with a large population differing in their religious opinions, but perfectly assimilated in language, manners and habits of thought, the principle of fusion rather than that of separation is the one to be adopted. Religious beliefs ought not be converted into a geographical expression, and a wise government would insist upon the various subject sects subordinating their polemical to their civil relations with one another.”²⁹ Gradually, he added in his distinctive style, the “barbarous distinctions which have hitherto divided its inhabitants into innumerable tribes and sects, may be expected to soften down; differences of race and of religion will to a certain extent become subordinate to those social relations, which a community of interests will establish.”³⁰ The establishment of a strong and centralized government in Syria, Dufferin concluded, was the most appropriate arrangement to reach such a state of things.

Tackling the delicate issue of Lebanon, Dufferin identified two causes for its latest disturbances: the ambition of the Maronite clergy to establish Christian supremacy in the Mountain, which provoked the animosity of the other sects and especially that of the Druzes, as well as the dissatisfaction of the Ottoman authorities with the partial autonomy of Mount Lebanon and their continual schemes to stimulate the animosity of the Maronites and the Druzes in order to discredit the government of the Mountain. Furthermore, looking back at the regulations of 1845, Dufferin determined that both the Druzes and the Maronites had proven incapable of governing either themselves or each other. Therefore, he added: “If we had before us a *tabula rasa*, I would be inclined to say that the simplest and most practical arrangement would be to assimilate the Mountain to the rest of the *pashalik* and entrust its administration to the governor of the region.”³¹

Indeed, the British commissioner saw no reason to exempt Lebanon from what he believed to be a generally beneficial administration. Such a system, he contended, represented a better guarantee for the security of its Christian populations—and the Druzes for that matter—than their former “anomalous” and “ill-defined” privileges. “Such privileges are at best a bad expedient invented to protect those who enjoy them against the ill effects of a worse government. When a good government is in operation, they are an embarrassment to the rulers, and a disadvantage to the ruled.”³²

However, Dufferin clearly saw that France would never consent to despoil the Christian sector of Mount Lebanon of its former privileges, and that European public opinion would view with indignation any European intervention leading to a deprivation of former Christian privileges and the reestablishment of a reinforced Ottoman rule, a fact that might be construed as “handling them over in a still more defenceless condition to the tender mercies of their persecutors.” Therefore, he observed, a compromise must be sought “reconciling the practical with the sentimental exigencies of the situation.”³³ He thus advanced the idea of allowing the northern sector of Mount Lebanon, inhabited mainly by Christians, to retain its former relative autonomy under its *qaimaqam*, while leaving the rest of the Mountain under the same government as the remaining Syrian provinces. In order to mitigate the inconvenience of this necessary *imperium into imperio*, the British commissioner insisted that the *qaimaqam* should be appointed by the governor-general of Syria. Later on, at the request of the French commissioner, Bécлар, he conceded the reunification of the whole Mountain, including the mixed sectors, on the condition that its administration be entrusted to a Christian non-native governor, who should differ in no respect from any other pasha of the province.

Dufferin’s project, once disclosed, exerted a “real fascination”³⁴ over most people in Beirut. Its impact on some local groups and personalities, and its repercussions on the simultaneous emergence of the Syrianist ideal, expressed at the time by Butrus Bustani, is examined in chapter 5.³⁵ Just as important, however, was its effect on the workings of the European Commission.

When Dufferin revealed his plan to the European commissioners in a private meeting at his house on December 20, it rallied the unanimous approval of all of his colleagues.³⁶ Until February 1861, when peremptory instructions from the European courts, following strong protests from the Porte, enjoined the commissioners to confine their labors strictly to the reorganization of Lebanon, Dufferin’s plan seemed to have won the day. At any rate, it remained the sole common

denominator among all of the commissioners and the most complete and coherent project presented.

Surprisingly enough, the French commissioner was easily won over by the plan of his British colleague in this first phase of the negotiations. He has often been accused by contemporary publicists and many historians of having been a poor defender of French and Maronite interests, and of having been totally subjugated by the personalities of Dufferin and Fuad Pasha. In fact, this perceived weakness stemmed from the fact that, as time passed, his original convictions were shaken by his immediate experience of concrete realities. Moreover, Béclard seemed to have been genuinely swayed by the views of his British colleague. As a result, he acquired many doubts as to the propriety of the project that his government had asked him to defend.

Upon his arrival, Béclard was considering other alternatives. Influenced by the special instructions of his minister, who had enjoined him to defend as best as he could the interests of the Maronites,³⁷ and by some recurrent themes in traditional French policy, he intended to propose to the Commission the establishment of an independent Christian principality extending over Mount Lebanon and the adjoining seacoast.³⁸ After some time in Beirut, Béclard began to question some of his original views and to develop other opinions.

Shortly after the informal agreement of the European representatives to Dufferin's plan, Béclard sent a report to his minister in Paris, on December 28, 1860, arguing in favor of such a project. A total reorganization of Syria, he asserted, was "the only way to follow if we want to build something durable and serious." Moreover, this idea did not disagree with the principle of the maintenance of the ancient privileges of the Christians of the Mountain to which his government seemed so attached. It presented the advantage of extending to the Christians of the Syrian province as a whole the privileges formerly enjoyed by those of Lebanon only. This combination, he went on, had a better chance of guaranteeing the security and happiness of the inhabitants of the Mountain than their alleged traditional privileges, which were, when closely examined, "almost illusory," and apart from some rare occasions, "have not in the least guaranteed the security and the development of the interests of the [local] populations."

The real banes of the Mountain, Béclard asserted, were the "feudal and the theocratic" systems, and their abolition would be much more beneficial to the Mountain than their confirmation. For that reason, the French commissioner spurned the restoration of a Shihabi prince, the embodiment of this abhorred "feudal" system, and representative of the old order.

It was therefore reluctantly that B  clard was brought, on the express injunctions of his minister, to abandon a plan he favored and to defend another about which he held grave reservations. His mission in this sense was facilitated by the fact that in the last phase of the negotiations, when the commission had put aside the plan for Syria and was working on one for Lebanon only, B  clard was not as isolated as he originally had been. Indeed, an intense diplomatic offensive by the French minister for foreign affairs had in the meantime laid the ground for acceptance by the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian governments of the principle of the establishment of a unitary Christian government over the entire Mountain. His British colleague was then outnumbered and unwillingly rallied to the last plan devised, providing for a semi-autonomous united Lebanon administered by a Christian governor. The question of whether the governor should be a native or not was left open for negotiations in Istanbul between the European ambassadors and the Porte. But, even after the commission's adoption of this last option, favored by his government, B  clard remained of opinion that "establishing a strong government for the Mountain is possible—I can say with complete assurance—only if Syria is administratively detached from the rest of the empire. Only a strong central authority in Damascus can guarantee that the new situation in Lebanon will be maintained."³⁹

The setting of the Lebanese question within the general Syrian context had therefore imparted an altogether different scope to the problem. It brought the two leading commissioners to seriously question the opportunity of confirming the so-called privileges of the Mountain. B  clard and Dufferin were of the opinion that an improvement in the administration of the entire Syrian province represented the appropriate formula to guarantee a better and more secure future for the Christians of this region in general, and those of Lebanon in particular.⁴⁰ The two commissioners perceived the main danger facing the Christians of the province as stemming from a deficient administration, detrimental to its Christian and Muslim populations alike, rather than from the presumed fanaticism of its Muslim population. They believed that an improvement in living conditions under a strong and secular government, which would endeavor to assimilate them on the basis of equal civil and political rights, regardless of religious differences, would gradually and necessarily attenuate the current tensions and animosities and eventually ensure the emergence of a harmonious polity. This solution sought to ensure the security of all of the Christians of the region through the welfare of all of its inhabitants.

In other words, this view posited that the security of the Christians could not be guaranteed against, but in conjunction with, that of the Muslim population.

Religious differences should not be accentuated but toned down through the application of the principle of the assimilation of the diverse populations under one beneficial government, whereas the confirmation of religious differences, through their institutional and geographical sanction, would only lead to more conflicts and wars. Moreover, the establishment of a separate Christian entity along the coast could not solve the problem. It could only pit the Christians living in this new state against those of the Muslim interior and endanger the fate of those living inside and outside that state.⁴¹ In addition, it begged the question as to why the Christians of the interior should not benefit from the guarantees and privileges granted to those on the coast.

In contrast, the establishment of an independent Christian Greater Lebanon, disconnected from its Muslim Syrian interior, was then energetically defended by the commander-in-chief of the French Expeditionary Force, by most French publicists, and by the Maronite clergy. It was based on another perception of the Lebanese and Syrian questions that commanded a different sort of solution. Its emergence at that time opened up another episode in the development of the “Franco-Lebanese dream” that had fascinated certain Maronite and French circles for years past.

THE FRENCH EXPEDITION

The first detachments of the French Expeditionary Force reached Beirut at the beginning of August 1860. Officially, its mission consisted of helping the Ottoman authorities reestablish law and order, in coordination with the special representative of the Sultan, Fuad Pasha. From the start, however, this specific and straightforward task was shrouded in ambiguity and misunderstandings. The novelty of the force’s role, consisting of a sort of peace-keeping mission *avant l’heure*, was quite perplexing for this epoch. The force was not sent to wage war against any enemy. Nor was it to intervene in or stop any ongoing fighting since hostilities had already ended by the time of its landing. Military speaking, its presence was therefore unnecessary. It was only meant to assist the repressive and pacificatory efforts of the Ottoman authorities, if and where need be. Ultimately, given the reluctance of Fuad Pasha to allow it to play any significant role, the French force proved redundant.

The mission of the French force was essentially moral and preventive. Its dispatch was understood by its proponents as a symbolic warning from Europe to the perceived fanatical population and a sort of guarantee against the recurrence of

new massacres. But, the mere presence of these French troops, as well as the political activity of its commander-in-chief, General Beaufort d'Hautpoul, conferred much more significance to this unprecedented European military enterprise in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire than its limited character warranted. Local Maronite circles and French officials and publicists also contributed to the enhancement of the import of this experiment.

For many Frenchmen, the dispatch of French forces augured a more interventionist French policy in the Levant. Catholic circles, outraged by the massacre of Christians by perceived fanatical Muslims, cried out for vengeance. For them, retribution was to be twofold. It would avenge the blood of the recently slain Christians and would by the same token allow redress for the Crusaders' debacle. Their views hardly disguised their feeling that a new round in the long-standing conflict between Christian and Muslim worlds had been opened. They hinted at the persistence of a certain Western historical vision and worldview imparting a religious character to the conflict between West and East and to the renewed appeal of the Crusader episode. The French press, as well as many contemporary pamphlets and narratives, were full of these kinds of allusions. Hence, the renowned Orientalist and future ambassador to Istanbul, Melchior de Vogüé, wrote on the eve of the arrival of the French forces in Syria: "It is as Christians, as adversaries of Islamism, that the Maronites, the peaceful residents of Damascus and other places, were massacred; it is as Christians that we must avenge them. The Cross has been deeply wronged; now it is the Crescent's turn. The whole of Christian civilization has been challenged; let it show its power."⁴² As for the publicist Baptistin Poujoulat, the analogy between the departing French forces and the Crusaders, was crystal clear: "What did our ancient Crusaders intend to do in the East? Exactly what the expeditionary army of 1860 is going to do: wage war against Muslim barbarity. Let there be no mistake, then: the French soldiers . . . are also Crusaders. The aim of the West's expedition to the East in the Middle Ages was no different from the aim of today's expedition: to drive Islamism back into the desert, where it should always have remained."⁴³ With more verve still, some were dreaming of a new Godeffroy de Bouillon who would soon enter Ste. Sophie,⁴⁴ or of the revival of the Frankish kingdom in the Levant and the restoration of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople.⁴⁵

Even Napoleon III, who did not share the blind enthusiasm of Catholic circles, for whose satisfaction he had mainly undertaken this adventure in the Levant, could not prevent himself from alluding to these glorious and momentous historical events in an address to the departing French soldiers: "You are not going to wage

war against any nation but to help the Sultan bring back to obedience subjects blinded by a fanaticism from another century. You will do your duty in this land far away, rich in memories, and you will show yourselves the dignified children of those heroes who gloriously brought the banner of Christ to that land.”⁴⁶ Beaufort, for his part, admonished his soldiers at the beginning of their mission, reminding them that in “these famous lands Christianity was born, and Godeffroy de Bouillon and the Crusaders, General Bonaparte, and the heroic soldiers of the Republic honored themselves. There you will find again glorious and patriotic memories.”⁴⁷

For their part, some French liberal circles, less sensitive to these overwrought religious sentiments, were advocating an emancipation of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire from the Ottoman hold in the name of civilization and the then-popular principle of nationalities. In their view, the end of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable and the diverse Christian nationalities that inhabited it were the legitimate and rightful heirs to its provinces. Such an option also had the advantage of avoiding a perilous annexation of Ottoman territories by foreign countries, and especially Russia. Expressing such an opinion, the French former deputy, Saint Marc Girardin, asserted: “Neither the Turks nor the Russians! . . . There is in the Orient others than the Russians to replace the Turks: There are the Christian of the Orient . . . since the principle of nationalities, if it is bound to prevail somewhere, must prevail above all in the Orient.”⁴⁸

French nationalist circles, finally, more concerned about the prestige of France and its international influence, extolled the firm policy of their government in 1860, secretly anticipating a reassertion of France’s former supremacy in the Levant and a revival of its international glory. The French expedition of 1860 presented an opportunity to reverse the effects of 1840, when a coalition of four European powers and the Ottomans had ousted France’s protégé, Muhammad Ali, from Syria and, indeed, to reverse the whole balance of power established in Europe in 1815. At any rate, the nationalists argued, since the expansionist drive of the West “had become the main characteristic of our epoch,” France had to follow an aggressive policy in the Levant if it wanted to retain its prestige and position as a great power.⁴⁹ Finally, in this same expansionist spirit, certain business and financial circles were beginning to perceive the potential of the Syrian market and welcomed an initiative that should reassert France’s political, economic, and trading position.⁵⁰

For the Maronite clergy, and indeed for many Maronites, the French expedition represented the realization of an unhopd-for salvation. Though it came too late to save the Maronites from their crushing military defeat and tragedy, it was welcomed as an unanticipated event that would allow them to compensate for

their military setbacks. The landing of the French forces bolstered the position of the Maronites, and, as a token of his deep gratitude, the Maronite Patriarch, Mgr Boulos Mas'ad, wrote a letter to Napoleon III, underlining the fact that the manifestation of his interest for the Maronites had "saved them from the abyss" and occurred just at "the moment when despair was filling our heart." He also expressed his confidence that the emperor would press for the adoption of the appropriate measures to ensure the security of the Maronites and the Christians in all Syria.⁵¹

BEAUFORT'S PLAN

In this emotionally charged atmosphere, it is not surprising that the commander-in-chief of the French force forgot the strictly limited terms of his mission. At its start, General Beaufort d'Hautpoul had wished for the direct participation of his forces in the repressive and pacificatory efforts of Fuad Pasha.⁵² He had secretly aspired to make massive arrests among the Druze population, if not to engage them militarily, and to deploy the French forces in Damascus and the Syrian interior.⁵³ He was thwarted by Fuad Pasha, who did his utmost to prove the presence of the French Expeditionary Force redundant, if not detrimental. As a result, the contribution of the French force was limited to deployment in the mixed districts and the Bekaa Valley, after the flight of most of the Druze warriors, as a moral guarantee to the returning Christians; for lack of any military task, they acted as masons and carpenters, helping the Christians of these sectors to rebuild their houses.

The frustrated general consequently endeavored to meddle in political affairs. He was dissatisfied with the European Commission's approach to the Lebanese question and was anxious to press for a solution more congenial to his own views. Writing to the French minister of foreign affairs, he began to assert that his mission was really "more political than military."⁵⁴ As he understood it, his mission and that of the French forces was to ensure a secure future for the Christians of Lebanon, and he made it his responsibility to achieve this aim before leaving the region.

The commander-in-chief of the French expedition had some clear ideas about the future of Lebanon and of the region. He knew Syria well, having joined the Egyptian army in the 1830s, when he acted as aide-de-camp to the commander of the Egyptian forces, Sulayman Pasha, and participated in his Syrian campaigns.⁵⁵ At that time, he had also visited the late Emir Bashir II in his palace in Bayt al-Din and was apparently quite impressed by his personality. Beaufort was therefore inclined from the start toward a restoration of the Shihabi Emirate on a more sound and firm basis.

CARTE DU LIBAN

D'APRÈS LES RECONNAISSANCES DE LA BRIGADE TOPOGRAPHIQUE

DE

CORPS EXPÉDITIONNAIRE DE SYRIE

EN 1860-1861

DRESSÉE AU DÉPÔT DE LA GUERRE

ÉTANT DIRECTEUR LE GÉNÉRAL BLONDEL

SOUS LE MINISTÈRE DE S. E. LE MARÉCHAL COMTE RANDON

1862.

[illegible]

Echelle Métrique (cont.)

Liquors Marines de 20 au Degré

Map of Lebanon from a survey by the topographical service of the 1860–61 French Expeditionary Force for Syria, deposited in the archives of the war ministry. Paris: Lemerrier, 1862.
Source: Bibliothèque nationale de France

All along, Beaufort's views remained articulated around this same premise. In his opinion, the European Commission's favored plan aiming at a complete restructuring of Syria and a reorganization of Lebanon within the framework of the other Syrian provinces was unacceptable and, at any rate, inopportune. To begin with, the idea of restoring any sort of Ottoman authority over the Christians of Lebanon seemed totally abhorrent to him: "While the necessities of the political entente in Europe require that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire be preserved, humanity and civilization require that the Christians of the East, whose ancient privileges give them indisputable rights, be delivered once and for all from the incessant dangers of the Muslim fanaticism fostered by the interference of Porte agents in the country's administration."

He also reckoned that an alienation of the whole of Syria from Turkish rule was impossible for the time being, given the anticipated opposition of the Ottomans to any such scheme, as well as the contradictory policies of the European powers. So, he concluded, the efforts of Europe must concentrate on the establishment of a Christian entity in an enlarged Lebanon that, in his view, represented "the real force of Syria." "While organizing the Mountain would be to the Christians' benefit, everyone in the interior will enjoy greater security. . . . In this form, Lebanon will be like a citadel for its inhabitants, a support and, if need be, a refuge for Christians from the rest of Syria. And, finally, for the future, this could be the starting point for the Christians from the rest of Syria."⁵⁶

The establishment of a semi-independent Lebanese entity had therefore, in Beaufort's opinion, many advantages. It immediately ensured the security of the Christians of Lebanon, protecting them, as he saw it, from baneful Ottoman rule and the fanatical population of the interior. As for the Christians of the interior, the most exposed could settle, for the time being, in this "refuge," until "in some near future"⁵⁷ a solution for the whole of Syria could be devised. The general was convinced that his solution was the appropriate and only possible one for the moment, combining "the tradition of the past, the commitments of Europe, the honor of France, the safeguard of our own influence, the experience of the last twenty years, the recent facts and the necessity to ensure the future of the Christians of Syria."⁵⁸

Convinced of the propriety of his plan, Beaufort went on refining it. On February 10, 1861, he presented his most elaborate report on the subject, entitled "Notes et renseignements sur le pays qui doit former le gouvernement du Liban," resulting from the "research of his officers and numerous conversations with the local inhabitants." His plan envisaged a reunified and largely extended Lebanon,

under the rule of the Shihab family, that would be essentially autonomous but would continue to recognize the suzerainty of the Porte, to which it would pay a yearly tribute. The main interest of this plan for our study is that it marked the first appearance of a map of what was to become Greater Lebanon some sixty years later, along with a whole historical legitimizing view. The frontiers of the Lebanese province were considerably extended, well beyond the mountain range, to reach the Nahr-al-Kabir in the north, the crests of Anti-Lebanon and those of Jabal-al-Shaykh including the rich Bekaa Valley and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya in the east, the whole district of Bilad Bishara in the south, and the Mediterranean, including the main coastal ports to the west.⁵⁹

To justify such a wide extension of the limits of his projected Lebanese entity, Beaufort referred first to Fakhr al-Din II, who had tried to establish a “Lebanese state” between 1595 and 1635, dominating at one point the whole Mountain range as well as the coastal plain from Latakiya to Acre. He had, he added, also pillaged Damascus and established his sway over parts of the Bekaa, including Rashaya and Hasbaya. Moreover, many of these districts had been in effect administered by Emir Bashir II. Beaufort reinforced these historical precedents with economic and strategic considerations. The annexation of the Bekaa Valley, “the granary of the Mountain,”⁶⁰ was essential to ensure its economic survival. The attachment of the ports of the Mediterranean coast to this new entity was necessary to allow the sale of its products and those of the interior:⁶¹ “For the government that is to be reconstituted in Lebanon to be self-sufficient, meet its own needs and defend itself, it must encompass all the localities that have at any time been subject to the direct authority or the influence of the Prince of the Mountain. . . . The crops of the Mountain are in the plains of Baalbek in the Bekaa valley. The Christians will reap the full benefit of those rich lands, as soon as a well-established government provides them with security.”⁶² Finally, to complete his argument, Beaufort asserted that he had found an appropriate candidate to rule over the projected Lebanese entity in the person of Emir Majid Shihab, a grandson of Emir Bashir II.

The French general did not content himself with presenting this extensive report to his superiors. Vindicated by the general approval of his project, albeit in a more modest form, by the French government, he endeavored to lobby earnestly for his own plan, trying to gain the support of the Lebanese themselves. With this aim in mind, he paid several visits to the Maronite Patriarch and undertook separate tours in the Christian northern and mixed districts. Moreover, he endeavored to circulate a petition, “written under his own supervision” in the name of the

Lebanese, signed by as many people as he could persuade.⁶³ In this document, the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, availing themselves of their ancient right to be governed by their own princes, enjoined the sovereigns of the foreign powers and the Sultan to restore the Christian Shihabi dynasty, represented by Emir Majid.⁶⁴

However, the specific candidacy of Emir Majid was opposed by some Maronite parties, notably by the provisional *qaimaqam* of the Christian districts, Yusuf Karam, who had ambitions of his own. It was also received with some reservations by the Maronite Patriarch, who refused to affix his signature to the petition circulated by Beaufort. Furthermore, it was contested by many French officials and personalities on the spot, including many officers of Beaufort's own staff, and by the French commissioner Béclard, who was inclined toward the candidacy of Yusuf Karam. Hence, this petition, which was meant as a sort of "universal suffrage"⁶⁵ in favor of the Shihabi restoration, increased the divisions within the Maronite camp and gave rise to recriminations and ill feelings between some French and Lebanese parties and among French officials themselves.⁶⁶

Undismayed, the general pursued his efforts to have his petition signed by as wide a sample of the population as possible, and his officers toured the whole country, using at times forceful arguments to rally support.⁶⁷ Before his departure from Lebanon, he was able to proudly announce to his minister that 35,713 persons had signed the petition.⁶⁸

These strenuous efforts of the French general did not have any immediate consequence. The petition, so obviously elaborated and circulated by him, was ultimately ignored by the negotiators at Istanbul. However, the general's political efforts did have an unexpected and enduring legacy. His project for a Greater Lebanon, and the map drawn under his auspices, disregarded at that time, resurfaced in 1919 when it was adopted by the Lebanese nationalists and the Maronite Patriarch as a yardstick for the frontiers of the Greater Lebanon they were claiming.

THE LOCAL REACTION

The highly publicized views of General Beaufort, and the differing ideas of foreign official and unofficial men on the spot, did not pass unnoticed. They were closely scrutinized by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, who also tried to advance their own opinions and aspirations. Their responses and initiatives can be measured by the various petitions presented by some local group or another, in reaction to an envisaged plan or to promote alternate views and projects. Moreover, French,

British, and Ottoman representatives disclosed their own ideas to the local inhabitants to gain their support and tried to have them sign contradictory petitions. This section is confined to a study of the impact of this intense political activity on the Maronite clergy and on the revival of the “Franco-Lebanese dream.”

The spirits of the Maronite clergy, shattered by the outcome of the events of 1860, were immediately lifted by the arrival of the French forces, and it endeavored to make the best of these new developments, which seemed to respond to their wishes and which, they believed, were meant to annul the results of their defeat and support their political designs.⁶⁹ In a letter to Charles Scheffer, special envoy of the French emperor,⁷⁰ Napoleon III, the Maronite bishop of Sayda, Mgr Bustani, maintained, for instance, that “the French expedition has come to Syria to protect the Christians and deliver them from oppression and tyranny.”⁷¹ French soldiers were therefore welcomed as saviors, and the Maronite clergy undertook to contact French officials in order to work out in common plans for the future. Both sides exchanged ideas in meetings held during the first months of the expedition between some Maronite bishops, Beaufort, and Scheffer.

By January 4, 1861, the Maronite Patriarch, having closely studied the situation and pondered over the diverse projects circulated for the future of Lebanon and Syria, felt his moment had come to present his own views clearly. He therefore sent to the special envoy of Napoleon III, Scheffer, a long and detailed letter directed to the French minister for foreign affairs, Thouvenel, and entitled “Report on the Turkish Empire and Syria.” The ideas presented in this document are a combination of the former policy of the Church, aiming at establishing a semi-independent Christian Emirate in the Mountain, and of the diverse projects publicized for the future of the region. They reveal Mgr Mas‘ad’s acute awareness of the new perspectives opened up by the latest events and the French expedition and his concrete knowledge of the different projects studied by the European Commission and those that had circulated in the French press.

The Ottoman Empire, the Maronite prelate argued, “was incapable of governing Syria with justice and equity. It could barely govern Constantinople, capital of its Empire.” Its territory was too extensive and its population divided into numerous, barely civilized and hostile religions and sects, lacking any sense of patriotism. High officials had lost all hope of reversing the fatal hatred that had newly arisen between its Christian and Muslim populations. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire had too few soldiers and no money. Therefore, Mgr Mas‘ad concluded, “for the peace and security of the Christians,” and to ensure the future stability of Syria, he envisaged five possible options. The first three alternatives provided for an

emancipation of Syria from Ottoman rule, its government to be entrusted to a European or Egyptian prince, or this province to be annexed to Egypt; in these last two cases Mount Lebanon was to retain its administrative autonomy under a Christian governor. The fourth alternative considered the administrative division of Syria into two parts, a coastal zone governed by a Christian and an interior region administered by a Muslim, with both officials appointed by the Porte.

Finally, the fifth plan contemplated the maintenance of Syria under Ottoman rule and the appointment of a native Christian governor over an extended Mount Lebanon, strangely resembling in its general delimitations the Greater Lebanon advocated by Beaufort. The Christian governor, Mgr Mas'ad suggested, should be granted wide administrative and executive prerogatives. Though he would remain, strictly speaking, a vassal of the Porte, his government would be under the protection of the great powers, and French forces should remain stationed in the country until its final organization.

At the end of his report, the Maronite Patriarch stressed once again the importance of the enlargement of the territory of Mount Lebanon and the annexation of the main coastal towns, and warned that "it is a serious error to believe that it is sufficient, for the Christians' peace of mind, to restore Mount Lebanon to the state in which it was at the time of Emir Bashir 'Umar al Shihabi. . . . Implementation of the above-mentioned measures along with enlargement of its territory and annexation of a number of towns is indispensable."⁷² He moreover sent an addendum to his memoir on January 11, enumerating exhaustively all the districts the annexation of which he deemed "indispensable" and that "were not part of Lebanon at the time of Emir Bashir, but would belong to it henceforth." These were essential, he maintained, for levying enough revenues for the upkeep of a force of 12,000 men, necessary for the maintenance of the peace and security of its inhabitants.⁷³ From the elaborate details presented by the Patriarch on this last plan, it may be surmised that this was the one toward which he inclined; it was the project that tallied best with the traditional policy of the Maronite Church for the past twenty years, even though Mgr Mas'ad had taken advantage of the latest events to enlarge it.

At the same time, Mgr Mas'ad pursued the policy, adopted by his predecessor since the beginning of the 1840s, of full reliance on France to reach his political objectives. He did not trust the potential of his flock, and their last crushing defeat only confirmed him in this conviction. He badly needed the help of France to fulfill his aims but expressed his readiness to conform to France's policy. In a private conversation with Scheffer, he reportedly stated: "The arrival in Syria of a French

expeditionary force saved us from imminent total ruin, and . . . everything that will be done by France will be accepted by us with acquiescence and gratitude.”⁷⁴ This apparent submission to France did not, however, prevent him from trying to sway France’s position by force of persuasion or by withholding his sanction and support to obstruct uncongenial solutions. Hence, apparently displeased by Beaufort’s selection of Emir Majid Shihab as the potential governor of Lebanon, Mgr Mas’ad refused to sign the petition circulated by the French general.⁷⁵

The opposition of the Patriarch to Emir Majid, never explicitly stated, can be surmised through the reports of others or his many procrastinations and was attributable to several factors. The Emir, who seemed to be lacking in character, had converted to Islam and then reverted to the Maronite rite. At the same time, the candidacy of a Shihab had revived and exacerbated dissent and divisions within the Maronite community. The old ruling class, anticipating the prospect of the restoration of the old order and the resumption of their authority, had reverted to their previous ways and adopted a haughty and hostile attitude toward their rebellious peasants and the acting *qaimaqam* and the Patriarch’s own protégé, Yusuf Karam. Attempts to bring the former to adopt a more conciliatory attitude failed, obstructing the endeavors of Mgr Mas’ad to reunify his community after the latest events and to reconcile its differing parties to a common platform. At the same time, the contradictory signals the Patriarch received from the several French officials on the spot and French visitors in the region who were sharply divided between a pro-Shihab and a pro-Karam camp, each one lobbying earnestly for his own candidate, did not help. These divisions affected the whole Maronite community, including his own Church. As a result, the Patriarch retreated into a cautious reserve.

The French general was critical of the attitude of the Maronite prelate, accusing him of favoring the candidacy of Yusuf Karam because he could better control him.⁷⁶ On his side, the Patriarch had taken umbrage to the terse and tactless manner in which Beaufort dealt with Yusuf Karam. Ultimately, the two men settled their differences during a meeting held on April 12, 1861, and the Patriarch reluctantly gave his consent to Beaufort’s project, which the latter presented to him as the one adopted by the government of France.⁷⁷ The resistance of Karam was harder to overcome and would have serious consequences.⁷⁸

These dissensions over the identity of the future governor of Lebanon obscured the fact that Beaufort and Mgr Mas’ad were fundamentally in agreement on one and the same project, namely the establishment of a Greater Lebanon, virtually

independent of the Porte and governed by a native. This project for a Greater Lebanon represented one of the latest embodiments of the “Franco-Lebanese dream” that had made its first appearance in the 1840s, as a result of a mirror game of ideas between some Lebanese and French parties and that had then centered upon the establishment in Mount Lebanon of a semi-independent Maronite Emirate under French aegis.

The years 1860 and 1861 saw a repetition of this process. Many French officials and visitors, including distinguished Catholic representatives like Louis Baudicour, Baptistin Poujoulat,⁷⁹ and l’Abbé Lavigerie, director of *Les Oeuvres des écoles d’Orient*, came to Lebanon during this period, where they met and exchanged ideas with local parties. The mood of French public opinion was therefore conveyed to the local inhabitants, though it was often distorted or exaggerated owing to the personal inclinations of its propagators. In turn, these personalities were also influenced by the ideas of the Lebanese themselves, which they incorporated in their own views and transmitted to France. Thus, a continuous interaction between ideas circulated in Beirut and Paris took place, leading to the reemergence of certain themes and projects that had already appeared in the 1840s.

The scheme for a Greater Lebanon that appeared in 1861 was one of these. Only this time, the projected entity was far larger in size and its links with Istanbul much looser than in the schemes advocated by some in the 1840s. More important, circumstances seemed quite promising for its fulfillment. European opinion was hostile to Ottoman rule and inclined to the granting of serious guarantees to the aggrieved Christians. The French government, or so it seemed, had endorsed the project and was working for its realization. Furthermore, a French army was on the ground. Beaufort, the Patriarch, and many others hence genuinely expected the realization of their dream in the near future. Their heated argument over the most appropriate candidate developed as a collateral consequence of this conviction.

Their disappointment with the *Règlement* adopted on June 9, 1861, was therefore sharp and bitter. No written record exists of the immediate reaction of the Patriarch, but his future reserve, not to say cold hostility, to the new regime during the first years of its enforcement are a good indicator of his feeling. The French circles who had promoted Beaufort’s project or some similar kind of scheme expressed for their part their disillusionment in clear and bitter terms. The results of the 1860–61 expedition and negotiations were perceived and presented as a defeat and a humiliation for France and Christian Europe, and bitter recriminations ensued as to the party responsible for it.⁸⁰

THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

The stance of the French government was more nuanced than portrayed by some French officials on the ground and envisaged by the Maronite clergy and some French Catholic circles, contributing to many misconceptions and misplaced expectations. When the events of 1860 broke out, Napoleon III supported the firm policy adopted by the French government. The French emperor's stance was actuated by an aspiration to respond to the indignant public mood, the opportunity to play a more assertive role in Syria, and a eagerness to gain the favor of French Catholic circles embittered by his Italian policy, which had tended of late to support the position of the nationalists in that country against the temporal powers of the Pope.⁸¹ His initiative to dispatch French forces to Syria seemed to respond to the wishes of the Catholic outcry for vengeance and military intervention. A first misunderstanding ensued. These circles assumed that the emperor, having adopted their views on this issue, would also favor the same objectives, namely the establishment of a Christian entity in the Levant under the aegis of France.

The emperor did not really try to disabuse the Catholics and other French circles of their misconceptions. For the time being, he was gratified to have won their support and approval for his policy, which he had sought to win in the first place. Moreover, the emperor, who had for the past years lost hope of a possible reformation and regeneration of the Ottoman Empire, had personally been inclining toward popular sentiment regarding the "sick man of Europe." His personal predilection for the principle of nationalities and the support of the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire had led him to favor their gradual emancipation and to consider an eventual dismemberment of the Empire. The Crimean War had given further impetus to the development of his position. In a private conversation with the British ambassador to Paris, Lord Cowley, in 1857, Napoleon III mentioned that he had told the Tsar during a recent meeting that the "late war had opened his eyes with respect to Turkey, that there did not exist another country so ill-governed, and that, as it could have no durability, he thought its dissolution should be provided for by all prudent and farseeing Governments." But, he added, even though "as a private individual he did not care for it [the integrity of the Ottoman Empire], and could not muster up any sympathy for such a sorry set as the Turks . . . as a political man, things looked different."⁸²

This last phrase summed up the main contradiction and ambiguity of Napoleon III's policy regarding the Ottoman Empire. As a political man, he respected the

international commitments of France. These imposed upon him a recognition of France's position within the Concert of Europe and the necessity of coordination with the other members of the Concert in all affairs concerning the Ottoman Empire. But, within these limits, Napoleon III sought to reassert France's influence and prestige in Istanbul and the rest of the Ottoman provinces. At the same time, he tried to advance principles congenial to him, like the protection and emancipation of the Christian populations in the east. His policy had tended to arouse misgivings among the other powers, especially Great Britain, Austria, and the Sublime Porte, leading at times to critical confrontations. In such cases, the French emperor had often shifted his position or backed down, imprinting a touch of improvisation and lack of determination to his foreign policy.

These "shifts and ruffles"⁸³ of the emperor had upset the cautious policy followed by France in the Levant after 1840. As a result, his bold initiatives during the 1860 crisis were regarded with extreme wariness and suspicion by the other powers. In spite of all the efforts of the emperor and his minister for foreign affairs to dissipate their misgivings, Britain and the Sublime Porte mistrusted Napoleon III's intentions, suspecting him of taking advantage of the situation to consolidate his position in Syria and in the whole Mediterranean region.⁸⁴ Several designs attributed to the French emperor at that time, such as the creation of an Arab kingdom governed by Abd al-Qadir or the establishment of a virtually autonomous Christian Lebanon closely linked to France, which stimulated the imagination of French commentators, officials, and the general public, enhanced, on the contrary, the apprehensions of the powers about the emperor's determination to alter the status quo in the region. However, these alleged designs of the emperor, often reproduced by later historians,⁸⁵ do not withstand closer scrutiny. Napoleon III may have hoped for the realization of such objectives, which seemed to fit his personal inclinations. He may even have contemplated and explored them more seriously, sending Scheffer on an inspection tour of northern Syria and a delegation to visit the Emir Abd al-Qadir.⁸⁶ But Napoleon was apparently only probing these schemes as potential future eventualities. At any rate, any prospective role for the Algerian Emir was dropped for the foreseeable future, in view of the firm opposition of the Porte to any plan providing for the semi-independence of Syria and by Abd al-Qadir's assertion that he did not seek such a role: "My political career is over. I do not wish for anything. I do not covet anything from anybody nor do I aspire for glory in this world. I would like to live henceforth in the sweet joy of family life, prayer and peace," he is reported to have said.⁸⁷

In the meantime, the emperor and his foreign minister had, throughout the 1860 crisis, set for themselves as a priority the maintenance of the former status quo in the region and in Europe. They were eager not to endanger their relationship with the other Western powers, especially Great Britain,⁸⁸ and conscientiously coordinated all their moves with the Western governments. Thouvenel believed that an acceptable solution could be found within the confines of the Concert of Europe. Unlike his sovereign and the French public, he had gone through a sobering experience as ambassador of France in Istanbul and had not retained a very high opinion of the potential of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire nor of that of the Ottoman authorities for that matter. He had serious doubts about the ability of the Ottoman Empire to reform and regenerate itself. But he was also convinced that the Christians of the Empire, too divided and heterogeneous, were not ready for an eventual takeover: “We know what regeneration by the Muslims means. On the other hand, one need only visit Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, Wallachia or Moldavia, not to mention Phanar, to be cured of any illusions about the possibility of the East’s being regenerated by the Christians.”⁸⁹

Confronted with what he saw as a choice of evils, Thouvenel still thought that the Ottomans were best suited to govern the Empire, under some sort of European tutelage, because, as he put it: “Between the foreign conquest that Europe rightly does not want and the continuation, at the very least, of Muslim primacy, I can unfortunately see—having given the matter very careful consideration—only chaos and the unknown.”⁹⁰

Thouvenel’s thoughtful considerations imprinted French diplomatic activity during the 1860–61 crisis with a conciliating touch. Thouvenel held fast to the principle of the restoration of a single Christian native government in Mount Lebanon adopted by the French government. But, when he realized that the opposition of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire to this option was insuperable, he compromised on the issue of a native governor for the Mountain. He even expressed his satisfaction with the new regime adopted for Mount Lebanon, on June, 1861, considering that France had scored one substantial gain through the abolition of the deficient 1842–45 arrangement and the substitution of a unitary Christian government, although he expressed his disappointment with the fact that a native governor had been “provisionally” disregarded.⁹¹

However, Thouvenel took his time in formulating the main lines of French policy, carefully monitoring developments on the local and international scenes before taking his decisions. He confined himself during the first months of the crisis to receiving the different and often conflicting reports of his

various agents on the ground without sending them precise instructions or firmly directing them. As a result, the latter followed different policies and indulged sometimes in various intrigues and maneuvers, thinking they benefited from his support.

It was only by the end of January 1861 that his dispatches to B  clard became more insistent. He stressed continuously the importance of a speedy conclusion to the Commission's deliberation. The emperor, Thouvenel wrote, was intent on an evacuation of the French forces on schedule and wanted to secure the establishment of a new order guaranteeing order and security before the end of their mission.⁹² Thouvenel's instructions support the emperor's own assertion that he was not seeking a permanent or prolonged occupation of Syria and belie contradictory suspicions.

With regard to the reorganization of Mount Lebanon, Thouvenel's instructions began to mention the candidacy of a Shihab prince as being the preferred option of the French government by late February,⁹³ apparently endorsing Beaufort's point of view. But Thouvenel did not unreservedly endorse the French general's project. His support for Beaufort's view was nuanced and equivocal. He never insisted absolutely on the Shihabi candidacy, preferring to focus on the selection of a native governor while leaving the door open to other eventual candidates. Moreover, Thouvenel did not seem to endorse Beaufort's idea of an enlargement of the frontiers of Mount Lebanon. Though the map drawn by the headquarters of the French army and transmitted to him by the War Ministry attracted his attention,⁹⁴ he never mentioned any extension of the frontiers of Mount Lebanon throughout the negotiations. On the contrary, when B  clard informed him in one of his early dispatches of the unanimous agreement of the commissioners for the maintenance of the 1840 frontiers for Mount Lebanon,⁹⁵ Thouvenel did not comment on or raise this issue again.

Apparently, his position was not clearly expressed, or at any rate it was interpreted differently in Beirut. B  clard, feeling he had been disavowed because of his defense of Dufferin's plan and his disapproval of the candidacy of a Shihab,⁹⁶ thereafter adopted a low profile, trying to defend to the best of his abilities the French position. Beaufort, on the contrary, felt totally vindicated and began to publicize the fact that his project had been officially adopted.⁹⁷ He had already selected his Shihabi candidate and began an active campaign in his favor. The message he transmitted to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon was quite clear: France had definitely opted for the restoration of a Shihabi Emirate.⁹⁸ His statements enhanced the expectations of some local parties, who began to dream of virtual independence in

an extended Lebanon. Thouvenel became aware of these expectations and warned B  clard against the encouragement of such hopes:

The information I am receiving from Beirut lead me to conclude that the various Christian populations, especially the Maronites, are seeking a government formed under new conditions that will guarantee them some sort of independence. The information suggest that they are counting in particular on our cooperation to achieve that outcome, and that they feel they have reason to believe that we are prepared to provide such assistance. It is important, M., that we not allow the birth of hopes that are certain to be disappointed, and I therefore urge you to take every opportunity that presents itself to let men of influence know our real intentions. . . . We must ensure that we cannot later be criticized for abandoning purposes that we will be said to have sponsored.⁹⁹

But strangely enough, Thouvenel never came back to this warning in his later communications with his agents, although he was duly informed of Beaufort's maneuvers and of the petition he was circulating in favor of the restoration of a Shihabi Emirate. He had apparently lost interest in what was going on in Beirut and had lost hope that any progress could be obtained there. The commission was bogged down in the examination of a project dividing the Mountain into three distinct administrative units, and the mission of the French force had been reduced to symbolic proportions. He preferred to turn his attention toward the other European courts and Istanbul in view of diverting the course of the negotiations. He partially succeeded in this endeavor, managing to convince the other European capitals to opt for the principle of a single Christian governor for the whole Mountain, although he failed to push the adoption of the principle of a native governor. The last phase of the negotiations focused on this last point, and after long fruitless discussions, the French were compelled to yield on this principle.¹⁰⁰ As a result, a new regime, commonly known as the *Mutassarifiyya*, was adopted on June 9, 1861, by the powers and the Porte.

But local misinterpretations or misconceptions of the French position during the whole crisis were to have immediate and more enduring consequences. The belief that France had earnestly striven to establish a virtually independent Christian entity but had been defeated died hard. Beyond the bitter disappointment of some local parties in Mount Lebanon, the conviction persisted that the defeat of France was temporary and could be reversed. The small phrase of Thouvenel, qualifying the new *R  glement* as a "provisional" arrangement that would have to withstand the test of practical implementation confirmed these kind of ideas.¹⁰¹

They nourished secret expectations that the realization of the “Franco-Lebanese dream” was only postponed until the rise of more favorable circumstances and contributed to the persistence of these views. They sustained, for some years, the determined opposition of the Church to the new regime. They also motivated the rebellion of Yusuf Karam and the troubled inauguration of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime in the Mountain.

Before moving to these developments, the regulations of the new regime adopted for Lebanon are briefly examined.

THE *RÈGLEMENT*

The agreement reached by the European powers and the Porte for the reorganization of Lebanon was embodied in a protocol, or the *Règlement Organique fondamentale relatif à l'administration du Mont Liban*, encompassing seventeen articles.¹⁰² Mount Lebanon was reconstituted into a single Ottoman district, or *mutasarrifiyya*, to be ruled by an Ottoman Christian governor. The selection of a native governor was not specifically ruled out, but, to circumvent the objections of the Ottomans and the British, such an alternative was then eluded by the signatories of the agreement; later on, this temporary expedient was adopted as an implicit rule. The governor, or *mutasarrif*, was to be appointed by, and directly responsible to, the Porte, in agreement with the guarantor powers. He was given wide executive, administrative, and judicial prerogatives. He was empowered to appoint most officials and judges, in consultation with the notables and local religious authorities; in 1864 this latter qualification was abrogated.

To assist the governor in his task, an Administrative Council, representing the six main communities in the Mountain was established.¹⁰³ It had mainly a consultative function and was only empowered to give an opinion on issues duly submitted to it by the governor. Its basic duties were to supervise the apportionment of taxation and the supervision of revenue and expenditure. The twelve members of the Council were to be elected for a six-year term by the village headmen, or *shaykhs*. The latter, selected by local inhabitants, were confirmed in their position by the governor. They also acted as judges of peace in minor civil and criminal cases.

The territory of the Mountain was divided into seven districts, or *qadas*, each headed by a *qaimaqam* appointed by the governor from the dominant sect. These districts included several subdistricts, or *nahiyes*, each administered by a *mudir*, also nominated by the governor. Justice was to be dispensed by the village *shaykhs*, courts of first instance, and two higher central courts. Judges were appointed by

the governor and theoretically were only removable after due inquiry. A local gendarmerie was to maintain order and security. All members of the administrative apparatus, the judicial courts, and police were to be locally selected.

Taxation in the Mountain was limited by the terms of the *Règlement* to 3,500 purses, to be doubled to 7,000 purses when circumstances allowed it. It was to cover the expenses of the local administration; any deficit in the Lebanese budget was to be supplemented by the central government. Finally, indirect taxes were to be levied for the construction of roads and other infrastructure works.

CHAPTER FOUR • The Church and the *Mutasarrifiyya*

On June 9, 1861, a special administration, generally known as the *mutasarrifiyya*, was established in Mount Lebanon. It provided mainly for a more regular mode of government, which was to be manned locally. The autonomous status of Mount Lebanon was, however, significantly limited. The governor of this district was himself not a native, but a Christian Ottoman official, appointed by, and directly responsible to, the Sublime Porte. The semi-autonomous political system of Lebanon secured, in spite of some initial difficulties, a favorable framework for the restoration of peace and a relative prosperity in the Mountain for nearly six decades.

On September 1, 1920, the Republic of Lebanon was proclaimed, following wider and dramatic changes, including the outbreak of World War I, the Arab Revolt of 1916, a Franco-British occupation of the Arab provinces of the Empire and the elimination of Ottoman sovereignty. The Lebanese Republic consisted of the semi-autonomous region of Mount Lebanon, to which the whole coastal band with its important seaports, the Bekaa Valley to the east, and large districts in the north and the south had been added.

For the historian, the temptation to establish a linear link between these two regimes is very strong, and indeed many historians have adopted this view.¹ Several factors tend to point in this direction. The *mutasarrifiyya* regime had allowed the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to enjoy, under their local administration, a relatively distinct evolution from that of their neighboring provinces. Their experiment in

limited self-government and representative institutions had acquainted them with the basic principles of a modern polity. By 1914, a distinct feeling of identity was discernible among its inhabitants, who had begun to call themselves Lebanese. Some had also undertaken to advocate for the consolidation of their autonomy and the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain. In short, by the end of the *mutasarriḡyya* period the bases for the establishment of the Lebanese Republic were already in existence and tended towards its ultimate realization.

The aim of the next chapters is not to contest altogether this assumption but to investigate it from another angle. Based primarily on the writings and claims of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon themselves, an attempt is made to reconstruct the development, and many fluctuations, of Lebanist ideas through their own eyes.

This approach reveals that, for the Church and the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, the evolution from the various schemes aiming at the establishment of a Christian entity in Lebanon, which had fascinated some clerical circles from 1840 until 1860, toward nationalist aspirations aiming at the establishment of a Greater Lebanon was much more complex and elusive than is usually envisaged. There was no direct and gradual progression toward this latter aim, but long lapses, and many digressions, during which alternative ideas and policies were explored. Moreover, when some Lebanese began to display nationalist inclinations, they did not conceive of the *mutasarriḡyya* regime as a stepping stone toward national independence, but as a negative and detrimental development in their historical struggle for national independence. The Maʿanid and Shihabi Emirates stood out as the high points of the idealized history they projected and, by comparison, the *mutasarriḡyya* was portrayed as a territorial mutilation and a curtailment of their previous local rule brought about by an overwhelming local and international conspiracy.

Actually, the *mutasarriḡyya* period was notable for a long hiatus in the development of Lebanist ideas among the Maronite clergy. Indeed the Church that had, until then, assumed a leading role in the development of Lebanist ideas, in association with political schemes that it strove to realize between 1840 and 1861, altered its views and aspirations as it adjusted to the new political setting. Its policy came to focus on the safeguard of the spiritual and sociopolitical autonomy of the Maronite community, along with a staunch commitment to the special political regime of Mount Lebanon that fairly secured this basic aim.

Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, apparently satisfied with the new *mutasarriḡyya* regime in Mount Lebanon, led a tranquil and secluded life. They accommodated to the new political order and did not, for some decades, advance

claims for its amendment or consolidation. It was only by the turn of the twentieth century that a new generation of Lebanese members of the elite raised anew Lebanese claims, which they developed in accordance with their personal inclinations and changing political circumstances.

This chapter hence focuses on the slow and difficult accommodation of the Church with the new regime, and the following chapters are dedicated to the differing views of the secular elite throughout the *mutasarrifiyya* period.

MGR MAS'AD AND THE *MUTASARRIFIYYA*

The Maronite clergy was deeply disappointed with the new *mutasarrifiyya* regime adopted for Mount Lebanon in 1861. The appointment of a non-native Ottoman governor, Daud Pasha, had dashed their expectations and frustrated their chief ambition for the past twenty years, namely, to secure the rule of a Maronite governor and ensure thereby the dominance of their community in the Mountain. The disillusionment of the Church was compounded by the fact that the 1861 *Règlement* allotted the Maronite community an equal representative share, along with the other main communities, in the judicial and administrative bodies of the new political system.²

The initial negative reaction of the Maronite clergy was predictable under the circumstances. It embraced both the person of the new *mutasarrif*, Daud Pasha, who was initially appointed for a three-year period, and the new regime he was entrusted to apply. It was moreover compounded by the dissatisfaction of many Maronite forces, which, for their own reasons, distrusted the new order. Hence, the Maronites of the Shuf, mainly afflicted by the 1860 massacres, resented the appointment of a Druze *qaimaqam*, or district official, over them.³ For the past twenty years they had been at the forefront of the battle for a native Maronite governor. It was their situation, as Christians living under the rule of Druze *muqata'jis*, that had crystallized this latter cause and had presented a strong case in its favor. In the northern Maronite districts, the traditional notable families, who had hoped that the new governor would be selected from among their members, saw in Daud Pasha a competitor obstructing their own fortunes. Moreover, they had expected that the rule of one of their peers would promote their influence and interests, which had been seriously compromised by the peasant insurrection in Kisrawan. As for the commoners, who had lived for past years in a state of open rebellion against both local leaders and central rule, their apprehensions focused on the restoration

of a regular authority and on the higher rate of taxation—7,000 purses instead of 3,500—immediately imposed by Daud Pasha over the Mountain in order to establish his new administration.⁴

This nearly unanimous Maronite opposition to the new regime was, however, tempered by the fact that the general Maronite dissatisfaction did not elicit a unified Maronite response. The differing causes and circumstances underlying their discontent, the diverse interests being defended, favored a variety of reactions within the community. Hence the Maronites of the mixed district of the Shuf overcame their initial apprehensions and readily accepted the rule of Daud Pasha. They came to appreciate the fair and regular authority established by the new *mutasar-rif* in this region, which contrasted with the previous arbitrary rule of the Druze *muqata'jis*. As a result, they developed a vested interest in the success of Daud Pasha's government, fearing that his failure would entail a new division of the Mountain and the restoration of a Druze *qaimaqamiyya*. They therefore came to regard with anxiety the opposition of the Maronites of the northern districts to the new regime and offered their support to the *mutasar-rif* against their coreligionists when the latter challenged his authority.⁵

In the predominantly Maronite northern districts, the opposition of the inhabitants proved more intractable, although inconsistent. Traditional regional solidarities and sensitivities separated the inhabitants of Kisrawan from those of the uppermost northern districts of Batrun, Ihdin, and Bsharri, evoking different attitudes from each. Moreover, the population of Kisrawan was still affected by the repercussions of the Peasant Revolt of 1858–60 and the many divisions and animosities then elicited. Two main forces seemed to dominate the scene: those of the traditional notables and the peasant's party.⁶ However, each was subdivided into many loose, often hostile, local or family coalitions. In short, if most Maronites shared a common defiance of the new regime, their inherent idiosyncrasies precluded any common action or agreement on an explicit program summarizing their grievances and clearly stating their desiderata.

The division of the Maronite secular leadership into several factions also contributed to the confusion of the northern Maronite resistance. The main poles of this opposition were the new Maronite *qaimaqam*, Emir Majid Shehab, and the intractable leader of the uppermost north, Yusuf Karam. Both had aspired to be nominated governors of the Mountain, and each still coveted this position at the end of Daud initial three-year mandate. During the first years of the *mutas-arriyya*, they vied for power and influence in the Maronite sectors, striving to prevent Daud from imposing his authority in the region while secretly working

to undermine and discredit each other.⁷ They encouraged and manipulated the hostile disposition of the population to the new regime to advance their own causes, without publicly endorsing local insubordination or trying to channel it overtly in the benefit of some higher specific cause. They rather tried to take advantage of popular agitation to prove the intractability of Daud's rule and establish their own influence. As a result, resistance in the Maronite districts was submerged in the intrigues and maneuvers of their leaders, failing to evolve into a general movement against the new regime. When things came to a head during Karam's rebellion, in 1866, the diffuse and erratic Maronite opposition, paralyzed by all its inherent contradictions, disintegrated rapidly, reducing the revolt of the northern Maronite leader to a local and individual affair.

Finally, the ambiguous stand of the Maronite clergy completed the prevailing Maronite disarray. The Patriarch and his main bishops, who for the past twenty years had spearheaded the battle for Maronite dominance, failed to give a definite direction to the dissatisfaction of their community in this transitional period. They engaged in divergent policies and schemes, reflecting their varying temperaments and views on the most appropriate means to reverse the new regime. The Patriarch, Mgr Mas'ad, who had emerged from the profound crises that had shaken the Mountain and his own community as the leading political and religious leader of the Maronites and the ultimate representative of the dominant community in the Mountain entrenched himself in a sullen reserve. His caution and his unyielding character predisposed him neither to ill-considered action nor to compromise.

Moreover, Mgr Mas'ad's options for altering the situation were limited and constrained his ability to act. He did not wish to provoke a Maronite movement against the *mutasarrifiyya*, having experienced in 1860 the devastating consequences that such a step could bring about. He believed that only through the support of France could the new regime be amended and Daud Pasha ultimately replaced by a native governor, preferably Yusuf Karam.⁸ He was therefore keen to maintain that support and to remain in agreement with French policy in the country.⁹ Furthermore, he believed that France shared his desire to see the appointment of a native Maronite governor but had been thwarted by unfavorable circumstances during the 1861 negotiations in Istanbul. He hoped that a more opportune conjuncture would soon arise, allowing for the fulfillment of his aspirations.¹⁰

Mgr Mas'ad therefore remained insensitive to French aspirations to support Daud Pasha as an experiment in semi-autonomous Christian government within the Ottoman Empire. He refused to heed the repeated entreaties of the successive

French consuls in Beirut to adopt a more cooperative attitude. He saw things differently. For him, any success on the part of Daud Pasha could only hamper the chances of indigenous government in Mount Lebanon, and he was not ready to help. Yet he did not want to openly oppose French policy. As a result, he adopted a vague and ambiguous stand, failing to give any clear directives to his flock. He neither publicly condemned the new regime nor denounced the new *mutasarrif*, but he refused to facilitate or to condone his government in any way.¹¹ He abstained from using his influence to bring the Maronites of the northern sectors to submit to Daud Pasha, and he only manifested himself to prevent serious disturbances or open hostilities against Daud's government. His ambiguous stand hardly concealed his desire to keep Maronite opposition to the regime within acceptable limits until the end of Daud's mandate, in order to establish the necessity of his replacement by a native governor at the end of his initial three-year term.

Mgr Mas'ad showed much less restraint in his private contacts with French officials. He tirelessly raised the issue of a native governor with successive French consuls in Beirut, in repeated efforts to sound out the French position on the question.¹² The equivocations of the latter only confirmed his misconceptions of the official French stance and sustained his hopes about the possibility of replacing Daud Pasha with a native governor. Hence, for example, the Patriarch misinterpreted the statement of the French consul, Bernard Des Essards, who confirmed to the Patriarch that the issue of a native governor had not been abandoned but only reserved, although he insisted on the loyal support of Daud's administration in the meantime.¹³ Justifying his comments on the issue, the French consul wrote to the minister of foreign affairs: "Since the idea of autonomy has been expressly set aside for the moment, the governor general has no other mission but to organize the country and lay the groundwork for it. In essence, it is important for everyone here to be fully convinced that this is the only way to proceed. Without that, without a hope that in the sufficiently near future everyone can glimpse its fulfillment, I view the government of this country as impossible."¹⁴ However, contrary to the consul's opinion, it was such expectations that rendered the government of Lebanon impossible. As long as the clergy and some Maronite circles retained hope of establishing the rule of a native Christian governor, they were not ready to "loyally support" Daud's experiment, as enjoined by the French consuls. On the contrary, they did their best to prove his government impossible.

When Daud Pasha's first term neared its end, Mgr Mas'ad felt the occasion was ripe to raise the issue at a higher level. In December 1863, he addressed a long

letter to the French minister of foreign affairs Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, that represents the clearest and most extensive expression of the clergy's critique of the new regime.¹⁵ In it, he focused mainly on the many "injustices inflicted on the Maronites" by the new regime's stipulations. Indeed, it was the condition of his own community under the new regime that preoccupied the Patriarch. Even if he used the term *Lebanese* to refer to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, it was the rights of the Maronites, "the original and primitive inhabitants" of the Mountain, and its most numerous community that concerned him. For him, a "Lebanese nationality [did] not exist," and the population of the Mountain was really divided into six distinct "nations."¹⁶

Going back to the negotiations that followed the 1860 massacres and led to the adoption of the 1861 *Règlement*, on which he seemed to have been precisely briefed,¹⁷ the Patriarch emphasized the fact that due to "unfavorable circumstances," the government of the Mountain had been entrusted "on a trial basis" to a "foreigner" for a three-year period without impairing Lebanon's right to native rule. The Patriarch predictably concluded that this provisional government, "instead of alleviating the misfortunes of the Lebanese, and of improving their condition, has wrought on them new disasters, since it had exposed them to dangerous divisions, to perils, to losses, and unbearable charges." "We knew it from the start," he added, "but the Lebanese have . . . submitted to this ordeal, in the conviction that, when this experience will be over, the Powers will take into consideration their sorry situation." Among these powers, he naturally singled out the French government, which had always manifested its solicitude for the Maronites, and which he hoped would endeavor "with its usual zeal" to redress the wrong inflicted on them.¹⁸

Tackling in detail the flaws of the new regime, the Patriarch first insisted on the impracticability of the rule of a "foreign" governor, a situation that departed from local tradition and the ancient "right" of the Mountain to native rule. The governor of the Mountain should not only be indigenous, he added, but also a Maronite, following the tenet of majority rule, "which, at present, is the fundamental principle of the civil Constitutions of all the civilized countries." A Maronite governor would benefit from the support of the majority, greatly facilitating his task, whereas a foreign governor would inevitably be opposed by this same majority and would need to resort to forceful and costly means to assert his authority. Moreover, a local governor would better uphold the interests of the inhabitants of the Mountain than would a foreigner and would have a greater stake in ensuring their welfare.

In this context, the Patriarch challenged the reasons invoked by the architects of the *Règlement* against the rule of a native governor. They feared, he said, that in view of the rivalries and animosities of the diverse communities inhabiting the Mountain, a governor chosen from one of them might “abuse his power at the expense of the other nations.” But, he objected, their concern for the well-being of minorities had led them to impair the rights of the majority. The Maronite community in the Mountain, he added, amounted to 200,000 individuals, whereas all the other communities collectively numbered 62,000, less than a quarter of the total.¹⁹ “Is it fair,” asked the Patriarch, “to require that the three quarters renounce their rights in favor of the other quarter?”²⁰

Mgr Mas‘ad also strongly contested the principle of allocating an equal representative share to the six communities of the Mountain in the main administrative and judicial bodies in spite of the “enormous” disparities in the numbers of these communities, in their ownership of land, and in their respective contributions to taxes. This system, he argued, was highly prejudiced against the rights of the Maronites. Hence, “the Maronites contribute approximately three-quarters of the sum earmarked for wages to civil officials, and only reap one sixth of offices, whereas the other nations collectively support one quarter [of these wages] and hold five-sixth [of the offices].”²¹ The Patriarch further substantiated his argument by listing several examples illustrating the unfairness and the incongruity of the system adopted. In the whole Mountain, he pointed out, there were 200,000 Maronites and 3,000 Muslims requiring equal representation in all the administrative apparatus. More specifically, in the Matn district, there were fifteen Muslims and 30,000 Maronites. The former, he stressed, were not numerous enough to fill all the offices allocated to their community in the district. At the same time, the Maronite prelate noted, the new system increased the number of offices, and hence the charges imposed on the inhabitants, unnecessarily, simply to accommodate the smaller communities.²²

One last and major issue raised by the Patriarch was that of the frontiers of the Mountain. Lebanon, he asserted, did not comprise enough land to sustain the needs of its inhabitants. It had been deprived of “many of the coastal towns and adjacent plains, which were submitted not long ago to the government of the Mountain,” and where many inhabitants of Mount Lebanon had come to reside. However, instead of invoking the annexion of the coastal towns and plains on which he just laid a vague historical claim, the Patriarch insisted mostly on the rights of the inhabitants of the Mountain living in these territories and the need to secure the jurisdiction of the Lebanese courts over them. He limited his territorial

demands to an indeterminate annexation to Lebanon of some adjacent localities such as “Ba‘albeck, Abra, Accar and others, in order to help the Lebanese secure their living, without impairing in any way the pecuniary rights of the Imperial Treasury over these localities.”²³

It is significant to note here how peripheral the issue of territory and frontiers had become for Mgr Mas‘ad. He only raised it incidentally and did not elaborate or seem to insist much upon it. Compared with the letter he himself had addressed three years previously to Thouvenel,²⁴ in which he had pressed for the establishment of a Greater Lebanon and scrupulously enumerated all the localities he deemed imperative to include in this projected entity, the territorial claims of the Maronite prelate had been seriously scaled down. This notable curtailment can be attributed to the fact that, in 1861, the Patriarch seemed confident that a native governor would be shortly appointed to the Mountain and, encouraged by the projects circulated by some French officials, had tried to press the need for a larger territory for the prospective Maronite entity that was expected to emerge.

The appointment of a non-native governor altered the Patriarch’s priorities. Apparently aware that his expectations of a Maronite Greater Lebanon were unwarranted for the time being, he tried to present a more modest and, for him, essential, claim. He reverted to the Maronite clergy’s central aspiration for the past two decades—the autonomy of the Mountain under the rule of a Maronite governor. Since this aim was first expressed by Mgr Hubaysh in 1840, the form and scope of the government claimed by the Patriarchate had varied according to circumstances and prospects. Its archetype had been the government of Bashir II, under whom the Maronites had enjoyed an unprecedented influence and prosperity. It had then evolved into a more substantial Christian entity in conjunction with parallel schemes devised by some French circles and tallying with their own dreams and aspirations. The primary focus of the Maronite clergy had, however, remained the defense of the particularism of the Maronites in the territory that had secured their autonomy, not the establishment of a viable Christian state. Indeed, Mgr Mas‘ad’s exclusive and obsessive insistence on the principle of a native governor throughout the first years of the *mutasarrifiyya*, and his apparent willingness to compromise on the issue of frontiers and the scope of the autonomy of the Mountain, underscores the fact that the substance of the ambitions of the Maronite clergy was still a community, not a territory or a state.

This tendency was further confirmed by the apparent indifference of the Maronite clergy and the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to Daud’s efforts in 1868 to enlarge the limits of the territory included in the *mutasarrifiyya* in order to turn

it into a more viable entity. Petitions were circulated at that time by the inhabitants of the coastal town of Sayda and the villages of Rashaya and Hasbaya to support Daud Pasha on this issue, but surprisingly enough almost none emanated from the Mountain.²⁵ On the contrary, while Daud Pasha was waging this vital battle on behalf of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon with the central government, some petitions were circulated in the northern districts for the replacement of the *mutasarraf* at the end of his second term.²⁶

Thus, the focus of Maronite dissatisfaction with the *mutasarrafyya* regime was initially and unquestionably centered on the “foreign” Ottoman governor. Concerns about the nature and scope of the autonomy granted to Mount Lebanon or its territorial and economic potential for evolution into a semi-independent entity remained very marginal, if not totally absent, in the clerical and secular Maronite complaints of that time.

Mgr Mas‘ad’s lengthy plea against the *mutasarrafyya*, and his earnest appeal to the French minister of foreign affairs to “restore to us [the Maronites] our ancient rights,”²⁷ did not strike a totally sympathetic chord. By that time, the French minister for foreign affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, had already opted for the renewal of Daud’s mandate. Following several reports by his agents in the region, he had resigned himself to the view that the government of Daud Pasha represented the best alternative for Lebanon due to his able record as governor and, more specifically, for lack of any appropriate native Maronite candidate.²⁸

The ambiguity that had characterized the French stand on the issue of an indigenous governor for Mount Lebanon since 1861 was hence settled to the detriment of France’s Maronite clients some months before the end of Daud’s first term of office in 1864. The Syrian crisis having lost its acuity, France’s general interests in the Ottoman Empire and its influence in Istanbul, where the process of overall reform was given a fresh start after 1860, took precedence. France, eager to support these efforts and to promote an improvement of the condition of Christians in the Empire as a whole, did not want to risk a confrontation with the Porte on what seemed to be a secondary issue. On the contrary, Drouyn de Lhuys wanted to subsume the Maronite question to that of the Christians of the Empire and hoped to establish the *mutasarrafyya* experiment in Mount Lebanon as a precedent, and an eventual solution for the other Christian populations.²⁹ In this context, a native governor in Mount Lebanon, who might eventually foster local separatist tendencies, could jeopardize France’s delicately balanced policy aiming to emancipate the Ottoman Christians while remaining true to French strategy of supporting the integrity of the Empire. Prosper Bourrée, who had returned to region as French

ambassador in Istanbul since 1866, voiced these general concerns by noting that even if the Maronites ended up by establishing “a small harmless Montenegro,” this antecedent “would have the serious effect . . . of reducing France’s ability to block Russian attempts to further fragment the authority of the Porte.”³⁰

The Patriarch was slow to grasp this reorientation of French policy and to accept the hard realities it implied. The reappointment of Daud Pasha for a five-year term and the amendment of the *Règlement* on September 6, 1864, represented serious setbacks to the desiderata he had just expressed in his long letter to the French minister of foreign affairs. The slight reapportionment of seats in the Administrative Council, where the Maronite share was increased from two to four in recognition of his community’s preponderance in the Mountain, did not soften the negative impact of the confirmation of the rule of a foreign governor.

More directly, the reappointment of Daud Pasha provoked the rebellion of Yusuf Karam in the northern Maronite districts.

THE REBELLION OF YUSUF KARAM

In the year 1866, Yusuf Karam instigated a rebellion against the rule of the Ottoman governor, Daud Pasha. Though this event took place some time after the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya*, it was in fact linked to developments in 1860–61. Indeed, Karam’s revolt came as a result of the high hopes and aspirations fostered at that time among some Maronite parties by the activity of certain French officials in the region, with the support of French Catholic circles, in favor of the establishment of a Maronite entity in Mount Lebanon. It symbolized the lingering hopes of local Maronite parties in the possibility of fulfilling such an objective.

Karam’s rebellion thus aimed to shake the international consensus that sustained the new *mutasarrifiyya* regime and to provoke French intervention in favor of the establishment of a Maronite government in Mount Lebanon. Karam’s revolt in 1866 represented the culmination of the activity of some Maronites to embroil the French government into effective assistance for their objectives and, as it turned out, the last such act by local Maronite parties. It exposed the misconceptions and illusory expectations that had locally sustained such a strategy, helping to dispel them and contributing to a complete reversal of the position of the Patriarchate.

Karam was born in the uppermost northern district of Mount Lebanon, in the village of Ihdin, in 1823. This region, where the Maronites had first established

themselves as a community in the seventh century—and had since maintained a continuous presence—had witnessed a distinct historical evolution that, combined with its difficult access, sharpened a sense of separateness among its inhabitants. In these districts, commonly called *al-Jibba*,³¹ the Maronites had lived as a compact religious minority in difficult conditions, exposed to the exactions of the Muslim governors of the nearby town of Tripoli, and to frequent incursions by their Shi‘ite neighbors—and eventual overlords in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.³² Though they were integrated with the rest of the Mountain under the same local political system in the eighteenth century, the inhabitants of the districts of *al-Jibbat* retained a different historical perspective from the rest of the mountaineers and a distinct parochial feeling of identity.

The singularity of the inhabitants of *al-Jibba* revealed itself in a certain aloofness from social and political developments in the rest of the Mountain,³³ and a defiance toward central power—whether local or Ottoman. It also manifested itself in a peculiar sociopolitical structure that differed from that of the remaining districts and that was characterized by a more fragmented distribution of political authority among petty chiefs, who combined political and clannish attributes and prerogatives.

Karam’s family belonged to this category of petty chiefs in the region, whose domination of the Ihdin districts was of recent origin. Karam’s grandfather, who had acquired some fortune and prominence, had maintained close relations with the French vice consulate in Tripoli, which helped him to appoint his son, Butrus, as *shaykh* of Ihdin and Zghorta.³⁴ His family had since retained a strong attachment to the French government. This devotion to anything French, which Yusuf Karam inherited, was reinforced by a Lazarist father who initiated him into French language and culture.³⁵ Karam was also a devout Maronite, who maintained close ties with the clergy and had assimilated its traditional sense of communal belonging and political aspirations.

Karam’s first appearance on the local political scene took place in 1860. When he heard of the outbreak of hostilities in the mixed districts, he gathered a small force and marched toward the south. With the agreement of the Maronite Patriarch, he advanced toward the key position of Bikfaya in order to thwart an expected attack against the Christian regions and to assist the town of Zahla in case of need—which, eventually, he failed to do.³⁶ He claimed to have been prevented from acting by the firm injunctions of the French consul in Beirut, Count Bentivoglio, who expressly asked him to retreat.³⁷ His critics dismissed Karam’s excuses and blamed him for the fall of Zahla, which was counting on

his assistance. For them, Karam should have rushed to save Zahla without losing time in vain negotiations with the consuls in Beirut in attempts to seek approval for his intervention, which their diplomatic position prevented them from sanctioning.³⁸ Whatever the case, it is clear that Karam then lost an opportunity to distinguish himself. His subsequent career and reputation remained tainted by this incident.

In spite of this failing, Karam's attitude during the events of 1860, when all the other traditional notables remained aloof, gained him a certain popularity. To some, he appeared as the only defender of the Christians during these ominous moments,³⁹ and he won unrestricted support from part of the clergy and the gratitude and affection of the Maronite Patriarch, Mgr Bulus Mas'ad, who became one of his firm supporters. The Maronite prelate supported his candidacy as a prospective governor for Mount Lebanon and repeatedly recommended him to the attention of the French agents who came to Lebanon in 1861. In a private conversation with Scheffer, the special envoy of Napoleon III, he asserted: "Yusuf Bey Karam has done us many great services. We insist that he not be sacrificed. He alone gave up everything to serve the Christian cause; abandoning him completely would be for us a cause of deep dismay and for the people a matter of discontent."⁴⁰

Karam's prominence and popularity reached its peak during the few months following the 1860 conflict and the arrival of the French forces. The Ottoman authorities appointed him as acting *qaimaqam* of the Christian regions, pending the final reorganization of the Mountain.⁴¹ At the same time, he became the idol of the French officers and visitors in the country and of Catholic circles in France.⁴² They all adulated him, portraying him as the hero of the day. Through his many French contacts, Karam also became aware of the projects for the establishment of an independent Christian principality advocated by some French circles, and he began to see himself as the man of the hour.⁴³ His pride and ambition rose accordingly, and he apparently began to secretly covet the position of governor-general of a regenerated Christian Lebanon.

But his glowing expectations were dashed during the first months of 1861, due to his own actions, the conflicting designs of General Beaufort, the higher interest of France, and the opposition of the Ottomans to any sort of independence for the Mountain.

Karam himself jeopardized what chances he had during his tenure as acting *qaimaqam*. He got caught up in the conflict in the Kisrawan and alienated peasants and notables by his tactless and ill-advised measures. He made it clear that the peasants would have to return the properties that they had seized from their notables

and pay indemnities for losses incurred.⁴⁴ As a result, his popularity among the peasants of Kisrawan waned. A minority among the latter continued to back him, while the rest gradually abandoned him. The leader of the 1858 peasant revolt, Tanius Shahin, turned against him as soon as he found some support from Emir Majid Shihab and Beaufort. Later he rallied to the government of Daud Pasha.⁴⁵

With the notables, the question was complicated by mutual antipathy and animosity. They looked down upon Karam, who hailed from a less distinguished family than they did, and resented his authority. For his part, Karam was offended by their haughty attitude, and he tried to humble them by engaging in a trifling battle over the proper form of address they were entitled to.⁴⁶ He also urged them to abandon those of their privileges that were most abhorrent to the peasantry if they wanted to reclaim their properties.⁴⁷ As a result, the notables rejected his mediation and adopted a hostile attitude toward him.

In short, at a time when conciliation and tact were needed to ensure the unity of the Maronites, Karam's performance further divided their ranks. He thus vindicated his opponents' view regarding his lack of political aptitude and his narrow views and inept actions. Beaufort, who had set his mind since his arrival at Beirut on the restoration of the Shihabs, took advantage of Karam's blunders to justify the superiority of his own candidate for the post of governor, Emir Majid Shihab. He repeatedly criticized Karam in his reports to Paris, underlining his unsuitability for the position of governor of the Lebanon, despite the firm support for the Maronite leader of some French officials in the region and many of his high officers.

Beaufort stressed the fact that Karam's narrow communal views rendered him totally unacceptable to the other communities of the Mountain, the allegiance of which only a Shihab could command. His appointment would consequently amount to the sanctioning of a smaller Maronite Lebanon in the northern districts only, abandoning the Christians of the mixed districts to their fate. Karam's aspirations and his narrow communal views, Beaufort asserted, made him amenable to settling for such a solution. In few words, he believed that Karam was really "a vulgar, ambitious man," ready to sacrifice the general interest of Christians in the Mountain for his own sake.⁴⁸

The differences between Beaufort and Karam turned into a bitter confrontation when Karam decided to oppose Beaufort's local campaign in favor of his Shihabi candidate. He was supported in his stand by the Maronite Patriarch and part of the clergy. He was equally heartened by his "exaggerated hopes" of being personally selected as governor, which arose from his relations "with the Jesuits, and with some officers of the expeditionary force, . . . as well as the sympathies he enjoyed

in the European community, the influence he exerted over part of the northern districts, and finally, his correspondence with some French ecclesiastics.”⁴⁹

Karam used his several personal French contacts to thwart Beaufort’s scheme. In several letters to the influential Abbé Charles Lavigerie of the *Oeuvre des Ecoles d’Orient*, to the French minister of foreign affairs and to French agents in Beirut, he underlined the fact that the Shihabs were “notoriously unpopular” in the Mountain and that the Emir Majid “was a renegade” who would disown the French cause as easily as he had renounced his own religion. His hostility to the Shihabs encompassed all the traditional Lebanese notables who supported them and who, in his opinion, had adopted an ignominious attitude during the latest events and were really traitors to the Christian cause. His refusal to support Emir Majid’s candidacy, he insisted, stemmed from his conviction that his appointment would lead to “the ruin of our nation.” Furthermore, countering Beaufort’s arguments regarding his narrow communal views and his lack of support among the other communities of the Mountain, Karam questioned the propriety of a policy that disregarded the wishes of the Maronite majority, who had always been loyal to France, in order to please the rest of the inhabitants.⁵⁰ Karam’s campaign therefore strove to discredit the old ruling class and to establish that he would serve the interests of France, of his own community, and of the Christian cause better and more loyally than his rival.

All of his efforts proved fruitless. His campaign failed to sway the French government. Frustrated by his failure to obtain sanction for his candidacy, Karam resigned from his position as acting *qaimaqam* and retired to his native village of Ihdin, in the hope that his initiative would eventually establish the necessity of his cooperation to secure order in Lebanon.

His disappointment was therefore great when Daud Pasha was appointed as governor-general of the Lebanon on June 9, 1861. But he quickly regained hope when he learned that the tenure of the *mutasarraf* had been limited to three years. His expectations were fostered by an ambiguous French stance, promoting the idea that Daud’s term was to serve as an experiment, and by regular reports he received from some of his supporters in France.⁵¹ The agitation that continued to smolder in the Maronite Christian districts during the first years of Daud’s mandate until Karam’s revolt in 1866 was in great part due to such local expectations and ambitions.

Indeed, the Maronites in the Kisrawan and the northern districts had refused to pay the higher rate of taxation imposed by the new *mutasarraf*.⁵² The negative attitude of the northern population was encouraged by some Maronite parties

for particular political reasons. It was fostered by the clergy and sustained by the complicated web of ambitions—pitting Yusuf Karam, Emir Majid, and Daud Pasha against one another—that surfaced as a result of the ambiguity and doubts surrounding the fate of the new regime in Lebanon.⁵³ The situation in the Christian districts was thus left to deteriorate slowly during the first years of Daud Pasha's government, largely because Emir Majid, appointed as *qaimaqam* of the Christian district, still cherished hopes of his own to be selected governor of the Mountain at the end of Daud Pasha's initial mandate. He was therefore reluctant to let the *mutasarrif*'s government appear efficient.⁵⁴ For his part, Daud Pasha's wariness toward his rival grew as time passed. Hiding behind the lack of means at his disposal, he avoided tackling the delicate situation of the Christian districts until the end of his three-year trial tenure. He hoped that the unfavorable situation in the northern districts would emphasize the inability of Emir Majid to rule over the Mountain.⁵⁵

As for Yusuf Karam, he was keen to prevent the success of either Daud Pasha or Emir Majid. He wanted to emphasize his own importance, the extent of his influence, and the necessity of his cooperation. His first reaction to the new regime had been ambiguous. But he had rapidly adopted an oppositional stance aimed at discrediting and undermining Daud's government while he pretended publicly to correct some of its injustices. He rallied around him the malcontents of his district, who soon attacked the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of neighboring district of Kura, who had paid their share of the higher taxes and submitted to the authority of the new governor.

Karam then advanced toward Batrun with a group of his own armed partisans to meet Daud Pasha and to submit a list of their grievances to him. Presenting himself as the representative of the local population and the spokesman for their claims against the local authority, he exposed himself to the accusation of instigating a movement against the constituted authority and thus opened the way for measures to be adopted against him. Fuad Pasha summoned him to Beirut and notified him of the decision, ratified by the European Commission, to exile him.⁵⁶ Karam interpreted his exile as a recognition by Daud and the Western representatives of his influence in the country and the impossibility of establishing the new regime in his presence. He considered his exile as a voluntary act he had acceded to until the end of Daud's first mandate in 1864 and seemed confident that the course of events would favor his own chances then.

Karam's banishment greatly offended the Patriarch, and it increased his distrust and dislike of Daud Pasha. He believed that Karam was innocent of all charges and

that his exile was meant to humble the Maronites.⁵⁷ He therefore covertly continued to support a passive opposition to Daud's government, hoping that it would help prove impracticability of the new regime and favor the appointment of a native governor at the end of his first mandate.

For his part, Yusuf Karam was also preparing himself for the crucial date when Daud's first term would end. In the summer of 1864, he moved from Alexandria to Izmir, which was nearer to Istanbul, where the ambassadors would decide his fate and that of Lebanon. It was there that he learned of the decision to renew Daud's tenure for five more years. As a result, he decided to return to Lebanon, where he had a greater chance of influencing the course of events. He still had many partisans there. Actually, his popularity had increased during his absence, especially in the uppermost *Jibba* district, where the absent *shaykh* had become a "legendary hero," according to a French marine captain, De Challié, who then visited the region. But the latter sharply remarked that "it bears repeating: this popularity, so great during his absence, is likely to wane on his return. Yusuf Karam is enjoying the benefit of his exile, but what demands he would face if he came back tomorrow."⁵⁸

Karam opened negotiations with the French consul in Beirut for his return. They stumbled over the latter's demands that Karam not only submit to Daud's authority but also accept an official position in his administration, so as to engage his responsibility in the maintenance of peace and order. Karam refused this latter condition, arguing that he was innocent and that his exile had been a voluntary step to allow Daud Pasha to establish his authority in the country. Forcing him to accept an official position would constitute a penalty he did nothing to deserve and violate the regular rule of law. On the contrary, he accused Daud Pasha of wrongdoing by exiling him unlawfully.⁵⁹

Convinced that he was within his rights, Karam disregarded these conditions and returned to Lebanon on his own initiative on November 24, 1864. He then hesitated and procrastinated for several months before yielding to strong French pressure and submitting to Daud Pasha, in March 1865, in the presence of the Patriarch.⁶⁰ But his compliance was a sham. He was really waiting for his moment.

It came in December 1865. Daud then decided to take advantage of the renewal of his mandate to establish his authority in the Christian districts. He moved his headquarters to Sarba on the coastal road and urged the inhabitants to prepare themselves to pay their taxes on the basis of 7,000 purses.⁶¹ Agitation ensued in Kisrawan and in the northern regions, which had until then avoided paying taxes

at the new rate. Tensions rose in the town of Ghazir, where a relative of Karam was arrested following skirmishes with the Lebanese gendarmerie.⁶² Karam deemed it a good opportunity for a trial of strength with Daud. Once more he advanced with a few hundred armed men from the north to Kisrawan, ostensibly to present their rightful claims to Daud. Karam's rebellion had begun.

His men attacked the residence of the *mutasarraf* along the coast in Juniya and the Lebanese gendarmes posted in Ghazir from positions overlooking that village. They were repelled after two hours of fighting by the Lebanese forces with support from the villagers of Ghazir. At the same time Karam heard that Ottoman forces had entered the village of Zghorta in the north, and he hastily retreated to that region. Ghazir and all of Kisrawan submitted to the authority of Daud and agreed to pay their taxes at the new rate.⁶³

The battle of Ghazir sealed the fate of Karam's rebellion. He thereafter lost sway in the important central Maronite district of Kisrawan. Many documents exist on this key engagement that shed light on the importance of Karam's movement and its subsequent evolution. The town of Ghazir, where the seat of the district's *qaimaqam* was established, was divided into pro-Karam and anti-Karam factions. The upper quarter, inhabited by notables and their dependents, was predictably anti-Karam, while the lower quarter, inhabited by peasants, was pro-Karam.⁶⁴

Similar splits existed in many villages of the sector, a legacy of the 1858 rebellion and of old clientele and family solidarities. But, contrary to several reports, Karam did not succeed in rallying what was often referred to as the "democratic party" of former rebel peasants in that region, which seems to have disintegrated by that time. Some local inhabitants of the district did support him. Most, however, stood on the sidelines. They hoped that his show of strength would allow them to evade the payment of taxes, in the same way that disturbances two years earlier had compelled the *mutasarraf* to abandon his plans to construct a new road linking Juniya to Ghazir.⁶⁵ The swift defeat of Karam and his subsequent retreat drove them to surrender readily to Daud's demands and authority.

Karam's prestige in the northern regions, where he did not count only adherents, was also affected by the Ghazir battle. Here, as well, most of his sympathizers had supported his movement, hoping that they would be able to drive the *mutasarraf* to yield to their demands. The deployment of Ottoman forces into the north instead prompted them to realize that procrastination or compromise was no longer possible, and they chose to submit. Only a hard core of Karam's partisans followed him thereafter, in what turned into a sort of low-level contest with the Ottoman forces,

lasting some months. Though he did score one initial success and undertook some daring acts, Karam lost ground steadily in his own stronghold. He was compelled to wander for some months in the barren and desolate heights of the north with only a handful of his partisans.

More important, Karam's defeat in Ghazir prompted the Patriarch to abandon his former ambivalence and procrastination and to help in the efforts aiming to establish Daud's government in the Maronite districts. Indeed, Karam's rebellion in 1866 came as an embarrassment to the Patriarch, and it placed him in a harrowing dilemma. He shared Karam's opposition to the *mutasarrifiyya* regime and wished for its abrogation. He wanted to establish the rule of a Maronite governor over the whole Mountain and had consistently favored Karam as his candidate. However, he realized that an armed campaign could not succeed. Daud Pasha had posted Ottoman forces along the coast, which he seemed ready to deploy in the Mountain, in accordance with instructions from the Sublime Porte.⁶⁶ Mgr Mas'ad knew from past experience that the Maronites were not up to resisting such an eventuality and realized that, sooner or later, the Ottoman forces were bound to prevail, bringing about "the ruin of the mountains of Lebanon."⁶⁷ He firmly believed that only "through France's assistance and will" could the Maronites obtain the rule of a native governor, and, under the circumstances, he was well aware that France would not lend its support.⁶⁸ The Maronite prelate had been duly and "officially" informed, since Karam's return in Lebanon in 1864, that if the latter's presence provoked serious disturbances in Lebanon and caused an Ottoman military intervention, France would find it difficult to oppose such an occurrence.⁶⁹

Mgr Mas'ad therefore seemed mostly concerned, throughout the crisis generated by Karam's rebellion, to prevent an Ottoman occupation of the northern Maronite sectors of the Mountain. The fear of such an eventuality drove him to try to bring Karam to lay down his arms, but to no avail.⁷⁰ Instead, the Patriarch endeavored to contain as much as possible the negative effects of the rebellion. After Karam's early defeat at Ghazir and his retreat from Kisrawan, the Maronite prelate and some leading bishops hastily negotiated the peaceful submission of the region with Daud Pasha.⁷¹ Thereafter, as Karam pursued his rebellion in the *Jibba* sector, the Patriarch made sure that the inhabitants of the Kisrawan remained quiet, allegedly threatening to excommunicate those who thought of joining the northern rebel.⁷²

Mgr Mas'ad's apparent opposition to Karam's rebellion did not imply the Patriarch's indifference to the latter's cause. The Maronite prelate feared that a total rout of Karam's movement would further damage the standing and morale of the

Maronite community. He had also to take into consideration the fact that Karam enjoyed strong support among some leading bishops and within the ranks of the lower clergy, especially the monks of his native district.⁷³ He therefore relentlessly pursued his efforts to save him. At that stage, he seemed mostly interested in an honorable resolution to the whole issue.⁷⁴

Undismayed by the Patriarch's concerns, and by the virtual failure of his movement, Karam pursued his mostly innocuous raids against the Ottomans in the northern heights. On June 20, 1866, he addressed an appeal to the Lebanese of all communities, reiterating his usual recriminations against Daud Pasha pertaining to his repeated violations of the terms of the *Règlement* and common law and to his decision to double the tax rate. Daud Pasha, he asserted, was trying to subject the inhabitants of the country to his arbitrary will and to impose on them a state of slavery, already abolished in Sudan itself. Presenting himself as a symbol of the resistance to this state of affairs, Karam called on the inhabitants of Lebanon to help in the restoration of the rule of law. More important, he urged them to unite and to reject all forms of communal division, because "we [the Lebanese] constitute one same Lebanese people and we are brothers in this country since ancient times."⁷⁵

Karam's appeal did not have any local impact. It was translated into French and distributed in Paris before it reached Lebanon, and it is not clear to what extent it was publicized there.⁷⁶ It seems to have been addressed more to his supporters in France than to the Lebanese. It contrasted too much with his previous narrow communal views, which relied on his own exclusive clientele, and his image as a hero of the Christian cause to be credible. All along, he had neglected to seek wider popular support among the mountaineers or to rally them around a clear political program that would have sustained more solidly his movement. His image as a nationalist hero who led a popular movement to liberate Mount Lebanon from Ottoman rule does not therefore match reality.⁷⁷

Actually, Karam was pursuing more personal aims and interests. His real objectives appear to have been to undermine Daud Pasha's authority, force a French intervention, and secure the establishment of a native governor, an alternative that always implied, in Karam's mind, his own appointment. These aims were directly linked to developments in 1860–61, to the emergence of French and Maronite schemes aiming at the establishment of a Maronite principality during this period, and to the lingering faith of some local parties in its realization. Indeed, some French agents in the region, and many of their compatriots in France, who dreamed of establishing a Christian entity in the Levant under French aegis, had

then “adopted” Karam as their “local hero.” Their praise and support led him to identify with their views and aspirations and to view himself as the most appropriate governor of the Christian entity they sought to establish. His support for the establishment of a Christian Lebanon and his ambition to become governor of that entity arose conjointly. His candidacy, he came to believe, would best serve the interests of his community, those of France and those of all the Christians, that he identified in a common Franco-Maronite cause: “Despite his profound mediocrity, he believed himself to be a figure who had Europe’s rapt attention. . . . Yusuf Karam was sustained in his illusions by the ill-considered flattery that he received from time to time from people in France who had become infatuated with him without knowing him or had the wrong idea about France’s purpose in Lebanon,”⁷⁸ wrote the French ambassador in Istanbul.

Karam’s feeling of righteousness and his illusions about his own importance sustained his strong conviction and determination. He simply overlooked all developments that belied this belief. He could not admit that the French government was blind to this evidence and thought it was being deceived. In his view, all the French agents opposed to his aspirations and actions distorted and misrepresented the true reality to the French government, deviating from the genuine French stance.⁷⁹ He never realized fully that the French government was no longer interested in a native governor and still less in his own candidacy. His final revolt, he seemed to hope, would awaken the French government from its delusion and prompt it to be true to what he perceived were its genuine principles and interests.

Karam hence fell victim to his own illusions and to misconceptions of what the French official position was, or should be. His rebellion revealed once more the limits of the schemes of certain Maronites, including those of Mgr Murad and Father Azar, spanning the years 1840 to 1866 to manipulate the support and encouragement of some French circles in order to embroil the French government into effective assistance for their objectives. Their initiatives should be seen as part of an elusive political project that they shared with some French factions and with which they engaged in a “mirror game” in which it was never clear who was deceiving whom.

To yield the floor one last time to Bourrée, who had closely followed Lebanese affairs since 1840, and who, in 1866, was appointed French ambassador to Istanbul:

Over the last 25 years . . . there has always been one Maronite who more or less duped people in France. The first, in chronological order, was Mgr

Murad, Archbishop of Lattakia; he distributed pamphlets attacking ministries that ignored French influence in Syria and the four million souls [*sic*] that made up the Maronite nation. . . . His successor, Father Azar, who lived in Paris for longer periods . . . caused trouble for Mr. Guizot for years. . . . Yusuf Karam is doing today what Father Azar did then, and behind him are the same men who have dedicated themselves to the question of Lebanon. . . . They lend their complicity, their pens, the newspapers they own and, both deceived and deceivers, they attempt to create what is known as the Christian hero, just as Father Azar had been described as another Peter the Hermit.⁸⁰

In the end, Karam only accepted to surrender to the French, acceding to an offer of the French government to offer him hospitality in Algeria. He left Beirut for his second exile, on January 31, 1867, never to return to Lebanon.

At the same time, Karam's rebellion put an end to the ambitious policy initiated by the Maronite clergy since 1840, aiming at establishing a Maronite political hegemony in the Mountain with the help of France. His own ambitions led him to push this policy too far. As a result, his revolt, instead of helping in the establishment of a Maronite entity in Lebanon, drove the Patriarch and the Maronites to accept thereafter the new *mutasarriḡyya* regime. It forced Mgr Mas'ad to confront the implications of his previous opposition to this regime. Up until then he had dismissed the new political order and had endeavored instead to conciliate his support for Karam with the need to maintain the favor of his French allies, trying to bring the French to promote his protégé as a native governor for Lebanon. Karam's movement jeopardized his former scheme and brought him to realize that his own opposition to the new regime had misfired and antagonized the French. Therefore, pending more favorable international circumstances and a change in the French stance, he came to accept the new regime and the necessity of working within its institutions in order to safeguard his own interests and those of his community. Karam's rebellion constituted therefore the last of many attempts by some Maronite clerical circles to impose a Maronite hegemony through the rule of a Maronite governor on the Mountain.

MGR MAS'AD'S *VOLTE-FACE*

The resignation of the Patriarch to the incontrovertible reality of the *mutasarriḡyya* did not suddenly turn into a full-fledged endorsement of the regime. This change did not occur sharply, but developed gradually, following external events

and local developments. The failure of Karam's revolt and his second exile constituted important steps in this direction and helped the Patriarch realize that insubordination in the Maronite districts could only have "unfortunate consequences, and [cause] ruin as a result, irrespective of the underlying aim."⁸¹ Moreover, the banishment of his former protégé and the consequent deterioration of their relationship impaired his desire to pursue his fight for Karam or for any other native candidate.

However, Mgr Mas'ad's personal antipathy to Daud Pasha still stood in the way of a genuine reconciliation between the Maronite prelate and the new regime. Furthermore, he needed to clarify the French and Ottoman positions before settling on any new course. Taking advantage of an invitation by the Pope to attend the commemoration of the Centennial of Sts. Peter and Paul Day in Rome, he also decided to visit Paris and Istanbul and left the Mountain on May 10, 1867. For Mgr Mas'ad, who since his election in 1854 had never visited Beirut and had repeatedly excused himself with references to his great age and a knee ailment to avoid a journey through the Mountain to visit Daud Pasha in Bayt-al-Din,⁸² this was indeed a surprising and remarkable initiative, underscoring the importance of the talks he wished to hold in the French and Ottoman capitals. It was also the first trip of a Maronite Patriarch to Europe since 1215.⁸³ His meetings in Paris with the French emperor, Napoleon III; the minister of foreign affairs, the Marquis de Moustier; and the French ambassador to Istanbul, Prosper Bourrée, apparently cleared his doubts and eased his indecision.⁸⁴ As a result, when he reached Istanbul, he is reported to have asked for the replacement of Daud Pasha by Franco Pasha, a former aide to Fuad Pasha who had accompanied the Ottoman minister to Lebanon in 1860–61 and had established good personal relations with the Patriarch and some Maronite local notables.⁸⁵

Mgr Mas'ad's call for the replacement of Daud Pasha by another Christian Ottoman governor represented the first significant indication of his willingness to renounce his former support for a native governor and abide by the rules of the *mutasarrifiyya*. This inclination of the Patriarch was confirmed when Franco Pasha was appointed *mutasarrif* of Lebanon in 1868, after the resignation of Daud Pasha. The cordial relationship the new *mutasarrif* established with the Maronite clergy and his efforts to preserve its influence and satisfy its demands helped him to gain the favor of the Maronite prelate and constituted another important step toward Mgr Mas'ad's acceptance of the new regime.⁸⁶

Two other external events achieved the conversion of Mgr Mas'ad to the *mutasarrifiyya*. The French defeat in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and the fall of the

Second Empire seriously affected France's international influence and neutralized what the Patriarch himself saw as "[our] sole protector and our great support."⁸⁷ He could no longer rely on the patronage of France for an eventual amendment or alteration to the status of the Mountain. Indeed, French military defeat by Prussia in 1870 curtailed France's foreign influence for a while and led it to pursue a more subtle policy regarding the Lebanese question. This tendency was again reinforced after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which, in spite of a solemn European pledge to safeguard the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, intensified European competition to secure political and economic gains in Istanbul and territorial acquisitions at its fringes. France, wary of Britain's growing influence in the region, endeavored to stake a general claim over the eastern Mediterranean provinces.⁸⁸ Efforts to assert France's presence in the Syrian provinces as a whole put French interest in Lebanon in perspective, and Lebanon henceforward lost its privileged position as the sole fortress of French influence in the Levant. Even though the Mountain and the Maronite community continued to draw special French attention, it was now balanced against France's expanding economic and political interests in Syria and the rest of the Empire. Lebanon now became only one of the three pillars of France's policy in the region, its educational institutions in the whole of Syria, and its commercial interests and investments there—such as the port of Beirut and the Beirut–Damascus highway—and in the rest of the Empire growing in importance as time passed.⁸⁹

Within these general limits, France strove to uphold the Lebanese *Règlement* as one of its main political assets in the region. The maintenance of an Ottoman province in Syria governed by a Christian governor, in which France's protégés the Maronites held a preponderant position, agreed with its ambition to maintain a strong influence in the region. However, France did not seek to expand or enhance the status of the Mountain. Its conservative stand contributed greatly to a crystallization of the Lebanese constitution, which was amended only once again, in 1912, to correct some of its obvious deficiencies and cope with some aspects of change in the Mountain.

Moreover, a serious political crisis engulfed the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s, culminating with the demise of Sultan Abdul Aziz, the proclamation of a constitution in 1876, and the Ottoman–Russian War of 1877–78. Thereafter, Sultan Abdul Hamid II managed to stabilize the situation and carried on a policy aiming to consolidate the central government's grip over its provinces.

In view of all of these circumstances, the special regime enjoyed by Lebanon, in spite of all its flaws, emerged for the Patriarch as a precious instrument to

safeguard the specificity and relative autonomy of his community within the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the new regime, as revised in 1864, had gone some way in acknowledging the numerical superiority of the Maronites, granting them a relative preponderance within its institutions. Of the eighty-six officials employed in the central administration, forty-seven were Maronites, twelve Druzes, twelve Greek Orthodox, six Muslims, and six Greek Catholics. Similarly, in the seven provincial districts, where officials were generally selected from among the largest community, the Maronites held 75 out of 140 positions.⁹⁰ In the local militia, which constituted the largest contingent of government employees, the Maronite share, modest at first, increased progressively. Finally, in the Administrative Council, the Maronite share had been raised from two to four seats. Moreover, in elections to the central Administrative Council in the mixed districts, the prevalence of Maronite *shaykhs* gave them a decisive voice in the selection of Maronite and non-Maronite candidates. Hence, for example, according to a contemporary source, two Druze councilors—one elected in the Jizzin district and the other in the Matn—were elected by a majority of Maronite *shaykhs* and were “therefore as a rule Maronite candidates and invariably men of inferior capacity whom the Druzes would never have elected as their representative in the Administrative Council.”⁹¹ More often than not they sided with their Maronite peers inside the Council. “By adhering to this principle in all the cazas, the Maronites usually managed to secure eight members out of twelve of the Administrative Council on their side to the detriment of the interests of the minor sects in the general equilibrium.”⁹² Moreover, the vice president of the Administrative Council was, by tradition, a Maronite.

As the new regime became more acceptable to the Patriarch and clergy, they successfully undertook to take advantage of these relative privileges to assert their own influence and the preponderance of their community within the system. Up until the end of the century, the clergy reigned supreme in the northern Maronite districts, where they renewed their alliance with the old, albeit weakened, notable class. They also succeeded in maintaining strong leverage in the rest of the Mountain. The Church in effect controlled most Maronite appointments and elections in the administrative, judicial, and executive branches. Indeed, the *mutasarrif* generally consulted the clergy before making such appointments, especially regarding the *qaimaqams* of Kisrawan and Batrun, while Maronite candidates to the Administrative Council generally endeavored to secure the support of the Patriarchate, “failing which their chances of success were doubtful.”⁹³ At the same time, the candidates and officials approved by the Patriarch were sure to gain the favor and protection of the French consulate in Beirut.

Most governors of Mount Lebanon respected this rule, and when Rustum Pasha (1873–83), Wasa Pasha (1883–92), and Muzaffar Pasha (1902–07) tried to circumvent it they were invariably faced with incessant intrigues and resistance from the clergy and with the disavowal of the French consuls in Beirut, impeding their government and compromising their chances for reappointment at the end of their mandates. As a result, they either reversed their policy, trying to make amends with the clergy, as Muzaffar Pasha did when his first mandate neared its end, or were ultimately replaced by more conciliatory governors.⁹⁴ *Mutasarrifs* came and left, but the Church remained strongly entrenched in its leading position. The opposition of certain Maronite secular circles to the clergy's hegemony by the end of the nineteenth century would prove a more serious threat to its influence than these episodic attempts by some governors to curtail its authority.⁹⁵

Until the end of his life, in 1890, Mgr Mas'ad seemed to have remained satisfied with the situation, which gradually turned his timid acceptance of the *mutasarrifiyya* into a determined endorsement of the regime. He became a resolute defender of the new order and, apart from some occasional secondary complaints pertaining to an appointment or to an undue infraction by the governor, never again contested the *mutasarrifiyya* or even suggested any amendment. This conservative stance by the Patriarch satisfied the French government and accorded with its general policy aimed at safeguarding the prevailing system in the Mountain. It therefore labored to support the position of the Patriarchate and defend its interests and those of its community.

The alliance between the Patriarchate and the French government was hence renewed and consolidated on a new basis, reflecting the concordance of their interest in maintaining and upholding the status quo in the Mountain. Until the end of the *mutasarrifiyya*, the French never wavered in their support of the Maronite Patriarchate, which at one and the same time enhanced the position of the latter in the Mountain and secured French influence in this province. The convergent interests of both sides were clearly perceived by French representatives in Beirut and plainly stated by one of them as follows: "The Maronite nation makes up more than three fifths of the Lebanese population. We have an interest in seeing that it has a strong leader. If he were, the Consulate of France could, with his agreement, dictate its wishes to the governor of Lebanon."⁹⁶

However, Mgr Mas'ad's old age and character did not predispose him to follow the lead of successive French consuls in Beirut who strove in the 1880s and 1890s to bolster the French position in the Syrian provinces, in line with French policy aiming, after 1878, at consolidating France's presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mgr Mas'ad's excessive caution—and his “blind cowardice”⁹⁷—irritated successive French representatives who felt the need for a “strong clergy . . . as a lever, and an energetic Patriarch”⁹⁸ asserting his role as head of the Maronite community in order to pursue with some credibility their more assertive policy in opposition to the attempts of Rustum and Wasa Pashas to impose their independent and supreme authority.⁹⁹ All of their efforts to “elevate, willingly or unwillingly this disunited clergy and to hearten somehow the old Patriarch”¹⁰⁰ proved vain, however, not only with Mgr Mas'ad but also with his successor Mgr Hajj (1890–99), another old and cautious man “more prone to passive resistance than action.”¹⁰¹ Both Patriarchs shunned open resistance to Rustum and Wasa Pashas' encroachments on their power and infractions of the *Règlement*, preferring to wait for the end of the governors' terms and to rely then on France and the powers to prevent their reappointments.¹⁰² The French representatives in Beirut frequently deplored the passive and reserved position of the Patriarchate during the last decades of the nineteenth century, which affected their whole community and disconcerted it by their lack of leadership.

“Its leaderless, unsupported clergy is losing its influence, which no one has regained, and the members of the Maronite nation, still attached to the clergy that used to guide them, today lie scattered,” remarked, for example, Petiteville in 1889.¹⁰³ Indeed, the importance of the Church, with its human resources, its considerable wealth, and its ownership of approximately one-fifth of the land,¹⁰⁴ increased throughout the *mutasarrifiyya* period, rendering it the only institution capable of leading the Maronites. Apart from it “there were only very local influences; the most powerful families barely extending their action farther than their immediate neighborhood.”¹⁰⁵ Moreover, these notable families, little predisposed to business and trade, progressively lost their title to landed property to the benefit of the Church and a rising and enterprising middle class.¹⁰⁶

THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE MARONITE CLERGY

The reorientation of the policy of the Patriarchate and its reserved attitude was also contested from within the Church itself by some leading bishops like Mgr Butrus Bustani, bishop of the Shuf; Mgr Yusuf Dibs, who replaced Mgr Tubiyya 'Awn as bishop of Beirut after the latter's death in 1871; Mgr Freiffer, bishop of Latakia but resident in Lebanon, and some segments of the lower clergy. These clerics resented the Patriarch's acquiescence not only to local Ottoman authority

but also to France's policy and to the perceived efforts of the Vatican to curtail the independence of their Church in conformity with its efforts to draw the Oriental Catholic Churches under stricter supervision.¹⁰⁷ They were anxious lest the reserved and cautious attitude of the Patriarchate would weaken the standing of their community and lead to its subjection by these dominant forces. Their fears were compounded in the mid-1870s by the profound instability of the Ottoman Empire, which nearly brought it to the verge of collapse during the Turkish-Russian War of 1877–78, and which they felt called for a more active policy to avert any eventual danger that might threaten their community and prepare it to face all eventualities. Taking advantage of Mgr Mas'ad's old age and his cautious character, they all tried, in their own ways, to promote independent schemes and policies, compounding the already ambiguous stand of the Church and furthering its disunity.¹⁰⁸

"From a political standpoint, the Maronite episcopate can be said to consist not of parties but of groups, between which there are differences of character and inclinations rather than divergences of ideas," remarked the French consul in Beirut, failing to find any direction or substance to these divergences within the Church.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, the bishops and other Maronite clerics, dissatisfied with what they perceived as the weakening influence and standing of their community in the last decades of the century, did not present a united front, nor did they come up with some clear solution to this predicament embodied in a tangible political project. They mainly resorted to a diffused and disordered opposition, underscoring further the limits of their actions and policies. The disgruntled clerics did not openly contest the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime in the Mountain, nor did they feel that the Church could challenge the coalition of forces upholding it. They merely made use of petty tactics, to take advantage of the rifts in the tacit coalition of France, the Holy See, and the Ottoman governor and to thwart the attempts of Rustum and Wasa Pasha to curtail the privileged role secured by the Church in the Mountain.

In fact, their dissatisfaction with the rule of the *mutasarrifs* badly concealed their inherent aversion to, and rejection of, the new regime established in the Mountain and their hope for its alteration. As a result, the disaffected bishops anticipated and banked on more vague eventualities that would reverse the prevailing conjuncture. They seemed to be anticipating some regional or international upheaval that would shake the general status quo sustaining the *mutasarrifiyya* regime, and they strove in the meantime to defend the standing and independence of their community and prepare it for these expected changes. For many, the figure of

Karam, embodying a strong Maronite leader, still appeared as the only possible savior in such ominous times.

One result of their petty tactics was the exile of Mgr Butrus Bustani to Jerusalem in 1878 by Rustum Pasha, with the approval of the Apostolic Delegate, Mgr Piavi, and that of the French representatives in Beirut and Istanbul.¹¹⁰ Mgr Bustani had, in conjunction with Mgr Dibs and against the advice of the Patriarch, tried to take advantage of turmoil in Istanbul to orchestrate a campaign of petitions against Rustum Pasha to obtain his removal. He was also accused of preparing some disturbances in his bishopric in the Shuf.¹¹¹ The arrest and deportation of a Maronite dignitary further emphasized, however, the weakened standing of this community in the Mountain and revealed the limits of the policies followed by the clerical opposition. It helped moderate the recalcitrance of most clerics, contributing to the decline of the more activist current within the Church.

The evolution of the views of the bishop of Beirut, Mgr Yusuf Dibs, well illustrates the difficult adaptation of some Maronite circles to the new order in the Mountain. Born in the northern Maronite sectors in 1833, Dibs had been associated with Yusuf Karam since he was a young priest and had established a close and solid relationship with him. The Maronite leader personified in his eyes the ideal profile of a hero, with his profound religiosity, his courage and bravery, his fortitude and energy, and his deep concern for the fate of his community.¹¹² He regarded Karam as the ablest Maronite candidate for the governorship of the Mountain and had backed him in 1861, when the establishment of a Maronite entity had seemed imminent. Thereafter, during the first years of the *mutasarrifiyya* and until Karam's rebellion in 1866, he remained hopeful about the possibility of a reversal of fortunes favoring the Maronite leader and his own community.

Karam rebellion's failure and his second exile did not seem to have weakened Dibs's unconditional support for the defeated leader, who still symbolized in his eyes the hope of a strong Maronite political presence. For the next decade he labored continually to secure Karam's return to Lebanon. Indeed, Dibs was preoccupied by the deterioration of the situation in the Empire and by the fate of the Christians of the Orient, including that of the Maronites. A series of insurrections in the Balkans had reawakened recent fears and memories in the Syrian provinces. In these troubled circumstances, Dibs felt the need to plan for the protection of the Maronite community and provide it with a much-needed leadership. In his opinion, only Karam could accomplish these feats. He tried to make his point to the French consul in Beirut, stressing that "caught unprepared, lacking leaders, they

[the Maronites] would be, as in 1860, easy prey for the Druzes and the Muslims. Only one man could save Lebanon in its hour of peril, by rallying an imposing force around himself: the former *shaykh* of Ihdin.”¹¹³

In the many letters he wrote to Karam during this same period, Dibs continually emphasized the need for him to return. “Without a secular leader we cannot succeed; we don’t have among us any emir or *shaykh* with a modicum of power and influence,”¹¹⁴ he wrote him. Dibs’s pleas to Karam became more pressing as the general situation of the Empire steadily deteriorated in the mid-1870s. “We cannot accept your exile forever while danger is surrounding us,” he reproached him, adding some time later, on the occasion of the accession of Murad V and the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution: “We face two alternatives, either the sultan succeeds in efficiently governing the Empire and averts its downfall . . . , or the Empire collapses totally and is replaced by another government; in both cases, your presence in the Mountain and Beirut would be more appropriate and beneficial.”¹¹⁵

Mgr Dibs’s aspirations stumbled over many obstacles. The French, the *mutasarrif* of the Mountain, and many Lebanese, notably Mgr Mas‘ad himself, were not very keen to see the return of the turbulent Maronite leader. Arthur Tricou, French consul in Beirut in 1876, expressed his total opposition to such an idea, asserting that it would undoubtedly cause disturbances, and questioned the wisdom of averting dubious and vague eventualities by a “certain and present evil.”¹¹⁶ The Patriarch, since the appointment of Franco in 1867 and his subsequent accommodation to the *mutasarrifiyya*, had expressed reservations concerning the return of his old protégé. He feared that Karam’s impetuosity and independence might endanger the tenuous equilibrium established in the Mountain and recognized that the reappearance of the Maronite rebel, without the agreement of the French and the Ottomans, could only lead to a repetition of the events of 1866. At the same time, the Patriarch had become wary of Karam since the latter had criticized his lack of support during his rebellion. So, taking advantage of Karam’s relinquishing of French protection and his flight from Paris to Rome in 1868, he put an end to his previous patronage of the young leader. “Karam has permanently lost himself by his own initiative,” he then claimed.¹¹⁷

Karam’s continued attacks against the policy of Mgr Mas‘ad and the inertia of the clergy in the face of the perceived encroachments of the Ottoman governors, France, and the Holy See deepened the rift between the two men. The Patriarch’s policies, he wrote to Dibs and Bustani, “have caused, and will

cause, great damage, nay he has eliminated and abrogated all the rights of the Maronites.”¹¹⁸ Though his remarks struck a chord with Dibs and that part of the clergy that also favored a more active policy in defense of Maronite political and spiritual autonomy and influence, they could not follow Karam in his staunch and open opposition to Mgr Mas‘ad, France, Rome, and the Ottomans. Dibs tried to reason with Karam, reproving his radical stances, which had only earned him the disapproval of many clerical and secular Maronite circles and the disfavor of France and Rome. He also warned him against any adventurist schemes, cautioning him that his plan to invade Lebanon in 1876 to “save his country,”¹¹⁹ with the help of the Serbs and the Greeks, had little chance of success: “You know the inconstancy of the people of this country. . . . You should know that you have two states against you [the French and the Ottomans] and that you cannot fight them with the good-for-nothing [inhabitants] of Lebanon.”¹²⁰ Finally, he added, the preservation of good relations with France was necessary, because it was the only power genuinely dedicated to the defense of Maronite interests. It was also important “to show deference to the Sublime Porte and our government which is better for us than any other government. I think we would better adhere to it,”¹²¹ he concluded.

From then on, Dibs gradually distanced himself from Karam, and he relinquished his illusions about any possible alteration to the situation in the Mountain and the Syrian provinces. He aligned himself with the general position of the Patriarchate aiming at preserving the status quo in the Mountain. By 1892, he had come to recognize that the *Règlement* had “undoubtedly secured peace between the diverse populations of the Mountain and contained within just limits the power exerted by the Imperial government on them.”¹²²

Dibs’s accommodation to concrete realities transcended the narrow confines of the Mountain to include a larger acceptance of, and integration into, the general Ottoman political framework. This tendency gained ground within many secular and clerical Maronite circles by the end of the nineteenth century. It coincided with the consolidation of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime in the Mountain, with the general stabilization of the situation in the Empire, and with Abdul Hamid II’s policy of promoting traditional and parochial leaderships in the provinces. Many years later, Mgr Dibs would look back on the turbulent situation of the 1860s and 1870s and write that if some lesson had to be drawn from Karam’s revolt, it would be that ultimately it was a serious error to rebel against the established authority and the central Ottoman government.¹²³

THE CHURCH, FRANCE, AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Church had generally come to accept the *mutasarrifiyya* regime. It had moved away from its schemes that aimed at the establishment of a semi-independent Maronite government in the Mountain, under French aegis, toward a ready acceptance of the *mutasarrifiyya*. The Church sought then to advance and defend the interests of the Maronites through the system, eventually scoring many successes. Concurrently, its view of the *mutasarrifiyya* altered, and it became a staunch defender of its preservation. The memory of the various schemes aimed at establishing a semi-independent entity in Mount Lebanon faded, and other views and policies replaced it. These still focused on the destiny of the Maronite community and the best way to preserve its particularity and influence, and they still centered around Mount Lebanon, which had provided the traditional and congenial setting for such aspirations, but they had lost their former separatist bent, pointing to a more open attitude to their immediate environment and to the Ottoman Empire as a whole.

The *Règlement* suited the revised perspective and ambitions of the Church, providing an appropriate instrument to preserve the specificity of, and a certain degree of autonomy for, the Maronites while shielding them from a too close assimilation within the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the *mutasarrifiyya* regime reconciled the Maronite clergy to Ottoman authority, representing an acceptable and legitimate framework for their integration within the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the Church did not take advantage of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime to pursue its schemes of the mid-century to establish a virtually autonomous Maronite entity in the Mountain. It opted instead for a milder and conservative Ottomanism, allowing for a reasonably satisfactory degree of communal autonomy within an Ottoman framework. In this context, Mount Lebanon and the *Règlement* emerged as adequate bases to secure this latter aim, not stepping stones to attain a higher degree of autonomy and, ultimately, political self-determination.

A memorandum presented in 1897 by the incumbent Patriarch, Mgr Hajj, to the French consul in Beirut well reflected the clergy's new perspective on the system focusing on the need to maintain it while strengthening Maronite influence.¹²⁴ "Although the changes made in the most recent *Règlement*, in 1864, deprived them of many of their rights, the Maronites tolerated them, because the spirit and overall purpose of the *Règlement* remained favorable to the preponderance of their influence and interests, especially with respect to functions in the government and

general leadership of Lebanon,”¹²⁵ underlined Mgr Hajj. The first two *mutasarrifs*, he added, had respected “the spirit of this *Règlement*” by acknowledging the preponderance of the Maronites and allowing them a prevalent influence. Thereafter, the governors had tended to favor the other minority communities in the Mountain and to rely more upon them in the management of the administration, a situation that “struck a blow to the honor and the rights of the Maronites and left them in a humiliating and pitiful state.” The allusion here was to some officials who had gained a leading influence with the last two *mutasarrifs*, Rustum Pasha (1873–83) and Naum Pasha (1892–1902), notably two Greek Orthodox secretaries, Nassif Bey Rayyis and Iskandar Twaini. Maronite influence, Mgr Hajj then emphasized, was on the wane not only qualitatively, but quantitatively also. Thus, for example, in the militia, the Maronites did not form a majority, despite an article in the *Règlement* governing the ratio of gendarmes to religious communities. Worse still, he went on, governors had altered some stipulations in the *Règlement*, in order to favor other minority communities. Hence, Rustum had divided the High Court of Appeal into a civil and criminal branch in order to grant the presidency of the latter to a Druze. Wasa Pasha had modified the composition and organization of the provincial courts in a manner prejudicial to the Maronites by enlarging them to include one judge from the dominant community of the district and two assessors from the two communities next in importance. In the Maronite sectors, the minority communities were hence given a say in trials mainly involving Maronites, to the displeasure of the Patriarch. Finally, Mgr Hajj complained that the successive governors had introduced many additional illegal taxes that the Lebanese were unable to pay. As a result, the Maronite prelate emphatically demanded redress of all the wrongs inflicted on his community: “Thus, the Maronite nation, which *paid for this Règlement with the blood of its children* (my italics), looking with displeasure upon these changes, which impinge on its rights and tarnish its honor, is very unhappy with the humiliating state in which it currently finds itself.”¹²⁶ He then listed all the minor modifications he wanted to see introduced in the next *Règlement*, inserting unexpectedly at the top of his list the appointment of a Maronite governor, “in conformity with the other *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire which are administered by governors of the same race and the same religion as the majority.” However, even though Mgr Hajj reiterated the traditional Maronite claim to governorship, based on alleged historical antecedents and on the Maronite majority in the Mountain, he hinted to the French consul as he submitted his memorandum that he had little hope regarding this request, which he seemed to have added as a matter of principle and in order to raise the stakes, asking for more in order to obtain less.

Compared to Mgr Mas'ad's memorandum of December 1863,¹²⁷ Mgr Hajj's remarks contained many similarities and some substantial differences. The sharp contrast in the assessment of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime by the two prelates underscored the distance covered by the clergy in the intervening three decades. Whereas Mgr Mas'ad had systematically disparaged the regime and insistently asked for its abrogation and the establishment of a Maronite government in the Mountain, Mgr Hajj's perception of the administration was much more qualified. Though the latter complained of restrictions to the alleged right of the Maronites to self-rule, he conceded that there had nevertheless been an acknowledgment of their preponderance in the Mountain. He even went as far as claiming that the Maronites had fought for and paid a heavy price to obtain this regime. Mgr Hajj's aim therefore was not an abrogation of the *mutasarrifiyya* but the consolidation of the position of the Maronite community within the system.

Indeed, like Mgr Mas'ad, Mgr Hajj's main focus was his own community, not the merits and potential of the political regime. Having recognized by then that the *mutasarrifiyya* had secured a fair degree of autonomy for the Maronites, in contrast with the tightening grip of the Ottoman government over neighboring provinces, he had not only accepted it but came to assume that its spirit and aim was the welfare of his community and the guarantee of its spiritual and sociopolitical autonomy. His main claims centered on an increased clout for the Maronites, not on a consolidation of the autonomous status of the Mountain as such. His objection to the new judicial organization introduced by Rustum and Wasa Pashas, for instance, did not consider whether it had improved the general dispensation of justice, as indeed it had according to the consuls on the spot, but only underscored the fact that it had curtailed the ability of the Maronites to be tried by a Maronite magistrate. Similarly, his protest against the growing authority of the governors did not pertain to its abusive character as such, but rather to the fact that they had tended of late to favor the other communities of the Mountain at the expense of the Maronites. From his complaints and demands on this point, it appears that Mgr Hajj had no objections to the governor using his absolute powers to maintain a certain Maronite edge in the Mountain while at the same time avoiding any undue interference in the internal affairs of that community. Finally, the total absence of any mention of the issue of frontiers and of any claim for the enlargement of the territory of the *mutasarrifiyya* underscored Mgr Hajj's reconciliation with the existing territorial boundaries of the Mountain and his indifference to the financial difficulties it was then facing. In this respect, the Church further proved its insensitivity by ignoring the necessity of a reassessment of the taxation system in

the Mountain to finance development projects and improve the performance of the administration, despite obvious benefits to the general welfare. The Church continually refused any reevaluation of the taxation base in the Mountain by means of a new land-survey, which would have included the vast properties of the Church as well as lands reclaimed to agriculture since the last cadastre of 1864, while maintaining the same rate of taxation for the rest of the inhabitants of the Mountain.¹²⁸ It preferred to hold the Porte to its obligation to make good any deficit in the budget of the Mountain in accordance with the terms of *Règlement* and refused to shoulder any responsibility in this domain, even though its stand was harming the inhabitants of the Mountain and impairing its administration.¹²⁹

The Church went to great lengths to get the local and central Ottoman government to countenance its desiderata and, by the end of the nineteenth century, even worked to establish direct links with the Imperial Ottoman Palace. Taking advantage of the elevation of two Maronite brothers, Salim and Nagib Malhamé, to high positions in Istanbul,¹³⁰ and of their close relations with the Sultan, the Church often resorted to their services to present and uphold its point of view. The latter readily obliged, and the Maronite Church, which had always prided itself on its recourse to French intervention in its relations with the Porte, came to appreciate the benefits of direct links with the Palace. As a result its former aversion to acknowledgment of the legitimate authority of the Ottoman government over the Mountain gradually smoothed away.

The conservative policy of Abdul Hamid II's government also facilitated this tendency. Moving away from the more secular and integrationist attempt of the *Tanzimat* period, which aimed to promote a concept of Ottoman citizenship and nationality based on a centralized state and the gradual integration of the diverse Ottoman communities into one Ottoman nation whose members enjoyed the same civic and political rights, Abdul Hamid II had tended to emphasize a more traditional notion of Ottomanism, based on personal loyalty to the Sultan as head of an Ottoman Muslim state composed of loosely knit ethnic, communal, and parochial elements. This latter view of Ottomanism was more congenial to the Church, in spite of its emphasis on the Muslim character of the Empire, because it allowed greater communal autonomy to Christian religious minorities under the overarching and protective sovereignty of the Sultan. It did not command narrow allegiance to an Ottoman nation of equally integrated citizens, but milder loyalty to a state and sovereign reigning over the loosely associated multifarious ethnic and religious elements of the Empire. In this sense, it may be said that the Church became, in its own peculiar way, Ottomanist by the end the nineteenth century, a position that did

not contradict its narrower Maronite feeling of identity and solidarity but complemented it. The accommodation of the Church to Ottoman rule is illustrated by a comment by Mgr Elias Hoyek (1899–1931), successor of Mgr Hajj, who undertook to visit Istanbul in 1905 where, thanks to the influence of the Malhamé brothers, he was warmly received by the Sultan: “Let them say whatever they want about Abdul Hamid. He has elevated two [members] of my community and has shown a particular affection to me; for all his faults and qualities, we see naught but his qualities.”¹³¹ Leading politicians in the Mountain, and even the governors, also had recourse to the patronage of the Malhamés and to that of Izzet Pasha, the secretary of Abdul Hamid II, in attempts to advance their interests. As a result, the Imperial Palace frequently came to intervene in Lebanese affairs, much to the alarm of the French and British consuls in Beirut. The latter expressed concerns that such interference was “undermining the semi-independence enjoyed by the Lebanon under the Organic Law,”¹³² while his French peer expressed fears that the recent influence of the Sublime Porte and the Imperial Palace on the Maronites was subverting France’s hitherto supreme and unmatched authority among them.¹³³

The rapprochement between the Maronites and the Ottoman central authorities did not, however, significantly alter the close relationship between the Patriarchate and the French. The former, more cognizant of its Ottoman environment, had sought to diversify its sources of support and to promote its interests in Istanbul by relying on the assistance that its connection with the Malhamés and Izzet Pasha had initiated. The Sublime Porte, eager to encourage this tendency in order to enhance its control over the Maronite community and the Mountain, had responded positively to these overtures.¹³⁴ As a result the Maronite clergy had tended, under Mgrs Mas‘ad and Hajj, to emancipate itself slightly from the exclusive patronage of the French and to show more deference to local and central Ottoman authorities. However, the Maronite clergy remained strongly attached to its historic association with the French government, which had traditionally provided it with a powerful external support in its relationship with the Sublime Porte, even though the benefits of such a patronage had become less salient. Moreover, its historic links with France and Rome had become essential elements in its self-identification and its own view of its historical formation and specificity, distinguishing it from the other inhabitants of the Empire. The clergy consequently tried to allay the apprehensions of the French regarding their developing independence, reiterating their immutable attachment to France, “which our nation and especially its clergy regard as a second homeland. . . . Like our forebears, we value more than life itself

those sacred traditions which presided over our establishment as a nation and the consecration of our religious autonomy,”¹³⁵ asserted, for example, the influential vicar of Mgr Hajj, Bishop Joseph Najm. For their part, the French consuls in Beirut recognized that France should not discontinue its support of, and alliance with, the Maronite Church, which “from a political point of view, was a main medium of influence over the population.” Indeed, “the bishops will remain for a long time the real chiefs of the oriental communities, and as long as this persists, we should treat them with consideration to preserve our influence over the populations.”¹³⁶

In sum, it may be said that the reserved style and leadership of Mgr Mas‘ad and Mgr Hajj, lacking apparent direction and substance, nevertheless left lasting, although indefinite, marks. Their legacy can be identified in the increased influence of the Church within its own community and an alternation between an association with, and passive compliance to, the central political authorities in the Mountain and in Istanbul, complemented by a strong relationship with France and Rome. More generally, the two prelates presided, by the end of the 1860s, over a shift in emphasis on policy away from previous activity promoting a virtually independent Maronite entity in favor of a more communal project aiming at safeguarding the specificity and autonomy of the Maronites within the confines of the Ottoman Empire. This revised aim lost its former separatist bent and content in favor of a more conventional objective, namely the preservation of the particularity of a religious minority within the framework of a multiethnic and multireligious empire.

Indeed, the role that these two Patriarchs envisaged for their community in the main matched that of other religious minorities within the Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. The reform of the Millet system in the 1856, which had associated the civil leadership with the internal administration of the religious minorities, had tended to formalize a limited, but real, separate sociopolitical organization of the non-Muslim communities and to consolidate a sense of a distinct identity and solidarity among each of them, with secular and political undertones.¹³⁷ The vagaries of the reform process in the Ottoman Empire, as well as its faltering fortunes, further favored this tendency.

For the Maronites, a similar redefinition and consolidation of the nature and content of communalism did take place. The awakening of a new secular and political communal sense of belonging among the Maronites was favored by the preponderant influence of the Church, its political clout, and its supervision of the educational system and social sphere, which allowed it to inculcate the Church’s

basic values and worldview to its flock. It was equally supported by the nature of the Lebanese regime that allocated offices in the administration on a communal basis, helping in the crystallization of a Maronite political interest.

With time, the Maronites came to identify with this feeling of communal belonging, which matched their new sociopolitical conditions. The substance of this secular and political Maronite communal feeling varied greatly, reflecting the various views and interests of its adherents. Nevertheless, a basic identification with a loosely defined political sense of communal belonging and solidarity developed throughout the nineteenth century among the Maronites. Therefore, if the Patriarchate did not succeed in its separatist schemes, aiming at turning the community into a “nation” and securing for it a distinct political entity, it did prove ultimately more successful in its efforts to convert the Maronites into a political community conscious of its separate identity and its specific corporate interests.

At the same time, Mgrs Mas‘ad and Hajj sustained and remained devoted to special and strong relations with France and Rome that further emphasized and supported Maronite specificity and relative autonomy. Similarly, as they realized that the *mutasarrifiyya* fairly secured the autonomy of their community, they accommodated themselves to the regime and endeavored to manipulate it to their own advantage and that of their community. They turned into staunch defender of the *Règlement*, and for Patriarch Hajj, this regime epitomized the success of a long and historical struggle by his community to secure its spiritual and political autonomy.

The Lebanist ideal of the two Patriarchs thus remained predicated upon, and closely linked to, a basic Maronite sense of belonging and allegiance more indicative of a communal project with strong political undertones than a nationalist project. Their policies centered on their community and the improvement of its position within the system, not on a progressive consolidation of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime and the development of its administration leading to the achievement of self-determination in Mount Lebanon. Their conservative policies, focusing on a scrupulous preservation of the status quo that obtained in the Mountain at the end of the century, curtailed the Church’s leading role as a motor of change and an agent of new and inspiring views and aspirations and prepared the ground for the opposition of an alienated secular elite during the first years of their successor to the Patriarchate, Mgr Hoyek, elected in 1899.

CHAPTER FIVE • The *Mutasarrifiyya* Framework *An Equivocal Legacy*^a

With the accommodation of the Church to the *mutasarrifiyya* regime, the Lebanist ideal slowly subsided, witnessing a long hiatus. Lebanist aspirations and activity surfaced again only at the beginning of the twentieth century when a new secular elite elaborated various projects to reform political and socioeconomic conditions in the Mountain. Several factors then favored the emergence of Lebanist inclinations among members of the secular elite, notably a situation of crisis within the Mountain, a notable movement of change that affected the mountaineers, and the influence of reformist and fledging nationalist movements in the neighboring Syrian provinces and among emigrant communities abroad.

The Lebanist ideal of the secular elite differed from the one elaborated by the Church by the middle of the previous century. It matched the contrasting views and aspirations of the various groups and personalities that began to advocate it and also bore the mark of the multifarious changes and influences that affected meanwhile the population of the Mountain. Indeed, throughout *mutasarrifiyya* period local inhabitants were exposed to conflicting influences. While this regime provided them with a certain degree of autonomy, which relatively shielded them from the political life in the rest of the Empire, several economic, social, and cultural factors contributed at the same time to open up the Mountain to its immediate environment and the external world as never before, greatly mitigating the effects of their autonomy. The political and intellectual evolution of the Lebanese was shaped by these conflicting factors, which pulled in different directions.

This chapter examines the political, social and intellectual factors and influences that contributed to the reemergence of Lebanism at the beginning of the twentieth century; the next one focuses on the impact of these contrasting elements on the Lebanist ideal of the secular elite.

THE *MUTASARRIFIYYA* FRAMEWORK

The *mutasarrifiyya* regime inaugurated an era of change, political stability, and relative prosperity in Mount Lebanon. It replaced the previous de facto and customary parochial authority its inhabitants had always known with a regular administration, containing some of the most abhorrent aspects of the old order, especially the continual feuds between shifting coalitions of notable families and their arbitrary extortions of the population. The social and political scene of the Mountain was deeply altered as a consequence. Rival coalitions of the old notability, allied with elements of the new bureaucracy and a rising middle class, began to vie for power and influence within institutions rather than on the battlefield. The new regime set new rules that all learned to respect or, at the very least, to manipulate to their own advantage.

Meanwhile, the rest of the inhabitants of the Mountain also adapted to the new regime. While it is difficult to ascertain exactly their views and aspirations, it seems fair to assume that the *mutasarrifiyya* gradually emerged, for most of them, as a satisfactory framework in which to operate. They no doubt came to appreciate their semi-autonomous status and the many advantages that went with it, namely, lower rates of taxation than neighboring provinces, exemption from military conscription, and a locally manned, and relatively efficient, administration that “contrasted most favorably with the surrounding districts.”¹ Economic expansion, which marked the first decades following the implementation of the new regime, must have equally reinforced their dedication to their special regime. The new political system also secured a certain internal stability and protection from developments in the rest of the Empire to which the mountaineers must have been especially sensitive in view of the precarious and volatile condition of the Empire during the troubled decades of the 1860s and 1870s.

The satisfaction of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon with their special administration manifested itself in the unusually tranquil and apparently uneventful political life of this province throughout the rest of nineteenth century. Contestation, in all its forms, whether political, socioeconomic, or communal, steadily dissipated, or at the very least was reduced to symbolic expressions of discontent

with specific and generally secondary issues. The uncommon tranquility of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon can be attributed partly to the merits of the new system and partly to the eagerness of the local notables and the Maronite Church to preserve a prevailing status quo that fairly safeguarded their own interests and that secured, for some decades, the apparent submission and acquiescence of the population.

The political stability brought about by the new regime favored general demographic and economic expansion. The population of Mount Lebanon grew considerably during this period. Agricultural production developed markedly. All the lands that could be exploited were cleared for cultivation, which was mostly geared toward the production of raw silk, the main cash crop and industry of the Mountain.² The latter provided its inhabitants with a steady external source of income, sustaining a relative prosperity that only began to show signs of serious strain by the end of the nineteenth century.³ The slowdown in economic growth in Mount Lebanon favored a vast and unprecedented movement of emigration that offered a temporary expedient to internal economic problems and ensured, for a while, the removal of potentially troublesome elements from the Mountain.

Significant and widespread changes began to be felt in the Mountain during the last decades of the nineteenth century and manifested themselves in all aspects of life. Communications and movements within the Mountain, and among it, neighboring provinces, and the outside world, were transformed. New carriage roads linked most villages, and the main Beirut–Damascus railway ran across its territory, while steamships provided regular and reliable transport for people and goods. Telegraph lines were installed in the 1870s, allowing prompt internal connections and access to the outside world. Newspapers began to circulate, supplying the population with a varied set of local and international political, social, and intellectual news. Education made rapid and remarkable progress, accounting for a very high rate of literacy in the Mountain, which reached 50 percent, as compared to 25 percent in the rest of the Syrian provinces.⁴ Literacy altered the intellectual outlook of the mountaineers and opened up new employment opportunities for the local inhabitants. At the same time, increased trade multiplied points of contact with the external world. Emigration and more frequent travel also exposed many individuals to new ventures and experiences and supplemented their exposure to new ideas and ways of life.

The socioeconomic structure of the Mountain was affected by these changes. Though the majority of the population continued to live off their land, the social fabric lost some of its rigidity. It was no longer divided into two main blocs

comprised of a hierarchical landed notability on the one hand and a landless or small-landowning peasantry on the other. The changing fortunes of these two classes favored the gradual acquisition by small peasants and traders of the properties of an impoverished notability. Many new professions and enterprises came into existence and provided a whole range of activity to a rising middle class. A new class of merchants, middlemen, lawyers, bankers, journalists, doctors, engineers, contractors, government officials, and bureaucrats gave evidence of the magnitude of change and embodied the new intellectual and material factors that had contributed to their formation.

Yet, for all its apparent magnitude, change did not dramatically alter the general political configuration, and certain ideas and mentalities survived with remarkable tenacity. Hence, along with the changes already mentioned, many continuities were still discernible. Significant features of the old political organization persisted. The traditional notable class outlived the political reorganization and adapted well to the *mutassarifiyya* order, in spite of the fact that the *Règlement* formally abolished the former fiscal and judicial prerogatives on which their authority had rested. Indeed, the first governor of the Mountain, Daud Pasha, had chosen, when he was establishing his administration, to entrust the main provincial positions to members of the old notability because he felt he could rely on their administrative experience while ingratiating himself with them.⁵ The latter welcomed this opportunity, which enabled them to retain a certain official authority and influence and to safeguard their own interests.

The successive governors of the Mountain had generally kept to this rule.⁶ At the same time, the Church, reconciled to the *mutassarifiyya* regime, allied itself with the notability and supported their dominion. As a result, roughly the same traditional notable families continued to prevail throughout much of the *mutassarifiyya* period, although their powers and influence were much diminished and significantly altered. In some sectors, especially the Kisrawan and the Matn, a new emerging middle class and bureaucratic class began to challenge the authority of the traditional notability. This movement, which gained in importance during the last decades of the *mutassarifiyya*, did not, however, develop into an organized and articulate effort.⁷ By and large, the middle class did not seem to exert much effective influence in the political process in the Mountain. Its role was greatly reduced by the establishment of a vast majority of its members outside the confines of the Mountain—in Beirut, Egypt, or farther away. As such, this class did not attempt to change the political system or replace the traditional notables. Rather, some new figures from the emerging commercial, professional, and bureaucratic

classes managed to join the ranks of the existing political elite. The political sphere remained the preserve of one same elite that competed for the limited positions the administration could offer, securing political influence and a basis for patronage networks.

Sociopolitical relations and allegiances altered very slowly. Kinship relationships and loyalties still stood at the core of widening circles of association and political allegiance, including the village, the region, and the community. The rural character of Mountain society, where no notable urbanization, industrialization, or other major socioeconomic disruption occurred, favored the lingering endurance of these parochial ties and loyalties among the majority of the local population, scattered in a multitude of villages of a few hundred to a thousand persons each. The continuing predominance of the conservative elite also maintained and strengthened parochial and communal structures and allegiances. As a result, under the thin cover of a unified local scene, local particularisms and kinship allegiances or rivalries continued to prevail in the fragmented society of Mount Lebanon. Their persistence was noticeable in the divisions of the local inhabitants along these multifarious lines throughout the *mutasarriḡiyya* period.

Superimposed on these basic bonds and allegiances, a communal feeling of identity and loyalty gained in importance and acquired a new secular and political significance as time went by. Under the old order, as mentioned earlier, communal allegiances and identities complemented and sustained the basic kinship networks and local groupings but did not entail political commitments. Political allegiances and networks had cut across the main communities of the Mountain, encompassing basic kinship and parochial socioeconomic associations grouped around a local chief and landlord. During the first half of the nineteenth century several internal and external political and economic factors contributed to disrupt the former sociopolitical organization of the Mountain and the legitimizing principles and views that sustained it. Among these, the political emergence of the Maronite clergy and its attempt to take advantage of internal and regional disruptions to mobilize its community and impose Maronite dominance in the Mountain played a significant role. At the same time, the violent contests of the 1840–60 period contributed to the crystallization and the exacerbation of communal feelings of identity among the inhabitants of the Mountain, and more particularly within the Maronite community. But the sociopolitical and ideological structures needed to sustain and legitimize this feeling and develop it into a prominent political allegiance still had to be established. As a result, the Maronite community failed to act as a unified and conscious community defending its rights in the critical years that followed

the collapse of the Shihabi Emirate and performed as a disarticulated body loosely patched together by circumstance and not very deeply committed to, or aware of, a still-vague Maronite communal cause.

The *mutasarrifiyya* proved a congenial framework for the development of religious communities as political communities. Institutionally, it identified the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon as belonging to six distinct religious communities whose political rights as such were guaranteed. This basic categorization of the population along communal lines favored a corresponding political identification of its members. It provided the different religious communities of the Mountain with a political framework within which to operate and thus favored the politicization of communal solidarities and feelings. The implacable contest between the Maronites and the Druzes for supreme power was contained by the new regime, and the communities of the Mountain accommodated to a more subtle contest for political influence within recognized institutions.

For the Druzes, the transition from the status of a ruling caste to that of a minority political community was eased by the moral defeat they suffered in 1860. Their role in these fateful events had incurred general opprobrium, and they had to pay a heavy price for it. Many of their notables were exiled for a few years while some petty chiefs and commoners preferred to emigrate of their own free will to the Hawran. This movement of emigration of the Druzes from the Mountain continued throughout the *mutasarrifiyya* period, and their importance in some districts dwindled noticeably. In the Jizzin sector, for example, where in 1860 they owned most of the lands, they lost almost all of their landholdings by the beginning of the twentieth century.⁸ In their own stronghold in the Shuf, they managed to retain a certain preponderance, although they were eventually slightly outnumbered by the Christians. To offset this relative weakness, they rallied closely around their traditional notable families, especially the Arslans and the Jumblatts.

However, for certain reasons, it was among the Maronites that the crystallization of communal solidarities and allegiances gained most prominence. The prevailing influence of the Church, politically and socially, provided a pole that gave unity and coherence to the still-fragmented Maronite community. The Maronite Patriarchate's role as the leading representative of its community and the defender of its political rights was consolidated under the *mutasarrifiyya* regime. Allied with the traditional Maronite leadership, and benefiting from the support of local French representatives, it practically managed the spiritual and political affairs of its flock. It controlled most Maronite elections and appointments for positions in the local administration and continually strove to increase its own influence and that of the

Maronites within the Mountain. The social and intellectual clout of the Church completed its ascendancy over its flock. Its role as guardian of the identity and particularism of the Maronite community took a renewed importance with the expansion of education. Its views on the history and identity of the community could now be inculcated to a wider, more receptive audience.

Other factors also contributed simultaneously to the enhancement of a feeling of communal identity among the Maronites. The political system, which allocated power political and administrative functions according to denominational affiliations, further linked their interests. Better education and easier internal contacts also helped to give a more tangible reality to the community and to shape a concordant sense of belonging and political allegiance. Finally, the opening up of the Maronite community to its own immediate environment and to much wider horizons favored a deepening of this process of self-awareness and identification. Regular and open intercourse with the “Other” prompted and enhanced the awareness of “Us” and helped in the crystallization for many Maronites of a communal sense of identity. It alternatively led some Maronites to foresee and adopt wider political identities or to combine their political allegiance to the community with other allegiances.

This represented one of the many paradoxes of the *mutasarrifiyya* period. While this regime finally formally consecrated the relative autonomy of the inhabitants of the Mountain within the Ottoman Empire, political, social, economic, and cultural factors concurred to open up this region to the outside world as never before and to undermine the practical import of its relative autonomy. Its political, socio-economic, and intellectual history was therefore shaped and determined by the interaction of these conflicting forces, which often pulled in opposite directions. The political evolution of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon was affected by this multifarious combination of influences that accounted for the development of diverse and often conflicting inclinations.

Indeed, the *mutasarrifiyya* contributed to the formation of a separate Lebanese political sphere while it also favored the crystallization of a wider regional feelings of identity among the mountaineers. It served as an appropriate framework for the reconciliation of the Lebanese elite and population with Ottoman rule and their further integration in the Ottoman Empire. Their accommodation with the established political order in the Mountain also came gradually to encompass a more general sense of belonging, and allegiance, to the Ottoman Empire as a whole. With the establishment of peace and security, improvement in the means of communications and direct and continual interaction with neighboring or distant lands,

the mountaineers became more aware of their larger environment. The governorship of a Christian Ottoman high official, as well as regular local ceremonies, such as those marking the birthday of the Sultan or the public reading of the imperial *firman* of investiture of the governor, also periodically reminded the Lebanese of the tangible reality of Ottoman sovereignty.

Ottomanism, to the extent that it commanded a loyalty to the Ottoman state that did not contradict other local solidarities, hence gained currency in the Mountain. The more conservative Ottomanism promoted by Abdul Hamid II's regime, which mostly emphasized the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Empire to state and Sultan and overlooked the close integration of the multiple ethnic and religious groups into a uniform and unified Ottoman nation, allowed for such more or less harmonious combinations of overlapping and complex identities and allegiances. Many mountaineers came to flaunt their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan and state. Some even established direct contacts with high officials in Istanbul to gain patronage, directly involving the Imperial Palace in Lebanese affairs.⁹

Ottomanism therefore became one of the facets of the multifarious identity of the mountaineers, often combining and overlapping with their local and communal identities and allegiances, and with other wider generic identifications, among which Syrianism predominated. These complex identities and allegiances followed and reflected their composite social and political environment. Hence, to a socio-political sphere beginning with the family and the village and then widening to encompass the community, the Mountain with its particular administration, the neighboring Syrian provinces, and the Ottoman Empire as a whole, there corresponded widening circles of identities and allegiances, combined in differing proportions and matching these diverse structures and spheres.

At the same time, after the events of 1860, many mountaineers began to move to Beirut.¹⁰ There, they were exposed to a different political setting and to new perspectives and ideas. Some became involved in the wider politics of the Empire, adopting the reformist and liberal ideas and principles of the *Tanzimat* period that they attempted to accommodate to their own sphere. In the process, they adopted and promoted reformist ideas and new and wider feelings of identity and allegiances, among which Ottomanism and Syrianism prevailed.

A first generation of reformers hailing from the Mountain immersed themselves totally in the new ideas, movements, or even religions and turned their backs on their pasts.¹¹ They did not meddle in, nor did they then directly affect, the political life of the Mountain. They preferred to expound wider ideals, transcending their community and the Mountain. These concepts, derived from the philosophy of the

Enlightenment, were mainly articulated around reason, science, civic and political rights, secularism, patriotism and national solidarity, and the necessity of fighting despotism and intolerance. Imbued with a positive faith in progress, the first reformers believed that their liberal and secular ideas would ultimately, progressively, and peacefully change their whole environment, including the Mountain. They were building a better future, which they hoped would soon dawn, and had no intention of giving offense or forcibly reversing communal solidarities and allegiances, which they saw as remnants of the past that would inevitably be wiped away by the “spirit of the time.” Although their confident optimism turned out to be unwarranted, in some ways they were right. They did lay the ground for future generations of Lebanese and Syrians who drew much inspiration from their views and writings. However, the diffusion of their ideas and their impact was to be much slower and elusive than they had anticipated.

In the 1880s, many figures from this first generation of reformers left Syria, driven away by the repressive policy of the regime of Abdul Hamid II. They took along their reformist ideals with them, and they continued to promote, in their adopted lands—especially Egypt, where they established many newspapers¹²—political and social change in their native lands. Thereafter, Beirut lost its leading position as the center of the intellectual revival and the movement for political reform in the region, to the benefit of Cairo or some European capitals. But it nevertheless remained an important cultural, intellectual, economic, and commercial center for its immediate environment.

At about the same time, a flow of emigration out of Mount Lebanon began. The majority of those who left the Mountain at the time were not political emigrants, nor did they belong to the well-off, literate elite.¹³ They included mostly peasants and members of the middle and lower classes, driven away by recession and the lack of working opportunities. The educated middle class left for Egypt, which became after the British occupation “the new Eldorado for functionaries and speculators,”¹⁴ while the bulk of emigrants of modest means proceeded to more distant lands, mainly to North and South America. The emigrants forced to leave the Mountain were exposed to other cultures and ways of life, which altered their former ways of thinking. They compared the societies and polities of their new lands with those of their land of origin and perceived the need to change and reform the latter. At the same time, in their new lands, this second generation of Lebanese emigrants came across and interacted with previous emigrant communities hailing from the Mountain, but also from other Syrian provinces. They were influenced by their liberal reformist ideals and assimilated many of the

views that they aspired to uphold in the Mountain. Indeed, in contrast to the first generation of reformers who had turned their backs on the Mountain, the new emigrants remained attached to, and concerned about, their homeland, with which they maintained regular contact. As a result, some began to look for and promote solutions focusing specifically on the Mountain.

By the beginning of twentieth century, the impact of the views and ideas of the first generation of reformers and those of later emigrants, combined with the local effects of economic change, recession, education, and emigration, began to show in the Mountain itself. A new rising generation of local intellectuals and members of the professional and bureaucratic class undertook, in alliance with part of the political elite of the Mountain, to question and contest the prevailing status quo. Their movement, closely linked to a struggle for power among different factions of the elite inside the Mountain, was strongly influenced by ideas and currents in circulation in neighboring provinces and among emigrant communities. It was in the name of the same modern and progressive ideas that a Lebanese “liberal” faction of the elite led its bid for power and change. Hence, the views of Lebanese reformers need to be considered and studied in conjunction with the reformist—and later decentralist—currents, as well as the Ottomanist, Syrianist, and Arabist fledgling nationalistic notions *en vogue* among members of the elite in Syria, the Ottoman Empire, and the emigrant communities.

It was among this Lebanese secular elite, scattered within and without the Mountain, that projects for the consolidation of the autonomous regime of Mount Lebanon and the enlargement of its territory began to be articulated during the first two decades of the twentieth century. They were responsible for the development of Lebanist programs, which they adapted to their new inclinations, often combining them with other nationalist agendas. Intermingled with these claims, confused and vacillating nationalist visions and assertions came into existence, as aspirations for political reform led to, and blended with, the development of new perceptions and views of self, society, and politics.

The development of fledgling nationalist ideas and aspirations among the new Lebanese secular elite, which surfaced during the first two decades of the twentieth century, came, therefore, as a result of the interaction and combination of some of the earlier Lebanist views of the Church, with other ideas and currents that originated outside this region. Any analysis of the emergence and evolution of their ideas and aspirations cannot therefore be studied in isolation, and it cannot be confined to the Lebanese sphere alone. It must take into account many views

and currents that prevailed outside the limited range of the Mountain but that nevertheless influenced the new elite within and without the Mountain.

The views of the Church have already been examined. The following section hence focuses on the wider political currents prevailing outside the Mountain, beginning in the 1860s with the emergence of reformist and nationalist movements in Beirut and their ulterior evolution in the region and in the lands of emigration. Chapter 6 surveys the repercussions of these currents in the Mountain itself and how they influenced and combined with the Lebanist ideal of the new secular elite in the Mountain.

POLITICAL REFORM, OTTOMANISM, AND SYRIANISM

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, Beirut became the center of a literary revival, widely known as the *Nahda*, that subsequently spread throughout the Syrian provinces.¹⁵ This movement began to take shape among a small group of writers, members of the merchant community and the bureaucracy, motivated by an eagerness to partake in the reform movement initiated by the Ottoman government and a deeper awareness of the profound changes taking place in the rest of the world. Beirut represented an ideal setting for such an awakening. During previous decades it had developed rapidly to become the main port of the Syrian coast, the virtual headquarters of the *wilaya* of Sayda, and the second most important city in Syria after Damascus.¹⁶ *Walīs* and higher Ottoman officials, wealthy and prosperous local and foreign merchants, foreign consuls accredited to Syria and foreign missionaries imparted a more cosmopolitan cachet to Beirut than any other town in the region.

After 1860, the literary and cultural movement, initiated in Beirut, began to acquire political undertones as some members of the Beirut elite, including those hailing from the Mountain, forsook their former reserve and engaged in political affairs.¹⁷ Indeed, the magnitude of the events of 1860 had established for the Ottoman government the necessity of engaging more seriously in a thorough reorganization of the Syrian lands. The international community, appalled by the atrocity of the massacres, also pressed for urgent action, and dispatched an International Commission of inquiry to study the situation. The whole setting was favorable to the activation of a parallel reflection among the local inhabitants on the causes of these events and the means to avoid their repetition. The views and designs that

this conjuncture had inspired in certain Maronite circles have been examined previously. At the same time, other views and solutions were devised by members of the Beirut elite. The latter concurred with, and may have been influenced by, Lord Dufferin's plan and ideas for a special administration for the whole of Syria, which was then widely circulated and which exerted, according to a contemporary source, "a real fascination over the minds of those who adhered to it."¹⁸

Butrus Bustani and his son Salim exemplify the differing currents of thought that then emerged, which they helped form and which marked their generation and those to come. It is worthwhile studying more closely their itineraries and writings.¹⁹

Born in 1819 in Mount Lebanon, Butrus Bustani was educated in the distinguished school of 'Ain Warqa, where he acquired a solid classical education in Arabic and some foreign languages. He then settled in Beirut in 1840, collaborated with the newly established Protestant mission, and soon adopted its faith. Having thus dissociated himself twice from his original Maronite community, once physically by abandoning the refuge of the Maronites in Mount Lebanon and settling in the more cosmopolitan Beirut, and a second time spiritually, by converting from his original faith to Protestantism, he "turned his mind to the thought of some wider community to which he could belong."²⁰

Two events seem to have influenced his search for a new social and political identification. The first one was the proclamation of a new imperial firman, the 1856 *Hatt-i-Humayun*, promising equal civil and political rights for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, "which marked our entry in the family of the civilized world."²¹ Being well acquainted with the social, intellectual, and political history of the West, he realized that the Ottoman Empire had declined dangerously and needed to reform itself along Western lines by adopting the beneficial and, as he saw it, ineluctable aspects of European civilization. For him, the Ottoman Empire not only had to catch up with the West but to place itself definitely in the mainstream of history if it wanted to survive. The "spirit of the time," stressed an editorial in *al-Finan*, "is based on equality . . . liberty . . . and on the furtherance of the means of progress." It had replaced religious solidarity with national solidarity and had separated religion and politics. "He who does not conform to it willingly, will have to conform to it unwillingly," it warned.²² Bustani therefore saw the *Tanzimat* movement as a step in the right direction. Most of all, he was attracted by the concept of Ottomanism, which Ali and Fuad Pasha introduced, because it "aimed to establish the identity and the legal status of the [state's] subjects upon secular ideas, rather than religious beliefs."²³ This concept aligned with

his own aspiration to promote the notions of patriotism and national loyalty in place of religious solidarity. He therefore became a loyal and faithful Ottomanist and remained so for the rest of his life.

However, if there was an Ottoman state there existed as yet no distinct Ottoman nation, and Bustani grappled with the problem of imparting meaning and substance to his Ottomanism. Provided that government was organized along secular lines, he respected the fact that the Ottoman Empire was a Muslim Empire and that its official religion was Islam, the religion of the majority of its population, in accordance with prevalent practice elsewhere in the world. Nonetheless, it was the idea of the Ottoman Empire as a sort of league for the peoples of the East that he mainly identified with, and he believed that the survival of the Empire constituted the best guarantee for their defense against the encroachments of the West. The “Ottoman Eastern nation,” as specified in a series of articles in *al-Jinan*, was composed of “many nations speaking different languages and belonging to different nationalities” that could neither survive on their own nor defend themselves against European designs.²⁴ Moreover, these various nations and religious communities were closely intermingled, making it impossible to dissociate them.²⁵ It was therefore “in their own interest to form, from the north of the Tuna to the middle of the Arab lands, one same Ottoman nation, benefiting from a powerful and renowned centre like Istanbul.”²⁶

Indeed, Bustani saw himself as an Easterner, and his attitude toward the West, of which he had only secondhand knowledge, was not one of total fascination. His desire to adopt European concepts was prompted by his belief that they were beneficial and universally applicable. At the same time, he felt that Easterners should strongly defend their identity and their interests vis-à-vis the West. For this purpose, he worked untiringly for the revival and propagation of the Arabic language and heritage.

The second experience that helped shape Bustani’s views was the 1860 infighting in Mount Lebanon and Damascus, which shocked him profoundly. The perpetrators of these acts had “overstepped the limits of humanity and . . . surpassed the savages and the barbarians,” he lamented shortly thereafter, adding that these events would forever remain “a black spot in the history of Syria.”²⁷ They confirmed his conviction that “religious loyalty was a dangerous basis of political life”²⁸ and needed to be replaced by secular patriotic and national solidarity. This time, however, he emphasized a new concept and stressed a new aspect of, and focus for, patriotic and national identification. “Syria,” he asserted, “known as *Barr al-Sham* or Arabistan, is our fatherland . . . and the inhabitants of Syria, whatever

their creed, community, nationalities or group are the sons of our fatherland.”²⁹ They should all cooperate in concord and unity and manifest an “earnest concern for the welfare of their country.” They should also love their fatherland and be loyal to it.³⁰

Bustani thus set the bases of Syrianism, or a political identification with a territorial entity called Syria matching the geographical region of Bilad al-Sham, along with a notion identifying all the inhabitants of Syria as members of one same nation, tied together by common customs and interests and by a distinctive language and culture.³¹ Among all these common characteristics, Bustani emphasized the importance of the Arabic language and an Arabic culture as the means of merging and integrating his Syrian nation, this “Babel of religions, races and beliefs,” to prevent it from also turning into a “Babel of languages, customs and inclinations.”³² Thus, Bustani’s Syrianism acquired a strong Arab character, at times giving the impression that these two elements combined so well in his thought that his new concept may more accurately be qualified as Arabo-Syrianism. Nonetheless, although his Syrianism was strongly imbued with an Arab identity, the fact remains that he singled out Syria as a distinct territorial entity and pole of identification within the wider, and still vaguely perceived, Arab sphere.

Bustani’s call for Syrian patriotism did not negate his overarching allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. For him and for most of his contemporaries, Ottomanism and Syrianism were not incompatible but complementary concepts. Ottomanism, which bore promises of a reformed and strengthened Empire, genuinely appealed to them. At the same time, the events of 1860 induced them to look for more specific political solutions and more tangible allegiances and identities for their own countrymen. Syria emerged as their local pole of identification and constituted the political sphere they were most directly interested in seeing reformed.³³ In this sense, the Syrianist ideal when it first appeared in 1860 was not directed against the Ottomanist concept but was, on the contrary, closely linked to the more general Ottoman reformist current aimed at reorganizing the political sphere along more secular and liberal lines; Syrianism was meant to be the local contribution to this broader movement. For its proponents, the specific political conditions of the Syrian provinces, and the recent political crises that had afflicted them, required the adoption of specific arrangements for its development and progress within the framework of, and in conjunction with, the rest of the Empire.³⁴

Moreover, one gets the impression that Bustani considered Ottomanism or Syrianism as incomplete concepts in themselves, lacking sufficient appeal to command

total allegiance. For the Syrians, the Ottoman Empire constituted a too broad and remote unit with which to identify. Allegiance to it therefore had to be supplemented by another loyalty more meaningful to the people. Yet, Syria, he felt, this “conglomerate of diverse tribes with differing inclinations, affinities, purposes and interests,”³⁵ was still too divided socially and politically to be able to manage its own affairs. It could only safeguard its internal cohesion and integrity by remaining part of the Ottoman Empire.

Bustani’s national identifications remained therefore multiple and equivocal. They seem to reflect widening circles of allegiance and identity, matching a Syrian sphere that was part of a wider Arab world, which was itself an element of a still wider Ottoman Empire—all of these belonging to a larger whole, namely the East. He used indistinctively and successively, often in one same article, the terms Syrian nation, Ottoman nation, Arab nation, or even Eastern nation. Although Bustani was well aware of the Western concept of nation and its historical development, and he realized that the prevailing order of things demanded the existence of a nation,³⁶ he remained reluctant to delimit clearly his own nation and preferred to keep all of his options open.

Multiple, blurry, and shifting national identifications remained characteristic of the politico-intellectual elite of the Mountain and the Syrian provinces until ultimately the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I compelled its members to make more definite choices. The articulation and maturation of these identities generally evolved in relation to the lines of the various political programs promoted and to the geographical spheres to which they were directed. Their main axis and impetus was the aspiration of their authors to reform and reorganize a dismal sociopolitical reality according to new concepts of government predicated on ideas of liberty, political rights, civil and political equality, and more particularly on that of nation and national and patriotic solidarity.

Aspirations for political reform, in turn, led to new perceptions and views of self, society, and politics since the new concepts of government advocated by the elite implied novel, concordant sociopolitical allegiances and identities. New national identifications and assertions hence matched and supplemented projects aiming at reforming specific political realms and varied according to political opportunities, accounting for frequent and sudden shifts in political agendas and identities. Members of the elite hence articulated and combined various nationalist aspirations and identities, altering and readjusting them according to political circumstances and prospects.

These blurred and complex nationalist aspirations reflected the different and overlapping reform programs with which members of the elite juggled according to fluctuations in the general situation of the Empire as well as the multiple identities and allegiances that underlay such agendas. They also exposed the conservatism and pragmatism of an intellectual and political elite that seemed reluctant to challenge altogether the prevailing status quo and that mainly looked for ways to improve their environment while promoting their own interests. They preferred to probe and weigh their programs and ideas and to look for various accommodations until they were compelled by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to adopt definite positions.

Indeed, the nationalists of the Syrian and Lebanese provinces were mostly reformers, publicists, and politicians, not revolutionaries. They believed in the power of words, not action. Moreover, they displayed a certain distrust of, and reserve toward, the lower classes of their projected nation and were disinclined to mobilize the masses, preferring to air their opinions in the press and within the framework of literary clubs, Masonic lodges, and political alliances. At best, they believed that the local population needed a long period of preparation and education before being able to assume their roles as full members of the nation.

Thus, the period preceding World War I did not witness nationalist movements as such but an intellectual and tentative nationalist quest among part of the Syrian and Lebanese elite in conjunction with a search for alternative political frameworks. Seen in perspective, some trends can be discerned within this complex process.

Syrianism emerged after 1860 as a major local focus of sociopolitical identity and was adopted by many inhabitants of Bilad al-Sham, including Mount Lebanon, as the century unfolded. Syria was adopted by many thereafter as a generic identity in a world where claiming one's national identity, and being identified by others according to one's nationality, became more and more the norm. Gradually, the local inhabitants of Syria and the Mountain began to perceive themselves as Syrians, to call themselves Syrians or *Suriyyin*, and to be identified as such by others.³⁷ Some bore this identification lightly, rarely exceeding a general feeling of identity, overlapping and combining with their parochial, communal, and regional ones. For others, this identification with Syria acquired clear political undertones and connotations. Politically, it derived from an aspiration to change and develop the political and social spheres along secular and more liberal lines. Political Syrianism provided the most natural solution for those who felt the need of reorganizing their political sphere along secular lines. Most of those who

adopted the Syrianist ideal did so because it represented a political project above and outside the realm of communalism and local particularisms.

At the same time, Syrianism emerged as an extension of, and a complement to, a corresponding wider Ottomanist program. Both concepts remained closely linked with each other and with the reformist, secular, and liberal ideas that had contributed to their parallel local emergence. As such, Syrianism never really dissociated itself from a liberal view of the Ottomanist concept in order to evolve toward a separate and independent nationalist project, and it somehow followed the same intricate course as Ottomanism.

After its first appearance in 1860, Syrianism spread from Beirut to other Syrian towns, following different paths and unfolding by means of literary clubs, newspapers, and journalistic circles, Masonic lodges, and secret political societies. Around the mid-1880s, when Abdul Hamid II's regime turned more repressive and autocratic, and when the liberal Ottomanist project was supplanted by a more conservative one, many reformers left Syria, taking along their Syrianist, Ottomanist, and other liberal ideals that they continued to advocate in their new places of residence, and especially in Egypt. After 1908, Syrianism witnessed a new and brief revival, parallel to that of the liberal concept of Ottomanism, sustaining the decentralist movements focusing on the Syrian realm that developed in Beirut and among the Syrian and Lebanese emigrant circles in Egypt during the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

Syrianism turned into an independent nationalist project aiming at establishing a sovereign Syrian political entity in the whole region of *Bilad al-Sham* only after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. At that same time, it then split into two trends, one striving to impart a strong Arab identity to the Syrianist ideal and to link the projected independent Syrian entity closely to the rest of the Arab world, and the other professing a specific and distinct Syrian identity, separate from the rest of the Arab world.

Although Syrianism remained generally imbued with a strong Arab character, Arabism itself was a later development, born in the first decades of the twentieth century, when the Arab nation was more clearly perceived by the local inhabitants following the upheavals that affected simultaneously the Arab regions. It also came as a slow and late result of the evolution of the Arabic literary movement, and of the Islamic Reformist current, toward more secular Arab political tendencies.³⁸

As for Ottomanism, it struck root in the region around 1860 as a wider framework for the reform, development, and consolidation of the whole

region and, for many members of the politico-intellectual elite, its significance fluctuated according to the progress made by the Ottoman government in this direction. Hence, for Bustani and his generation, still hopeful and confident about the slow but progressive evolution of the Ottoman Empire toward more secular and liberal norms and its ultimate regeneration, Ottomanism symbolized a genuine aspiration and commitment. Two decades or so later, a younger generation began to display a certain disappointment with the general Ottoman process of reform and to express bitterness and doubts regarding the propriety of the Ottomanist option.

A review of articles written during this period by a young journalist and thinker, Adib Ishaq (1856–84), reveal these delicate vacillations in the Ottomanist ideal among local reformist circles. Early on Ishaq adopted the prevalent reformist ideas of his epoch. He considered that the East had declined vis-à-vis the West as a result of tyranny and the division of its inhabitants according to their religious denominations.³⁹ He therefore advocated the union of these various communities and their adoption of the principles of justice, liberty, knowledge, and patriotism devoid of religious fanaticism because religion could not constitute a proper basis for union.⁴⁰ The *patria* he most identified with was the Ottoman Empire, which he saw as the most appropriate framework for the realization of his political ideals. “The Ottoman union,” he wrote, “is necessary because it is imperative for a nation of different origins to have some sort of unity around which to rally, a bond of common sentiment, and a focus of political authority; the nation referred to as Ottoman has no other possible basis for unity.” Such a union also was essential to safeguard the independence of all its different subjects. Besides, he added, “the [Ottoman] state is already an established reality, and the existent must not be abandoned in favor of the non-existent.”⁴¹

Nonetheless, Ishaq’s allegiance to the Ottoman Empire was not unconditional. It was predicated on a total reform of its methods of government along constitutional and liberal lines. For him, the Ottoman Empire really had no other alternative but to adopt the path of reform to safeguard its internal cohesion and existence. Hence he welcomed the proclamation of the constitution in 1876, following “the example of the rest of the civilized countries” as well as the declared intentions of the Sultan to implement a whole set of reforms at the end of the Russian–Ottoman War. These dispositions, he wrote, “have bolstered the confidence of the nation in its Sultan, renewed its ancient zeal and its former youth, and revived in its heart its waning love of the fatherland.”⁴² Some time later, seeing that the anticipated reforms had not materialized, Ishaq’s Ottoman patriotic feelings and those of his

reformist friends began to cool, and “some of its [the Empire] sons turned into its fiercest enemies.”⁴³

Indeed, as the Ottoman government took on a more conservative and autocratic bent after the mid-1880s under the rule of Abdul Hamid II, Ottomanism lost much of its appeal for the liberal elite. Expressing the alienation prevalent among his generation, a leading contemporary journalist, Salim Sarkis, wrote in 1902, “As for me, calamities have always pursued me. The first misfortune which befell me, was that I was born in Beirut, and have become consequently by right of birth, and not of my free own will, a subject of the Ottoman government, and this is the worst and most grievously offending misfortune. . . . The second one was that I learnt the English language, and could no longer bear the [prevalent] apathy while I was reading the newspapers and works of Europe and nurturing my mind with the principles of progress and liberty.”⁴⁴

Ottomanism, however, was not totally abandoned by the elite and remained for many an inescapable and privileged option, as shown by the myriad of articles and declarations following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, when Ottomanism regained for a short while its promise of a better future and a meaningful entity to which to belong. Addressing a group of Ottoman emigrants in Egypt shortly after the 1908 Revolution, a leading figure of that time, Faris Nimr, expressed his renewed sense of pride at belonging to the Ottoman nation, comparing it with his state of mind just a few weeks previously: “We used to feel, as I felt . . . that I lived in this world alone, solitary, outcast and lifeless, with no nation to embrace me and no state to depend upon which could accept a man like me as one of its sons. I used to feel as a stranger with no support and no opportunity to address the sons of the other nations and say this is my army, my fortress, my sword, my shield.” Now, he went on, he prided himself in his fellow nationals and he felt and knew that he was “one of them . . . and that we all together belong to one same main body, that is the Ottoman nation.”⁴⁵

It is important to note in this context that Ottomanism continued to represent a religious necessity for many Muslims, the Ottoman Empire representing the last remnant of the Muslim Empires that had successively held sway in the region. Hence, Islamic reformers like Rashid Rida, for instance, who also felt a certain alienation from the autocratic regime of Abdul Hamid, firmly defended the necessity to safeguard it.⁴⁶

For the purpose of this study, a more elaborate examination of these different currents of thought is not necessary. It is, however, important to keep them in mind in the coming survey of the emergence of the Lebanist ideal among the secular

elite of Mount Lebanon at the start of the twentieth century. Indeed, Lebanism was then adopted by many members of the Lebanese elite as an additional option to Syrianism and Ottomanism and a particular sphere that they wanted to reform. Lebanism was hence often combined with these two ideals, overlapping and competing with them, following the general situation in the Empire and the delicate oscillations of the diverse nationalist currents that they motivated.

CHAPTER SIX • The Secular Elite and the *Mutasarrifiyya*

By the beginning of the twentieth century, a new generation of local intellectuals and members of the middle class, in alliance with part of the political elite, began to question and contest the prevailing status quo in the Mountain. Alienated by the constrained and clerically dominated polity of the Mountain, this group of “liberals,” as they were often called, challenged the dominance of the Church and the traditional notables, as well as the arbitrary and authoritarian government of the *mutasarrif*. Their movement, closely linked to a struggle for power among different factions of the elite within the Mountain, was distinctly influenced by ideas in neighboring provinces and among emigrant communities. It was in the name of these modern and progressive ideas that the “liberals” led their bid for power and change inside the Mountain.

However, their activity remained limited and sporadic, failing to develop into an articulate and well-organized movement. New ideas and more elaborate programs for the reform of the Lebanese political sphere, when they eventually emerged, did so from outside the circle of politicians and indeed very often from outside the Mountain itself, among a young generation of emigrants living in Beirut, Egypt, Paris, or farther away, and engaged in liberal professions such as journalism, medicine, and law. In conjunction with these reformist views, vague and ambiguous nationalist visions and assertions began to appear. Within this general context, some Lebanist views promoted by the Church by the middle of the nineteenth century were taken up by the new elite that tried to adapt them

to its differing inclinations, often combining them with other nationalist ideals and identities.

This chapter examines the emergence and evolution of reformist aspirations, as well as Lebanist and other nationalist views, among the Lebanese secular elite scattered within and without the Mountain in the few years preceding the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

THE “LIBERALS”

By the turn of the twentieth century, as the *mutasarrifiyya* was approaching its fortieth year in existence, the notable achievements of the regime could no longer conceal certain flaws and imperfections. Despite the restoration of peace and order, the establishment of a regular administration and the initial economic prosperity, a certain malaise and urge for change began to surface in Lebanon as signs of an economic and political crisis became apparent to all.

A first obvious set of problems arose from the general economic situation. Since the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya* in 1860, the population of the Mountain had increased considerably, notwithstanding the effects of emigration, which had removed about 100,000 people.¹ According to the rough and approximate data available, the established population of the Mountain nearly doubled during the first four decades of the *mutasarrifiyya*, increasing from 220,000 to nearly 400,000 inhabitants.² Agriculture also expanded remarkably but reached, by the beginning of the century, the limit of its capacity as there remained no new land that could be reclaimed to accommodate the continually growing population.³ Moreover, competition from artificial silk produced in the Far East reduced demand for the Mountain's single cash crop and its main industry.⁴ The Mountain had clearly reached saturation level and could no longer support a population that still lived mainly off the land. Furthermore, little scope for development and expansion in other directions existed in an environment lacking natural resources and an industrial tradition or facilities. The economic predicament of the Mountain pushed local inhabitants to leave in large numbers in search of a living. Emigration assumed serious proportions by about the 1880s, and by 1900, nearly a quarter of the local population had already left Lebanon, relieving the Mountain of its excess workforce and postponing only temporarily an inescapable crisis.

Another set of problems arose “from the essence and from the application” of the *Règlement* itself.⁵ With the dawn of the new century it was becoming clear that the “antiquated regulations” of the Mountain had become obsolete and “were no

longer applicable to the inhabitants of the present day.”⁶ One of the main flaws of the system resided in the unlimited and discretionary powers granted to the governor and the absence of any effective checks to temper his absolute powers. Indeed, the latter was empowered to appoint and dismiss, at his own discretion and with only minor formal limitations, all officials in the administration, the judiciary, and the militia. Successive governors, who had “always had more or less despotic tendencies,”⁷ had fully taken advantage of their prerogatives to impose themselves as the uncontested masters of the Mountain, reigning as “real viceroy[s] throughout the whole province.”⁸ The *Règlement* had tried to limit somewhat the power of the *mutasarrif* by providing for the establishment of an Administrative Council whose duties were “to apportion taxation, supervise the administration of revenue and expenditure and give an advisory opinion on questions submitted to it by the governor.”⁹ However, the Council utterly failed to limit the authoritarianism of the governors:

In reality, the body that was to serve as a regulatory authority has become, through a change in its operation, an extremely docile instrument in the *mutasarrif*'s hands. The Council has become the slavish executor of its every whim and now serves only to legitimize its arbitrary decisions. . . . Its role consists, in fact, solely of blindly preparing the budget as intended by the *Mutasarrif*, in voting for any new expenditures or public works that he desires. As for its advice, the governor requests it continually, but only to protect himself and not without indicating in advance the tenor of the advice to be given.¹⁰

The failure of the Administrative Council to assert itself on the political scene stemmed from several factors, among which predominated deficient, and heavily constrained, electoral regulations and procedures. The councilors were elected by the headmen of the villages, or *shaykhs*, who, according to the *Règlement*, were to be selected by the local population and then confirmed in their positions by the *mutasarrif*. In fact, the *shaykhs* were appointed and dismissed quite arbitrarily by the governor, turning them into mere subordinates to official authority. On elections days, these *shaykhs*, who were “mostly semi-literate and had little experience of nation-wide politics,”¹¹ generally followed the directions of the local *mudirs* or *qaimaqams*, who in turn were subject to all sorts of pressure from the *mutasarrif*, the local notables, the Maronite Church, and the foreign consuls. Hence, the election of a councilor came as the result of a complicated web of manipulation, deals, pressure, and corruption, reflecting more the delicate balance of power among

these diverse forces than any popular will. Under the circumstances, the councilors were beholden to the forces that contributed to their election and that they needed to propitiate to maintain their positions, and the Council, acting under strict supervision from more influential forces, never managed to impose itself as an independent body.

Other considerations contributed to limit the confidence and liberty of the councilors. In the restrained political scene of the Mountain, political opportunities and offices were limited,¹² generating fierce competition. Positions in the administration and the Council were particularly coveted because of the prestige they bestowed upon their holders and the opportunities they opened for patronage and for self-enrichment. The twelve councilors were therefore little inclined to any independent action that might endanger their hard-won positions and threaten their unstable power bases. Indeed, in the absence of nationwide politics and political parties, the councilors, like most officials in the administration, could not depend on stable and independent popular support to ward off eventual competitors or neutralize pressure from powerful sponsors. Their relationship with their followers was predicated upon patronage and favors that only a position in the administration could secure. An official could not bank on the persistence of his influence or popularity once out of office: "In our country, a person is an office. Whoever the person might be, and whatever his origin, it makes no difference. A position bestows prestige. It safeguards rights. It allows for some infringements—and the higher the office, the more extensive the infringements. Office attracts friends. Delegations visit your house. You are surrounded by flatterers seeking favours. When you loose your position, your house becomes smaller. Grass sprouts on the stairs."¹³

These words, attributed to a leading politician in the *mutasarriyya*, Habib Pasha Sa'ad, expressed quite plainly the crudeness of the rules of the political game in the Mountain. And, indeed, the latter were quite harsh and simple. An exclusive political elite monopolized the main offices of the central and provincial administration, rotating according to the wishes and whims of the *mutasarraf*, the Maronite clergy, and the foreign consuls. It all looked like a game of musical chairs, in which "the party out of office is always discontented and those who have held office before leave no stone unturned in order to damage the credit of their more fortunate rivals."¹⁴ Rival cliques of officials continually accused each other of corruption, prevarication, judicial interference, electoral maneuvering, or other sort of misdeeds, laying bare parts of the shady reality of local elite politics.

The petty feuds of the elite did not seem to draw much interest from the rest of the inhabitants. They only contributed to discredit local politicians in the eyes of

a rising and well-educated middle class more cognizant of modern political ideas and alienated by the constrained, clerically ridden, unprincipled, and corrupt politics of the Mountain while aspiring to a more liberal and efficient administration. The political disaffection of this class was coupled with, and exacerbated by, an awareness of its serious economic predicament and a social, cultural, and political sense of alienation.

Indeed, since the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya*, silk production favored the enrichment of some peasants, intermediaries, traders, manufacturers, and bankers. Emigration also turned out to be a profitable operation for Lebanon, as the emigrants sent substantial remittances back home, either to support families left behind or to invest in business and property. As a result a local middle class and better-off peasantry emerged that was in its overwhelming majority Christian, since it was mostly the Christians who engaged in silk production and emigrated in large numbers.¹⁵ At the same time, education made remarkable progress in the Mountain, where missionary and local schools “lavished education on classes who in past years were content to press oil and scratch the soil for the cultivation of the mulberry and the vine and could neither read nor write.”¹⁶ Education allowed many mountaineers access to Western, and especially French, culture and provided an opening onto a rapidly developing world. It altered the former outlook and views of many and awakened them to the need to change and develop their own environment and to redress what they came to see as their own stagnation and backwardness. The situation of the educated and more prosperous groups became more and more vexing, as they were unable to find locally some proper outlet to satisfy their new social and intellectual status nor even some promising area for economic development.

Social and economic tensions built up during the last years of the nineteenth century and became especially apparent in the northern Maronite districts of Kisrawan and Batrun and the mixed area of Matn. There, the rising and better-educated middle class had grown restless and began to manifest its dissatisfaction. Such discontent was mainly directed against those local forces that they perceived as blocking their advancement, namely the Maronite clergy and the traditional notable families. For the past four decades, these two forces had, in close association, dominated the political and social life of the Maronite sectors. The notables had reasserted and consolidated their political dominance, although their local credibility and legitimacy had been slowly eroded by their lack of economic initiative and productivity, their gradual impoverishment and loss of land, and their outdated and overbearing methods of government: “As long as they had only

the populace before them, things went smoothly. Such was not the case after the formation of that middle class. . . . More intelligent and better educated than the *shaykhs*, its representatives had difficulty tolerating their haughty demeanor, their often brutal authoritarianism and their antiquated pretensions.”¹⁷

The alienation of the middle class from its political elite also came to encompass the Maronite Church, whose presence during past decades had grown conspicuous and overwhelming. It regulated all questions pertaining to the personal status of its flock and maintained supreme control over all the internal affairs of the Maronite community in view of its determination to prevent any reform of the communal institutions to allow the association of the secular leadership. It dominated the political scene and practically ruled uncontested in the northern Maronite sectors through its alliance with the notability and its role in the selection of most officials. The Church was also the wealthiest and largest landowner; it monopolized the richest and most productive lands and seemed little inclined to share the huge benefits it drew from them: “The Patriarch, the bishops and the monks who owned land or had appreciable incomes cared only about accumulating wealth and ignored their mission of beneficence and charity, leaving our Latin monks to educate the children and care for the Mountain’s sick. In places where the Sisters of Saint Vincent de Paul, the Jesuits and the Lazarists served with tireless dedication, the senior Maronite clergy turned up only to collect donations and support its clients in their political battles.”¹⁸

As the Church had grown more rich and powerful, it had become more conservative and lost its driving force as an agent for change. Its contribution to the cultural, social, and economic advancement of the Maronites had sensibly declined. Though the Maronite Church controlled a myriad of rather basic schools in the villages, by means of which it perpetuated its cultural and moral ascendancy over the rural classes, and some more serious educational institutions like ‘Ain Warqa and a prominent secondary school established by Bishop Yusuf Dibs in Beirut, it remained that the main impetus and effort for the education of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon came from foreign missionaries. Many Maronites began to feel that their Church was not doing enough in this direction considering its huge material and human resources, and villages began to demand, sometimes quite firmly, the establishment of proper schools on Church lands and at the Church’s expense. Some Maronite intellectuals even drew the conclusion that the Church was in fact unwilling to educate the populace and was opposed to all means to Maronite progress and advancement, for fear that these might threaten its ascendancy over its flock. In an allegorical satire, published in 1903, the Maronite writer Amin Rihani

has one of his figures, representing a high church dignitary, stating frankly: "We are against civilization. We are against mechanical machines, steamships and electrical vehicles. We are against every mind strained by its master to find new facilities and beneficial inventions."¹⁹ Some years later another Maronite intellectual plainly expressed the low opinion intellectual circles had of their clergy: "Those Lebanese monks do very little. . . . They provide no instruction, or almost none. . . . Their charitable works are laughable. . . . They are generally ignorant, lazy, scheming creatures of habit who are hostile to progress in the Mountain."²⁰

Similarly, some Maronites came to feel that their Church was not only oblivious to the socioeconomic advancement of its flock but was hampering such a development. While it monopolized the best lands and most of the wealth of the country, it did not care to match its economic prominence with some initiatives to promote the development of its flock or to ease the economic predicament of the Mountain. As a matter of fact, the clergy barely paid any tax on its large properties.²¹ This unconcern of the Church with socioeconomic issues was affecting the expansion of the middle and lower classes of the Mountain. These classes, in need of more land for the growing populace, found themselves confronted by the vast mortmain landed property of the Church, which could not be bought or sold. Unable to engage in agriculture, or any other activity, they emigrated in large numbers, depriving the Mountain of its most dynamic and educated elements.

Finally, the Church had gradually alienated the political sympathy of the Maronite middle class and peasantry by unrestrictedly supporting and condoning, in the northern Maronite sectors, the authoritarian and arbitrary rule of an impoverished, discredited, and overbearing nobility: "Conflicts erupted in which they found the bishops allied with their adversaries against them. As a result, they felt toward both sides an exasperation that was usually expressed to the Patriarchate in the form of threats to convert to Protestantism, though such threats were seldom acted upon."²²

These incidents, rare at first, became more frequent as time passed. Thus, in Baabda, in 1893, one family raised a complaint against another to the local bishop regarding a water source. For convenience's sake, the prelate sided with the notable family. The aggrieved party, numbering 722 Maronite villagers, decided to convert to Protestantism. The Maronite Church failed to bring them back to its fold, prompting the Capucins to intervene; it took them three years of patient effort to reconvert the neophyte Protestants to their original rite.²³ On another occasion, in Zuk Mikhail in 1902, the resentment of the inhabitants against the privileges of the local notables and the complicity of the Church broke out on the occasion

of the burial of a girl from the influential Khazin family, when the population adamantly refused to permit the presence of her body inside the church, demanding the establishment, at the Church's expense, of a cemetery and a school for the town, the emancipation of the Church from any class hegemony, and the appointment of the local *mudir* from among the townspeople. The intervention of the local authorities against the townsmen, some of whom were arrested and badly beaten in the presence of the Khazin notables, only made things worse; a delegation from Zuk then headed for Beirut, seeking support to convert to Protestantism. It was only thanks to the good offices of the *mutasarraf*, Muzaffar Pasha, that a reconciliation occurred some months later between the inhabitants and the Patriarchate.²⁴

Several factors contributed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the channeling and intensification of the diffused and scattered disaffection of local Maronite circles and their evolution into a more politically articulate movement. In 1902, a new *mutasarraf*, Muzaffar Pasha, was appointed to Mount Lebanon. The new governor surprised everyone in the Mountain by announcing, on the day of the reading of his *firman* of investiture, a "real program of reforms,"²⁵ encompassing measures to enhance the performance of the administration, the judiciary, and the militia, and to regulate finances. To alleviate the socioeconomic problems of the Mountain, Muzaffar Pasha suggested an increase in indirect taxation, the development of trade and handicrafts, the encouragement of local industries and, more specifically and important, the opening of Lebanese ports to international navigation and the incorporation, under certain restrictive conditions, of parts of the Bekaa Valley to the government of the Mountain.²⁶

Muzaffar Pasha's good intentions stumbled over the opposition of the Maronite clergy and traditional notables who resisted the changes he strove to introduce, fearing threats to their vested interests. At the same time, the Porte blocked his attempts to open Lebanese ports to international navigation and incorporate parts of the Bekaa Valley, to ease the economic problems of the Mountain by boosting local revenues derived from agriculture and trade. Moreover, Muzaffar Pasha's lack of administrative skills, his frequent and arbitrary dismissal of functionaries, his eccentricities, and his irresolution all alienated the support of many functionaries and part of the local population, who grew wary of his reformist tendencies.

Deprived of the means to implement his reform program, Muzaffar embroiled himself in a contest with the influential local forces he had aroused against his plans and his person, especially the Maronite Patriarchate, with whom a total break in relations occurred after 1904. To counter the opposition of these circles,

Muzaffar encouraged and supported the movement of disaffection against Church and notables in the Maronite northern sectors, allegedly endorsing the formation of Masonic lodges and so-called Maronite charitable organizations, which served as the backbone of what often came to be referred to as the “liberal and anti-clerical party.”²⁷

Freemasonry was introduced into the region in 1862, with the establishment in Beirut of the first local lodge, “Lebanon,” under the patronage of the Grand Orient of France.²⁸ In 1889, a second lodge, “Salam,” following the Scottish rite, was established in Beirut. Many members of the literate and liberal elite, belonging to all denominations, from the town and from the Mountain, joined these lodges, which functioned as social and cultural clubs where members could meet, get to know each other, and exchange and discuss ideas. The humanistic message of Freemasonry, with its core views drawn from the tradition of the Enlightenment and its cult of liberty, reason, and progress, matched their own aspirations and helped them to cultivate and develop, within a congenial framework, their own liberal inclinations.

Although some mountaineers joined the Masonic lodges of Beirut, no lodge seem to have been established within the Mountain itself before the twentieth century. “Lebanon remained, for a long time, unsullied by the impurity of Freemasonry, until some emigrants came back from America, having sold there their religion for more earthly concerns; they propagated, after their return, the spirit of the Masonic lodges amongst its inhabitants, and caused some ignorants to loose their precious religion,”²⁹ wrote one of the most determined adversaries of the Masons at the time, the Jesuit Father Louis Sheikho. And, as a matter of fact, it was only in 1904 that a Lebanese emigrant returning from the United States, Faris Mashriq, established the first Masonic lodge in Lebanon, “Sannin,” following the Scottish rite. However, contrary to Sheikho’s assertions, the adherents of this lodge did not only amount to a “few ignorants.” Very quickly, the lodge seemed to have gained a certain popularity all over the Mountain, rallying intellectuals, members of the middle class, and many of the discontented. The Maronite and Catholic Churches, and especially the Jesuits, had, since the appearance of Masonic lodges in the region, fiercely fought the society, denouncing its adherents as infidels and rebels opposed to all revealed religions and established political authority.³⁰ They had thus driven many Freemasons to adopt a more radical stance concerning religious institutions and their involvement in worldly affairs, imprinting an anticlerical touch to local Masonic societies. It is therefore not surprising that many among the inhabitants of the Mountain, alienated by the

attitude of their Church and the oppressive rule of the notables, felt attracted by the liberating message of the Freemasons and sought patronage and support from their lodges.

Among these, a Maronite notable from the North, Shaykh Kan'an Dahir, reportedly rallied the Masonic movement to become one of its leading figures and indeed, in the eyes of the French consul in Beirut, "the prominent Lebanese leader of anticlericalism."³¹ Dahir was the scion of a notable family in the upper northern district of Zawiya, rival to the Karam family of Zghorta, which had succeeded, after the Yusuf Karam episode, in reasserting its regional preeminence in alliance with the Church, generally monopolizing the *qaimaqamship* of the Batrun district. Dahir therefore first directed his political ambition toward the Administrative Council, to which he was elected in 1887 with the support of the incumbent *mutasarraf*, Wasa Pasha, in spite of the opposition of the local bishop, Mgr Freiffer.³² He held the seat of Maronite councilor for Batrun for twelve years before being evicted by a coalition of some Maronite bishops and the Karam family, who, with the tacit support of another *mutasarraf*, Naum Pasha (1892–1902), resorted to shady maneuvers to ensure Dahir's defeat in the elections of 1899.³³

In 1904, Dahir was appointed by Muzaffar Pasha as *qaimaqam* of the Kisrawan, the traditional preserve of the Church, where he was this time confronted with the intractable opposition of the Khazins, allied with three influential Maronite bishops from the region, Mgrs Nejem, Mas'ad, and Murad. Seeking support from those among his compatriots who had grievances to formulate regarding the attitude of the high clergy, Dahir hence rallied the party, opposing the clerical influence.³⁴ Most of his partisans in the northern district of Batrun followed suit, taking advantage of this occasion to provoke some incidents against the partisans of the Karams and the clergy. Hence, in the uppermost northern district, "this country of semi-feudality . . . where family rivalries . . . and passions are still particularly ardent,"³⁵ the liberal/conservative divide overlapped with the old traditional line separating the partisans of the Karams and those of the Dahirs.

At the same time, in the Kisrawan, the restless local middle class began to organize. In 1904 in the town of Ghazir, a dragoman of Muzaffar Pasha, George Zuwayn, established, under the patronage of the *mutasarraf*, a Maronite charitable and ostensibly nonpolitical society called the Maronite Ghaziriote Brotherhood. Shortly thereafter, this society succeeded in having one of its adherents elected as head of the municipal body of the town, defeating the nominee of the notables and the clergy. The Khazins and the Maronite bishops native to Kisrawan thereupon mobilized their adherents against the Ghaziriote Brotherhood and endeavored to

circulate petitions denouncing the election results. A delegation of dignitaries from Ghazir, who went to the local bishop to complain against the maneuvers by the prelates, met with public humiliation, intensifying the contest between the two sides. Tension spread to the whole area, as each party tried to rally partisans in the neighboring villages and matters were left to fester for some time.³⁶

Things came to a head in 1907, on the occasion of the election of the Maronite councilor for Kisrawan, in which the Church and the local notables had always succeeded in imposing their own nominee since the establishment of the *mutasar-rifiyya*. This time, however, George Zuwayn decided to stand against the candidate of the notables, Yusuf Hubaysh. For the Khazins and the Kisrawani bishops, the challenge was critical, and they threw themselves headlong in the electoral battle. "Assisted by 300 monks, the bishops visited the villages, going so far as to threaten excommunication to the partisans of their adversaries, and reaching into their purses to buy the 126 electors . . . a considerable sum for the country."³⁷ In spite of all these efforts, Zuwayn won an overwhelming victory against his competitor, with a majority of eighty-five votes against thirty-five.

Zuwayn's victory represented a severe blow to the moral and political prestige and influence of the Church and a significant censure of its policies. The newly elected Patriarch, Elias Hoyek, and the Maronite bishops—at odds with each other ever since the influential Kisrawani bishops had opposed his election to the patriarchal seat in 1899—nevertheless agreed in refusing to acknowledge the importance of the movement directed against them and in neglecting to appreciate its political, social, and economic bases. They contemptuously dismissed its adherents as "ignorant" and preferred to see in all the agitation in the Maronite sectors the secret and vindictive hand of the *mutasarraf*, Muzaffar Pasha, with whom they were embroiled in a bitter contest.³⁸

Mgr Hoyek and his clergy accordingly engaged in an implacable fight against the "liberals," resorting to high-handed and obsolete methods that served only to further estrange a growing section of the Maronite community and to damage the moral prestige and influence of the Church. Thus, when Mgr Hoyek published a circular against the Freemasons in 1905, threatening to excommunicate "all the members of this society, its supporters, and those who did not report the names of their leaders," his edict prompted only derisive demonstrations of liberal groups in the streets of the villages and towns of the Kisrawan,³⁹ testifying to a significant loss of deference toward the Church and the person of the Patriarch in this traditional Maronite fiefdom. The clergy could, admittedly, still rely on the loyalty of large sections of the lower classes who, according to the French

consul, “had preserved their credulity; superstitious to the extreme, they will remain, for a long time, under the dominion of the Church.”⁴⁰ But its ascendancy over the educated elite and large segments of the rising middle class had been seriously shaken.

The political loss of the Church was even greater. The victory of Zuwayn marked the emergence on the political scene of a new secular politico-intellectual elite, enjoying popular support and independent of the Church’s influence. The clergy thus lost its former supremacy within the Maronite community and had thereafter to contend with this new ambitious and assertive elite. If the clergy did not altogether lose its local political leverage in this contest and, indeed, gradually managed to regain much of its political clout and to bring some liberals back to the fold, it did, however, lose thereafter the initiative in political concerns. The latter passed to a new liberal elite, which now took the lead in the search for solutions and the promotion of alternatives for the improvement of the condition of the Maronite community, the liberalization of the regime of the Mountain, and the consolidation and enlargement of its autonomy. During the momentous events that followed shortly thereafter, such as the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, the outbreak of World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of Greater Lebanon, the Church lagged behind the secular elite that adopted bold and original stances that it promoted in the press, pamphlets, and through the formation of committees, undertaking to press them ahead independently. The Patriarch himself was then influenced by some ideas advanced by Lebanese intellectuals and activists but was generally wary of the diverse orientations of their movements. He experienced great difficulty in containing and directing their activity and succeeded at all thanks only to the divisions and vulnerabilities within the secular elite itself.

Indeed, the local liberal secular current that began to take form in the Mountain during the first years of the twentieth century did not represent, nor did it evolve into, a unified and coherent movement. It consisted of a nebulous association of scattered local groups that comprised some alienated intellectuals, discontented members of the middle class and peasant cliques, and a group of pragmatic politicians, functionaries, and officials, along with their traditional parochial partisanship. All of these personalities and forces had been brought together in opposition to the authoritarian, conservative, and overbearing rule of the notables, the clergy, and the *mutasarrif*, but they held different views and had different motives and interests. If some intellectuals and members of the middle class, alienated by

the oppressive, clerically ridden, and corrupt polity of the Mountain, were beginning, under the impact of foreign ideas and the views promoted by Lebanese emigrants or other reformist movements in the region, to seriously envision and press for radical changes in the economic, social, and political spheres, the motivations and aspirations of their other associates in the "liberal party" were not as obvious. Among these associates dominated the loose coalition of liberal politicians and functionaries that crystallized around Kan'an Dahir and George Zuwayn, including leading political personalities such as Salim 'Ammun and Habib Pasha Sa'ad, a relative of Dahir, all victims or rivals of the conservative league of notables and clergy. Their coalition occasionally came to include politicians from other communities, such as the Druze chief, Nasib Jumblatt, and a group of liberals in Zahla.

The liberal politicians and functionaries had adopted, and were beginning to promote, certain ideas originating with the intelligentsia and the activists, but their liberal jargon hardly disguised or prevailed over their more concrete and limited interests and aspirations. If they were willing to associate with more radical groups among the intelligentsia and the middle class and adopt some of their ideas, they proved much more reluctant to pursue the liberal changes and modifications desired by the latter. Their alliance with the disaffected middle class was based less on ideology than on interest. It aimed to provide liberal politicians with support in their parochial rivalries with the local representatives of the powerful conservative league. Hence, the coalition of liberal politicians remained captive to the parochial and limited interests of its members and the elitist character of politics in the Mountain. Their contest for power and office with the rival conservative coalition of notables was really an intra-elite affair, and they were as wary as their political competitors of radical changes in the political system or of an effective liberalization of the political regime leading to a wider association of the rest of the population with the political process.

The liberal party hence remained closely enmeshed in the petty and parochial interests of its composite membership, which never really became more closely integrated nor generated a clear and broad claim or program around which to rally. Its inherent weakness and divisions prevented its maturation into a popular, coherent, and articulate movement with a recognized leadership and a clear program and ideology. As a result, the shaky liberal coalition was badly equipped to confront the crucial developments that were soon to shake the Lebanon and the rest of the region. Weakened by the sudden death of Muzaffar Pasha in 1907 and the

appointment of a more conservative governor, the local liberal opposition found itself overwhelmed, divided, and gradually marginalized by the developments that followed the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, leaving the initiative to groups and personalities from the emigrant community.⁴¹

POLITICAL REFORM AND THE EMIGRANTS

Wider and more articulate visions of the situation in Mount Lebanon and of the changes needed to liberalize its authoritarian and arbitrary polity and alleviate its socioeconomic problems emerged at that time among a group of intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, bureaucrats, merchants, and other members of the elite not directly involved in the political process in the Mountain and, indeed, often not really established in the Mountain itself. Most of them lived in Beirut, in Egypt, or in other lands of emigration but had kept in close contact with Mountain society, continually interacting with its inhabitants, often visiting and sometimes returning to live there. The role of this literate elite, scattered within and without the Mountain, in “enlarging the intellectual horizons of the local inhabitants . . . and making them participate in the general movement of civilization and progress,”⁴² has been testified to by many contemporary observers and authors. More important, its role in articulating the views and programs that gradually gained currency in Mount Lebanon and in initiating, shaping, and directing the opinions of liberal politicians and local movements of opinion was equally central. It had the advantage of a better vantage point than the local opposition, bogged down by its petty and parochial interests, enjoyed a greater freedom of expression, and was generally well equipped intellectually to be able to perceive wider perspectives and formulate a variety of solutions for the Mountain. Its acquaintance with different polities had also contributed to shake more profoundly its former worldviews and beliefs and to open wider horizons. For some, the cultural shock had been revealing and momentous. “America is also my land of birth, my second birth, so to say, and this second birth is more significant to me than the first one,” acknowledged, for instance, Amin Rihani, who left the Mountain at an early age for New York.⁴³ It had awakened most emigrants to the relative backwardness and stagnation of their land of origin and to the need to reform its constrained social and political spheres and promote its economic development. As a result they had engaged in serious reflection on the causes of their predicament and on the solutions required to reverse their sorry situation. They then circulated

their ideas within Mount Lebanon through the numerous newspapers they had established, their frequent travels to the Mountain, and their many contacts with local inhabitants.

The reflection of the emigrants was deeply influenced by the ideas and conditions prevailing in the countries in which they came to live. Fascinated by the new polities and societies they had discovered, they closely studied their histories, social and political organizations, and cultural and scientific performance, trying to determine the essence of their success. They then looked back to the Mountain, compared its situation with that of these countries, and tried to adapt some selected Western and universal principles to their original environment. At the same time, their meditation was influenced by the liberal and reformist Syrianist and Ottomanist movements that had grown and flourished abroad. Indeed, in their new lands, the former mountaineers had found other communities hailing from the neighboring Syrian regions or different parts of the Ottoman Empire. As emigrants in a foreign land, sharing the same problems and experiences, they had all come closer together, and “the Lebanese and the son of the *wilaya* had become one with heart and soul.”⁴⁴ It was thus in these distant lands that many Lebanese emigrants had emerged from their former communal and parochial world and came to discover, and open up to, their immediate Syrian environment and their larger Ottoman world. They were thus affected by the liberal reformist and secularist ideas first expounded by Butrus Bustani and his contemporaries and still *en vogue* among emigrant communities abroad. The early writings of Amin Rihani and Khairallah Khairallah, for example, echoed the general principles expounded by these circles. They equally denounced the divisions in their society, religious fanaticism, the authoritarianism and inefficiency of government, and the ignorance of the masses. Their general panacea for these evils was also very similar, encompassing: religious tolerance; the secular organization of the political sphere on national bases; the liberalization of government geared toward a wider participation of the educated and the elite; administrative reform and allocation of offices on the basis of competence; and the education of the masses. Most Lebanese emigrants were hence imbued with the liberal and humanistic philosophy of the Enlightenment that had marked preceding generations of Syrian and Lebanese reformers. A younger generation also began to be attracted by a more radical literature and tradition, born of the French Revolution, “which became the gospel of more than one of [the] young intellectuals.”⁴⁵ The younger generation of Lebanese intellectuals was eager and determined to push forward the movement for change and reform that had been a long time coming. They were also very aware of the importance of

their role—which indeed they perceived as a mission—in initiating and promoting this process. With the oppression of the *mutasarraf*, the dominance of the clergy, and the subservience of the officials, stressed Amin Rihani in 1903, the people of Lebanon could not await any salvation except from “the Syrians who have emigrated, acquired knowledge, and became aware of their true duties, their critical responsibilities and their sacred rights.”⁴⁶

However, if the Lebanese reformers who emerged by the first years of the twentieth century were in agreement with their predecessors and many of their liberal contemporaries as to the general lines of the required reform, they were similarly just as perplexed by the appropriate answers to more specific and difficult questions regarding the means and methods of reform and the social, political, and geographical spheres that reform needed to encompass. Their own quest was nevertheless facilitated by some practical considerations that directed their search for the appropriate answers to the complex questions they came to face. Indeed, the inhabitants of the Lebanon already enjoyed, within the boundaries of their Mountain, some administrative and fiscal privileges to which they were attached and for which they were envied by many in the neighboring Syrian provinces. The scope and general lines of the political reform for which they longed were therefore almost set for them. If their local government had drifted toward authoritarianism and arbitrariness and their administration suffered from corruption and nepotism, some simple modifications could be brought to their *Règlement* to remedy the situation. And indeed, for many intellectuals and local inhabitants the lines of the desired political reform did not then transcend these general limits.

These limited aspirations also conformed with those of the members of the Lebanese elite who, attracted by the wider liberal Syrianist and Ottomanist movements, yearned for a more general reform of the Ottoman Empire. However, in view of the apparent inertia of the general situation in the Empire during the last years of the reign of Abdul Hamid II, and the disillusionment of most liberals regarding an eventual reform of the Empire meeting their expectations, the liberalization and consolidation of the autonomy of the Mountain appeared as the only available and legitimate field for possible action.

Lebanese reformers were encouraged in this direction by the British and French consuls in Beirut, who had also begun to advocate the introduction of certain modifications in the *Règlement* to liberalize somewhat the constrained polity of Lebanon and to allow the local population greater participation in their administration. In 1902, before the appointment of Muzaffar Pasha, the two consuls had submitted to their ambassadors in Istanbul a list of the amendments that they

deemed necessary, mainly including measures to reinforce the Administrative Council as a check to the *mutasarraf*, to reform the finances of the Mountain, and to guarantee the independence of its judiciary.⁴⁷ Due to general political considerations, independent of the situation within the Mountain, the suggestions of the two consuls were not adopted at the time by the Porte nor by the ambassadors of the guarantor powers.⁴⁸ However, the measures set forth by the two consuls guided those who strove for a more liberal and just administration and were adopted by those who realized the advantages that could be drawn, in their fight against their local adversaries, from the existence of more liberal central institutions. A local movement for the introduction of some amendments to the *Règlement*, which eventually took place in 1912, was hence initiated.

However, if the elucidation of measures for the improvement of the administration of the Mountain appeared clear to all, and their eventual implementation seemed plausible, there apparently existed no simple and apparent solution to its economic predicament. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the dismal economic situation of the Mountain had begun to engender growing discontent and to create serious social tensions. The crisis now hit nearly all classes, and the scope for expansion in agriculture, trade, or industry and work opportunities for skilled labor were all virtually closed. For the local opposition that then began to organize, the most obvious opening appeared to be the vast lands monopolized by the Church, and, indeed, some Maronites began to consider, and press for, the expropriation of most of the Church's properties in order to give some room to the rest of the population. But this outlet was perceived as ultimately insufficient, and, in any case, not quite within reach.⁴⁹ Other directions thus needed to be explored.

Impetus for those who looked for solutions to the perennial economic problems of the Mountain also came from some local sources. Indeed, as has been already mentioned, it was at about that time that Muzaffar Pasha was appointed governor of Mount Lebanon and suggested, among many other measures meant to improve the economic situation of the Mountain, the opening of Lebanese ports to international navigation and the incorporation to the government of the Mountain of some parts of the rich neighboring Bekaa Valley. His propositions had then been rejected by the Porte and had, at all events, gained little local support. However, unintentionally Muzaffar had publicly opened the door to future claims for the rectification of the frontiers of the *mutasarrafyya* to favor its economic development, the necessity of which became more pressing in years to come. A contemporary activist, Khairallah Khairallah, did not fail, some years later, to pay tribute to

the leading role of Muzaffar Pasha in initiating the local movement of reform: “Muzaffar did good things in Lebanon. Knowingly or not, he freed the people from the dual torpor of the notables and the functionaries, and he introduced ideas of reform, which will sooner or later bear fruit.”⁵⁰

At the same time, a Jesuit priest, long established in Beirut, Father Henri Lammens published, in 1902, an article pertaining directly to the situation in Mount Lebanon that appeared to have had an unmistakable impact on some Lebanese intellectuals.⁵¹ In this paper, entitled “Quarante ans d’autonomie au Liban,”⁵² Lammens openly discussed the economic and political problems of the Mountain and suggested specific solutions. If the political reforms advanced by Lammens did not differ much from those of the two consuls, the measures he promoted for the solution of the economic predicament of the Mountain were much more bold and original. Mount Lebanon, he asserted, had at first prospered under the *mutasarrifiyya* regime but was witnessing a severe economic crisis due to the remarkable increase of its population and the scarcity of available land. Therefore, he concluded, the best solution was to enlarge the boundaries of the autonomous government to include “the geographical frontiers of Mount Lebanon.” The latter, he stated, were clearly delimited “by the Mediterranean to the West, the Nahr el Kabir to the North, the Orontes to the East, and the Litani to the East and the South.”⁵³ Practically speaking, this would have meant the incorporation to the Mountain of the coastal towns of Beirut—“the natural port of Mount Lebanon”—Sayda and Tripoli, as well as parts of the Bekaa to the east, the ‘Akkar district to the north and the sector of Sayda to the south. Although Lammens expressed strong doubts about the possibility of such an enlargement of territory and, indeed, questioned the opportunity of annexing certain of these regions, such as the ‘Akkar, whose overwhelming Muslim population would upset the demographic equilibrium of the Mountain, he nevertheless considered the possibility of a partial rectification of the frontiers of the Mountain. He suggested annexing at least some of the rich plains of the Bekaa, which were badly exploited and which could serve as an outlet for the surplus Lebanese population, and the attribution of a port for Lebanon, which would allow the Mountain to breathe and permit the local population to develop its commercial aptitudes: “Lebanon’s port is Beirut. Will the international powers ever intervene to bring this important city, which is three-quarters Christian, under the autonomous government? It seems doubtful. Failing that, the steamships could be allowed to dock in the beautiful harbour of Juniya.”⁵⁴ Whatever the solution, he concluded, “a rectification of frontiers is imperative.” He strongly urged the

European powers to adopt such a measure “completing thus in 1902 the task they had undertaken in 1861.”⁵⁵

Lammens’s suggestions, like those of the French and British consuls and those of Muzaffar Pasha, were not heeded at that time by the European guarantors and by the Porte, but his article certainly attracted the attention of some local intellectuals who drew inspiration from it. For example, Jouplain reproduced, in his central work published in 1908, *La question du Liban*, many ideas, and even some passages copied verbatim from Lammens’s article. Moreover, Lammens’s pragmatic approach to the issue of the enlargement of the frontiers of Mount Lebanon presaged that which some mountaineers would soon follow. Indeed, when various Lebanese intellectuals began, in the following years, to articulate claims for the extension of the territory of the Mountain, they also pragmatically suggested several options for partial annexation of neighboring regions to the Mountain, pressing only for the establishment of a clearly delimited Greater Lebanon after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁶ Finally, Lammens had in his article introduced an important concept, which he was to develop later, namely that of the “natural and geographical frontiers of Mount Lebanon,” used extensively thereafter by Lebanese intellectuals.

In the event, local claims for the enlargement of the Mountain were not long in coming. In 1903, incidents that took place in Beirut prompted many Christians of the town and of Mount Lebanon to press for its annexation to the Mountain. Communal tensions between Christians and Muslims in this important seaport had been slowly building up over the previous years, as the Christian population, which was in the majority, gradually came to believe it was being marginalized. While many Christians had emigrated from Beirut, Muslim families had tended to move into the city, buying more and more land and slowly changing the communal configuration of many of its quarters.⁵⁷ Moreover, under the influence of certain officials in the Imperial Palace, and especially Izzet Pasha, the Syrian secretary of Abdul Hamid II, Christians believed they had been gradually excluded from offices in the *wilaya* of Beirut.⁵⁸ At the same time, armed gangs of Muslim smugglers, protected by the *wali*, terrorized some quarters in the town and increased the prevailing Christian feeling of insecurity. Several brawls and isolated murders took place, and the Christians had, whenever they could, sought revenge. On September 6, 1903, these separate incidents snowballed, provoking attacks by Muslim gangs against some Christian quarters in which twenty persons from both sides were killed or wounded. As a result, the majority of the Christian population of

the town, about a quarter of whom were Maronites, fled to the Mountain, refusing to return to their homes for more than two months.⁵⁹ In this heated atmosphere many Christians established in Beirut began to consider seriously the annexation of their town to the Mountain to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and to thwart the perceived creeping Islamization of the city. The Greek Orthodox bishop of Beirut, Mgr Messara, admitted as much when he confided to the local British representative that such a project was indeed “the panacea which was in all men’s thought.”⁶⁰ At the same time, many Lebanese, looking for scope for expansion, were instinctively turning their eyes toward Beirut.

For many inhabitants of the Mountain and Beirut the merger of these two entities seemed, moreover, quite natural: “While the *Wilaya* and the *Jabal* were independent of each other, they were, in many ways, a single entity. The economic, social and political life of the whole area was so intertwined that what happened in one affected the other.”⁶¹ Furthermore, some 20,000 mountaineers, mostly Maronites, enticed by economic and professional opportunities and educational facilities, were established on a semi-permanent basis in Beirut. As a result, Beirut had gradually emerged as the real economic, intellectual, and social capital of the Mountain. It centralized most of its economic activity and channeled most of its trade as well as the lucrative flow of Lebanese emigrants. Many Beirutis had economic interests in Mount Lebanon, focusing mainly on the silk industry, and most had houses there, where they spent their summers. At the same time, the coastal port and the Mountain were highly interdependent with regard to basic commodities, the former drawing supplies of all kinds from Lebanon, especially meat, vegetables, flour, and water, while the latter received most of its imported goods from Beirut. Finally, the awkward position of Beirut, a small enclave 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) in length and 3 kilometers (1.8 miles) in width, surrounded on all sides by the Mountain and the sea, and including 120,000 persons, called for a more rational organization of the relationship between the two entities.⁶² The incongruity of the prevailing situation was apparent in many details, such as the fact that the *wali* of the province of Beirut, who resided in the city, could only communicate with the remaining districts of his province by sea. On their part, the governors of the Mountain preferred to live in the more cosmopolitan seaport, residing in this town and commuting on a daily basis to the siege of the government in Baabda. They moved to the Bayt-al-Din palace in Mountain only in the summer season.

However, in spite of all these factors, several considerations played against any eventual incorporation of Beirut to the Mountain. Foremost among these was the

fact that Beirut was not only the economic center of the Mountain but had become the economic and commercial center of the whole of Syria. Since the establishment of the railway line linking Beirut to Damascus, with branches to the Hawran and Aleppo, Beirut channeled most of the exports and imports of the interior. Beirut was, moreover, an important political, diplomatic, and administrative center that, together with Damascus, represented one of the two pillars of Ottoman control in the region, and the Porte would have never accepted the loss of its direct control. The *wali* of the town warned the French consul against such schemes: "To the Turks, Beirut is the port of Damascus, citadel of pan-Islamism. To Christianize Beirut would be to emasculate Damascus, and the Porte will never accept such an eventuality."⁶³

As a result, the first attempt by a Maronite notable, Ibrahim Tabet, to rally the French to the idea of incorporating Beirut into the Mountain came to naught. Tabet, established in Beirut, was motivated by a desire to find an outlet for the export of tobacco, from Lebanon to Egypt, exempt from the control of the *Régie des Tabacs et Tombacs* that supervised and taxed its circulation in the ports of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sayda. He therefore endeavored, with the support of Muzaffar, to allow tobacco exports to Egypt from the port of Juniya and, indeed, to open this port to international navigation to boost the economy of the Mountain. However, such an alternative, he realized, would be greatly detrimental to important French interests in Beirut and to the Christian population there, including many resident Lebanese. To conciliate the interests of the French, the inhabitants of Beirut, and those of the Mountain, Tabet saw therefore only one solution: "There is only one practical but infallible means of putting an end to the Juniya project once and for all, an action that would have, for France's sake, the greatest effect on both the Christians and the Druzes . . . : the annexation of Beirut to Lebanon."⁶⁴

Tabet's suggestions irritated the French more than they pleased them, and their consul in Beirut, Sercey, dismissed them as "fantasist."⁶⁵ However, Tabet's proposal highlighted the fact that the search by some Lebanese for solutions to the perennial economic problems of the Mountain had begun to transcend the boundaries of the territory delimited by the *mutasarrifiyya*, while the consideration of more pragmatic options within the framework of the regime, such as opening a port at Juniya, were simultaneously being explored. Initial failure does not seem to have discouraged them, as such proposals were strongly pressed once again after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. In the meantime, other more abstract considerations helped them to strengthen their claims for the consolidation of their autonomy and an enlargement of the territory of the *mutasarrifiyya*.

THE DILEMMAS OF THE LEBANESE REFORMERS

The delicate reflections of the Lebanese literate elite on necessary social, economic, and political reforms provoked, for many, a parallel search for identity, activating a pressing need to know who they were and on which bases the reorganization of their society should occur. Indeed, it was not enough to ask for more liberal political institutions, a more efficient administration, and the elimination of ethnic and religious divisions and their replacement by a more secular patriotic bond linking all members of the nation together regardless of communal affiliations. The boundaries of the ideal *patria* for which they yearned had to be drawn, and the substance of the national identity and bond they wished to promote had to be defined.

Previous attempts to adapt the concept of nation in the region had not been very conclusive. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the statesmen of the *Tanzimat* tried to introduce the concept of Ottomanism as an adjunct to their reform program. This concept then appealed to many Syrian and Lebanese reformers, also yearning for an overall reorganization of the sociopolitical structures of the Empire. Ottomanism was hence readily accepted by many of them as a political program aiming at a liberal and secular reformation of the political system and administration, together with a complementary allegiance to a regenerated Empire and a solidarity and common sense of identity linking all the inhabitants of the Empire as a community of citizens enjoying equal civic and political rights regardless of religious affiliation. At the same time, due to the many difficulties and crises that marked the implementation of the movement of reform in the Syrian provinces, another ideal, Syrianism, had developed among local reformists. Syrianism was not meant to be an alternative to Ottomanism but was understood by its proponents as an element of, and a complement to, their wider Ottomanist ideal, catering more specifically to the needs of the Syrian provinces.

With the accession of Abdul Hamid II to power, the liberal strand of Ottomanism receded, and local reformists gradually grew alienated by his increasingly conservative and repressive government. However, in spite of the bitterness of their disappointment, they did not forsake their old dream of an eventual regeneration of Syria and the Empire, which remained alive in their hearts and spirits and which many continued to promote with an admirable perseverance. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, a few lost hope of any possible recovery of the “sick man of Europe” and were beginning to look for, and

envision, other alternatives. Thus, in 1905, Négib 'Azoury, an Ottoman Christian, published his famous plea for a separate and independent Arab nation,⁶⁷ while a few Muslim reformers, who had slowly drifted toward a more secular strand of Arabism, similarly began to envision an eventual separation of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁸

Hence, for the Lebanese intellectuals and activists engaging at the beginning of the twentieth century on the path of national identification, some local traditions already existed. Foremost among these was the liberal and secular reformist movement, deeply imbued with Ottomanist and Syrianist inclinations and aspirations, which still predominated among reformist circles abroad and in the neighboring Syrian provinces and which attracted many members of the Lebanese literate elite. At the same time, the Christian Lebanese elite were exposed to other views and traditions and could draw upon some additional sources of inspiration. Its members had been thoroughly exposed to European, and especially French, culture and thought. With it, they had not only discovered a different world than theirs and adopted many of its universal ideas, its faith in progress, and its basic principles for liberal political organization. They had equally discovered and assimilated some of its views on the Orient, its prejudices against Islam, and its skepticism about the ability of the Ottoman Empire to raise itself from its torpor and engage seriously on the path of modernization and development. Such opinions coincided with the growing alienation and disillusionment of the liberal elite in the Mountain by the turn of the twentieth century regarding the eventual success of a thorough reform of the Empire that would meet their expectations. They encouraged a few to envision a future, distinct if not separate from that of the Empire and closely linked to Europe, with which they believed they shared various religious, cultural, and intellectual affinities.

Developments during the previous decades in the Balkans, which led to the emancipation of many Christian populations with the support of Europe, inspired and fostered such separatist aspirations. Looking at the fate of the Christian nationalities of the European parts of the Empire, some Lebanese activists came to the conclusion that "there existed many parallels between the political history of the Balkans and that of Lebanon."⁶⁹ In both cases, as they saw it, Christian populations had yearned to be liberated from the Ottoman domination, and Europe had stepped in and helped them in this endeavor. Following this line of thought, Yusuf Sawda, a Maronite lawyer established in Egypt who became very active in Lebanese political associations after 1908, wrote: "Had the Balkan principalities been left to themselves in the face of the Ottoman State, none would have succeeded, as attested by

history, to free itself from the yoke of the conquerors. But Europe has helped these principalities, and has provided them with money, men and political backing, and has continued to help them as they evolved from an Ottoman province, to local autonomy, to total independence.”⁷⁰ Hence, some Lebanese intellectuals began not only to dream of their future along lines similar to those of the Balkan states but also to expect naively the benevolent support of Europe, and especially that of France, in their own eventual emancipation.

In this context, some Lebanese intellectuals discovered the projects designed by local and French circles that had striven, by the middle of the nineteenth century, to establish a semi-independent entity in Mount Lebanon under the aegis of France, as well as the prolific literature that had accompanied such schemes. These mainly included the views and policies then promoted by some French Catholic circles, centering on an emancipation of the Maronites and the other Christians of the Ottoman Empire from the Muslim Ottoman dominance and that had been echoed at the time in the works of Mgr Murad and Father ‘Azar. They also included a more secular, and at first liberal, Western tradition, born of the French Revolution and advocating the emancipation and self-determination of all the oppressed nationalities of the world.

Finally, there also existed some local views and traditions on which the Maronites could draw, namely those of their own Church. The latter had gradually revised its policies and views as it had accommodated itself to the *mutasarrifiyya*. For past decades, the Church had eschewed the bold views it had developed between 1840 and 1860 in association with the semi-separatist projects it then had pursued and had instead tended to promote more traditional ideas underlying the distinct character of their community, with no specific political perspective or agenda, except for the preservation of a status quo in the Mountain. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, some Maronite intellectuals had, in the course of their own search for identity and historical roots, become acquainted with the whole literature bequeathed by their clerics and endeavored to remodel it, developing it in several directions according to their own differing views and inclinations. In this context, they were particularly interested in certain accounts relating to the formation of the Maronite community and its specific evolution.

Therefore, exposed to very different, and often contradictory, local and Western traditions and influences, the Lebanese secular elite tried to elaborate its own views according to the particular inclinations of its members. All of these were very sketchy and tentative at first, as very few developed a well-defined political view with a political program and a matching nationalist agenda and

identity. During the first years of the new century, the young generation of Lebanese intellectuals who had taken the path of political reform and national identification was still grappling with the appropriate answers to all of these issues. Their quest led very few to devise clear solutions, while most were caught in intractable dilemmas, trying to conciliate apparently contradictory traditions and aspirations.

Hence, very few were beginning to envisage their future in terms of a separation of the Mountain from the rest of the Empire. For these individuals, Mount Lebanon, because of its overwhelming Christian population, should be detached from what they saw as a decaying and oppressive Muslim Empire and instead be closely linked to the Christian Western world. Their communal views were similar to those expounded by the clergy and some of their French supporters during the previous century, advocating the establishment of a semi-independent Lebanese entity to cater to its Christian population and protect it from a hostile Muslim government; only this time, a thin modern and nationalist veneer was added to the old formulations.

Thus, in 1905, for instance, Ferdinand Tyan, a Maronite notable established in Paris, wrote and published in French a small pamphlet entitled “La nationalité maronite.”⁷¹ The main rationale behind Tyan’s booklet may be easily elucidated: if the Maronites were eventually to liberate themselves from Ottoman domination, it was not enough for them to be recognized merely as a Christian community living in a Muslim environment; they needed to be perceived, and to perceive of themselves, as a nationality claiming its right to self-determination. Tyan therefore tried to fit the concept of nationality to the Maronites, having discovered a huge gap in local tradition and available literature: “For while pages have been written on the history and perpetual orthodoxy of the Maronite nation—without fully exploring the subject—no one has yet thought of recording the interesting story of the Maronite nationality, that harmonious structure of the nation’s organic life.”⁷² Tyan’s attempt to fill in the gap was quite straightforward. There was no need for great and elaborate theories. It seemed enough for him to assert that indeed the Maronites had a very ancient nationality dating back to the early days of Christianity, “in existence before France and Spain.”⁷³

Tyan then simply reformulated, in a more modern language, the traditional account of the Maronite clergy on the formation of the Maronite community, punctuating his text with passages underlying the fusion of the religious and national principle in the case of the Maronites. Tyan, who was well aware of the modern concept of nation, referring, for example, to the views of Ernest Renan on this

question,⁷⁴ seemed to have realized that such a simple association and seeming confusion between religious affiliation and nationality might sound obsolete to many of his Western contemporaries. He hence felt the need to further explain and support his point of view: "The root cause of this grave error is ignorance of the influence that religion has in the East, the cradle from which all religions arose and where nationality [is] the daughter of religion. . . . It could not be otherwise in a country where the people have no national existence or personality except when they rally around their pastors, where nationality consists in neither a homeland nor a common language, but solely in a religious idea."⁷⁵ Accordingly, he added, it was to defend their religious identity that the Maronites had, at one and the same time in the fourth century, constituted themselves as a religious community and as a nation, and it was thanks to their "theocratic organization and to their jealous and bellicose faith that they had maintained until today a sort of independence in the middle of a country subjugated by the Turks."⁷⁶

Apparently, Tyan did not feel the need to push his argument any further and suggest some concrete project to liberate the Maronites from Ottoman rule in his pamphlet. He seemed to have been mainly concerned, as a first and essential step, to assert and defend the idea that the Maronites were indeed a nation and to rally his readers to this new idea. But the implications of his idea were quite clear, and Tyan himself further developed them in a book published in 1917 when, deeming the occasion opportune, he put forward a claim for the establishment of an independent Maronite Emirate in Mount Lebanon.⁷⁷

Most Lebanese intellectuals and reformers, however, had not opted for a neat separation of the Maronites from the rest of the Empire nor for a clear Syrianist–Ottomanist track. They were caught in the middle, in between these two alternatives. On the one hand, they were tempted by the Ottomanist and Syrianist ideals. They felt uneasy within their own community dominated, as they saw it, by a domineering, conservative, and self-centered clergy, in the same way as they were alienated by the constrained and authoritarian policy of the Mountain. Having discovered an expanding and dynamic world outside, they yearned to relate more directly to it, but they thought that they could not realize this aspiration within the limited scope of the Mountain. On the other hand, the general situation of the Empire during the last decade of Abdul Hamid's reign was not of a kind to encourage further assimilation; it had, on the contrary, pushed most inhabitants of the Mountain to hold fast to their political privileges, which they saw as a protection against closer integration in a Empire with which many found it hard to identify. Similarly, a Syrian nation did not exist as yet, and the possibility of establishing a

government that would work for the assimilation of the diverse ethnic and religious elements of the Syrian provinces seemed quite remote.

In other words, many members of the Lebanese elite felt that their communal and political institutions, which most still wanted to preserve as a protection against further assimilation into what they perceived as a lagging, maladministered, and sometimes hostile environment, were turning at the same time into barriers against their opening up to a world in full expansion. Herein indeed lay the main dilemma of the Lebanese secular reformers: how to balance and harmonize their need to safeguard their communal and political particularism, which most felt they should not as yet forsake, without impeding their aspiration to participate in, and identify with, wider local and universal movements. The solutions elaborated by members of the elite to this intractable question varied greatly; they produced several delicately balanced combinations trying to conciliate the apparently contradictory terms of this dilemma. In the absence of a clear direction, a prominent party, or a generally agreed-upon program, each member of the elite concocted a very personal and complex solution that combined in differing proportions multiple options and identities, according to his own inclinations, experiences, and interests.

A common complex solution generally combined an immediate Lebanist political option with a more remote Syrianist and Ottomanist agenda to which corresponded overt Lebanist, and latent Syrianist and Ottomanist, nationalist identifications. Indeed the apparent hiatus in the reform process under Abdul Hamid II's regime led members of the Lebanese elite to focus their aspirations for political reform on the Mountain, where they hoped to be able, at least, to develop and consolidate their local autonomy and economic situation as a first step in the regeneration of the Syrian and Ottoman lands, or as a basis for eventual emancipation if no change or further deterioration occurred in the Empire.⁷⁸ Yet, this "Lebanon first" option did not imply for many the abandonment of other Syrianist and Ottomanist options. Many members of the Lebanese elite embraced, and continued to identify with, the local liberal ideal of a regenerated Empire and a Syria definitely embarked upon the path of development and progress, through which all inhabitants would enjoy equal civil and political rights and freedoms and where there would be no need to maintain the particular communal and political regime of the Mountain as a protection for its Christian population against the Muslim majority and as a guarantee against the inept Ottoman administration. These more latent Syrianist and Ottomanist aspirations clearly manifested themselves in 1908 and 1918, when opportunities for their realization eventually materialized.

Other combinations between these three poles—Lebanism, Syrianism, Ottomanism—were also possible, with varying emphasis and differing order of preference. Sometimes, all of these options and identities were adopted and promoted simultaneously as distinct but complementary spheres, each requiring specific reforms. Hence, Amin Rihani could, at one and the same time in the early 1900s, and without any incongruity, uphold the liberalization of the regime in the Mountain as a Lebanese, advocate the establishment of Ottoman national schools to promote an Ottoman patriotism as an Ottoman, and finally, address a Maronite youth organization in New York as a Syrian, enjoining them to transcend their communal divisions: “Oh Syrians! We are a nation whose population does not exceed three millions persons, with one million scattered around the world; if we remain divided into fifteen parties and *millets*, what will be the consequences of our divisions and dissension?”⁷⁹

Thus, in the early years of the twentieth century, when members of the Lebanese secular elite were beginning to grapple with the difficult terms of their dilemma, and when the apparent paralysis of the situation in the Empire did not compel them to make more definite choices, they, like their Syrian counterparts, seemed reluctant to choose clearly between their various options and multiple identities. They preferred, instead, to leave all their options open, probing and readjusting and modifying their delicately balanced solutions according to shifting political circumstances and perspectives.

It is therefore difficult to present a single representative archetype for the complex solutions devised by various members of the elite, especially during the first years of the twenty century, when most had only developed vague and ambiguous solutions and when political literature on the subject was still scarce. When events began to accelerate after 1908, demanding more definite choices, intellectuals and politicians continued to juggle their multiple alternatives and identities, shifting successively between more pronounced and strongly asserted, but only tentative, options according to rapidly developing events and opportunities. It is therefore important to keep in mind when studying nationalist texts of this period that even when emphatically presented, nationalist views and identifications were really political options and programs, ideals that could change, evolve, or even be totally reversed. Moreover, it is important to pay great attention to the wider context in which these statements and texts were advocated and to the subtle fluctuations in the general political situation in order to understand the many readjustments and shifts which they provoked.

All these themes are again dealt with in the next two chapters, focusing on the periods following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the outbreak of World War I. But first, it will be helpful to briefly examine one example of the views and aspirations of a member of the Lebanese secular elite before these momentous events.

JOUPLAIN'S OPUS MAGNUS

Of all the literature published by members of the Lebanese elite in the last few years of Abdul Hamid's reign, Jouplain's impressive work, *La question du Liban*,⁸⁰ stands out as the most elaborate, articulate, and eloquent study on this question. Its author, Bulus Nujaym, a young Maronite born into the Kisrawan middle class in 1880, published his book in French under the pseudonym of Jouplain in 1908, at the end of a sojourn of a few years in Paris, during which he completed one doctorate in law and another in political science. Thereafter, he returned to live in the Mountain, where he was appointed, in 1913, as secretary for foreign affairs in the local administration. During World War I he was exiled to Anatolia by Jamal Pasha, and then joined, in the postwar period in Beirut, a group of young intellectuals with whom he published, for some months in 1919, a short-lived journal of quality, *La Revue Phénicienne*.

Jouplain's background and experience exemplifies that of a young generation of Lebanese intellectuals who had been thoroughly exposed to Western culture at home through missionary education and had then had the opportunity to experience and interact more directly with Western civilization abroad, while remaining closely in touch with their homeland. This experience had inspired in him, as in many of his contemporaries, a thorough reflection on the causes of the Mountain predicament and on the appropriate solutions to remedy this state of affairs, coupled with a parallel search for identity. In order to better address all of these issues, Jouplain undertook a very serious and elaborate inquiry, encompassing a study of the current situation and past history of Mount Lebanon, of its inhabitants, and of his own Maronite community. As a result, he came to identify a "Lebanese question," which he tried to present as completely as possible in his book, including the "history of this small Lebanese territory, of this small nation," as well as an "exposition of the Lebanese question in its economic and political aspects, as it presently stands, and the submission of the solution which we deem essential [to it]."⁸¹

The significance of Jouplain's study lies not in its originality or in some special creativity. In fact, Jouplain had very conscientiously reproduced, collated, and reformulated some of the clerical texts relating to the history of his community, as well as most of the contemporary ideas and views in circulation regarding the situation of the Mountain and the necessary political and economic reforms. The importance of his book thus lies in the thoroughness of his research, which had led him to discover many long-neglected clerical texts, to examine published Western documents relating to the recent history of Mountain and the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya*, and to acquaint himself with the more recent views regarding the economic and political problems of its inhabitants. Jouplain's main contribution lay then in the elaborate synthesis that he produced from all these sources, documents, and views, and that was exceptional for its time. It presented a strong case in favor of an immediate consolidation and increase of the autonomous status of Mount Lebanon as a first step toward a more remote and vague regeneration of the Syrian provinces as a whole.

Jouplain's line of thought followed in its initial premises that of Ferdinand Tyan, but he elaborated greatly upon the latter's simple formulations and diverged from his main conclusions. Like many of his contemporaries, Jouplain's direct exposure to Western culture and civilization had led him to perceive the disparity between an expanding, developing world and an ailing Orient. He equally felt deeply alienated by Ottoman rule and had come to the conclusion that it was vain to believe in any revitalization of the East by means of the Ottomans, who "were themselves in need of a total regeneration, their civilization being too inferior to that of the Syrians for them to be able to stimulate them [the Syrian provinces]."⁸² However, the simple, monistic, and communal solution suggested by Tyan did not satisfy his more sophisticated mind. Jouplain perceived that his small community and the limited scope of the Mountain were too narrow and restricted a sphere to allow for the fulfillment of his broad aspirations for a better and prosperous future for his people and his land, a future attuned to that of the rest of the world and consonant with the universal values and principles with which he had come to identify, such as liberty, democracy, and progress. In other words, Jouplain's alienation from Ottoman rule had not led him to withdraw within his own community and opt for its neat dissociation from a perceived hostile Muslim environment. Imbued with modern, universal, and liberal ideas, which he shared with many of his contemporaries, Jouplain also came to dream of an ultimate self-regeneration of the East. If the latter could not be undertaken by the Ottomans, he concluded, then this task was incumbent upon "a Syrian power, awakened from the torpor

weighing over the whole country,” and it would ultimately come to encompass the entire Syrian and even Mesopotamian spheres and the whole of lower Asia, “at long last reconstituted as a land of high and beautiful civilization, of great wealth and prosperity.”⁸³

Jouplain did not elaborate much on this future regeneration of Syria and the rest of Asia, and he obscured totally the issue of its ultimate relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Unaware of the profound changes that would affect these provinces and the Empire as a whole just after the publication of his book, he seemed to believe that his anticipated regeneration of the Syrian provinces might be a long time coming. Meanwhile, and until the moment when such a complete and thorough reorganization of Syria might take place, Jouplain was concerned about the immediate present and the necessity to adopt prompt measures to prevent any further deterioration of the situation, since to “leave the Mountain and Syria in their current state would be to condemn them to rapid decline.”⁸⁴

As a result, Jouplain came up with a creative solution combining his aspirations for an eventual regeneration of the Syrian provinces with his more immediate desire for political and economic reform in the Mountain, while attuning his manifest communalism to his more universalist ideals. Lebanon, Jouplain asserted, was called upon to lead the regeneration of the Syrian provinces. Indeed, “social evolution and intellectual and economic development are much more advanced in Lebanon than in other parts of Syria. Lebanon is truly at the forefront of civilization in this whole vast segment of the East. . . . It is the centre of Syria’s indigenous populations. On it are fixed all eyes that do not despair of freedom and the future of their country.”⁸⁵

Nature and history had destined Lebanon to play such a role within its Syrian environment. By placing the mountain range of Mount Lebanon at the center of Syria, a land situated at the crossroads of three continents and open to all conquerors, it had fated the Mountain to become, since antiquity, a “natural fortress” for the inhabitants of Syria. However, it was only after the Arab Islamic invasions in the seventh century that Lebanon fully assumed the role of a natural stronghold and began to play a particular role in Syria.⁸⁶ It was then, Jouplain asserted, that the local Christian inhabitants of the Mountain, imbued with a vibrant feeling of independence, refused to submit to the Muslim armies and constituted themselves into a nation to resist the assaults of the conquerors, managing to preserve a singular autonomy within the Muslim Empire.⁸⁷

The community of Christians in the Mountain, elucidated Jouplain, was compelled to organize itself militarily and politically, and for security reasons, a local

aristocracy headed by a native notable had emerged. Their seclusion and their particular political life favored the emergence among them of an ardent local patriotism.⁸⁸ It was, however, the Maronite clergy that had imprinted its national character to this population and constituted the “national backbone of the Maronites”: “It is through religion that they [the Maronites] differentiated themselves—and still differentiate themselves today—from other groups in Lebanon and Syria; it is religion that created their nationality; having the same beliefs, they formed a tight-knit group to defend them. It is the unity of their faith that originally forged their national unity.”⁸⁹

The small Maronite nation thus lived secluded, withdrawn into itself, until the arrival of the Crusaders. By this time, Jouplain added, the Maronites had united with Rome and thus consolidated their relations with western Europe, with which they had then come to share a common religion. These close relations with Europe were also reinforced by the French Protectorate of the Catholics—and especially the Maronites—living in the Ottoman Empire, which dated back, he asserted, to the Crusade of Louis IX. This Protectorate, ineffective at first, finally bore fruit, and “Lebanon really became the great land of asylum for the Christians of Syria.”⁹⁰

Lebanon not only became the stronghold of the Maronites but also served as a “refuge” for other communities.⁹¹ At the time of the Arab Muslim conquest, Jouplain explained, many Christian inhabitants of Syria who had refused to submit to the Muslim conquerors and wanted to pursue the fight against them rallied to the Maronites in the Mountain. Later on, “heretical Muslim tribes, persecuted by official orthodoxy”⁹² also settled in the Mountain refuge. And, finally, after the Ottoman conquest of Syria, “Lebanon achieved a degree of independence under its emirs. It became the refuge of all Syrians fleeing the tyranny of the pashas, the citadel of freedom in oppressed Syria.”⁹³

The Ottoman conquest marked, in Jouplain’s account, an important transformation in the general situation of the region and in the internal polity of the Mountain. Whereas the former great Muslim Empires had contributed to the economic prosperity of the Arab lands and the development of the most brilliant civilization of the Middle Ages, the Ottomans imposed a strong despotism that hampered the economic and intellectual life of the region. The situation of the Mountain became all the more precarious, and “the main Maronite *shaykhs* realized that to salvage the autonomy of the Mountain, union with the Druzes was necessary.” In order to alleviate the susceptibilities of the Druzes, the Maronites then decided to elect a Ma’an Emir to lead the Mountain’s community.⁹⁴

This union of the Maronites and the Druzes, Jouplain added, was cemented by the Ma'ān Emir, Fakhr-al-Din II, who succeeded in establishing a powerful and well-organized state widely transcending the boundaries of the Mountain: "It was no longer a Turkish province; it was a State with a life of its own, more like the civilized countries of Western Europe than a *pashalik* of the Sublime Porte. While the Ottoman Empire was subjected to the most heavy-handed military and religious despotism, and economic and religious life there was inhibited, Lebanon, under an "enlightened despot," witnessed the full splendor of the Renaissance."⁹⁵

At the end of the day, Fakhr-al-Din II failed in his endeavor and was vanquished by the Ottomans. But for Jouplain, he had left an inalterable legacy. He had "created a Lebanese State, capable of playing a great role in Syria" and in the Orient as a whole, and had shown that "in the future . . . the salvation and independence of Syria could only come from Lebanon." He had also solidly established the political union of the Druzes and the Maronites for the sake of defending their autonomy and "had awakened in the mountaineers a national consciousness." Thereafter, the Druzes and the Maronites remained united "as Lebanese . . . against the common enemies who would threaten their autonomy."⁹⁶

This Lebanese nation had gone through severe crises that marked its history by the middle of the nineteenth century. The process of modernization generated serious and inevitable social tensions and conflicts. "The road to progress is always strewn with corpses," he wrote, and Syria was not to escape this bitter reality.⁹⁷ However, in the Mountain, Jouplain added, the Ottomans had manipulated these social tensions to their own advantage in view of abolishing the autonomy enjoyed by its inhabitants. They had turned the social conflict into an antagonism between the Maronites and the Druzes and thus succeeded in dismantling the semi-independent Lebanese Emirate, restricting its political autonomy, and limiting its territory.⁹⁸ Lebanon was saved from total destruction and assimilation only by the intervention of the Western powers that succeeded in partially safeguarding the former autonomy of the mountaineers, imposing the establishment of a semi-autonomous regime under its common trusteeship. As a result, "thanks to its autonomous institutions, Lebanon regained its internal peace. Antagonisms between the different religious communities considerably subsided. "A political and national life has developed," and "there is now just one Lebanese nation, as in the past, a nation that wishes to live and prosper in independence and liberty."⁹⁹

Hence, for Jouplain, it was in the Ottoman era that the former autonomous communal organization of the Maronites in the Mountain evolved into a more secular Lebanese polity, regrouping all the inhabitants of the Mountain around a

common cause and with a community of interests. A Lebanese nation aware of its specific personality and fate was then born. Thereafter, Jouplain shifted to the more secular Lebanese mold when referring in his account to the inhabitants of the Mountain. At the same time, he imparted a more modern essence and role to his Lebanese nation; whereas the Maronites had fought the Arab Muslim conquerors and established themselves as an autonomous political community solely in the name of religion, the Lebanese nation of Jouplain united and crystallized to defend its independence in the face of an inept and despotic government in the name of liberty, civilization, and progress.

However, Jouplain's secular Lebanese nation never really transcended his former Maronite community but somehow came to coincide with it. Even if the Maronites had been compelled to concede the governorship of the Mountain to a Druze Ma'anid prince at the moment of the formation of the Lebanese polity, Jouplain was careful to point out that in fact it was the Maronites who took the initiative of establishing the political union with the Druzes that gave rise to the Lebanese Emirate. Moreover, it was not long before the Maronites gained economic and political ascendancy within this Lebanese polity, driving the most influential families of the Mountain to convert to their rite. By the time of Bashir II's accession, the supremacy of the Maronites was already consecrated,¹⁰⁰ and the role and influence of their Druze partners gradually receded in Jouplain's account, leaving the Maronites to lead the Lebanese nation, identified thereafter as a modern and secular nation striving to safeguard its *de facto* political independence in the Mountain, albeit in association with other communal groups.

Jouplain's attempt to imprint a secular Lebanese political image on the society of the Mountain reflected an attempt to project in the past the image of the ideal Lebanese nation he wished to create in the future: a nation bound together by a national and patriotic sentiment, transcending former religious divisions and solely preoccupied with future development and prosperity. This historical projection was also meant to impart credit and legitimacy to his more immediate political projects and support his main argument: only such a nation could lead in the future, as it had done in the past, the eventual regeneration of the Syrian provinces and guide them on the road to progress, liberty, democracy, and civilization.¹⁰¹ Jouplain was therefore setting the ground for political claims he intended to advance in the name of the idealized Lebanese nation he had conceived and that, according to him, "had [today] become aware of itself"¹⁰² and was yearning to play the prominent role for which it was destined. However, he added: "For [Lebanon] to play the great

role that nature and history are teaching it in Syria, great and profound reforms are necessary, starting with territorial adjustments.”¹⁰³

Indeed, in contrast to the glorious past and glowing future Jouplain had envisioned for them, the current situation of the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon was miserable. If prompt measures to save them were not adopted, he stressed, their survival might be greatly endangered.

The autonomous regime of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime, Jouplain conceded, in spite of its imperfections, had brought about excellent results. It had ensured four exceptional decades of peace and prosperity to the Mountain.¹⁰⁴ However, internal peace and stability were threatened by three immediate problems: the authoritarianism of the political system, the scarcity of arable land, and emigration.¹⁰⁵ The *Règlement*, he added, had granted the governor extensive prerogatives and concentrated all executive, administrative, and judicial powers in his hands. All *mutasarrifs* had made use of these large prerogatives to rule over the Mountain as real despots, assisted by the conservative local notability. Recently, however, a “democratic party,” to which he alleged the majority of the population had rallied, had gained in strength and was claiming a greater say and share in the administration. Discontent was mounting, and some political reforms needed to be conceded to satisfy these aspirations. The *Règlement* had provided for an elected body to act as a check to the unrestricted powers of the *mutasarriif*; however, he added, reproducing a view prevalent among many of his contemporaries: “The central administrative *majlis*, instead of being a regulating assembly, a counterbalance to the very broad powers of the governor general, has in fact become the instrument of his absolute authority. Through it, he actually exercises legislative power. He can make and unmake majorities; he forces it to vote for the measures and laws that he wants. The *majlis*’s financial control does not exist in fact.”¹⁰⁶

Jouplain hence claimed the enlargement of the prerogatives and electoral basis of this assembly as a means to allow a greater participation of the local population in its own administration and limit the omnipotence of the governor. He also claimed measures to limit the arbitrariness of the governors in the appointment and dismissals of administrative officials and their selection according to meritocracy. In this context, Jouplain, in keeping with his ideal of a secular Lebanese nation, denounced severely the confessionalism of the political system of the Mountain “which perpetuated race rivalries and religious conflicts” and prevented “a fusion, or even a rapprochement between the various national and religious elements.”¹⁰⁷

However, he admitted, the complete and immediate abolition of the political confessional was not immediately feasible, and until such time came when it would be possible to implement this measure, the prevailing repartition of sieges inside the Administrative Council, highly unfavorable to the Maronites, needed to be revised.

The economic problems of the Mountain, Jouplain stressed, were, however, more significant and compelling and required urgent and vital solutions. All of these resided in a simple and vexing fact: the Mountain could not feed any longer its growing population. Due to a critical lack of arable lands, local inhabitants had been compelled to emigrate in massive numbers. A quarter of the population, including its most active and educated elements, had already left the Mountain, weakening dangerously the vitality of the remaining society. To alleviate this crucial problem, Jouplain saw only one straightforward and inescapable solution: the enlargement of the frontiers of the Mountain: "If we do not wish to destroy the Christian nation of Lebanon and scatter it around the world, we have to give it new land by expanding its territory."¹⁰⁸

Jouplain hence developed a complete and elaborate argument combining historical, geographical, and economic considerations to claim "the reconstitution of the Lebanon *de la grande époque* with the frontiers it had under Fakhr-al-Din and the Shihabi emirs."¹⁰⁹ Aware that the frontiers of the Lebanese Emirate to which he was referring had greatly varied,¹¹⁰ Jouplain preferred to strengthen his case with claims based on geography and economy. When the boundaries of the *mutasarrifiyya* were drawn in 1861, he remarked, reproducing almost in its integrity the argument developed before him by Lammens, the autonomous province barely included geographical Lebanon. The Bekaa, "the indispensable agricultural complement of the Mountain"; Beirut, "the natural capital of Lebanon;" and the regions of Tripoli and Sayda to the north and the south had been excluded from the delimited territory.¹¹¹ This arbitrary and unjust "mutilation," which he attributed to the schemes of Lord Dufferin and Fuad Pasha, who had wanted to restrict as much as possible the extent of the autonomous province, had greatly harmed the inhabitants of the Mountain as well as those of the excluded territories. Sayda had declined to become a small secondary port, and most of the fertile lands of the Bekaa were lying fallow. The Lebanese had left the Mountain in the thousands in search for some land to cultivate and had preferred to "colonize Egypt and America"¹¹² instead of settling in the abandoned plots in the Bekaa and the south because of the arbitrary and oppressive rule of the pashas in these provinces. Moreover, many Christians who lived in these provinces bent beneath the Ottoman "yoke." It was therefore

high time, he concluded, to revise “the unjust work of 1861” and incorporate to the autonomous territory, the Bekaa, Marj‘uyun and Hasbaya to the east, the Huleh region, Bilad Bishara to the south, Tripoli and ‘Akkar to the north, Sayda and Beirut, and reunite a nation unjustly divided.¹¹³

This task, Jouplain asserted, was incumbent on the powers that, since 1856, had taken upon themselves the right to protect the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire by means of a collective trusteeship. “Since the rivalry of the Powers in the Orient prevented the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and the awakening of the Christians did not permit their abandonment to Muslim fanaticism,” this concept of collective trusteeship was devised.¹¹⁴ It was hence their duty to help the Christian Lebanese nation to reconstitute itself and to prosper and develop, in the same way they had helped the other Christian populations of the Empire: “The Powers drew the 1861 border. . . . Later, they emancipated Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia; they conferred independence on Crete; they gave Thessaly to Greece, only partially emancipated in 1830, thereby remedying an old mistake. Hence, they can also reorganize Lebanon and restore its former borders. They can reunite under one autonomous government the people of the Mountain and their blood brothers, the Christians of the Bekaa, Marj‘uyun, Huleh and Bilad Bishara, just as they reunited the Greeks of Thessaly with their nation, emancipated half a century earlier.”¹¹⁵

“We do not ask that all of these annexations be implemented at once,” Jouplain concluded; the most essential ones, such as the incorporation of the Bekaa and Beirut, could be undertaken as a start. The Porte should not oppose such a solution, he asserted, which was dictated by justice and reason and which, moreover, would safeguard its territorial integrity much better than the constant interventions of the powers.¹¹⁶

Jouplain’s book was the first of its kind at the time of its publication. It reflected quite thoroughly the preoccupations and way of thinking of some members of the secular Lebanese elite at the end of Abdul Hamid II’s reign. The alienation and impatience of some had begun to generate far-reaching reform platforms and concrete political projects accompanied by nationalist representations. These were still hazy, prospective, and tentative, testifying to the differing alternatives explored by their authors. Jouplain’s book advanced one such alternative, marking the emergence of a Lebanist option among some Lebanese intellectuals. Jouplain presented in this context the most complete and thorough project for an immediate reform of the Lebanese sphere.

However, Jouplain had not yet clearly delimited and defined his options. Although he focused his study and solutions on the Mountain, he left his Syrianist option open. The enlarged and reformed Lebanon he envisioned was still closely connected with its Syrian environment. Indeed, Jouplain was advocating the consolidation of the autonomous status of the Mountain as a first step toward a larger and eventual regeneration of a Greater Syria.

Moreover, in spite of his frequent assertions regarding the existence of a Lebanese nation, he ended up by suggesting an enlarged, but still autonomous, Lebanon; total independence and self-determination for his idealized Lebanese nation were not part of his agenda. His nationalist visions really aimed at justifying and legitimizing the concrete solutions that he wanted to implement in Lebanon. *La question du Liban* should hence be seen as a political program of reform for Lebanon rather than a confirmation of separatist nationalist aspirations and intent among Lebanese intellectuals.

However, Jouplain's book laid the ground to a more elaborate articulation of the Lebanist ideal. In the wake of the troubling and momentous events that were soon to engulf the whole region, many of the views and solutions he presented for the Mountain were to gain currency among intellectuals and politicians in the Mountain and among emigrants abroad. Core elements of his study were often reproduced almost verbatim, and elaborated upon, although sometimes essential issues were significantly altered. The examination of their ulterior propagation and evolution, in the light of specific and pressing circumstances, is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN • The 1908 Revolution and Its Aftermath

On July 23, 1908, a group of Young Turk rebel officers compelled Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the constitution that he had suspended thirty-two years earlier. The prime aim of the rebel officers and activists was to curb the despotism of the Sultan and to establish a government better able to protect the Empire from internal and external threats by means of a reformation and standardization of the central administration.¹ However, due to several internal and external factors, their movement was to have an opposite effect: instead of saving the Empire, it ultimately helped precipitate the end of the Ottoman Sultanate few years later, at the end of World War I. Indeed, the perils that threatened the Empire, from within and from without, were complex and intricate, and the Young Turk Revolution, instead of abating them, further exposed and exacerbated all of the contradictions of the Empire and unleashed conflicting reactions and aspirations among internal and external forces.

In the Syrian provinces and Mount Lebanon, the ten-year period following the Young Turk Revolution proved to be an eventful and momentous time. The old political order and stability, based on a complex association between Ottoman officials and local notables, was seriously disrupted, while the general situation of the Empire became more precarious due to the covetousness of some foreign powers, the war launched against it by the Balkan countries, and last but not least the devastating World War I. For local inhabitants, the decade of 1908–18 hence

turned out to be an unsettling and disquieting period. The Young Turk Revolution upset the delicate balance composed by most natives among their multiple political options, allegiances, and identities and forced them to readjust them incessantly under the pressure of the critical and rapidly changing circumstances that ensued.

The new Young Turk regime gradually promoted a more active strand of Ottomanism that aimed at imposing stricter control from the central government and at integrating more closely the local populations into a unified Ottoman nation. At first, the July revolution was generally welcomed by local inhabitants, reawakening the Ottomanist inclinations and aspirations of many. However, soon enough, the centralization efforts of the Young Turks, as well as successive wars that put into question the survival of the Empire, alienated vast segments of the population in the Arab provinces. The appeal of the Ottomanist option was seriously undermined, and some local inhabitants started, under the pressure of these rapidly shifting circumstances, to think of other alternatives. They were brought to weigh more seriously all of their options, to define their political stances, and to articulate varying political programs. Most nevertheless continued to alternate between, or to try to conciliate and balance, differing and seemingly contradictory options following the fluctuations of the political conjuncture.

The following sections examine the activity and political programs of members of the Lebanese elite during the crucial and momentous period stretching from the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 to the outbreak of World War I, in the Mountain proper and among emigrant communities abroad, focusing on particular events and personalities that symbolized and embodied specific experiences, and ideas, while the next chapter deals with the World War I period and its aftermath.

THE IMMEDIATE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION

The 1908 revolution in Istanbul equally provoked a small revolution on the Lebanese scene. It generated, for the first time since the establishment of the *mutasarrıfyya*, a serious debate among local inhabitants about the benefits and shortcomings of this regime and about ways to improve it. More important, it raised delicate questions about the wisdom of preserving the particular status of the Mountain and opened the issue of the nature of the relationship that the Mountain needed to maintain with its immediate environment and the Ottoman Empire as a whole.

All of these intricate issues absorbed and confounded members of the Lebanese elite, deeply dividing their ranks.

The effects of the July revolution were rapidly felt in Mount Lebanon. This event galvanized into activity the so-called liberal movement that had begun to crystallize for past years in the Mountain, loosely regrouping several Maronite politicians, such as Habib Pasha Sa'ad, Salim Bey 'Ammun, Kana'an Dahir, and George Zuwayn, scattered cliques of intellectuals, and other disaffected parochial groups. Taking advantage of the proclamation of the constitution, the various elements of the liberal coalition tried to reassert their presence and influence, badly damaged by the sudden death of Muzaffar Pasha in 1907. Since his appointment shortly thereafter, his successor, Yusuf Pasha (1907–12), had reverted to a more traditional policy of association with the conservative league of the notables and the clergy and displayed a hostile attitude toward the liberal movement. He had dismissed most of the officials appointed to high positions by Muzaffar Pasha and strictly repressed, in December 1907, a demonstration by the societies of Ghazir against the appointment of a Khazin to the *qaimaqamship* of Batrun.²

The July revolution hence appeared to the liberals to present a favorable and unhoped-for opportunity to curtail at one and the same time the authoritarianism and arbitrariness of Yusuf Pasha as well as the conservative influence of the Church and the notables. At the same time, this event appeared to open the door to badly needed reforms in the political system. Indeed, the members of the liberal coalition within and without the Mountain, who shared in the general enthusiasm manifested throughout the Empire in the immediate wake of the revolution, hoped that the change of regime in Istanbul would also allow for long-awaited change and reforms in the Mountain.

Throughout the months of August and September, members of the liberal coalition in the Mountain dominated the scene. Together with the Druze notables of the Arslan and Jumblatt families, who rallied to their side, they organized several banquets and meetings in various towns and villages of the Mountain, in celebration of the restoration of the constitution and in honor of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) officers in Beirut and in Salonika.³ Some, such as Habib Pasha Sa'ad and Mustapha and Shakib Arslan, reportedly joined the Beirut committee and strove to establish CUP branches in the Mountain, to which rallied several supporters, functionaries, office seekers, and other discontented.⁴

While celebrations were going on in the Mountain, "the necessity of coming to practical business was recognized," and the leaders of the liberal movement

gathered in Beirut on September 5 and unanimously agreed to present the following five demands, in the name of the Lebanese, to Yusuf Pasha:

1. The proclamation of the constitution in Mount Lebanon and parliamentary representation of the Lebanon in the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul, subject to the condition that their members shall not take part in any deliberations affecting the *Règlement* of Lebanon, except where authorized by the inhabitants to do so;
2. The dissolution of the Administrative Council of the Lebanon and the election of new members benefiting from the confidence of the public;
3. The dismissal of all “traitors” and corrupt officials in the Lebanon as carried out in other parts of the Empire;
4. The abolition of newly created taxes;
5. The formation of an advisory committee for financial reforms elected by the inhabitants.⁵

On September 12, a delegation of the most vocal and active participants to the Beirut meeting, including the two Druze chiefs and their liberal Maronite associates, assisted by other activists and a few office seekers, headed for Bayt al-Din to present these claims to the governor. Yusuf Pasha, “instigated by some of those government officials who foresaw their own downfall owing to the deputation being composed of personal enemies of theirs,” at first declined to recognize the representative character of the members of the delegation and flatly refused to receive them or to comply with any of their demands.⁶ The members of the delegation, who took offense at this terse reception, refused to leave the serail, expressing loudly their outrage and threatening the governor and his men with the anger of the masses. Some rushed to the telegraph office to communicate with the CUP committees at Salonika and Beirut, while others contacted the officers of the detachment of Ottoman dragoons stationed at Bayt al-Din, who sympathized with the demonstrators. At the same time, the Druze Arslan and Jumblatt *shaykhs* called on their supporters from the neighboring villages, who assembled in the vicinity of the palace.

Under the circumstances, Yusuf Pasha, who was advised to give in by the officers of the local Ottoman garrison, felt the need to comply. The following day, he recalled the members of the delegation, apologized for his former reception, proclaimed forthwith the constitution, and was coerced into removing immediately some unpopular high officials, all personal rivals to one or other of the members

of the deputation.⁷ In their stead, he notably appointed the popular liberal leader, Salim 'Ammun, to the vice presidency of the Administrative Council, and the Druze notable, Shakib Arslan, to the *qaimaqam*ship of the Shuf.⁸

The immediate and arbitrary dismissal of high officials, rivals to the leaders of the demonstrators, forcibly imposed upon the governor, evoked expressions of disapproval from local inhabitants who had at first sympathized with the cause of the liberals. They saw in these measures signs that the main objective of the liberal politicians who had led the Bayt al-Din demonstration was to cause the downfall of their rivals to replace them. The next initiative of the liberal politicians aroused more serious concern. On September 20, they organized a mass meeting in 'Aley, ostensibly to entertain a commission from Salonika, "but really to precipitate preparations for the elections of deputies, as was clearly shown by the orations of the selected speakers."⁹ A day or two later, Yusuf Pasha, acting avowedly under a month-old circular from the Porte but actually under the pressure of the CUP committee in Beirut and the impact of the message of the 'Aley meeting, issued instructions to the *qaimaqams* to take immediate steps for the election of deputies to the Ottoman Parliament.¹⁰ These latter developments alarmed elements in the liberal coalition who felt that the pro-CUP politicians were bent on pushing the Mountain toward parliamentary representation only to satisfy their personal interests, and without even having assured themselves beforehand as to the effect this might have on the special autonomous status of the Mountain. As a result, the liberal movement in the Mountain split into two wings, one radical and the other more moderate and cautious.

Tensions and dissension within the liberal coalition had already begun to show at the occasion of the Bayt al-Din demonstration. For some unclear considerations, Salim 'Ammun and the members of the societies of the Kisrawan had refused to associate themselves with the delegation of politicians that had headed for the serail.¹¹ The brash conduct of the latter at this occasion, and their unrestricted activity in favor of the representation of Mount Lebanon to the Ottoman Parliament, to which Habib Pasha Sa'ad and Mustapha Arslan hoped to be elected, also alienated other liberals. While all wished to benefit from the anticipated reforms augured by the restoration of the constitution and strove to take advantage of the new constitutional ideas gaining ground around them to modify the obsolete and authoritarian provisions of their political system, the issue of the representation of the Lebanon in the Ottoman Parliament, closely linked to that of the special regime enjoyed by the Mountain and to the scope and range of the needed reform, deeply divided the ranks of the disparate liberal coalition.

For their part, the pro-CUP politicians and activists denied lobbying in favor of such a Lebanese representation simply because it served their own interests and argued that their initiative was in the best interest of the Mountain. The Ottoman Parliament, they contended, was to adopt the general lines of the anticipated reforms. Accordingly, the Lebanese would be well advised to send representatives to participate in the elaboration of the new laws that were to govern the whole Empire and to promote within this institution “a regime for Lebanon, inspired by a spirit of progress.”¹² Moreover, most affected to believe, or at least publicly maintained, in spite of clear warnings to the contrary by the French and British consuls in Beirut, that these new laws need not contradict the preservation of the special regime for the Mountain. The new Ottoman government, they asserted, would be willing to give the Lebanese assurances to this effect.¹³

Among this latter group, some politicians and activists, carried along by the general enthusiasm sweeping the Empire as a whole in the few months following the Young Turk Revolution, were willing to forsake altogether the special regime of the Mountain to associate themselves fully with the general movement of reform in the rest of the Empire. The Young Turk Revolution, which at first promised to fulfill their old dream of a regenerated Empire definitely set on the way to progress and development, awakened their Ottomanist inclinations. They welcomed the opportunity to fully relate to this rejuvenated Empire, which represented in their eyes a more fitting sphere in which to realize a thorough reform meeting their expectations than would the constrained and limited polity of the Mountain. Indeed, the prospect, augured by the revolution, of establishing an Ottoman nation regrouping on an equal basis all Ottoman subjects regardless of religious and ethnic affiliation constituted for many Lebanese and Syrians the most appropriate solution for all Ottoman subjects, and more specifically for the Lebanese divided along communal lines. A liberal Ottoman Empire appeared as a much more appealing and meaningful entity to which to belong than did their stifling and ailing communal or autonomous structures. As a matter of fact, the latter could only hamper the full association of the Lebanese with this reformed and liberal Ottoman entity. Thus, the special regime of the Mountain, which they had wanted to preserve as a guarantee against fuller integration in what they perceived as a maladministered, inept, and autocratic Empire in the days of Abdul Hamid II, now appeared to them as a barrier against genuine participation in the anticipated movement of reform. The special *Règlement* of the Lebanon, they maintained, had no more *raison d'être*, since the Empire as a whole was to benefit from constitutional rule.¹⁴ More so, they added, the Lebanese

would not be able to benefit from constitutional rule unless they forsook their particular regime.

This point of view was then earnestly defended by several members of the politico-intellectual Lebanese elite within and without the Mountain who were still hopeful in the wake of the 1908 revolution of the success of the Young Turks' bid to safeguard and elevate the Empire. Hence, Daud 'Ammun, a young Lebanist activist, argued in private letters to his friends that the situation that obtained in the Mountain subsequent to the 1861 *Règlement* was politically and economically unsatisfactory. The Lebanese were unable to improve their condition on their own in view of the fact that they did not enjoy any legislative prerogatives but mostly because they were divided among themselves. Under the circumstances, he concluded, "the Lebanese had only one choice left to obtain the reforms indispensable to the betterment of their condition: to trust the Young Turks, forsake their autonomous status, and accept the liberties that the new constitution offered to all Ottoman subjects."¹⁵ As for Charles Debbas, a Greek-Orthodox lawyer of Beirut, who was to become the first president of the Lebanese Republic, he then maintained: "For the sake of constitutional principles, for the sake of the equality of all before the law, it is important that Lebanon sacrifice its privileges to [Ottoman] national unity and come directly under the common law."¹⁶

At the same time, in Cairo and Paris, Lebanese and Syrian members of the elite were establishing Ottomanist associations to promote and support the anticipated transformation of the Empire into a constitutional and parliamentary entity in which all would share equal political and civic rights. Hence, in Paris, Shukri Ghanem, imbued with the ideas of liberal Ottomanism to which he had been exposed by his elder brother, Khalil Ghanem,¹⁷ a former deputy to the 1876 Ottoman Parliament, contributed to the formation of a *Ligue Ottomane*, while in Cairo several members of the Syrian and Lebanese community, including notably Faris Nimr, Ya'qub Sarruf, Daud 'Ammun, Rashid Rida, and Rafiq al-'Azam, founded a pro-Ottomanist association, *al-Ikhaa' al-'Uthmani*.¹⁸ For all of them, the promise of achieving their long-cherished reformist ideals within a liberal Ottoman framework took precedence over all of their other political options. It was only after the likelihood of attaining such an Ottomanist solution receded in the following months that these enthusiastic Ottomanists fell back on and began to articulate other nationalist options, such as Lebanism, Syrianism, and Arabism.

Many Lebanese reformers did not, however, share the eager enthusiasm and confidence of their associates. Although the perspective of a liberal Ottomanist solution appealed to them, and they believed that their political status needed

significant modifications, they were reluctant to give up their autonomous organization and the tangible privileges that went with it for problematic and uncertain constitutional benefits. The Young Turk Revolution had not dispelled all of their apprehensions and their lack of confidence in the promises of the new Ottoman government. They preferred to ascertain beyond any doubt the implementation of the anticipated improvements in the neighboring Syrian provinces and the rest of the Empire before renouncing their special status. In the meantime, some were ready to opt for parliamentary representation only if their special privileges were safeguarded, while others favored the maintenance of their particular status until the situation further clarified. Hence, for instance, Bulus Mas'ad, a Maronite Lebanese writer established in Egypt and a member of the *Alliance Libanaise*¹⁹—a political organization that arose in opposition to the principle of Lebanese representation and in defense of the Lebanese privileges—expounded at length this latter point of view in a book published in 1909 and entitled *Lebanon and the Ottoman Constitution*.²⁰ Even though it was desirable that “we [the Lebanese] share with our Ottoman brothers all the rights and duties they were granted by their new Constitution,” he wrote, Lebanon was not a simple Ottoman province: “The Lebanese enjoy privileges which facilitate their material life to an extent hardly imagined by any other people in the world; even if these privileges were only confined to an exemption from taxation and conscription and the right to freely own property, there were sufficient enough to make them the happiest and most fortunate population on earth.”²¹

It would hence be unwise for the Lebanese to lightly forsake such a privileged situation. Even if, as Mas'ad conceded, the political system of the Mountain, nearly fifty years old, no longer met the expectations of the Lebanese and badly needed adjustments, he saw that the immediate association of the Lebanese into the constitutional movement was not the appropriate solution.²² The Lebanese, he argued, wouldn't reap any additional benefit from the election of representatives to the Ottoman Parliament to participate in the elaboration of new general laws for the Empire. Indeed, he added, if these laws infringed on Lebanon's special regime, then they could not be applied in the Mountain; if they did not conflict with the *Règlement*, then Lebanon would anyway benefit, since, apart from the seventeen articles of the *Règlement*, Lebanon was subject to all the laws and regulations of the Empire.

Furthermore, Mas'ad continued, the special regime of the Mountain was guaranteed by foreign powers, and its modification could only be implemented with their consent. These powers, he asserted, had intimated on several occasions,

through the intermediary of their local representatives, that they were favorable to the retention of the special regime. Under these conditions, the representation of the Lebanon in the Ottoman Parliament would amount to a denunciation of this regime by the Lebanese themselves, and it would induce the powers to withhold their support to the Lebanese in case, sometime in the future, the Ottoman government decided to abolish their privileges. Hence, it would be imprudent for the Lebanese to needlessly antagonize the powers, “especially if matters were to evolve contrary to the wishes of the Young Turks.”²³

To conciliate his reformist aspirations with his caution, Mas‘ad advocated a wait-and-see approach, whereby the Lebanese would maintain their special regime “for the time being” and see how things developed in the rest of the Empire. If the Young Turks succeeded in their bid to elevate the Empire and to establish constitutional rule, then the Lebanese could always ask for their incorporation in the Empire on an equal footing with the remaining Ottoman provinces in view of improving their own condition. If, however, the Empire remained weak and impotent, then the Lebanese would have to wait, “even if it took a long time,” for the powers to take the initiative of introducing badly needed amendments to their *Règlement*.²⁴

The caution of the moderate liberals coincided with that of other sections of the Lebanese population, including tradesmen and small landowners, eager for some improvements in their condition and changes in the political system but wary of a loss of their fiscal and other privileges.²⁵ More important, it conformed to the views of the Maronite clergy that had, since the inception of the Young Turk Revolution, displayed strong misgivings at the change of regime in Istanbul and their eventual repercussions on the situation in the Mountain. Supported by the old notability, the Church altogether disapproved of any change being effected in the autonomous status of the Mountain, or in the political system, lest it might disturb a status quo that had tended to favor its own interests.²⁶ During the months of August and September, the Maronite Patriarch and his clergy, who had lost their former ascendancy over large sections of their community, had helplessly watched the active movement of the liberals in celebration of the restoration of the constitution.²⁷ It was only at the end of September that, heartened by the divisions in the liberal camp, they joined forces with the more moderate liberals and the traditional notables to organize a counter-movement opposed to a Lebanese representation to the Ottoman Parliament.

The impetuous activity of those who wanted to partake more fully in the Ottoman Empire had hence caused, in reaction, a local movement against such a

prospect. The inhabitants of the town of Dayr-al-Qamar in the Shuf, who had at first been the most fervent supporters of the constitution, took the initiative. On September 22, they distributed a petition rejecting the election of deputies from the Mountain.²⁸ At the same time, some members of the Lebanese elite established in Beirut—notably Farid and Philip al-Khazin, the latter an honorary dragoman of the French Embassy; Bishara al-Khury, a lawyer and future president of the Lebanese Republic; Rizqallah Arqash, a lawyer and journalist; and Khalil Zaynieh, a prominent journalist—formed the *Comité Libanais de Beyrouth* to support the same cause.²⁹ The clergy, the notables, and the officials freshly dismissed after the September demonstration followed suit and equally began to mobilize their partisans. From all sides, petitions against the representation of the Lebanon to the Ottoman Parliament began to pour upon the Administrative Council, the Porte, and the foreign representatives of the powers guarantor of the *Règlement* reaching by the end of November the number 195, with 30,000 signatures.³⁰ This counter-agitation embarrassed the liberal politicians and compelled some, such as Habib Pasha Sa'ad, to give up the idea of organizing legislative elections in Lebanon.³¹ At the same time, a message sent by the French and British ambassadors in Istanbul, plainly stating that the consent of the guaranteeing powers was necessary for the election of Lebanese deputies, brought the internal debate to a close.³² It prompted the Administrative Council to adopt on October 12, 1908, a resolution endorsing the decision of the inhabitants opposed to any Lebanese representation.³³ As a result, the preparations for the organization of elections in Lebanon died out, and the Ottoman Parliament held its opening session in December 1909 without any Lebanese delegates.

DISAPPOINTMENT AND THE REVIVAL OF LEBANISM

The resolution of the issue of Lebanese representation to the Ottoman Parliament did not, however, alleviate the predicament of the Lebanese. Some local politicians and functionaries who supported the CUP, trying to ingratiate themselves with the Porte, pursued their campaign in favor of an eventual integration of Mount Lebanon to the rest of the Empire. Capitalizing on persistent rumors to the effect that the special privileges of the Mountain were to be abrogated, they pragmatically argued that, under the circumstances, the Lebanese would be better advised to make a show of patriotism and take the initiative in making concessions regarding their special status rather than being compelled to do so by the Ottoman government.

Their views were slowly gaining ground within the Mountain, raising the anxieties of the Church and certain Lebanese circles.³⁴

At the same time, the moderate liberals who had campaigned against the representation of Lebanon in the Ottoman Parliament, animated by the spirit of reform that was spreading in the Empire, strove to improve the situation in the Mountain and to put an end “to the many disabilities under which they stood and which were incompatible with the institutional ideas gaining ground around them.”³⁵ They mainly aimed at introducing reforms in the Mountain and at curtailing the “despotic” powers of their governor. As a result, the councilors, led by their vice president, Salim ‘Ammun, labored to strengthen the prerogatives of the Administrative Council to check the authoritarianism and arbitrariness of Yusuf Pasha. Taking advantage of the weakened position of the latter on the internal scene after the Bayt-al-Din demonstration, and his uneasiness vis-à-vis the new central government owing to the fact that he was viewed as a man of the old regime, they began to initiate some administrative decisions rather than simply rubber-stamping those of the *mutasarraf*. However, their limited success did not last long. The sudden death of ‘Ammun in April 1909 and the gradual accommodation of Yusuf Pasha to the new regime helped the latter regain his former confidence.³⁶

By the beginning of 1910, basing himself on the letter of the *Règlement* that confined the prerogatives of the council to an advisory capacity, Yusuf Pasha refused to accept some of its initiatives. A perceptible tension ensued between the governor and this body, which broke out in February when the boisterous councilor of Kisrawan, George Zuwayn, offended by the refusal of the governor to receive him, tried to force his door and brandished his pistol to oppose the guards who tried to stop him. Zuwayn was arrested and suspended, and Yusuf Pasha, heartened by the moral support he received at this occasion from the French and British consuls, strove to obtain the consent of the Ottoman government to dissolve the Council, to no avail.³⁷ Yusuf Pasha hence adopted another approach. During the following months he suspended two other councilors on electoral corruption charges, took legal action against two others, and again suspended the new vice president of the Council following a specious accusation of insulting the Sultan. Of the seven remaining councilors, four were to stand for reelection and were therefore keen not to displease the governor. “As a result,” wrote the French consul, “it can be said that the Council does not exist anymore,”³⁸ and Yusuf Pasha managed to regain his former ascendancy over the local administration.

The endeavors of some local inhabitants to boost the economic situation of the Mountain by opening the port of Juniya to international navigation equally ended

in failure. In the summer of 1909, they had tried to force the issue by chartering two steamers to deliver cargo in Juniya and embark some passengers, arousing the displeasure of interested parties in Beirut, who protested to the Porte. The latter instructed the governor to prevent such operations, prompting a locally formed committee dedicated to the pursuance of this issue to initiate a campaign against what they perceived as an unjust and arbitrary decision, “incompatible with the advent of the reign of Justice and Equity.”³⁹

Thus, the attempts of the Lebanese in the Mountain to improve on their own their political and economic situation came to naught, and the liberal coalition within the Mountain disintegrated in disarray. Its leading politicians and functionaries tried to ingratiate themselves with the *mutasarraf* or to seek support from the foreign consuls or the Patriarchate to protect their interests. Hence, Kan‘an Dahir, who for past years had played a prominent role in the liberal movement in the Mountain, made amends with the Patriarch and was appointed as *qaimaqam* of the Kisrawan. He also drew closer to his former rivals, the heads of the notable Karam and Khazin families, endeavoring to work for the unity of the Maronites in the northern districts.⁴⁰

With the near collapse of the local liberal coalition, the initiative in the search and the promotion of means to improve the situation of the Lebanese and defend their interests passed to members of the Lebanese elite generally established outside the Mountain and anxious about the turn events were taking. Indeed, during the years of 1909 and 1910, several issues arose underscoring the awkward and precarious situation of Mount Lebanon within the Empire after the revolution. Among those, a resolution of the Administrative Council to issue special identification cards to the mountaineers similar to those held by the rest of the inhabitants of the Empire, and measures adopted by the Ottoman authorities, in line with their efforts to standardize administrative practices, to draft more Christians in the army, appeared to apprehensive Lebanese as preliminary steps toward the abrogation of Lebanon’s special regime.⁴¹ More particularly, it raised fears among Lebanese residing in Beirut and other parts of the Empire that the special exemptions they had thus far benefited from with respect to taxation and conscription risked being challenged. Furthermore, the adoption of a new Press Law by the Ottoman Parliament, which Yusuf Pasha endeavored to apply in Lebanon, raised the delicate issue of the enforcement of the laws voted by the Ottoman Parliament in the Mountain.⁴² The claim of some Lebanese that these laws could not be enforced in Lebanon without their consent was dismissed by the Ottoman government and the foreign consuls in Beirut, who stressed that Lebanon was bound to adopt laws

and regulations approved by the Ottoman Parliament and government as long as they did not specifically conflict with the privileges provided by the *Règlement*.⁴³

All of these issues alarmed some Lebanese who began to organize to safeguard the special status of Mount Lebanon. By then, the fervent enthusiasm of most for the Young Turk movement, and their hopes to see a reformed and regenerated Empire, had cooled down. They hence sought to defend and consolidate their special regime and fell back on their Lebanist option. Given the fact that the political elite within the Mountain, deeply divided and mainly concerned to preserve its vested interests, had failed to take any relevant action, a group of Lebanese not directly involved in politics and generally residing outside the Mountain took upon themselves the responsibility to defend and eventually strengthen their regime.

For the first time to date, they formed special associations to defend their autonomy. Accordingly, members of the Lebanese community in Egypt established in February 1909 the *Alliance Libanaise*. This association, presided over by Iskandar ‘Ammun, a distinguished lawyer and brother of Salim ‘Ammun, notably included Daud ‘Ammun, their third brother, who had by then renounced his fervent Ottomanist ardor; Daud Barakat, editor-in-chief of *al-Ahram*; Antun Jumayyil, another editor of the same newspaper; Yusuf Sawda, a lawyer; and Bulus Mas‘ad.⁴⁴ At the same time, the *Comité Libanais* of Beirut pursued its activities there, while Khairallah Khairallah, a journalist of the *Le Temps*, and Shukri Ghanem, disillusioned by the policy pursued by the Young Turks,⁴⁵ formed in Paris another *Comité Libanais*. Similarly, in New York, some members of the Lebanese community established yet a third *Comité Libanais* headed by Na‘um Mukarzel, owner and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *al-Huda*.

All of these groups maintained close ties with one another but never merged into one association nor evolved into a unified political party. They did not try to mobilize and organize the Lebanese population around a clear political program but mostly confined their activity to writing press articles, issuing pamphlets, and dispatching petitions and delegations to the powers to express their desiderata and press them to act on their behalf. Hence, the activity of these groups never really expanded beyond the limited number of activists who constituted them. Their contribution to the Lebanese cause was nonetheless significant: they were responsible for the promotion and dissemination of programs aiming at the consolidation of the status of the Mountain and the articulation of core ideas and views around which Lebanism crystallized in this new phase.

Prompted by their “excessive fears,” the members of these associations exhibited an extreme sensitivity with respect to any change in the regulations of the

Mountain, protesting against all innovations, often on unfounded historical grounds. Such “exaggerated” claims were promptly dismissed by the French consul in Beirut, who commented: “They probably were not far from claiming for Lebanon a status somewhat analogous to that enjoyed by some Balkan States before their complete emancipation. Since the province is under the protection of the six Powers, the most fanatic of the Lebanese say that they do not believe that Turkey can have more rights over them than each of the protecting Powers.”⁴⁶

Nonetheless, the protests of the Lebanese activists evolved into more ambitious claims as time passed by and as the situation of the Ottoman Empire grew more precarious following the Italian takeover of Tripolitania in 1912 and the concurrent war waged by the Balkan states against it. These claims surfaced near the conclusion of Yusuf Pasha’s first mandate on July 8, 1912. On this occasion, and in view of the negotiations that were to take place between the powers and the Porte for the selection of a new governor, the *Alliance Libanaise* in Cairo adopted in April a list of desiderata including, notably, the strict application of the stipulations of the *Règlement*; the modification of the mode of election of the councilors and the enhancement of the prerogatives of the Administrative Council; the restriction of the powers of the governor and especially his arbitrary dismissal of officials; the opening of Lebanese ports to international navigation and the establishment of a commercial tribunal within the Mountain; and, finally, the increase of the revenues of the Lebanese administration by means of a new cadastre. They also decided to dispatch Daud ‘Ammun to Paris to present their claims to the French minister of foreign affairs.⁴⁷ This was followed by a roughly similar list presented by a new society, the *Arṣ* (Cedar) committee, headed by the two Khazin brothers, Farid and Philippe, to the foreign consuls in Beirut.⁴⁸

At the same time, in Paris, the *Comité Libanais* also prepared a *Mémoire* encompassing its own views regarding the reforms it wished to see adopted. The latter were much more elaborate than those of the *Alliance* and the *Arṣ* committee, including, for example, over and above the consolidation of the administrative and financial prerogatives of the Council, its attribution of legislative powers to allow it to “adopt the Ottoman codes which did not infringe on the administrative autonomy [of Lebanon] . . . and, if need be, to introduce necessary amendments.” More important, the program of the Paris committee presented claims for the enlargement of the boundaries of the territory included in the *mutasarrifiyya* based on economic considerations and widely exaggerated historical rights. Hence, the committee asserted: “Before 1860, Lebanon was a principality in vassalage

to Turkey, preserving its independence by paying a small tribute; it had its prince, its army, its laws, its ports, its customs service; it signed trade treaties and contracted alliances.”

In 1860, an International Conference had elaborated a special status for Lebanon, curtailing many of its former prerogatives and contracting its frontiers. Thus, the committee added, Lebanon was deprived of the ports of Beirut, Sayda, and Tripoli that used to belong to it and of certain rights that it used to enjoy in the Bekaa Valley. Moreover, since 1880, the Porte had withheld the payment of any subsidy to make good the deficit in its budget as called upon by the *Règlement*, thus accumulating a considerable sum to the benefit of the Mountain. Given that the revenues of Lebanon were insufficient to sustain its administration, and the poor financial situation of the Empire precluded the payment of the huge debt that the Porte owed Lebanon, the Paris committee suggested, by way of compensation, three different solutions. The first one was the “retrocession” of the ports of Beirut, Sayda, and Tripoli to Lebanon; the second, the annexation of the plains of the Bekaa and Baalbek; and the third, a loan guaranteed by the Porte to boost the economy of the Mountain.⁴⁹

The claims advanced by the *Alliance* and the Paris committee in 1912 summed up mostly those that would be reiterated on several occasions by the members of the Lebanese associations until the outbreak of World War I. These mainly focused on the consolidation of the autonomous status of the Mountain and the enlargement of its frontiers, along with the formulation of several arguments to support their demands. Hence, to justify claims for a wider autonomy, they first asked for a strict application of their *Règlement*, which in their opinion had been extensively infringed upon by the successive governors. At the same time, they interpreted quite widely the terms of this protocol, using sometimes the text and sometimes the spirit of its seventeen articles to justify their claims. At times, also, they went back to the alleged implicit intentions of the authors of this arrangement to strengthen their point. Finally, to add weight and legitimacy to all these arguments, they referred to more distant and questionable historical rights, contending, for instance, that before the establishment of the *mutasarrifiyya*, Lebanon was never a mere Ottoman province but a virtually independent principality only nominally subject to the central Ottoman government.⁵⁰

Similarly, to legitimate their claims for the extension of the frontiers of the Lebanese territory, the members of the Lebanese associations variously made use of alleged historical rights, economic needs, and the concept of natural frontiers first advanced by Lammens. Yet, it is important to stress here that all of the territorial

claims that emerged after those of the *Comité de Paris*, and up until 1914, were equally partial in that they demanded the annexation of the coastal towns, the Bekaa Valley, or some other adjoining district to the Lebanese territory. No claims for a Greater Lebanon, including at one and the same time the Bekaa, the three ports of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sayda, as well as the southern district of Bilad Bishara and the northern district of 'Akkar, arose during this period, even though the map drawn by the French military expedition of 1860, which later inspired claims by Lebanese activists for a Greater Lebanon and which they continually made use of in the 1918–10 period to legitimate their claim for the establishment of such an entity, seems to have been discovered by some activists by then. Mention of this map surfaced, for instance, in 1914, in a series of articles dealing with the situation in Mount Lebanon by George Vassié, a French national residing in Egypt and director of the Havas agency. After the 1860 massacres, he wrote: "The Mountain no longer recognized its own boundaries: to comprehend its painful surprise, one need only glance at the map of Lebanon drawn by the French expedition's surveying unit and compare it with today's maps." Linking then this alleged territorial amputation to the sorry financial situation in the Mountain, Vassié concluded that there existed only one solution to the Lebanese predicament, namely "le plus grand Liban." However, even in this instance, Vassié confined his demands to the annexation of parts of the Bekaa Valley to the east, some territories in the north and south, or the three ports of Beirut, Sayda, and Tripoli.⁵¹

Finally, the claims presented by the Lebanese activists until the outbreak of World War I never transcended the framework of an extended autonomy in favor of a full-fledged independence. In one of their latest and most ambitious requests in this sense, presented in 1913 to the French consul by Iskandar 'Ammun and Khairallah Khairallah, the two men asked for the appointment of a native governor elected by the population and confirmed by the Porte, or a European governor suggested by the powers and nominated by the Porte, instead of an Ottoman functionary, for the "autonomous Lebanese province."⁵²

It might therefore be said that the claims advanced by the Lebanese before World War I were not indicative of national separatist aspirations. They amounted mostly to reformist political programs focusing specifically on Mount Lebanon. Indeed, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 galvanized the elites of the Lebanese provinces that at first expected that their hopes for a thorough political reform of the Ottoman Empire would finally be realized. Many Lebanese, alienated by the constrained polity of the Mountain, welcomed the prospect to participate in this general movement of reform; some were even prepared to relinquish altogether

their special political status to be able to associate themselves fully with this movement. Others, more cautious, preferred to wait and see the effective materialization of the anticipated reforms in the rest of the Empire before renouncing their privileged status, which they thought could still shield them from an eventual failure of the Young Turks' bid to regenerate and elevate the Empire. Later developments within the Empire vindicated the point of view of this second party. As a result, the movement for the closer integration of the Mountain into the rest of the Empire died out slowly, and a greater consensus arose within the Mountain and among emigrant communities abroad for the preservation of the specific status of Mount Lebanon. Instead, members of the Lebanese elite began to form political associations to defend their regime, and they elaborated various programs for a thorough reform of the Lebanese political system and the consolidation of its autonomous status.

The reformist programs devised by the Lebanese political elite during the Young Turk era were similar in nature to those formulated at the same time by members of the Syrian elites to promote greater autonomy for the Syrian provinces; they all emerged simultaneously and they evolved in a parallel pattern. Furthermore, members of the Lebanese associations did not strictly confine their aspirations to an improvement of the situation in the Mountain. Many still envisaged Mount Lebanon's future within the framework of a larger Syrian entity and concurrently militated for a wider autonomy for the Syrian provinces as a whole. Hence, at a time when he was earnestly militating for the consolidation of the autonomy of Lebanon, Khairallah Khairallah published in 1912 a book entitled *La Syrie*, in which he envisioned the establishment of a Greater Syria "one and indivisible, where harmony will arise out of diversity." In this prospective Syrian entity, secular and democratic and based on the principle of decentralization, added Khairallah, echoing a view first propounded by Jouplain, Lebanon would play a leading role owing to its autonomous status that allowed it to develop in a climate of relative liberty. This autonomy, however, added Khairallah, was threatened by the many transgressions of the governors who used and abused their absolute authority, and its status needed to be consolidated. "The future of Syria depends greatly on that of Lebanon, which represents its soul and intellectual centre. To condemn it in this way, in the midst of its evolution, to inaction, is to pronounce its death sentence, and the death of Lebanon can only jeopardize the future of Syria," he concluded.⁵³

In a similar vein, Iskandar 'Ammun acted at one and the same time as president of the *Alliance Libanaise* and as vice president of the Decentralization Party,

established in 1912 in Cairo by Syrian emigrants and advocating the adoption of a decentralized system in the Ottoman Empire and more particularly in the Syrian provinces. This movement, which grew out of the disillusionment of Syrian and Lebanese activists with the policies of the Young Turks and the ability or willingness of the Ottoman government to push ahead reforms consonant with their aspirations, as well as their dwindling confidence in the ability of the government to protect the Empire from foreign threats, gained many adherents in Syria and more especially in Beirut, where a parallel Reform Society was established.⁵⁴

The Italian occupation of Tripolitania in 1912 and the Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War in 1913 weakened the attractiveness of the Ottomanist option and the plausibility of the autonomist and decentralization schemes that were *en vogue* among the Lebanese and Syrian elites at the time. Nonetheless, members of the Lebanese and Syrian elite, with a greater sense of urgency, held to their decentralist programs within the confines of the Empire. Hence, at the Syrian–Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913, and regrouping Syrian and Lebanese activists, Iskandar ‘Ammun declared: “After the bloody events that have just taken place, the Ottoman Empire is now caught between a painful past and a future fraught with ominous eventualities.” Reviewing the situation of the Empire, ‘Ammun concluded that the cause of all of the misfortunes of the Empire lay in the extreme centralization that had been implemented by the Ottoman government since the Young Turk Revolution. Hence he added, “a system of government that satisfied none of the components of the Ottoman Empire, that assured neither its integrity nor its prosperity, must disappear before it shakes loose the last cornerstones on which national unity rests.” He emphatically pointed to the decentralization program, allowing greater autonomy to the Empire’s diverse elements, as the only solution for a future association of the Arabs and the Ottomans: “Since we are at a time when only frankness may be appropriate, if the Turks wish to jump head first into the abyss, we shall not blame the Arabs if they hesitate before following them over the edge. . . . The Arabs do not want to separate their cause from that of their Ottoman brothers. . . . What they want is to replace the current system of government with another that is in harmony with the diversity of the Empire’s constituent parts.”⁵⁵

The Young Turks remained deaf to ‘Ammun’s firm warning, and shortly thereafter World War I broke out, pulling down the Empire in its wake. However, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire did not make things any easier for the Lebanese. Although it eliminated the Ottomanist option, it left options open and, moreover, disclosed new and unexpected opportunities.

World War I and its aftermath opened new prospects for members of the Lebanese elite within and without the Mountain. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of the Wilsonian principles of self-determination encouraged them to shift from their limited reformist autonomist schemes to more ambitious projects encompassing the independence of a Greater Lebanon or a Greater Syria. At the same time, these events established the necessity for members of the elite to make definite choices. It led them, once more, to reexamine and readjust their diverse political options and multiple identities and to spell out what they wanted. However, at the very time when events called for definite choices, members of the elite found themselves divided and irresolute, alternating elaborate political programs and strongly asserted national identities according to rapidly shifting circumstances and perspectives.

The terms of the debate were first set by the members of the elite in exile who took the initiative. While hostilities were still raging, they set out to formulate and promote political programs articulating their visions for the future. A significant majority of emigrants rallied at first behind a Greater Syria that promised to fulfill more fully their aspirations for a secular, liberal and democratic polity, while initially few favored the establishment of a Greater Lebanon. The plans devised by the Lebanese exiles were, however, rapidly overtaken by the tumultuous events within Lebanon and Syria during the fateful 1918–20 years, which foreclosed the Greater Syria option and led to the establishment of a Greater Lebanon.

This chapter examines the vacillations of the members of the Lebanese elite between the Greater Lebanon and Greater Syria schemes and the underlying political circumstances that ultimately led to the establishment of a Greater Lebanon.

THE EMIGRANTS' VIEWS: GREATER SYRIA OR GREATER LEBANON?

The outbreak of World War I at first paralyzed the Lebanese within and without the Mountain. The decision of the Ottoman government to side with Germany and Austria-Hungary and the initial reverses of the Entente powers confounded them and led them to retreat in a prudent reserve.¹ They reckoned that there was little they could do but wait and see the outcome of this worldwide conflict that overwhelmed them. Furthermore, the Mountain was soon engulfed in distressing problems of its own that consumed its inhabitants and prevented them from engaging in any independent activity.

It was only in 1917, as the situation in the Middle East started to tilt in favor of the Entente powers, that Lebanese emigrant communities abroad started to organize. Given that Lebanon was still under Ottoman control, the emigrants initiated—and thereafter greatly influenced—the campaign for the future of Lebanon, establishing several associations to that effect.² On June 16, in Paris, a group of Lebanese and Syrians exiles decided to form a *Comité Central Syrien* (CCS), headed by Shukri Ghanem, in order to centralize the efforts of the Syrian communities abroad, contribute to the liberation of Syria, and devise the form of its future government in agreement with France.³ At the same time, in New York, the League for the Liberation of Syria and Lebanon was established, presided over by Ayyub Tabet, with Amin Rihani as its vice president and Jubran Khalil Jubran as its secretary.⁴ These two committees called for the independence of a unified Greater Syria, including Lebanon, under the aegis of France and urged Syrians and Lebanese around the world to rally around this claim.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, the Arab Revolt launched by Sharif Husayn, British military preparations for a campaign in Syria, as well as appeals by the two committees galvanized members of the Lebanese and Syrian communities established there. While some, such as Iskandar ‘Ammun, president of the *Alliance Libanaise* and vice president of the Decentralization Party, decided to join the Arab camp, many rallied to the idea of a Greater Syria. Several small Syrian committees emerged in the various Egyptian towns and regrouped in a *Conseil des comités libano-syriens*

d’Egypte presided over by a Maronite notable, ‘Abdallah Sfeir, and including Lebanese and Syrians exiles such as Hakki al-‘Azam, Alphonse Zenié, and Edgar Tawil. For their part, some Lebanese activists, “surprised by the tendency of these milieux to assimilate Syria and Lebanon under one same government,” decided to reactivate the *Alliance Libanaise*—first established in 1909 to safeguard the autonomous status of the Mountain—and to advocate the independence of a Greater Lebanon within its “natural and historical” frontiers under the guarantee of the powers.⁵

Hence, during the last months of World War I, the three orientations that were to absorb the Lebanese, up until the establishment of the Lebanese and Syrian states in 1920, took shape: an independent Arab Greater Syria, governed by Faysal and linked to an Arab kingdom headed by Sharif Husayn of Mecca; an independent Greater Syria, under French or Western aegis and politically dissociated from the rest of the Arab world; a Greater Lebanon, sponsored by France and separate from the rest of Syria. While few Lebanese emigrants decided to join the Arab camp,⁶ the Greater Syria and the Greater Lebanon projects deeply divided their ranks, even though a significant majority favored the Greater Syria project that initially seemed to prevail among Lebanese and Syrian emigrant communities abroad.

Several factors accounted for the wide appeal of the Greater Syrian project among Lebanese and Syrian exiles. Since its emergence in the 1860s, the Greater Syria idea had gained widespread currency among the inhabitants of the Syrian provinces. Many political, economic, and social developments had imparted a tangible reality to the Syrian entity and contributed to the prevalence of a sense of belonging to a Syrian homeland. The implementation of the process of Ottoman reforms had introduced regular and uniform administrative structures in the Syrian provinces and ensured order and security throughout the country. The laying of an extensive road and railway network had stimulated trade and exchanges among the main towns and regions and contributed to the close economic integration of the Syrian provinces. Social interactions among the various parts of the country had intensified as people moved about more freely, traded with each other, or settled in other parts of the country that offered better opportunities. As a result, a distinct feeling of Syrian identity had developed among the inhabitants of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces who began to perceive themselves as Syrians, to call themselves Syrians or *Surriyin*, and to be identified as such by others.

Such a feeling of Syrian identity was more deeply shared by members of the elite, who interacted with each other frequently in various political and administrative institutions, engaged together in commercial or business relationships, or

mixed together in clubs and cultural associations and on other social occasions. It was all the more pronounced among emigrant communities abroad, where exile conditions had drawn Lebanese and Syrian exiles who lived and worked in closely knit communities. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the growing identification of the political and intellectual elite with a Syrian entity had inspired many reformers to formulate schemes focusing specifically on the Syrian provinces and contributed to the formation of the decentralization and reform associations in which Syrian and Lebanese elites had collaborated together within the Syrian provinces and abroad.⁷

When the war and the impending liberation of Syria by the Allies opened up the perspective of a Greater Syria, many Lebanese emigrants in France, Egypt, and the Americas therefore rallied behind this project, which offered a better promise of fulfilling a long-awaited dream to establish a modern, secular, and thriving entity, “a great and beautiful homeland”⁸ that would merge all of its diverse elements and allow them to transcend their communal divisions.⁹ In Egypt, home to the largest and most active Lebanese community abroad,¹⁰ many former members of the *Alliance Libanaise* left this organization, preferring to join the various Syrian committees. Explaining the reasons for such a change of mind, a former member of the *Alliance Libanaise* expressed a commonly held view: “Before the war, every sincere, sensible Lebanese had to be a member of the *Alliance Libanaise*, whose mission was to defend the Mountain’s privileges, . . . constantly threatened by Turkish bad faith. . . . Since the war, every sincere, sensible Lebanese should quit an association that no longer has a purpose . . . as the victory of France and her Allies meant . . . complete and total liberation not only for Lebanon but for all of Syria.” Many among the Lebanese, he finally concluded, “who like me used to belong to this association before the war, have now detached themselves from it.”¹¹

Nevertheless, although the proponents of a Greater Syria seemed to have taken the lead over their rivals in the *Alliance*, driving the latter clearly in the minority,¹² their case was far from conclusive. Syria had historically never existed as an independent entity; it had no distinct historical state traditions to uphold, no ancient boundaries to restore, and no clearly defined nationality to sanction. Furthermore, its territory was contested by a number of rival claimants, including various Lebanese associations that wanted to establish a Greater Lebanon in parts of the country; an Arab party that maintained that Syria was an Arab country and should as such be integrated in an Arab kingdom; and last but not least France and England, who had agreed to partition the country and to establish several incongruous

and ill-defined entities. To support their case, the proponents of a Greater Syria therefore advanced a mix of political, economic, geographic, and strategic arguments. Like their Lebanist and Arabist rivals, and other new aspiring nations around the world, they selectively manipulated, balanced, and combined the different elements of their case to further their cause, evoking self-determination principles when it suited them, economic and strategic considerations when these favored them, and questionable ethnographic criteria when these worked to their political advantage.

On the whole, the proponents of a Greater Syria presented their claims to self-determination as a self-evident incontrovertible fact. Syrians, they asserted, despite their communal and other differences, “formed incontestably a well-defined nationality.” Their country “possessed a geographical unity clearly defined by nature” and was bounded by clearly identifiable natural frontiers stretching from the Taurus in the north to the Isthmus of Suez in the south, and from the Mediterranean in the west to the Euphrates in the east. “Their future lay in the realization of their political unity” in their natural frontiers, which should be neither enlarged nor reduced.¹³ To forestall such an eventuality, advocates of a Greater Syria tried to systematically counter the claims of the supporters of a Greater Lebanon or of an Arab Empire, whose projects promised to wreck the prospects of an independent Greater Syria.

Hence, in a short pamphlet, Edgar Tawil, a former member of the *Alliance* who had joined the pro-Syrian committee in Egypt, denounced the members of the Lebanese associations who were trying to take advantage of the situation to irrevocably confirm the artificial partition between Lebanon and Syria. Availing themselves of the fact that Lebanon had enjoyed since 1860 a certain autonomy, he added, some Lebanese were advancing untenable geographic and ethnographic arguments to support their claim for complete independence. However, he went on, this autonomy was really a makeshift arrangement that had favored neither progress nor civilization. It had been adopted by the powers following the events of 1860 to protect its mainly Christian population against Turkish misrule. Persisting in such a path today would amount to the abandonment of the 750,000 Christians living outside the Mountain. Moreover, he concluded: “How and on what will a people confined to an enclosed rock, with no industry or resources, live? . . . Lebanon may be nominally independent, but it will surely be a vassal in fact. . . . Let there be no talk of expanding Lebanese territory, of encroaching on the coastal plain or the plain of the Bekaa. If we play that game, we may as well call Syria Lebanon and Lebanon Syria.”¹⁴

Tawil's pamphlet tackled the delicate problem of the Christian minorities in Lebanon and Syria and the means to guarantee their security and well-being, which partly underlay the claims of the Lebanist associations for an independent Greater Lebanon. Whereas the Lebanist parties envisaged the separation of a Greater Lebanon, which would incorporate roughly the coastal areas of Syria where the Christian element predominated, from the interior Muslim regions of the country, the Greater Syria advocates contemplated the establishment of a secular liberal constitutional regime under which all inhabitants would enjoy equal rights. The separate autonomous status of Lebanon, they contended, despite its drawbacks, had represented a necessary safeguard for the Christians of Lebanon against Ottoman misrule. However, with the liberation of Syria from Ottoman rule, such an arrangement was no longer justified nor opportune. The division of Syria into separate zones on the basis of communal considerations would only deepen communal tensions and rivalries. Furthermore, "a nationality cannot be based on religious faith;" this was contrary to the spirit of the time and to the principles of progress and civilization, and it was "hard to imagine, in this century of pervasive secularization and democratization, governmental regimes, temporal powers based on religious distinctions" or, for that matter, an Arab Empire that they feared would be based on Islamic principles.¹⁵ Rather, they argued, the best way to guarantee communal and particularist rights was to adopt "a constitutional regime, liberal enough to regroup all the small religious or ethnic communities and to bring them towards a conception of a Syrian homeland" and to institute a federal regime "respecting the customs and beliefs of each group and committed most of all to respect local liberties."¹⁶ In sum, for the proponents of a Greater Syria, the solution of the Syrian question lay in "the reconstitution of an integral Syria, home to a unique Syrian nationality, irrespective of sects and religions, on the basis of a federal system and democratic government devoid of a religious character, the only system liable to lead Syria on the way of national union and consequently of civilization and progress, since the union among the inhabitants of a same country form the essential basis of its progress and its prosperity."¹⁷

By the same token, the advocates of a Greater Syria dismissed the obsolete ethnic considerations advanced by their Lebanese and Arab rivals—and the Zionists, for that matter—to partition or enlarge the Syrian entity: "We should not . . . invoke the political and ethnic divisions of antiquity as reasons for dividing ourselves into meager regions and thereby condemn ourselves to turning back the clock 20, 30 or even 40 centuries to the time of the Hebrews, the Phoenicians and

the Canaanites. . . .”¹⁸ The Syrians, they asserted, formed a distinct people whose unity had been forged by the necessity of a common social and economic life, and “the inhabitants of Syria, whatever their religion today, are in great majority the descendants of all the ancient native peoples of the country, the Arameens, Channeans, Chaldeans, Phoenicians, Assyrians . . . and the descendants of other races which have come later . . . such as the Hebrews . . . the Persians . . . the Greeks, the Romans, the Franks and the Arabs.”¹⁹ Finally, the advocates of Greater Syria stressed that the country formed one economic unit and that any division of Syria would impair its economic development and future prosperity, since the interior plains needed access to the sea and the coastal areas needed the produce of the plains of the interior.

Nonetheless, the proponents of a Greater Syria appreciated that their “dream” was only an ideal that they wished to achieve, and many concrete obstacles hampered its fulfillment. Indeed, if the idea of establishing a Greater Syria captivated them, they feared lest their many communal and ethnic divisions would soon engulf this prospective Syrian entity in chaos and anarchy. At the same time, they feared the conversion of their ideal Syrian entity into a new Islamic state, whereas what they had in mind was the establishment of a secular nation-state along Western lines. This is why they claimed the support of some Western power—preferably France—which they naively believed would generously help them to establish such an ideal entity.²⁰

“A feeling of national unity,” reckoned, for example, the *Conseil des comités Libano-syrien d’Egypte*, “did not exist in Syria but needed to be created.” All those who asserted the ability of the Syrians to govern themselves independently, it added, did not base their argument on solid grounds. They proceeded only by analogy, arguing that if other people, that is, the Greeks, the Serbs, and the other Balkan populations, had proven able to do so, then the Syrians should also be capable of self-government. However, the committee remarked, they seemed to forget that these “populations were homogeneous, united by racial and religious links, and unanimous in their national aspirations, without divergences among them, and they had common leaders who contributed to ensure their national unity,” whereas Syria lacked all these essential conditions.²¹

All the arguments of the Greater Syria advocates did not, however, seem to convince the partisans of a Greater Lebanon who, undismayed by the desertion of many of their former partisans to the Syrianist associations, persisted in their dissenting campaign. Their point of view was mainly propounded at the time by the *Alliance Libanaise* and more particularly by Auguste Adib Pasha, a retired

official of the Egyptian administration who took over the presidency of the *Alliance Libanaise* in Egypt after the resignation of Iskandar ‘Ammun, and Yusuf Sawda, a lawyer who headed the Alexandria branch of the *Alliance*. Each published a book making the case for the independence of a Greater Lebanon and developing a comprehensive narrative and distinct claims to support their objective.

Adib Pasha’s book, *Le Liban après la guerre*, maintained that Lebanon’s claims to independence lay first in its historical right, which it earned by virtue of the “perennial” autonomy that the Mountain enjoyed throughout history, and in the legacy of Fakh al-Din and Bashir II, who unified the Mountain under the rule of a single local dynasty. After the events of 1860, he added, reiterating an argument first expounded by Lammens and elaborated on later by Jouplain, the International Commission deprived Lebanon of its “natural frontiers,” which also corresponded to its historical frontiers. On this last point, however, Adib Pasha conceded that the limits of the Lebanese entity had greatly varied throughout the centuries; nevertheless, he added, these frontiers were well delimited and had been “acknowledged by the map drawn by French expeditionary Corps in 1860–1861 as belonging to Lebanon.”²² It is interesting to note here the resurgence of the map drawn by Beaufort in 1860–61, which Lebanese activists had rediscovered by that time and which all partisans of a Greater Lebanon thereafter adopted as a standard and yardstick of legitimacy for the “natural and historical frontiers” they were claiming. An entire narrative was developed around this map by the Greater Lebanon advocates who alleged that Lebanon had been deprived of these natural and historical boundaries in 1861 by the Ottoman foreign minister Fuad Pasha and the British commissioner Lord Dufferin, who had conspired to limit the autonomy of the Mountain and “amputated” its territory. Hence, by claiming an enlarged Greater Lebanon, the Lebanese activists claimed that they were merely asking for the restoration of historical Lebanon and the annexation of territories that had been “severed from it in 1861 and which, nevertheless, belonged to it geographically, economically and historically.”²³ Adib Pasha furthermore invoked the principle of self-determination to bolster the claims of the association he was heading for “the full independence of Lebanon in its natural and historical frontiers, under the guarantee of the Powers,” stressing emphatically at the same time the imperative necessity of extending its territory since “to live freely and to prosper, the Lebanese needed not only their political independence, but also the extension of their territory to include its natural frontiers,”²⁴ which were essential to ensure its economic survival. Adib Pasha admitted in this context that the right to self-determination that he was invoking for the Lebanese might

clash with the extension of the same right to the inhabitants of the territories that Lebanon wanted to annex and who might refuse to be joined to Lebanon. But, he added, Lebanon had a preeminent right over these territories by virtue of its imprescriptible historical rights and, more important, by virtue of “the right to life, which cannot be denied to any people, large or small, strong or weak” and that must prevail over other considerations. “Without these territories, Lebanon cannot live or prosper,” he concluded.²⁵

Yusuf Sawda’s book reiterated arguments similar to those put forward by Adib Pasha, adding, however, some original and at times extravagant details to the latter narrative. In his historical survey, Sawda took pains to stress the distinct history of Lebanon within its Syrian environment because “contrary to what many people thought” Lebanon had had a separate history.²⁶ As a matter of fact, he maintained, the fate of the Lebanese had always been to fight for their own liberty and independence against repeated attempts by the Arab and Ottoman conquerors to subdue them and to merge Lebanon with the remaining Syrian provinces.²⁷ Sawda’s insistence on this point aimed to justify his claim for a Greater Lebanon separate from its Syrian environment by projecting into the ancient past the divide he wanted to maintain between these two entities in the future. Moreover, he was imparting on the historical mission of the Lebanese, as he viewed it, a modern and secular dimension that appealed to the West, namely their traditional struggle for liberty.

In the same vein and in a further bid to appeal to Western sympathy and support for Lebanon’s claims to independence, Sawda underscored the ancient and central contribution of the Lebanese to world civilization. The ancestors of the Lebanese—the Phoenicians—he asserted, were the original founders of civilization. “They invented the alphabet and navigation and many other remarkable industries and they taught the world the art of commerce by land and by sea.” They were the precursors of the Egyptian, Greeks, and the Romans and they served as their model.²⁸ Having thus appropriated the Phoenician legacy and established the ancient and glorious past of the Lebanese since the very beginning of history, Sawda elaborated his point: “If Europe had helped to liberate the modern Italians and Greeks, it did so in recognition of the role of their forefathers in the founding of civilization.” Therefore, he went on, “the Lebanese were even more entitled to this help than they were.” Furthermore they had fought for their independence more than the Balkan populations did, and they benefited much less from Western help.²⁹ Since the days of Fakhr-al-Din II, he went on, and up until the reign of Bashir II, Lebanon’s princes had tried to free themselves from

the Ottoman domination. Thereafter, Europe tried to intervene on their behalf. However, whereas European intervention and assistance in the Balkans led to the independence of these populations, in Lebanon, it had an opposite effect. It led a first time, in 1840, to the division of this country, and a second time, in 1860, to the deprivation of its right to national rule and the amputation of territories essential for its survival.³⁰

European intervention, Sawda conceded, ensured a limited autonomy that secured peace in Lebanon but constrained its prosperity.³¹ It was therefore time for Europe to make up for this oversight and fulfill its “duty” toward this country, he concluded, expressing the hope that the future peace settlement would complete the work that Europe had begun in 1861.³² As part of the European assistance he was calling for, Sawda specifically appealed to France. Restating here another theme first advanced by Murad, he insisted on the ancient relationship between the Lebanese and French, who had always helped each other in case of need. Since the days of the Crusades, he wrote, the Lebanese had extended many services to France, who, for its part, benefited from its special association with the inhabitants of the Mountain to consolidate its influence in the East.³³ Therefore, he inferred, the French had a “moral debt” to discharge to the Lebanese, who were badly in need of their support. Indeed, he stressed, the fate of the Lebanese rested today in the hands of the French. However, he concluded: “By asking for the help of the French, the Lebanese had no intention of forsaking their previous independence. . . . They believed that France was greater and nobler than such deals, and that she will help the Lebanese because of the many services the latter had extended to her throughout history.”³⁴ Finally, Sawda did not neglect to refer to the recent declarations of the Allies, and the Wilsonian principles, to strengthen all his diverse arguments and bolster his claim. Since today the right of small nations to independence has been recognized, he wrote, Lebanon should be granted its full independence and given wide enough boundaries to allow it to live.³⁵

Sawda and Adib Pasha obscured in their respective books one important underlying consideration for establishing separate Lebanese and Syrian entities, namely the fact that Lebanon was overwhelming Christian, whereas, in a Greater Syria, the Christians would be outnumbered by a Muslim majority. They preferred to refer to more modern and universal ideas, advancing historical, cultural, and socio-economic arguments to promote their ideal, which they equally perceived as a “beautiful dream.”³⁶ This omission might be attributed to the authors’ attempt to curry favor with Western powers and audiences by framing their claims in secular and universal terms that they thought would appeal to them. It also reflected a

more secular outlook among part of the Lebanese elite within the Mountain and abroad who viewed the specificity of the Lebanese in cultural and social terms, as well as the distinct experience and views of the emigrants and elites of the Mountain and the coastal areas for whom intercommunal cooperation in government institutions, associations, and business enterprises had, if not totally overcome communal allegiances, nevertheless created a certain sense of secular though ill-defined nationality.

In the end, the earnest campaigns of the emigrants to gain support for their respective ideals were overtaken by events on the ground in Lebanon and Syria after their liberation in October 1918. Circumstances then eventually favored the proponents of a Lebanese option, as the prospects for a Greater Syria matching the aspirations of their Syrianist rivals was overshadowed by a competing Arab Greater Syria agenda and by the intervention of foreign powers that spawned a bitter contest over the future of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces. The views and writings of the Lebanist and Syrianist emigrants did nevertheless have an impact in Mount Lebanon and its neighboring provinces, where the ideas first adopted and circulated by the emigrants gained currency. Furthermore, their views revealed a still open realm of possibilities for the Lebanese and Syrian provinces that were foreclosed by events in the following months.

LEBANON AND SYRIA AT THE END OF THE WAR: THE UNMAKING OF SYRIA

Meanwhile, in Lebanon and Syria, the long war years had exhausted the local populations. Heavy conscription, famine, disease, economic and social hardships had caused widespread suffering and destitution across the Lebanese and Syrian provinces, afflicting nearly all sections of the population. Large numbers of men were drafted and sent to fight in often distressing conditions on faraway fronts in Anatolia, Iraq, and Egypt. A climate of fear swept through the country as the Ottoman military governor, Jamal Pasha, arrested and executed on tenuous charges of treason thirty-three leading Lebanese and Syrian figures and sent more than two hundred Lebanese and Syrian notables into exile in Anatolia. However, for most inhabitants of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces the most traumatic experience of the war years centered around severe economic conditions, chronic food shortages, and a dreadful famine that devastated the country between 1915 and 1918.³⁷

While the famine spread to many regions of Syria, affecting more particularly the poor classes and the coastal areas, its effects were most severely felt in Mount

Lebanon, which found itself particularly vulnerable to the combination of factors that set it off. An Allied blockade of the coastal Mediterranean ports barred imports of foods, stemmed the flow of emigrants' remittances on which the Mountain heavily depended, and halted the export of silk cocoons, its main cash crop. A plague of locusts in 1915 destroyed harvests in the Mountain and the surrounding areas, exacerbating wartime food shortages caused by military requisitions and high inflation. Rampant corruption and profiteering, made worse by government inefficiency and neglect bordering on malevolence, further hindered the transfer of essential food supplies to the population of Lebanon. The ravages of the famine in the Mountain were devastating. Starvation and disease hit nearly every village, reducing the population of some by more than half and wiping out at times the entire populations of isolated villages, while leaving the majority of surviving inhabitants of the Mountain in a state of utter destitution. Altogether, according to estimates, nearly a third of its prewar population perished.

By the time the Allied forces reached Damascus, Beirut, and Lebanon, they were therefore greeted by relieved but exhausted crowds who seemed willing to acclaim any forces that promised to put an end to their ordeal. Their feelings were, however, soon tested by a new but no less daunting set of circumstances. The bitter experience of the war years had finally pushed the inhabitants of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces to turn the page on their Ottoman past. But the end of the Ottoman era opened new opportunities and presented difficult challenges and dilemmas they had not anticipated and were not prepared to confront. In the prewar period, when the forceful centralizing efforts of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had shaken the status quo and the Balkan war had renewed concerns about the survival of the Empire, a small number of activists had started to envisage separatist schemes. However, local political elites had showed little interest in grand schemes that might disrupt the established, though threatened, order of things, and many had instead rallied together to safeguard the status quo by means of elaborate plans for the decentralization of the Syrian and Lebanese provinces within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.

The demise of the Ottoman Empire forced local Lebanese and Syrian elites to confront the uncertain prospects of self-determination and political independence, but their ostensible embrace of the idiom of nationalism hardly concealed their uncertainty and ambiguity about the boundary and essence of nationhood and their misgivings about the potential hazards of self-government and independence. For the most part, their nationalist stances evolved from, and continued to be influenced by, their prewar local and communal allegiances and interests and their reformist

and decentralist plans for the Syrian provinces.³⁸ These plans corresponded to their general perception of the Syrian provinces as a sphere of common interests, ties, and sentiments. In turn, the perception of Syria as a distinct geographic and economic unit predisposed many members of the Syrian and Lebanese elite to envision Syria, by default, as an alternative potential political entity of choice or necessity after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.³⁹ At the very least, as subsequent events would show, local elites were reluctant to envisage the merger of the Syrian provinces into a larger entity, and many recognized the detrimental socioeconomic effects that their eventual partition might entail.

At the same time, if past trends and common interests had to a certain extent tended to bring the elites and the populations of the Syrian provinces closer together, they had not done so evenly. The unequal and uneven incorporation of the various parts of the country had also contributed to generate many tensions and to sustain and reproduce the division of Syrian society along local, regional, religious, sectarian, sociocultural, and other lines. These divides were furthermore accentuated by the conflicting principles and haphazard implementation of the Ottoman reforms that, notwithstanding their centralizing tendency, continued to accommodate the religious, social, and cultural differences of diverse social groups by means of various administrative and legal measures.⁴⁰ These divides, in turn, fostered various forms of local and communal solidarities and loyalties and a diversity of particularisms, among which Lebanese particularism represented only one among many other variants. The significance of these particularisms varied from place to place and waxed and waned over time in relation to state policies and a web of intersecting ties and interests. They did not necessarily prefigure any fragmentation of the society along these diverse lines but could, depending on circumstances and opportunities, obstruct, confuse, or simply color eventual efforts to draw the boundaries and character of a prospective state in the Syrian provinces and to define the essence of nationhood.

Finally, if local elites embraced the rhetoric of self-determination and independence, many recognized, albeit grudgingly, the need for foreign assistance and support for the establishment of their prospective state and its future security and development. However, they differed on the kind of help they expected. While some wanted to restrict foreign assistance as far as possible for fear that foreign support might devolve into foreign occupation, others, belonging most notably to the various minority communities, Christian or otherwise, were willing to agree to a stronger foreign presence to safeguard their rights within that state.

In sum, despite many uncertainties and potential issues of disagreement among the Lebanese and Syrian elites, their thinking was still informed by the prewar decentralization programs, and these plans might conceivably have provided some foundations for an understanding among local elites had circumstances been more favorable. Instead, the fate of Lebanon and Syria remained suspended for two long years, captive to an intense triangular contest among France, Britain, and Faysal for control over Syria, which fanned a series of growing and intersecting tensions and confrontations, intensified internal divisions and intrigues, and plunged the Lebanese and Syrian provinces into chaos and confusion. A fleeting chance to bring together the various Syrian and Lebanese populations united by their common disaffection with Ottoman rule at the end of the war was hence lost, and the whole country fell prey to centrifugal forces unleashed by the collapse of government institutions and a state of lawlessness, leaving behind a bitter legacy of rancor and resentment that thereafter became difficult to overcome.

During the war Britain and France had sought to delimit their spheres of influence in the Middle East to forestall potential conflicts in the postwar era. But the Sykes-Picot Agreement that they signed in 1916 was quickly overtaken by events and ended up causing more acrimony than harmony. By the end of hostilities the ill-fated agreement seemed to please no one, not least its two main authors. By March 1918, Sir Mark Sykes had already conceded that the agreement was “completely out of date,” and he warned his French counterpart, Georges Picot, that the crudely imperialist terms of the agreement would need to be revised in light of the principle of “the consent of the governed” dear to the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson. For his part, Picot, who was by then merely conducting a rearguard battle to salvage as far possible the beleaguered Franco-British settlement, conceded the need to put a more enlightened spin on the agreements. As a result, the British and the French governments had issued in November 1918 a joint declaration that, without explicitly disavowing the 1916 agreement, promised “the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations,” albeit under the guidance and with support of the two European powers.⁴¹

British high officials, for their part, were contemplating much more radical alterations to the “obsolete and impracticable” 1916 agreement, if not its abrogation. Not only did they covet full control in Palestine and the annexation of Mosul province to the British zone in Iraq, but they hoped to persuade France to give up its claim to Syria, and if that proved unfeasible, to reduce its zone of influence

as far as possible. In this respect, British officials had determined that Britain had “less direct political interest in Syria than in any other of the Arab countries,” and for them Syria therefore seemed to present a good opportunity to redeem Britain’s pledges to the Arabs and to put in operation the principle of self-determination that it was disinclined to allow in its own spheres of influence in Palestine and Iraq. The War Cabinet Eastern Committee, set up in 1918 to formulate British Middle East policy, hence envisaged to recognize the independence of Syria “under an effective [Arab] Government friendly to the British Empire,” thus allowing Britain to gain indirect influence in the country while limiting that of France, if absolutely necessary, to areas where it had special historical interests, namely Lebanon and Beirut, and Alexandretta for good measure.⁴² Britain did not only propose to revise to its own satisfaction the terms of the 1916 agreement but, taking advantage of its predominant position on the ground, proceeded at the end of the war to unilaterally shape events to its advantage. Britain installed Faysal in Damascus and allowed him to establish a quasi-independent Arab government in the Syrian hinterland. At the same time, Britain allowed France to extend, within strict limits, its control over the Syrian coastal areas.⁴³ Britain’s decision to partition the country into two distinct administrative spheres did not satisfy, however, either the French or Faysal, and it stirred up a fierce competition between both sides for control over all of Syria.

British schemes in Syria only served to harden the French position. France had laid claim to Syria to uphold its significant financial and economic interests in the eastern Mediterranean, to preserve its cultural influence, and last but not least to safeguard its status as a great power. France considered it unacceptable that “the victory of the Entente should result in the destruction of the historic heritage of France in Levant,” all the more so since Britain was carving for itself a large empire in the region. France’s grand ambitions, however, were constrained by practical realities. While France was consumed by the war with Germany on its eastern frontier, Great Britain had taken the lead in military operations in the Middle East and had occupied with only symbolic French participation all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. France was therefore not only outmaneuvered and outnumbered by Britain in Syria, but contrary to its inflated expectations, France had not received the warm and appreciative welcome it thought it deserved from the local populations of the country. The Christian populations of the coastal areas and Lebanon had, it is true, welcomed the arrival of the French troops, but in Damascus the newly established Arab government made it bluntly known that French services were not needed there or in the rest of the country. Moreover, in

the coastal areas and Lebanon that fell under its control, the small French contingent was utterly overwhelmed by the tasks at hand, including an urgent need for a vast assistance program, infrastructure rehabilitation, the maintenance of law and order, and the supervision of the administrative apparatus. The helplessness of the French forces stood in sharp contrast to the much larger and better-equipped British forces that lorded over them, further contributing to undermine their standing with the local populations. France was hence forced to concede that the changed circumstances called for some concessions, and it considered that it had duly obliged by liberally renouncing its claims in Palestine and Mosul in favor of Britain. But France refused to budge any further; it firmly held on to the Sykes-Picot clauses relating to Syria that granted France a sphere of direct control along the coast and a sphere of indirect influence in the interior. France, however, recognized the need to recast the clauses of the agreement in terms more in step with the principles adopted by the Peace Conference. Accordingly, France submitted to Britain, at the beginning of the month of February 1919, a proposal that advocated the abolition of the zone of direct French control in the coastal zone and its merger with the inland zone under a common regime "to be subsequently defined." France tried to present the suppression of the zone of direct control as a liberal measure inspired by the decision of the Allies "to repudiate any annexation." A less charitable interpretation of French motives would suggest that the merger of both regions under one regime was meant to allow France to extend its control more firmly in the inland zone, where the Sykes-Picot Agreement granted France only vague economic and supervisory rights. Furthermore, the French government argued, Syria formed "a geographical, historical and economic unit," and its division into two distinct zones was impractical. "The *vilayets* of Damascus and Aleppo cannot be separated from those of Beirut and Lebanon," and the dismemberment of the country was in any case "rejected by the general opinion of the populations whose interests are at stake." France's concern with the interests and well-being of the populations of Syria was not, however, strictly disinterested. These diverse populations, the document concluded, "accustomed to look to France," were not yet ripe for existence without tutelage, and it was therefore "for the French government an obligation to claim Syria as a sphere of influence."⁴⁴ In sum, France claimed a mandate over all of Syria. However, France's hand was weak; it badly needed the assistance of Britain, who controlled militarily the country to facilitate the consolidation of the French position on the ground, and it needed the political support of Britain to support its claim for a Syrian mandate at the Peace Conference. On both counts, however, British support

was not forthcoming, and British maneuvers to ease France out of Syria served only to infuriate French officials and to strengthen their determination to impose a French mandate over all of Syria.

Faysal also laid claim to the whole of Syria. By some strange twist of fortune, the young Arabian prince had found himself propelled in the postwar period to a leading role on the Syrian and Arab political scene. He was installed in October 1918 by the British as the *de facto* ruler of Syria, and he was intent on consolidating his position as the future leader of the country. Faysal viewed Syria as the “gem in the Arab crown,” the linchpin of any prospective Arab kingdom, and he considered that “if that goes to other hands, the Arab countries will suffer a loss that will cripple them forever.”⁴⁵ But his position was precarious and depended in great part on his chances of realizing his grand but still elusive projects. He had gained his position in Syria as the representative of his father, the Sharif Husayn, who claimed to represent all the Arab-speaking people and who hoped to establish an Arab Empire, an ideal shared in its broad lines by Faysal and his closest associates, the young Arab officers, and a coterie of Arab nationalists. In his first proclamation to the Syrian people, Faysal announced the “establishment of an Arab Constitutional Government . . . fully and absolutely independent, in the name of our Lord, Sultan Husayn.” This government, he claimed, was to extend over “all Syria.”⁴⁶ However, the local populations did not seem to relish the subordination of their country to the Hejaz and their incorporation into a larger and elusive Arab Empire. They were willing to accept Faysal as their new leader, provided he conducted himself “as a Syrian, relying on neither Sherifian nor Bedouin support.”⁴⁷ Faysal recognized the need to placate local sentiments to consolidate his own position in Syria, and he therefore tried to follow a policy that would reconcile at one and the same time “those who were thinking only of Syria and those who favoured a great Pan-Arab State.”⁴⁸ He readjusted his overall strategy, giving precedence to the immediate independence of Syria while continuing to advocate the establishment of an Arab federation embracing Syria, Iraq, and Palestine and the Hejaz, which will “eventually” unite in some undetermined future.⁴⁹ But this equivocal stances did not satisfy the local elites who remained wary of his grand projects, which they attributed to the uncompromising stances of the young Arab officers in pursuit “of an exaggerated political ideal for the attainment of which, or the off chance of its attainment, they are ready to set the Syrian provinces ablaze.”⁵⁰ At the same time, Faysal’s stance did not please his father, who tried to call him to order, or his Arab nationalist supporters, many of whom hailed mostly from Iraq and Palestine and who opposed a policy focused only on Syria. More important, Faysal’s ambitions

faced serious difficulties in Syria, where France's claim to a mandate threatened to undermine his bid to independence, and France's occupation of the coastal area blocked all access to the seaports, leaving him with "a house without a door."⁵¹ Nevertheless, Faysal gambled that he could drive out the French from Syria and assert his authority over the coastal areas and Lebanon, with British assistance if need be. But he misjudged French determination and the extent of British support, and his policies eventually put him on a collision course with France.

The relentless clash between France and Faysal over Syria radicalized and polarized the local populations. Both sides tried to advance their own interests by supporting and abetting opposing local parties, thus enhancing their ambitions and amplifying their claims. In turn, local parties tried to take advantage of the situation to advance idealistic and maximalist agendas and to impose their own schemes over reluctant opponents instead of trying to reach out to them, thus further accentuating the polarization of the populations.

On the face of it, the main line of division separated the mainly Muslim proponents of an independent Arab Syrian entity, backed by Britain, against the mostly Christian supporters of a separate Greater Lebanon, backed by France. However, the growing polarization of the populations in two well-defined and increasingly antagonistic camps, in which nationalist alignments seemingly matched religious allegiances, concealed a wild diversity of social and communal cleavages within each camp, encompassing a vast array of often conflicting local interests and loyalties. More important, it obscured the ambivalence, tentativeness, and fluidity of declared political allegiances and strongly asserted nationalist stances, which continued to vary according to uncertain and rapidly changing circumstances and opportunities. This is not to say that the nationalist stances of the local populations were contrived and artificial, mere facades meant to conceal deeper and more genuine interests and identities, although such instances no doubt did occur. The war years, the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the interregnum period that followed admittedly accelerated the crystallization of national feelings and identifications among the local populations. However, while the exacerbation of the contest over the future of Syria and Lebanon intensified nationalist feelings, the motivations of the disparate groups who joined the different nationalist camps varied greatly, and their commitments to the overall nationalist struggle remained ambivalent and tentative as long as the general situation remained unsettled and the prospects of the conflicting national projects uncertain.

The temptation for the historian is great to try to impart some order on this complex situation by weaving a narrative pitting two well-defined camps—Arab Syrian nationalists on the one hand against particularistic and communal separatists on the other hand. However, such a narrative tends to mirror too closely the narrative of nationalist activists, emphasizing a unity of purpose and sentiments among the populations they claimed to represent and concealing the diversity and fluidity of nationalist views and commitments among the majority of the population in the Lebanese and Syrian provinces during the interregnum period. The nationalist frenzy that swept through the Lebanese and Syrian provinces admittedly contributed to the dissemination of nationalist ideas and agendas and to the mobilization of the local populations behind differing nationalist agendas. However, for the most part, the nationalist visions and the commitment of key actors and significant segments of the population to the different nationalist agendas remained much more tentative and conditional than portrayed in traditional nationalist narratives.

LEBANON'S SHIFTING SANDS

In the Lebanese Mountain, the end of the Ottoman era caught the local elites and population unawares and unprepared, with no clear plan for dealing with the new situation and explicit national claim to uphold. In contrast to the Lebanese activists abroad, who had started during the war years to formulate elaborate and ambitious programs for the independence of a Greater Lebanon or a Greater Syria, the local elite and population had had to face endless and grievous difficulties, including the occupation of the Mountain by Ottoman troops; the abolition of the special status of the Mountain; political repression and persecution, arrests and executions and the banishment of many local leaders; and last but not least, a severe and dreadful famine that started in 1916 and intensified in the following years. As they emerged from the war, distressed, exhausted, and traumatized, they were overwhelmed by a new set of circumstances that called for a determined response. A new Arab government, which laid claim to the whole of Syria, including Lebanon, had been established by Faysal in Damascus, while French troops had disembarked in Beirut, proclaiming the beginning of a new order in Syria under their aegis. Nevertheless, despite the urgency of the situation, the leaders of the Mountain took some time to define their goals and claims, which they refined and revised in light of rapidly shifting and uncertain circumstances and opportunities. At first, local elites, still imbued

with their prewar aspirations, mainly contemplated the consolidation of the autonomy of the Mountain and an undefined extension of its boundaries, and a few months elapsed before they first staked a claim for the independence of a clearly delimited Greater Lebanon, whose contours clearly bore the mark of the programs formulated by the emigrants abroad. Capitalizing on these ideas, the Maronite Patriarch, Elias Hoyek, and the reconstituted Administrative Council took over the responsibility of articulating and promoting these claims over the next months.

The initial caution of the elite in the Mountain was due in part to the distressing conditions in Lebanon at the end of the war. When the Allied forces reached Beirut in the first week of October 1918, they were shocked by the “horrible spectacle” of starvation in the streets of Beirut, where the famine still claimed one hundred victims daily and where “the dying were groaning, lying next to dead corpses.” Many of these victims had tried to flee starvation in the Mountain, where the scenes of “misery were even more atrocious.” There the Allied soldiers found “along the roads skeletons with huge legs, letting themselves die” and passed through “empty villages, whose inhabitants had died from hunger and laid buried under the crumbling roofs of their houses.”⁵² The French, with the support of the British, mounted a swift and large-scale relief operation, distributing tons of food, and by December they had succeeded in stemming the famine and saving the remnants of the population.

The caution of the leaders of the Mountain was also due to the confused situation that emerged in Lebanon in the immediate aftermath of the war. In contrast to Damascus, where the British forces had promptly installed and backed an Arab government politically, militarily, and financially, the situation in Lebanon remained in a state of limbo following the departure of the last Ottoman governor on September 30. Lebanon, along with the whole coastal area from the Palestinian border up to Cilicia, was, according to an agreement reached on the same day by France and Britain, to be administered by the French, who only reached Beirut a week later. In the meantime, the Arab government rushed to fill the void and assert its authority over the whole area. On October 5, an envoy of the Damascus government had reached Beirut, where he endorsed the Arab government that had been established few days earlier by the notables of the city, and he proceeded two days later to the Mountain, where he appointed Habib Pasha Sa‘ad as governor of Lebanon in the name of King Husayn. In a brief ceremony, Sa‘ad swore allegiance to the Arab government, and the Arab flag was hoisted over the siege of the government in Baabda.⁵³ On the following day, however, the British and

the French forces reached Beirut, forced Faysal's envoy to return to Damascus, and entrusted the administration of the coastal area and the Mountain to French military governors. But, for two more weeks, neither the new French governor, Colonel Piépape, nor the political representative of French government, Robert Coulondre, found time to visit the Mountain. Left to themselves, the leaders of the Mountain waited; and indeed there was little they could do but wait.

In Baabda, Habib Pasha Sa'ad and the members of the Administrative Council were nominally in charge of government. But the coffers of the government were completely empty, and the country lay in ruin. Economic activity had come to a near standstill; silk production and export, the main industry and cash crop of the Lebanon, had been interrupted for the past four years by the Allied blockade; and most lands lay fallow for lack of people to tend them.⁵⁴ The dismal situation in the Mountain and the muddled political circumstances in the region left them with few options. The members of the Administrative Council had no authority to reinstitute the special status of the Mountain that, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the shattering of the international consensus that underlay it, fell under the authority of the International Peace Conference that was due to convene in Paris to determine the status of all the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire. Nor, apparently, did the councilors display an inclination to claim for themselves the right to reassert the former status of their province, let alone to proclaim the independence of the Mountain.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire had raised anew the question of the status of the Mountain, with which the leaders of the Mountain had grappled for the past decades without any satisfactory result. As they pondered their options for the immediate postwar period, the councilors must have recognized that there was no straightforward solution to the Lebanese question. A mere restoration of the former autonomous status of the Mountain was problematic. The autonomy of the Mountain had provided the Lebanese province peace and tranquility, but it had failed to bring it prosperity. Since the beginning of the century, the limited resources of the Mountain had ceased to provide for its growing population, pushing larger numbers of Lebanese to emigrate. Its public finances were unsustainable and, as the councilors well knew, its budget had shown a persistent deficit year after year. Furthermore, the war years had clearly shown the limits of the economic potential of the Mountain and the extent of its reliance on import of vital resources from the Syrian hinterland, export of silk to Western markets, and the remittances of its emigrant community. However, all other potential alternatives were equally problematic and, moreover, contingent on factors outside their

control. One solution was to relinquish the autonomy of the Mountain and to incorporate it into whatever entity might emerge on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Such a solution had been envisaged by some activists, councilors, and politicians, such as Habib Pasha Sa'ad, in 1908 in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution. But at that time, this option had been scuttled by those who favored a more cautious approach until the fate of the Empire under the Young Turks had been clearly established and later developments in the Empire had apparently vindicated their views. Therefore, as long as the nature and identity of the entity that might replace the Ottoman Empire remained unsettled, the councilors were understandably reluctant to take such a step.

Another solution was to enlarge the boundaries of the autonomous province of Lebanon. This option had already been advocated by some Lebanese activists before the war who had lobbied for the incorporation of the Bekaa or the coastal ports of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sayda into the autonomous province of Lebanon. But at that time the councilors had shied away from endorsing such a claim, and they advocated instead more modest solutions to the economic troubles of the Mountain, such as the opening of ports lying within the boundaries of the Mountain to international navigation and holding the Ottoman government responsible for the payment of an annual subsidy to balance its budget, as called for by the *Règlement*.⁵⁵ It may well be that the pragmatic councilors recognized better than the idealist Lebanese activists, many of whom lived abroad, that the Ottoman government was unlikely to agree to the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain. But their hesitation to call for the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Empire seemed to indicate that they had other reservations, or at the very least that they were cautiously assessing the scope and opportunity of such a claim. Indeed, the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain presented opportunities but also many challenges. For one, such a solution risked upsetting the delicate social and demographic equilibrium of the Mountain, and it threatened to disrupt the balance of power on the limited Mountain's political scene, which had guaranteed the interests of the local councilors and notables. Furthermore, the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain was no simple matter and had either to be negotiated with or imposed upon the populations living in the areas to be annexed to Lebanon and sanctioned by regional and international agreement. Whatever the case, it seems that the councilors were carefully weighing their options and that they did not consider it opportune to make any claim until the situation clarified and they were better able to ascertain the intentions of other key players. As for the Maronite Patriarch, who represented

another important pole in the Mountain, he too adopted a cautious approach. He did not give any public indication of his views with respect to the future of the Mountain, nor did he take any initiative except to enjoin the politicians of the Mountain to avoid any inconsiderate move.⁵⁶

In sum, the wait-and-see approach of the leaders of the Mountain in the immediate aftermath of the war seems to indicate that they did not have as yet ready answers or clear plans for the future, and their caution does not seem to vindicate the view that the Lebanese leaders had already determined to establish an independent Greater Lebanon and that they moved on to realize this goal as soon as the opportunity presented itself after the demise of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁷ The available evidence seems instead to indicate that a full-fledged claim to establish an independent Greater Lebanon was first developed during the war by some Lebanese activists, and that it eventually gained currency among the leaders and population of the Mountain under the pressure of the special convergence of circumstances that emerged in the interregnum period.

These circumstances were shaped by two developments that influenced the views of the Lebanese leaders. The first and most significant event was admittedly the advent of French forces that at first strengthened their determination to consolidate the special status of the Mountain within the Syrian provinces and eventually encouraged them to envisage the separation of an enlarged Lebanon from the rest of the Syrian provinces. These tendencies were further bolstered by the establishment by Faysal of an Arab government in Damascus that stirred their apprehension that this government might jeopardize the status quo. These misgivings were compounded by fears among the Christian population that Faysal's Arab government presaged the rise of a new Islamic state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. However, as the Lebanese leaders were soon to discover, subsequent events left them with little leverage to influence the situation. Instead, they found themselves embroiled in an intricate and unpredictable situation beyond their control that exposed them to confusion, disillusion, and frustrations.

French policy was one of the main causes of Lebanese disarray. France had come to Syria in the aftermath of the war full of confidence and illusions, but ruefully unprepared. It had resolutely staked a claim to Syria as its rightful due in any postwar settlement in the Middle East, and it was bent on making good on its claim come what may. France considered that the Sykes-Picot agreement guaranteed it control over all of Syria, although strictly speaking the agreement only granted France a zone of direct control over the coastal area, including Lebanon, and indirect

influence in the Syrian hinterland, which was to remain under the sovereignty of an Arab state. But France never lent much credit to the fine points of the agreement. It assumed that an Arab state would never materialize and that it would face no serious problem extending its firm control over the Syrian hinterland in due time. But above all, French complacency was due to its inflated vision of itself and its innate faith in the benefits of the French civilizing mission that it firmly believed all Syrians, Muslims, and Christians “accustomed to look to France” yearned for.⁵⁸

France’s hubris and self-delusion received a rude check when French forces reached Syria in October 1918. By the time they disembarked at Beirut, Faysal, backed by the British, had firmly established himself in Damascus and was, as reported by French officials, “already considering himself to be the new lord of the country, and acting as such.”⁵⁹ He then embarked on a grand tour of the main Syrian towns, including Beirut, the seat of the French headquarters. Everywhere he was manifestly warmly welcomed by the population, exposing the limited extent of France’s popularity. Moreover, Faysal was proving to be much less malleable than anticipated, and he was refusing to collaborate with the French. To make matters worse, supreme authority in the country was held by the British commander, General Allenby, who used his position to curtail French influence as far as possible. He restricted French military presence to the coastal area and Lebanon, and he removed the Bekaa Valley from the French zone and incorporated it “for the time being” in the Arab zone; all French entreaties to reverse his decision fell on deaf ears.⁶⁰ Last, the small number of French forces was not only outnumbered by vastly superior British forces, but they were underequipped and understaffed, and they lacked qualified officers.⁶¹

The emerging situation in Syria was starkly different from what France had anticipated, and no one was as disillusioned and bitter at the unanticipated turn of events as Georges Picot, who had been appointed high commissioner in Syria. He had played a central role in the formulation of France’s grand designs in Syria, and more than anyone else he could measure the gap between France’s pretensions and the depressing reality on the ground. In a series of bleak, and at times angry, reports he filed after he arrived in Beirut on November 6, he warned his government that the only way to save France’s position from being ruined was to send substantial French troops to replace the British forces and to take over the reorganization of the country. As long as the British army continued to occupy the country, he noted, “a doubt will remain in the minds of the populations with

regard to the future reserved to Lebanon and Syria,” and France’s supporters will continue to feel intimidated and disheartened. France, he added, needed to send reinforcements without delay “to reassure the Lebanese and make the Arabs feel a strength they are beginning to doubt;” otherwise the subdued role of France in Syria will soon induce its supporters to “turn their back on from protectors so timid and hesitant... and it will push those who are undecided to side against us.” “If we delay longer it will be too late . . . and our situation in Syria will be definitely ruined,” he concluded.⁶² At the same time, Picot deplored the absence of a clear French policy with regard to Syria, and he pointed out that France needed to decide whether it wanted to work for the establishment of a unitary Syria under Faysal in which Lebanon would be loosely linked to the interior in return for French mandate over all Syria; to concede the division of Syria into two different zones and to grant Faysal greater freedom of action in the Syrian interior in return for tighter French control on a Greater Lebanon; or to try to undermine Faysal’s rule in the interior with a view to driving him out of Syria.⁶³

Picot’s entreaties, however, fell on deaf ears, and the French government barely acknowledged his reports.⁶⁴ At that time, France was celebrating the armistice agreement signed with Germany on November 11, 1918, which put an end to the long and brutal war that had cost it nearly one million casualties, and Paris was preparing to host the Peace Conference that would open two months later and that was to formulate the terms of the peace settlements. In this heady atmosphere, the French government officials paid little heed to the alarming reports sent by Picot. They interpreted signs of their unpopularity in Syria, especially among the Muslim population, as the result of a perfidious propaganda by the British, and they confidently believed that the deluded Syrian populations would revert to their traditional attachment to France once they start to experience the benefits of French civilization and benevolence.⁶⁵ By the same token, French officials in Paris saw Faysal only as a British puppet whose popularity was bound to wane as soon as the British put an end to the large subsidies they were paying him. Faysal, they believed, would then realize that he needed to turn to France to find a solid backing “and it will then certainly be possible to bring him around to an understanding beneficial for both of us.”⁶⁶ As a result, French officials believed that the key to securing their position in Syria lay in a bilateral agreement with Britain, and their first contacts with London led them to believe that they had obtained the assurances they were seeking. On December 1, 1918, the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, met with his British counterpart, Lloyd George, and reached

a verbal agreement whereby France relinquished its claim to Mosul and Palestine in favor of Britain in return for British support at the Peace Conference for French claim to Syria and Cilicia.⁶⁷ But in the following months, Lloyd George tried to backtrack on this agreement and to limit, if not to eliminate, France's presence in Syria, leading to a bitter confrontation between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, a deterioration of French–British relations, and endless delays in the resolution of the Syrian question.⁶⁸

The French government's utter disregard for unpleasant realities in Syria and its firm belief that all the difficulties it was facing in this country would be promptly resolved by a direct agreement with the British government kept it for several months from formulating a coherent Syrian policy. In the meantime, Picot left without clear instructions or meaningful support from his government and tried to fend for himself. He engaged in a complicated balancing act, trying to reassure the Lebanese and the Christians of the coastal area while striving to gain the confidence of the wary Muslim communities and that of the Arab government, but his endeavors to please everyone seemed to please no one.

The fumbling of the French government and its representative in Syria deeply unsettled the Lebanese leaders. They were keen to ascertain the intentions of France before formulating their own desiderata and determining their stand vis-à-vis the Arab government that had just been established in Damascus and was claiming sovereignty over all of Syria, including Lebanon. The equivocations of French officials, however, disconcerted them and fueled their frustration as they found themselves caught between the vacillations of the French government and the growing hostility of the Damascus government.

FROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE

In the first weeks of October 1918, the Lebanese leaders had yet to take the full measure of things of come. After the arrival of the French forces at Beirut on October 6, the Lebanese leaders had to wait for two full weeks before French officials finally turned their attention to the political situation in the Mountain. On October 23, the French governor for Beirut and Lebanon, Colonel Piépape, accompanied by Robert Coulondre, who was acting as the political representative of France pending the arrival of Picot, embarked on their first tour of the Mountain. Significantly, they first called on the Maronite Patriarch, Mgr Elias Hoyek, with whom they agreed to restore the status quo ante in the Mountain with a French governor in lieu of the Ottoman governor. Two days later, the two French envoys

presided over an official ceremony in Baabda, where they formally announced the restoration of the autonomous status of the Lebanon and the reinstitution in office of the Administrative Council under the presidency of Habib Pasha Sa'ad, while Colonel Piépape took over provisionally the charge of governor.⁶⁹ The Baabda ceremony did not fully dispel, however, the uncertainty of the leaders of the Mountain with regard to their future. The French representatives had remained vague, assuring the Lebanese leaders that the Peace Conference would soon convene and devise a settlement that would take into consideration their concerns and interests, and that they should await its outcome with patience and confidence. Moreover, the councilors could not have failed to notice that despite the vague reassurances of the French representatives, the position of France in Syria remained precarious. France's room for maneuver was seriously restricted by the British, who retained overall control in the country, and its nominal authority in its own zone was flouted by Faysal, who as part of his grand tour of Syria in mid-November visited the Bekaa Valley, where he stated that Lebanon, "the pearl of Syria," was to be part of Syria.⁷⁰ On November 12, Faysal then left Syria to represent his father at the Paris Peace Conference without even bothering to coordinate his visit to France with French authorities.

Faysal's departure to Paris drove notables from Lebanon to sound out Picot about the possibility of sending delegates to the Peace Conference to present their own claims, and the French high commissioner showed himself receptive to their initiative. As a result, the Lebanese Administrative Council, presenting itself as the spokesman of the Lebanese, adopted on December 9, 1918, its first postwar resolution claiming the confirmation of the administrative and judicial autonomous status of the Mountain; the extension of its boundaries to include "its historical and geographical frontiers" to ensure its economic viability; and the support and collaboration of France to fulfill these aims. At the same time, the Council decided to dispatch a delegation presided over by Daud 'Ammun to present its desiderata to the Peace Conference, in accordance with "the right of the peoples to present their claims to the greatest justice tribunal established by humanity."⁷¹

The wording and content of the Council's resolution bore the mark of the views developed by the early Lebanese nationalists and refined by the exiles abroad during the war. The resolution hence adopted the same claim for the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain and reproduced the same questionable historical arguments formulated by the nationalists to justify this claim, emphasizing the perennial autonomy of the Mountain throughout the ages and reproducing the allegation that in 1860 the astute Ottoman foreign minister Fuad Pasha had duped

the other members of the International Commission into agreeing to the “mutilation” of the historical and natural territory of Lebanon, stripping it of its ports and plains and confining it to arid mountains, thus undermining the autonomous status of Lebanon granted by the powers. In the same way, the resolution also supported its historical references with economic arguments emphasizing the fact that the Mountain only produced enough cereals to feed its population for two months, condemning its population to famine if its access to neighboring ports and plains was shut off, as happened in the World War I.⁷² The adoption by the councilors of main elements of the nationalists’ claims and historical narrative marked a significant reorientation of their prewar views and can be attributed to the changed circumstances that appeared to favor the enlargement of the boundaries of the Mountain; the support and encouragement of the French high commissioner Georges Picot, a firm supporter of a Greater Lebanon; and the influence of the Lebanese nationalists who had initiated a campaign during the war for the establishment of an independent Greater Lebanon. By then, Lebanese nationalists abroad had taken advantage of the reestablishment of communications between Lebanon and the outside world to disseminate their programs within the Mountain. Moreover, leading figures from the Mountain and Beirut, who had fled to Egypt during the war, where they remained in close touch with nationalist circles, had returned to the Mountain and contributed to the diffusion of the nationalists’ latest views. One of these returnees, Daud ‘Ammun, the councilor from Dayr-al-Qamar, who was selected to head the delegation of the Administrative Council to the Peace Conference, boasted that he played a leading role in the adoption by the Council of the resolution in favor of an enlarged Lebanon.⁷³

The Administrative Council did not, however, at this stage adopt in its entirety the program developed during the war by the Lebanese nationalists abroad. Hence the December resolution of the Administrative Council did not endorse the nationalists’ call for the independence of Lebanon, nor did it define the extended boundaries of the Greater Lebanon they were claiming or dwell on the nature of the relationship between this autonomous Greater Lebanon and the rest of the Syrian provinces. The ambiguity of their resolution on these points may have reflected the ambivalence of the French stance, and more particularly the concerns of Picot, who although favorable to a Greater Lebanon feared that a claim for an independent Greater Lebanon might impair France’s ambition to extend its authority over all of Syria.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, the resolution of the Council appears to have reflected fairly well the concerns and priorities of the members of the Council, and more particularly their concern to consolidate the autonomy of the

Mountain, to safeguard their own interests, and to extend as far as possible their own prerogatives. Accordingly, the councilors demanded the transformation of their Council into a “representative chamber . . . empowered to legislate and possessing all the attributions of parliaments in democratic countries.”⁷⁵ At the same time, to guarantee and bolster the autonomous status of the Lebanese province, the councilors requested the extension of its borders “so that it can constitute a country capable of providing for its inhabitants.”⁷⁶ For the councilors, the borders issue was closely linked to the preservation of the autonomy of the Mountain; without it, as the experience of the *mutasarrifiyya* had shown, the autonomy of the Mountain would remain seriously constrained. But the councilors did not feel the need to define the “geographical and historical” boundaries they were claiming, leaving this issue open for further consideration in the light of the unfolding circumstances and opportunities. As to the issue of independence, it is not clear whether the councilors considered it out of reach or inopportune or whether they were divided over this issue, with some councilors disinclined or at the very least reluctant to endorse such a claim at that time. At any rate, it seems that Habib Pasha Sa‘ad expended many efforts to bring the councilors to agree to the carefully worded resolution.⁷⁷

In any event, the visit of the Lebanese delegation to Paris did not accomplish much to advance the claims of the Council. The delegation made mostly ceremonial visits to the leading French officials, and it duly presented, in a short session on February 13, 1919, its demands to the Conference. But its appearance before the Council of Ten was overshadowed by Faysal’s audience on February 6, in which he pleaded for the independence of the Arabs and more particularly the independence of Syria, and by Shukri Ghanem’s lengthy and grandiloquent speech on February 13 in favor of a united Syria under a French mandate that tested the patience and good will of the heads of state and defeated its purpose of challenging Faysal’s credentials and theses.⁷⁸ However, if the Lebanese delegation’s audience with the Council of Ten did not make a great impression, the visit of the delegation to Paris was significant in other respects. In the French capital, the delegation was caught in the crossfire of a spirited debate within the Lebanese and Syrian exile community between the proponents of a Greater Syria and the proponents of a Greater Lebanon, with each side trying to win over the members of the delegation to its cause. The Lebanese delegation was hence exposed to the views and arguments of both camps and somewhat refined its own views.⁷⁹ For one, the delegation, no doubt in response to sharp criticisms from Lebanese nationalists who faulted it for the vagueness of its claim relating to the extension of the boundaries of Lebanon,

decided to present to the Council of Ten some three weeks after its audience a memorandum defining the boundaries of the Greater Lebanon they were claiming and adopted, following the lead of the nationalists, the map drawn by the French Expeditionary Force in 1861 as an authoritative source to legitimate and vindicate the “historical and natural frontiers” to which it allegedly corresponded.⁸⁰ At the same time, the Lebanese delegation endorsed the program of the *Comité Central Syrien* (CCS), backed by France, in favor of a Greater Syria in which an autonomous Greater Lebanon would be included provided that France be awarded a mandate over all Syria: “If France should lend its support to Syria as a whole, we would hail the decision with joy since, by attaining our internal autonomy within a greater Syria under French influence, we would unquestionably benefit from real economic advantages, and our security would be even more assured.”⁸¹

Yet, no sooner had the Lebanese delegation returned to Lebanon by the end of March 1919 that a movement in the Mountain in favor of its independence started to take shape. By that time, the leaders and population of the Mountain who had awaited with calm and confidence the decisions of the Peace Conference were growing increasingly uneasy and suspicious that their concerns were being ignored, or worst still, sacrificed in the intense struggle for Syria among the French, the British, and Faysal. In Paris, the discussion of the Syrian question by the Peace Conference had quickly degenerated into a bitter clash between Clemenceau, who sought the confirmation by the Conference of a French mandate over Syria, , and Lloyd George, who firmly opposed French claims to extend their control over the Syrian hinterland, where, he argued, both the Sykes-Picot and the Husain-Mc Mahon agreements had envisaged the establishment of an Arab state. Both men refused to budge, and the quarrel between them escalated into an unrelenting and bruising confrontation, holding up hopes of a swift resolution of the Syrian question. As a way out of the impasse President Woodrow Wilson suggested the dispatch of an International Commission of Inquiry to the region to determine the wishes of the populations. But Wilson’s solution soon turned into a new point of contention between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, when the former refused to send French delegates unless French troops replaced British troops in Syria and the latter refused to oblige. In the end, Lloyd George, who was as wary as Clemenceau about the visit of the Commission of Inquiry, announced that he too would not send the British delegates unless French delegates went. As a result, the American commissioners finally left alone for the Middle East by the end of May.⁸²

At the same time, French and British officials and advisers, alarmed by the level of heated exchanges between Clemenceau and Lloyd George and anxious that

the dispatch of the commission would cause more delays and expose the level of opposition to French and British designs in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, tried to arrange for a direct agreement between France and Faysal as a means of obviating the need to send the commission.⁸³ Clemenceau, who despite his indignation at Lloyd George's underhanded dealings on the Syrian question, attached much greater importance to the terms of the treaty with Germany than to the particulars of the prospective French mandate in Syria, agreed to open talks with the Arab Emir. But the brief and inconclusive negotiations between France and Faysal in April 1919 served only to make a confused situation still more confused. For the French government the aim of these negotiations was to gain Faysal's acquiescence to a French mandate in Syria in return for France's recognition of Syria's right to independence. They thought that Clemenceau and Faysal, who met on April 13, had reached a tacit understanding along these lines and that Faysal had promised to use his influence with the people of Syria to secure a French mandate for Syria.⁸⁴ In fact, Faysal had been more evasive than the French liked to think. He was then banking on the dispatch of the Commission of Inquiry and on British and American support to curb French influence in Syria, and he had no intention of following through on the spirit of any understanding he might have arrived at with the French.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, after his return to Syria, Faysal maintained the illusion of some sort of understanding with Clemenceau in the hope of gaining favor with the Christian populations of the coastal towns and Lebanon before the arrival of the American Commission of Inquiry, in the same way that Picot tried to capitalize on the presumed agreement to neutralize the hostility of the Muslim populations of the hinterland to a French mandate. "A big bluff is going on under the carpet—who is the bluffer or the bluffed—Faysal or Picot—nobody knows," remarked the British political officer in Beirut.⁸⁶

The intricacies and subtleties of international diplomacy and all their attendant deceit, double dealings, and intrigue were, however, lost on the inhabitants of the Mountain. Rumors of a deal between Faysal and Clemenceau preceded the Emir's return to Syria on April 30, 1919. The warm welcome he received at the hands of French authorities on his arrival to Beirut, as well as his statements that his efforts during his five-month stay in Europe had been crowned with success and that the powers had recognized "in principle" the independence of a Greater Syria, including Lebanon, only lent weight to such claims. These rumors fueled suspicions among several parties in the Mountain that France was willing to sacrifice Lebanon's autonomy for the sake of extending its control over Syria as a whole in association with Faysal. As news of the forthcoming arrival of the Commission

of Inquiry began to spread, they rallied to convey their frustration that the fate of the Mountain was being decided without their participation and their concern at the prospect of an eventual incorporation of Mount Lebanon in a Greater Syria controlled by Faysal. On May 20, the Administrative Council met and adopted a resolution calling for the first time for the “political independence of Lebanon in its geographical and historical frontiers.”⁸⁷ The Council’s resolution was accompanied by demonstrations in several parts of the Mountain, backed by the Maronite clergy and coordinated by the municipalities, in support of the independence of a Greater Lebanon. In one such demonstration in Baabda at the beginning of June, demonstrators hoisted a Lebanese flag and solemnly proclaimed the independence of Lebanon before being promptly dispersed by order of the French military governor. At the same time, the Maronite Patriarch, Mgr Hoyek, who had since the arrival of the French forces some months earlier adopted a reserved attitude, decided to travel to Paris to uphold the Lebanese cause.⁸⁸ The Patriarch was feeling “anxious and betrayed, fearing a fusion [of Lebanon] in an Arab Empire,”⁸⁹ and his apprehensions were confirmed by Picot, who called on him on May 25 to try to win him over, without much success, to the new policy he was trying to promote.

The French commissioner, who had been taken aback since his arrival few months earlier by the weakness of the French position in Syria and by Faysal’s apparent success in establishing his authority in the country, had come to the conclusion that France needed to strike a deal with the Arab prince to salvage its position in Syria, and he still hoped to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations that his government had initiated in Paris. To this end, he tried to gain the approval of the Lebanese and the Christians of the coast for the incorporation of a Greater Lebanon state in a Syrian confederation under French aegis. If the Faysal ceased its collaboration with France, he assured them, then Lebanon’s links with Syria would be severed and the state of Lebanon would recover its full independence with France’s collaboration.⁹⁰ Picot’s convoluted scheme aimed to use Lebanon as leverage in his negotiations with Faysal in return for Faysal’s acquiescence to a French mandate in the Syrian hinterland.⁹¹ The French commissioner was therefore frustrated by the campaign for the independence of Lebanon in the Mountain, which threatened to undermine the grand bargain he was trying to strike with Faysal,⁹² and he was quite irritated by, and dismissive of, the inflexibility of the Patriarch, Habib Pasha Sa‘ad, the members of the Administrative Council, and all the other politicians who refused to agree to his scheme. And when the Patriarch informed him that he planned to go to Paris, Picot tried at first to dissuade him from doing so.⁹³

The French commissioner's frustration was reciprocated by the Maronite Patriarch's growing dismay at France's inconsistent policy. Mgr Hoyek shared Picot's consternation with the turn of events in Syria, but he had drawn different conclusions from what he was beginning to see as an alarming situation. At the end of the war, he contended, French officials had assured him that, in accordance with an agreement with the British, the Lebanese were to enjoy their independence with the collaboration of France. "Since then things had changed and the Lebanese were being told that they would be incorporated in a Syria that would be part of the Hejaz Empire."⁹⁴ He had little faith in Picot's assurances that France would continue under his scheme to ensure in all circumstances the independence of Lebanon, and he feared that France's about-turn reflected the weakness of its position in Syria. He was beginning to have serious doubts about whether France had the willingness or the ability to stand up to British designs in Syria and indeed about whether it would succeed in securing a mandate over Syria and Lebanon or in maintaining French presence and influence in the region.⁹⁵ Mgr Hoyek was therefore keen to ensure the independence of Lebanon in order to guard it against all future contingencies.

Mgr Hoyek's disillusionment with French policy did not, however, shake his faith in the need for France's assistance. The Patriarch had few illusions about the efficacy of demonstrations and protests to achieve the independence of Lebanon, and he believed that without France's support the Lebanese had few chances of attaining their goals.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, he hoped that the movement in favor of independence in Lebanon would lend weight to his talks with French officials in Paris, where he hoped to win the support of French officials to the establishment of an independent Greater Lebanon. With this aim in view, he solicited an official mandate from the Administrative Council delegating him to preside over a second Lebanese delegation to Paris to defend the goals outlined in their latest resolution to the French government and the Peace Conference. But his plan to include in his delegation representatives from all the communities in Lebanon was scuttled by Picot, who insisted on reducing as far as possible the size of the delegation; the Patriarch's delegation ended up being not only an all-Christian but an all-clerical one, including, apart from Mgr Hoyek, five Maronite and Greek Catholic bishops.⁹⁷

The composition of the delegation reflected the uneven support among the different communities of Lebanon for latest campaign in favor of the independence of Lebanon. While the preservation of the autonomous status of the Mountain and the potential enlargement of its borders apparently garnered broad support,

the campaign for the independence of Lebanon had mainly rallied the Maronites and other Christians along with some Druze and Muslim officials and their supporters. The majority of the Druze and Muslim notables, with limited support from some Christian notables, disapproved of a separation of Lebanon from the rest of Syria.⁹⁸ In the same way, Christians in the districts adjoining Lebanon had generally expressed their support for a Greater Lebanon, while the Sunnis in the main coastal towns were on the whole firmly opposed to it. Hence, in Beirut, the Christian Committee of Beirut, regrouping influential Christian notables, publicly endorsed a program in favor of the independence of a Greater Lebanon to which it wanted to annex their city, whereas in the other coastal towns and the Bekaa Christian notables signed petitions in favor of the program adopted by the Administrative Council on May 20.⁹⁹

The jumbled Syrian scene confounded the American commissioners, who spent nearly a month in the country. On the face of it their mission was straightforward: they were to ascertain as far as possible the opinions and desires of the populations and present recommendations to the Conference as to “the division of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace and development of the peoples concerned.”¹⁰⁰ But after they toured the country and met with delegations from the main towns and villages and received nearly 1,863 petitions, they recognized that the “Syrian riddle” raised difficult and complex issues in view of the conflicting wishes of populations, the rights of minorities versus those of the majority, the various commitments made by the Allied powers to one another, as well as the pledges of some Allied powers to local parties. As a result, the members of the commission differed significantly in their assessments of the situation in Syria and Lebanon and the solutions they suggested, as evidenced by the conflicting reports prepared by Captain William Yale and George Montgomery, two of the advisers to the commission, on the one hand, and by the two main commissioners, Henry King and Charles Crane, and Albert Lybyer, the third adviser, on the other hand.¹⁰¹ Their conflicting analyses and conclusions are worth mentioning briefly as they reflect the views of outside, but not necessarily impartial, observers on the Syrian and Lebanese questions in the summer of 1919.

The main points of contention among the members of the commission pertained to the many divisions within Syrian society, and especially the Christian/Muslim divide, and the prospect of overcoming these difference by means of a common secular nationalism; the establishment of one single Syrian state versus

the division of the country into a Lebanese and a Syrian state; and the choice of a mandatory. Both sides were in general agreement that the main divide between the Christians, mainly concentrated in the Lebanon and the coastal areas, and the Muslims of the hinterland had, as Yale noted, been exacerbated by the division of the country at the end of the war between a French- and a British-controlled area and by the French and British rivalry for domination over the country. This split had translated into a widespread demand among the Christians of Lebanon and the coast for the establishment of a Greater Lebanon state separate from Syria, whereas the Muslims in general strongly favored a unified Syrian state. But the members of the commission fundamentally differed on the best means to tackle this problem. For King, Crane, and Lybyer, the antagonism between Christians and Muslims in Syria was not as insuperable as might appear, as it was to a certain extent mitigated by other factors such as common language, culture, traditions, and customs as well as shared economic interests. Furthermore, they considered that the division of the country into two separate states to accommodate the concerns of the Christians of Lebanon and the coast would tend to intensify religious differences that it was advisable to weaken in favor of a national feeling. In this respect they believed that the nascent feeling of Syrian nationalism in the country showed promising potential and should be cultivated, and that the right of the Christian and other minorities could be secured by several means, including the guarantee of religious liberties, a large measure of local autonomies, and the presence of a strong mandatory. Finally, they argued, the Syrian territory was too limited and the population too small to "make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable, if such division can be avoided."¹⁰² Therefore they recommended the establishment of a unified Syrian state with a large degree of autonomy for Lebanon under a single American or British mandate. "If the policy failed the country could be partitioned later on," they concluded.¹⁰³

For his part, Yale conceded that there existed in Syria "a sense of economic unity, a feeling that Syria cannot be separated without causing economic disadvantages," but, he added, if Syria constituted an economic, commercial, and linguistic unit it was clearly not a coherent political or social unit as "there is no sense of Syrian nationalism, there is no desire for union in the political sense among the peoples of Syria."¹⁰⁴ The prevailing crisis had, he added, stimulated something of a national feeling, but it was too weak and superficial and barely concealed underlying signs of intolerance and prejudice among the Muslim majority of the population and the Young Arab party in whose hands real power lay. A national spirit and feeling may in time be developed, but in the intervening time the concerns of the Christians

should not be taken lightly in view of recent historical precedents and, more particularly, that of the Young Turk movement, whose members were for the most part initially open minded and well meaning but who later “turned into a chauvinistic nationalist and pro-Islamist” movement. A misjudgment of the Arab movement might “cost the lives of thousands of Christians in Syria, as the misunderstanding of the essential element in the Young Turkish movement cost the lives of over a million [Armenian] Christians in Turkey,” he cautioned.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the Christians of Lebanon and the coast had a different way of life and ideals and did not want to be incorporated in the rest of Syria. “Even in the face of this demand it might be possible with careful supervision, disinterested encouragement and a thorough educational system to create after long many years a Syrian State whose citizens would be animated by a patriotic love of their country and penetrated with a spirit of nationalism. However, this would be frankly an experiment, and there is no one who can predict that it would be successful.”¹⁰⁶

As a result, Yale recommended the establishment of a separate Greater Lebanon under a French mandate and a Syrian state, with access to the sea at Tripoli, under a British or joint French–British mandate. Such a solution, he concluded, was not an ideal solution, but in view of the conflicting aspirations and wishes of the different groups there were no ideal solutions to the Syrian question, and it would be impossible to do more. His scheme, he concluded, had the merit of meeting halfway the desires of the peoples of Syria and Lebanon, and it did not preclude an eventual reunification of both states in the future if circumstances permitted.¹⁰⁷

MORE DELAYS AND NEW SETBACKS

The Patriarch made his statement to the American commissioners on July 9 and left few days later for Paris, where he planned to hold discussions on the situation in Syria and Lebanon with French officials, and especially with Clemenceau, in the hope of gaining their firm support for the establishment of an independent Greater Lebanon.¹⁰⁸ However, the visit to Paris of the second Lebanese delegation headed by Mgr Hoyek proved nearly as inconclusive as the first one. At that time, the French government was still looking to an agreement with Britain to secure its mandate over all of Syria and was disinclined to commit itself on the status of Lebanon before that of Syria had been settled. A note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the minister before his meeting with the Patriarch summed up well the noncommittal French official stance with regard to Lebanon. The Patriarch, the note stated, was characteristically “verbose and vague,” and he

will demand that France secure the independence of Lebanon and the extension of its frontiers. Since it was likely that “his demands will remain fairly imprecise the response of the minister can equally remain warmly imprecise,” confining himself to elusive promises that once France obtained its mandate over Syria it will make every effort to “facilitate the material and moral development of the Lebanese populations.”¹⁰⁹ In this spirit, the meeting between Clemenceau and Mgr Hoyek, on which the Patriarch was pinning high hopes, was brief and to the point. The prime minister contented himself with a few vague and reassuring remarks that he confirmed in an formal and no less vague and ambiguous letter on November 10, expressing the hope that the resolution of the Syrian question by the Peace Conference would allow the French government to fulfill “to a large extent” the wishes of the Lebanese populations for independence, but carefully avoiding any concrete pledge with respect to the future status of Lebanon or its future boundaries.¹¹⁰

The Patriarch also took advantage of his stay in Paris to send a long memorandum to the Peace Conference that was filed without further ado. In it, Mgr Hoyek, clearly influenced by the ideas advanced by the *Alliance* and the Lebanese activists,¹¹¹ reiterated the diverse historical, political, economic, and cultural arguments already advanced by the latter, and which had by then solidified into standard narrative aimed at legitimating the existence of a Lebanese nation striving to establish its own state. The Patriarch similarly demanded the independence of a Greater Lebanon whose boundaries, he asserted, should correspond with its historical frontiers as drawn in the French map of 1861; he emphasized that the independence he was claiming was “especially a complete independence towards any Arab State which might be established in Syria.”¹¹²

The efforts of the Patriarch to obtain a concrete pledge from the French government with regard to Lebanon hence came to naught. Nevertheless, Mgr Hoyek and the members of his delegation took some hope from an unrelated decisive development that occurred during their stay in Paris. On September 13, Lloyd George, who had so far obstructed all endeavors by France to gain the approval of Britain for a mandate in Syria, decided to withdraw all British troops from Syria by November 1, 1919, washing his hands of the whole Syrian muddle that he had in great part contributed to create and leaving Faysal to the tender mercies of the French government.¹¹³ Lloyd George’s decision had less to do with his sudden conversion to the merits of the French claims in Syria than with his recognition that Britain was facing pressing crises in Egypt, Ireland, and India and could not afford the luxury of maintaining indefinitely its forces in Syria; the time had come

to reach an understanding with the French over the Syrian question and to encourage Faysal to follow suit. For Mgr Hoyek and the members of his delegation, Lloyd George's decision seemed to augur the allocation of the mandate over Syria to France, and they sent a telegram home to break the good news, which for them implied the impending fulfillment of their aspirations for an independent Greater Lebanon.¹¹⁴ But they were soon to discover that their optimism was unwarranted and that the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria did not remove all obstacles to the realization of their ambitions.

Lloyd George's unilateral decision to disengage from Syria came with an insidious proviso: he decided to hand over British positions in the coastal area to the French and those in mainland Syria to Faysal's Arab government, leaving Syria divided and the French and Faysal in an uneasy face-to-face. France was left with two choices to extend its control over all of Syria: it could either negotiate with Faysal or occupy the country by force. Clemenceau opted for the negotiated solution in great part to conciliate the British and secure their support at the Peace Conference for a mandate over Syria. For his part, Faysal, abandoned by the British, was left with no other choice but to try to come to terms with the French.¹¹⁵ After difficult negotiations the two men reached a provisional agreement on January 6, 1920, whereby France recognized the independence of Syria under the rule of Faysal in return for Faysal's acceptance of a French mandate. The agreement also provided for the independence of Lebanon under a French mandate, but its boundaries were to be defined later in accordance with "its historical rights, economic interests and the free will of the people." A plebiscite was to be organized in the regions to be included in Lebanon with a view to ascertaining the "will of people."¹¹⁶ Clemenceau nevertheless warned Faysal that if he failed to live up to the agreement and to assert his authority in the country, "the French government would regain all liberty and impose order by force."¹¹⁷ At the same time, Clemenceau assigned a new team to implement the new French policy in Syria, appointing General Henri Gouraud as high commissioner in Syria and Robert de Caix as his right-hand man. The choice of the two men, close to Catholic and colonial circles in France, was meant to deflect criticisms from these two influential groups of the new French policy in the Middle East.

Clemenceau's agreement with Faysal demonstrated once again that, for France, Lebanese aspirations were subsidiary to its interests in all of Syria and that it was ready to uphold the former only to the extent that these coincided with the latter. Hence, the Clemenceau–Faysal agreement provided for the independence of Lebanon, but France pushed for this provision in part to satisfy Lebanese claims

but most of all to safeguard its position in the region by securing a solid base in Lebanon.¹¹⁸ At the same time, France displayed willingness to compromise on the boundaries claimed by the Lebanese, as attested to by the fact that Clemenceau agreed, without much difficulty and as gesture of goodwill toward Faysal, to leave the Bekaa Valley under the control of the Arab government until the final conclusion of the agreement. Clemenceau's decision occurred just as Gouraud was preparing to occupy the plain, and it displeased the French general, who feared that it might be construed as a sign of weakness by the nationalists in Damascus and as a letdown by the Lebanese.¹¹⁹ Moreover, Clemenceau's decision to leave the Bekaa Valley under the control of the Arab government was likely to influence the conditions under which the planned plebiscite that was to determine whether the valley was to be included in Syria or in Lebanon was to take place, and therefore the results of the consultation. As a matter of fact, the opinion of the populations in this area, which included the four disputed districts of Baalbek, Bekaa, Rashaya, and Hasbaya, and where the population was composed of Christians, Sunnis, Shi'is, and Druzes, was unsettled. The Commission of Inquiry, which had visited the region in July 1919, had been unable to clearly ascertain the wishes of the population. Faysal himself was unsure whether the planned plebiscite would be in favor of the Arab government, whereas Gouraud considered that unless the consultation of the populations of these districts had been well "prepared," he could not guarantee that the results would be in favor of a Greater Lebanon.¹²⁰ The situation in these districts well illustrate the fluidity of the opinion of the population in Syria and Lebanon in these interregnum years, especially in the disputed districts surrounding Lebanon, where part of the inhabitants were hedging their bets and were reluctant to commit to either side before the final status of country had been determined, for fear of compromising their future status and interests with the winning side. A similar situation prevailed in the southern districts of Sayda, Tyre, and their hinterland, where the opinion of the main notables of the predominantly Shi'ite population was divided and where the leading notable Kamel As'ad, who had at first leaned toward the Arab government, had since then wavered, waiting to see how events would turn out.¹²¹

After the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria, the disputed region of the Bekaa Valley became the site of an intense contest between the Arab government and the French authorities that spilled over into outlying districts controlled by the French to the south and the north. As soon as news of the decision to redeploy the British troops reached Damascus, the Arab government and newly formed popular and defense committees, who feared that the British move heralded a decision by

the Peace Conference to grant the Syrian mandate to France, decided to promote and assist the formation of armed bands in the regions adjoining the French zone to harass French forces with a view to forcing the French government to withdraw its forces from Syria.¹²² The raids of the armed bands coincided with a more critical offensive by Turkish forces under the command of Atatürk against French forces in Cilicia, compelling Gouraud to send reinforcements to the north, and leaving only token forces in Lebanon and the other areas of the western zone. As a result, law and order deteriorated steadily in the French-controlled areas; banditry became rife, and the emboldened armed guerrilla bands started to carry out, with the assistance of local Shi'ite and Druze forces, daring forays in the Bekaa and the hinterland of Tyre and Tripoli. The Christian villagers in these areas paid a heavy price in the ensuing confrontation; the armed bands soon turned their attacks against them in retaliation for their perceived pro-French sympathies or simply to settle old and petty local scores and take advantage of the opportunity to loot the relatively more wealthy Christian villages in their midst. The situation of the Christians became especially precarious in the southern districts, where in late December 1919 a mixed Bedouin and Druze force led by the head of the Golan district, Mahmud Fa'ur, ravaged some twenty Christian villages in the Marj'uyun area and the surrounding southern districts, forcing their populations to flee to the coastal area, and then fought off a French column sent to repulse them, inflicting some sixty French casualties. Due to the scarcity of troops, the French were unable for several months to secure the area, where banditry increased and scattered raids continued, culminating in an attack in May 1920 by Shi'ite bands against the Christian village of 'Ayn Ibl that left fifty dead. This latest attack drove the French to send a devastating punitive expedition to root out the gangs from the southern Shi'ite districts, but by that time most of the hinterland Christian villages in the Marj 'Uyun and Tyre districts had been abandoned by their inhabitants, who had taken refuge in the safer towns of the coast.¹²³

In the Shuf district in Mount Lebanon the state of insecurity was less severe, but as elsewhere in the western zone the security situation deteriorated steadily as news of the relief of British troops by French troops became known. French authorities accused notables favorable to the Arab government, led by Nassib Jumblat, Amin Arslan, and Moustapha Bey al-'Imad, of waging a campaign to rally the Druzes and stir troubles against the Christians of the region in a bid to prove to them that France was incapable of ensuring their security. Although their campaign did not seem to have found an echo among the local Druze population, acts of "political banditry" and murders multiplied throughout the region, causing alarm among the

Christian population of Lebanon.¹²⁴ The French struggled to restore order but their efforts met limited success, and the situation in the Shuf only gradually returned to normal after the Druze leaders of the Hawran, who had always maintained wary relations with the government of Damascus, initiated a rapprochement with the French authorities in Beirut following the withdrawal of the British troops, driving the Druze notables of the Mountain to follow suit.¹²⁵ By the spring of 1920, the leading Druze notables, including Nassib Jumbalatt, the head of the Jumblatt clan, had shifted sides and rallied to the Greater Lebanon camp.

The activities of the armed bands and the apparent helplessness of the French, as well as their failure to occupy the Bekaa Valley, rattled the Christians of the Mountain and the coast. Their anxieties were heightened by news of the Clemenceau-Faysal agreement and a propaganda campaign by the Arab government claiming that France, cash-strapped and exhausted by the war, would soon leave the country, abandoning the Christians to their fate.¹²⁶ Mgr Hoyek hence decided to send in February 1920 yet another delegation to Paris to ascertain once again France's intentions about the independence of Lebanon and more particularly to discuss the issue of its boundaries. But the visit of the third Lebanese delegation, headed by the patriarchal vicar, Mgr 'Abdallah Khuri, proved as frustrating and inconclusive as that of the previous two delegations. Although it was able to rally the support of influential French parliamentary and colonial circles, it faced the same dilatory tactics by the French government, which, while disposed to renew Clemenceau's general pledges of France's support to Lebanese aspirations, was unwilling to discuss, and much less commit itself to, the issue of the frontiers of the prospective Lebanese entity.¹²⁷

DENOUEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER LEBANON

The visit of the third Lebanese delegation once more coincided with major developments that were to have a crucial impact on the fate of Syria and Lebanon. In January 1920, Clemenceau retired from political life after having lost his bid for the presidency, and he was replaced as prime minister by Alexandre Millerand. Although not a committed colonialist, Millerand attached greater importance to the settlement of the Syrian question than did his predecessor. Millerand at first endorsed the Clemenceau-Faysal agreement on the condition that Faysal demonstrated proof of his authority and his ability to curb the armed bands, but

he quickly grew disillusioned with the Arab leader.¹²⁸ Since the latter's return to Syria, he had failed to win the support of the nationalists to the January 6 agreement with France and had adopted an ambiguous attitude toward the activities of the armed bands. While he showed some signs of reining in some of their most glaring acts, he nevertheless tried to take advantage of the pressure exerted by the bands on beleaguered French troops to revise the terms of the agreement to his own advantage, and more particularly to go back on his agreement to allow for an enlargement of the boundaries of Lebanon.¹²⁹ When his requests were rejected, Faysal decided to throw his lot with the nationalists and was proclaimed king of a Greater Syria on March 6, 1920, by the Syrian Congress, which also proclaimed the independence of Syria and Iraq. This event alienated France as well as Britain, who feared for its position in Palestine and Iraq. Exasperated by Faysal tergiversations and frustrated by the heavy French losses in Cilicia at the hands of Turkish forces, Millerand became convinced that a showdown with Faysal was inevitable if France were to consolidate its position in Syria.¹³⁰ By that time, the Americans had withdrawn from the Peace Conference following the illness of President Wilson and the rejection by the Senate on November 19, 1919, of the peace treaty with Germany. France and Britain, having patched up their remaining differences, hence proceeded to draft on their own the terms of the Middle Eastern settlement that was formally approved at the Conference of San Remo on April 25. France was finally awarded a mandate for Syria, while Britain obtained mandates for Palestine and Iraq. Millerand, having therefore been granted a free hand in Syria, started to plan for a confrontation with Faysal that was to take place as soon as the military reinforcements he was dispatching to Syria were in place.¹³¹

Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the general mood was turning sour. Nearly two years had passed since the end of the war, and still the status of the country had not been settled. The local population, which had greeted the end of hostilities with relief and optimism, was growing weary and apprehensive. Their expectations had been amplified by a set of unforeseen circumstances, leading Lebanese leaders to demand at first the enlargement of the autonomous province and then to stake a claim for an independent Greater Lebanon. And then, just as they had thought that their claim was about to be fulfilled in the autumn of 1919, following Clemenceau's celebrated letter to the Patriarch, the nomination of General Gouraud as high commissioner and the announcement of the relief of British forces by French forces, things had started to unravel again. The French forces had failed to occupy the Bekaa Valley, armed bands had started to launch lightning and devastating raids in the outlying

districts of Lebanon, forcing the Christians of these regions to take refuge in the coastal areas, and the French, who had proved incapable of quelling the activities of the armed bands, had reached out to Faysal and signed an agreement with him. Gouraud had tried his best to calm the apprehensions of the disillusioned and distrustful Lebanese, to no avail.¹³²

The endless delays of the Peace Conference in settling the fate of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces did not help. Rumors of all sorts about the various terms of the final settlement added to the unease and perplexity of the Lebanese. The latter, unaware of Millerand's preparations for a showdown with Faysal, were losing patience and confidence. "Here, confusion reigns supreme because everything is imprecise," complained the president of the Administrative Council, Habib Pasha Sa'ad. "Too many differing and conflicting authorities are fighting each other, too much uncertainty weighs on men and things. And each day, the situation is getting worse."¹³³ In turn, the deterioration of the general situation, coupled with a nagging uncertainty about the future, tested the resolve of leading actors on the Lebanese scene, leading them to reappraise their political and national options. The national stances of the local leaders, born of the exceptional circumstances and opportunities opened by the demise of the Ottoman Empire, had not crystallized into firm goals and commitments. They were, for the most part, based on a mix of conviction, interests, social affinities, circumstances, and prospects, and they denoted preferences and inclinations that could nevertheless be adjusted and revised to fit shifting circumstances, especially in the face of adverse conditions. The troubled circumstances following the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria witnessed such shifts in the stances of leading actors in Lebanon and Beirut and led to a dramatic turn of events on the Lebanese scene.

On July 10, 1920, seven of the twelve members of the Administrative Council, who had acted as the official representatives of the Lebanese since the end of the war, adopted a resolution that shook the Lebanese scene. In it the councilors called for the "complete and absolute independence of Lebanon" and the enlargement of its boundaries in accordance with an agreement to be concluded with the government of Damascus.¹³⁴ The councilors, who included among their ranks the brother of the Patriarch, then left for Damascus on their way to Paris, where they planned to present their resolution to the Peace Conference. The councilors were, however, arrested on their way to Damascus by the French authorities on charges of high treason and conspiracy and were sentenced by a French military tribunal to six to ten years' exile and the deprivation of their civil rights.¹³⁵ Some details behind the decision of the councilors to reach an agreement directly with the government

of Damascus over the status of Lebanon and the delimitation of its boundaries, thereby bypassing the French authorities, remain murky. They had apparently reached a prior understanding with Faysal through a number of intermediaries, including most notably Ryad al-Sulh, Amin Arslan and 'Aref al-Na'mani, securing the independence of Lebanon and the enlargement of its boundaries to include possibly the three coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, and Sayda in return for their renunciation of a French mandate.¹³⁶ The terms of this understanding, and especially those pertaining to the boundaries of Lebanon, do not seem to have been fully settled, and the trip of the councilors to Damascus was apparently aimed to finalize its details with the Arab government and get the approval of the Syrian Congress.¹³⁷ However, the wording of the resolution adopted by the councilors as well as some of their subsequent statements shed some light on their motives. The most striking element in these statements is the profound disaffection of the councilors with French policy and administration and their misgivings about the wisdom of close cooperation with France. After nearly two years, the councilors seem to have reached the conclusion that France was using them as a pawn in its contest with Faysal and that it had no intention, whatever the outcome of this contest, to fulfill the aspirations of the Lebanese, as evidenced by the vague pledges of Clemenceau and Millerand, who both declined to commit themselves to the establishment of an independent Greater Lebanon. Moreover, as Sulayman Kan'an, who played a leading role in rallying the remaining councilors, revealed in court, the councilors had recently received information that the French did not intend to annex the coastal towns of Beirut, Sayda, and Tripoli to Lebanon. If the end result was to obtain a smaller Lebanon, Kan'an added, then "we did not want it and we did not want to be under the protectorate of a [foreign] nation since Lebanon enjoyed special privileges."¹³⁸ In addition, the French policy of using the Lebanese as leverage in its negotiations with Faysal had aroused the animosity of the Arab government and set off raids by armed bands against Lebanon that the French had proved powerless to prevent. This led the councilors to recognize that the establishment of good relations with the government of Damascus was necessary to guarantee the security and well-being of Lebanon "as demonstrated by . . . the regrettable and troubling events which have occurred since last year."¹³⁹ And since the Arab government had apparently let them know that it was ready to accommodate the demands of the Lebanese for independence, the councilors had decided to reach an agreement directly with Faysal.

The councilors' action also reflected their growing disaffection with the high-handed French administration in the Mountain, which, notwithstanding French

repeated statements about its liberal intentions, was turning into downright direct rule aggravated by inefficiency. Foreign observers had few kind words for the French administration and even the American commissioner William Yale, who was otherwise favorably inclined toward France, reckoned that the “French administration was a most unpleasant spectacle to contemplate.”¹⁴⁰ French officials themselves acknowledged the problem, which they attributed to the lack of qualified personnel and the fact that French officers were trying to implement in Lebanon and Syria methods they had learned in North Africa and that were rubbing the local populations the wrong way. However, French officials’ appreciation of the problem did not seem to have helped them overcome their natural disposition toward direct rule, for which they always seemed to find good reasons. Picot, for instance, who complained that he had problems convincing military officers that “they were not in conquered country and must therefore have some regard for the wishes of the population” and refrain from “trying to govern and regulate everything,” nevertheless balked at appointing local administrators to assist French officials in order to preserve the prestige and authority of French officials and shield them from local partisan politics.¹⁴¹ Gouraud’s idea of administrative liberalization was to change the titles of French officials from administrators and inspectors to advisors.¹⁴² The councilors had issued in November 1919 a lengthy and firm statement complaining about the undue intervention of French officials in the working of the local executive, judicial, and security institutions without respect for hierarchical organization or established procedure, as well as the arbitrary dismissal of local officials.¹⁴³ However, not only had French authorities ignored the cautionary note of the Council but, to add insult to injury, they had orchestrated a campaign of petitions in the Mountain in June 1920 in favor of the appointment of a French governor for at least five years, which ended in failure when a majority of inhabitants refused to sign the circulated forms.¹⁴⁴ The French military administration in Lebanon, which contrasted unfavorably with the unimpeded local administration in the zones controlled by the Arab government, must have also weighed in the councilors’ frustration with French administration and their decision to turn to the authorities of Damascus.

The defection of members of the Administration Council lifted the veil on some significant facets of the nationalist movement in the crucial 1918–20 years. It revealed for one that the Council that played a central role in articulating and promoting the nationalist aspirations of the Lebanese was not a homogeneous and cohesive body and that there apparently existed some significant differences among

its members with regard to the goals and means of the Lebanese national effort. These differences were not necessarily related to the communal affiliations of the councilors, as there existed, for instance, divergences among the Maronite members of the Council owing to old and new rivalries and personal animosities but also divergences in political views. These differences surfaced at each new turn in their efforts to devise and revise their claims about the future status of Lebanon. Hence, when the councilors met in December 1918 to formulate their first resolution calling for enlarged and autonomous Lebanon under French mandate, Habib Pasha Sa'ad had to expend intense efforts to bring all the councilors around. When later on, in May 1919, the councilors decided to issue a resolution calling for the independence of Lebanon under French aegis, the Druze councilor Mahmud Jumblatt dissented on the grounds that he was opposed to the separation of Lebanon from Syria. Finally, when the seven councilors decided to adopt their latest resolution in July 1920 in favor of a direct agreement with the government of Damascus over the independence of Lebanon, they did not bother to inform the other five councilors, and most notably the president of the council, Habib Pasha Sa'ad, because they knew that they were "opposed to our ideas,"¹⁴⁵ thus confirming that differences among the members of the council had been the object of previous discussions.

The difference of views among the councilors temper the image of unanimity and resolve in favor of an independent Greater Lebanon among the majority of the Lebanese population, and it points instead to a more nuanced vision of a diverse and fluid Lebanese political scene in which central issues pertaining to the future status of Lebanon and its relations with its Syrian environment and with France continued to be debated and contested up until the eleventh hour. The councilors and the other notables of the Mountain were apparently generally agreed on the need to preserve and consolidate the special status of Lebanon, but they grappled with, and differed on, the best ways and means to secure this objective. Furthermore, they continued to deliberate their options and to interact with notables from all sides within the Mountain and in the neighboring provinces, with whom they were linked by all sorts of long-standing social, political, and commercial ties. Frequent contacts and meetings continued to be held among all of these notables, who debated openly the issue of the future of status of Lebanon and its relation with France and the neighboring Syrian provinces.¹⁴⁶ These ongoing conversations between politicians and notables from all sides also mitigate the commonly held image of a climate of sharp polarization between two well-defined camps—one

favorable to a Greater Lebanon and one favorable to a Greater Syria—and allow us to envision a political scene where the line of division between both camps was much more blurred and where the political and national stances of main actors were tentative and fluid and subject to equivocations, readjustments and reversals according to rapidly shifting and uncertain circumstances and opportunities.

As for the rest of the Mountain population, information about them remains scant and sketchy. Reports are mainly limited to campaigns of petitions in favor of an independent Greater Lebanon, accompanied by a spate of demonstrations that took place in mid-1919 in conjunction with the passage of the American Commission of Inquiry. These campaigns, apparently encouraged by the Maronite clergy, thereafter subsided, as the Maronite Patriarch, who remained firmly committed to the establishment of a separate Lebanese state, preferred to expend all his efforts on pressing, with unrelenting insistence and growing distress, his demands with French officials on the ground and the French government. The sporadic attempts to mobilize the local population around the Greater Lebanon agenda no doubt contributed to the dissemination of this ideal and the rallying of segments of the population around it. The intensification of the contest between Faysal and the French after the withdrawal of the British forces by the end of 1919, as well as the raids by armed gangs on Christian villages in the south, the Bekaa, and the Marj'uyun districts, followed by the flight of many of local inhabitants toward the coastal areas, must have also strengthened the dedication of parts of the Christian population in Mount Lebanon and the coastal areas to the establishment of a Greater Lebanon independent from the emerging Syrian state. However, here again, the image of unanimity within the Lebanese population, or at the very least its Christian component, rallied behind the Greater Lebanon agenda needs to be mitigated by the fact that demonstrations remained limited and localized and that petitions and campaigns were more often than not orchestrated and murky affairs. Moreover, this image of unanimity also needs to take into consideration that part of the population within the Mountain remained on the sidelines, waiting to see how the wider ongoing contest over the fate of the Mountain, which largely transcended local concerns and clout, would turn out. Finally, it fails to take into consideration that part of the population expressed their lack of faith in the nationalist struggle by altogether opting out. Indeed, as soon as the Allied blockade was lifted at the end of the war and steamship service resumed, a steady stream of migrants, which grew in the subsequent months to alarming proportions, started to leave the Mountain for greener pastures, thus belying the image of a firm and

unanimous commitment to, and confidence about the prospect of, an independent Lebanese state.¹⁴⁷

The Administrative Council incident precipitated events leading to the establishment of Greater Lebanon. By that time, the French troops dispatched by the French government were already in place and the plans for the final showdown with Faysal had been finalized. Gouraud, fearing that Faysal was about to leave Syria for France via Haifa, sent on July 14 an ultimatum to Faysal that led to the battle of Maysalun two weeks later and to the demise of the Faysal. On August 3, Gouraud annexed the Bekaa Valley to Lebanon, and on September 1, he solemnly proclaimed the establishment of Greater Lebanon.

In the end, a Greater Lebanon came into existence. The final decision to create an independent Greater Lebanon was taken by France as part of its policy to carve up Syria into separate states in order to weaken and isolate the opposition to its mandate in the hinterland regions. The Lebanese were hardly consulted in the last-minute exchanges between Millerand in Paris and Gouraud in Beirut, during which the establishment of the country was settled and its boundaries drawn.¹⁴⁸ For France, the wishes of the local populations, Lebanese or otherwise, were subsidiary to its wider strategic interests; it had seriously considered compromising on the level of independence of Lebanon and the limits of the country for the sake of extending its control over the rest of Syria. However, if the involvement of the Lebanese in the decision to establish an independent Greater Lebanon was negligible, their contribution to this final outcome was not entirely insignificant. When France ultimately decided to establish a Greater Lebanon, French officials were influenced and guided by the claims and narratives developed and circulated by the Lebanese activists within and without the Mountain over the past two years, and General Gouraud delimited its boundaries along the lines of the map that was drawn by General Beaufort some eighty years previously and that had mostly gathered dust in the archives until it was rediscovered by Lebanese activists in the years preceding the World War I and adopted by them as standard for the “natural and historical boundaries” they were claiming.¹⁴⁹ But such an outcome was not planned or inevitable, and other outcomes could well be envisaged had events in the pivotal 1918–20 years not taken such a sharp turn.

Conclusion

Since 1920, a controversy over the establishment of a Lebanese state has plagued the contemporary history of the country and generated many disputes and arguments fought out by nationalists making use of conflicting historical narratives. Hence, on the one hand, Lebanese nationalists have tried to vindicate the establishment of a separate Lebanese state by treading a typical nationalist historical narrative, tracing the roots of the Lebanese nationalism in a distant past, and relating the teleological development of a Lebanese nation until the realization of its ultimate goal, namely the establishment of its own state. On the other hand, Arab nationalists have tended to write off Lebanese nationalist aspirations prior to the establishment of the Lebanese state and to attribute the emergence of the country as part of a French scheme to thwart and contain genuine Arab historical nationalist aspirations.¹

This controversy has clouded the historiography of Lebanese nationalism. It has limited potential fields of inquiry and overshadowed alternative representations of the past and incongruous events at odds with the linear and teleological nationalist mind-set. The account presented in this book represents an attempt to disengage the historiography of Lebanese nationalism from past and current controversies and from nationalist ideological moulds, or to “rescue history from the nation.”² It has tried to present an alternative narrative that reflects a complex and muddled reality, with all its dissonance and contradictions. The narrative untangles the multiple and disjointed points of departure, constructions, transformations,

and fluctuations of Lebanese nationalism before the establishment of the Lebanese state. It has focused more particularly on the construction of a Lebanese national ideal, but at the same time it has tried to suggest that the early history of Lebanese nationalism paralleled and overlapped with other contemporary national ideals, such as Ottomanism, Syrianism, and Arabism. The different chapters of the book have hence tried to reconstruct different moments and aspects of a complex and multifaceted story that mirrors the inconsistent, convoluted, and disjointed path of Lebanese nationalism before the establishment of the state. The account presented in this book is admittedly not the only possible one. It has left out many significant features and focused particularly on the Maronites, in part to deconstruct previous conventional narratives. It has also focused on key moments and events and blended in case studies, lateral analyses, and many digressions. It is only by combining several such narratives that we will be able to uncover the complexity and dissonance of the past history of Lebanon and the region. By way of conclusion, some of the main themes of the book are highlighted briefly.

The early origins of Lebanese nationalism can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century. At that time, elements of an ideal, which might be called “Lebanism,” were first formulated in conjunction with elusive schemes for the establishment in Mount Lebanon of a semi-independent entity. These schemes were shaped by specific circumstances encompassing an intricate and multifaceted local contest for power in the Mountain, which coincided with attempts by the Ottoman government to reorganize the administration of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces amid intense foreign intervention. This complex conjuncture set off two decades of intertwined social and political conflicts in Mount Lebanon that culminated in 1860 and ultimately led to the establishment of a special autonomous administration in the Mountain. Thereafter, projects to alter the status of the Mountain dissipated for a while, only to reappear in different forms and configurations and under changing circumstances. They ranged from a consolidation of the special administration of the Mountain to broader schemes envisioning the integration of the Mountain in a decentralized Syrian sphere or a regenerated Empire, and they coincided with serious internal crises amid shifting regional and international conditions. At the same time, national representations and historical constructions appeared in relation with the various projects articulated by members of the clerical and secular Lebanese elite. These representations endeavored to outline the essence and contours of a Lebanese nation whose history was projected back to a distant and ideal past. They remained fluid and unsettled, and they varied according to the aims and inclinations of the local forces that envisioned them,

centering at times on the Maronite community and expanding at others to encompass the different communities who lived in the Mountain. Furthermore, these Lebanist national representations overlapped with other national contemporary representations and ideals, such as Ottomanism and Syrianism, as some activists and members of the Lebanese elite envisioned the association of the Lebanese nation with, or its eventual incorporation into, a wider Syrian or Ottoman nation. The various projects devised by the members of the Lebanese elite, together with their different national presentations and ideals, continued to fluctuate according to shifting circumstances and opportunities until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Hence, Lebanism followed a much more complex, convoluted, and elusive path than has been suggested by conventional linear and teleological accounts. Its development was marked by many contingent twists and turns, discontinuities, diversions, and reconstructions. Furthermore, throughout this period, Lebanism did not spawn a coherent and popular nationalist ideology or movement, but core ideas and basic historical myths and representations, around which Lebanese nationalism eventually crystallized, were conceived by members of the Lebanese clerical and secular elite.

In this respect, Lebanism did not differ much from other national ideals, namely Ottomanism, Syrianism, and Arabism, that surfaced in the Syrian provinces before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the state system in the region. All of these different national representations and ideals surfaced and evolved in tandem against the background of profound social, economic, and political transformations wrought by the reformation of the Ottoman state and the incorporation of the Ottoman economy into the world economy. The different national representations matched specific reform programs devised by members of the political and intellectual elite in the Lebanese and Syrian provinces. These programs aimed to inform and complement the general movement of reform implemented by the Ottoman government and to inflect its development in a direction more in line with the aspirations and interests of some local forces. The reformist programs of the local Lebanese and Syrian elites, and their attendant national representations, need therefore to be considered together, as different facets of the reform aspirations of some members of the elite of these provinces. They need to be studied in relation to the specific contexts in which they appeared, and to the different forces that promoted them, in order to unravel the delicate fluctuations in political agendas they generated and to elucidate the significance and import of the national representations they elicited. These different projects and ideals should not be seen anachronistically as clear and coherent nationalist agendas that

embodied the aspirations of clearly bounded and prospective nations that aimed to break up from the Ottoman Empire. At that time, no such nations existed; the different national ideals conceived by some members of the Lebanese and Syrian elite represented tentative, complex and ambivalent alternative ways in which the nation was perceived and envisioned in the late Ottoman Empire, and they vied and overlapped with each other and with other local, regional, and communal constructions, allegiances, and identities. The fortunes of all these diverse programs and ideals remained uncertain and unpredictable, and the field of possibilities for the future still open until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.

With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the complex and ambivalent ideals devised by some members of the elite evolved into explicit claims for the independence of a Greater Lebanon, a Greater Syria, or an Arab Empire. The emergence of these claims was shaped by the new circumstances created by the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the principle of self-determination promoted by President Woodrow Wilson, and the intervention of France and Britain. The different nationalist claims were linked to specific national agendas promoted by activists and embraced at first by local notables and various segments of the populations. The sudden advent of the age of nationalism in the region became, however, embroiled in the contest between France and Britain to extend their influence in the region. As the prospects for the different nationalist claims became uncertain, the apparent unity and cohesion of nationalist movements and camps was badly tested, as nationalist activists quarreled about objectives and strategies while many local notables and social groups reassessed their options and hedged their bets. In the end, the fate of the Lebanese and Syrian provinces was forcibly settled by France, which established separate Lebanese and Syrian states. But this outcome was far from predetermined and predictable. France and Britain only settled their differences late in the day and France continued to waver until the eleventh hour between different options, among which an independent Greater Lebanon represented only one among many other possible courses of action. Furthermore, despite the contentions of Lebanese and Arab Syrian nationalist activists that they represented the genuine and long-standing aspirations of the populations in the country, the national inclinations of the populations they claimed to represent remained at the time much more ambivalent and tentative. Lebanese, Syrian, and Arab nationalisms solidified only gradually and unevenly, and with mixed success, into more coherent and popular ideologies and movements after the establishment of the modern state system in the region, through the various

intersected struggles to assert the independence of the peoples of the region on firmer grounds. The fortunes of these different nationalist movements continued to fluctuate according to circumstances and opportunities and according to the ever elusive achievement of the different national projects they pursued—and the process of imagining the nation in the region remains today, as yesterday, an open and contested question.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Israel Gershoni, "Rethinking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in the Middle East, 1920–1945: Old and New Narratives," in James P. Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); R. Stephen Humphreys, "The Strange Career of Pan-Arabism," in R. Stephen Humphreys, *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age* (rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

2. See, for example, Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988); Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1920* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Fawwaz Trabulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto, 2007); Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004); Ussama Makdisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no. 4 (November 2002), 600–617. Salibi's book exposes and demystifies the historical "myths" of the diverse Lebanese communities; Zamir's book provides a new and engaging account of the formation of modern Lebanon; and Akarli's book focuses on the *mutasarrifiyya* period and highlights the process by which the local Administrative Council, an elected body of representatives designed to assist and advise the Ottoman Christian governor, was able to assert progressively its authority; Trabulsi presents a sophisticated historical survey of the history of modern Lebanon from the sixteenth century to the present; Kaufman traces

carefully and thoroughly the emergence and development of the Phoenician myth of origin of the Lebanese in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

3. Zamir, *Formation*, 38.

4. *Ibid.*, 50 and 70.

5. Salibi, *House*, 20.

6. *Ibid.*, 25.

7. *Ibid.*, 28.

8. Akarli, *Peace*, 187.

9. Trabulsi, *History*, viii.

10. *Ibid.*, 82–84.

11. See, for example, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (rev. ed.; London: Verso, 2006); Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Anderson argues that nationalism first emerged in Latin America but that only the European variants served as generic models for emulation. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. For his part, Chatterjee challenged Anderson's notion of a singular modular form for the development of nationalism and argues that nationalism in the colonial and post-colonial world tried to define itself by emphasizing its difference from the West within its own "inside" realm. See Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments*.

12. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993).

13. Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 4.

14. Fred Halliday, "The Middle East and the Nationalist Debate," in *Nation and Religion in the Middle East* (London: Saqi, 2000), 37. See also John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996); Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

15. Breuilly, "Approaches," 160; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; and Tom Nairn, "Marxism and the Modern Janus," *New Left Review* 94 (November–December 1975): 3–29.

16. James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of the Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 12 and *passim*.

17. On the staged approach to the emergence of nationalism, see Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 22–24; and Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 12.

CHAPTER ONE

1. See Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Caravan, 1977), *A House of Many Mansions* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), and “The Lebanese Emirate 1667–1841,” *Al-Abhath* 20 (1967): 1–16; Dominique Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris: Geuthner, 1971); Ilya Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society; Lebanon 1711–1845* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Toufic Touma, *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druses et les Maronites du Liban du XVIIe siècle à 1914*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1986); William Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon 1788–1840: A study of the impact of the West on the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963); Ussama Madisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, 2000). Local contemporary historians have also tackled this question, or aspects of it, among whom Tannus al-Shidyaq, *Kitab akhbar al-a‘yan fi Jabal Lubnan*, Fuad E. Bustani, ed. (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise [1859], 1970), and Nassif al-Yaziji, *Risala tarikhiyya fi ahwal Lubnan fi ‘ahdihi al-iqta‘i* (Harisa: Matba‘at al-Qiddis Bulus, 1936) are the best known.

2. See Salibi, *House*, chap. 6, “The Imagined Principality.” See also Abdul-Rahim Abu Husayn, *Provincial Leadership in Syria: 1575–1650* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1985), and “The Feudal System of Mount Lebanon as Depicted by Nasif al-Yaziji,” in S. Seikaly et al., *Quest for Understanding: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm H. Kerr* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1991); Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

3. The title of “Emir” was derived from the official function of the local leader as *Sandjak-beyi*, or *Amir-i-Liwa*, that is, governor of a province. See Salibi, *House*, 66.

4. Salibi, *House*, 65–68, and Harik, *Politics*, 13–16.

5. In fact they owned part of the land as private property and controlled the rest under various contractual and legal arrangements. The issue of private landholding in Mount Lebanon during the Ottoman era is a controversial issue. While some authors have contended that in contrast to the neighboring provinces, private property was prevalent in Lebanon, others have contested this fact, asserting that in Mount Lebanon, as in the rest of the Empire, land was subject to the Ottoman land regime and was classified as *miri* land, or state owned, until the promulgation of the Land Law in 1858 that legalized private property. In the absence of an in-depth study on patterns of land ownership in Lebanon, such general assertions remain mainly educated guesses. Moreover, broad generalizations on this question are unhelpful given disparities in patterns of land ownership throughout the Mountain and variations over time. A recent study

that focuses on Kisrawan in the eighteenth century mentions that some *muqata'jis* were able, through different legal means, and especially in the eighteenth century, when central control over the alienation of land became less stringent, to transform some of "their holdings into quasi-property," while they controlled the rest as tax farms. See Richard Van Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khaṣin Sheikhs and the Maronite Church 1736–1840* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 71–72 and 181–87.

6. Yehoshua Porath, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858–61 in Kisrawan," *Asian and African Studies* II (1966), 80–81; Chevallier, *Société*, 132.

7. Salibi, *House*, 108–67, and Abu Husayn, "The Feudal System."

8. See Chevallier, "Les cadres sociaux de l'économie agraire dans le Proche-orient au début du XIXe siècle," *Revue Historique* 239 (1968), 93–94; and P. Khoury and J. Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), introduction, 5.

9. For various definitions of tribes and different types of tribes, see Khoury and Kostiner, *Tribes*; see especially the articles of Richard Tapper, "Anthropologists, Historians and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East," 48–73; and Bassam Tibi, "The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nations-States in the Modern Middle East," 127–53.

10. Tapper, "Anthropologists," 50 and 56.

11. Yaziji, *Risala*, 20.

12. See Chevallier, "Cadres," 93–94; and Polk, *Opening*, 61–71 and 181–89.

13. See Chevallier, *Société*, 72; Shakir al-Khury, *Majma' al-masararat* (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, [1908] 1985), 22–23; and Yusuf al-Hakim, *Suriyya wa Lubnan fi al-'ahd al-'uthmani* (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar, [1964] 1980), 43–44.

14. Chevallier, *Société*, 72.

15. The writings of two Maronite laymen, clerics of Bashir II's administration, illustrate well this image of a pluralistic and segmented society and political sphere in which religious communal allegiances had apparently no real bearings on political affiliations. See Shidyaq, *Akhbar*, and Yaziji, *Risala*.

16. For a recent study on the rise of sectarianism, see Madisi, *Culture*. This study concurs with Madisi's main conclusions that political communalism was a modern phenomena that emerged in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century at the intersection of local upheaval and reconstruction, imperial Ottoman reformation, and European colonialism. However, compared to Madisi's focus on the cultural production of sectarianism, this study puts emphasis on the effect of local political struggles and socioeconomic factors on the concurrent political imagination of communalism and nationalism.

17. For the history of the Maronite Church until the nineteenth century, see Kamal Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon* (Beirut: American University of Beirut,

1959), and “The Traditional Historiography of the Maronites,” in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 212–25; Harik, *Politics*; Van Leeuwen, *Notables*; D. Kerr, *The Temporal Authority of the Maronite Patriarch 1920–1958: A Study in the Relationship of Religious and Secular Power*, D.Phil thesis (Oxford: St Anthony’s College, 1973); Pierre Dib, *Histoire de l’église maronite* (Beirut: Editions de la Sagesse, 1962–73); Bernard Heyberger, *Les Chrétiens du Proche-Orient au temps de la réforme catholique* (Rome: Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, 1994); Yusuf Daghir, *Batarikat al-mawarina* (Beirut: n.p., 1957); Butrus Fahd, *Batarikat al-mawarina wa asaqifatuhum: al-qarn al-tasi ‘ashar*, and *Batarikat al-mawarina al qarn al-‘ishrin*, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, 1986–87); and Yusuf Dib, *Al-jami’ al-mufasal fi tarikh al-mawarina al-mu’asal* (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, [1893] 1987).

18. Until the Council of Luwayza, which forbade this practice, notables participated in the selection of bishops and the election of the Patriarch, and intervened frequently in the internal affairs of the Church. For the movement of reform in the Church see, Harik, *Politics*, 96–126; Van Leeuwen, *Notables*, 110–47.

19. See Harik, *Politics*, 112 and 117–25; see also, Van Leeuwen, *Notables*, 198–234; and Chevallier, *Société*, 255.

20. Harik, *Politics*, 152–66; see also Heyberger, *Chrétiens*, 433–550.

21. Salibi, “Traditional,” 216.

22. See Salibi, *Historians* and “Traditional;” Ahmad Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains* (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1984).

23. Salibi, “Traditional,” 219–20.

24. Ibid., 217 and 219. See also, Beydoun, *Identité*.

25. The case study of Nicolas Murad, later on, represents a clear example of this process.

26. For Bashir II’s rule, and the main events of this period, see Salibi, *History*, 18–39; and Polk, *Opening*, 83–190; Chevallier, *Société*; Asad Rustum, *Bashir bayna al-sultan wa al-‘aẓiẓ* (Beirut: Publications of the Lebanese University, 1956); Shidyaq, *Akhbar*.

27. The Maronite *muqata’jis* affected by these measures included, most notably, members of the Khazin family. See, for example, Mansur Hattuni, *Nabdha Tarikhiyya fi al-muqata’a al-kisrwanīyya*, ed. Nazir Abbud (Beirut: Dar Marun Abbud, [1884] 1987), 180–90 and 216.

28. See Shidyaq, *Akhbar*, 278–81.

29. See Husayn Ghadban Abu Shaqra, *Al-Harakat fi Lubnan ila ‘ahd al-Mutasarri-fīyya* (n.p., n.d.), 25 and 33; and M. Michaud and M. Poujoulat, *Correspondance d’Orient 1830–1831*, Vol. 7 (Paris: Ducollet, 1835), 341–42.

30. Mgr Hubaysh was succeeded by Mgr Yusuf Khazin (1845–54), and afterward by Mgr Bulus Mas'ad (1854–90); see Yusuf Dagher, *Batarikat*; Butrus Fahd, *Batarikat al-mawarina*; Dibs, *Al-jami' al-mufasal*.

31. Harik, *Politics*, 229–43.

32. The Maronites represented an outright majority in the northern districts, while the Maronite along with other Christians represented a relative majority in all southern districts except the Shuf.

33. Michaud and Poujoulat evaluate that the number of Druzes decreased under Bashir II's rule from 150,000 inhabitants to 60,000. *Correspondance*, 342. Abu Shaqra mentions a vast movement of emigration among the Druzes of the Shuf to Hawran after Bashir Jumblatt's elimination and severe conscription measures that affected half of the Druze male population. *Harakat*, 15 and 22. If these figures cannot be relied upon, they give us an idea of the scope of the negative impact on the Druzes of Bashir II's and Egyptian rule. At that time, the total population of Mount Lebanon was estimated at roughly 200,000. For an analysis of demographic estimates of the population and the breakdown of the population by religious affiliations in the several districts, see Chevallier, *Société*, 30–35 and 49–63.

34. Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914* (London: Methuen, 1981), 76–82; Chevallier, *Société*, 108–30.

35. Kais Firro, "Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon 1860–1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22 (1990): 151; see also Boutros Labaki, *Introduction à l'histoire économique du Liban: Soie et commerce extérieur en fin de période ottomane 1840–1914* (Beirut: Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1984); and Akram Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

36. Mount Lebanon was never fully self-sufficient. It had to import part of its grain consumption from the neighboring Bekaa Valley, which it exchanged against its surplus of olive oil, vine, and silk. The Mountain therefore needed to maintain commercial links with the interior and the coast open in order to survive.

37. On the 1820 peasant uprising see Harik, *Politics*, 208 and passim; Chevallier, *Société*, 100; and Trabulsi, *History*, 10–11 and 24–41; for rising level of taxes, see Chevallier, *Société*, chap. 9.

38. For sources on the 1840 rebellion and the campaign to expel Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, see especially, Shidyaq, *Akhbar*; Asad Rustum (ed.), *Materials for a Corpus of Arabic Documents Relating to the History of Syria under Mehmet Ali Pasha*, 2nd ed., 6 vols. (Beirut: Librairie Saint Paul, 1987); and *A Calendar of State Papers from the Royal Archives of Egypt Relating to the Affairs of Syria* (Beirut: Librairie Saint Paul, 1986); British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant from February 15, 1839 to July 13, 1841*, 3 parts in 2 vols. (London, 1841);

Adel Isma'il, *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l'histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVI^e siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 6; Philippe and Farid al-Khazin, *Majmu'at al-muhararat al-siyasiyya 'an Suriyya wa Lubnan min sanat 1840 ila sanat 1910*, 3 vols (Beirut: Dar al-ra'ed al-lubani, [1910] 1983); Polk, *Opening*, 190–212; and Harik, *Politics*, 243–354; Touma, *Paysans et institutions*; Madisi, *Culture*; Caesar Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon 1830–1861* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

39. See Shidyaq, *Akhbar*, 303–35, and Rustum, *Calendar*, Vol. 5, nos. 6303, 6310, 6318, 6324.

40. Rustum, *Calendar*, Vol. 4, no. 6318.

41. British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence* (1841), Basily to Bouteneff (Beirut, May 30 and June 11, 1840). The numbers of rebels varied over time. They are reported to have numbered between 4,000 and 8,000 men.

42. Shidyaq, *Akhbar*, 305–6, and Rustum, *Calendar*, Vol. 4, no. 6338.

43. Rustum, *Calendar*, Vol. 4, nos. 6339, 6344. and 6358.

44. Shidyaq, *Akhbar*, 313; and British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence* (1841).

45. Rustum, *Corpus*, Vol. 5, no. 535; see also Madisi, *Culture*, for an exhaustive analysis of the commoners' views.

46. Rustum, *Calendar*, Vol. 4, no. 6307.

47. Baron de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères depuis le premier traité conclu, en 1536, entre Suléyman Jerier et François Ier jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Amyot, 1866), Vol. 3, 82–83.

48. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, June 6, 1840), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 46–47.

49. Bourrée to Thiers (Beirut, August 2, 1840), *ibid.*, 116–17.

50. The Greeks had rebelled against Ottoman rule in 1821 and succeeded, with the assistance of European powers, most notably France, Britain, and Russia, in gaining their independence in 1830. The Greek revolt touched off a wave of sympathy for the Greek insurgents among the Western public, fired by the spirit of romanticism, and it inspired nationalist movements among neighboring nationalities in the Balkans.

51. Rustum, *Corpus*, Vol. 5, no. 531. In the same communiqué to the Lebanese population the rebels also attributed the cause of the French Revolution to an attempt to disarm the Frenchmen “so that they can be enslaved by others.” They had rejected this order and “defying death . . . and with courage they defeated 150,000, in spite of the fact that they were few in number.”

52. Adel Isma'il and E. Khury, *Al-Siyasa al-duwaliyya fi al-sharq al-'arabi min sanat 1779 ila sanat 1956* (Beirut: Dar al-nashr li al-siyasa wa al-tarikh, 1961), Vol. 2, 229–30 and Vol. 3, 21.

53. *Ibid.*, 412.

54. Rustum, *Calendar*, Vol. 4, nos. 6329, 6338, 6339, 6353; on the support provided by the foreign community in Beirut, see also Henri Guys, *Beyrouth et le Liban* (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, [1850]1985), Vol. 2, 171–72; and Francois Charles-Roux, *Thiers et Mehmet-Ali* (Paris: Plon, 1951), 109.

55. Charles-Roux, *Thiers et Mehmet-Ali*, 109.

56. British Sessional Papers, House of Commons LX, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Syria 1843* (London, 1843), Rose to Aberdeen (January 5, 1842).

57. British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence (1841)*, Wood to Ponsonby (October 8, 1840). The dispatches dealing with the issue of the promises made by British agents are too numerous to be cited separately; they punctuate many of Wood's reports all along this campaign. For the ulterior importance of these pledges, see chap. 2.

58. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, March 23, 1842), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 104.

59. Bourrée to Thiers (Beirut, June 27, 1840), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 80–81.

60. Bourrée to Thiers (Beirut, May 21, 1840), *ibid.*, 28–29.

61. *Ibid.*, 27.

62. Charles Roux, *Thiers*, 88.

63. Thiers to Bourrée (Beirut, July 29, 1840), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 111.

64. The British consul-general in Beirut portrayed him as a “person of talent” but also as a “formidable and uncompromising adversary.” British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence (1843)*, Rose to Palmerston (August 18, 1841).

65. Archives of the Maronite Patriarchate, Hubaysh papers, Mss., nos. 5805, 6157. I would like to thank Farid al-Khazin and Alain Chahwan for their assistance in providing access to the original documents from the Maronite Patriarchate. See also Harik, *Politics*, 290–93 and 254–55.

66. *Ibid.*

67. This study hints at such historical elaborations as much as the general coherence of the text allows. Singling out all the numerous variations around this theme would soon become tedious and defeat its purpose. What is of interest to our subject is “what, when, and why” new elements are added to this developing historical narrative.

68. See n. 57.

69. As already mentioned, it is difficult to measure the impact of these foreign influences, and it is much safer to note their concurrence with similar ideas in Lebanon.

70. See chap. 2.

71. British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Syria 1843, 1844, 1845*, 2 parts (London, 1845), Rose to Aberdeen (Beirut, August 9, 1844).

72. British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence (1845)*, Memorandum of Alison, Inclosure in Canning to Aberdeen (Buyukdery, September 17, 1844).

73. For text of the pact see Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 369–71; Shidyah, *Akhbar*, 324–35.

74. For text of Druze petition, see Philippe and Farid al-Khazin, *Muhararat*, no. 26; and British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence* (1843), Wood to Aberdeen (November 4, 1841).

75. Recalling the impact the Patriarch’s moves to unite his community and the signature of the Maronite Pact, Abu Shaqra mentions that these events strengthened the feeling of solidarity among the Druzes (*ta‘asabu*). Abu Shaqra, *Al-Harakat*. Hattuni mentions that the distrust of the other communities in the mountain was aroused by the signature of the pact by the Maronites. Hattuni, *Nabtha*, 249.

76. The Patriarch did not seem to realize that by attacking these principles he was weakening his own cause since the local autonomy of the Mountain rested upon the *iltizam* system, i.e., on the delegation by the Ottoman authorities of their power of levying taxes and maintaining order. Given the new Ottoman policy that aimed at abolishing these remnants of a foregone past, the power of the *muqata‘jis*, if called into question, could only be replaced by a more direct administration.

77. For details on this campaign and the reasons of its failure see Shidyah, *Akhbar*, 328–40; Harik, *Politics*, 261–66; Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, November 6, 1841), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 39–40; and British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence* (1843), especially, Rose to Aberdeen (November 8, 1841) and Rose to Aberdeen (November 19, 1841).

78. For example, see British Sessional Papers, *Correspondence* 1843, Rose to Aberdeen (October 28, 1841); and *Correspondence* (1845), Rose to Canning (May 4, 1845).

79. See, for example, Harik, *Politics*, 262.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, November 15, 1841), in Isma‘il, *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l’histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-orient du XVIIe siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 7, 48.

2. On this subject, see especially Baron de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères depuis le premier traité conclu, en 1536, entre Suléyman Ier et François Ier jusqu’à nos jours*, Vols. 2 and 3 (Paris: Amyot, 1866); British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant from February 15, 1839 to July 13, 1841*, 3 parts in 2 vols. (London, 1841); Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 25; Charles-Roux, *Thiers et Méhémet Ali* (Paris: Plon, 1951); and Vicomte Eugène de Guichen, *La Crise d’Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l’Europe* (Paris, Emile-Paul Frères, 1921).

3. Bourrée to Thiers (Beirut, June 27, 1840), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 80–81.
4. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, August 2, 1841), *ibid.*, 422–43; Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, August 19, 1841), *Ibid.*, 427.
5. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, August 25, 1841), *ibid.*, 436.
6. By the end of the nineteenth century, though, the French had to balance their interests in the Mountain more closely with growing economic investments in the rest of Syria and the Ottoman Empire. For French interests in the Empire on the eve of World War I, see Jacques Thobie, *Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l'Empire Ottoman, 1895–1914* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1977).
7. See, for example, Bertou to Guizot (Beirut, December 12, 1840), Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 295; and Churchill, *Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years' Residence from 1842 to 1852*, 3rd ed., 3 vols (London: Saunders and Otley, 1853), viii.
8. M. Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps* (Paris: Michel Levy Frères, 1864), Vol. 6, 37–129 and 244–58.
9. See Mathew Burrows, “‘Mission Civilisatrice’: French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860–1914,” *Historical Journal* (March, 1986), 109–35.
10. On Guizot's policy toward the Empire and Lebanon, see Guizot's speech to Parliament on July 15, 1845, in Eugène Poujade, *Le Liban et la Syrie 1845–1860* (Paris: A. Bourdilliat, 1860), 267–75.
11. Guizot to Bourqueney (Paris, November 15, 1841), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 165–66.
12. France's protectorate of the Catholics, deriving from a series of capitulatory agreements with the Porte, entitled it to officially uphold the interests of Catholic missions in the Empire, as well as the Holy Places in Jerusalem, but did not, strictly speaking, involve the protection the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, France had striven “when political circumstances allowed it to act with varying degrees of efficiency” to unofficially and occasionally intervene in favor of Christian subjects of Empire. Georges Outrey, *Etudes pratiques sur le protectorat religieux de la France* (Constantinople, 1898), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 34, pp.19–20; See also François Charles-Roux, *France et chrétiens d'Orient* (Paris: Lagny, 1939). By the middle of the nineteenth century, France, however, took advantage of the reformation of the Ottoman Empire to champion much more forcefully the cause of the civic and political rights of the Christian minorities, in order to advance its own interests in the Ottoman domains.
13. The term *liberal*, which gained wide currency at the time in France and Europe, was used in different contexts. “Liberalism” referred to the rights of peoples against despotic governments. It also referred to the resistance of the secular state to the pretensions of the clergy. See Georges Weill, *L'Europe du XIXe siècle et l'idée de nationalité* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1938).

14. Louis de Baudicour, *La France au Liban* (Paris: E. Dentu and Chalamell Ainé, 1879), 54 and 60. Comte Théodore de Quatrebarbes, deputy of Maine-et-Loire, was a member of the Committee for the Defense of Education presided over by the liberal Catholic deputy Charles de Montalembert. On Quatrebarbes and the background to the 1847 parliamentary debate, see Chevallier, *La Société du Mont Liban à l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris: Geuthner, 1971), 36–37.

15. Alphonse de Lamartine, *La France Parlementaire (1834–1851): OEuvres oratoires et écrits politiques par A. de Lamartine* (Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie., 1865), Vol. 4, 291–308; see also, Alphonse de Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient 1832–1833* (Paris: Hachette, [1835] 1875), 471–93; Baudicour, *France*, 41 and 45; and Guichen, *Crise*, 79–80.

16. Compte rendu des débats au sénat français sur les événements du Liban et de la Syrie en 1860, in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 30, 74–75. See also Guizot speech to Parliament on July 15, 1845, in Poujade, *Le Liban et la Syrie*, 267–75; and Guizot, *Mémoires*, Vol. 7, 247–54.

17. On the Lallemand Boré Commission of Inquiry, see Guizot to Bourrée (Paris, July 14, 1847) in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 85–87, and Lallemand to Bourqueney (December 5, 6, and 9, 1847), in *ibid.*, 131–70.

18. It is difficult to see who exactly initiated what. It is safer to note the similarities of views between the French opposition and the Maronite clergy at the time and compare their parallel evolution and interaction.

19. This study henceforth uses the phrase “Franco-Lebanese dream” to refer to this vague fledging political project, whose main lines included the establishment of a more or less independent Christian entity, under the aegis of France, in the Levant. By this term I do not mean to imply that the French consciously manipulated the Maronites, or vice versa, but to underline once more the complexity of this mutual reflection of ideas and the ambiguity of the process that influenced, inspired, and encouraged the ambitions of the Maronite clergy at the time. On Nicolas Murad, see last section of this chapter.

20. These tales flourished during the 1840–60 period. The sources reproducing these idealized historical accounts are too numerous to be quoted. Some of the best examples of such literature are the numerous books and pamphlets that were published in France after the massacres of the Christians in 1860, Baptistin Poujoulat, *La vérité sur la Syrie et l'expédition française* (Paris: Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861), and Baudicour, *France*, representing two relevant examples.

21. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, January 17, 1848), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 260.

22. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, March 23, 1842), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 102.

23. Lallemand to Bourqueney (Beirut, January 17, 1848), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 157–59, and Lallemand to Guizot (Beirut December 12), in *ibid.*

24. Guizot to Bourrée (Paris, March 10, 1842), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 99–100.

25. Guizot to Bourqueney (Paris, March 19, 1842), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 311. The French ambassador in Constantinople even protested against the fact that the “Porte had so suddenly broken a *contract* [my italics] linking it to the members of the Shihabi family.” Bourqueney to Guizot (Péra, January 27, 1842), *ibid.*, 230–32. Later, in a special report on the history of Mount Lebanon, Bourrée rectified this inaccurate vision, underlying the fact that the French argumentation and assertions on this subject rested on very poor grounds: “It is now clear that with regard to the Porte, we were ill-advised to seek in the traditions arguments for switching from the hortative to the imperative;” Bourrée to Guizot (January 17, 1848), *ibid.*, Vol. 9, 221–66.

26. Pontois to Guizot (Péra, April 17, 1841), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 76.

27. On these negotiations, see Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. 3, 62–226; Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 209–424; and British Sessional papers, House of Commons, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Syria 1843* (London, 1843).

28. Bourqueney to Guizot (Péra, February 16, 1842), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 253–85.

29. See chap. 1.

30. See, for example, *Correspondence 1843*, Memorandum Containing the Propositions Agreed Upon by Viscount Ponsonby, Baron de Sturmer, and M. de Titow, and Presented to Rifa‘at Pasha by Mr Wood at His Excellency’s Request (Constantinople, June 5, 1841).

31. *Ibid.*, Canning to Aberdeen (June 9, 1842), and Canning to Aberdeen (February 1, 1842).

32. On this whole issue see *Correspondence 1843*.

33. Ali Pasha, for instance, in response to a French proposition for the restoration of the supposedly traditional authority of Bashir II, stated: “This authority . . . may have existed in practice. Emir Bashir has governed Lebanon in the same conditions as other individuals who, like him, gained a relatively elevated position, loosely compatible with the principles of government that the Porte then practiced. This did not represent a right in favor of the Mountain, anymore than those *derebeys* who waged war against each other and divided the country, but failed to set up their authority on their rebellion. What would you say to the sons of these *derebeys* if they were to claim today by way of inheritance or privilege the authority exercised by their father?” Lavalette to Thouvenel (Thérapia, June 12, 1861), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 31, 134–35.

34. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, January 17, 1848), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 255; and Lavalette to Thouvenel (Thérapia, June 4, 1861), *ibid.*, Vol. 31, 37–38.

35. Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 55.

36. Metternich to Neumann (Vienna, February 28, 1842), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 311–12.

37. Note verbale adressée aux représentants des cinq puissances par Sarim Effendi (La Sublime Porte, June 28, 1842), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 19–22; and Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. 3, 66–68.

38. The British ambassador at Istanbul could state, for example, in 1844 that the “Christian Powers . . . had redeemed [these pledges] by the arrangement of 1842.” Canning to Rose (Buyukdery, August 13, 1844). *Correspondence 1843, 1844, 1845*, part 1.

39. At that time most of the political dignitaries were illiterate and their signature was often affixed on these petitions with their personal seal. In the 1842 battle of petitions, these seals were often counterfeited, a fact that reflects well the low opinion their instigators held of the “will of the people.”

40. On this subject, see Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, Bourqueney to Guizot (Thérapia, June 6, 1842) and annexes, 394–417; Bourrée to Guizot (July 8 and 24, 1842), 153–68; *Documents*, Vol. 7; and *Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Syria 1843*. See also, Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 190–211. For samples of competing petitions, see, for example, Philippe and Farid al-Khazin, *Majmu'at al-muhararat al-siyasiyya wa al-mufawadat al-duwaliyya 'an Suriyya wa Lubnan min sanat 1840 ila sanat 1910* (Beirut: Dar al-ra'id al-lubnani, 1910), nos. 53, 57, 64, 75, and 76.

41. Rose to Aberdeen (Beirut, August 9, 1844). *Correspondence 1845*. This opinion was corroborated by a British envoy who visited all parts of Lebanon and concluded that “he had found much difference of opinion amongst the upper classes, some being for and others against the Shihabs; but that amongst the lower orders one half did not care and the other half did not know anything about them.” Ibid. See also Canning to Aberdeen (Buyukdery, September 3, 1844), *Correspondence 1845*. See also Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, January 1, 1842) and Bourrée to Guizot, (Paris, July 30, 1844), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 7. For his part, the Maronite Patriarch indicated to the French consul that in his opinion only a fourth of the inhabitants of the Mountain were favorable to Bashir II. See Bourrée to Guizot in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 6 (Beirut, August 25, 1841), 437.

42. Nevertheless, although such campaigns of petitions did not necessarily represent the popular will of the population, they did over time contribute to raising awareness among the local population about the issues involved and somewhat helped in shaping some kind of public opinion.

43. Bourrée a Guizot (Beirut, November 12, 1847) and Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, March 23, 1847), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 120–21.

44. According to the French consul in Beirut, the Christian sector included 140,000 inhabitants, 6,000 of whom were Druzes, whereas the Druze sector included

approximately 58,000 inhabitants, with 21,271 Druzes, 27,525 Maronites and Greek Catholics, and a small Greek Orthodox and Sunni minority. Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, August 27, 1847), in Isma‘il, *Documents* Vol. 9, 101–3.

45. See, for example, British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Syria 1843, 1844, 1845*, 2 parts (London, 1845), Rose to Aberdeen (Beirut, September 9, 1844).

46. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Caravan, 1977), 64.

47. See, for example, Malcolm Kerr (ed.), *Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism 1840–1868: A Contemporary Account by Antun Dahir al-Aqiqi* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1959), 13.

48. For the peasants’ revolt in Kisrawan, see Porath, “The Peasant Revolt;” Madisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), chap. 4; Marwan Buheiry, “The Peasant Revolt of 1858 in Mount Lebanon: Rising Expectations, Economic Malaise, and the Incentive to Arms,” in Lawrence I. Conrad (ed.), *The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1989); Dominique Chevallier, “Aspects sociaux de la question d’Orient: Aux originines des troubles agraires libanais en 1858,” *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations* 14 (1959), 35–64; Kerr, *Lebanon*; Toufic Touma, *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druses et les Maronites du XVIIe siècle à 1914*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1986); Antun Dahir al-‘Aqiqi, *Thawra wa fitna fi Lubnan: Safha majhula min tarikh al-jabal min 1841 ila 1873*, Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak, ed. (Beirut: Matba‘at al-Ittihad, 1939); Mansur al-Hattuni, Nizar ‘Abbud ed., *Nabdha tarikhiyya fi al-muqata‘a al-kisrawaniyya* (Beirut: Dar Marun Abbud, [1884] 1987). Additional factors that contributed to the outbreak of the revolt included a deep economic crisis spawn by a virtual collapse of the silk industry in France, Lebanon’s principal export market, and which resulted in a 50 percent drop in local silk production, the ruin of many leading silk merchants, and the freezing up of credit, which affected local peasants; Buheiry, “Peasant Revolt,” 506–7. Van Leeuwen also emphasizes the weakening of the authority of the Khazins since end of the eighteenth century; see Richard Van Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khaṣṣin Sheikhs and the Maronite Clergy 1736–1840* (Leiden, 1994).

49. Nicolas Murad, *Notice historique sur l’origine de la nation Maronite et sur ses rapports avec la France, sur la nation druze et sur les divers populations du Mont Liban* (Paris: A. Le Cière, 1844). The terms *nation*, *nationalité*, or *race* were often used at the time in the Western sources to designate the Druze or Maronite communities, a fact that may account for their reproduction by Murad. On the other hand, the use of the term *nationalité* may have aimed at tapping a groundswell of support in France and Europe for oppressed nationalities after the Greek Revolt in 1830. For analyses of Murad’s

book, see also Harik, *Political Change*, 139–43; and Hourani, “Historians of Lebanon,” in Lewis Bernard, *Historians of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 226–45; Mouawad Joseph and Antoine Koual, eds., *Notice Historique sur la nation Maronite* (n.p., 1988).

50. Since then, as can be seen from the list of his official titles on the original copy of the pamphlet, Abbot Murad had apparently been raised to the dignity of Archbishop and appointed as representative of his “nation” to the Vatican.

51. Since Murad did not know French, Mouawad and Koual state that it must have been translated to that language. Mouawad and Koual, *Notice*, introduction, 5.

52. Many French books and pamphlets on Lebanon published after Murad’s notice, and especially after the massacres of 1860, reproduced these views.

53. Murad himself, who was in Paris at the time, was received by the French monarch, whom he had already met in 1839, during a brief sojourn in the French capital. Mouawad and Koual, *Notice*, introduction, 23 and 34.

54. Murad, *Notice*, 5–6.

55. This argument has been rarely put in such a final way: “And the Maronites still preserve their ancestral faith today, in every village and town, sound, pure, immaculate, and with a fine uniformity of feeling, and no matter how numerous they have been or are now, no matter how tightly surrounded they are on all sides by unbelievers, heretics and schismatics, never has the slightest disagreement on matters of faith arisen among them, never has a schism broken their ranks, never has a single one of them sullied the purity of the Catholic faith.” *Ibid.*, 9.

56. See chap. 1.

57. Murad, *Notice*, 18.

58. Bourrée asserts that this population amounted at most in 1841 to 200,000. Commenting on figures raising this number to 350,000 or 500,000, he stated: “These figures are taken seriously far too often; I regret being unable to ascribe them to errors made by those who compiled them. To call a spade a spade, they are purely and simply a deliberate lie.” Bourrée to Guizot (Beirut, August 27, 1847), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 101.

59. Murad, *Notice*, 18–19, fn. 1.

60. We are still far as can be seen, from any concept of “historical frontiers,” which would appear much later.

61. Murad, *Notice*, 22.

62. *Ibid.*, 46.

63. *Ibid.*, 22–24.

64. *Ibid.*, 47.

65. *Ibid.*, 41.

66. *Ibid.*, 16.

67. Ibid., 25.

68. Ibid., 25–26.

69. Ibid., 27–28.

70. Ibid.

71. As early as 1847, a French commission of inquiry sent to Lebanon questioned the authenticity of this letter: “I should refrain from contesting the letter’s authenticity, *though it seems dubious* [my italics], especially as I should not want to show disrespect for its author’s memory,” wrote one of its members, who added that, anyhow, this letter written in the thirteenth century could not seriously vindicate any political right in the nineteenth century, in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 9, 157–59. On his part, Kamal Salibi asserts that this letter is definitely apocryphal (Interview with Salibi, October 23, 1995). See also Youssef Mouawad, “Aux origines d’un mythe: La Lettre de St Louis aux maronites,” in Bernard Heyberger and Carsten-Michael Walbiner, *Les Européens vus par les Libanais à l’époque ottoman* (Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 2002), and Gérard Khoury, *La France et l’Orient Arabe: Naissance du Liban moderne 1914–1920* (Paris: A. Collin, 1993), 19.

72. Murad, *Notice*, 27.

73. René Ristelhueber, author of *Traditions françaises au Liban* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1918), asserted that he looked for this letter in the archives of the Maronite Patriarchate and did not find it, 67.

74. Requête de Mourad, prêtre maronite, à Louis Philippe, roi des Français (Février 1840), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 262.

75. Mgr N. Murad, évêque de Laodicée, délégué du Patriarche Maronite en France, à S.M Louis Philippe, roi des Français (Paris, April 30, 1844), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 355.

76. Youssef Mouawad reaches a similar conclusion in his article on the “Letter.” See Mouawad, “Aux origines,” 103. In this context, it should be noted that the first two editions of Lamartine’s *Voyage en Orient*, those of 1835 and 1841, did not mention St. Louis’s letter, which was only added in the 1849 edition of the book. Ibid, 103.

77. Canning to Aberdeen (Constantinople, June 26, 1844), *Correspondence 1845*.

78. Murad to Louis Philippe (February 1840), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 261.

79. Murad, *Notice*, 38. See also Joseph Mouawad, “Bonaparte et les communautés libanaises,” *Les Cahiers de l’Orient* 14 (1989), 225–41.80. Murad, *Notice*, 34.

81. Ibid., 44.

82. Requête de Nicolas Mourad, prêtre maronite, à Louis Philippe, Roi des Français, in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 6, 262.

83. Murad, *Notice*, 43.

84. Ibid., 43–44.

85. Murad to Guizot (Péra, March 27, 1842), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 25, 333–35; and Lettre adressée par le père Nicolas Murad, délégué du Patriarche maronite, à Guizot (Constantinople, November 27, 1842), *ibid.*, Vol. 26, 250–52.

86. Mgr N. Murad, évêque de Laodicée, délégué du Patriarche Maronite en France, à S.M. Louis Philippe, Roi des Français (Paris, April 30, 1844), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 7, 354.

87. These themes and developments are dealt with in chaps. 5 to 8.

88. For ‘Azar’s visit to France, see Baudicour, *France*, 48–110.

89. *Revue de l’Orient et de l’Algérie*, 2e série, II (1847), 338–43.

90. Father Azar, *Les Marounites d’après le manuscrit arabe du R.P. Azar* (Cambrai: F. Deligne et E. Lesne, 1852), 130.

91. *Ibid.*, 48. See also 51.

92. *Ibid.*, 90.

93. *Ibid.*, 118–19.

94. *Ibid.*, 91.

95. *Ibid.*, 127.

96. Bulus Nujaym [Jouplain M., pseud.], *La question du Liban: Etude d’histoire et de droit international* (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1908). See chap. 6.

CHAPTER THREE

1. See chap. 2.

2. Baron de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissances étrangères depuis le traité conclu, en 1536, entre Suléyman Ier et François Ier jusqu’à nos jours* (Paris: Amyot, 1884), Vol. 6, 68–69.

3. Charles Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites under Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860* (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1862), 158–59.

4. *Ibid.*, 159.

5. FO 78/1627, Dufferin to Lord Russel (Beirut, December 19, 1860).

6. *Ibid.*

7. On the massacres of 1860 in Lebanon, see Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994); Ussama Madisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Caravan, 1977); Toufic Touma, *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druzes et les Maronites du 17e siècle à 1914*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Beirut: 1986); Churchill, *Druzes*; L. Baudicour, *La France au Liban* (Paris: E. Dentu and Chalamell Ainé, 1879); Baptistin Poujoulat, *La vérité sur la Syrie et l’expédition française* (Paris: Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861); Anonymous, *Souvenirs de Syrie (Expédition française de 1860 par un témoin oculaire)*

(Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1903); Iskandar ibn Ya‘cub Abkarius, *The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860*, trans. J. F. Scheltema (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920); and FO 406/10, *Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Syria 1860–1861* (London, 1861).

8. Louis Philippe-Albert Comte de Paris, *Damas et le Liban. Extraits d’un journal de voyage en Syrie au printemps de 1860* (London: W. Jeffs, 1861), 67. The Comte de Paris was the grandson of Louis Philippe I.

9. Churchill, *Druzes*, 178. See also Abkarius, *Turmoil*, 69–70.

10. Antoine Lubbos, *Tawajuhāt al-iklīros al-marūnī al-siyāsīyya fī Jabal Lubnan 1842–1867: Wathā‘iq Bkerke* (Beirut: n.p., 1991), 161–82.

11. Churchill, *Druzes*, 152–53.

12. MAE MD/T 123, Bentivoglio to Karam (Beirut, July 15, 1860).

13. De Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. 6, 81–84.

14. Thouvenel to Persigny (Paris, July, 23 1860), in *Correspondence 1861*, and Adel Isma‘il (ed.), *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l’histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVIIe siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 28, 402.

15. The mandate of the French contingent was later extended for three additional months.

16. See, for example, Poujoulat, *Vérité*, 190 and 344–45; Ernest Louet, *Expédition de Syrie, Beyrouth, Liban, Jerusalem, 1860–1861. Notes et souvenirs* (Paris: Amyot, 1862), 84. See also, FO 78/1630, “Minutes of the British commissioner detailing personal reserves in the reorganization of Lebanon” (Beirut, April 26, 1861).

17. See chap. 2.

18. See, for example, Poujoulat, *Vérité*, 435–38; Baudicour, *France*, 171; Louet, *Expédition*; P. Camille de Rochemonteix, *Le Liban et l’expédition française en Syrie (1860–1861). Documents inédits du général A. Ducrot* (Paris: A. Picard, 1921); François Lenormant, *Histoire des massacres de Syrie en 1860* (Paris: L. Hachette, 1861); Comte Melchior de Vogüé, *Les événements de Syrie* (Paris: C. Douniol, 1860).

19. See, for example, Poujoulat, *Vérité*, xii–xiii.

20. The following section focuses mainly on certain aspects of the workings of the European Commission and the concurrent international negotiations that took place during 1860 and 1861, pertaining specifically to the reorganization of Mount Lebanon, and relevant to our subject. On this subject see Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. 6; *Correspondence 1861*; and Fawaz, *Occasion*, 193–217.

21. The five powers, Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were represented respectively by Lord Dufferin; Léon Bécлар, French consul in Alexandria; De Weckbecker, Austrian consul in Beirut; and De Reyfus and E. P. Novikow, both chargés d’affaires in Constantinople.

22. Procès-verbal de la première séance de la commission, in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 10, 285–91. For text of the transcripts of the commission's workings, see De Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. VI, 106–99.

23. FO 78/1624, Instructions from Bulwer to Dufferin (July 30 and August 9, 1860), *Correspondence 1861*; see also Thouvenel's instructions to Bécлар, in Testa, *Recueil*, 345.

24. See, for example, the "Synoptic table of the various schemes which have been proposed for the future government of Syria and the Lebanon," in FO/1626, Graham to Dufferin (November 18, 1860).

25. For an analysis of these issues, see Fawaz, *Occasion*, chaps. 6 and 7 and 202–8.

26. FO 78/1626, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, November 3, 1860). For biographical information on Lord Dufferin and an apt portrait of the man, see Fawaz, *Occasion*, 195–96; see also, Fruma Zachs, "'Novice' or 'Heaven-Born' Diplomat? Lord Dufferin Plan for a 'Province of Syria: Beirut, 1860–1861,'" *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 3 (July 2000): 162–63.

27. Dufferin had met Fuad Pasha shortly after his arrival in Beirut and had taken a liking to the man, whom he described as "tall, handsome, well-versed in French and of charming manners," Zachs, "'Novice' or 'Heaven-Born' Diplomat?," 170. It is not clear whether Dufferin ever sounded out the Ottoman minister on his proposal for Syria or on his suggestion to nominate him for the prospective post of governor-general, or more important, whether Fuad Pasha approved of both proposals. But, given that both proposals were the talk of town, it seems quite certain that he was aware of them. Scheffer and Bécлар mentioned in their reports that Fuad Pasha confided to them that he was amenable to the idea of being appointed as governor-general or viceroy of Syria and was even preparing himself for such a prospect. See *L'Europe et les destinées du Proche-Orient II: Napoléon III et ses visées orientales 1848–1870*, 3 vols. (Damascus: Editions Tlass, 1988), Vol. 2, 1157, 1162, 1166–67, and 1199. But their comments are not corroborated by any other sources, and moreover, Fuad Pasha himself firmly denied such ambitions in a note to 'Ali Pasha. However, an indication of the widespread awareness of Fuad Pasha's prospective governorship not only in Beirut but also in the Mountain can be gauged from a mention by Beaufort of a petition emanating from Christians of Mount Lebanon in favor of such a prospect. Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, January 27, 1861). See also, Anonymous, *Souvernirs*, 265.

28. FO 78/1627, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, December 31, 1860).

29. FO 78/1626, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, November 14, 1860).

30. FO 78/1627, Dufferin to Fraser (Beirut, January 16, 1860).

31. FO 78/1626, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, November 3, 1860).

32. FO 78/1627, Dufferin to Fraser (Beirut, January 16, 1860).

33. FO 78/1627, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, January 1, 1860).

34. Anonymous, *Souvenirs*, 265.
35. See chap. 5.
36. FO 78/1627, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, December 21, 1860).
37. MAE MD/T 138, Thouvenel to Bécclard (Paris, August 16, 1860).
38. MAE MD/T 139, Bécclard to Thouvenel (Beirut, November 23, 1860).
39. Bécclard to Thouvenel (Beirut, May 10, 1861), as quoted in Hajjar, *Europe*, Vol. 3, 1590.
40. In all fairness, one should add that the Austrian representative, De Weckbecker, also concurred with these views, at least at first.
41. FO 78/1626, Dufferin to Bulwer (Beirut, November 15, 1860).
42. De Vogüé, *Événements*, 22.
43. Poujoulat, *Vérité*, 12.
44. E. Forcade, "Chronique de la quinzaine," *Revue des deux mondes* (July 14, 1860), 503–4.
45. Saint-Marc Girardin, "Controverse sur la Question d'Orient," *Revue des deux mondes* (1860): 400–26; Vogüé, *Evenements*, 28; Baudicour, *France*, 156.
46. As quoted in *Correspondence 1861*, Cowley to Russel (Paris, August 8, 1860).
47. Ordre general (No. 1) du Gl. Cdt. le Corps Exp., Marseille, August 7, 1860, in Yassine Soueid (ed.), *Corps Expéditionnaire de Syrie, Rapports et Correspondance 1860–1861* (Beirut: Naufal, 1998), 46.
48. Girardin, "Controverse," 415. See also Girardin, "Les affaires de Syrie selon les papiers anglais," *Revue des deux mondes* (1861): 258–61 and 273.
49. Xavier Raymond, "La Syrie et la question d'Orient," *Revue des deux mondes* (1860): 637–38; Girardin, "Controverse," 425.
50. Marcel Emerit, "La crise syrienne et l'expansion économique française en 1860," *Revue historique* (1952): 211–32.
51. MAE MD/T 138, Letter of Maronite Patriarch to Napoleon III (Beirut, August 17, 1860).
52. On Fuad Pasha's repressive and pacificatory efforts see Madisi, *Culture*, chap. 8; and Fawaz, *Occasion*, chap. 6. On the confrontation between Fuad Pasha and Beaufort, see *ibid.*, 121.
53. Beaufort to Randon, letters 16, 17, and 18 (Beirut and Kab Elias, October 11, 20 and 25, 1860), in Soueid, *Corps*, 115–126.
54. Beaufort to Thouvenel (December 21, 1860), as quoted in Hajjar, *L'Europe*, Vol. 3, 1475.
55. Louet, *Expedition*, 8–9.
56. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, November 4, 1860); and Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, December 21, 1860).
57. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, January 27, 1861).

58. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, November 4, 1860).
59. The map drawn under the auspices of General Beaufort was published separately in 1862. *Carte du Grand Liban d'après les reconnaissances de la brigade topographique du Corps expéditionnaire de Syrie en 1860–1861* (Paris, 1862). In a note to Thouvenel sent two weeks later, Beaufort suggested that in drawing the boundaries for the prospective Lebanese entity he had erred on the generous side in order the guarantee what he deemed essential, and if need be that some of the territories included in his plan, such as Bilad Bishara (south Lebanon) and Akkar (to the north) and some of the coastal towns, could be relinquished. “To get all would be best, to get less would mean a lot.” Hajjar, *Europe*, Vol. 3, 1514.
60. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, October 6, 1860).
61. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, November 4, 1860).
62. MAE MD/T 122, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, February 10, 1861).
63. MAE MD/T 141, Béclard to Thouvenel (Beirut, April 20, 1861).
64. Ibid. See also Louet, *Expédition*, 353–55. The text of an undated petition, addressed by the peoples of Lebanon to the European powers and the Sultan and claiming the reunification of the Mountain under the rule of the Shihab family, is annexed to Beaufort’s report of April 19. However, this petition does not mention explicitly Emir Majid, as mentioned in other contemporary reports. It might be a draft of the petition, or a truncated version. See Annex no. 5 in No. 48 (Beirut, April 19, 1861) in Soueid, *Corps*, 310–11; on campaigns of Beaufort in favor of petition in mixed and northern districts, see No. 49 and No. 50 in *ibid.* (April 29 and May 5, 1861), 312–25.
65. Louet, *Expédition*, 352; and MAE MD/T 142, Béclard to Thouvenel (Beirut, May 4, 1861).
66. See section on Karam following; for critiques of Béclard, MAE MD/T 141 (April 20, 1861); Rochemonteix, *Liban et l’expédition française*, 178–81.
67. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, April 12 and 26 and May 19, 1861).
68. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, May 19, 1861).
69. See, for example, MAE MD/T 146, Scheffer to Thouvenel (February 1, 1860).
70. Ch. Scheffer, a former drogman at the French embassy in Istanbul and the interpreter of the emperor Napoleon III for oriental languages. Thouvenel to Bentivoglio (Paris, August 9, 1860), in Isma’il, *Documents*, Vol. 10, 231–32.
71. MAE MD/T 146, Scheffer to Thouvenel, Annex to report of February 1, 1861.
72. MAE MD/T 146, Scheffer to Thouvenel (Beirut, January 4, 1861).
73. Ibid.

74. MAE MD/T 147, Scheffer to Thouvenel (Beirut, February 23, 1861).
75. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, April 19, 1861).
76. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, May 5, 1861) and Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, May 10, 1861).
77. Ibid.
78. See chapter 4.
79. Baudicour and Poujoulat both wrote accounts of their separate visits to Mount Lebanon that included their views on the current situation there.
80. Louet, *Expedition*, 380; and see fn. 64.
81. Alyce Edyth Mange, *The Near Eastern Policy of the Emperor Napoleon III* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940), 90–91; Rochemonteix, *Expedition*, 94; Pierre de la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire* (Paris: Plon, Nourrit & Co., 1896), Vol. 3, 316.
82. Mange, *Policy*, 72–73.
83. Ibid, 90.
84. Ibid, 87–90; see also *Correspondence 1861*.
85. See, for example, Charles-Robert Ageron, “Abd elKader souverain d’un royaume arabe d’Orient,” *Revue de l’Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* (1970): 15–30; and Emerit, “Crise.”
86. See, for example, mission of Scheffer in northern Syria, MAE MD/T 147, Scheffer to Napoleon (Damas, June 27, 1861).
87. Poujoulat, *Vérité*, 444.
88. Mange, *Policy*, 89–91.
89. Louis Thouvenel, *Trois années de la question d’Orient 1856–1859* (Paris: C. Lévy, 1897), 359–60.
90. Hajjar, *L’Europe*, Vol. 1, 475.
91. Thouvenel to Lavalette Paris, June 28, 1861, in Isma‘il, *Documents*, 268–71; and Thouvenel to French agents, July 1, 1861, in Testa, *Recueil*, 403–4.
92. MAE MD/T 140, Thouvenel to Bécлар (Paris, February 8 and March 8, 1861).
93. MAE MD/T 140, Thouvenel to Bécлар (February 22 and March 8, 1861).
94. MAE MD/T 141, Thouvenel to Randon (Paris, February 23, 1861).
95. MAE MD/T 140, Bécлар to Thouvenel (Beirut, January 29, 1861).
96. MAE MD/T 141, Bécлар to Thouvenel (Beirut, March 18, 1861).
97. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (April 12 and May 5, 1861); and Louet, *Expedition*, 376.
98. See, for example, MAE MD/T 148, Letter of Patriarch to Beaufort (April 19, 1861); and MAE MD/T 140, Yusuf Karam to Lavigerie (March 1, 1861).
99. MAE MD/T 140, Thouvenel to Bécлар (February 8, 1861).
100. See Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. 6, 336–405.

101. Thouvenel to Lavalette (Paris, June 28, 1861), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 29, 268–71; and Thouvenel to the French agents (July 1, 1861), in Testa, *Recueil*, Vol. 6, 403–4.

102. The 1861 agreement was revised in 1864. The following chapter relies mostly on this second amended version, which remained in force until 1915. For a full text of the 1861 and 1864 protocols, see Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 102–11; and *ibid.*, Vol. 12, 32–41. For further information, see Salibi, *Modern History*, 110–11; John Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1914* (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 41–45; and Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

103. These were the Maronites, the Druzes, the Greek Catholics, the Greek Orthodox, the Sunnis, and the Shi‘ites. In the 1861 *Règlement*, the twelve seats of the Council were divided equally between the six communities of the Mountain. In 1864, the apportionment of seats was redistributed as follow: four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Muslim, and one Shi‘ite.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. See, for example, Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1920* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Albert Hourani, *Political Society in Lebanon: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, Papers on Lebanon 1, 1986); Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Caravan: 1977).

2. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, September 9, 1862), in Adel Isma‘il, *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l’histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVII^e siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 11, 235. The 1864 *Règlement* rectified this equal representation allocating, for instance, the twelve seats of the Administrative Council as follows: four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, and one each for the Sunni and the Shi‘ite community.

3. MAE MD/T 142, Béclard to Thouvenel (Beiteddin, August 28 and September 8, 1861).

4. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, September 9, 1862) and Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, December 12, 1863), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 235–47 and 379–80.

5. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, September 9, 1862) and (Beirut, December 12, 1863), *ibid.*, 239 and 376–78. See also, Gustave d’Allaux, “Daoud Pasha et le Liban,” *Revue des deux Mondes* (1865): 139–68 and (1866): 5–49.

6. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, December 12, 1863), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 377.

7. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, September 24, 1862, and December 12, 1862), *ibid.*, 244–47 and 376–85.

8. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, December 12, 1863), *ibid.*, 380.
9. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, February 5 and May 3, 1863), *ibid.*, 267–68, 289–90.
10. Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, January 10 and February 5, 1863, and May 3, 1865), *ibid.*, 264–70, and Vol. 12, 143–47.
11. Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, May 3, 1863) and Challié to Minister of Marine (Beirut, November 3, 1863), *ibid.*, Vol. 11, 289–91 and 354–66.
12. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, May 3, 1863), *ibid.*, 289.
13. Des Essards to De Lluys (Beirut, May 3, 1865), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 144.
14. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, June 12, 1865), *ibid.*, 165–71. See also Bentivoglio to Thouvenel (Beirut, June 30 and July 18, 1861), *ibid.*, Vol. 11, 125–26 and 131–34.
15. MAE MD/T 122, Patriarch and Maronite Bishops to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, titled “Reflexion sur la Constitution actuelle du Mont Liban” with Memorandum annexed (Mount Lebanon, December 18, 1863).
16. *Ibid.*
17. The Patriarch’s cognizance of the details of these negotiations is astonishing. He referred often and precisely to the ambassadorial meetings held in Constantinople in May–June 1861 and exactly quoted the contents of the French minister’s dispatches to his ambassadors. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. According to a census of Mountain population completed in 1869, the total number of males over fifteen was 99,834, of whom 57,420 were Maronites and 32,414 belonged to the other communities combined. The total population then was 220,000, according to the British consul Drummond Hay. See FO 195/2075, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, April 17, 1900). See also, Akarli, *Peace*, 104–5.
20. MAE MD/T 122, Patriarch and Maronite Bishops to French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mount Lebanon, December 18, 1863).
21. *Ibid.* Akarli indicates that in 1860, the Maronites constituted 57.5 percent of the population and paid 51.2 percent of the taxes. Akarli, *Peace*, 105.
22. MAE MD/T 122, Patriarch and Maronite Bishops to French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mount Lebanon, December 18, 1863).
23. *Ibid.*
24. For Mas‘ad’s letter of February 1861, see MAE MD/T 146. See also chap. 3.
25. Walewski to Moustier (Beirut, October 27 and November 9, 1867), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 19–26 and 29–32.
26. Walewski to Moustier (Beirut, January 29, 1868), *ibid.*, 56.

27. MAE MD/T 122, Patriarch and Bishops to Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mount Lebanon, December 18, 1863).
28. De Challié Report to the Ministry of Marine (Beirut, November 3, 1863); Outrey to Droyun de Lluy (Beirut, November 15, 1862, and December 12, 1863); Drouyn de Lluy to Outrey (Paris, November 7, 1863), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 255–57, 354–68 and 376–85.
29. Drouyn De Lluy to Des Essards (Paris, April 28, 1863), *ibid.*, 141–42; and John Spagnolo, “Mount Lebanon, France and Daud Pasha: A Study of Some Aspects of Political Habituation,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2(1971): 151–52.
30. Bourrée to Moustier (Péra, April 7, 1868), Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 33, 228; and Spagnolo, “Mount Lebanon,” 166.
31. The district of *al-jibbat* included the uppermost northern part of Mount Lebanon, including mainly the villages of Ihdin, Bsharri, and the Qadisha Valley.
32. See Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
33. This region was thus unaffected by the peasant revolt that erupted in the neighboring Maronite district of Kisrawan in 1858 or by the conflict of 1860.
34. MAE MD/T 122, Note sur la famille Karam (December 3, 1860).
35. Istfan Bash'alani, *Lubnan wa Yusuf Bek Karam* (Beirut: Matba'at Sadir, 1925), 108–10; and Camille de Rochemonteix, *Le Liban et l'expédition française 1860–1861* (Paris: A. Picard, 1921), 158.
36. Anonymous, *Souvenirs de Syrie* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1903), 50.
37. Joseph Karam, *Joseph Karam aux gouvernements et nations de l'Europe* (Rome: n.p., 1871), 14–16; and Rochemonteix, *Expédition*, 46–48.
38. For Bentivoglio's own account of this incident, see Bentivoglio to Thouvenel (Beirut, November 15, 1861), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 181–86. See also Nadra Moutran, *La Syrie de demain* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916), 117 and 121; Anonymous, *Souvenirs*, 71–73; and Issa Iskandar Ma'luf, *Tarikh Zahla* (Zahla: Manshurat Zahla-al-Fatat, 1977), 201–9.
39. Anonymous, *Souvenirs*, 48; Rochemonteix, *Expédition*, 46; Bash'alani, *Yusuf*, 268.
40. MAE MD/T 147, Scheffer to Thouvenel (February 23, 1861).
41. Baptistin Poujoulat, *La vérité sur la Syrie et l'expédition française* (Paris: Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861), 25 and 309.
42. *Ibid.*, 311.
43. Louis Baudicour, *La France au Liban* (Paris: E. Dentu and Chalamell Ainé, 1879), 210–11; Bentivoglio to Thouvenel (Beirut, November 15, 1861), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 181–86.

44. Rochemonteix, *Expédition*, 166.
45. MAE MD/T 142, Bécларd to Thouvenel (Paris, May 4, 1861); Rochemonteix, *Expédition*, 168.
46. MAE MD/T 140, Bécларd to Thouvenel (Beirut, February 19, 1861).
47. Rochemonteix, *Expédition*, 167. MAE MD/T 141, Bécларd to Thouvenel (March 18, 1861).
48. MAE MD/T 148, Beaufort to Randon (Beirut, December 2, 1860; January 12, March 29, April 12, and May 5, 1861).
49. MAE MD/T 142, Bécларd to Thouvenel (Beirut, May 4, 1861).
50. MAE MD/T 141, Karam to Lavigerie (Beirut, March 1, 1861) and Karam to Thouvenel (Juniya, May 5, 1861); MAE MD/T 142, Karam to Scheffer (n.d.); MAE MD/T 147 Karam to Scheffer; and Rochemonteix, *Expédition*, 176–77.
51. See, for example, Moustier to Drouyn de Lluys (Pera, February 14, 1866), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 33, 31–32.
52. John Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon* (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 61–62; Allaux, “Daoud Pasha,” II, 16–27.
53. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, September 24, 1862), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 244–47.
54. Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (March 7 and August 22, 1863), *ibid.*, 273–79 and 331–37.
55. Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, November 15, 1862), *ibid.*, 255–57.
56. MAE MD/T 122, Séance du 11 novembre et du 9 décembre 1861 de la Commission Européenne.
57. Outrey to Thouvenel (Beirut, May 21, 1862) and Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, November 1, 1863), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 11, 189–91 and 351–53.
58. De Challié to Minister of War (Beirut, November 3, 1863), *ibid.*, 354–66.
59. Yusuf Karam to Outrey (Smyrna, September 28, 1864) and Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, October 22, 1864) in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 9–20, and 44–45. The confusion in Karam’s mind stemmed from his belief that he had been exiled following an arbitrary decision of Daud and not a regular trial. In fact, the decision to exile him had been adopted by Fuad Pasha, with the approval of the representatives of the European powers, in order to avoid such a trial in the delicate period that followed Daud’s accession.
60. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (March 28, 1865), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 128.
61. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, December 20, 1865), *ibid.*, 214–17.
62. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, December 31, 1865), *ibid.*, 246–47.
63. Des Esards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, January 8 and 13, 1866), *ibid.*, 266–78 and 280–83.

64. Althabe to War Ministry (Beirut, February 20, 1866), *ibid.*, 313–21; J. B. Laborde, Henri Jalabert (ed.), *Un montagnard contre le pouvoir: Liban 1866* (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1975), 57; and Allaux, “Daoud Pacha,” II, 40.
65. Spagnolo, *France*, 70–73.
66. Ceccaldi to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, February 14 and 20, 1865), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 100–105.
67. Laborde, *Montagnard*, 100.
68. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, May 3, 1865), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 144.
69. Drouyn de Lluys to Moustier (Paris, November 25, 1864), *ibid.*, 63–65.
70. Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, January 7, 1866), *ibid.*, 265.
71. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, January 13 and 21, 1866), *ibid.*, 280–85.
72. Laborde, *Montagnard*, 120, 160, and 210.
73. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, March 5), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 331, and Spagnolo, “Mount Lebanon,” 153–54.
74. Des Essards to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, April 3, May 16, and September 3, 1866), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 12, 351–57, 362, and 387.
75. Bash‘alani, *Karam*, 453–56.
76. *Ibid.*, 462–63.
77. This image of Karam as the nationalist hero of Lebanon figures prominently in nationalist literature. It is fostered by local epics that tirelessly relate his heroic struggle against the Turks. See, for example, Toufic Touma, *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druses et les Maronites du XVIIe siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1971–72), Vol. 1, 315–33; Bash‘alani, *Karam*; and Sim‘an Khazin, *Al-Harb fi sabil al-istiqlal, aw Yusuf Karam wa Daud* (Juniya, 1957).
78. Moustier to Drouyn de Lluys (Péra, February 14, 1866) in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 33, 31. See also Bentivoglio to Thouvenel (Beirut, November 1861), *ibid.*, Vol. 11, 181–86; MAE MD/T 141, Karam to Lavigerie (March 1, 1861).
79. Karam, *Aux gouvernements*, 40–41.
80. Bourrée to Moustier (Péra, April 7, 1868), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 33, 226–27.
81. Mgr Bulus Mas‘ad to Walewski (Bkerké, February 6, 1868), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 67.
82. Outrey to Drouyn de Lluys (Beirut, January 29, 1865) and Walewski to Moustier (Beirut, March 7, 1868), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vols. 12 and 13, 88 and 71.
83. Spagnolo, “Mount Lebanon,” 161.
84. Yusuf Dibs, *Safr al-akhbar fi safar al-ahbar* (Beirut: Al-matba‘at al-‘umumiyya, 1868), 265–318.

85. Bourrée to Moustier (Péra, May 12, 1868), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 33, 287. Dibs, *Safr al-akhbar fi safar al-ahbar*, 332–93, and Spagnolo, *France*, 114.
86. Rousseau to Moustier (Beirut, November 30, 1868) and Rousseau to La Tour d’Auvergne (Beirut, December 29, 1869), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 147 and 193.
87. Mgr Boulos Mas‘ad to Walewski (Bkerké, February 6, 1868), *ibid.*, 65.
88. Spagnolo, *France*, 130–32, 150 and *passim*.
89. See, for example, Delaporte to Freycinet (Beirut, January 26, 1880) and Sienkiewicz to Freycinet (Beirut, September 15, 1880), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 14, 138–43 and 214–21. For France economic and financial interests in the Empire in the late Ottoman period, see Jacques Thobie, *Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l’empire ottoman 1895–1914* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1977).
90. FO 195/2075. Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, April 17, 1900).
91. FO 195/2190, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, October 17, 1905).
92. FO 195/2190, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, April 6, 1905).
93. FO 195/2097, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, February 15, 1901). On this subject, see also the opinion of Patriarch Yusuf Hajj in 1897, in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 394–95.
94. FO 195/2217, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, February 5, 1906).
95. See chap. 6.
96. Guiot to Ribot (Beirut, July 1, 1891), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 61.
97. Petiteville to Goblet (Beirut, January 23, 1889), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 15, 341.
98. *Ibid.*, 342.
99. Guiot to Ribot (Beirut, July 8, 1891), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 61–62.
100. Petiteville to Goblet (Beirut, March 2, 1889), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 15, 343.
101. Taillandier to Ribot (Beirut, May 10, 1896), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 126.
102. Guiot to Goblet (Beirut, September 8, 1888), and Taillandier to Ribot (Beirut, March 8, 1892), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vols. 15 and 16, 296 and 115.
103. Petiteville to Goblet (Beirut, January 23, 1889), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 15, 341.
104. Note sur la Syrie et le Liban présentée par Petiteville à Flourens (March 1888), *ibid.*, 265.
105. Note sur la Syrie le Liban (Paris, July 10, 1897), *ibid.*, 427.
106. *Ibid.*, 429.
107. Rousseau to La Tour d’Auvergne (Beirut, October 12, 1869), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 169–91. See also, Joseph Hajjar, *Le Vatican, La France et le Catholicisme Oriental (1878–1914): Diplomatie et histoire de l’Église* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979).

108. Note sur la Syrie et le Liban présentée par Petiteville à Flourens (March 1888), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 15, 263–66.
109. Taillandier to Ribot (Beirut, May 22, 1892), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 130.
110. Guys to Waddington (Beirut, June 6, 1878), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 438–40.
111. Guys to Waddington (Beirut, May 27 and June 6, 1878) and Rustom Pasha to Tricou (Beirut, June 6, 1878), *ibid.*, 436–44.
112. Mgr Yusuf Dibs, *Al-jami‘ al-mufasssal fi tarikh al-mawarina al-mu’assal* (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater [1893], 1987), 346–47.
113. Tricou to Descazes (Beirut, March 4, 1876), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 374.
114. Bash‘alani, *Lubnan*, 536.
115. *Ibid.*, 536.
116. Tricou to Descazes (Beirut, March 4, 1876), Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 375.
117. Rousseau to Moustier (Beirut, November 30, 1868), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 146 and *passim*.
118. Bash‘alani, *Lubnan*, 558.
119. See Bash‘alani, *Lubnan*, 540 and 512, and Rousseau to Moustier (Beirut, October 10, 1868), and Tricou to Decazes (Beirut, August 5, 1876), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 13, 130 and 381.
120. Bash‘alani, *Lubnan*, 545–46.
121. *Ibid.*, 560–61.
122. Taillandier to Ribot (Beirut, February 14, 1892), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 109.
123. Dibs, *Al-Jami‘ al-mufasssal*, 348–49.
124. For Hajj memorandum, see Memoire confidentiel remis par le patriarche maronite, Mgr Youhanna Hajj, à M.Souhart, consul de France à Beyrouth, annexed to Souhart to Hannotaux (Beirut, June 2, 1897), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 393–402.
125. *Ibid.*, 394.
126. *Ibid.*, 397.
127. See *ft.* 15.
128. Hajj Memorandum, in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 400. See also chap. 6.
129. The Porte, faced with financial difficulties of its own since 1876, had discontinued the payment, provided for by the *Règlement*, of the subsidy to the Mountain in case expenditures “strictly necessary for carrying on of the regular administration exceeded the income from taxation.” See Akarli, *The Long Peace*.
130. Salim Malhamé was minister of forests, mines and agriculture, whereas Najib was head of the secret police. On the career of the Malhamé brothers, see Jens Hanssen, “‘Malhamé-Malfamé’: Levantine Elites and Transimperial Networks on the Eve of

the Young Turk Revolution,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011): 25–48. See also Engin Akarli, “‘AbdulHamid II’s Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman State,” in David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political Social and Economic Transformation* (Jerusalem, 1986).

131. Ibrahim Harfush, *Dala’il al ‘inaya al-samadaniyya*. Juniya: n.p., 1935, 494.

132. FO 195/2097. Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, November 7, 1901). See also reports by Drummond Hay of March 25, 1901, in FO 195/2117 and of January 28, 1904, in FO 195/2165.

133. See, for example, Jullemier to Hanotaux (Beirut, January 30, 1898), and De Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, September 6, 1898), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 16, 227–28, and Vol. 17, 56–57.

134. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, September 6, 1898) and Constans to Delcassé (Beirut, August 21, 1899), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 56–57 and 82.

135. Mgr Joseph Nagem to Guiot (Bkerké, November 1, 1891), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 14, 76–77.

136. Jullemier to Hanotaux (Beirut, June 30, 1894), *ibid.*, 228–29.

137. See Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), chap. 4, 132–35.

CHAPTER FIVE

Excerpts from this chapter and the following ones were published in Carol Hakim, “Shifting Identities and Representations of the Nation among the Maronite Secular Elite in the Late Ottoman Period,” in Thomas Philipp and Christopher Schuman (eds.), *From the Syrian Lands to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, Beirut Texts und Studien 96 (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2004), 239–53. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

1. FO 195/1369, Eldridge to Dufferin (Beirut, December 19, 1881).

2. FO 195/2075, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, April 17, 1900).

3. *Ibid.* See also Boutros Labaki, *Introduction à l’histoire économique du Liban: Soie et commerce extérieur en fin de période ottomane 1840–1914* (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1984), 142.

4. Carter V. Findley, “Knowledge and Education,” in C. Black and C. Brown (eds.), *Modernization in the Middle East and its Afro-Asian Successors* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1992), 138.

5. Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1920* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 149.

6. FO 195/2117, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, March 25, 1902).

7. See chap. 6.

8. FO195/2190, Drummond Hay to O'Connor (Beirut, April 6, 1905); Couget to Poincarré (Beirut, March 24, 1912), in Adel Isma'il, *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l'histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVIIe siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 18, 419–39, and Akarli, *Peace*, 154.

9. Hence, for example, Habib Pasha Sa'ad was the protégé of the Malhamés, while Mustapha Arslan could rely on the support of Izzet Bey. FO 195/2117 and FO 195/2165, Drummond Hay and Richards to O'Connor (March 25, 1902, and October 23, 1903). See also chap. 4.

10. Leila Fawaz Tarazi, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 44–66.

11. Some among this first generation became Protestants, or even Muslims, as if they needed to mark their rupture, or *désaveu*, with their closed and ailing communities of origin by effectively joining another community. See Jean Fontaine, *Le désaveu chez les auteurs chrétiens*. Thèse de doctorat (Paris: Sorbonne, 1970).

12. The most prominent newspapers and periodicals established by Lebanese emigrants were the *Ahram*, established in 1875 by Bishara and Salim Takla; *al-Muqtataf*, established in 1876 by Faris Nimr and Ya'cub Sarruf; and *al-Hilal*, established in 1892 by Jurji Zaydan.

13. On this second wave of emigration, see Akram Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

14. Campana to Pichon (Beirut, May 1, 1907), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 388.

15. See, for example, Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, [1962] 1983); Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2005); Fawaz, *Merchants* (1983).

16. The Sidon *vilayet* was merged in 1865 with that of Damascus. It was eventually replaced with the *vilayet* of Beirut in 1888; see Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut*, 25–54; Fawaz, *Merchants*, 22–27; and Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1862* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1968), 33.

17. See, for example, how Butrus Bustani attributed his political writings to these events, and regretted his former reserve on the subject. Butrus Bustani, *Nafir Suriyya* (Beirut: Dar al-fikr lil Bahth wa al-nashr, [1860–61] 1990), 28 and 48–50.

18. Anonymous, *Souvenirs de Syrie (Expédition française de 1860) par un témoin oculaire* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1903), 265.

19. Butrus Bustani's main political work was *Nafir Suriyya*. In 1870 he founded a newspaper, *al-Jinan*, and entrusted its editorship to his son Salim, who promoted and further elaborated the same ideas as his father. Hence the quotations in this section

on Bustani sometimes cite *al-Jinan* to clarify his thought. For studies on Bustani, see mainly Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Christian between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 11 (1980); Yusuf Q. Khury, *Rajul sabik li 'asrihi: Al-mu'allim Butrus al Bustani* (Beirut: Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, 1995); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought*; Fruma Zachs, *The Making of a Syrian Identity: Intellectuals and Merchants in Nineteenth Century Beirut* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Ussama Madisi, "After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no. 4 (November 2002), 600–617, and *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

20. Hourani, *Thought*, 101.

21. *Al-Jinan* 4 (1873), in *Ifitahiyyat majallat al-Jinan 1870–1884*, Vol. 1, Yusuf Quzma Khury, ed. (Beirut: Dar al-harmra, 1990), 267.

22. *Al-Jinan* 1 (1870), in *ibid.*, 98. See also *Al-Jinan* 5 (1874) in *ibid.*, 289, and *Al-Jinan* 10 (1879), in *Ifitahiyyat al-Jinan*, Vol. 2, 520.

23. Abu-Manneh, "Christians," 296.

24. *Al-Jinan* 5 (1874, 6 (1875), and 7 (1876), in *Ifitahiyyat al-Jinan*, Vols. 1 and 2, 293, 312, 363, and 426.

25. *Al-Jinan* 1 (1870), in *ibid.*, 124–25.

26. *Al-Jinan* 6 (1875) and 7 (1876), in *ibid.*, 363, 376, and 426.

27. Bustani, *Nafir*, 22 and 45.

28. Hourani, *Thought*, 97.

29. Bustani, *Nafir*, 21.

30. *Ibid.*, 48–50.

31. For recent study on the emergence and development of Syrianism, see Zachs, *Making*; see also Abu-Manneh, "Christians"; and Itamar Rabinovich, "Syria and the Syrian Land: The 19th Century Roots of 20th Century Development," in Thomas Philipp (ed.), *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992), 43–54.

32. Bustani, *Nafir*, 60.

33. *Al-Jinan*, 1 (1870), in *Ifitahiyyat al-Jinan*, Vol. 1, 128.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Bustani, *Nafir*, 26.

36. *Al-Jinan*, 1 (1870), in *Ifitahiyyat al-Jinan*, Vol. 1, 121.

37. On the etymological history of the term *Syria* and its local use as of the mid-nineteenth century, see Zachs, *Making*, 98, 245–51, and 86–150.

38. Arabism did not seem to have influenced members of the Lebanese elite during the period under study and does not need to be further elaborated here.

39. Adib Ishaq, *Misr* 48 (May 20, 1879), 20 (November 14, 1879), and 17 (October 24, 1879), in *Adib Ishaq: Al-kitabat al-siyasiyya wa al-ijtima'iyya*, Naji Allush ed. (Beirut: Dar al-tali'a, [1978], 1982), 80–81, 116–17, and 187–95.
40. Ishaq, *Misr* 20 (November 14, 1879), in *ibid.*, 116–17.
41. Ishaq, *Taqddum* (n.d.), in *ibid.*, 362.
42. Ishaq, *Misr* (1877) and 25 (December 20, 1878), in *ibid.*, 93 and 122.
43. *Ishaq, Misr* 13 (September 7, 1879), in *ibid.*, 125.
44. Salim Sarkis, *Ghara'ib al-maktubji* (Beirut: Dar al-hamra, [1902] (1990), 16.
45. Faris Nimr, "Al khitab al shahir," in Abd al-Masih Antaki, *Nayl al Amani fi al-dustur al-'Uthmani* (Cairo: Matba'at al 'Arab, n.d.), 135–41.
46. See, for example, Rashid Rida, "al Rihla al-suriyya al-thaniya," *Al-Manar* (April 1920): 379–80.

CHAPTER SIX

1. FO 195/2190, Drummond Hay to O'Connor (Beirut, October 17, 1905); and Engin Akarli, "Ottoman Attitudes towards Lebanese Emigration 1885–1910," in A. Hourani and N. Shehadi (eds.), *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1992), 109–38; Akram Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Mas'ud Dahir, *L'Émigration libanaise en Egypte: Les Chawam-s en Égypte* (Beirut: Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1986).

2. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, February 26, 1903), in Isma'il, *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs à l'histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVIIe siècle à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 17, 220–29; and FO 195/2075, Drummond Hay to O'Connor (Beirut, April 17, 1900). Sercey estimated the population of Mount Lebanon, discounting the emigrants, to have reached 400,000 by 1903. Drummond Hay believed that this figure was too high and considered that 300,000 was more plausible, in view of the fact that "the Lebanese exist chiefly on agriculture, and the country under such conditions can never support more than a limited number of inhabitants." When a new census of the population was done in 1914, for the first time since 1864, the population was found to have indeed slightly exceeded the 400,000 limit. For the 1914 census, see Isma'il Haqqi, *Lubnan: Mabahiith 'ilmiyya wa ijtima'iyya*, Antoine B. Qiqano, ed. (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, [1918], 1993), Vol. 2, 262. See also, Charles Issawi, "The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration," in Hourani and Shehadi (eds.), *Lebanese in the World*, 22–23.

3. FO 195/2075, Drummond Hay to O'Connor (Beirut, April 17, 1900).

4. Georges Picot to Viviani (Beirut, July 19, 1914), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 20, 376–83; and Gérard Khoury, *La France et l'Orient Arabe: Naissance du Liban moderne 1914–1920* (Paris: A. Collin, 1993), 49–51.

5. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, May 7, 1902), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 27, 147–61.
6. FO 195/2217, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, February 5, 1906).
7. FO 195/2117, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, January 20, 1902).
8. Henri Lammens [H. Levantin, pseud.], “Quarante ans d’autonomie au Liban,” *Etudes* 92 (1902): 42.
9. Art. 2 of the *Règlement*.
10. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, May 7, 1902), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 148 and 152. This view, corroborated by many contemporary accounts, disagrees with Akarlı’s contention that the financial role of the Council gradually allowed it to assert its authority vis-à-vis the *mutasarrif* and to gain a significant role on the political scene. See, *The Long Peace* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 82–101.
11. Akarlı, *Peace*, 245–46.
12. All in all there were 140 officials in the provincial administration and 86 in the central administration.
13. Yusuf Sawda, *Fi sabil al-istiqlal* (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1922), 319.
14. FO 195/2024, Crow to De Bunsen (Beirut, September 22, 1898).
15. Boutros Labaki, *Introduction à l’histoire économique du Liban: Soie et commerce extérieur en fin de période ottomane 1840–1914* (Beirut: Publications de l’Université Libanaise, 1984), 112.
16. FO 195/2024, Crow to De Bunsen (Beirut, September 22, 1898).
17. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, September 30, 1904), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 27, 295.
18. Campana to Pichon (Beirut, March 21, 1907), *ibid.*, 377–78.
19. Amin Rihani, *Al-muhalafa al-thulathiyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Jumayyil, [1903], 1989), 22.
20. Bulus Nujaym [M. Jouplain, pseud.], *La question du Liban: Etude d’histoire diplomatique et de droit international* (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1908), 573.
21. When a survey of the land had been done in 1862 to apportion taxes, the lands belonging to the Church and to some influential *shaykhs* had been assessed at a quarter of their true value. Since then, the Maronite clergy had staunchly opposed the idea of a fresh land survey to redress the injustices of the previous survey and include newly reclaimed lands, so as to increase the revenues of the administration, improve its performance, and allow for some development projects. FO 195/2074, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, April 17, 1900).
22. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, September 30, 1904), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 295.
23. Fontaine, *Le désaveu chez les écrivains Libanais chrétiens de 1825 à 1940*, Thèse de doctorat (Paris: Sorbonne, 1970), 47.

24. Abd Allah al-Mallah, *Mutasarrifiyya Jabal Lubnan fi 'ahd Muẓaffar Pasha 1902–1907* (Beirut: Mu'assasat Khalifa, 1985), 389.
25. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, October 20, 1902), in Isma'īl, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 200.
26. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, October 20, 1902), in *ibid.*, 199–204; and FO 195/2117 Drummond Hay to O'Connor (Beirut, October 23, 1902).
27. FO 195/2217, Drummond Hay to Barclay (Beirut, November 13, 1906); FO 195/2245, Drummond Hay to O'Connor (Beirut, July 5, 1907); Campana to Pichon (Beirut, March 21, 1907), and Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, June 10, 1907), in Isma'īl, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 376–86 and 393–402.
28. For sources on Freemasonry in Syria and Lebanon, see Jirji Zaydan, *Tarikh al-masuniyya al-'am* (Cairo, 1889); Suhail Sulayman, *Athar al-ban'in al-ahrar fi al-adab al-lubnani* (Beirut: Naufal, 1993); Louis Sheikho, *Al-Sirr al-masun fi shi'at al-franmasun* (Beirut: Dar al-ra'id al-lubnani, 1910), and FO/2277, Cumberbatch (Beirut, October 30, 1908).
29. Sheikho, *Sirr*, book 4, 15.
30. See, for example, *ibid.*, book 2, 39–41.
31. Campana to Pichon (Beirut, May 3, 1907), in Isma'īl, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 392.
32. FO 195/1581, Eyres to White (May 1887).
33. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, April 24, 1899), in Isma'īl, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 61–72.
34. Campana to Rouvier (Beirut, March 13, 1906), in *ibid.*, 324.
35. Fouques-Duparc to Rouvier (Beirut, September 1905), in *ibid.*, 313.
36. Mallah, *Mutasarrifiyya*, 307–8 and 371–72.
37. Campana to Pichon (Beirut, March 21, 1907), in Isma'īl, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 382.
38. Campana to Pichon (Beirut, March 21, 1907), in *ibid.*, 381; see also De Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, September 30, 1904) in *ibid.*
39. Yusuf Daghir, *Batarikat al-mawarina* (Beirut: n.p., 1957), 112.
40. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, September 30, 1904), in Isma'īl, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 296.
41. See chap. 7.
42. Nujaym [Jouplain, pseud.], *Question*, 567.
43. Amin Rihani, *The Path of Vision* (New York: James T. White, 1921), 127.
44. Amin Rihani, *Al-Qawmiyyat* (Beirut: Dar al-Jummayil, [1956], 1987), 128.
45. K. T. Khairallah, *La Syrie. Territoire. Origines ethniques et politiques, évolution* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1912), 59.
46. *Al Hoda* (November 10, 1903); Rihani, *Qawmiyyat*, 30–35.

47. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, May 7, 1902), 147–61; and Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, July 4, 1902), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 147–61 and 165–68.
48. Constans to Delcassé (Thérapia, August 18, 1902), *ibid.*, 177–80.
49. Nujaym, *Question*, 577.
50. K. T. Khairallah, *Syrie*, 130.
51. Lammens’s lectures and articles on Islam and the history, ethnography, and geography of Syria greatly influenced a whole generation of Syrian and Lebanese thinkers and politicians who came into prominence in the first decades of the twentieth century. For more information on Lammens, see Kamal Salibi, “Islam and Syria in the Writings of Henri Lammens,” in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
52. Lammens, “Quarante,” 31–52 and 157–69.
53. *Ibid.*, 36.
54. *Ibid.*, 368.
55. *Ibid.*, 369.
56. See chaps 7 and 8.
57. By the beginning of the century the population of Beirut was estimated at 120,000, of whom 85,000 were Christian and 35,000 Muslims. Campana to Pichon (Beirut, May 1, 1907), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 387 and 386–89.
58. FO 195/2097, Drummond Hay to O’Connor (Beirut, November 7, 1901).
59. FO 195/2140, Richards to O’Connor (Beirut, September 4 and September 8, 1903).
60. FO 195/2140, Richards to O’Connor (Beirut, October 22, 1903).
61. Nicholas Ajay, *Mount Lebanon and the Wilayat of Beirut (1914–1918): The War Years*, Ph.D. diss. (Washington DC, Georgetown University, 1973).
62. FO 195/2075, Heathcote to O’Connor (Beirut, August 16, 1900).
63. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, April 6, 1903), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 241.
64. De la Boulinière to Delcassé (Cairo, March 2, 1903), in *ibid.*, 231.
65. Sercey to Delcassé (Beirut, April 6, 1903), in *ibid.*, 240.
66. For more details on this issue, see chap. 5.
67. Négib Azoury, *Le réveil de la nation arabe dans l’Asie turque* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1905), 164; for more information on Azoury, see Sylvia Haim (ed.), *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 29–31.
68. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, *Tabai‘ al-istibdad* (Cairo: Dar al-qawmiyya, [1892?] 1959) and *Umm al-qura* (Beirut: Dar al-ra‘id al-‘arabi, [1931] 1982); see also, Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, 25–29; and David Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990).

69. Yusuf Sawda, *Fi sabil Lubnan* (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, [1919] 1988), 73.
70. Ibid.
71. Ferdinand Tyan, *Sous les cédres du Liban: La nationalité maronite* (Paris: La Chapelle-Montigeon, 1905).
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 2.
74. Ibid., 18.
75. Ibid., 1–3.
76. Ibid., 6.
77. Ferdinand Tyan, *France et Liban: Défense des intérêts français en Syrie* (Paris: Perrin, 1917).
78. See, for example, the case study of Jouplain following.
79. Amin Rihani, *Al-Rihaniyyat* (Beirut: Dar al-Jumayyil, [1910] 1987), 33–46; see also *Shaḡarat mina al-siba* (Beirut: Dar al-Jumayyil, [1950], 1991), 153–239.
80. Nujaym [Jouplain, pseud.], *Question*. For more information on Jouplain and his work see Marwan Buheiry, “Bulus Nujaym and the Grand Liban Ideal 1908–1919,” in Marwan Buheiry (ed.), *Intellectual Life in the Arab East* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981); Ahmad Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais* (Beirut: Publications de l’Université libanaise, 1984); and Farés Sassine, *Le libanisme maronite: Contribution à l’étude d’un discours politique*. Thèse de doctorat (Paris: Sorbonne, 1979).
81. Nujaym [Jouplain, pseud.], *Question*, vii and ix.
82. Ibid., 129.
83. Ibid., 129 and 560.
84. Ibid., 597.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., 12 and 37.
87. Ibid., 12.
88. Ibid., 42–43.
89. Ibid., 141.
90. Ibid., 142–43 and 152–53. For the early history of the Maronites, and the St. Louis episode, Jouplain relies extensively on the manuscript of Azar.
91. Ibid., 47. Jouplain here highlights the historical role of Lebanon as a refuge for oppressed communities, an idea usually attributed to Father Lammens, who only expounded it clearly in his major book, *La Syrie*, published in 1920. Was it the effect of some direct influence or a mere concordance of views? The question has been asked by Farés Sassine in his doctoral dissertation, but he offers no answer to this question. The direct influence of the Belgian scholar on Jouplain seems more plausible, in view

of the fact that this influence is noticeable throughout the book, and that Jouplain often referred to early articles by Lammens and reproduced many of Lammens's views on Syria, while specifically referring to him when discussing some issues. See Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), 130–50; and Sassine, *Libanisme*, 92.

92. Nujaym [Jouplain, pseud.], *Question*, 12 and 47.

93. *Ibid.*, 90.

94. *Ibid.*, 20, 113, and 92.

95. *Ibid.*, 113–14.

96. *Ibid.*, 119–20, and 146.

97. *Ibid.*, 250.

98. *Ibid.*, 287–90, and 380–85.

99. *Ibid.*, 596 and 508.

100. *Ibid.*, 143–44.

101. *Ibid.*, 580.

102. *Ibid.*, 587.

103. *Ibid.*, 584.

104. *Ibid.*, 509.

105. *Ibid.*, 576. In his analysis of the problems of the Mountain and the necessary solutions, the influence of Lammens's article is conspicuous. Apart from the issue of the mortmain properties of the Church, all of the ideas Jouplain advanced were merely reformulations and sometimes simple reproduction of those advanced by the Belgian scholar.

106. *Ibid.*, 527.

107. *Ibid.*, 522.

108. *Ibid.*, 578.

109. *Ibid.*, 582. Here Jouplain reproduces Lammens's concept of the natural frontiers of Lebanon.

110. *Ibid.*, 290. On the specific issue of attributing historical precedents to the territorial claims of the Lebanese, Lammens had warned his readers some years ago that such arguments stood on very poor grounds. Lebanon could not pretend to an uninterrupted possession of Beirut, he had stressed, and Tripoli and Sayda had never belonged to Lebanon. See Levantin, "Quarante," 36–37.

111. Nujaym [Jouplain pseud.], 469–71.

112. *Ibid.*, 580.

113. *Ibid.*, 582.

114. *Ibid.*, 336.

115. *Ibid.*, 582–83.

116. *Ibid.*, 583.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. See Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); see also Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Politics, 1908–1914* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969), Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2. Fouques-Duparc to Constans (Beirut, December 2, 1907), in Adel Isma‘il, *Documents consulaires et diplomatiques relatifs à l’histoire du Liban et des pays du Proche-Orient du XVIIe siècle jusqu’à nos jours* (Beirut: Editions des oeuvres politiques et historiques, 1975–94), Vol. 18, 15–20.
3. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, August 20 and September 9, 1908).
4. Ristelhueber to Pichon (Beirut, August 7, 1909), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 200–207.
5. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, September 9, 1908). See also Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, September 20, 1908), in *ibid.*, 95–99.
6. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, September 18 and October 8, 1908); see also K. T. Khairallah, *La Syrie. Territoire. Origines ethniques et politiques, évolution* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1912), 133.
7. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, September 18, 1908); and Fouques-Duparc to Constans (Beirut, September 15, 1909), 93–95.
8. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, September 21, 1908), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 100–102.
9. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, October 8, 1908).
10. *Ibid.*
11. Khairallah, *Syrie*, 132; and Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, September 21, 1908), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 100–102.
12. Lyne Lohéac, *Daoud Ammoun et la création de l’Etat libanais* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1978), 47.
13. Fouques-Duparc to Constans (Beirut, September 5, 1908), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 73–75; and FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, September 25, 1908).
14. Ristelhueber to Pichon (Beirut, August 7, 1909) in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 200–207.
15. Lohéac, *Daoud*, 46–47.
16. Ristelhueber to Pichon (Beirut, August 7, 1908), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 200–207.

17. On Khalil Ghanem, see Kayali, *Arabs*, chap. 1.
18. See Lohéac, *Daoud*, no. 11, 45; Shukri Ghanem, *Ecrits politiques: Oeuvres Complètes* (Beirut: Dar an-Nahar, 1994), liv.
19. Yusuf Sawda, *Fi sabil al-istiqlal* (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1967), 25. On formation of *Alliance Libanaise*, see following.
20. Bulus Mas'ad, *Lubnan wa al-dustur al-'uthmani* (Cairo: Matba'at al-ma'arif, 1909).
21. *Ibid.*, 19.
22. *Ibid.*, 18 and 26.
23. *Ibid.*, 25.
24. *Ibid.*, 26, 17, and 47.
25. These privileges included, notwithstanding the local administration, exemption from conscription and much lower taxes than those paid by the inhabitants of the rest of the Empire. In this respect, Lebanese paid on average 17 piasters, whereas the contribution of the other inhabitants amounted to 90 piasters. See Boppe to Selves (September 25, 1911), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 379–85.
26. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, October 8, 1908).
27. Sawda, *Fi sabil Lubnan*, 23; and Couget to Pichon (Beirut, December 31, 1910), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 333–36.
28. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, September 27, 1908), in *ibid.*, 103–8; see also FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, October 8, 1908).
29. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, September 27, 1908), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 28, 103–8; and Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: F. Cass, 1993), 72 and n. 5, 347. Others members of the committee mentioned in a later press statement included notably Dr. Alfred Khoury and Dr. Amin Gemayel. See Comité Libanais de Beyrouth to Poincaré (Beirut, January 12, 1913), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 19, 277.
30. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (November 19, 1908).
31. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, September 27, 1908), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 103–4.
32. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, October 8, 1908).
33. FO 195/2277, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, October 30, 1908).
34. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, 24 June 1909); and Ristellhueber to Pichon (Beirut, December 21, 1909, and September 10, 1910), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 192–95, 238–46, and 321–24. According to a statement by a CUP delegate, 1,500 Lebanese had joined the committee by December 1909. *Ibid.*, 240.
35. FO 195/2311, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, January 7, 1909).
36. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, May 4, 1909), in Isma'il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 164–66; and Spagnolo, *France*, 259.

37. Ristelhueber to Bompard (Beirut, February 18 1910), *ibid.*, 262–65; and FO 195/2342, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, March 10, 1910).
38. Couget to Pichon (Beirut, December 31 1910), *ibid.*, 332–36; and John Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861–1914* (London: Ithaca Press, 1977), 259–60.
39. Le Comité National libanais, *Le liban et ses ports*, annexed to FO 195/2312, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, August 16 1909).
40. Fouques-Duparc to Pichon (Beirut, April 28 1910), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, V. 18, 282–87.
41. FO 195/2342, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, March 25 1910); and Spagnolo, *France*, 257–58.
42. Ristelhueber to Pichon (Beirut, December 23 1909 and January 14 1910), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 17, 247–54 and 256–59; see also FO 195/2342, Cumberbatch to Lowther (Beirut, January 8, 1910), and FO 195/2343, Lowther to Cumberbatch (Constantinople, January 20, 1910).
43. Ristelhueber to Pichon (Beirut, December 23, 1909) in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18; and Spagnolo, *France*, 253–54.
44. Sawda, *Fi Sabil Lubnan*, 25. Although Sawda did not mention his name, it seems that Ya‘qub Sarruf, one of the owners of the influential *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Muqattam* newspapers, participated for a while in this association. See, for example, Defrance to Poincaré (Cairo, November 25. 1912), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 19, 148–50.
45. “Where are the hopes of yesteryear, of yesterday even? The Turks have killed them with their smugness and their exclusivism,” lamented then Ghanem. See Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 19, 24–25.
46. Ristelhueber to Pichon (Beirut, December 21, 1909), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 241.
47. Desiderata de l’*Alliance Libanaise* au Caire sur les réformes administratives et judiciaires à introduire au Liban, (n.d), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 18, 451–53.
48. Exposé des plaintes et desiderata des Libanais adressé aux représentants des grandes puissances signataires du Règlement organique du Liban par le Comité des Cèdres du Liban (n.d.), in *ibid.*, 455–62.
49. Comité Libanais de Paris, *Mémoire sur la question du Liban*, in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 19, 44–45, 59, and 62–63.
50. See, for example, Comité de Paris, *Mémoire*; and Philippe al-Khazin, *Perpétuelle indépendance législative et judiciaire du Liban depuis la conquête ottomane en 1516* (Juniya, 1910).
51. Georges Vassié to Gauthier (Cairo, June 17, 1913), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 20, 208–13.

52. Iskandar ‘Ammun, President of the *Alliance Libanaise* and K. T. Khairallah, Secretary of the Comité Libanais de Paris to Couget (s.d), in Isma‘il, *Documents*, Vol. 19, 336.

53. Khairallah, *Syrie*, 142, 119, 139–40.

54. On the Decentralization Party, see Tauber, *Emergence*, 121–35, and Kayali, *Arabs*, 116–43; on the Reform Society of Beirut, see Tauber, *Emergence*, 135–51, and Kamal Salibi, “Beirut under the Young Turks: As Depicted in the Political Memoirs of Salim ‘Ali Salam 1868–1938,” in J. Berque and D. Chevallier (eds.), *Les Arabes par leurs archives, XVIe–XXe siècles* (Paris: Ed. Du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1976), 193–216.

55. Wajih Kawtharani (ed.), *Wathaiq al-mu‘tamar al-‘arabi al-awwal* (Beirut: Dar-al-hadatha, 1980), 129–31. For Arab-Syrian Congress, see also, Tauber, *Emergence*, 178–97.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Comité Central Syrien (CCS), *L’Effort Syrien pendant la guerre* (Paris: n.p., 1919), 4.

2. Although Syrians and Lebanese joined these associations, this survey focuses only on selected associations established and joined by Lebanese emigrants abroad.

3. *Correspondance d’Orient* 167 (June 10, 1917); and CCS, *Effort*, 5–6. The *Comité Central Syrien* has often been dismissed by Faysal and by its opponents as a mere tool of the French government, who admittedly backed its formation and provided it with generous financial support. However, this did not necessarily imply that its leaders and all those who subscribed to its program were mere instruments of the French government or necessarily insincere in their professed views. If anything, the support of the French government to the leaders of the *Comité* testified to its poor judgment, as Shukri Ghanem turned out to be a vain and embarrassing figure. Furthermore, the same critics who accused the Comité of receiving funds from the French government often benefited themselves from large foreign subsidies.

4. *Correspondance d’Orient* 172 (August 25, 1917).

5. Alliance Libanaise, *L’alliance Libanaise d’Egypte et la question du Liban* (Cairo: Imp. J. Kawa, 1921), 6.

6. See Yusuf Sawda, *Fi Sabil al-Istiqlal* (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1967), 87–91.

7. See chaps. 5 and 6. See also James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of the Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

8. Chekri Ghanem, *Écrits politiques: Oeuvres Complètes* (Beirut: Dar an-Nahar, 1994), 202.

9. Several books testifying to the popularity of the Greater Syria idea appeared at the time, such as Nadra Moutran, *La Syrie de Demain* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916), Jacques Tabet, *La Syrie, historique, ethnographique, religieuse, géographique, économique, politique et sociale* (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1920), Edgar P. Tawil, *Syrie* (Alexandria: n.p., 1918), and Georges Samné, *La Syrie* (Paris: Bossard, 1920).

10. The Syrian community in Egypt was estimated to be between 60,000 and 80,000 before the war; of these approximately 35,000 were considered to be Lebanese. Moreover, since the outbreak of World War I, many leading Lebanese personalities had fled from Beirut and the Mountain to Egypt.

11. Anonymous, *Journal du Caire* (n.d) as reprinted in *Correspondance d'Orient* 203 (December 10, 1918).

12. Captain Yale, dispatched by the American government to assess the situation in the region, wrote: "Although it is impossible to say with any degree of assurance how representative l'*Alliance Libanaise* is today of the sentiment of the Lebanese, it can be said that the present policy of the Society is not acceptable to many of the leading and prominent Lebanese in Egypt." Yale Papers (January 28, 1918), St. Antony's College, Oxford. For his part, Gilbert Clayton, chief British intelligence officer, considered that the *Alliance Libanaise* "does not . . . contain any persons of standing or exercise any widespread influence . . . and possesses neither influence nor cohesion." FO 882/17, Clayton to Director of Arab Bureau (August 15, 1918). Finally, Yusuf Sawda, one of the most vocal members of this association, alluded to this fact, which he attributed to adverse propaganda. See, *Fi Sabil al-Istiqlal*, 93–94.

13. Georges Samné, "L'Unité Syrienne," *Correspondance d'Orient* 174 (September 25, 1917).

14. Tawil, *Syrie*, 12.

15. Comité Central Syrien, *La Question syrienne exposée par les Syriens* (Paris: n.p. 1919), 15–17; Georges Samné, *Le Liban autonome de 1861 à nos jours* (Paris: n.p., 1919) and "l'Unité Syrienne."

16. Samné, "Unité Syrienne," 164.

17. CCS, *La Question Syrienne*, 21.

18. Comité Libano-Syriens d'Egypte, Cairo (January 10, 1919), in *Correspondance d'Orient* 207 (February 15, 1919).

19. CCS, *La Question Syrienne*, 20.

20. In this respect, they did not differ from other Lebanese, Syrian, or Arab activists who, notwithstanding vocal assertions to the contrary, openly or privately acknowledged the necessity of Western assistance to fulfill their aspirations. As T. E. Lawrence wryly remarked: "They have a pathetic belief in the idiot altruism of Britain and France. . . . For their sake we are to . . . expel the Turks, and police the country at their direction. . . . In return we are to have their gratitude, afterwards." See FO

882/21, T. E. Lawrence, "Syrian Cross Currents," Arab Bulleting Supplementary Papers (Cairo, 1918). Ironically both Faysal and Shukri Ghanem ended their plea to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in favor of the establishment of a Syrian entity by expressing in return their deep gratitude. Hence Faysal ended his memorandum with: "In return we can offer you little but gratitude." See FO 608/105, Faysal Memorandum to Peace Conference (January 1, 1919), in *Records of Syria*, Vol. 1, 299–300. For his part, Ghanim stated: "Syria will evidently be what you wish it to become," adding that "the gratitude we owe you would prevent us" from opposing your decision. See Ghanim Statement before Supreme Council, in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference*, 1919, Vol. 3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1036.

21. *Requête des Comités Libano-Syrien d'Egypte*, Cairo, January 10, 1919, in *Correspondance d'Orient* 207 (February 15, 1919).

22. Auguste Adib Pacha, *Le Liban après la guerre* (Cairo: Imp. P. Barbey, 1919), 87.

23. *Ibid.*, 128–34.

24. *Ibid.*, 128.

25. *Ibid.*, 132–33.

26. Yusuf Sawda, *Fi Sabil Lubnan* (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, [1919] 1988), 12.

27. *Ibid.*, 10–11.

28. *Ibid.*, 16–32. On the Phoenician myth of origin of the Lebanese, see Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

29. Sawda, *Fi sabil Lubnan*, 15.

30. *Ibid.*, 73–74. In this respect Sawda stressed that "had the Balkan principalities been left to themselves, none would have been able to free itself from Turkish yoke. But Europe had supported these principalities and provided them funds, men, and diplomatic support . . . ensuring their evolution from Ottoman provinces to autonomy to complete independence."

31. *Ibid.*, 247. It is important here to underscore the negative perception by Sawda and Adib Pasha of the *mutasarrifiyya* regime, which they presented as a curtailment of the former independence of the Lebanese and an obstacle to their development.

32. *Ibid.*, 101–2 and 247.

33. *Ibid.*, 308–19.

34. *Ibid.*, 325–26 and 379.

35. *Ibid.*, 260–61.

36. *Ibid.*, 260–70.

37. For accounts of the war and the famine in Syria and Lebanon see Najwa al-Qattan, "Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War," in Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*. Beirut:

Texte und Studien 96 (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2004); Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*, chap. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, "The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria," in John Spagnolo (ed.), *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1992); Nicholas 'Ajay, *Mount Lebanon and the Wilayat of Beirut 1914–1918: The War Years*. Ph.D diss. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1973); Antoine Yammine, *Quatre années de misère au Liban* (Cairo: Imp. Emin Hindi, 1922).

38. Most plans that emerged during this period for a Greater Syria continued to refer to local autonomies within the framework of a united and federal, or decentralized, Syria. See, for example, FO 882/24, Party of Syrian Union, "The Fundamental Statutes."

39. See Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 159–60.

40. See, for example, Roderic H. Davison, *Reform of the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), and Carl L. Brown, *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

41. FO371/3381, Memorandum by Sir M. Sykes (July 3, 1919), in Jane Priestland (ed.), *Records of Syria*, Vol. 1 (Slough: Archives Editions, 2005), 135–47; see also Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Expansion* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), 157 and 161–62; Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914–1918* (London: Athlone Press, 1969), 50 and 80–83.

42. FO608/105, Sir E. Richards, Secret Peace Conference, "Syria" (January 1919), in *Records*, Vol. 1, 283 and 297; FO 371/4178, Curzon to Derby (February 12 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 374–77. See also Nevakivi, *Britain*, 98–101, and Jan Karl Tanenbaum, "France and the Arab Middle East 1914–1920," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 68, no. 7 (1978): 21–23.

43. Tanenbaum, "France," 21; Andrew and Kanya Forstner, *France*, 160–61; and Nevakivi, *Britain*, 77.

44. AE, Levant SL 9, Projet d'accord franco-anglais sur la Syrie (February 6, 1919); for an English translation of document see FO371/4180, French Draft of a proposed new Anglo-French Agreement (February 6, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 338–43.

45. FO 371/4181, Detailed Report of the Interview between Emir Faysal and General Officer Commanding and the Political Officer at Aleppo (n.d.), *Records*, Vol. 2, 545.

46. AE Levant SL 3, Coulondre to AE (Cairo, November 6, 1918); and AE Levant SL 5, Mercier to HC (Damascus, November 20, 1918); see also Zeine Zeine N., *The*

Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria (Beirut: Khayat, 1960), 33–37.

47. FO 371/4178, Hogarth to Chief Political Officer (Cairo December 18, 1918), *Records*, Vol. 1, 253–57; FO 371/3385, Ormsby Gore to Clayton (Cairo, November 8, 1918), in *ibid.*, 217–20; and FO 371/3385, Ormsby Gore to Clayton (Cairo, November 18, 1918), *ibid.*, 227–32.

48. FO371/4181, Clayton to Earl Curzon (June 23, 1919), in *Records*, Vol. 1, 542.

49. FO608/105, Faysal Memorandum to Peace Conference (January 1, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 299–300; Meinnertzen to Curzon (Cairo, September 11, 1919), in Great Britain. Foreign Office, E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), *Documents on British Policy, 1919–1925*, First Series, Vol. 4 (London, 1952), cited hereinafter as *Documents I:4*, no. 272, 381–82.

50. T1/12469, Gertrude Bell, “Syria in October 1919” (November 15, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 96.

51. FO371/4259, Note of a conference held in Prime Minister’s Flat (Paris, March 20, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 435.

52. Roger de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s’est installée en Syrie 1918–1919* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1923), 84–85 and 244; Zeine, *Struggle*, 33.

53. Habib Pasha Sa’ad will later claim that he only accepted this charge “to avoid a worse choice” after consulting with the commander of the French naval forces off the Lebanese coasts. AE Levant SL 3, Coulondre to AE (Cairo, October 18, 1918).

54. Gontaut-Biron, *Comment*, 244.

55. See chap. 7.

56. Zeine, *Struggle*, 38, and Ibrahim Harfush, *Dala’il al-‘inayat al-samadaniyya* (Juniya, Lebanon: n.p., 1935), 584.

57. See, for example, Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

58. FO371/4180, French draft of a proposed new Anglo-French agreement in Syria (February 6, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 339.

59. AE Levant SL 4, Picot to AE (Cairo, November 16, 1918).

60. AE Levant SL 5, Picot to AE (Cairo, November 22, 1918); AE Levant SL 3, Coulondre to AE (Cairo, October 27, 1918); AE Levant SL 4, Lord Cecil to Pichon (London, November 1, 1918); AE Levant SL 4, Pichon to Coulondre (Paris, November 5, 1918).

61. AE Levant SL 4, Picot to AE (Cairo, November 12 and 14, 1918); AE Levant SL 4, Note pour le Ministre (Paris, November 15, 1918).

62. AE Levant SL 4, Picot to AE (Cairo, November 14 and 16, 1918).

63. AE Levant SL 4, Picot to AE (Cairo, November 16, 1918).

64. AE Levant SL 5, Picot to AE (Cairo, December 3, 1918).

65. Pichon, for example, told the Budget Commission of Chamber on December 26, 1918, that “the populations are calling for us; only a devilish campaign is turning them away,” as quoted in Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, *France*, 179. See also AE Levant SL 5, Note pour le Ministre (Paris November 15, 1918).

66. AE Levant SL 5, Note pour le ministre (Paris November 15, 1918).

67. AE Levant SL 6, Pichon to Picot (Paris, December 20, 1918); AE Levant SL 5, Note pour le Ministre (Paris November 15, 1918); see also Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, *France*, 174–75; and Nevakivi, *Britain*, 91–93.

68. See Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, *France*, chap. 8.

69. AE Levant SL 3, Coulondre to AE (Cairo, October 18, 24, and 26, 1918).

70. AE Levant SL 4, Picot to AE (Cairo, November 13, 1918).

71. AE Levant SL 6, Picot to Gout (Beirut, December 19, 1918).

72. See, for example, Alliance Libanaise, *Memorandum sur les aspirations des Libanais* (Cairo, January 8, 1918).

73. Lynne Lohéac, *Daoud Ammoun et la création de l'Etat libanais* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1978), 73; Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 151–52.

74. Zamir, *Formation*, 52.

75. AE Levant SL 6, Picot to Gout (Beirut, December 19, 1918).

76. Ibid.

77. AE Levant SL 11 Picot to AE (Beirut, March 22, 1919); see also, Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 159–60.

78. Statements of the members of the Lebanese delegation before the Council of Ten, U.S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference*, 1919, Vol. 4, 2–5; AE Levant SL 9, Note du Quai d'Orsay (February 4, 1919); for Faysal appearance before Conference, see *Papers Related to the Foreign Policy of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference*, 1919, Vol. 3, 888–94; for Ghanim statement, see *ibid.*, 1024–38; and Zeine, *Struggle*, 73–74.

79. Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 168–69; AE Levant SL 9, Comité Libanais de Paris to Pichon (Paris, February 14, 1919); AE Levant SL 10, Cambon to Picot (Paris, February 25, 1919); AE Levant SL 9, Chukri Ghanem to Berthelot (Paris, February 4, 1919).

80. AE Levant SL 10, Notes sur les frontières du Grand Liban (March 8, 1919); Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 164–68; AE Levant SL 7, Letter from President of the *Alliance Libanaise* to Clemeneau (Cairo, January 5, 1919).

81. *Le Temps* (January 29, 1919) in *Correspondance d'Orient* 207 (February 15, 1919).

82. Meeting of Allied Supreme Council (May 31, 1919), in *Documents I:4*, no. 176, 257–58; Harry Howard, *The King Crane Commission* (Beirut, 1963), 41–51.

83. Zeine, *Struggle*, 80; Nevakivi, *Britain*, 137–38.

84. Balfour to Curzon (Paris, April 30, 1919), *Documents I:4*, no. 628, 252; Report by British Liaison Officer on Political Situation in Arabia (Damascus, May 16, 1919),

Documents I:4, no. 182, 265; Clayton to Curzon (Cairo, June 23, 1919), *Documents I:4*, no. 199, 286; Minute by M. Forbes Adam (n.d.), *Documents I:4*, no. 3 60, 529; Gérard Khoury, *La France et l'Orient arabe: Naissance du Liban moderne 1914–1920* (Paris: A. Collin, 1993), 231; Nevakivi, *Britain*, 140–44.

85. Report by British Liaison Officer on Political Situation in Arabia (Damascus, May 16, 1919), *Documents I:4*, no. 182, 265; FO371/4181, Clayton to Earl Curzon (June 23, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 542.

86. FO371/4181, Clayton to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (June 9, 1919), *Records*, Vol. 1, 517; Report by Colonel Copin (Beirut, June 4, 1919), *Documents I:4*, no. 199, 293; Khoury, *France*, 221–35.

87. AE Levant SL 13, Picot to AE (Beirut, June 3, 1919); AE Levant SL 11, De Feer to Picot (Beirut, April 7, 1919); AE Levant SL 14 Copin to GHQ (Beirut, June 24, 1919); AE Levant SL 15, Picot to AE (Beirut, July 21, 1919).

88. Georges A. Karam, *La question du Liban 1918–1920: Sources historiques*, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Editions Almanhal), 99.

89. *Correspondance d'Orient* 215 (June 15, 1919).

90. AE Levant SL 13, Picot to AE (Beirut, May 31–June 1 and June 12, 1919).

91. AE Levant SL 13, Picot to AE (Beirut, May 31–June 1, 1919).

92. AE Levant SL 13, Picot to AE (Beirut, June 3, 1919).

93. Karam, *Question*, 99–104.

94. AE Levant SL 16, Barrère to AE (Rome, August 8, 1919).

95. AE Levant SL 17, Ghanem to Pichon (Paris, September 11, 1919).

96. AE Levant SL 14, Picot to AE (Beirut, June 22, 1919); Karam, *Question*, 99.

97. Karam, *Question*, 104; Harfush, *Dala'il*, 595.

98. Clayton to Curzon (Cairo, June 23, 1919), *Documents I:4*, 289.

99. AE Levant SL 13, Picot to AE (Beirut, June 13, 1919).

100. Howard, *Commission*, 34 and 58.

101. No attempt is made to assess the limitations and flaws of the procedures followed by the commissioners in their inquiry, nor to analyze the wishes of the various delegations or the content of the various petitions that on the whole consisted of standardized statements with almost identical wording that betrayed the intense and well-organized propaganda by all sides. For more information on members of the Commission see *ibid.*, 37–41; for information on the procedures followed by the Commission to ascertain the wishes of the population, see *ibid.*, 142–45; see also Nevakivi, fn. 5, 167, for a critical assessment of the procedures of the Commission. For the conflicting analyses and recommendations of the members of the Commission, see Howard, *Commission*, 195–235 and 345–61.

102. Howard, *Commission*, 46.

103. *Ibid.*, 122, 210–11, 220–27, and 345–61.

104. Ibid., 205.
105. Ibid., 115.
106. Ibid., 208.
107. William Yale, A Report on Syria, Palestine and Mount Lebanon for the American Commissioners (July 26, 1919), Yale Papers, St Antony's College, Oxford.
108. AE Levant SL 16, Barrère to AE (Rome, August 5 and 9, 1919).
109. AE Levant SL 17, Note Reception du Patriarch Maronite (Clarie, August 26, 1919); AE Levant SL 17, Gout (Paris, September 8, 1919).
110. AE Levant SL 19, Clemenceau to Hoyek (Paris, November 10, 1919); Harfush, *Dala'il*, 598.
111. In his memoirs, Sawda relates that the Patriarch read the book that he published in 1917 and that the Patriarch's speech to the conference was influenced by its content. Sawda, *Fi Sabil al-istiqlal*, 183–84 and 206.
112. Mgr Elias Pierre Hoyek, *Les revendications du Liban: Mémoire de la délégation libanaise à la Conférence de la Paix* (Paris, 1919).
113. Zeine, *Struggle*, 118.
114. AE Levant SL 18, Forcade to AE (Beirut, September 22, 1919).
115. AE Levant SL 19, Clemenceau to Gouraud (Paris, November 27, 30, and December 9, 1919); AE Levant SL 21, Clemenceau to Gouraud (Paris, January 7, 1920); FO371/4186, Meinertzhagen to Foreign Office (January 26, 1920), *Records*, Vol. 2, 26–27.
116. FO 371/5033, Summary of negotiations between the Emir and the French government, *Records*, Vol. 2, 108–14; AE Levant SL 21 Berthelot to Faysal (January 6, 1920) and Faysal to Berthelot (January 7, 1920); see also Khoury, *France*, 271–81 and 290–94.
117. AE Levant SL 21, Clemenceau to Gouraud (Paris, January 7, 1920).
118. Zamir, *Formation*, 72.
119. AE Levant SL19, Clemenceau to Gouraud (Paris, November 27 and 30, 1919) and Gouraud to AE (Beirut, December 8, 1919); and AE Levant SL 20, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, December 17, 1919).
120. AE Levant SL 22, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, January 25 and 26, 1920); AE Levant SL 24, Gouraud to AE (February 21, 1920).
121. See Tamara Chalabi, *The Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation-State 1918–1943* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 76–77. As'ad will eventually again alter his stance and side with the Arab government following the Hujayr conference in April 1920. Ibid., 77–82.
122. AE Levant SL 27, Gouraud to AE (May 2, 1920).
123. AE Levant SL 21, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, January 4, 6, 9, 11, and 16, 1920); AE Levant SL 20, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, December 27, 1919); AE Levant SL 27,

Gouraud to AE (Beirut, May 10, 11, 14, and 15, 1920); AE Levant SL 21, Report French Navy (Beirut, December 19 and 26, 1919, and January 2, 1920); AE Levant SL 22, Archimandrite Attie (January 29, 1920); AE Levant SL 28, Mgr Maximos Sayegh (Tyre, May 15, 1920); FO 371/5120, Wratislaw to Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Beirut, May 25, 1920), *Records*, Vol. 1, 852–53; see also Gelvin, *Divided*, 122–24; Chalabi, *Shi'is*, 83–84; and Zamir, *Formation*, 84–86.

124. AE SL Levant SL 18, Report French Navy (Beirut, October 10, 1919); AE Levant SL 18, French Admiral of Syrian Division to Navy (October 15, 1919); AE Levant SL 19, Weekly Bulletin Military Section (October 15–22, 1919). 125. AE Levant SL 19, Picot to AE (Beirut, November 19, 1919); Gouraud to AE (Beirut, January 19, 1920); FO 882/24, Jachou to November Director of Arab Bureau (Atbara, November 15, 1919); Malcolm Russel, *The First Modern Arab State: Syria under Faysal 1918–1920* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1985), 84.

126. AE Levant SL 19, Picot to AE (Beirut, November 20, 1919).

127. AE Levant SL 24, Gouraud to AE (March 2, 1920); AE Levant SL 25, Gouraud to AE (March 13, 1920); Harfush, *Dala'il*, 612–633; Karam, *Question*, 249–302.

128. AE Levant SL 23, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, February 10, 1920).

129. AE Levant SL 24, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, February 21, 1920).

130. AE Levant SL 27, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, May 11, 1920); AE Levant SL 28, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, May 27, 1920).

131. AE Levant SL 27, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, May 4, 1920); AE Levant SL 28, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, May 26, 1920); AE Levant SL 29, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, June 1, 1920); AE Levant SL 30, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, June 13, 1920) and Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, June 15, 1920).

132. AE Levant SL 19, Gouraud to AE (December 8, 1919); AE Levant SL 21, Report French Navy (December 19, 1919); AE Levant SL 25, Gouraud to AE (March 13, 1920).

133. *Le Temps* (October 8, 1919), in Karam, *Question*, 496.

134. Karam, *Question*, 344–47.

135. The charges brought against them in court included dereliction of duty and bribery for accepting funds from the Arab government to cover the expenses of their trip to Paris. For trial of councilors, see Karam, *Question*, 391–437; for arrest of councilors, see AE Levant SL 30, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, July 12, 1920).

136. FO 371/5037, Wratislaw to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (July 2, 1920), *Records*, Vol. 2, 247–48; Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 293–94; AE Levant SL 30, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, June 18, 1920); AE Levant SL 32, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, August 10, 1920).

137. Statement of Sulayman Kan'an in court, *Lissan al Hal*, July 19, 1920, in Karam, *Question*, 395; see also, Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 293.

138. *Lisan al-Hal* (July 19, 1920), in Karam, *Question*, 394; and FO371/5120, Wratislaw to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Beirut, May 25, 1920), *Records*, Vol. 1, 852–53.

139. Karam, *Question*, 346.

140. Yale Papers, *Report*.

141. AE Gout MSS 9, Picot (December 17, 1918), as quoted in Andrew and Kanya Foster, *France*, 177; AE Levant SL 9, Picot to AE (Beirut, February 16, 1919); AE Levant SL 12, De Feer to Picot (Beirut, April 18, 1919); AE Levant SL 15, Commandant Sciard, *Compte rendu d'un voyage en Syrie* (June 29–July 25, 1919).

142. AE Levant SL 23, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, February 6, 1920).

143. *Correspondance d'Orient* 15 (February 1920).

144. FO 371/5037, Wratislaw to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (July 2, 1920), *Records*, Vol. 2, 247–48; Sawda, *Istiqlal*, 256–57.

145. *Lisan al-Hal* (July 19, 1920), in Karam, *Question*, 399.

146. See, for instance, Carla Eddé, *Beyrouth: Naissance d'une capitale (1918–1924)* (Paris: Sindbad, 2009), chaps. 3–4.

147. French officials, as well as the British consul in Beirut, expressed repeated concern about the growing wave of emigrants. For its part, a local newspaper estimated the number of migrants for the months of March and April 1920 to 19,000. *La Syrie*, 14–5–20, as quoted in *Correspondance d'Orient* 239 (June 15, 1920).

148. AE Levant SL 32, Millerand to Gouraud (Paris, August 2, 6, and 7, 1920); and *ibid.*, Gouraud to AE (Beirut, August 3, 7, and 13, 1920).

149. See speech of Gouraud in Karam, *Opinion*, “Avant de delimenter les limites, j’ai consulté les populations et je n’ai eu pour règle que de satisfaire les vœux librement exprimés des populations, et de servir leurs intérêts légitimes,” 305.

CONCLUSION

1. See Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988).

2. Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

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