Operation Menace
Author: Martin Bourne
Date: 1996-08-01 04:00:00+00:00
Publisher: Vandering Publications

Naval Warfare

Outside

The Pacific

Operation ‘MENACE’

The assault on Dakar.

By
M. J. Bourne

Naval Warfare Outside the Pacific:

Operation ‘Menace’: the assault on Dakar

Copyright M J Bourne 1996

2nd edition published 2010 by

Vandering Publications

29 Dumfries St,

Barrow-in-Furness

Cumbria

LA14 2DA

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the copyright holder.

Introduction

In September of 1939 Britain and France went to war as allies against the common threat of Nazi Germany.  Just twelve months later the erstwhile partners were reluctantly shooting at each other.  The reasons were complex.

During the mid-war years Britain's Royal Navy had been run down to an astonishing degree.  Although it remained the largest in the world, this had only been achieved by arbitrarily increasing the service life of individual vessels and thus avoiding the necessity of building many new ships.  Even with this "program slippage", for the first time in 150 years it became official Royal Navy policy to rely on allies for undoubted naval superiority over potential enemies.  The French navy, which had been revitalised by the energetic leadership of Admiral Darlan, was an integral part of this policy now that the Italians had openly sided with the Axis.

The military situation in France by mid June of 1940 had become so grave that French Premier Reynaud considered that he would have to ask for an armistice, in spite of admonitions from hotheads like General de Gaulle.  Rather shamefacedly Reynaud consulted with his allies before approaching the Germans.  The British Government, for their part, understood the situation perfectly.  They agreed that France should submit, for they realised that the French army was incapable of further resistance.  The French navy, however, was a different matter altogether.  It had not collapsed like the army had.  For example, French naval officers had successfully evacuated all ships capable of steaming from the Channel and Biscay ports.  Some had headed for Britain, but the majority had sailed for the French colonies in Africa. If the French were now to become non-belligerents the balance of power at sea would shift markedly, especially in the Mediterranean.  The Royal Navy, with its fleets based at Alexandria and Gibraltar, would be both heavily outnumbered and divided by the centrally positioned Italians.

The new French Government, based at the town of Vichy under the old hero Marshal Petain, negotiated as best it could.  The final conditions of the Armistice with regard to the French fleet were in fact rather lenient.  Apart from ships needed for colonial defence, the navy was to be retained in French owned ports and disarmed under German supervision.  The Nazis took over a few coastal defence ships and minesweepers but undertook not to seize the bulk of the fleet for their own use.  Darlan, who had become minister of marine as well as Commander in Chief in the new Vichy government, gave his solemn word to Churchill that the fleet would never be allowed to fall into German hands (and did in fact issue secret orders to his commanders to that effect).

Notwithstanding these assurances, few strategists in London believed that if the Germans decided to seize the ships there was much chance that they would fail.  This could not be allowed to happen if Britain was to be taken at all seriously in its determination to continue the war.  These ships could give the Axis virtual equality at sea.  Accordingly, the British began to draw up plans to neutralise French naval forces.

On July 3rd armed parties silently boarded and seized French warships in Plymouth and Portsmouth.  Simultaneously, French ships in Alexandria agreed to disarm themselves after diplomatic representations by Admiral Cunningham.  At Dakar in West Africa several powerful elements of the Vichy fleet, the centrepiece being the modern battleship Richelieu, ignored a British ultimatum to either join the Royal Navy, scuttle or disarm.  Consequently, on July 8th aircraft from the light carrier Hermes torpedoed the Richelieu, and that night a depth charge planted under her stern by a small boat further damaged her.  Satisfied that the giant warship had been neutralised for at least the foreseeable future, the British withdrew.

But these diverse successes were largely nullified by disaster at Mers el-Kebir near Oran.  Here a similar ultimatum to that delivered at Dakar was also rebuffed and with much reluctance force was used.  British warships bombarded the port and the ships in the harbour.  Three battleships were destroyed and 1400 French sailors killed.  Even then a fourth battleship, together with its escorts, managed to evade the British and reach Toulon.  Not surprisingly these events caused enormous animosity towards the British throughout the French Navy.  Active collaboration with the Germans increased.  Recruits to the fledgling Free French movement dried up almost immediately.

Oran was an enormous embarrassment to General de Gaulle, who had fled to London and was planning to mobilise a French army from the many thousands who had been evacuated from Dunkirk and Norway.  Nevertheless he persevered and by early August the Free French movement was 7000 strong and had been recognised by the British Parliament as an Ally, having national autonomy under British command.  The Vichy Government bitterly denounced all these British actions and broke off diplomatic relations.  For good measure, they also declared de Gaulle to be a traitor and a renegade.  He was found guilty in absentia by a Military Tribunal and sentenced to death.

In spite of this, encouraging messages of support soon began to reach de Gaulle, especially from France’s then extensive colonial empire.  There was evidence that a large proportion of colonial officials were lukewarm in their support of the Vichy Government.  After all, many of these colonies lay next to British territories that they were dependant on for trade.  The North African colonies were too susceptible to German influence and the Pacific ones were too far away, but the West African colonies - Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey - could become a base for the Free French movement, and a powerful springboard for a return to Europe.  De Gaulle's eyes began to turn to West Africa, and in particular to its capital, Dakar.

The town of Dakar was of immense strategic importance.  Situated on the westernmost point of the African continent, it was the eastern end of the shortest trans-Atlantic route.  It had an international airfield, one of the best ports in Africa, and a large naval base.  It was strongly fortified and would be of great value in holding the west Atlantic sea routes.  Conversely, in Axis hands it would be an ideal base from which to attack the important sea communications between Britain and the Cape.

Dakar was also a rallying point for the sparsely settled West African colonies.  The governor of West Africa, Boisson, had moved the entire colonial administration there.  A tough and popular leader, he was carrying out an energetic campaign against Free French sympathisers, many of whom had been arrested.  Nevertheless messages of support continued to reach de Gaulle.  The morale of the Vichy garrison was reported to be low.  There had even been a mutiny amongst some of the sailors.

In mid July of 1940 de Gaulle put forward a proposal to land at Konakry in French Guinea with a small force and march inland, gathering support as he went.  His force would then swing north and approach Dakar from inland, cutting the supply routes.  This would emphasise the French nature of the operation, and reduce the possibility of bloodshed.

It was a bold plan but it underestimated the difficulties of moving through Africa (of which de Gaulle knew nothing) and also the possibility of Vichy intervention.  De Gaulle was forced to admit he would need help and modified his proposal to include a Royal Navy blockade of Dakar.  On August 3rd Churchill cautiously approved the idea.

Then, at a meeting on August 6th, the British Prime Minister unexpectedly put forward an altered plan of action.  His reasoning was that although the rewards of occupying Dakar were enormous, so too were the risks.  A failed attempt could provide the Germans with the excuse they needed to seize all French bases, which would be a blow to Britain’s cause.  The Americans in particular would not be impressed.  There was also the possibility that a repetition of the Oran debacle might push the Vichy government into a declaration of war.  The French forces in North Africa were formidable, including 70 submarines and over 600 combat aircraft.  If Vichy were to openly side with the Axis (which privately Churchill thought unlikely) the British position in the Middle East would become untenable.  The originally conceived operation would take weeks or even months to execute, which would increase the tension between the British and Vichy.  Besides the Royal Navy simply did not have enough ships to impose a blockade for such a length of time.  Any operation would instead have to be short and decisive.

Churchill’s vision was of a huge Allied fleet arriving off Dakar, intimidating the local population.  An envoy would be dropped, bearing a note pressuring the governor—either cooperate, or face overwhelming odds.  Only if this did not work would landings be made.  De Gaulle accepted the modified plan, principally because he was anxious to avoid a Frenchman versus Frenchman fight.  With these constraints, on August 7th Operation "Menace", the occupation of Dakar, was officially sanctioned.  The target date was to be September 8th.

The Free French forces available were not large.  There were only two battalions (one of them foreign legion), a single company of tanks, and two boxed flights of British supplied Blenheims and Hurricanes.  Of necessity the British would have to provide the bulk of the forces, but for political reasons their involvement was to be limited to just the bare minimum in order to guarantee success.  The British contingent consisted of four battalions of Royal Marines and some specialised units under Major-General Irwin.

General de Gaulle was reportedly very angry at the paucity of warships assigned to the operation, seeing it as a lack of resolve on the part of his allies.  In fact the naval covering force for "Menace" was quite substantial.  It was drawn from the Home Fleet, South Atlantic command, and Force "H" at Gibraltar.  Designated Force “M”, it was placed under the command of Vice-Admiral Cunningham.

Operation “Menace”, Allied order of battle.

Force “M” (Cunningham).

Battleships.

Barham (Queen Elizabeth class)

Resolution (R class)

Aircraft-carrier.

Ark Royal (Ark Royal class)

Cruisers.

Australia (Kent class) [late addition]

Cornwall (Kent class)

Cumberland (Kent class)

Delhi (Danae class)

Devonshire (London class)

Dragon (Danae class)

Fiji (Fiji class)

Destroyers.

Echo (E class)

Eclipse (E class)

Escapade (E class)

Faulknor (F class)

Foresight (F class)

Forrester (F class)

Fortune (F class)

Fury (F class)

Greyhound (G class)

Inglefield (I class)

Patrol vessels.

Commandant Domine (Elan class) [Free French navy]

Commandant Dubloc (Elan class) [Free French navy]

Sloops.

Bridgewater (Bridgewater class)

Milford (Falmouth class)

Savorgnan de Brazza (Bougainville class) [Free French navy]

Boom defence vessel.

Quannet (Dairycoates class)

Trawler.

President Houduce [Free French navy]

Ground forces (Irwin/De Gaulle).

Merchant vessels.

Anadyr— mechanical transport carrier

Belgravia– foodstuffs

Casanance—mechanical transport carrier

Ettrick—1st Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

Fort Lamy—mechanical transport carrier

Karanja—5th Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

Kenya—2nd Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

Nevada—mechanical transport carrier

Ocean Coast—mechanical transport carrier

Pennland—1100 Free French troops

Sobieski—3rd Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

Westernland—1200 Free French troops plus General de Gaulle.

Aircraft.

Ark Royal had a compliment of 30 Swordfish dual-purpose reconnaissance/torpedo-bombers and 24 Skua dual-purpose fighter/dive-bombers.  The battleships and four larger cruisers between them carried six Walrus seaplanes for spotting.

The biggest weakness of Force “M” was that the component warships had been drawn from so many stations and had had little time to exercise together.  There were also problems with some of the individual vessels.  Barham had only recently been recommissioned and her gunnery left a lot to be desired, which would be a problem if the Vichy garrison resisted.  The only carrier available, Ark Royal, would have to provide all the air cover for the operation with a total of 54 low-performance planes.

Planning for "Menace" began at once, but swiftly became bogged down.  An amphibious operation of this magnitude had never been carried out before and staffs struggled with the huge list of details.  As late as August 24th three of the British marine battalions were sent to Scapa Flow for a crash course in making opposed beach landings, for which there was an acute shortage of assault landing craft.  Knowledge of local conditions (suitable beaches, surf conditions etc.) was sparse.  The plan itself changed on an almost daily basis.

Unsurprisingly the proposed date for the strike proved to be wildly optimistic.  The troopships were supposed to make 12 knots and reach Dakar in sixteen days.  In fact the ships hired by de Gaulle to carry the mechanical transport could only make 8-9 knots.  Moreover a wide detour into the Atlantic had to be made in order to avoid German submarines, imposing a delay of five more days.  Another three days were lost in the complexity of loading and fuel constraints meant a refuelling stop of two days would have to be made at Freetown in Sierra Leone.  Even so, a slower convoy of five merchants carrying food and mechanical transports had to be sailed on ahead.  The strike was rescheduled for 19th September.

The opening stages of “Operation Menace”.  The French destroyer La Flore, impressed into British service, escorts HMS Barham.

Photograph courtesy Imperial War Museum, London.

There was also the constant worry that the existence of the operation would "leak" to the Vichy authorities.  Security was extremely lax in the Free French forces.  Free French officers quite openly toasted the coming operation in restaurants.  During embarkation at Liverpool a packing case broke open and scattered hundreds of pro-Free French leaflets headed “To the people of Dakar” throughout the docks.  De Gaulle himself purchased a tropical uniform from a London tailor, stating specifically that it was for use in Africa.  In contrast, security amongst the British was if anything too tight, as will be seen.

Moreover, the political basis that underlined operation “Menace” came into question.  When the Vichy authorities had broken off diplomatic relations they had expelled two British liaison officers who had been stationed at Dakar.  On August 28th these men finally arrived in London and delivered a disquieting report.  Their impression of the political situation in Dakar conflicted sharply with the one upon which the operation was based.   In their view both the populace and garrison were strongly supportive of the Vichy government.  They further pointed out the strength of the defences, and their conviction that any attempt to make a landing would certainly be opposed.  If this was true, the prospects for "Menace" were not good.

Notwithstanding all the practical difficulties and this latest intelligence, the joint commanders decided not to abort the operation.  They thought that it was now too late to cancel.  Besides, there had also been good news from Africa.  On August 25th Governor Eboue of Chad had declared for Free France, and his example was soon followed by the French Cameroons, Oubanui-Chari (now the Central African Republic) and the Congo.  Ubangi and Gabon followed suit soon after, and although Gabon renounced its decision on the 31st following the arrival of a Vichy General and some troops, its capital Libreville was isolated and secured by Free French forces from the Cameroons a few weeks later.  It looked like the dream of a Free French Africa was coming true.

“Menace” gets underway.

The three separate groups comprising "Menace" finally set sail on August 31st from Scapa Flow, the Clyde and Liverpool.  Disaster struck almost immediately.  The cruiser Fiji was torpedoed by U-32 and forced to return for repairs.  Her place was taken by the cruiser Australia, hurriedly drafted in from the Home fleet.  Worse was to follow.  There had been no time to issue detailed orders for the operation and staffs had to work flat out to write out all the instructions.  Because of the need to maintain radio silence communication between commanders was restricted to Aldis lamp.  Conditions in the converted mess decks were cramped and the oppressive heat strained tempers.  Knife fights broke out amongst the Free French troops.  General Irwin himself tripped over a corpse in the darkened passageway outside of his room.

Then late on September 11th came the news that a Vichy squadron had passed through the straits of Gibraltar and was at large in the Atlantic.  The obvious implication of the appearance of these French ships was that the Vichy government had got wind of "Menace" and were attempting to relieve the Dakar garrison, or perhaps even seize the port for the Germans.

The Vichy squadron, known as Force "Y" and under the command of Rear-Admiral Bourrague, consisted of three cruisers and three destroyers.  They had passed through the straits of Gibraltar at 0835 on September 11th and were heading south down the African coast.  The British Admiralty ordered Force "H" at Gibraltar to intercept and question them, directing them if necessary to non-occupied ports.  The battlecruiser Renown had already been brought to one hours notice to steam by Admiral Somerville, commander of Force “H”, on the assumption that she might be needed, but without instructions had not stopped the French force.  She eventually set off in pursuit at 1630, accompanied by the destroyers Griffin, Velox and Vidette.

But the French ships had too great a head start.  They made a stopover at Casablanca to refuel during the night of September 11th, where Bourrague learnt that Force "H" was pursuing him.  Fearing another Oran, he cut short the stop at Casablanca and, aided by bad weather, slipped by Force "H".  Under Admiralty orders the "Menace" escort also attempted an interception but by the time Force "M" was on station it was the evening of September 14th and the three Vichy cruisers had reached Dakar, an event that was widely broadcast by Vichy and swiftly confirmed by air patrols from Ark Royal.  Consequently Cunningham reset his course back to Freetown, detaching the cruiser Cumberland to keep a watch off Dakar.

It seems incredible that a Vichy squadron had been allowed to pass Gibraltar when a major strike was in the process of being executed at Dakar, especially when by the terms of the armistice the British had to be notified of any movement of Vichy ships.  In fact the British Consul at Tangier did cable the news that a Vichy squadron intended to move through the straits to Admiral North at Gibraltar on the evening of 9th September.  Similarly, the following evening the British naval attaché in Madrid was informed that Force "Y" had left Toulon and would pass the straits on the 11th.

Unfortunately, the tight security that surrounded "Menace" excluded all of these individuals from any knowledge of the operation.  None of them understood the significance of the Vichy movement, and no special effort was made to pass the information on to the Admiralty, at least partly due to the fact that the blitz on London was then at its height.  Indeed, the Admiralty only learnt that Force “Y” was at sea when the destroyer Hotspur, on patrol in the Mediterranean, spotted them 50 miles east of Gibraltar heading for the straits.  Admiral North was rather unfairly blamed for allowing them to pass, and was subsequently recalled.

The Vichy response.

In fact the Vichy government had no idea at all that an operation against Dakar was in progress.  They had become worried by the defections in the equatorial regions and decided to enforce their authority by sending Force "Y", via Dakar, to Libreville.  If the Free French continued to gain it could give the Germans an excuse to occupy key African points.  By a show of force, Vichy believed that not only could they deal with de Gaulle, but equally demonstrate to the Germans that they were capable of dealing with de Gaulle.  Bourrague set off at all speed to Casablanca, making no efforts to disguise his presence.  As diplomatic relations between Vichy and Britain had been broken off after the Oran affair the British were unaware of all this.  So on September 16th the War Cabinet decided “Menace” had been compromised and instructed Cunningham to cancel the operation and sail on to Duala in the French Cameroons.  As matters stood, no-one officially knew about “Menace”, and therefore it could be called off without any loss of prestige.

The assorted "Menace" convoys arrived at Freetown between the 14th and 17th of September and commenced refuelling, while Cunningham, Irwin and de Gaulle discussed their options.  De Gaulle was concerned about the effect that a powerful Vichy squadron at sea would have on the coastal colonies.  He remained confident that he could bring Dakar over to the Free French.  As far as Cunningham was concerned the naval position remained unchanged.  The cruisers altered nothing.  Aerial reconnaissance from Ark Royal confirmed they were lying at anchor with awnings spread and consequently made excellent bombing targets.  As far as the position on land went there was no conclusive proof that Force "Y" had brought reinforcements for the garrison.  The three commanders therefore cabled London their collective opinion that "Menace" was still salvageable.  Churchill was so pleased with this display of fighting spirit that on September 18th the order to cancel was rescinded and the best method of proceeding left to the commanders on the ground.  But the Vichy French were to get their blow in first.

Governor Boisson had become increasingly anxious about the Free French gains in equatorial Africa and the increased British naval activity in the area.  He deemed it vital that the French flag be shown as quickly as possible.  The ultimate destination of Force "Y", Libreville, had no refuelling facilities.  Bourrague planned therefore to send the tanker Tarn (escorted by the cruiser Primaguet) and the freighter Poitiers ahead so that fuel and general stores would be available for the rest of force “Y” when they arrived later.  The Vichy ships were not to get far however.  News that the French vessels had sailed from Dakar quickly reached Cunningham, and ships were despatched to intercept them.  On September 16th, one hundred miles south of Dakar, Cumberland caught up with Poitiers.  Upon being challenged, the crew of the French vessel set her on fire and abandoned ship, leaving Cumberland to sink her.

On 18th September Cornwall and Delhi succeeded in catching up with Primaguet and Tarn and ordering them to turn back to Casablanca.  The Vichy cruiser radioed for instructions, and realising that Primaguet was no match for the two British cruisers Admiral Bourrague ordered her to comply.  This effectively cancelled the Vichy Admiral's mission, as without Tarn there would be no fuel supply waiting at Libreville.  Force "Y" turned back to Dakar.  At 9 AM on September 19th the cruiser Australia, sailing to relieve Cumberland from her Dakar patrol, ran into Force "Y".  The British ships gave chase, and although they had no speed advantage the strain eventually told.  Gloire suffered an engine failure and her speed fell to just 15kts.  Australia escorted her to Casablanca too.  The other French cruisers held their course and managed to reach Dakar at 0550 on September 20th, where Admiral Bourrague was relieved of his command.

Cunningham's prompt action had undoubtedly saved equatorial Africa for the allies and partially succeeded in denying reinforcements to Dakar.  However the defenders had now been warned and the forced movement of ships caused "Menace" to be delayed yet again.  Force "M" finally sailed from Freetown in three separate groups from September 19th to the 21st, carefully timed so that all the ships would arrive at dawn on the 23rd.  In spite of the fact that the Vichy government now knew that an operation against Dakar was planned, the voyage was uneventful.

All now depended on the response of Dakar.

Vichy Fleet units at Dakar (Landriau).

Battleship.

Richelieu (Richelieu class)

Cruisers.

Montcalm (La Galissonniere class)

Georges Leygues (La Galissonniere class)

Destroyers.

L’Audacieux (Malin class)

Le Fantasque (Malin class)

Le Hardi (Hardi class)

Le Malin (Malin class)

Submarines.

Ajax (Le Redoutable class batch I)

Bevezieres (Le Redoutable class batch III)

Persee (Le Redoutable class batch I)

Sloops.

Calais {Arras class)

Commandant Rivière (Elan class)

D'Entrecasteaux (Bougainville class)

D'Iberville (Bougainville class)

Gazelle (Elan class)

La Surprise (Elan class)

Auxiliary Cruisers.

El Djezair

El Kantara

El Mansour

Schoelcher

Ville d'Oran

The French commissioned many sketchily converted merchant ships as auxiliary cruisers at this time, particularly liners.

Oaukam airfield.

1 group of Curtis P-36 Warhawk fighters

1 group of Martin 167A-3 “Glen” bombers.

Ground forces.

1 Sengalese brigade

1 Mobile brigade

8 x 9.4” guns

25 x 5.4” guns

18 x 3.4” guns

September 23rd.

The final plan of operation for "Menace" was relatively unchanged from Churchill's original concept.  The fleet was to make a majestic awe-inspiring arrival off Dakar in order to intimidate the local population.  General de Gaulle would broadcast a personal appeal by radio for his troops to be allowed to land.  Aircraft from Ark Royal would then deluge the town with leaflets, while two small Luciole passenger planes landed four Free French officers at Ouakam airfield, hopefully to secure it for allied use.  After some time to allow the inhabitants to consider their position, five emissaries would then enter the harbour by motorboat from the Savorgnan de Brazza and deliver a personal message to the Governor-general.  If these entreaties did not work, the British would assist de Gaulle’s men to make a landing.  If the response was totally hostile, the situation codenamed “Nasty”, the Free French would withdraw and the British would suppress the defences by force.  This last event was considered unlikely however.  The general feeling, from commanders to private soldiers, was the defences would fire a few shots for forms sake, and then surrender.

In the event it all went horribly wrong for the Allies.  On the fateful morning of September 23rd an unexpected and completely unseasonable fog covered the entire area, blocking sight of the fleet from Dakar and obliterating any psychological effect that might have been achieved.  De Gaulle made his broadcast as planned but the Vichy authorities responded with great speed.  The general alarm was sounded and all defences were stood to.  Truck loads of troops patrolled the streets, effectively suppressing any insurrection.  The four officers landed at Ouakam were quickly captured, and one had in his pocket a list of de Gaulle's chief supporters in the town, who were promptly rounded up by the Vichy authorities.  Two Curtiss fighters were then scrambled, and these quickly chased off the four Swordfish from Ark Royal that had been scattering leaflets over the town.  The five emissaries were met at the docks by the Vichy fleet commander, Admiral Landriau, who had heard de Gaulle's broadcast.  He ordered them to be arrested and they were forced to flee amidst a hail of machine-gun fire, two being wounded.  Engaged by the secondary guns of the Richelieu, Savorgnan de Brazza hurriedly withdrew as well.

The Force "Y" cruisers were ordered to raise steam and disperse into the outer roads.  Two of the submarines, Persee and Ajax, attempted to move out of the harbour, to be promptly pursued by the destroyers Foresight and Inglefield.  Then the Vichy sloop Calais spotted the Allied fleet through the murk and passed on an accurate report of its strength to Landriau.  The large numbers of transports made it clear that a landing was imminent.  Landriau quickly alerted all his forces and prepared to fight.

The situation deteriorates.

With his initial entreaties summarily rejected, de Gaulle took a tougher stance.  He broadcast another appeal, this time with the veiled threat of direct action if there was further resistance.  When there was no response he tried again, even more threateningly.  In reply, at 1030 the Vichy shore batteries opened fire at the Allied wing destroyers through a momentary clearing of the fog.  Force “M” had taken up bombardment positions in case the plan to suppress the defences and effect a landing had to be undertaken.  The pervasive fog  restricted visibility however, and forced the British ships into positions closer than they would have normally taken, and thus into range of the fort’s guns.

By 1100 the whole fleet was being shelled.  The British did not return fire immediately, and when they did they only a few salvoes at the forts, in accordance with the decision to use the least amount of force.  Barham engaged one at less than 6000 yards range, but even so some shells overshot and landed in the crowded town beyond.  Several of the merchant ships in the inner harbour were also hit, one Danish vessel, Tacoma, being set on fire.  Vichy shooting was slow but accurate, and Cumberland was damaged so severely by a 9.4" shell hit in her engine room that she was forced to withdraw completely.

Soon after, the Vichy submarine Persee attempted a surface torpedo attack on the Barham and was sunk by Dragon.  The cruiser moved to pick up survivors, but made herself a target of the Goree island battery.  She was repeatedly straddled and took so many splinter hits that she was also detached back to escort the convoy.

This gunnery exchange was clearly being unproductive and the British force was ordered to haul off.  By 1130 all firing had died away.  Just before noon a message was received by Cunningham from the garrison confirming that any landing would be opposed.  It was apparent that appeals had failed, but there was a contingency plan.  After hurried consultations between the expedition commanders it was proposed to use the Free French sloops to land troops onto the shoals of Rufisque, a small port ten miles to the east of Dakar.

The assault on Rufisque.

The fog made the business of transferring marines from the troopships immensely confusing.  A reconnaissance plane from Ouakam spotted the preperations and at 1600 the destroyer L'Audacieux left the anchorage east of Goree Island and moved to investigate.  She was engaged by Australia, Greyhound and Fury, disabled, set on fire and finally beached at Rufisque.  She managed to fire two torpedoes at Australia, but both missed.  Landriau, now aware that something was happening in the eastern end of the bay, hurriedly despatched Georges Leygues and Montcalm to the area.

At 1730 the two smaller Free French sloops arrived at Rufisque bay and after silencing a battery near the lighthouse, dropped their boats laden with soldiers.  The Vichy defenders waited until the larger sloop was committed before uncovering a 4" battery and beginning a deliberate fire.  Simultaneously, a company of Senegalese colonial troops opened up on the boats with machine-guns.  At this critical juncture the two Vichy cruisers were spotted by a British plane.  The sloops were obviously in considerable danger, there being no larger British close enough to intervene, and had to hurriedly re-embark their troops and withdraw.  In Dakar itself some Africans made a demonstration in favour of de Gaulle, but Richelieu fired some of her secondary guns at them and the rising was swiftly dispersed.

The ultimatum is renewed.

With the Rufisque landing foiled the three "Menace" commanders met to decide their next move.  September 23rd had ended in complete failure, partly because of the weather, partly because of the poor radio communications, but mostly because against all expectations the Vichy had stood firm.  There seemed no alternative but to either humiliatingly abandon the operation or to bombard the town.  De Gaulle was of the opinion that bombarding French civilians would do his cause no good at all, so it was agreed that it would be make clear that the Free French would not take in part in such an action.  Around 2300 Churchill made the decision by ordering them "Having begun, we must go on to the end.  Stop at nothing".  Thus spurred on by this the joint commanders decided to try a bluff.  An ultimatum was broadcast at 2345, explaining the Allied position that Dakar could not be given to the Germans.  The town must be surrendered by 0600 the following day, or the Free French would withdraw and let the British attack.  At 0430 Boisson gave the defiant reply "France has entrusted Dakar to me.  I shall defend it to the end".

September 24th.

With their terms rejected, the Allies now had no recourse left if they wanted “Menace” to continue.  The Free French ships withdrew and the British battleships and cruisers were ordered to take up bombardment positions.  Originally these were to have been about eight miles from Dakar, but although the fog that had so bedevilled operations on the 23rd had partially cleared the town was still completely hidden at such a range.  The fleet had to back away in order to reform for a shorter ranged attack, and then close in again.

The first contact came at 0700 when the Vichy submarine Ajax, on patrol eight miles south-west of Goree island, spotted the British battleships.  She attempted an attack but was badly damaged by both gunfire and a hail of depth-charges.  Forced to the surface ninety minutes later, her commander ordered her scuttled to avoid capture.

Ark Royal meanwhile launched three successive air strikes.  The first, of six Skuas armed with semi-armour piercing bombs, was directed at Richelieu.  The giant battleship (which Fleet Air Arm pilots had taken to calling the Cardinal") was taken by surprise, but no hits were scored, probably due to lack of practice.  Skuas doubled as fighter aircraft and their training in the run up to "Menace" seems to have emphasised this duty at the expense of dive-bombing.

The second strike was aimed at the Cap Manuel battery and consisted of six Swordfish armed with general-purpose bombs.  Swordfish were not designed for this kind of attack and little damage was done.  The third strike was also of Swordfish, armed with torpedoes this time, and was aimed at the French cruisers.  By now the defences were ready.  No less than three Swordfish were lost to ground fire, and one more was shot down by a Curtiss fighter.  Not one torpedo hit.

At 0930 Resolution, Barham, Australia and Devonshire engaged the Vichy ships, which gamely fired back.  Although Richelieu was still moored to the dockside, the Vichy cruisers were zigzagging in the outer roads and they made elusive targets.  French destroyers immediately began laying smoke to thicken the mist and by 1010 the bay was completely obscured.  The British were forced to withdraw again.  As they moved southwards, they were ineffectually attacked by high-altitude Martin bombers from Ouakam.

The bombardment was resumed in the afternoon, when the French used smoke again.  Barham engaged the Richelieu and Resolution the batteries on Goree island.  The cruisers were also allocated targets, but owing to a signalling mishap they turned away and did not take part in the bombardment.  The defenders concentrated on Barham.  The flagship was hit four times, although she suffered no serious damage.  The heavy smoke again forced the order to cease fire about 1330.  Richelieu had been hit only once and although the Cap Manuel battery had been destroyed, most of the shore forts were still intact and several of the smaller Vichy batteries had not even been located.  The Vichy air force was becoming increasingly aggressive, making air strikes and even reconnaissance missions from Ark Royal hazardous.

At 1400 Cunningham, Irwin and de Gaulle gathered yet again to discuss what to do.  It was now clear that the defences of Dakar had been badly underestimated.  De Gaulle suggested an alternative strategy.  Small parties of Free French troops would land at lightly defended positions along the coast and march on Dakar overland, whilst the fleet blockaded the harbour.  The only alternative was to abandon the expedition.  The British commanders thought that no landing could be feasible while Richelieu and the Force Y cruisers were active, but they were equally chary of abandoning the long prepared operation.  They therefore decided, independently and without the general’s knowledge, to resume bombardment of the defences on the 25th if the conditions were favourable.

In the meantime they resorted to air attack with a strike against the Vichy cruisers.  Nine Swordfish, escorted by three Skuas, made a low-level torpedo run at around 1530.  The French were caught by surprise, but by good evasive action avoided all the torpedoes fired at them.  Two of the Swordfish were lost, although the crews were safely picked up by British destroyers.

September 25th.

The new day dawned bright and hopeful for the Allies.  The weather had cleared and visibility was extremely good.  Even news of Vichy reprisals the previous day only added to the sense of determination.  Boisson had kept the government he served will informed of developments.  They backed his actions unequivocally, and decided that a forceful expression of French displeasure was needed in addition to the denouncements of the British and de Gaulle they had made to the world’s press.  Late in the afternoon of September 24th a high altitude retaliatory raid was conducted against Gibraltar by about forty bombers from French bases in Algiers.  It was not pressed very hard and little damage was done.

The British battleships moved to their bombardment positions approximately 21,000 yards from Dakar, using their Walrus seaplanes to direct fall of shot.  Seeing their stately progress the French decided to pre-empt them.  At around 0900 Richelieu opened fire at 23,000 yards, and the British, rather startled, returned fire almost simultaneously.  Richelieu, being kept clear of the jetty by tugs, was almost immediately hit by a 15" shell from Barham.  Flames spurted up, but were quickly brought under control, and Barham's Walrus was shot down.  The British ships continued to close to their prearranged gun line, but this took them into the sights of the last Vichy submarine, Beveziers, which had been cunningly positioned by Admiral Landriau.

Captain Lancelot of the Beveziers had exercised continuously with the British before the armistice and was familiar with their methods.  He recognised the signal to turn onto the gun line and, in spite of being detected and heavily attacked, fired a full spread of torpedoes at Resolution as she reached the turning point, hitting her once amidships.  The battleship immediately listed heavily to port and lost all power, and Inglefield and Foresight were ordered to screen her with smoke.

It was a sweet moment for Vichy, for Resolution had played a major part in the attack on Oran.  Without her Cunningham's force was outgunned by the Vichy defences, but they persisted for a few minutes yet.  Barham took on the Richelieu alone, while Australia engaged the French cruisers and Devonshire shot at the forts.  In a twenty minute gun duel Barham was hit once and Australia twice.  It was now plain to Cunningham that the defences were too strong to be overcome without sustaining unacceptable levels of damage, and so he decided to abandon the operation.  The British ceased fire at 0912 and drew off.  At 0918 French fighters shot down Australia's Walrus plane.  The British headed south, covering Resolution.  At 0940 and 0950 Martin bombers from Ouakam made high altitude attacks on her, and in fact she was fortunate not to be hit again.

The ultimate irony.

But Cunningham had pulled out too early.  If he had held on for just a few minutes longer the prize for which so much blood had been spilled and so much damage had been suffered would have been his.  Unknown to the British and Free French Boisson was writing out Dakar's surrender just as Cunningham’s fleet turned away.  The garrison had almost expended their ammunition, but because of the withdrawal of the battleships the note was never sent.  As the dejected Allied fleet withdrew southwards for the last time, they were not to know that they had missed victory by a matter of minutes.  The war cabinet in London approved the decision to abandon “Menace” a few hours later.  Barham took Resolution in tow, and the entire force retired to Freetown.

Meanwhile Vichy continued its reprisal actions against Gibraltar.  During the night a naval foray of four destroyers was made from Casablanca, and later on the 25th another, larger, air raid was made.  Nearly one hundred aircraft bombed the rock, although without any great vigour, many bombs landing in the water.  Two Martin bombers were shot down, and both sides tacitly called it quits.

Aftermath.

Politically Dakar was a heavy Allied setback.  It was apparent that the garrison had chosen Vichy above Free France, and Vichy propaganda made sure everyone knew as well.  The failure to seize the port was a blow to British and especially Royal Navy prestige, at a time when both the will and ability to stand alone against the Germans was being severely questioned.  The Americans were particularly disappointed.  Dakar in Axis hands endangered their security too, as it bypassed the main British naval bases that otherwise blocked Germany and Italy from the Atlantic.

The failure of operation "Menace" was primarily down to faulty intelligence, both of the physical defences of Dakar and the morale of the garrison.  Although there had been some indiscipline amongst French naval reservists in July 1940, this had mostly been about service conditions, not dissatisfaction with Vichy policy.  In August Darlan sent Landriau to restore efficiency and discipline, a task in which he succeeded only too well.  The operation itself was hastily and sketchily drawn up, and its timetable disrupted by delays and changes of plan.  The unseasonable weather limited the effect of the fleet.  The unexpected arrival of Vichy reinforcements on top of all that ended any hope of success.

There were some positive results for the Allies from the debacle at Dakar.  The Vichy squadron never reached equatorial Africa, and so de Gaulle was able to subsequently land at Duala and rally the French African colonies.  More importantly, France's ability to defend it's colonies had been proven, and provided Vichy with the ammunition they needed to forestall German attempts to intervene in colonial affairs.  Finally the Allies learnt a great many useful lessons about amphibious operations, which were to stand them in good stead in the future.

On the military side, no British ship was lost during "Menace", but several were very badly damaged.  Cumberland was out of service for two weeks, Fiji for six months and Resolution for a whole year.  Several other ships sustained lesser damage and at least twelve aircraft were lost.  Happily there were less than fifty casualties.  Upon reaching Freetown, the fleet dispersed to other duties.

The Vichy French had lost two destroyers and two submarines.  There was also damage done to both Richelieu and the coastal forts.  This was particularly serious as the facilities at Dakar were such that repairs to damage of this nature were very difficult to make.  French personnel losses are unknown.  They were certainly higher than Allied casualties but were nevertheless still quite light.

The destroyer L'Audacieux, beached at Rufisque, was subsequently refloated and towed to Bizerta for repairs, which took nearly two years to complete.  She was destroyed by the USAAF in early 1943.

Captain Lancelot and the crew of the Beveziers were lauded as heroes in France.  The good captain survived to fight for the Allies later on in the war.

Richelieu took nearly a year to repair.  She remained at Dakar up until the Torch landings in November of 1942 when the port and all its resources joined the Allied cause.  She was refitted in America, and then served, in succession, the Mediterranean fleet, the Home fleet and finally the Eastern fleet, in all of which she made a very good impression.

Bibliography.

“The Guns of Dakar”, by J. Williams.  Published by William Heineman Ltd, London, 1976.

“The Second World War, Volume II”, by W. S. Churchill.  Published by Cassel & Co. Ltd, 1949.

“De Gaulle, by B. Ledwidge.  Published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, London, 1982.

“De Gaulle”, by A. Crawley.  Published by Collins Ltd, London, 1969.

“De Gaulle.   The Warrior”, by B. Crozier.  Published by Eyre Methuen Ltd, London, 1973.

“Ships of the Royal Navy, Vol 1 & 2”, by J. J. Colledge.  Published by Daniel & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1969.

“The War at Sea, 1939-1945 Volume 1”, by S. W. Roskill.  Published by H.M.S.O., London, 1954.

“Warship losses of World War Two”, by D. Brown.  Published by Arms and Armour Press, London, 1990.

“Battle Summary No. 20, Naval Operations off Dakar”, H.M.S.O.