


Islam and Pakistan's Political Culture

Farhan Mujahid Chak



ROUTLEDGE

Islam and Pakistan's Political Culture

This book explores the ideological rivalry which is fuelling political instability in Muslim polities, discussing this in relation to Pakistan. It argues that the principal dilemma for Muslim polities is how to reconcile modernity and tradition. It discusses existing scholarship on the subject, outlines how Muslim political thought and political culture have developed over time, and then relates all this to Pakistan's political evolution, present political culture, and growing instability. The book concludes that traditionalist and secularist approaches to reconciling modernity and tradition have not succeeded, and have in fact led to instability, and that a revivalist approach is more likely to be successful.

Farhan Mujahid Chak is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs at Qatar University, Doha, Qatar.

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First published 2015
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Chak, Farhan Mujahid, author.

Islam and Pakistan's political culture / Farhan Mujahid Chak.

pages ; cm. -- (Durham modern Middle East and Islamic world series ; 33)

1. Islam and politics--Pakistan. 2. Islam and politics. 3. Political culture--Pakistan. 4. Knowledge, Theory of (Islam) 5. Pakistan--History.

6. Pakistan--Politics and government. I. Title. II. Series: Durham modern Middle East and Islamic world series ; 33.

BP63.P18C435 2015

306.2095491--dc23

2014007886

ISBN: 978-1-138-78838-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-81908-2 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Taylor & Francis Books

I wish to dedicate this book to my mother who will, forever, be my greatest teacher. Her spirituality, devotion and ‘Firāsa’ translated every life experience into a God-sent message that taught me to be both strong and innocent, warrior and poet, proud and humble. And to my father, whose life has been a symbol of self-sacrifice, lofty idealism, loyalty and courage. His quiet struggle to provide for his family made him sacrifice so much of what he loved.

**Esa,
Aşkim,
Bir Tanem,
‘Me chu she sith mohabbat’.
All that I did not like,
Was exactly what I needed
Faris,
Janan,
Hayatim,
maang kenhteh,
A precious gift from God,
Your presence allows me to feel
His Divine Mercy.**

The Cruel and the Critic

My heart is a glass
Caught between the two stones
Of the Cruel and the Critic
I lay shattered between fools
Who offer nothing new,
Or know only to mimic
This madness,
My mind
Struggles to resist
Painting the Image of God as Tyrant
Or removing Him from His Throne
To sit
This dark night my soul mourns
By those who take
Fragments of Truth to justify
This dark night by body scorns
With hands that forsake
Constants of faith to vilify
The Cruel speaks only of hate
A despise for the 'Other'
The Critic loathes his own self
Speaking in the tongue of another
The Cruel wishes to live in the past
The Critic wishes to bury it
Spite takes my soul as a burden
Shame kills its will to exist
The touch of the Cruel is scorching
The Critic cannot be felt
An unpleasant breath lingers
With confusing breaths that melt
The Cruel refuses to think
To carve a path to a bright, new day
The Critic refuses to listen
Walking a path that will not stay
A Cruel practice of faith
Hating those that do not
They wish to share their misery
While compassion having forgot
A Critic's insolence to faith
Hating those who do
Reminded of their shortcomings
I only wish they knew
My scattered pieces are trampled

By those without balance
Who offer burnt flesh
Or the flesh of my dead brother
I gasp for air
As they persist to smother
A child is not born
The children will not play
From this misery, Oh Allah
Show me a way, away

Farhan Mujahid Chak

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
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Maps



Map 1 Map of Pakistan, 2010



Map 2 Map of disputed territory of Jammu And Kashmir, 2006

Chronology of major political events

- 1906** Muslim League founded as forum for Muslim unity and collective self-determination in the British Raj.
- 1940** Muslim League endorses idea of separate political entity for the diverse Muslims residing in the British Raj.
- 1947** Independence from the British Raj. Most of the Muslim majority provinces of the British Raj formed a new nation-state called Pakistan. Several hundred thousand people die in widespread communal violence and millions are made homeless.
- 1948** Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Pakistan Movement and first head of state, dies.
Liaquat Ali Khan takes over as prime minister.
The first war with India erupts over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
- 1951** Jinnah's successor Liaquat Ali Khan is assassinated.
- 1956** Constitution proclaims Pakistan an Islamic republic.
- 1958** Martial law declared and General Ayyub Khan takes over.
- 1960** General Ayyub Khan becomes president.
- 1965** Second war with India over Kashmir.
- 1969** General Ayyub Khan resigns and General Yahya Khan takes over.
- 1970** Victory in general elections in East Pakistan for breakaway Awami League, leading to rising tension with West Pakistan.
- 1971** East Pakistan attempts to secede, leading to civil war. India intervenes in support of East Pakistan, which eventually breaks away to become Bangladesh.
- 1972** Simla Peace Agreement with India sets new frontline in Kashmir.
- 1973** Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes prime minister.
- 1977** Riots erupt over allegations of vote-rigging by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). General Zia Ul-Haq launches military coup.
- 1978** General Zia becomes president, launches campaign to introduce Islamic law and usher in an Islamic system in Pakistan.

- 1979** Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto hanged.
- 1980** US pledges military assistance to Pakistan following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
- 1985** Martial law and political parties ban lifted.
- 1986** Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir returns from exile to lead PPP in campaign for fresh elections.
- 1988** August – General Zia, the US ambassador and top Pakistan army officials die in mysterious air crash.
- 1988** November – Benazir Bhutto's PPP wins general election.
- 1990** Benazir Bhutto dismissed as prime minister on charges of incompetence and corruption.
- 1991** Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif begins economic liberalisation programme. Islamic shariah law formally incorporated into legal code.
- 1992** Government launches campaign to stamp out violence by Urdu-speaking supporters of the Mohajir Quami Movement.
- 1993** President Khan and Prime Minister Sharif both resign under pressure from military. Election brings Benazir Bhutto back to power.
- 1996** President Leghari dismisses Bhutto government amid corruption allegations.
- 1997** Nawaz Sharif returns as prime minister after his Pakistan Muslim League Party wins elections.
- 1998** Pakistan conducts its own nuclear tests after India explodes several nuclear devices.
- 1999** April – Benazir Bhutto and her husband convicted of corruption and given jail sentences. Benazir Bhutto stays out of the country.
- 1999** May – Kargil Conflict: Pakistan-backed forces clash with the Indian military in the icy heights around Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir. More than 1,000 people are killed on both sides.
- 1999** October – General Pervez Musharraf seizes power in coup.
- 2000** April – Nawaz Sharif sentenced to life imprisonment on hijacking and terrorism charges over his actions to prevent the 1999 coup.
- 2000** December – Nawaz Sharif goes into exile in Saudi Arabia after being pardoned by military authorities.
- 2001** June – General Pervez Musharraf names himself president while remaining head of the army.
- 2001** September – Musharraf swings in behind the US in its fight against terrorism and supports attacks on Afghanistan. US lifts some sanctions imposed after Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998.
- 2001** December – India, Pakistan prompt fears of full-scale war by massing troops along common border amid growing tensions over Kashmir following suicide attack on Indian parliament.

- 2002** January – President Musharraf bans two militant groups – Lashkar-E-Toiba and Jaish-E-Mohammad – and takes steps to curb religious extremism.
- 2002** April – President Musharraf wins another five years in office in a referendum criticised as unconstitutional and flawed.
- 2002** May – Pakistan test fires three medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, amid rumours of impending conflict with India.
- 2002** August – President Musharraf grants himself sweeping new powers including the right to dismiss and elect parliament.
- 2003** November – Pakistan declares a Kashmir ceasefire; India follows suit.
- 2003** December – Pakistan and India agree to resume direct air links and to allow overflights of each other's planes from the beginning of 2004, after a two-year ban.
- 2004** February – Leading nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan admits to having leaked nuclear weapons secrets, reportedly to Libya, North Korea and Iran.
- 2004** June – Pakistan mounts first military offensive against suspected Al-Qaeda militants and their supporters in tribal areas near Afghan border. US begins using drone strikes to target Al-Qaeda leaders in the area.
- 2004** April – Parliament approves creation of military-led national security council, institutionalising role of armed forces in civilian affairs.
- 2004** May – Pakistan readmitted to commonwealth.
- 2005** April – Bus services, the first in 60 years, operate between Muzaffarabad in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Srinagar in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
- 2005** Pakistan tests its first nuclear-capable cruise missile.
- 2005** Earthquake kills tens of thousands of people in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
- 2006** Government signs peace accord to end fighting with pro-Al-Qaeda militants in Waziristan tribal areas near Afghan border.
- 2007** Sixty-eight passengers are killed by bomb blasts and a blaze on a train travelling between the Indian capital New Delhi and the Pakistani city of Lahore.
- 2007** President Musharraf suspends Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, triggering a wave of protests across the country.
- 2007** Security forces storm the militant-occupied Red Mosque complex in Islamabad following a week-long siege.

- 2007** Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returns from exile. Dozens of people die in a suicide bomb targeting her homecoming parade in Karachi.
- 2007** Musharraf wins presidential election but is challenged by Supreme Court. He declares emergency rule, dismisses Chief Justice Chaudhry and appoints new Supreme Court, which confirms his re-election.
- 2007** November – Former PM Nawaz Sharif returns from exile.
- 2007** December – State of emergency lifted. Benazir Bhutto assassinated at election campaign rally in Rawalpindi.
- 2008** February-March – Pakistan People's Party (PPP) nominee Yusuf Raza Gilani becomes PM at head of coalition with Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League Party, following parliamentary elections in February.
- 2008** August – President Musharraf resigns after two main governing parties agree to launch impeachment proceedings against him.
- 2008** September – MPs elect Pakistan People's Party's (PPP) Asif Ali Zardari – the widower of assassinated former PM Benazir Bhutto – president. Suicide bombing on Marriott Hotel in Islamabad kills 53 people. Soon after, government launches major offensive in Bajaur tribal area, killing more than 1,000 militants.
- 2008** November – The government borrows billions of dollars from the International Monetary Fund to overcome its spiralling debt crisis.
- 2008** December – India blames Mumbai attacks in November on Pakistani-based militants and demands Pakistan take action. Islamabad denies involvement but promises to cooperate with the Indian investigation.
- 2009** February – Government agrees to implement sharia law in north-western Swat Valley in effort to persuade Islamist militants there to agree to permanent ceasefire.
- 2009** March – After days of protest, government yields to demands for reinstatement of judges dismissed by former President Musharraf.
- 2009** April – Swat Agreement breaks down after Taleban-linked militants seek to extend their control. Government launches offensive to wrest control of Swat from militants.
- 2009** July – The Supreme Court acquits opposition leader Nawaz Sharif of hijacking charges dating from 1999 army coup, removing ban on his running for public office.
- 2009** August – The leader of Pakistan's Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, is killed in US drone attack in South Waziristan. He is succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud.

- 2009** November – President Asif Ali Zardari hands control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to PM Yousuf Raza Gilani, in apparent attempt to ease political pressure.
- 2010** January – Suicide attack on volleyball match in north-west kills more than 100 people.
- 2010** April – Parliament approves package of wide-ranging constitutional reforms. Measures include transferring key powers from office of president to prime minister.
- 2010** August – Worst floods in 80 years kill at least 1,600 people and affect more than 20 million. Government response widely criticised.
Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden found hiding in a suburban compound in Pakistan.
- 2010** October – Rise in targeted political killings, bombings in commercial hub of Karachi.
- 2011** January – A campaign to reform Pakistan’s blasphemy law leads to the killing of two prominent supporters: Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in January and Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti in March.
- 2011** March – The prime ministers of India and Pakistan meet to watch a cricket match, an occasion seen as a chance for the two nations to repair relations.
- 2011** April – The founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, is killed by American special forces in Abbottabad.
- 2011** November – Pakistan shuts down NATO supply routes after a NATO attack on military outposts kills 25 Pakistani soldiers.
- 2011** December – Pakistan boycotts the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in protest at the NATO attack on a border checkpoint.
The government comes under pressure over a leaked memo alleging that senior officials sought US aid against a possible military coup after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in April.
- 2012** January – Amid growing tension between government and military over the ‘Memogate’ scandal, army chief General Pervez Kayani warns of ‘unpredictable consequences’ after PM Yousuf Raza Gilani criticises army leaders and sacks a top defence official.
Supreme Court threatens to prosecute Prime Minister Gilani for contempt of court over government’s refusal to reopen corruption cases against President Asif Ali Zardari and other political figures.
- 2012** May – A US senate panel cuts \$33m in aid to Pakistan over the jailing of Pakistani Doctor Shakil Afridi, who helped the CIA find Osama Bin Laden.

- The arrest of Rimsha, a Christian girl, prompts protests against blasphemy laws.
- 2012** June – Supreme Court disqualifies Prime Minister Gilani from holding office after he declines to appeal against a token sentence in the President Zardari corruption row. Parliament approves Water and Power Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf as his successor.
- 2012** July – Pakistan agrees to reopen NATO supply routes to Afghanistan after the US apologises for killing 24 Pakistani soldiers in November.
- 2012** September – Muslim Cleric Khalid Chishti is arrested on suspicion of planting burnt pages of the Koran on a Christian girl briefly detained for blasphemy. Amid widespread condemnation of the case against the girl at home and abroad, a court drops it in November.
- 2012** October – Taliban gunmen seriously injure 14-year-old campaigner for girls' rights Malala Yousafzai, whom they accuse of 'promoting secularism'. The shooting sparks a brief upsurge of anger in Pakistan against the militants.
- 2012** November – Taliban suicide bomber kills at least 23 people at a shia Muslim procession in the Rawalpindi.
- 2013** January – Supreme Court orders the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf over corruption allegations dating back to his time as a minister in 2010. He denies wrongdoing. The government sacks Balochistan Chief Minister over bomb blasts in the provincial capital Quetta that kill at least 92 shia Muslims. Sunni extremist group Lashkar-E-Jhangvi claims responsibility. Populist cleric and anti-corruption campaigner Tahirul Qadri leads a nationwide march on Islamabad. The government responds by agreeing to dissolve parliament early and to consult Mr. Qadri over the formation of a caretaker government.
- 2013** February – President Zardari and Afghanistan's President Karzai agree to work for an Afghan peace deal. Bomb attack targeting shia Muslims in Quetta kills 89 people. Police detain Lashkar-E-Jhangvi militant group founder Malik Ishaq after the group claims responsibility.
- 2013** March – Government appointed to oversee parliamentary elections.
- 2013** April – A court orders the arrest of General Pervez Musharraf over his attempt to impose house arrest on judges during his military rule in March 2007. General Musharraf had returned from British exile in March to contest parliamentary elections.
- 2013** June – Parliament approves Nawaz Sharif as prime minister after his Muslim League-N wins parliamentary elections in

May. Extremists conduct a systematic campaign of attacks and intimidation, but fail to deter the largest turnout of voters since 1970. Secular parties are routed.

2013 July – Mamnoon Hussain elected president by parliament.

2013 September – More than 80 people are killed in a double suicide bombing at a church in Peshawar. It is the deadliest attack so far against Christians in Pakistan, while extremists claim responsibility.

Acknowledgements

I am eternally grateful to God, the Most Merciful and Most Compassionate, for His continuous guidance, support and blessings throughout my life. The completion of this book is simply another manifestation of His blessings that I could never deny. In all things, I am mindful of my Creator, and, through that, my responsibilities to Creation.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my PhD supervisor Mehmet Asutay, who I endearingly refer to as '*Agabey*'. He is fine gentleman, a sophisticated scholar and a great friend. This achievement would not be possible without his genuineness, sincerity and encouragement.

Thereafter, I wish to sincerely thank my dearest teachers, confidantes and guides who have assisted in the course of writing this book. Among them, I would like to thank Prof. Saleem M. M. Qureshi, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, Dr Sayyid Saeed, Shaikh Ahmad Totonji, Professor Azzam Tamimi, Professor Tariq Ramadan, Professor Stephen Welch, Professor Paul Rogers and Professor John Esposito.

Last, I owe an unending debt of gratitude to the wonderful, dynamic people of Qatar. In particular, I wish to graciously thank the love, support and encouragement of the eminent Shaikh Muhammad – a gem of a man, his entire family, especially sister 'Umm Hamad', and numerous other Qatari households who have welcomed me into their home as one of their own.

Knock, and He'll open the door.
Vanish, and He'll make you shine like the sun.
Fall, and He'll raise you to the heavens.
Become nothing, and He'll turn you into everything.

Rumi

1 Introduction

The symbol of Islam is not the Wheel of Dharma, the Shield of David or the Crucifix. It is, undoubtedly, the cube of the Kaa'ba. That immovable, stable and enduring symbol of permanence represents the absolute character of Islam. If there ever was a symbol that so completely represents the spirit of Islam it is the Kaa'ba: perpetual certainty, or 'permanence,' constantly surrounded by the 'impermanence' of orbiting believers who represent both dynamism and flux. This, after all, sends a powerful message: life is full of change, yet we often live for those things that don't change. Clearly, 'meaning' in our lives exists as a consequence of permanence – and this is precisely what comes under question in the modern world.¹ Contrarily, this 'permanence' remains the mainspring of an Islamic ethos.

'Once the spirit of Islamic revelation had brought into being, out of the heritage of previous civilizations and through its own genius, the civilization that may be called distinctly "Islamic", the main interest turned away from change and adaptation'.² Henceforth, its corresponding epistemology came to embody a 'permanence' premised on the 'certainty' of the principles from which they issued forth. This 'permanence', in fact, is far too often mistaken as inertia in Muslim societies. Yet, more succinctly, it reflects the unique balance that Islamic civilization instils between enduring principles and changing circumstances.

Today, many Muslim polities attempt to intelligently reconcile the twin forces of 'permanence' – *thabit* – and 'change' – *mutaghayir*. Relatedly, this reconciliation includes managing modernity and tradition. Though nowhere is the problematic nature of reconciliation better exhibited than when deconstructing political culture in Muslim polities. It is here that the antecedents of political instability may be understood. Therefore, in recognition of that chronic, internal civilizational tussle between permanence and change, this book analyzes political culture to understand the roots of its ideological and consequential political instability. However, conclusions drawn and insights gained are relevant across Muslim majority countries.

To begin with, this book thoroughly reviews the literature on political culture and locates, therein, constant references to the 'core', 'existing meaning', 'enduring cultural component' or 'stock of knowledge' in a given polity. Then

2 Islam and Pakistan's Political Culture

those unexplained terms are used to describe the essence of political culture, alluding to its intrinsic values. Yet that allusion is vague, since what the 'core' exactly consists of, amounts to or how it may alter, is left largely undefined. Here we are provided a concept that is meant to do the explaining, which itself requires an explanation. Therefore, this book proceeds to define that 'core', with regard to Muslim polities, and labels it as the '*foundational*' aspect of Islamic political culture. This, effectively, represents its deeply cherished political ideals, yet is only the first sphere of inquiry essential to understand the totality of political culture in Muslim polities. Specifically, understanding that totality involves grasping the complex interplay between the 'core' political ideals that are symbolic of permanence, the changing context in which they are evident, as in Pakistan, and the approach political leadership chooses to interact with both. In other words, understanding Islamic political culture involves three spheres of inquiry: '*foundational*' (what endures or should be), '*contextual*' (what is) and '*individual*' (the agent for movement), illustrated in Figure 1.1 below:

Strictly speaking, the solid outer circle is the '*foundational*' sphere of inquiry, which includes those patterns of behaviour, norms, and cultural assumptions collectively representing the core ideological and political platform of Islam – the 'ideals'. In this study, it includes the Qur'anic theory of knowledge, the political ideals extracted from both the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings with, lastly, the Rashidun era. Essentially, these four variables enable us to extract deep-rooted political principles and set them forth as an 'ideal type'. These 'ideals', then, are manifest not only in Muslim society in Pakistan, but throughout the entire Muslim world, albeit to varying degrees. Straight-forward to this analytical approach is the assumption that the ideals incorporated at the 'foundational' sphere of inquiry are of significant consequence, having a pivotal impact on the organization and direction of political life. Second, the criss-crossing and porous lines inside the circle, symbolic of impermanence, represent the 'contextual' sphere of inquiry. This pertains to the way the 'foundational' finds expression, depth and meaning, for instance in Pakistan. And is representative of the spread of 'foundational' ideals of Islam to regions beyond Hejaz and its consequent interfacing with divergent sociocultural realities. However, to limit the scope of our analysis, the time frame for our




Figure 1.1 Graphic representation of the requisites for political stability in Muslim polities, which requires a balance between the three spheres of inquiry.

study begins during the early twentieth century Pakistan movement, moves on to include its fractious constitutional development and ends with civil-military analysis. Third, the star in the centre, another aspect of impermanence, represents the individual that responds to both forces and, similarly, influences them in application or form.

Collectively, these three spheres of inquiry comprise the composite Islamic political culture and coexist simultaneously. The 'core' values, the manner in which they find expression in space-time and the agent for movement directly impact its manifestation. Therefore, any analysis focusing singularly on one sphere of inquiry would be deficient in revealing its totality. Consequently, this trilateral approach is intended to shun simplistic analyses, and is calculated to offer a careful framework – without dissociating the inquiry from its sociological context.³ Furthermore, this approach disqualifies both the portrayal of a monolithic Islamic political culture across spatial and temporal bounds, to a degree defying empirical realities, and those who insist of there being no commonality across *Islamdom*.

This triangular relationship lies at the heart of understanding Islamic political culture and produces three variant political cultures – namely, '*traditionalist*', '*secularist*' and '*revivalist*'. More clearly, the differing manner in which 'individual' political leaders in their 'context', such as Pakistan, choose to interact with the 'foundational' produces them. This interaction, however, is, largely, antagonistic, not solely as a result of their diverse understandings, but also by competing for control of the centres of power. As a result, the conflict between these variant political cultures contributes towards ideological and political instability. Yet the 'revivalist' political-culture type manages this rivalry by both a restraining influence and cohesiveness that resolves issues of instability insomuch as it hinders development, progress and direction.

Here, this study proceeds to take into consideration two pioneering figures of the Pakistan movement, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal. It closely examines and characterizes them as '*revivalists*' who expressed a vision that resonated or connected with their people. Resultantly, they succeeded in fostering unity, amidst diversity, towards a common directive. Not only did they balance the 'core' values of their society with their present-day realities, but understood power as meaningless without popular support. Accordingly, their narrative was rooted in the sensibilities of their context, based on established tradition, ongoing through the process of enculturation.

Furthermore, both Jinnah and Iqbal may be portrayed as 'revivalists', or harbingers of a new '*asabiyya*', by the manner in which they responded to the challenges of their time.⁴ That included a clear vision for the future rooted in an appreciation of their cultural and religious past, though not necessarily bound by it. Granted, these leaders were competing and contesting dissimilar meanings held by 'traditionalists' – who were unable or unwilling to synthesise Islamic ideals with the idea of the nation-state, or 'secularists' who did not recognize the importance of Islam in their political narrative. Admittedly, the depiction of both Jinnah and Iqbal as 'revivalists' may be disputed. Indeed,

today in Pakistan it is a hotly contested issue. Yet what is undeniable is that they both chose to not '*disconnect*' in idea, word or deed, from either the historiography – which '*secularists*' often ignore – or the contemporariness – which '*traditionalists*' often ignore – of their society. Fittingly, they prevented delegitimizing themselves in the eyes of their people and succeeded in galvanizing an ethnically diverse mass into a cohesive unit. This, too, irrespective of opposition from the traditionalists and secularists, both of whom opposed an independent homeland for Muslims. Taking that into account, what has popularly been referred to as the 'Arab Spring' is simply, another manifestation of 'revivalists' securing the support of the majority of people in Muslim polities and seizing their rightful place at the helm of socio-economic, cultural and political affairs. This, too, in spite of resentment and resistance by secularists and traditionalists, who, disregarding lip service, tend to be wary of democratization.

In total, this book critiques the concept of political culture and offers an alternative methodology to explain Islamic political culture. As such, it begins by analysing the early foundational mores of an Islamic polity based on four variables: its epistemic tradition, the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and Rashidun era. Together, this leads to the analytical formation of the 'foundational' sphere of inquiry, the first explanatory variable. Then it places that in the context of Pakistan and assesses how individuals interact with it. By doing so, this study reveals the development of competing political cultures, with their own understandings and trajectories, whose interaction broadens ideological and political instability.

Concerning the archetype of the early foundational mores, this book does not merely propose to reiterate the early Islamic era as the ideal and the eras following as mere efforts to reach or catch up. Instead, there is a reinvention of that 'ideal' relevant to the context in which it arises, which disqualifies any contradiction towards the foundational inasmuch as it seeks to garner legitimacy. Certainly, for one to 'catch up' to an ideal it must, from the onset, be accepted as the benchmark to achieve. For that reason, this study insists 'ideals' exist as a consequence of principles espoused by its epistemic tradition and enculturation.⁵ The challenge, then, is to create it anew, acknowledging that renewal is not linear, in that there needs to be a return to a specific ideal thought to exist in the past. Utopia is not, necessarily, mimicking of bygone days, or to put it plainly '*going back in time to an idealized past*'. Nor does it require viewing the world as the source of ills and conflicts, and not humans, and by doing so making human life expendable.⁶ Yet the 'ideal' *does* exist in any society with regard to its ethical, socio-economic and political direction. Thus, 'foundational' mores cannot be ignored, nor can present conditions. In essence, it is this creative articulation of enduring principles and its present-day application that the 'revivalist' in Muslim polities wishes to realize, the 'traditionalists' wish to resist and the 'secularists' wish to deny.

Subsequent efforts, throughout Muslim history, to create such 'utopias' were the responsibility of 'revivalists' in which they, per se, aim to actualize its substance, or *maqasid*, rather than merely its form.⁷ In our analysis, the

'revivalists' in Muslim polities do so by responding to challenges with a solution that steers away from both the 'traditionalist' and 'secularist.' Both largely understand Islam as a monolithic and unchanging dispensation, albeit for their own reasons.⁸ It is undeniable that early schisms existed in Islam, as they persist today. Nevertheless, the 'revivalist' aims at recognizing the strength and wisdom of diversity – a diversity that includes different ideas and colours, unusual beliefs and devotion, dissimilar languages and race. Truly, appreciating diversity is recognizing all those differences, still maintaining convergence of purpose, even while insisting on differing methods and then, lastly, trusting that 'God knows best'.

It may be noted that this high classicalism is similar to other religio-political ideals, as well, if one looks at Jewish history or the classical Hindu age in India, now being idealised amongst the Hindutva proponents. Often such 'utopianism' may be, as John Gray says, based on millenarianism, which is not unique to Abrahamic traditions but equally shared by communists and other such trajectories.⁹ The 'nostalgia' exhibited by some contemporary American scholars, bemoaning their crisis, follows a similar design. Though the idea of 'utopianism' in Muslim society is distinct – at least from Gray's description, which labels society, not humans, as responsible for societal ills. Humans, in Islamic tenets, are described as God's vicegerents on earth, with a responsibility to work together to achieve a synthesis between the foundational, contextual and individual. By doing so, they actualize justice. In other words, each generation will have its own utopia that in substance correlates to its 'foundational' mores, even while the form may differ. The stability of Muslim polities resides in the ability of their leadership to understand the twin aspects of 'permanence' and 'change,' and articulate a healthy balance of the principle while recognizing that it differs in application according to context. The Muslim polity that is able to project this equilibrium achieves stability, progress and widespread acceptance.

Thus Pakistan was conceived as an 'ideal', a 'Model Islamic State', and its internal ideological fissures, as a result of the clash between traditionalists and secularists, along with military-civic/political dichotomies, only aggravated the issues of governance, as well as often hindering civil society. Therefore, these are the questions we are asking: What is political culture? How is it effectively described in Muslim polities? What is its existing stock of knowledge, core, or its inherited meaning? What attitudes toward governance are encouraged in Islam? How are these exemplified in Pakistan? The task seems daunting, yet in Pakistan the broad-based ideals as stipulated by Islam provide a good starting point for analysis of a people's outlook toward governance.

Research design, strategy and method

'For those who see only with their eyes, the distant is always indistinct and little, becoming less and less as it recedes, till utterly lost; but to the imagination, which thus reverses the perspective of the senses, the far off is great

and imposing, the magnitude increasing with the distance'.¹⁰ Creative ingenuity is often the act or process of forming a conscious idea of something never previously perceived for the impetus of artistic or intellectual design. Similarly, in scholarly environs, the potency of the intellectual rests in the ability to grasp, with the mind's eye, a myriad of realities, from differing perspectives and clearly convey this to others. However, a positivist approach to research and observation is the antithesis of this rendering of the enlightened scholar. The 'scientification' of the social sciences by positivism proposes analyses of social phenomena with a mentality corresponding to the physicist. Cox suggests 'by positivism I mean the effort to conceive social science on the model of physics ... before it has assimilated the principles of relativity and uncertainty'.¹¹ It fails, then, due to its incapacity to reflect on its own complicity and 'recognize its embeddedness in social and political life and its contribution to the prevailing order of things by accepting this order as its framework'.¹² Therefore, the astute researcher discards this analytical approach for a theoretical framework of analysis that considers intersubjective meanings, inwardness, and cultural subtleties. Broadly speaking, this is what is meant by cultural analysis: to determine the thoughts, feelings and perceptions of a particular society; to put aside our convictions of what is desirable and assess what the society under investigation considers significant. The task requires stepping out of one's own mindset to view the 'other' not through one's own lens but through his. Thus, in formulating a fitting research design, strategy and method for this book, the foregoing theoretical issues were taken into account. Accordingly, this book utilizes a qualitative research methodology, which includes discursive interpretation, abductive research strategy and critical discourse analysis.

To begin with, the methodology of this study is qualitative, involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the concept of political culture and how it relates to ideological and political instability in Pakistan. This methodology draws the researcher into the phenomenological complexity of participants' worlds where situations unfold, and connections, causes and correlations can be observed as they occur over time.¹³ It implies a study of phenomenon in their natural settings and attempts to interpret events in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Therefore, this research methodology examines people's words and actions in 'narrative or descriptive ways more closely representing the situation as experienced by participants'.¹⁴

In addition, the research design in this study involves discursive interpretation. This form of interpretation is most pronounced in its opposition to positivism and absolute universal truisms.¹⁵ It emphasizes the importance of the context in which interaction, political or otherwise, takes place, stating that this is critical for accurate analysis. Rather than assume that data collected in one context can be generalised beyond it, discursive interpretation and analyses focus on ways in which people make sense of their interaction, of themselves or their own mental states *in that context*.¹⁶ In other words, discursive interpretation explores how 'the ways in which we come to talk about and account

for our own mental states actually provide the resources for managing and experiencing the world and our own mental states'.¹⁷

Moving on from that, this study utilizes an abductive research strategy that focuses on Pakistan. An abductive research strategy has often been described as 'inductive'; yet this largely misrepresents the complexity of the analytical task involved. Paralleling the inductive research strategy, it begins by observing the social world and the social actors under investigation. However, the abductive research strategy emphasizes the social actors' construction of reality, their ways of conceptualizing and giving meaning to their social world, their tacit knowledge.¹⁸ This can only be accurately discovered from the accounts that the social actors provide. The reality of the social actors under investigation, the method and manner in which they have constructed and interpreted their own activities, is embedded in their discourse. Hence, the researcher has to enter their world in order to discover the motives and reasons that accompany social activities. 'The task, then, is to re-describe these motives and actions, and the situations in which they occur ... Individual motives and actions have to be abstracted into typical motives for typical actions in typical situations. These social scientific typifications provide an understanding of the activities and may, then, become ingredients in more systematic explanatory accounts'.¹⁹

Clearly, the abductive research strategy is based on interpretation and understanding, utilizing interpretive ontological and epistemological elements such as critical theory. Such a strategy involves constructing a theory that is derived from social actors' language, meanings and theories, or is grounded in everyday activities. Abduction is the process used to produce social scientific accounts of social life by drawing on the concepts and meanings used by social actors, and the activities in which they engage. According to Reichertz, its particular strength is it being both logical and innovative in its research strategy. On the one hand it is a logical inference and, thereby, reasonable and scientific; on the other hand, it extends into the realm of profound insight and therefore generates new knowledge.²⁰

Lastly, in this book, the research method utilized involves critical discourse analysis for secondary data and interviews for primary data. Critical discourse analysis employs interdisciplinary techniques of text analysis to look at how texts construct representations of the world, social identities and social relationships.²¹ In addition, critical discourse analysis refers to the use of various procedures for the study of textual practice and language use as social and cultural practices.²² Overall, critical discourse analysis builds from three broad theoretical orientations:

First, it draws from post-structuralism the view that discourse operates laterally across local institutional sites, and that texts have a constructive function in forming up and shaping human identities and actions. Second, it draws from Bourdieu's sociology the assumption that actual textual practices and interactions with texts become 'embodied' forms of 'cultural capital' with exchange value in particular social fields.²³ Third, it

draws from neo-Marxist cultural theory the assumption that these discourses are produced and used within political economies, and that they thus produce and articulate broader ideological interests, social formations and movements within those fields.²⁴

The presupposition of critical discourse analysis is that institutions or individuals teaching texts such as the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and written or oral accounts of the Rashidun era act as gatekeepers for mastery of these expansive resources. In other words, they shape the ideological fabric of the listener or reader and inculcate certain 'ideals'. With that thought, it may be argued that the Qur'an itself is a sort of institution that sets forth a mechanism towards acquiring knowledge, imparting certain values, beliefs and 'ideals' and, consequently, which governs relations between individuals pertinent to political life. Nonetheless, the task of critical discourse analysis is both deconstructive and reconstructive. In its deconstructive moment it aims to elucidate those principles, ideology and insights pertinent to the political realm, outlining the parameters of power relations in everyday life. On the other hand, its reconstructive moment involves the formulation of a coherent understanding of what those political principles imply.

More clearly, the principal unit of analysis for critical discourse analysis is the text. Texts are taken to be social actions, meaningful and coherent instances of spoken and written language use.²⁵ Yet their shape and form is not random or arbitrary. Specific text types or 'genres', as Luke refers to them, serve conventional social uses and functions. That is, particular kinds of texts attempt to 'do things' in social institutions, with predictable ideational and material effects.²⁶ This, precisely, is what the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and Rashidun era attempt to do. In that regard, these sources of legitimacy in Muslim society, even though immutable, are still dynamic and continually subject to reinvention by being affiliated with particular conventionalised discourses as a part of its civilizational directive.

This study of subject positions of the text, such as the Qur'an, has focused on selective traditions of political principles or 'ideals' of governance. In addition to describing the cultural assumptions expressed in the text macrostructure, analysis can describe particular epistemological directives and attitudes towards the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. In this study, this inclusion of epistemology was precisely because of it being expressed in the textual macrostructure and has the ideological effect of instilling a certain preference in the manner in which one approaches knowledge. Thus, critical discourse analysis can document how the world is portrayed as in Qur'anic epistemology and how political actions are represented, sanctioned and critiqued in the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and Rashidun era.

Motivation for this book

The manner in which contemporary society chooses to interact with the 'Other' will be shaped by the outcome of an edgy struggle between advocates

of a 'Clash' or 'Dialogue' of civilizations. The champions of 'dialogue' aim at ending notions of exclusivity, an 'us and them' mentality, and the singular, uncompromising possession of 'Truth'. By acknowledging diversity in society as a blessing, not an aberration, a healthy mindset develops, which aims to work together under mutually agreed frameworks. Actually, the fate of our modern world rests in a 'balance of culture', a harmony among the different peoples, neither suffocating dissent nor encouraging absolute relativism.²⁷ And this becomes increasingly important as the 'world is moving toward a civilizational paradigm' and our attitudes toward the 'other' will affect the very fabric of the coming era.²⁸

Therefore, in recognition of that thinking, a new platform for a *Dialogue of Civilizations* offers an alternative to a fearful, violent and exclusivist world order.²⁹ Reputable international personalities like the late Vaclav Havel, the former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, the late Nelson Mandela, Prince Charles of Great Britain, and Hamza Yusuf, Tariq Ramadan, Sayyid Syeed and Archbishop Desmond Tutu have been pushing, in their own ways, for precisely this kind of dialogue. Clearly, for people of good will the idea of dialogue lies at the heart of the human condition with the need to reach out in our shared space. For Muslims, the concept of dialogue is 'foundational' in Muslim 'sources of legitimacy'. In the *Holy Qur'an*, God mentions that He 'created the different nations and tribes so that they may know one another'.³⁰ Also, it is mentioned in the *Qur'an* that 'among His signs is the creation of the heavens and earth and the differences of your languages and colours'.³¹ Of course, 'signs' are meant to remind us of His Magnificence and Majesty, not turn us scornfully away. In this book, the analysis aims to recognize that attitude towards diversity as wholeheartedly supported by the authentic 'sources of legitimacy' in Islam.

In its place, there are those who insist that a 'clash' between civilizations is inevitable and proffer a caricatured image of Islam as their justification. It is here that the ostensible conflict between 'Islam' and the 'West' is presented as a continuation of a historically threatening Islamic civilization.³² Yet this menacing depiction that paints Muslims as the monolithic 'Other' and the exact opposite of 'us' is unsophisticated. Huntington, in his contentious literary work *The Clash of Civilizations*, encourages a renewal of the derogatory 'other'. His hypothesis is that 'civilizational identity' will provide the impetus for conflicts in the contemporary world. Among several civilizations, 'Islam and the West' receives the lion's share of his attention. Unfortunately, simplification of enormous entities such as 'Islam' and 'the West' are brazenly utilized without much regard for thoughtful analysis. Certainly, he does not have 'much time to spare for internal dynamics and the plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagoguery and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization'.³³ Similarly, he tries to make 'civilizations' and 'identities' into sealed-off, shutdown, and impermeable

entities that have been purged of the countless currents and counter-currents that animate human history. These historical currents contain imperial conquests as well as exchange. Hence, it may be convenient to ignore factors that promote dialogue between civilizations, but it is not rigorous scholarship to do so. Labels like 'Islam' and 'the West' are often misleading and this shabby form of compartmentalization 'doesn't make the supposed entities easier to see; rather, it speaks to how much simpler it is to make bellicose statements for the purpose of mobilizing collective passions than to reflect, examine, and sort out what it is we are dealing with in reality; the interconnectedness of innumerable lives, "ours" as well as "theirs"'.³⁴

By craftily calling for the United States and European countries to 'achieve greater political, economic, and military integration ... encourage "Westernisation" of Latin America ... restrain development of the conventional and unconventional military power of Islamic and Sinic countries ... and maintain Western technological and military superiority over other civilizations,' Huntington's formula is a recipe for civilizational collision.³⁵ Regrettably, the means employed to 'restrain development' and 'maintain superiority' have been surreptitiously swept under the rug. To be exact, while claiming to prevent global war, his policy suggestions create the world that he ostensibly seeks to save humanity from. A modus operandi that presupposes human interaction to be innately confrontational legitimizes 'might is right' and only encourages others to follow suit.

Sadly, the idea of 'dialogue' was struck a deadly blow on September 11, when four hijacked airplanes killed thousands of innocent people. Among the smouldering rubble and smoking ruins lay buried the belief in dialogue. Emotions ran too high for rational thought, with belligerent posturing and threats abounding. An event of such monumental political significance, that in and of itself has been used to justify a near complete paradigm shift in the manner of both domestic and international relations. The war on terror, or of terror, had begun and it was time for the US to strike back. On that extraordinary day, 'stocks tumbled, the Stock Exchange closed, all flights were suspended, emergency was declared in several states, and false alarms sent people scurrying for their lives'.³⁶ The media further heightened the sense of urgency, panic and hysteria. Anthrax cases, a fire in the subway, and even a tremor in California were instinctively blamed on 'terrorists'. The news and commentaries that followed were broadcast under the headings of 'America under Attack' and 'Why do they hate us?'

The unprecedented carnage and mayhem led to a declaration of war and in early October the bombing of Afghanistan began. 'In this case it was a totally asymmetrical war in the most profound ways possible: the two different societies, one highly industrialized and world-dominating, the other still pre-industrial, impoverished, and tribal spoke different languages and lived in different cultures'.³⁷ The only thing in common between the two was the mutual incomprehension with which they viewed each other. A clash between 'arrogance' and 'ignorance' had begun. Furthermore, the idea of Islam as an enemy was gaining ground, as indicated by fear-mongering and racist comments made by Armageddon proponents such as Franklin Graham.³⁸ Of course, no

one bothered to understand that the hijackers had nothing to do with Islamic theology, which postulates that taking one life is as though slaying all of humanity.³⁹ Few, also, recognized the humiliation and on-going terror in much of the Muslim world from the decades of emotional and physical violence it had been subjected to. Consequently, the idea of Islam set on a collision course with America was triumphant over the notions of global peace and dialogue.

The prospect of a harmonious relationship between Islam and 'the West' looks uncertain, perhaps pessimistic. The relationship is further complicated with patronizing media assaults reinforcing the stereotype of the pejorative 'other' and energises Islamophobia. This archaic paradigm of thought is representative of a colonial mindset that subjugates and furthers self-worth on the basis of that subjugation. It is this particular mindset that is pushing forward the idea of collision, which should be opposed. And only with compassionate comprehension of other civilizations, through the development of a scholarship of inclusion, can we resolve some of the world's most pressing issues. The common problems – which negatively affect all, irrespective of race, nationality or religion – in a shrinking world need to be jointly identified to strengthen the idea of dialogue. The growing gap between the rich and poor throughout the world, the scourge of drugs, breakdown of the family, youth violence and skyrocketing crime, racial prejudices, poverty, a growing sense of anarchy, the depletion of our natural resources and other ecological concerns, and the sexual debasement of women and children are global issues that should encourage enlightened discourse. 'These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give some momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis'.⁴⁰

Certainly, the tremendous interdependence of our era, hitherto unfamiliar, underlines the importance of successfully crossing cultural barriers in a manner that nurtures understanding and togetherness in the human diaspora. The rapid coming together of the world poses risks as well as opportunities. The result of globalization rests with the honest pursuit of equity, fairness and even-handedness of peoples in and between nations. Also, the ideal of unity through diversity – multiculturalism – attempts to respond to this challenge through a process of inclusion. There can be little use for dialogue without understanding. This book, thus, hopes to further a dialogue of civilizations by articulating a significant internal challenge confronting Muslim societies. Obviously, reducing a sophisticated civilization to simple rituals encourages simple solutions: reaching for weapons.⁴¹ We, as humans, are all swimming in interdependent waters, and this has never been so obvious as it is today in our global village.

Organization of this book

This study is organized into nine chapters. Chapter 2 is a conceptual inquiry into political culture – a literature review. It reviews major concepts in the

field of political culture and describes how people articulate and interpret them. That includes the definition, origins and development of political culture, leading to isolating the 'gap' in political culture research. Chapter 3 deals with a Qur'anic account of epistemology and establishes the groundwork from which to define the 'gap' in political culture research for understanding it in Muslim polities. Chapter 4, specifically, defines that gap by extracting political principles from the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and Rashidun era. Then Chapter 5 takes those principles and uses them as building blocks to describe a corresponding political order, which focuses on the principle of coexistence. Chapter 6 deals with the contextual level of analysis, namely Pakistan. It focuses on the relationship between religion and society, culminating in the political movement for Pakistan. Furthermore, it details the growth and development of three opposing ideological trends in Muslim polities: the traditionalist, secularist and revivalist. This chapter applies the insights learned theoretically to the practical situation in Pakistan. Chapter 7 gives a history of Pakistani political culture after the 1947 partition of the British Empire in South Asia. It follows the development of the current constitution from its roots in the newly formed country. Chapter 8 discusses the relationship between civilian and military rulers in Pakistan and assesses the manner in which each interacts with the 'foundational' political thoughts, ideals and values emanating from the 'sources of legitimacy' in Islam. Chapter 9 discusses major events that have transpired in Pakistan and possible ways forward. Chapter 10, the conclusion, summarizes the findings of this study and explores their theoretical implications and utility.

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- 29 President Muhammad Khatami of Iran, in his text to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, on 24 September 1998, advocated a 'Dialogue of Civilizations'.
- 30 Qur'an. Chapter Yusuf, Verse 13.
- 31 Qur'an. Chapter Rum, Verse 22.
- 32 Huntington, Samuel *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking the New World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) p. 19.
- 33 Said, Edward. 'The Clash of Arrogance', a feature story in *The Nation*. 22 October 2001, p. 23.
- 34 Ibid., p. 23.
- 35 Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*, p. 312.
- 36 Ahmed, Akbar. 'Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilizations and the Dilemmas of Islam and the West Today', in *Middle East Journal*, Volume 56 – No.1. Winter 2002, 22.
- 37 Ibid., 22.
- 38 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2006/10/22/graham.html>.
- 39 Qur'an. Chapter Al-Maida, Verse 32.
- 40 Said, Edward. 'The Clash of Arrogance', a feature story in *The Nation*. 22 October 2001.
- 41 Ahmed, Akbar, 'Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilizations and the Dilemmas of Islam and the West Today', in *Middle East Journal*, 22.

2 Deconstructing political culture

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the ‘serious issues’ involved in understanding the concept of political culture. Thereafter, by selecting a few of those issues for more in-depths analysis, and further evaluating their content, it assesses their implications. By doing so, this chapter reveals a ‘gap’ that exists in political culture research and provides a context from which this analysis will proceed. In other words, this chapter evaluates the importance of political culture, defines it, critiques the manner in which political culture research is undertaken and, thereafter, locates the ‘gap’. Subsequently, it articulates how that ‘gap’ circumvents understanding political culture in Muslim polities. Last, it explains the necessity of using an alternative methodology for Muslim polities by scrutinizing Pakistan. Granted, the scholarly works reviewed contain many differing approaches for understanding political culture per se. And this chapter describes those differing approaches and places it in the context of the theories found in the material overviewed. Of course, there are certain points of convergence and those are highlighted. Still, they are, as will be evident, largely insufficient in offering an effective explanation of political culture in Muslim polities.

The importance of political culture

The concept of political culture is important because in politics knowledge of accurately interpreting events is vital. Knowing the mind, and appreciating the deepest, most intimate values of one another, is truly the first step towards understanding differing thought patterns and behaviour. However, this explicitly implies a comprehension of others on their terms; it means putting aside personal convictions of what is desirable and looking at the world through a different set of lenses.¹ Broadly speaking, this is what any form of ‘cultural analysis’ aspires to apprehend – what it is that a society considers significant. This, then, anchors the conviction that any genuine analysis of political culture must begin by probing culture itself.

Looking closely, Letwin examines the etymological definition of the word ‘culture’ and reveals its literal meaning: ‘handing down’.² In her view, culture

constitutes a conception of *how things should be done*, a manner of understanding and dealing with certain matters, a complicated cluster of criteria and skills. The term 'culture' is, then, understood as a process of socialization that is learned and shared, though its precise notions – how it is learned and the extent to which it is shared – remain matters of contention.³ Nowadays, proponents of an 'emerging world culture' argue that growing cultural similarities are more important than cultural relativity.⁴ Of course, globalization is diminishing distances between peoples. Yet cultural differences, particularly in regard to orientations to political objects in a society, remain important and often distinct. And cultural analyses are effective for understanding those distinctions, inexplicable in scientific or positivist terms. Welch concurs by suggesting that political culture is, at its core, really dealing with 'values' that are operationalized through norms regulating the explicit elements of culture.⁵ It includes beliefs, ideas, images, knowledge of what is considered to be true, and basic propositions regarding what 'ideals' should be aspired to in political life.

Clearly speaking, the building blocks of culture are values, which are normalized into traditions – a practice perpetrated without formal acknowledgement of anyone's authority to set and maintain those standards. 'This is why the personal association of parent-child, teacher-pupil, has been considered essential to the transmission of a tradition'.⁶ In other words, since values and traditions, as constituents of culture, are handed down by teaching and learning, apprenticeship is its essence. This insight holds significant ramifications for understanding political culture since political orientations are also '*handed down*' by a process of enculturation and socialization. However, what specifically are those political orientations that will be 'handed down' and how is apprenticeship actualized? To answer that, one needs to closely investigate a culture along with the currents and crosscurrents that animate its history. It is, precisely, for this reason, that determining what is important to 'hand down' reinforces the importance of political culture.

Culture is a repository of a people's values and traditions, including the political, communicated through a process of apprenticeship. In all, there should be a harmony between the values, traditions and culture of a people, and its education that imparts self-awareness. Of course, throughout history there have been those rare epochal paradigm shifts that alter the values of a people. Still, that rarity involves a competition between the old and the new, in which victory depends on how thoroughly the new paradigm, with its values, addresses the shortcomings in society. For that reason, Letwin critiques Mathew Arnold's book *Culture and Anarchy* for its emphasis on 'tribal unity' as the highest civic achievement in a modern, urban metropolis.⁷ Tribal unity, for Arnold, is represented as an ideal to be 'handed down' or aspired to, due to the sense of togetherness it inculcates. Yet she dismisses that as a romantic illusion, since it ceases to be relevant, as a set of precise commands that gives every member an assigned role, in a contemporary city. In other words, she criticizes Arnold for romanticising a concept of tribal camaraderie without recognizing its absence from the culture meant to sustain it. Tribal customs

are by definition unchanging, with assigned roles, and they could not manifest themselves in today's modern cities in which the structure for designation of responsibilities is different.⁸ Traditions remain coherent not through changelessness but through continuity, which must emanate from something within that particular culture. One could only hope for continuity of a tradition if it is present in the cultural fabric of society, not by simply wishing it so. Hence, the continuity of tradition is dependent on the teaching skills of the 'master' who recognizes the embeddedness of certain values, but does not require mere imitations of his performance or style. Every pupil must make something new of what he learns, for a tradition lives through a stream of individual interpretations and reinvention of what has gone before.⁹ Whether invented tradition or rigid imitation, both, far from maintaining tradition, kill it.

The process of continuity that permits political orientations to be handed down and effectively reinvented from generation to generation needs to be substantiated from within a culture. If this process of reinvention and reimplementation of values and tradition is acceptable to the populace at large, then, the result will be widespread legitimacy. Here Letwin cites Palladian architecture: 'it is said that Palladio's buildings are the perfect embodiment of what is called the classic tradition'. Undoubtedly, they contain direct echoes of ancient buildings, but in fact those 'echoes are fairly superficial and what is much more important is a certain sense of order, a certain relationship of parts among themselves and to the whole'.¹⁰ Of course, Palladio learned a classical theory of proportion through his studies of Trissino, and he acquired the architectural vocabulary of the ancients through making pedantic drawings.¹¹ However, she attributes Palladio's expertise to his studies and reformulation of other architects. 'Palladio read Alvise Cornaro ... the Bolognese theorist, Sebastino Serlio ... and great Italian designers like Brunelleschi and Michelangelo, but also from the Byzantine fantasy and Venetian lightness'.¹² What this implies is that Palladio absorbed information from many diverse sources and then produced buildings that look as if they had grown out of the ground on which they stand. Explaining, Letwin insists that though there is 'good reason to describe Palladio as classical, he was not classical in the same way as Bramante, Sangallo, Sansovino, or Raphael. He had created a style of his own, the Palladian building'.¹³ And so it is with political culture; it grows by seeking continuity with established traditions and deep-seated societal values in order to seem as if it 'grows out of the ground on which it is meant to stand'. Of course, this is not merely to mirror what has transpired, or ignore influence, but to present an alternative that is at once relevant, in that it is connected to tradition, and contextual. Certainly, institutions transferred from outside, without precedent in the society that it means to perform, will find difficulty in acceptance, thereby causing instability.

The process of continuity, substantiated on local values, and progressively moved forward by apprenticeship, requires both deference and individuality. Letwin states that it is a 'false understanding of individuality that had led to the disdain of deference and apprenticeship that produces the horrible confidence of

the parvenu and has made the call for organic unity beguiling to cultured people'.¹⁴ In other words, every apprentice must start by imitating or heeding his master in the fashion of a disciple, yet will see such a relationship as a prelude to another sort of relationship and another sort of learning and teaching that accepts personal initiative in knowledge reconstruction. Blind adherence to custom stifles inventiveness; it certainly cannot tolerate it. If societies are expected to mature, live and change in line with cherished values, then the individuals collectively comprising a society must permit new applications and consider contextual nuances. The failure to do so is bound to kill tradition by reducing it to custom, or by provoking rebellion among those who rightly value their independence.

In essence, the importance of political culture is that it ultimately deals with values, which shapes the direction of political life. Examining it, though, raises the following critical questions: How do we decipher what those values are in a given polity? Indeed, even if we can convincingly reveal those values, what is the process by which they are passed down from generation to generation, namely apprenticeship? By what standard does reinvention occur without becoming illegitimate? These and many other questions are important; however, prior to resolving them this study will discuss the exceptional difficulties in defining political culture.

Defining political culture

Few concepts have bedevilled description as much as 'political culture'. An increasingly trendy and illusory designation, it obscures far more than it illuminates. Perplexing and thorny, it has become quite widespread 'among journalists, television commentators, policy analysts, governmental officials, peoples of all walks of life, and, in its most worrying development, to advertising copywriters'.¹⁵ Of course, due to its breadth, the idea of political culture is attractive, often serving the purpose of the final word. And, for 'political scientists, historians, and pundits, like the early anthropological idea of culture itself, it threatens to absorb everything in its vicinity'.¹⁶ For that reason, though, it has sometimes been avoided because of the danger of tautology: '*petition principii*: the thing that has to be explained is used itself as the main explaining factor'.¹⁷ Other objections to the term 'political culture' include it being used in too fixed a way due to its reliance on consensus in society. As if all society would have accepted the values and rules of a singular political culture. Still, notwithstanding its widespread use, we don't really understand this term; it has become a convenient shorthand for a variety of factors embedded within it, and is frequently misrepresented, leading to misconceptions about how to understand it. Commonly, pertinent questions of usage and intent are ignored, and it is assumed that people from different cultures think and act the same way, or are motivated by similar goals.

First, a description of 'political culture', with its value propensity, group formation and impact on the political environment, was Ibn Khaldun's

conceptualization.¹⁸ But it was J.G. Herder's eighteenth-century insight that coined the term and brought it into the accounts of modern academic consciousness.¹⁹ It was, however, not until Gabriel Almond described it 'as the particular pattern of orientations to political action' wherein 'every political system is embedded' that it became recognized.²⁰ Since then, scholars have continued to define political culture in a multiplicity of ways. Macridis, for instance, argues that it is 'commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules'.²¹ Similarly, Kim described it as orientations toward national political institutions, including values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes about how a government ought to conduct itself.²² For Pye, the indicators of a nation's political culture include its political scope, how the ends and means in politics are related, standards for the evaluation of political action, and what values are salient for political action.²³ Kavanaugh, comparably, stresses that political culture has much to do with orientations that arise, in a particular sense, from a subculture, influenced by general culture.²⁴ As is evident, the multiplicities in definitions of political culture are not necessarily in disagreement, even while focusing on different social aspects of its impact. However, this does inform us that its definition is largely shaped by the context under investigation. Clearly, the aspects that define political culture, in any context, are changing phenomena and that partially explains the differing definitions of the term. This, conversely, points to serious drawbacks in attempting to define it – namely, methodology and usage.

For Rosenbaum, the multiplicity of definitions of political culture, although insightful, led to the necessity of describing the methodologies to study it. He suggests there are, essentially, two major approaches: first, the 'individual-centric' approach, with a strongly psychological basis that entails all the important ways in which a person is subjectively orientated toward the essential elements in his political system; and second, a 'system-level' approach that refers to the collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system.²⁵ Here, he is interested in the manner in which citizens, individually or collectively, evaluate their political institutions and officials. To say, for instance, that a nation's political culture is largely cohesive implies that most people within the system have similar, or like-minded, political culture orientations, which are agreeable to the political institutions within which they live. Hence, when political culture is discussed, it usually refers to these mass political orientations across the whole political system.

Rosenbaum, suitably, recognizes that divergent methodologies influence political culture definitions. Yet there is, still, a broad consensus that political culture denotes the emotional and attitudinal environment within which a political system operates. Be it his individual or system-centric approach, political culture, to put it plainly, is the underlying value-based, psychological climate in which politics takes place. The tendency, then, by political scientists, is to emphasize cultural and/or structural factors when trying to define it and explain the nature and performance of political systems. Parsons, who believes in an inherent interconnectedness in societies' social systems, both

cultural and structural, takes this standpoint.²⁶ Undoubtedly, a rich explanation of political phenomena will draw on both cultural and structural factors, but will primarily be concerned with orientations toward political objects that emanate from their values. Orientations, here, means predispositions to political action; they are determined by religion, traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, myths, emotions, and symbols. Wilson breaks down these orientations into their constituent parts as follows: 'thoughts – knowledge and awareness of the political system; influence – emotional disposition to the political system; and assessment – judgment about the system'.²⁷ Political objects, or institutions, also need explanation. That would include the functioning of the executive, judiciary and legislative processes, political parties, pressure groups, and the individual's view of himself as a political actor, as well as his views of other citizens. Political culture, then, may be seen as the overall distribution of citizens' orientations to political objects. Thereafter, we are encouraged to think in terms of what kind of orientations are held by people toward political objects. Herein is the most significant challenge: how to accurately describe those orientations towards political objects, and, thereafter, describe the political culture of a given polity?

Here, let's examine Almond and Verba's renowned book, *The Civic Culture*, which uses a definition of political culture associated with democracy.²⁸ For them, a 'civic culture' includes a dualistic orientation to political authority – a balance of directive and acquiescent, participant and passive, attitudes. It is this mixed political culture, taken as 'ideal', which allows elites the freedom to take decisions that can be countered by participant orientations. Consequently, this makes the elites sensitive to popular preferences. The problem, however, is that this definition of political culture justifies a particular type of orientation, or 'civic culture', that presupposes a close affinity to West European/North American liberal democratic political traditions.²⁹ And, by doing so, it does not assist us in deciphering a given country's political culture, only how far along it is in relation to the democratic standard set.

Admittedly, Almond and Verba have cleverly drawn on the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of attitudes about political objects to develop their typology of political cultures: participant, subject and parochial.³⁰ Where orientations are positive to all the objects, they articulate a 'participant' political culture. If citizens assume a passive or obedient relationship to the system, perceiving themselves as hardly affecting the political apparatus, though being affected by it, the political culture is 'subject'. Where the individual hardly relates to the political system and has only a dim awareness and knowledge of it, they classify the political culture as 'parochial'.

To explain further, a 'parochial' political culture is pre-political in nature. Individuals belonging to this typology are characterized as being apolitical or insular in attitude. For instance, tribal societies often reflect a parochial type of political culture. Inhabitants of tribal societies commonly manifest a distinct inability to relate to the relevance of societal structures, authority sources, and polities beyond their immediate family or tribe.³¹ Individuals in parochial

polities are often unaware of – and also unconcerned about – matters that do not pertain to their immediate kinship group.

Second, the 'subject' political culture is distinct from the parochial type apropos the peoples' awareness of the sociopolitical setting that exists beyond their immediate familial ties and kinship affiliations. Being cognizant of a broader political setting, inhabitants of a subject political culture reasonably comprehend the manner in which the political structures affect them, and may even accept the legitimacy of these structures. However, the individual's role is principally a passive one, and is confined primarily to obeying decisions made by political leaders.

Third, the 'participant' political culture type provides for an explicit and distinct political role for the individual member. In fact, input from the masses is actively promoted. The populace is accorded a high-profile status and is considered vital for the successful maintenance, management and stability of the polity. A participant political culture, in other words, operates on the premise that individuals should be masters of their own destiny and should have a direct hand in shaping this destiny.³² This type of political culture allows for disgruntled citizenry to express discontent within the confines of the political environment. It intends to manage conflict within its political apparatus and to avoid the only recourse to dissent being violence.

The democratic culture, as suggested by Almond and Verba, is a mixture of parochial, subject and participatory types.³³ It is suggested that excessive amounts of participatory, parochial or subject mentality in the culture of a given polity would be detrimental to the sustenance of democracy. The concept of 'mixed nature' being the magic of democracy is reflected in the idea that democratic cultures are pre-eminently 'allegiant' and participatory in nature.³⁴ To explain, the allegiant component of a democratic culture serves to promote a general sense of identification with, and loyalty toward, the political system. It generates a sentiment of popular trust and a willingness to permit those in positions of political authority to administer the affairs of state and to decide on issues, which have ramifications for the populace at large. However, in keeping with their premise that a balance between political culture typologies is imperative to sustain democracy, allegiance does not translate into mass complacency in political authority. It coexists with the participatory dimension of democratic culture, thus ensuring political accountability and public control of those in positions of power and authority.

Welch, while not critiquing Almond and Verba's definition of political culture typologies, admonishes them for their support for the modernization theory of political development and their confusion of comparative and sociological political culture research.³⁵ By associating political culture with democracy and liberal values they fail to teach us how to understand it. Similarly, Brands agrees that a liberal/democratic definition of political culture had become 'in vogue' in Europe, and was used to describe successful political development. Analysis on political culture, then, always used those values as a benchmark. Further explaining, he critiques European attitudes towards political culture

as following a threefold developmental pattern: 'First, the era of natural classification and hierarchy in societies – 'all anchor'; second, the period after World War II: paradigm of universal development – 'all sail'; third, our contemporary period, both 'sail and anchor'.³⁶ In other words, for the achievement of a prosperous, democratic polity, it reads: (a) we can, you can't; (b) we all can; (c) or, lastly, some might and others might not.

To explain, Brands definition of political culture and development in the pre-World War II period – 'all anchor' – reveals descriptive tendencies that rely on static social characteristics. One needs to 'simply glance at a pre-war encyclopaedia to notice how strong the immutability of social characteristics was still considered to be'.³⁷ At that time, notions of active and passive races were pervasive: 'races that were making history and those who were only considered to be objects for the others; people being by innate quality fit for self-government and those who needed to be ruled by others'.³⁸ Interestingly, those that ruled were always ethnic Europeans and this tendency to promote their view of political culture and development is a vital cultural reality pre World War II.

By compiling a collection of statements by European scholars and politicians during the 'inter-bellum', it is easy to discern this thinking among leading intellectuals. Commenting on this, Brands argues that one only has to read Christopher Thorne's *Allies of a Kind*, which details 'American and British cooperation during the war against Japan and reveals the deeply ingrained racist ideas manifested on both sides of the Atlantic'.³⁹ Gunnar Myrdal and Sissela Bok's book *The American Dilemma* deals with the same issues, though in an American context.⁴⁰ So pervasive were these ideas that Hegel proposed 'the entire nature of the Negro race is such as to preclude the existence of any ... political constitution'.⁴¹ These racist ideas flourished during the 'interwar years'.⁴² The power structure in the world and in Western society did not encourage giving up the idea of a 'natural hierarchy' of peoples and of their corresponding political culture.⁴³ That would, though, soon change with the transformation of European intellectual society following the destruction of Nazi Germany.

The effective destruction of Nazism, and their ideas of racial superiority, led to Brands' second classification of political culture and development, namely '*all sail*'. 'Never before had ideas about the inequality of peoples, races, individuals been as strongly discredited as by the experiences of the Third Reich ... the Nazis being so strongly in favour of ideas of natural inequality, most strongly helped the revolution of equality ...'⁴⁴ Added to this, the discrediting of the natural division of labour and a favourable climate of change was soon to sweep political fields. Resultantly, this transformation came with an enthusiastic naiveté concerning optimistic universal development; all could prosper, albeit through embracing liberal values and democracy.

Economic development and political self-determination became not only political goals, morally substantiated through United Nations declarations, but also the paradigm the social sciences worked with. Commonplace theories

of natural impediments to development, including climate, geopolitical situation and demography, were swept aside by the optimism of universal development heralded by modernization theories.⁴⁵ Of course, those theories did not give much attention to the diverging values, traditions and culture of people. In fact, Brands adds that while economic development was considered essential for 'political modernization and modernization of values ... these theories were implicitly and explicitly strongly "*Americano-centric*"; they referred to the development of, broadly speaking, American society or aspects thereof'.⁴⁶ Critics did warn, however, against the doctrine of developmental universalism – the belief that each new nation-state deserves and can achieve a developed economy and a working democracy with a participatory political culture. Those warnings, though, went unheeded because vested interests, both economical and ideological, were too strong.

Now, in the final and present stage, the past counts again and the world is becoming less new than many theorists expected, or even wanted. Those who believe in racial hierarchy, and others who believe in the universality of liberal democracy, persist. Yet what is argued for by this study is the need for an alternative, rather than a one-size-fits-all, theory of political culture and effective governance. Many historical elements that were previously ignored are now recognized as critical in our 'post-industrial', 'post-materialistic', 'post-humanistic' and postmodern society. A considerable reorientation of political ideas is taking place, which incorporates indigenous attitudes to knowledge. That appreciation recognizes the diversity of political culture definitions, shifting by methodology and usage. Hence, our aim here is to effectively understand the dynamics of political culture in Muslim polities, citing Pakistan. The following section will shed light on how this study proceeds to accomplish that.

Political culture research

Political culture research is a 'scholarly jungle, tangled and cacophonous' and can only loosely be divided into neat, mutually exclusive categories.⁴⁷ Often, considerable overlapping occurs and it has more to do with what is being studied than what it is itself. Now this may seem confusing, since undertaking political culture research reveals that definitions shift according to the objectives of inquiry. Yet those shifting definitions permit the astute scholar to decipher the motivation for political culture research and recognize the importance of its environment. In other words, it accounts for and explains particular orientations to political objects in society.

To begin with, Welch describes political culture research as entailing two methodologies: the behavioural and the interpretivist.⁴⁸ This study, instead, characterizes them based on the manner in which they are used, namely 'hegemony' and 'clash'. Hegemony occurs in a behavioural, quantitative research method that encourages positivism and universality of values. It may give way to either comparative or sociological studies, or a combination of

the two. Conversely, ‘clash’ occurs as a result of a culturally relative, qualitative research method that gives way to interpretivism and idealist tendencies. Both methods are inadequate to accurately define political culture in a given context. Consequently, Welch argues for the ‘phenomenological’ method, which construes meaning as that described by participants themselves. Below, Figure 2.1 reveals the dominant trends of political culture research.

Hegemony

The ‘hegemonic’ tendency in political culture research first found fertile soil in the ‘legal-institutional’ approach, which ‘focused on the importance of political institutions, the constitution, the judiciary ... and the interaction between these and the masses’.⁴⁹ This approach was excessively narrow, restricting its attention to formal rules and institutions and overlooking informal behaviour.⁵⁰ Its most striking inadequacies were its inability to account for and incorporate indigenous perceptions and values toward understanding political structures. In other words, it focused on institutions as opposed to peoples’ engagement with them. By doing so, it neglected the struggle of various classes in society with one another and with the political system. These deficiencies led to the development of ‘behaviouralism’ in political culture research.

Behaviouralism was only a slight improvement on the legal-institutional approach. It did, however, expand political culture research to include informal elite behaviour, voter behaviour and, finally, mass attitudes and conduct beyond the space of electoral participation. Yet this approach, too, is fraught with ambiguity since it adopts a positivist outlook on political culture. It purports to show the ‘development of a science of the political process’ and ruses as a ‘major step forward for the naturalization of political science as a science ... a




Figure 2.1 Graphic representation of the two dominant trends of political culture research and their trajectories

probabilistic theory of politics'.⁵¹ Essentially, this method joins a scientific study of politics with a methodology that appears to make that aspiration achievable, quantitative survey methodology.⁵² In other words, it is characterized by the scientific aspiration of value-neutrality, expressed in survey methodology, with a concomitant subjective or psychological definition of political culture.⁵³ Now, this expansionist tendency and claim for value-neutrality is misleading since it imposes meaning on its objects of study. To impose meaning, naturally, restricts the explanatory validity of the concept of political culture, whether it is for comparative or sociological ends. This, thereby, warrants the accusation that behaviouralism is used to justify particular patterns of political orientation while disregarding others. That, in turn, leads to its description as hegemonic.

To further explain, the comparative use of political culture research is dedicated to the relationship between modernity and the modernization theory of political development; a defence of democratic forms of political institutions and behaviour.⁵⁴ By subscribing to certain set values, asserted as universal, and the attitude that 'if it's good for me, it's good for you', it is hegemonic. Of course, the comparative use of political culture aims to identify why certain nations are more stable and susceptible to democracy than others. However, it does so poorly by suggesting, simply put, that most countries are not literate enough to share 'Western' values and, until they do, they will not progress. The discrepancy between where a people are and the modern, democratic ideal that they are meant to be at is explained as a result of an intriguing idea, namely 'cultural lag'.

The idea of 'cultural lag', invented by William Ogburn, was intended to describe a situation 'when one of two parts of culture which are correlated changes before or in greater degree than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts that existed previously'.⁵⁵ It was meant to describe internal sociological disproportionality within a culture. But Almond and Pye used it to justify the modernization theory of development and rationalize their understanding of a stable political society, founded on a certain political culture. This led to Welch's contention that 'political culture research, then, in its comparative use has been invoked precisely to save modernization theory from accusations of illegitimate teleology. Cultural lag is the means by which the rescue is attempted'.⁵⁶

Therefore, the comparative use of political culture research is not simply manipulative when comparing nations, but precisely so by its manner of explaining differences in national political outcomes and structures. Still, the difference between the comparative and the sociological is not only one of methodology or definition. It is a distinction that is drawn clearly at a given level of putative explanation, or for given units of comparison.⁵⁷ For instance, let's compare various nations and their political cultures with a view to explaining divergent political outcomes. Clearly, this is a comparative use of political culture. The problem arises when it is used to defend certain assumptions about development that are, blatantly, sociological. Under

these conditions, a behavioural, comparative use of political culture becomes hegemonic.

Alternatively, a sociological approach to understanding political culture focuses on examining the relationship of variables in it, such as interpersonal trust and group-forming propensity. Rosenbaum's three categories of sociological uses of political culture research include 'orientations to governmental structures, orientations toward others in the political system, and orientations to one's own political activity'.⁵⁸ Here, once again, we are dealing with values that externalize in the form of orientations. Continuing, he defines 'rules of the game, as an individual's conception of what should be followed in civic life; which may or may not be consistent with prevailing law and other norms supposed to govern civic conduct'.⁵⁹ Now, the question for us remains as to the best method to extract those 'rules of the game'? And what happens when prevailing law is contrary to those rules?

With the inclusion of sociology in political culture research, we are better equipped to understand those rules of the game. By doing so, we arrive at a new explanatory theory in which individuals, not nations, are the units of comparison. And, by focusing on the individual, the ever-important values and 'rules of the game' are better manifest. However, there are two drawbacks. First, even though it claims to assess the relationships among complementing and conflicting forces in a nation-state rather than between them, it is repeatedly used to substantiate democratic values. Values that are, often, contrary to the culture studied. This, then, leads to faulty analyses and a lack of legitimacy. Moreover, advancing contrary ideals may, too, be hegemonic since it implies a derogatory attitude toward prevailing indigenous attitudes. Second, sociological sophistication renders untenable the generalizations that are necessary for cross-national comparisons. This is, especially, true when considering intra-national aspects such as gender, education levels, trust-formation, values and beliefs.

Clash

The 'clash' tendency in political culture research is largely based on embracing 'cultural relativity' and recognizing the global diversity of political values.⁶⁰ Moreover, it has confidence in qualitative research methodology to ascertain those values, giving priority to the thoughts of those under investigation. Granted, appreciating the diversity of orientations to political objects is an improvement, particularly over the behavioural method. Still, those orientations must be explained, and that led to the development of 'interpretivism' in political culture research. However, interpretivism was not without its own challenges and it, too, could stray in either of two directions, the 'idealist' and the 'phenomenological'.

First, interpretivism was a reaction against claims of value-neutrality and universality from the behavioural tradition.⁶¹ It rejected behavioural 'standards of verification' and favoured 'a criterion of plausibility'.⁶² This means it

makes use of tests of plausibility and construes political culture as 'meaning' observed by individual interactions. Herein is the challenge, then, when making any judgement based on observation: the necessity of effectively describing that observation and ascertaining the relevant meaning. For this, Geertz's idea of 'thick description' is noteworthy, which insists behaviour is not usefully described 'objectively', but its meaning has also to be described.⁶³ Likewise, Charles Taylor uses terms such as 'intersubjective' and 'common' meanings to explain the importance of hidden values that, often, are recognizable only in the social life to which they give rise.⁶⁴ Of course, intersubjective meanings do not just facilitate social life, they make it distinctive for society's members. And this often implies different meanings in different cultures. For instance, the meanings of culture, politics and religion differ in Muslim polities and being unable to understand that will affect our observation and judgement. Hence these intersubjective meanings provide the fabric of social life, the criterion of a group being in society.⁶⁵ Only when intersubjective meanings are present is there a possibility for shared attitudes or, for that matter, disagreements, because intersubjective meanings express each society's values. Thus, the defining feature of interpretivism is a conception of political culture as the meaning of political life for the political actors themselves.

Now, it is fine to recognize the importance of those deep-seated meanings in a polity, and it's quite another thing to understand it. There is strong resistance of 'intersubjective' meanings to empirical observation, or quantitative survey methodology, since these methods only expose common attitudes, not necessarily their meaning. Taylor illustrates the resistance of intersubjective and common meanings to empirical investigation by citing the example of children in missionary schools who are taught the values and beliefs of a society alien to them.⁶⁶ While one may survey the ideals that are taught, interpreting social practice as a whole can only access the individual expression of those ideals through each child. Also, even if we may understand what the children are being taught, and how they behave, we are still unable to understand the unique embrace of that ideal and what it really means, individually, to each child.

This inability to effectively grasp meaning led to the criticism of the interpretivist political culture research. Specifically, when the meaning for the analyst took precedence over meaning for the participants, it was labelled 'idealist'. This is so, since it was idealistically assumed that awareness of participant meanings was sufficient. That deficiency, and its tendency to distract attention from concrete evidence to project onto the subjects of study the description made by the analyst, are its major weaknesses. Take, for instance, the example of a wink. While a wink may be described in terms of certain bodily movements, an adequate description would involve specifying whether the movements were voluntary, what their intention was, and what social conventions and cues governed their interpretation by an audience.⁶⁷ Only a description that included all those factors would effectively recognize what was going on. In other words, behaviour, while it can be described in terms of its objective manifestations, cannot usefully be so described.

Furthermore, Geertz's infamous rendition of a Balinese cockfight elaborates on the methods involved in ascertaining a 'thick description'. He suggests that in cultural analysis 'one is faced with a problem not in social mechanics but in social semantics' and that it is necessary to observe behaviour to understand it.⁶⁸ But apart from the justification already offered for thick description – that it assists the ethnographer in self-orientation – a further justification is offered by Geertz regarding the cockfight and in the self-understanding of the Balinese. 'Its function, if you want to call it that, is interpretative: it is a Balinese reading of Balinese experience, a story that tells themselves about themselves ... attending cockfights and participating in them is, for the Balinese, a kind of sentimental education'.⁶⁹ Here is where the criticism of the 'idealist' approach ensues, by encroachment on the sensibilities of the participants by the ethnographer. Geertz has, inadvertently, defined the participants' understanding for them. The problem, then, is 'the projection by the ethnographer of the cultural interpretation onto the subjects: the conflation of what makes the situation intelligible for the ethnographer with what makes it intelligible to the participants'.⁷⁰ Commenting on this, Jonathan Lieberman asserts that 'it is one thing to claim that devotees of the cockfight attribute deep significance to it because it serves as an opportunity to express and dramatize their individual status and rivalries; it is another to describe the cockfight by the Balinese as a "commentary" on the social order and organization that makes these conflicts possible'.⁷¹ This tendency to impose meaning is what led to the design of a phenomenological approach for understanding political culture.

Phenomenology

Countering the 'idealist' tendency to unwittingly impose meaning on the participants, Welch argues for the phenomenological method of political culture research. In that approach, for interpretation to be a success, it must account for the interpretative practices of the participants themselves. That, too, in turn is related to grasping the existing meaning in their social environment. Therefore, phenomenology anchors interpretivism to concrete social reality, while at the same time arguing that such a reality is a construct needing to be continually reproduced. By doing this, it avoids both a hegemonic and clash usage of political culture research.

Originally founded by Edmund Husserl, phenomenology explains the process by which the immediate elements of perceptual experience are understood as distinct objects, distances and movements.⁷² It is therefore a philosophy of the attribution of meaning and form to experience, considered as a natural human response to experience.⁷³ Then, Alfred Schutz incorporated it into a study of the social world.⁷⁴ Later, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann continued along that framework and, eventually, Welch argues for its use in political culture research.⁷⁵

Elaborating on phenomenology in the social world, Luckmann and Berger begin with the assumption that 'man constructs his own nature' and that this

occurs in a twofold manner involving 'stock of knowledge' and 'habitualization'.⁷⁶ First, the 'stock of knowledge' refers to human beings coming into a world of existing meanings or 'formulae'. And he 'uses them, sometimes deliberately and with care, most often spontaneously with ease, but always with the same end in view: to put a construction upon events through which he lives, to adjust themselves within the ongoing course of experience of things'.⁷⁷ Second, habitualization is any action that is repeated frequently, becomes cast and, thereby, is apprehended by its performer as a pattern. Yet, even while both assist in constructing nature, it still must be intelligibly communicated. That occurs through idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints and the idealization of the congruency of the system of relevancies.⁷⁸ All of this leads to the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives and the apprehension of objects and their aspects that are actually known by me and potentially known by you as everyone's knowledge, conceived to be objective and anonymous.⁷⁹

Critically, and what is so important, is the impact of existing meaning or the stock of knowledge in understanding political culture, for it permeates society prior to the advent of the individual, and is not static. Rather, it is in a constant state of dynamism but directly impacts values, traditions and 'what is handed down' – and, thereby, political culture. This existing meaning is what Schutz refers to as the 'stock of knowledge', which Berger and Luckman use, extant in the social environment to which one is born. Similarly, Geertz describes it as the 'significant symbols' rooted in a polity. Rosenbaum, in line with others, notes the importance of understanding the 'core' of a society in order to effectively define its political culture.⁸⁰ Inglehart, too, suggests the construction of meaning, while in a constant state of fluctuation, is premised around certain 'enduring cultural components', present and permeating the metaphysical fabric of society.⁸¹

Now, whether it is defined as 'existing meaning', 'formulae', 'stock of knowledge', 'core' or 'enduring cultural components', they all refer to the same enigma that accounts for national variation in political cultures. Explaining, Inglehart claims that national variations come to the fore when one sets out, for example, to address happiness indicators in society. Inglehart's explanation for variation, thereof, is that 'given societies may have different cultural baselines for normal response to questions on how well one is doing'.⁸² But, as Welch points out, this 'enduring cultural component' is not adequately addressed in his analysis.⁸³

At the concrete level, phenomenology is characterized by an insistence on detailed investigation of the process of the construction of meaning. This includes understanding existing meaning in society, without which accurate observation of the social world is impossible. In other words, the phenomenological approach to political culture research aims to understand the 'formulae', 'significant symbols', 'stock of knowledge', 'core' or 'enduring cultural component' that enables a complete understanding of political culture. This, then, is understood as the 'gap' in political culture research: the failure to adequately research and define that 'enduring cultural component' in

Muslim polities that would allow us to describe its political culture. This, precisely, is what this study describes as the 'foundational' sphere of inquiry.

Conclusion

In this chapter we assessed the importance of political culture, noting that it has much to do with values and their continuity, which makes political life intelligible. Yet that association to values does not prevent there from being considerable complexity in narrowing down a precise definition. This is so, since its definition is contingent upon methodology and usage, which often are used to support the modernization theory of development and a liberal, democratic ethic. That insight then discredits those consequent definitions as unworkable across sociocultural realities. Thereafter, this chapter examined and described those differing methodologies in political culture research, which, revealingly, takes either a 'hegemonic' or 'clash' approach. Both, arguably, are inadequate to accurately comprehend political culture in a Muslim polity; hence, what is required is a phenomenological approach. This approach accounts for indigenous perceptions towards politics and acknowledges the deep-seated, existing meanings to which an individual is born. Those meanings are what impact social values and, eventually, political culture.

Welch suggests that it is incumbent upon political culture theorists 'to show what distinct socialization processes lead to their [political culture] formation. This has seldom been attempted'.⁸⁴ And, that, precisely, is what this study aims to accomplish. It recognizes that human beings come into a world of existing meanings: 'formulae', 'stock of knowledge', 'core', 'significant symbols' or 'enduring cultural components'. Knowing what that amounts to enables us to accurately define political culture. Thus, the distinct socialization processes that lead to variation among national political cultures is located here. And this is the 'gap' in political culture research that this study attempts to decipher in relation to Muslim polities.

Inglehart discusses the notion of 'enduring cultural components' in a given society but avoids a clear and precise analysis of how they are to be extracted.⁸⁵ Others, too, while recognizing the need to learn what the 'core' is, do not provide a clear methodology to understand it. Yet they are hardly blameworthy, since what 'enduring cultural components' or the 'core' is will depend on the society under investigation.

More clearly, the 'gap' in political culture research is defined as the 'enduring cultural component,' the 'ongoing experience of things,' or that hidden, unspoken but understood nuance, the 'stock of knowledge' – or, as this study is defining it, the 'foundational' – that accounts for national variation in political culture. Thus, a human being comes into the world of those existing meanings and makes sense of it. The following chapter, then, while recognizing that, attempts to deconstruct those 'enduring cultural components' to articulate the distinct socialization processes leading to understanding political culture in Muslim polities, to be used in Pakistan.

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Part 1

Foundational sphere of inquiry

3 The theory of knowledge and Qur'anic epistemology¹

Introduction

In the preceding chapter this book recognized the importance of existing meaning, the stock of knowledge, core, or, enduring cultural component in society, that permits a comprehensive definition of political culture. For Muslim polities, we described that as the 'foundational' sphere of inquiry that contains four components – namely, Qur'anic epistemology, Qur'an, Sunnah and the Khulafa Rashidun. In this chapter we begin to define it by analyzing Qur'anic epistemology. By doing so, this study will provide micro foundations/perspectives before macro foundations; thus individual learning comes before the principles of governing; and hence the logical and structural flow.

A comprehension of epistemology – or the theory of knowledge – is essential for understanding how a particular civilization inculcates learning, establishes a premise that governs the justification of belief and, thereby, makes valid knowledge claims.² Relatedly, it enables us to grasp the unique processes of thought development therein, for undoubtedly the assembly of thought patterns is not fortuitous. Actually, to put it plainly, the manner in which we think is a by-product of our socialization and leads to the formation of beliefs that empower us to distinguish between claims of truth and falsehood. That social construction, consequently, mandates what constitutes knowledge for those making assertions. This, in effect, is what epistemology provides: the foundation for a specific worldview – a general '*vision*' that defines how a people understand their own 'self', law, theology, philosophy, art, political culture, or even the entire universe.³ Rahman argues that:

an Islamic worldview does need to be worked out today and that this is an immediate imperative; for unless such a system is attempted, there is little that can be ministered through education. But, here, precisely we come up against the most vicious of all circles of contemporary Islam – that unless necessary and far-reaching adjustments are made in the present system of education, it is not even conceivable that creative minds will arise that will work out the desired systematic interpretation of Islam.⁴

Without restraint, resolving this imperative is crucial – but how to do so?

First, it is important to recognize that many epistemic traditions construct different assumptions towards knowledge acquisition and the justification of belief. In particular, the modern post-Enlightenment occidental epistemic tradition, which today holds considerable sway throughout the world through globalizing of 'intimate and personal aspects' of life, contrasts with Qur'anic epistemology.⁵ It is here, then, where we concentrate, in order to unravel those divergent, deep-seated epistemic assumptions that, later, assist us in understanding political culture. Yet enigmatic questions emerge: What is the significance of those dissimilar assumptions for acquiring knowledge? What are the distinguishing features of modern occidental epistemology? How does it differ from a Qur'anic epistemology? What impact does Qur'anic epistemology have on political values?

To put this in perspective, the development of the modern occidental theory of knowledge is, principally, the unseemly consequence of the eighteenth century 'Age of Enlightenment' in which the aim of achieving true knowledge replaced God with 'Science'.⁶ This new deity, too, had a sole offspring that became the much-acclaimed 'modern' man who recklessly celebrated his newfound idol. Now, in a post-enlightenment occidental world, only 'science' is considered worthy enough to blind. However, a peculiar conundrum arose from this changing of loyalties in that there was an epistemic paradigm shift. What that means is that life was no longer understood the same way, whether it be axiology, ontology or teleology – established meaning had disappeared. Granted, the disappearance of meaning instigated a plethora of creativity to reclaim lost spaces of understanding. However, replacing 'God' resulted in the creeping in of doubt and consumed the hitherto natural order under the instrumentality of reason.⁷ All that had once stood firmly withered away.

Here it is, as it were, that the 'enlightened' and 'modern' man finds himself removing God from His Throne, to seat himself. However, he is confounded by his own clumsy limitations, and thereby denies truth per se. As a result, Taylor's '*malaise of modernity*' begins, leading to the disenchantment of the world, its social relationships and a skeptical approach to knowledge. In that context, it is unsurprising that epistemic studies in the occident would reveal either a bewildering rejection of the attainment of true knowledge or, merely, a plausible acceptance of its potential. The '*instrumentality of reason*' would have it that 'reason' and individual 'self-sufficiency' would allow men to emerge confident from the shackles of their intellectual servitude. Yet that hardly held true, with man increasingly alienating himself from his surroundings. Kant concisely defines the enlightenment as '*man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [Dare to be wise] "Have courage to use your own understanding!"*'⁸ Now, in this intellectual milieu, individualism thrives. Yet with all the euphoria associated with individualism, and

notwithstanding Kant's caution against unbridled disregard for society, narcissism tramples human responsibility to one another to fulfill Nietzsche's nightmare of '*miserable ease*'.⁹ These intellectual challenges continue to perplex contemporary occidental epistemology.

Markedly, Islam's perspective on epistemology began on an entirely different premise and, nowadays, faces an altogether unusual crisis. It started with the Qur'anic *ayah* of 'Read, in the Name of your Lord who has created all that exists'.¹⁰ From that historic moment onwards, revelation was introduced into a world of reason. And the pursuit of knowledge was to be undertaken while being cognizant of God through textual association. As a matter of fact, 'faith and knowledge' became the defining ethos of Islamic civilization.¹¹ This epistemic paradigm would remain intact, largely unchallenged, until the 'Treaty of Westphalia' and the consequent economic, political and cultural ascendancy of Europe.¹² Slowly the epistemic heritage of Islam would come under increasing threat, initially from within by those mesmerized by European pre-eminence. Yet it was to eventually capitulate under the brute force of colonialism. Of course, Muslim society was not alone in facing this imperialist onslaught. Toynbee speaks of 'Western conquest' throughout the world, especially in the political and economic realms.¹³ However, what this imperial conquest did was impose, or attempt to impose, an epistemology on the subject peoples. Said, succinctly, reflects that 'colonialism' continues unabated 'in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological and social practices'.¹⁴ To be precise, this kind of general cultural imperialism is where occidental epistemology encroaches on the Muslim socio-cultural values and develops into a crisis.¹⁵ This makes articulating a Qur'anic epistemology, in the context of this tension, with its impact on values, critical for understanding political culture.

Today, everything from textbooks to television in English largely reinforces an occidental epistemology that clashes with established meaning in Muslim society. Similarly, that imposing vernacular expresses an axiology, teleology and ontology that conveys contrasting conceptions of religion, politics, culture, gender, or even human beings. Elmessiri points out this discrepancy, suggesting it results in dissonance by producing either rejectionists or mindless imitation.¹⁶ This holds particularly true for intellectuals throughout Muslim society, who are socialized in their local epistemic tradition, while institutionalized in a conflicting occidental epistemology. Perhaps this epistemic dissonance is the principal problem in arresting scholarship in Muslim societies. And in order to excel in building science, competitive culture or a progressive civilization their scholarship must be rooted to their own epistemology. The question is, though, how do we begin to understand that epistemology?

Muslims understand the Qur'an as the infallible word of God, in which the origins, acquisition and dissemination of knowledge is made clear.¹⁷ The Qur'an shapes the mindset of those who read and accept it, thereby effecting socialization. It is here, then, that we look to decipher the contours of Qur'anic epistemology. As well, this task will allow us a better appreciation of the development of a wider, more encompassing Islamic epistemology.

Nevertheless, a Qur'anic epistemological account must contain an evaluative dimension, a means to distinguish between what we merely take as knowledge and what real knowledge is. Moreover, it must provide the context within which to pursue this evaluative task. However, this article will not answer all questions concerning Qur'anic epistemology, and definitely will not insist that it is the only epistemology that may be articulated from the Qur'an. It aims only to offer insights, according to Qur'anic textual analysis of the origins, acquisition and dissemination of knowledge.

To begin, this chapter will identify and describe two primary trends in modern occidental epistemology: (a) 'plausibility' – that we might be able to attain true knowledge, if it exists; (b) 'denial' – a skeptical approach that believes we are unable to attain true knowledge, since there is no such thing. Thereafter, this article exposes insights for an alternative Qur'anic epistemology, which begins with the affirmation or certainty of 'God knowing' with the potential for human knowing. In other words, it establishes an optimistic attitude of 'True' knowledge being possible – nevertheless, 'I' may be wrong, though God knows, and the potentiality of certainty is ever-present, even if distinct from my perspective. This, critically, allows us to appreciate the manner in which learning takes place in Muslim society, which thereafter provides a key insight into defining political culture.

Deconstructing occidental epistemology

Post-Enlightenment Europe embarked on a new epistemic journey that resulted in disenchantment with its hitherto natural order. That, consequently, let loose two forces: creativity and chaos. Free from the shackles of blind faith, leaving nothing as sacred, and challenging all established meaning in society, caused creativity to flourish. Yet, by desacralizing establishing meaning, chaos ensued. That disappearance of meaning, then, implanted a 'doubt' in all that was and how it was understood. Taylor mentions that *'once society no longer has a sacred structure, once social arrangements and modes of action are not longer grounded in the order of things or Will of God, they are in a sense up for grabs'*.¹⁸ Yet, interestingly enough, that loss of meaning had the unintended consequence of searching for 'True' knowledge. That, specifically, led to the development of the modern occidental field of epistemology. Of course, how could it not? If neither religious text, nor the guardians of it, controlled understanding, then the field was open to new interpretations.

At that moment, occidental epistemology began to deal with such questions as 'What can I know?' and 'How can I distinguish between those things that I am justified in believing over those things that I am not justified in believing?'¹⁹ Accordingly, two dominant and diverging paths in occidental epistemology began which persist to the present-day: 'we might be able to know the truth' – plausibility – or 'we are unable to know anything' – denial. The 'plausibility' of knowing assesses the way we understand knowledge, its source, its acquisition, and how we make valid knowledge claims. The 'denial' of knowing, or

skepticism, insists that sustained reflection about knowledge will eventually generate a skeptical attitude toward any claims of certainty, that there are 'no absolutes', and that 'all knowledge is relative'. Interestingly, both trends in contemporary occidental epistemology set the tone for learning in Western civilization: the repugnance of certainty.

Plausibility

From one standpoint, modern occidental epistemology follows a logic that we describe as the 'plausibility' of knowing. Because epistemology studies 'knowing', it struggles to comprehend the criteria for distinguishing between 'true' or 'adequate' knowing and 'false' or 'inadequate' knowing. That, then, leads to assessing what methods of justification best achieve the objective of knowing something to be true.²⁰ Now, as ever, epistemologists continue to devise increasingly complicated formulas to understand claims of knowledge. For instance, Audi uses the terms '*intrinsic*' – its value in and of itself – and '*instrumental*' – concerning its value through what it leads to – when contemplating the problematic associated with understanding occidental epistemology.²¹ Alston, on the other hand, uses the terms 'internal' and 'external' methods of justification of belief.²² Yet, regardless of those differences, it still remains only 'plausible' to convincingly know. In other words, we might be able to know the 'truth', but we're not sure how, or, even if, it exists at all. The differences among epistemologists, here, exist only in assessing the value of one model over another; that is, in methods of justification.²³

Simply put, different formulas for 'justification' include the methodology used to understand what is considered truer and may adequately be labeled as 'knowledge'. Audi's methodology for acquiring knowledge employs the following six basic premises: 'perceptual, memorial, introspection, a priori, inductive, and testimony-based' – and much of occidental epistemology deals with the reliability of knowledge from these sources.²⁴ For instance, a belief that the mug is coarse is **perceptual**, arising as it does from touch – tactile perception. My belief that I walked through the streets of Seville on a sunny afternoon is **memorial**, since it is stored in my memory. My belief that I am imagining a rose garden is called **introspection** because it arises from 'looking within' – the etymological meaning of introspection. Consider my belief that if a tiger is larger than a jaguar, and a jaguar is larger than a snow leopard, then a tiger is larger than a snow leopard. A belief like this is called **a priori** – roughly based on what is prior to observational experience. It arises through 'reason' based on an understanding of the physical world, and is thereby dependent on the three basic sources. Collectively, Audi considers these four epistemic sources that lead to a fifth and sixth – **induction** and **testimony**. My belief that a flower will not grow well without water for its roots is called **induction** because it is formed on the basis of generalization from similar experiences with flowers. Lastly, **testimony-based** knowledge arises when I form a belief on the basis of being given information by someone or something I trust that must have

relied on one of the previous basic sources. Taken together, these six methods of acquiring knowledge explain 'how we know' and 'how we distinguish between true and false knowledge'. The trouble is, skeptics argue, that fallible humans use them. Therefore, human fallibility is the fiercest argument that skeptics put forward to deny the existence of true knowledge.²⁵ For instance, a cup may be coarse to the touch, and we may then establish a belief that the mug is, indeed, coarse. However, some defect on the tips of our fingers may falsely give us the sensation of coarseness, when in reality the mug is smooth. Just like that, skeptics put forward countless hypothetical arguments to dispute that 'knowing' is at all possible.

Even though, epistemologists persist undeterred. While acknowledging their fallibility, they still seek 'true' knowledge without committing on whether it is possible. They do so because only human beings are capable of the 'kinds of cognition required to build an airplane ... to write Hamlet or compose a symphony ... how is it that we are able to engage in such sophisticated thought and arrive at the capacious knowledge that we use to direct both our everyday activities and our momentous achievements like flying to the moon?'²⁶ This perplexing paradox, along with a non-committal stance on whether knowledge is possible, leads to the attainment of knowledge being 'plausible' at best.

Aside from that, another noteworthy feature of occidental epistemology, highlighting the 'plausibility' of knowing, is the 'Gettier' problem: a formula that assesses criteria for justification of belief. Gettier states the following formula for the justification of belief: 'S knows P – if and only if: (i) P is true, (ii) S believes P, and (iii) S is justified in believing P'.²⁷ Chisholm slightly varies this by proposing the following formula as providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge: 'S knows P – if and only if: (i) S accepts P, (ii) S has adequate evidence for P, and (iii) P is true'.²⁸ Ayer, too, suggests a formula for the sufficient conditions for knowledge as: 'S knows P – if and only if: (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true'.²⁹ Subtle differences aside, the above epistemologists are comparably suggesting that their formulas offer, at best, the 'plausibility' of knowing since human fallibility precludes any surety. Now, this is the most bewildering of epistemic circles that, as often as we seek the 'truth' and methods of justification, human fallibility, as skeptics point out, prohibits us. In this respect, it is difficult to find fault with the skeptics, particularly when 'S' – that is, the human being, is the epicentre of their respective formulas. To be fair, it is possible to be justified in believing in something that is, in fact, false.

Denial

That epistemic conundrum brings us to an alternative viewpoint on the modern occidental theory of knowledge – namely, on whether knowledge is possible at all. Actually, skeptics doubt whether it is even possible for us to *find out* if there is anything we can know. By proposing this, 'skeptics'

discredit any attempt to establish the justification of belief by arguing that 'there are good reasons, after all, for supposing that we cannot know the kinds of things that most people think they can know'.³⁰ Supporting their claim, skeptics provide an impressive amount of information on human fallibility and, thereby, delegitimize any pursuit of 'true', non-relativist knowledge.

For instance, consider remembering a beautiful meadow, overlooked by the majestic Karakoram mountain range, then speculating that it may be nothing more than a hallucination. The methods of justification, in this instance memorial, include the potential for 'pervasive error', which lies at the root of skeptical argument.³¹ As a matter of fact, that skeptical challenge can be 'directed against all our beliefs about the external world, all our memory beliefs, all our beliefs about the future; indeed, all our beliefs about any subject provided they depend on our memory for their justification or for their status as knowledge'.³² The rejection of memory-based justification is plausible since memory is at least as fallible as vision. If any of the senses can deceive through hallucination, then beliefs grounded in the senses may, also, be justifiably undermined. Hence skeptics claim that the possibility of hallucination prevents the observation of physical objects from being justified and precludes 'things seen' from constituting knowledge.

Concerning 'pervasive error', skeptics insist that while you may perceive rain as falling from the sky, there are alternative explanations of how a person's sensory faculties may, wrongly, believe this. For instance, Descartes' reasoning that 'some malicious demon of utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me' is theoretically plausible and no contradiction is involved in assuming all our present experiences are caused by evil spirits.³³ Similarly, Putnam imagines that an evil scientist has subjected a human being to an operation. 'The person's brain has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients, which keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super scientific computer which causes the person, whose brain it is, to have the illusion, that everything is perfectly normal. There seems to be people, objects, the sky, etc ... but really all the person is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses from the computer to nerve endings'.³⁴ Both scenarios insinuate that it is logically possible to exist in this predicament and, since it cannot be disproven, we are not justified in believing otherwise. Note, skeptics are not saying we are living in a vat of nutrients, or even that we are justified in believing so. They are saying that we are not justified in believing otherwise. The skeptical position states: 'you cannot rule out the possibility that you are a brain in a vat, and without being able to rule out that possibility, knowledge of the material world is impossible'.³⁵

In total, skeptical arguments follow that every piece of empirical evidence you might rely on to prove that you really are here, could be used to prove that you are not. From a skeptic's point of view, it is not reasonable for me to have the beliefs that I do about things around me; hence, knowledge is impossible. That, then, led to Hume maintaining that persistent contemplation on knowledge will, eventually, challenge our claims to certainty.³⁶ Kant, too,

proclaims that it 'remains a scandal to philosophy ... that the existence of things outside of us ... must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their own existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof'.³⁷ The skeptics' position leads to *reductio ad absurdum*; that is, if we act upon our belief that there are familiar physical things around us, we will find we do not have any justified beliefs.

Moreover, skeptics show that we cannot have the kinds of knowledge that many of us claim to have. And if skeptics challenge our most basic kinds of knowledge, then they easily undermine the sophisticated knowledge distinctive of human beings. Such problems have played a central role in occidental epistemology. But more recent occidental epistemological trends take a different attitude toward skepticism. Rather than responding to human fallibility, epistemologists struggle to promote better levels of understanding the 'justification for belief'. It is plausible to be able to answer the skeptic by showing that those beliefs can be securely defended by appeal to other beliefs not among those deemed problematic. But skeptics maintain a monopoly on the construction of the argument – they set the intellectual boundaries from which to react. 'Every argument must proceed from some premise, and if the skeptic calls all relevant premises into doubt at the same time, then there is no way to reason with him. The whole enterprise of refuting the skeptic is ill founded because he will not allow us anything with which to work'.³⁸ Keeping in mind the restrictions placed by skeptics on the justification of belief as a result of human fallibility, or pervasive error, epistemologists are moving toward lesser levels of qualified belief or contextualization.

Contextualization refers to a naturalized approach to epistemology. Quine holds that 'epistemology could find its answers by simply studying how believers justify their actions'.³⁹ Hence the real problem one faces in epistemology involves searching for a one-size-fits-all answer to 'knowing', or on 'how to have true knowledge' in all societies and circumstances. When confronted by human fallibility, this leads to 'plausibility' or 'denial'. Therefore, what is required is to simply understand how people rationalize their own actions and what their methods of justification are. That is, precisely, what we intend to accomplish by examining Qur'anic epistemology.

Qur'anic epistemology – 'certainty of knowing'

Epistemology, at its most basic level, provides an insight into how a certain society thinks. This includes social phenomena and interactions, leading to experiences that ultimately involve some sort of knowledge, whether justifiable or not, as an integral part of life. That means any epistemic account must resort to fundamental principles, which could explain life, and the source and acquisition of knowledge, its limits, and its objectives, and provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the world, the nature of human relations, and what they entail in terms of duties, rights, and proscriptions. As Al-Alwani makes clear, 'since people's thinking stems from their overall

worldview, their references, methods and theory of knowledge will be determined by their own doctrinal foundation and ideals ... which, in turn is based on Qur'anic origins of thought.⁴⁰

Therefore, the Qur'an is an obvious place to start in developing an overarching Islamic epistemology. However, it must be recognized that one may develop differing epistemologies from the Qur'anic text through differing interpretations. Certainly, one must recognize that the Qur'an is not the same as Islam writ large and that elements of Islamic epistemology could be derived from other sources. Yet this study is not tackling the totality of Islamic epistemology, but on the assumption that it begins to develop coherently, and legitimately, based on insights the Qur'an shares. Thus, for this study, the relevant questions are 'What are the origins of knowledge in Qur'anic epistemology?' and 'How does the Qur'an approach "knowing" and "justification of belief"?' How does this influence our understanding of political culture in Muslim polities?

It is 'undeniable that various epistemological issues have been discussed in Muslim philosophy with a significantly different orientation from that of Western epistemology'.⁴¹ Those differing orientations include the role and limitations of the individual in seeking knowledge, including its purpose and source. For instance, by labeling Qur'anic epistemology as the 'certainty of knowing' we intend to reveal its inherent civilizational ethos and general assenting approach to knowing. There is a 'certainty', though it is not necessarily instantaneous, nor is it centred on 'me'; rather it involves a process, which includes a tripartite relationship between the Qur'an, the individual and the cosmos. By focusing on the Qur'an, this study by no means diminishes the importance of other sources of legitimacy in the Islamic tradition. But the Qur'an is the first point of reference in the Islamic tradition as a result of being understood as the infallible 'Word of God'. It informs the reader with a specific insight into 'What can we know?' and 'What are the necessary and sufficient conditions to know?' and 'How does one distinguish between true knowledge and false knowledge?' It is the guide for what amounts to knowledge and the yardstick used to assess justified belief. Lastly, the following sections will offer a Qur'anic epistemic response to the Gettier problem.

Sources of knowledge

To begin with, Qur'anic epistemology holds that God is the principal cause and, thereby, source of knowledge. In support of this, the Qur'an depicts a heavenly scenario where angels converse with God, following the creation of the first human being, Adam. It states, 'And remember when your Lord said to the Angels: "Verily, I am going to place (mankind) generations after generations on Earth." They said: "Will You place therein those who will make mischief and shed blood, while we glorify You with praises and thanks and sanctify You." He (Allah) said: "I know that which you do not."' ⁴² This conversation showcases angels questioning God's judgment concerning the creation of

humanity. In response, God replies that He knows what they do not; in effect, establishing ownership of knowledge. Next, the Qur'an continues: 'And He taught Adam all the names (of everything), then He showed the angels and said, "Tell Me the names of these if you are truthful"''.⁴³ However, the angels were unable to do so and, then, upon realizing their indebtedness to God, for what they know, proclaimed: '*Glory is to You; we have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, it is You who is the All-Knowing, the Wise*'.⁴⁴ Collectively, these verses assert that knowledge is not possible without God's sanction and He, Alone, is worthy of the definitive description of being 'All-Knowing' and 'Wise'. Moreover, these verses share three important insights of Qur'anic epistemology – namely, that God is the primary source of all knowledge, who imparted it to Adam; that 'Knowing' is not possible without His approval; and the importance of shifting epistemic centrality towards God. The entire narrative on acquiring knowledge concludes with the imperative that God knows.

Taken together, this does not negate the existence of others sources of knowledge, say, of our senses or intellect. It does, though, affirm that even if our senses are used to obtain knowledge, it is not possible without the source of our senses – God – and that should be acknowledged. In other words, the attainment of knowledge cannot be achieved solely through our own human effort. This perspective is supported by Al-Farabi, who suggests that God alone requires no essence other than itself for 'knowing'.⁴⁵ And, adding to that, the Qur'an describes humans as having five distinct parts – namely '*ruh*' (soul), '*aql*' (mind), '*qalb*' (heart), '*jism*' (body) and '*nafs*' (self) – from which 'knowing' may arise. Each part, though, functions differently in its potential to give 'knowing'. Indeed, the Qur'an establishes that God has given humans the capacity to potentially 'know' through their own efforts, relying on sensory or mental faculties, including the heart, mind and body. This, let's say, is described as *extrinsic* knowing. Of course, we must be active participants in the acquisition of knowledge, otherwise we cannot be held accountable for our actions. Yet our efforts are understood to be ineffective unless God wishes it otherwise, a realization that occurs outside our scope of awareness.

On the other hand, humans, also, have the capacity to 'know' in an *intrinsic* manner, in which 'knowing' is indicative of the human condition, such as in our soul and self. In this, 'knowing' is acquired by using our mental faculties to gain proper awareness of our own human condition. Both 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' 'knowing' differ in respect to the active participation of the human will and the use of human faculties to affirm knowledge, but they are both dependent on God's approval for acquisition.

Intrinsic and extrinsic knowing

To be clear, '*intrinsic*' knowing involves an innate knowing, the realization of which may occur by use of our mental faculties. This form of 'knowing' is inherent in the *fitrah* of the human being – it is part of what it means to be

human. A Qur'anic epistemology accounts for this when it states: 'your Lord drew forth from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves [saying]: "Am I not your Lord?" they said: "Yes! We do testify!" [This was] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection: "Of this we were unaware"'.⁴⁶ This act of creation reveals the acknowledgement, by each and every human being, that God created them, and that He alone is worthy of worship – this awareness can occur only as a result of knowledge. Granted, Qur'anic exegesis offers a multiplicity of explanations of this verse, ranging from those that treat it as being metaphorical to those that regard it as literal.⁴⁷ Its controversy surrounds the insinuation that human beings were aware of God prior to birth. Nevertheless, by accepting it as literal, the indication is that humans are imbued with an intrinsic ability to grasp knowledge. Similarly, the Qur'an further attests to that by declaring: 'And on the Earth there are signs for those who have faith with certainty. And also in your own selves. Will you not then see?'⁴⁸ Here, too, this verse substantiates the conviction that there is a 'sign', an innate 'knowing' that verifies that Qur'anic message. This leads to the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, by examining our own self. This 'intrinsic' knowing, however, is a consequence of the human condition and God shares this insight with humanity via the Qur'an.

In its place, 'extrinsic' knowing occurs through human efforts by way of sensory or mental faculties. The Qur'an verifies this when it states: '*And Allah has brought you forth from your mother's womb knowing nothing – but He has endowed you with hearing, and sight and hearts, so that you might have cause to be grateful*'.⁴⁹ However, the Qur'an similarly cautions the reader by stating, 'And do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Indeed, the hearing, the sight and the heart – about all those [one] will be questioned'.⁵⁰ Jointly, these verses do two things: first, knowing may occur with the use of sight, hearing and our hearts; second, we need to be cautious about the potential of false knowledge that may arise from these faculties. Here a Qur'anic epistemology is acknowledging sensory and mental faculties for knowing, but then restraining intemperate acceptance of information gained thereof.

In addition, Qur'anic epistemology takes a unique perspective on the heart, as the seat of learning and knowledge acquisition. The Qur'an describes wayward people who have '*hearts with which they do not understand*'.⁵¹ Al-Farabi clarifies this position by stating that the heart is the king of all human faculties involved in knowing and the five senses are its mere messengers.⁵² Occidental epistemology has understood the brain as the centre of consciousness. But in Qur'anic epistemology the heart is viewed as the centre of our being. The Qur'an mentions people who mocked the Prophet Muhammad (*pbuh*) and were entirely insincere in listening to his message, so God '*placed over their hearts a covering that they may not understand it and in their ears (He placed) an acute deafness*'.⁵³ 'Their inability to understand is a deviation from the spiritual function of a sound heart, just as their ears have been afflicted with a spiritual deafness. So we understand from this that the heart is centre of the

intellect, the centre of human consciousness'.⁵⁴ Even Arabic grammar contains a category '*af'aal al-quloob*' or 'verbs of the hearts', which are clearly 'verbs of thinking'.⁵⁵ Yet, even while emphasizing the important of the heart in 'knowing', this verse further emphasizes that a corrupted heart may prohibit the accurate understanding of knowledge. This, then, precludes the heart as an ultimate source of knowing.

Furthermore, it may be noted, the Qur'an highlights sight as a source of knowing when it declares, 'Verily, proofs have come to you from your Lord, so whosoever sees, will do so for the good of his own self ...'⁵⁶ Al-Farabi, too, details the ability of knowledge acquisition from our sight.⁵⁷ This the Qur'an does not dispute; yet it qualifies the reliability of perceptual knowledge as being dependent on God. It states:

There has already been a sign for you in the two armies that met. One was fighting in the cause of God and as for the other, they were disbelievers. They, the believers, saw them with their own eyes as twice their number, (although they were thrice their number). And, Allah supports with His Victory who He Wills. Verily, in this is a lesson for those who understand.⁵⁸

Here this verse makes the following features of Qur'anic epistemology clear: it agrees that sight is a source of knowing, then illustrates that what was perceived was, actually, false. What that means is as follows: that even though I may see, hear or understand with my heart, I might do so inaccurately, and with God remains the truth of what either is in front of me, or that I heard or felt. In other words, a Qur'anic epistemology makes one a skeptic in themselves and a believer in a transcendental God.

Hence, upon both recognizing the ability of our sensory and mental faculties to lead to knowledge, it concedes that they alone are insufficient. This, then, is why the Qur'an equates belief in the unseen with having faith: 'Those who believe in the unseen and keep up prayer and spend out of what We have given them'.⁵⁹ Consistently throughout the Qur'an, the reader is encouraged to believe in what one cannot see. This, most definitely, does not diminish the importance of sight, though it does lay an important foundation of Qur'anic epistemology in which perception is not necessarily a sufficient condition for knowing.

How can I know?

The Arabic word *Qur'an* means 'the reading', and implicit within its connotation is the necessity for acquiring and disseminating knowledge.⁶⁰ Its definition includes the concepts of reading, learning and acting, which are the attributes essential to perfect faith and attaining true knowledge. This provides the goal of Qur'anic epistemology: to distinguish between truth and falsehood and act accordingly. Moreover, another name for the Qur'an, as it refers to itself, is

Al-Furqan, which means 'the criterion which distinguishes truth and falsehood'.⁶¹ Essentially, the Qur'an is, to all intents and purposes, a theory of knowledge, in and of itself, par excellence. But how does it distinguish between true and false knowledge? The first Qur'anic verse, given to the Prophet Muhammad (*pbuh*) at the cave in Hira, proves insightful:

*Read in the name of your Lord who created. He created insan (human beings) from a clot. Read, and your Lord is Most Honorable, Who taught (to write) with the pen. Taught insan (human beings) what they knew not. Nay! Insan (human beings) are most surely inordinate. Because he sees himself free from want. Surely to your Lord is the return.*⁶²

Here two points are clear: first, that the method to distinguish between true and false knowledge begins with reading. Second, that reading is accompanied by a commandment to do so in the name of God. This, together, presents the unique Qur'anic attitude towards the process of learning – faith and knowledge.

The Qur'anic approach to 'knowing' is premised on the 'certainty' of knowledge, acquired in an affirmative sense, which is self-transcending. The first two verses, in the second chapter of the Qur'an, 'Al-Baqarah', provide a clear indication of that direction: 'Alif. Lam. Mim. This Book, there is no doubt in it (certainty), is a guide to those who guard (against evil)'.⁶³ This Qur'anic verse informs the reader of how an individual should approach the text itself, as well as the process of acquiring knowledge – namely, with certainty and without doubt. This sets the tone for a Qur'anic epistemology premising itself on a self-transcending 'certainty'. It says to the reader: 'Go, seek knowledge, confident and assured that you will find what you are looking for. Use your sensory and mental faculties, but be aware they may be misleading. Hence, if you do not find it, be certain that "God knows"'.

The Gettier problem and the Qur'anic formula for knowing

The Gettier problem and countless responses to it (e.g. Ayer, Chisholm) focuses on a formula for justification of belief. Essential for those formulas is the centrality of the individual, 'S', who seeks to achieve sufficient and necessary conditions for knowledge in order to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Skeptics argue that human fallibility prevents those conditions from arising. However, a Qur'anic epistemological formula does not focus on the centrality of the individual or 'S'. Of course, the individual is certainly involved in the process to knowledge, and, as such, is the agent responsible to read, learn and act. However, knowledge is attainable only from God, thereby implying that the human, alone, is insufficient. What is required is for a constant reconnect to the sacred text, the Qur'an, by thorough reading of its methodology. In other words, Qur'anic epistemology focuses on the centrality of the Qur'an, which, thereby, outlines its self-transcendence. By taking the

Qur'anic text as the primary source, the individual is, then, encouraged to look within himself and interact with his surroundings to initiate the process of obtaining the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, knowing full well that they may not achieve it but that truth, nevertheless, exists.

The Qur'anic model for epistemological justification is as follows: Q (the Qur'an) tells X (humans) (i) Q is true, (ii) Read Q to find out whether it's true, and (iii) Accept it or not. If X accepts Q, the following formula occurs: X accepts Q as true, (i) X assesses A [any thought, feeling, or experience that requires belief] in relation to Q, (ii) X is justified in believing A is either 'true', 'false', or 'God knows'. Two points are significant here: first, that Qur'anic epistemology is not premised on the individual and how he reacts to stimuli as the starting point. Second, that while X may falsely believe A is true, and may even be justified to believe it, he nevertheless is certain that he may not know, but God does, and Q is true. Therefore, there is an element of certainty permeating 'true', 'false', and 'God knows' responses in Qur'anic epistemology.

Here the emphasis is on the centrality of the Qur'an, and thereby on God, who informs the reader of its truth and certainty. In other words, the Qur'an 'speaks' to the reader, informing them that it is without doubt.⁶⁴ The formula is to read the text and understand its methodology for distinguishing between true and false knowledge. The Qur'an encourages the reader who interacts with the text to look inside himself and toward his surroundings to verify the truth. Therefore, the methods of justification of belief constantly have a Qur'anic input. A trifold relationship is formed by an individual continuously seeking guidance from the text, thereby 'naturalizing' epistemology.

Similarly, once an individual accepts the possibility of truth in the Qur'anic text, they then proceed with that certainty, not in their own selves, to examine their justification of belief by using both their mental and sensory faculties. Yet there must be a constant reconnecting to the text in order to receive guidance on 'What can we know?' and 'How do we know it?' Finally, in recognizing those intellectual quests, a Qur'anic epistemology confidently affirms that humans can know, it is a certainty, and even if their certainty does not materialize, 'God knows'.

Conclusion

Europe embarked on its epistemic journey following disenchantment with its hitherto established natural order. Freeing itself from the chains of blind faith, Europe, also, largely rid itself of established meaning. The disappearance of established meaning, then, implanted a 'doubt' in all that was and how it was understood. Rather than sit back, dismayed, at what destructiveness they had wrought, the Europeans stood confidently and peered ahead with exceedingly high hopes in what could be. With the scimitar of science they galloped ahead, ready to forge a new era of knowledge.

Consequently, occidental epistemology began to deal with such questions as 'What can I know?' and 'How can I distinguish between those things that

I am justified in believing and those things that I am not justified in believing?' Naturally so, since the disappearance of meaning necessitated a reevaluation of 'truth' and increased efforts to regain lost meaning. Thus began two dominant and diverging paths in occidental epistemology that persist today: 'We might be able to know the truth' – plausibility – and 'We are unable to know anything' – denial. For skeptics, though, any attempt at knowledge acquisition is riddled with human fallibility and 'pervasive' error. This, then, led to all our claims to knowledge being in one form or another dependent on our senses, not being considered as 'true knowledge'. What began enthusiastically as a search for tangible, hard proof of truth quickly fell into relativity. Refusing to accept that there is no truth, occidental epistemologists developed sophisticated methods of justification without insisting 'knowledge' is possible.

Doubt, then, became the cornerstone of the 'Western' intellectual tradition. Throughout the universities, colleges and campuses of Europe and North America, the most striking aspect of education is in this supplanting of doubt. When that doubt-infested paradigm was poorly transplanted into Muslim society, through its educational institutions, it produced chaos. This, nonetheless, is hardly surprising. Imitation without understanding cannot develop into creativity. What liberated Europe enslaved Islam. Therefore, this study sought to differentiate between societies and their respective epistemic traditions.

Qur'anic epistemology begins with the affirmation of the 'certainty of knowing', founded on a 'scriptural' tradition that is self-transcending and God-centric. 'I' am not the centre, even though 'I' am the agent responsible to read, learn and act. Moreover, it defines the sources of knowledge – God, and the tools used to derive knowledge – revelation (Qur'an) and reason, including both our sensory and mental faculties. However, it cautions humans in regards to the limitations of that knowledge, both sensory and mental, by reminding us that it is not possible without His sanction. In addition, it describes two kinds of 'knowing' that we've labeled as either 'intrinsic' – in that it is innately connected to the human condition, and as 'extrinsic' – in that is acquired with our sensory or mental faculties. Still, the acquisition of knowledge is not possible, in either form of knowing, without God's approval.

All in all, there exists an air of optimism in a Qur'anic epistemology that dares to say 'truth exists' and even if I don't know it, God does. This is so since the source and origins of knowledge begin with God, and the process towards obtaining that knowledge is initiated by the human being as the agent responsible to read, learn and act – constantly returning to the Qur'anic text for guidance. In essence, it combines a reading of revelation and creation in its search for true knowledge. Granted, obtaining knowledge is not a given, but rather is understood as a gift conferred by God on whomever He pleases. What is learned is not necessarily certain, but God is and He knows best.

To this, the Qur'an is a certainty, not the individual, who is prone to err. Therefore, Qur'anic epistemology acknowledges that there is 'doubt', yet that 'doubt' exists in me, not in the Qur'an or God. Doubt, to be clear, exists in our own ability to understand the text and God. Here we struggle through

evidence to best understand the correct way; fully aware we may be wrong, but secure in knowing that truth, or an objective reality, exists and God is Aware of it. Particularly important to reiterate, in comparison to other epistemic traditions, is the centrality of the sacred text – the Qur'an – rather than the individual. Revelation is first: this was thoroughly explained by the use of the Gettier problem. The implications of this are significant since the question of human fallibility doesn't factor primarily for justification of belief due to the premise of self-transcendence. In other words, I may be wrong about my understanding of the text, but, nevertheless, the text is a certainty. In the end, Qur'anic epistemology explains the aversion to say 'I don't know' in Muslim societies; when someone is unaware, and asks a question, the response is '*Allahu A'lam*' – 'God Knows'.

Moreover, we attempt to reveal how the Qur'an presents a unique approach to the acquisition and distinguishing of knowledge, endowing Muslims with a particular epistemology. This, then, highlights the attitude its epistemic tradition encourages with regard to the unchangingness or permanence of their own values, which directly impacts their political culture. According to the Qur'an, each nation possesses its own methodology, path and law – in other words, epistemology. Thus, according to the text of the Qur'an, God has ordained this unique epistemic tradition, implicitly found in the meaning of the word '*Qur'an*' – read, learn and act. Therefore, its ultimate accountability and reference is with the Supreme Being – God. That is, people are required to do the following: 1. *Read*, to find its source and principal reference in the Qur'an and cosmos; 2. *Learn*, to discover the attributes and basic principles which define its epistemic content; 3. *Act*, by living those principles in a dynamic form according to context. These basic principles are not simplistically bound by the literal word of Qur'anic verses. Rather, as Al-Alwani proposes, 'they will be found by applying the commandments of these *Qur'anic* verses by using sound human reason and sensory observation of the physical world and in human psychology and their social interaction'.⁶⁵

The Qur'an insists on using processes of rationality, deep observation and empirical analysis for any topic or phenomenon under study. One may conjecture, if the possibility of individual certainty is not there, then why pursue knowledge to begin with? Qur'anic epistemology does not guarantee that I may be certain about the knowledge I have. Rather, it asks me to have faith in the certainty of it existing. Of course, the possibility is there, yet that too is not entirely dependent on our own human effort. Knowledge is a gift and may be attained by human effort and God's generosity to confer certainty on the individual who pursues knowledge. Thus, by reading the Qur'an and the cosmos, it firmly implants this idea: believe in God, then in yourself.

Notes

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4 Political values

The Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and the Rashidun Era

Introduction

This chapter deconstructs what the 'foundational' in Islamic political culture is. To clarify, that includes, first, the Qur'an, with a focus on the Makkan verses; second, the 'Hadeeth' – primarily the Bukhari collection; and third, the 'Rashidun Era' – the first three decades of Muslim governorship. Collectively, these embody an ideal that is communicated to the reader, guiding an adherent's whole life by providing a yardstick to measure the desirability or undesirability of actions.¹ Of course, scholars have assembled those components in a multiplicity of ways, and have even added other sources, to put forward their postulates on directives. Nevertheless, the orthodox Sunni majority subscribes to these components, which provide broad-based values that infer a political philosophy. Variation, in other words, falls within an expansive spectrum of agreeability. This, then, is what this chapter aims to do – extract political values and reassemble them to put forth a coherent political philosophy that represents the high classicalism by which every successive era may be judged.

To begin with, the Qur'an comprises 114 'suras' (chapters), 30 'ajza' (parts), and 6,349 'ayat' (verses).² The chapters are of varying size and contain verses classified either as 'Makkan' or 'Madani', depending on the location of divine inspiration.³ Makkan verses, those the Prophet Muhammad received in Mecca, provide the basis of our analysis of political values. Critically, why should we insist on the Makkan verses? Does not that which was revealed in Mecca and Medina collectively form a single linkage? Certainly, this special feature of composition is, in itself, a unique feature of Qur'anic studies, called '*i'jaz*' or inimitability.⁴ However, according to Hamid, the Makkan verses provide the origins of political thought prior to its concretization into political institutions. He states that the Qur'an is a 'unified, linguistic, and stylistic composition whose directives are given in the first phases of revelation'.⁵ Thus, principles that identify the major objectives toward which both human society and political action are guided occur prior to the rise of institutions.

Second, in extracting political values from the Prophetic sayings, the Sahih Al-Bukhari collection is used. This is so since it is considered the 'most authentic of all the other works in Hadeeth literature'.⁶ It consists of 9 volumes

and 97 books on a variety of issues ranging from admirable personality characteristics to personal hygiene, marriage, wills and funeral rites.⁷ More specifically, in the ninth volume and ninety-third book, the section entitled 'The Book of 'Al-Ahkam', or 'judgements', deals with political values. Though, for purposes of further elucidating political values, other compilations of Prophetic sayings are used.

Third, the period immediately following the death of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) until the end of the 'Rashidun Era', an important era totalling 30 years, was pivotal for the establishment of the emerging Muslim community. During that era, the first four Caliphs – namely, Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali – who were among the earliest and closest of companions of the Prophet, attempted to syncretize enduring values with their specific conditions.⁸ Henceforth, our analysis aims to understand the modus in which they operationalized the 'foundational' political values in their circumstances. By doing so, we are able to assess the trilateral interaction of the foundational, the contextual and the individual, thereby deducing a pattern. In other words, we ask the question, 'How did each of the rightly guided Caliphs interact with the "foundational" in their changing contexts?' Here, too, our analysis, for purposes of brevity, will be prioritized by a focus on the principles of *shura* – 'consultation' – and *baya* – 'the pledge of allegiance' – into their respective service-orientated leadership styles.⁹

Together, these constituents elucidate the enduring political values in Muslim society, embedded in the minds of people by enculturation. They are not, merely, appropriation of the past in terms of 'a romanticised notion of a largely mythical age'.¹⁰ Nor are values and maxims implied in these components representative of a 'primitivist utopia, both in the sense that presented earliest of times as the best and in the sense that it deemed a simple society to be the most virtuous'.¹¹ Rather, those political values elucidate a high classicism towards which society is meant to work. That includes the Prophetic maxim that the 'leader of a people is their servant' and the model of Medina when, during Umar's time, a Bedouin refused to obey him and he did not seek to intimidate such a recalcitrant person. Rather, 'he tried to justify himself on a piece of cloth he had to take from his son's share and add it to his own tunic because he was a tall man'.¹² It is, precisely, to this high classicism that Muslim polities compare their current political structures so as to measure discrepancies with regard to it. And in this discrepancy resides the inherent tension that endures in Muslim polities. Examining this provides the normative framework and theoretical basis within which the parameters for understanding political culture in Muslim polities are made clear. Granted, this is only the first step in understanding the entire complexity of political culture in Muslim polities, since the manner in which an 'individual' interacts with it in their context completes the formula.

Certainly, political culture throughout Muslim polities is not monolithic. It may, and often does, differ. Yet no matter how varied its manifestation, they all may be characterized as 'Islamic' so long as the 'foundational' resonates throughout their socialization. Therein lay the elements of permanence, which

are those underlying and enduring political values. To grasp these is to better appreciate the rationale behind the 'idealistic insurrectionary tendency' in Muslim polities that struggles to actualize those ideals in reality.¹³ This chapter, then, completes the first sphere of inquiry by laying the groundwork for understanding what amounts to the 'foundational' in Muslim polities and how it interacts with the 'individual' and contextual' when comprehending the totality of Islamic political culture.

Political values from the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings

The first political value extracted from the Qur'an is that sovereignty belongs to God. The Qur'an states: 'Say: Oh Allah! Owner of Sovereignty! Thou givest sovereignty unto whom Thou wilt, and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from whom Thou wilt. Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt, and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt. In Thy hand is the good. Lo! Thou art able to do all things'.¹⁴ This verse, unequivocally, mandates ownership of sovereignty to God. Yet it also suggests the possibility of God giving or withdrawing sovereignty to or from whomever He pleases. In other words, then, sovereignty – and the responsibilities associated with it – may shift to people.¹⁵ Hence, even though God owns sovereignty, human beings may be empowered by virtue of a residual sovereignty and trusted to act freely in recognition of the fact that they fulfil their ultimate responsibility. This is corroborated in the Sahih of Bukhari, where it is written: 'I respond to Your call O Allah, I respond to Your call, and I am obedient to Your orders, You have no partner, I respond to Your call. All the praises and blessings are for You, all the sovereignty is for You, and You have no partners'.¹⁶ Here, then, we come across one of the most elementary pillars of Islamic political thought – namely, sovereignty – and by implication, total independence is not possible in anything other than God. Henceforth, it should not be sought after as a realizable individual goal. Certainly, people are residually sovereign in that God has created them, of good nature and equal, and given them choice. Yet a Muslim is to precisely perceive 'God alone as normative, His will alone as commandment, His pattern as constituting the ethical desiderata of creation'.¹⁷ People, then, become sovereign by recognition of God's sovereignty and, as a consequence, are endowed with responsibilities toward God and humanity. Of course, in order to accomplish those objectives, it becomes imperative to establish a political order that facilitates the actualization of these ideals.

Critically, this rendition of sovereignty relates to '*Tawhid*', which expresses the most sacred and complete ideational and teleological value system in Islam. Simple, brief and concise to the utmost limits of brevity, it carries within it the greatest and richest meanings in the whole of Islam. More succinctly, Al-Faruqi explains this value with five interrelated principles:

Duality – in which reality is of two kinds, God and non-God or Creator and created; Ideationality – the relationship between the two orders of

reality is ideational in nature and its point of reference is the manner in which humans possess the faculty of understanding the Will of God; Teleology – the cosmos is teleological and serving a purpose of its Creator and doing so out of design; Capacity of man and malleability of nature – since everything was created for purpose – the totality of being no less so – the realization of that purpose must be possible in space and time.¹⁸

Taken together, these interrelated principles, associated with the sovereignty and Divine transcendence that Islamic theology associates with God, have serious political implications. Particularly since humans have the potential to reconstruct their social order based on this self-transcendence. Clearly, life is not in vain and has a purpose; then to serve that purpose requires a constant interaction between the two orders of reality: the ‘contextual’ and ‘foundational’. It is to the latter that he looks for the values by which to govern the flow of the former.

Second, the Qur’an goes to great lengths to impress upon the reader the idea of equality of all human beings, only warranting distinction based on God-consciousness. Even from the first origins of human beings, it declares: ‘When your Lord drew forth from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves [saying]: “Am I not your Lord?” they said: “Yes! We do testify!” [This was] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection: “Of this we were unaware.”’¹⁹ In this verse, the intrinsic equality of all human beings is established on the basis of an indistinguishable spiritual experience. This inherent equality occurs irrespective of gender or race and is a consequence of the God’s creation of humanity. Hamid confirms that the equality of human beings is singled out here, since humans are created from a single soul and that soul is the soul of Adam, who was the first human being.²⁰ Implicit, also, is that no-one among the children of Adam and Eve may claim supremacy over another on the basis of their genetic origin, race, ethnicity, or on the basis of a privileged relationship to God. Indeed, with such enormity does the Qur’an deal with the issue of equality that it attributes the fall of the Devil, who refused to bow to Adam, to his belief in his own racial superiority. Thus, once human beings realize their common origins, the supreme sovereignty of the One Who creates and commands, and submits their souls to Him; they have embraced the ‘Din’ – faith or bond.²¹ This bond acts as the foundation of the entire social structure, including the political.

Third, from human equality arises the conviction of the independence of the judiciary.²² This is so since if all people are equal then the law should protect that equality. In other words, no-one is above the law and a righteous leader should testify against himself, if need be.²³ Of course, in order to institutionalize that equality and protect it from infringement, judicial specialists interpret the law and ensure that all are bound by their conclusions. These judicial specialists are not free from error; if they decide a matter that is rejected by the majority of the people, the opinion of the people takes

precedence.²⁴ The judiciary is responsible for overseeing the application and execution of the law and has the power to indict even the highest authority.

Fourth, and starkly contrasting with Western political theory, the Qur'an states that humans have an 'inherent sound and good nature'. Elaborating, it reads:

It is He, who created you (Humanity) from a single soul, and his mate of like nature, so that he might dwell with her. When they were united, she bore a light burden and carried it about [unnoticed]. When she grew heavy [with child], they prayed to God, their Lord, [saying]: 'If You give us a goodly child we shall be [ever] grateful'. But when He gave them a goodly child, they ascribed to others a share in the gift they received. But God is exalted high above the partners they associate with Him.²⁵

Importantly, these passages reaffirm that human beings have been created from a single soul, thereby signifying equality, yet, more relevantly, they describe human nature or 'fitrah' as 'good'. To explain, this Qur'anic passage is being spoken in the third-person narrative. Thus, 'you' in the passage is used in the plural form and addresses 'humanity' collectively. In addition, the words 'single soul' are meant to signify Adam. From this, an obvious endorsement of the interconnectedness of all humanity is evident, since it stresses that God created all of 'us' from a singular source, created its mate, and if He grants them a child, it will be 'good'. This assertion is supported by the Prophetic saying which states that 'the mother of every person gives him birth according to his true nature ...'.²⁶ Or, in Arabic the true '*fitrah*', which is described as '*saliha*' or good and pure. From this it is clear that all humans are born with the same good and pure nature. Indeed, had there not been an innate moral readiness to accept and submit to what is right and good, religion would have been unattainable, or a matter of enforcement and coercion.²⁷ Yet, since religion is a voluntary choice, each human being has been endowed with the capacity to freely make that choice.

Hence, human beings have a 'good' inborn nature that does not change: 'the nature in which God has made humankind: no change is there in the work wrought by God'.²⁸ Granted, there may be forgetfulness, deviation or rebellion from the inborn natural inclination toward God. 'Goodness', then, may become overshadowed by vice, rebellion and spiritually injurious thoughts and actions. Nevertheless, the Prophet Muhammad said, 'wrongdoing is that which wavers inside you' even while this may become increasingly difficult to recognize the more one commits to unethical practices. Yet, still, the point here is that there must be something inside human nature that naturally calls us towards faith. This intrinsic sentiment is a reflection of the inherent goodness in all people.

Fifth, the Qur'an states 'that God has established human beings on earth and has provided them with the means of subsistence'.²⁹ From this one can extrapolate that since all human beings had identical spiritual origins, were

born pure with a good nature, they are, consequently, all equal, with parallel rights on earth. Those rights, therefore, include 'subsistence' such as water, food, clothing and shelter. Human beings are also entitled to a certain control over the land they collectively occupy in order to meet their basic necessities. The key word utilized in this verse is '*makkanah*', which means 'to establish' or 'to bestow power or authority'.³⁰ This apparently indicates that humans have a place of authority and sovereignty on earth – to its land, minerals and natural resources – in order to be able to ensure their basic needs. Resultantly, an authentic rendering of Islamic political thought must consider that ownership of land can be a great source of societal tension, since it is a major source of wealth and power. Indeed, anyone who monopolizes land will have supremacy over others, which may result in oppression. And, since God has granted all people collective ownership of land, it is ultimately the objective of rulers to institute mechanisms to actualize that value. Hamid concurs, suggesting that 'since all human beings are equal before the One and the same Supreme Source of power, it is only logical to presume that they would all have equal rights on earth'.³¹ Land, therefore, must be exchangeable, and those who do not possess land must be able to benefit from it. This injunction applies to all human beings, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and this implies that the earth belongs to everyone, not just Muslims. More specifically, the earth belongs to God, alone, and God has commanded that members of His creation share it, perhaps as a test of character and justice.³² However, what is particularly important here is the clear endorsement of plurality of religious and, by extension, political life.

Sixth, another political value arises – the Qur'anic concept of social identity or 'Ummah'. Looking closely, the term is listed in *Lisan al-Arab*, the thirteenth-century Arabic dictionary, under the root 'amma' or 'amama', which means 'to seek', 'to go intentionally forward' or 'to seek the right path'. From the same root comes the word 'umm' or mother, which may, also, refer to the flag an army follows, the leader of a people, or meanings including a 'point of reference', 'way', 'path', 'source' or 'identity'.³³ In the Qur'an, the term 'Ummah' occurs 60 times, which, even while taking a variety of shades of meaning, revolve around the singular identification of being a 'faith-centric community'.³⁴ Al-Faruqi concludes that 'Ummah' is 'the defining tradition that a group takes as its goal and therefore as a source of identification. Hence, the word "mother", the provider of one's identity'.³⁵ Rahman adds that this unique value may be associated with its modern variant, national citizenship; it furthers the principle of equality and justifies universal political suffrage.³⁶ However, what sets it apart is the multiple layers of community to which the term implies.

Interestingly, the term 'ummah' may be used to describe all of humanity or may mean a single individual who acts in accord with certain beliefs.³⁷ Moreover, any created being or group of human beings who behave and act according to certain values may be considered a part of an 'ummah' which lays claim to those principles. In the Qur'an, it states: 'This community of yours is one single "Ummah" and I am your Lord; therefore, worship Me

alone. But humans have torn their unity wide asunder (forgetting that) unto Us all are bound to return. And yet, whoever does the good deed and is a believer, his endeavour shall not be disowned'.³⁸ Here, emphasis on all of humanity representing a common 'Ummah' is explained. Yet, in other passages, the *Qur'an* uses it to describe the aggregates of animals and birds who are constantly singing the praises of God.³⁹ Clearly, the term 'Ummah' derives its meaning from the purpose of the entity and how they manifest that purpose in life by commitment to certain values. To put this together, 'Ummah' may refer to 'a faith-centric community of Muslims' and, also, to the entirety of the human race as a larger, all-embracing collectivity. In other words, the larger Ummah consists of smaller groupings of individual 'ummam' – the plural of Ummah, including the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish 'faith-centric communities'.⁴⁰ The idea arising here is that there is an all-inclusive, primordial single Ummah and, while fractures in that unity gave rise to differentiating creeds, this doesn't negate the togetherness of humanity.

Attesting to that, the *Qur'an* states that all religious traditions emanate from a singular source and may be understood as variants of the original message: 'All mankind were one single community; then they began to differ, whereupon God raised up the Prophets as messengers of glad tidings and as warners, and through them bestowed revelation from on high, setting forth the truth, so that it might decide between people with regard to all on which they had come to hold divergent views'.⁴¹ Thus 'globalization' is the actualization of Islam – at least in regards to the concept of identity. In this belief, Al-Faruqi elaborates: 'humankind was created for a single purpose, and they are a single "ummah". How they act will determine the actual ummah in space-time'.⁴²

Amongst the larger Ummah, and smaller groupings within it, the leading Ummah is a meta-community constantly in the making. It is, though, clearly defined – 'you would be the best "ummah" ever evolved for mankind, enjoining the good and prohibiting evil and believing in God' to whom, as the verse continues, most of the followers of earlier revelations would have belonged 'had they believed and indeed some do believe and that would have been for their own good'.⁴³ Al-Faruqi, then, clarifies that this 'ideal "ummah" exists then through and in every righteous individual. It is made in the flesh and blood of all those who submit to the divine law'.⁴⁴ In as much as it includes past, present and future members embodying the law, it is the meta-historical ideal community closest to the path prescribed by God, an ideal community always to be realized, in which every individual equally applies the divine law fully and with full consent of his or her own will.

Seventh, the next political value extracted from the *Qur'an* is that 'all human beings fall under God's Divine Command which is conveyed to them through a series of Prophets or Messengers'.⁴⁵ The political implication here is of continuity of a singular truth that was imparted to humankind by Prophets or Messengers, in order that they remind humanity of their ultimate purpose, organize their identity, and bring law and moral codes of conduct. Hamid

concur, suggesting that the succession of Prophets and Messengers is intended to reinvigorate the inherent capacity of human beings to recognize God's Supremacy.⁴⁶ Therefore, Prophets were sent to remind, as the Qur'an refers to itself as the 'Reminder'.⁴⁷ The value, here, is to renew people's inclination toward God by establishing a political order based on the ethics that the Qur'an espouses. Following the culmination of prophecy and revelation with the Prophet Muhammad comes the requisite need for human beings to step forward and implement these principles by establishing a political order manifesting those aforementioned ideals.

Eighth, humans, as 'Khilafah', or as successors to the Prophets, must lead and establish a system of governance that elevates certain values and upholds the Law. Human beings are God's 'Khilafah' or leadership representatives on earth and must now 'take the mantle forward and establish a state based on political monotheism in which the principles articulated in the Qur'an would be able to be implemented'.⁴⁸ As it is stated in the Qur'an: 'Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a vicegerent on earth." They said: "Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? – whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?" He said: "I know what ye know not."' ⁴⁹ This dialogue between the angels and God involves the former questioning the wisdom in choosing human beings as His vicegerents. In response, God informs the angels that He has knowledge beyond what they have – which, incidentally, is an obvious endorsement of human agency and potential. Nonetheless, once it is recognized that human beings have this special leadership, responsibility and position, the following crucial questions arise: What are those specific leadership qualities? How should they establish a system of governance that would represent Qur'anic values?

The term 'Khilafah' is heavy and, to describe it, the Qur'an clearly associates it with leadership, and, more specifically, a 'believing Muslim'. However, the exact qualities of that individual are scattered by references throughout the text. For instance, the Qur'an states that 'For Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and women who give in Charity, for men and women who fast (and deny themselves), for men and women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah's praise – for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward'.⁵⁰ Moreover, a Prophetic saying further cements the responsibilities of leadership: 'Whoso from you is appointed by the people to a position of authority and he conceals from the people a needle or something smaller than that, it would be misappropriation of public funds and he would have to produce it on the Day of Judgment'.⁵¹ The aforementioned qualities are indicative of the necessary personal attributes of a leader, but still much more needs to be elaborated in regard to leadership from an Islamic perspective since this is crucial in the political realm.

The 'Khilafah' should deal justly and fairly with people regardless of their race, colour, national origin, or religion.⁵² The Qur'an commands Muslims to be fair even when dealing with those opposed to them: 'Allah does command you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are due, and when you judge between peoples that you judge with justice ...'⁵³ Elsewhere, the Qur'an states: 'And let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just, that is next to piety ...'⁵⁴ The Qur'an commands the leader to do his duty for Allah and to show kindness to those under their authority. Clearly, this supports the notion that the greatest test of character is how those with power treat those without. As it suggests in the Qur'an: 'Those, who, if we give them power in the land, establish worship and pay zakah (the charitable poor-due) and enjoin kindness and forbid inequity'.⁵⁵ Here, kindness is equated with genuine leadership and is predicated on loyalty, first and foremost, to God and then to the people. Also, the Qur'an states: 'O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor, for Allah can protect both ...'⁵⁶ Collectively, these verses clarify the qualities necessary for 'Khilafah' leadership in Islam – namely, fairness, justice, transparency and honesty. The Hadeeth literature further attest to the importance of these values when it is mentioned that 'any individual whom Allah has given authority of ruling some people and he does not look after them in an honest manner, will never have even the smell of paradise'.⁵⁷ Moreover, it is further stated that 'if any ruler has authority to rule Muslim subjects and dies while he is deceiving them, Allah will forbid paradise for him'.⁵⁸

Eighth, the Prophetic sayings clarify that the 'Khilafah' or leader of the Muslim community must be 'chosen by the people'.⁵⁹ Of course, what this implies and how it is ascertained remains a matter of contention; nevertheless, it is undeniable that leadership and people are enmeshed in a reciprocal relationship. Second, 'the majority of the believers cannot collectively err'.⁶⁰ These Prophetic sayings clearly establish that people matter. These Prophetic sayings presuppose that the wishes, aspirations and preferences of the people are of primary importance and that there exists a deep insight in the collective wisdom of the masses. Equality is inferred and people in their collective wisdom should decide on who should lead them. While the principle stands that people should choose their leaders and that they cannot collectively err, there is, however, no clarification on how a society should proceed to ascertain the aspirations of the people. This has been left for each society to comprehend for itself according to its context. A broad parameter is established based on a value that empowers people in the political process and encourages them to establish those principles in their societal contexts.

Ninth, the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings elucidate that one ought '*not to seek leadership or authority, but to graciously accept it if offered*'. This is clear from numerous Prophetic sayings that assert that those who want leadership

should not have it.⁶¹ The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said: 'Do not seek to be a ruler, for if you are given authority on your demand, you will be held responsible for it, but if you are given it without asking for it, then you will be helped, by Allah, in it'.⁶² Moreover, it is also mentioned that those who wish to seek power and leadership will regret it on the Day of Resurrection: 'You people will be keen to have the authority of ruling which will be a thing of regret for you on the Day of Resurrection'.⁶³ The foregoing suggests that those who actively seek out leadership are unworthy of the responsibility. This seems to caution against the idea of egocentric political advocacy. Granted, while no clear directive is given, the whole concept of political parties, as it exists in the modern democratic structure, is competitive and, often, antagonistic, which is in conflict with the principle of displaying magnanimity towards political aspirants. In this regard, many Muslim polities have criticised political parties outright, including Egypt, Pakistan and Morocco, and have been advocating banning them.⁶⁴ Still, that would not resolve the matter of reconciling divergent voices in a society.

Tenth, and one of the most important political values from the Qur'an, is the concept of 'shura' or consultation. This value is of such importance that not only is it stated numerous times in the Qur'an, but also an entire chapter is entitled after it. Unequivocally, the Qur'an states, 'And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish prayer, and who conduct their affairs by consultation and spend out of what We bestow on them for sustenance'.⁶⁵ Even the Prophet Muhammad was directed by God to take decisions with mutual consultation:

It is part of the Mercy of Allah that you do deal gently with them. Were you severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about you: So pass over their faults, and ask for Allah's forgiveness for them and consult them in affairs of the moment. Then, when you have taken a decision, put your trust in Allah. For Allah loves those who put their trust in Him.⁶⁶

Thus, the practice of 'shura' enables people to participate in the decision-making process and provides legitimacy to the leaders for the authority they exercise. Hamid adds that the people, or Ummah, and the Qur'an reinforce each other in the process of guidance, and the state, or system of governance, becomes a limited institution.⁶⁷ It is limited on one side by the Book and the other side by the people. As such, the Islamic state has to apply the self-evident Qur'anic principles verbatim and refer the nonspecific ones to the people, to clarify their ambiguity and reach a consensual decision thereon. Therefore, consultation is a necessary measure for ascertaining the truth and protecting both the leadership and the people from error. Moreover, the majority opinion of the people cannot be bypassed or superseded by the opinion of a single person, including that of the leader, since the leader is also bound by the truth, which has gained the consensus of the people.⁶⁸

The Prophetic sayings, similarly, substantiate this style of consultative decision-making and support the principle of accountability:

I am only a human being [Prophet Muhammad – pbuh], and you people come to me with your cases; and it may be that one of you can present his case eloquently in a more convincing way than the other, and I give my verdict according to what I hear. So, if I judge by error and give the right of a brother to his other brother then [the latter] should not take it, for I am giving him only a piece of fire.⁶⁹

Here it is clear that the Prophet Muhammad establishes that his decision allows room for consultative decision-making and encourages honesty within litigants. Admittedly, the exact form of mutual consultation has not been described, although the principle of engaging the citizenry and consulting people has been established both by the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad. This is crucial since it indicates a relationship between those who govern and those who are governed.

Eleventh, there are two other important deductions that are drawn from authorizing consultation – namely, consensus and accountability. To explain, let us describe 'shura' as an act of consultation, whereas 'ijma' involves the consensual decision taken by the majority following the consultation process. The majority opinion must be respected and adhered to, irrespective of whether or not it was accepted by all. To disregard, or undermine, would entail compromising on the principles of both 'shura' and 'ijma'. That, then, would ridicule how leaders are both accountable to those they hold authority over and bound by the collective decisions that are made. The Prophet Muhammad has corroborated this by stating that 'If you two agree on a counsel, I shall not dissent'.⁷⁰ This weighty statement reaffirms the consultative decision-making process and the authority attributed to it. Moreover, it notes the manner in which the Prophet participated in open consultations with others and then reaffirmed that he would not meet their decisions with dissension. As a consequence of being bound by consensus of the people, the 'Khilafah' leadership is accountable to them. And, as mentioned earlier, no-one is above the law. This accountability entitles the people to bring leaders to account for their actions. As the Prophet Muhammad has said, 'nations prior to you were destroyed because if a noble amongst them stole, they used to excuse him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would apply Allah's legal punishment to him'.⁷¹ Here, again, is an unequivocal endorsement that no-one is above the law, not even the leader. The Qur'an further attests to this by saying:

O you who believe! be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness of Allah's sake, though it may be against your own selves or (your) parents or near relatives; if he be rich or poor, Allah is nearer to them both in compassion; therefore do not follow (your) low desires, lest you deviate; and if you swerve or turn aside, then surely Allah is aware of what you do.⁷²

Twelfth, both the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings mandate obedience to those in authority over you. Both male and female are bound to the leader and must pledge allegiance in the form of '*bay'a*'. This act involves pledging allegiance to whomever one wishes to nominate or select as leader. As the Prophetic sayings suggest, 'We gave the pledge to Allah's Messenger that we would listen and obey him both at the time when we were active and at the time we were tired'.⁷³ This pledge of allegiance may not be violated without a just cause, as it is mentioned: 'Verily, those who give the bay'a to you are giving a pledge to Allah. The Hand of Allah is over their hands. Then whosoever breaks his pledge, breaks only to his harm, and whosoever fulfils what he has covenanted with Allah, Allah will bestow on him great reward'.⁷⁴ One could reasonably conclude that the pledge of allegiance parallels voting, since that, too, is a reflection of one's individual preference in regard to leadership. Here, emphasis is placed on the principle that people elect their leaders and then offer their pledge of allegiance to the leader for as long as the leader does not contradict the moral premise upon which his authority rests. The specific age of offering a pledge of allegiance is left open, but evidence is given of both females and children offering the oath of allegiance.⁷⁵

Rashidun Caliphate – 632–61 AD

This section provides an analysis of the period immediately following the death of Prophet Muhammad (*pbuh*), in what is known as the 'Rashidun Era'. It does so with the objectives of understanding the application of 'foundational' political values in space-time by the first four caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali. This important era, totalling thirty years, was pivotal for the establishment of the emerging Muslim political community.⁷⁶ Of course, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an in-depth analysis of each leader. However, this section reveals how the 'foundational' political values provide parameters of manoeuvrability implemented uniquely by each caliph. Specifically, the following analysis examines the manner of political succession and the principles of '*shura*' and '*bay'a*'.

The first Caliph: Abu Bakr 632–34 AD

The Prophet Muhammad said: 'If I were to take a friend other than my Lord, I would take Abu Bakr as a friend'.⁷⁷ In 634 AD, as the news of the Prophet Muhammad's (*pbuh*) death spread, a number of tribes rebelled and refused to pay the poor-due called '*zakat*'.⁷⁸ Also, a number of impostors claimed that Prophethood had now passed to them, raising the standard of revolt.⁷⁹ Even worse, two powerful empires, the Eastern Roman and the Persian, both threatened the fledgling Islamic state at Medina. Immediately disputes arose concerning political succession, with various groups attempting to establish the legitimacy of their claims. The people of Medina insisted that they wield authority, considering their commitment to the Prophet Muhammad and the

message of Islam.⁸⁰ Contrarily, the Meccans claimed authority by virtue of their membership in the powerful Quraysh tribe, and, as such, claimed to be the rightful heirs to political leadership. Also, the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima, according to some interpretations of historical documents, made a plea in favour of her husband Ali, Muhammad's cousin.⁸¹

In this overwrought political setting, two important 'foundational' political values were operationalized that managed the discontent: *shura* and *bay'a*. At the Conference of Saqifa' in Medina,⁸² Umar, one of the closest companions of the Prophet Muhammad, who was to later become the second caliph, stood forward and offered the *bay'a* pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr; this gesture was followed by those present.⁸³ This was not considered sufficient by Abu Bakr, who later assisted in the gathering of Muslims the following day in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. There, the people gave a general *bay'a* to Abu Bakr that legitimized his authority.⁸⁴ And, upon accepting the responsibility of caliph, Abu Bakr stated:

O people, even though I am not the best of you, I have been given the responsibility of ruling you. I will consider the weakest among you strong until I claim for them whatever is their due. And the strongest among you, I will consider weak until I have taken from them whatever is due from them. O people! I am a follower of the Prophet Muhammad, not an innovator. So, if I do well, assist me! And if I deviate, straighten me out ... then obey me as long as I obey Allah! But, if I disobey Allah or his Prophet Muhammad, you owe me no obedience. I really prefer that another one of you should have been given this responsibility. And if you expect me to assume the same role as the Prophet Muhammad in relation to 'wahy' [revelation], I cannot do that. I am only human, so make allowance for me.⁸⁵

Abu Bakr clearly advocated that people should follow him only so long as his actions were in accordance with the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings. This act, in and of itself, alludes to the concept of *shura* and political accountability, as well as encouraging activism and political participation of the populace. Moreover, by mentioning that he did not want power, he supported a key feature of Islamic leadership in which those who want it should not have it.

Abu Bakr died on 21 'Jamadi-al Akhir, 13 AH' – 23 August 634 AD – at the age of sixty-three, and was buried by the side of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina.⁸⁶ His caliphate was merely 27 months in duration. In this brief span Abu Bakr had managed to strengthen and consolidate his community through '*shura*' by seeking their gathering after his nomination and concretizing by *bay'a* – or a pledge of allegiance.

The second Caliph: Umar 634–44 AD

The Prophet Muhammad said: 'God has placed truth upon Umar's tongue and heart'.⁸⁷ Prior to his death, Abu Bakr conferred with notables in the

community and adopted a slightly different method of political succession, though still utilizing the principles of *shura* and *bay'a*. Abu Bakr nominated Umar as the next caliph, contingent upon ratification by the population in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina.⁸⁸ The majority of people in the Prophet's Mosque pledged their allegiance to Umar via *bay'a*, but a restive minority opposed his nomination. Nevertheless, following more consultations and discussions with the vocal minority, all accepted Umar.⁸⁹ It is interesting to note that political dissent was tolerated since the appointment was initially opposed; but by way of mutual consultations, or *shura*, the matter was resolved.

After taking charge of his office, Umar spoke:

O people, you have some rights on me, which you can always claim. One of your rights is that if anyone of you comes to me with a claim, he should leave satisfied. Another of your rights is that you can demand that I take nothing unjustly from the revenues of the State. You can also demand that I fortify your frontiers and do not put you into danger. It is also your right that if you go to battle I should look after your families as a father would while you are away. O people, remain conscious of God, forgive me my faults, and help me in my task. Assist me in enforcing what is good and forbidding what is evil. Advise me regarding the obligations that have been imposed upon me by God.⁹⁰

This declaration reveals Umar's reaffirmation of his utmost responsibility, which is to serve the people. And he encourages people to advise him and become active participants in the overall well-being and structure of society.

In regard to principles of accountability and judicial independence, an incident took place that involved a man, Ubbay, who brought a claim against the Caliph Umar. When the Caliph Umar appeared in court, the judge deferentially stood up. Reprimanding him, Umar said, 'this is the first act of injustice you did to this man', pointing to his accuser.⁹¹ Here, the Caliph was ordered to a court of law to defend himself against accusations by a citizen. He was not above the law and as leader was held accountable, even for perceived, albeit unfounded, wrongdoings.

Moreover, another incident reflecting Umar's embodiment of 'foundational' political values occurred during the conquest of Jerusalem. He defined, by precept and by example, the rights and privileges of non-Muslims, especially the Christians of Jerusalem:

This is the protection which the servant of God, Umar, the Ruler of the Believers, has granted to the people of Eiliya [Jerusalem]. The protection is for their lives and properties, their churches and crosses, their sick and healthy, and for all their coreligionists. Their churches shall not be used for habitation, nor shall they be demolished, nor shall any injury be done to them or to their compounds, or to their crosses, nor shall their

properties be injured in any way. There shall be no compulsion for these people in the matter of religion, nor shall any of them suffer any injury on account of religion.⁹²

In this official declaration, Umar guaranteed freedom of religion and the rights of non-Muslims living under his jurisdiction, attesting to his commitment to pluralism. Still, if further evidence was required, Umar's commitment to equality was evident when he entered Jerusalem walking his camel while his slave was riding it.⁹³

Still, Umar's leadership style resonated with a profound sentimentality for people. With the expansion of the caliphate came considerable innovations. One such being the pulpit, inside mosques, now called the 'mimbar'. The first instance of its use was recorded by Amr bin Al-As, when he built his mosque in Egypt. The Caliph Umar, upon hearing it, wrote to him saying: '*And now: I have heard that you use a pulpit and thus raise yourself above the necks of the Muslims. Is it not sufficient for you that you are standing while the Muslims are at your heels? Therefore, I urge you to smash it to bits*'.⁹⁴ His magnanimity was such that he strove to empower people. And what better a testament then urging the Governor of Egypt, at that time, to smash any symbol that reinforces distance between leadership and people. Tragically, while on his way to lead prayers in a mosque, Umar was severely wounded by Abu Lulu Feroze, who had a personal grudge against him and stabbed him several times.⁹⁵ Soon after, he died on account of his wounds, in the first week of Muharram, 24 AH, and was buried by the side of the Prophet Muhammad.

The third Caliph: Uthman 644–56 AD

The Prophet Muhammad said: 'Every Prophet has an assistant, and my assistant will be Uthman'.⁹⁶ Prior to succumbing to his wounds, Umar appointed a committee consisting of six of the ten companions of the Prophet Muhammad about whom the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) had said, 'they are the people of heaven' and that committee included Ali, Uthman, Abdul Rahman, Sa'ad, Al-Zubayr, and Talha.⁹⁷ These individuals were to choose the next caliph from among them and, thereafter, seek approval for their choice through a pledge of allegiance by the people. This procedure included the principles of *shura* and *bay'a*, but differed from the methods of his predecessors. Also Umar outlined the procedure to be followed if any differences of opinion should arise. Abdul Rahman withdrew his name as a potential candidate for caliph and, as a result, was authorized to ascertain the aspirations of the remaining committee members and the acceptance by the people. After two days of discussion, the choice was finally limited to Uthman and Ali. To finally decide, two questions were posed to each of them by Abdul Rahman.

First, Abdul Rahman asked Uthman and Ali, separately: 'Who should be the next caliph? Both hopefuls responded by saying the other should be

caliph. To that, Abdul Rahman replied, 'You are both correct'. Second, Abdul Rahman asked, 'Will you promise to act according to the commandments of the Qur'an and the example set by the Prophet Muhammad and his two caliphs?' To this, Ali responded 'To the best of my ability', whereas Uthman answered, without hesitation, 'Yes'.⁹⁸ The quickness with which Uthman responded was considered most fitting for leadership. As a result, he was selected as caliph, though the people's approbation was required, and followed. From this selection process, three ideas stand out clearly. First, those that want leadership should not have it. Hence, in this circumstance, both Uthman and Ali responded correctly to Abdul Rahman's question when they preferred the other to themselves. Second, in response to whether either would abide by the Qur'an, the Prophetic example, and their predecessors, that readiness takes precedence over hesitation. Third, the population at large, by some mechanism, must ratify the final decision. The selection process, then, exemplified the 'foundational' principles previously discussed.

Upon being given the responsibility of caliph, Uthman issued a directive to all civil and military officers. 'He insisted that they should be just in their dealings, honest in money matters, and tolerant toward non-Muslims. Further, the officers were told to keep their word, even with the enemy'.⁹⁹ They were reminded that they were no more than the servants and guardians of the people, not their masters and rulers.¹⁰⁰ In an event that tested Uthman's leadership, a close friend and respected notable, Saad bin Waqqas, Governor of Kufa, took a loan from the public treasury and was unable to pay it back when promised. 'The Treasury Officer, Abdullah bin Masud, reported the matter to the Caliph. As a consequence, overlooking his friendship and admiration for Saad Bin Waqqas, Uthman dismissed him'.¹⁰¹ This illustrates the importance Uthman placed on maintaining the highest standard of law, in which no-one may be excused for even a late payment.

Last, and arguably the most important incident in his life, Uthman's commitment to peaceful conflict resolution was aptly displayed when an internal uprising exploded in the last year of his leadership.¹⁰² Some unruly people began conspiring against Uthman and were not only publicly airing their grievances, but threatened his life. Despite this, Uthman refused to use force on them. His commitment to peaceful methods of conflict resolution and his revulsion at violence convinced him to not take any preventive measures to quell the rebellion.¹⁰³ Of course, if he had wished, the rebellion could have been crushed. Yet he preferred to reason with the rebels and try to persuade them with kindness, especially since he did not wish to set the precedent of using violence against his own people. As Shaban mentions, 'his celebrated weakness was not one of character – his only reported fault, in reliable sources, is that he was extremely polite'.¹⁰⁴ After a long siege, the rebels broke into Uthman's house and murdered him. He was 84 years old and is buried in Medina. His commitment to avoid the use of violence led to his assassination. Actually, he gave the ultimate sacrifice by giving his life, rather than run the risk of killing an innocent, even inadvertently.

The fourth Caliph: Ali 656–61 AD

The Prophet Muhammad said: 'You [Ali] are my brother in this world and the next'.¹⁰⁵ After Uthman's martyrdom, the office of the caliphate remained vacant for three days. Many people insisted that Ali should take up the office, but he was reluctant. 'In fact, the problem lay rather in persuading Ali to accept, for he was naturally hesitant to take power in such intimidating circumstances'.¹⁰⁶ Ali, at last, accepted, on the condition that it be announced in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina and approved by the community in the form of a pledge of allegiance.¹⁰⁷ Again, the Qur'anic principles of *shura* and *bay'a* were utilized, as for the former three caliphs.

Once Ali became caliph he gave an impassioned plea to the congregation, saying, 'Allah commands the Muslims to live as brothers. A Muslim is he who does not hurt anyone with his word or deed. Fear Allah in your dealings with other men. On the Day of Judgement you will have to answer for your dealings, even with animals. Obey Allah, the Almighty. Do not cast aside His commandments. Do well and keep away from evil'.¹⁰⁸ Here, two points are worthy of mention. First, Ali's apprehension in accepting the position of leadership attests to the principles in the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings that those that want power should not have it. Second, in his acceptance speech, Ali reminds the people of their obligations to one another and to God.

Uthman's murder and the events surrounding it were indicative of considerable civil strife. Ali felt that the tragic situation was mainly due to inept governors. 'He therefore dismissed all the governors who had been appointed by Uthman and appointed new ones'.¹⁰⁹ All the governors, with the exception of Muawiya, the Governor of Syria, submitted to his orders. Muawiya declined to obey until Uthman's blood was avenged. The Prophet's widow, Aisha, also took the position that Ali should first bring the murderers to trial. 'Due to the chaotic conditions during the last days of Uthman it was very difficult to establish the identity of the murderers, and Ali refused to punish anyone whose guilt was not lawfully proved'.¹¹⁰ Disregarding his own sense of loss and tragedy upon the death of a close friend, Ali refused to take the law into his own hands and punish people without adequate proof.

The situation in the Arabian Peninsula became so troubled that Ali moved his capital to Iraq. Muawiya now openly rebelled against Ali and a fierce battle was fought between their armies, which was inconclusive. Resultantly, Ali had to accept the de facto government of Muawiya in Syria.¹¹¹ Ali's acceptance of a truce with Muawiya led a fanatical fringe group, called the 'Kharijites', to rebel. Consisting of people who had broken away from Ali due to his compromise with Muawiya, the rebels claimed that neither Ali – the caliph – nor Muawiya – the ruler of Syria – nor Amr bin al-Aas – the ruler of Egypt – were worthy of rule.¹¹² They vowed to kill all three rulers, and assassins were dispatched in three directions.¹¹³ The assassins who were deputed to kill Muawiya and Amr did not succeed, but Ibn-e-Muljim, the assassin who was commissioned to kill Caliph Ali, accomplished his task,

stabbing him with a poisoned sword while he was absorbed in prayer.¹¹⁴ Although Ali was threatened with death if he entered into peace negotiations with Muawiya, he did so in the interest of maintaining peace. As a consequence, he was martyred. Thus, on the 20th of Ramadan, 40 AH, died the last of the Rightly Guided Caliphs of Islam.¹¹⁵

With the death of Ali, the first political phase in the history of Muslim peoples came to an end. According to prevalent Muslim beliefs, the caliphs strived to incorporate the principles of the Qur'an and the Prophetic sayings into their leadership, even at their own peril. In the preceding section, this study analysed the matter of political succession, the concepts of *shura* and *bay'a*, and highlighted a few incidents that display the Caliphs' application of the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings. In regard to the concepts of *shura* and *bay'a*, this study found that they were consistently applied in principle, albeit in differing form, from one Caliph to another. Also, we have seen that each leader nurtured the concepts of popular will and public participation in that acceptance of leadership was dependant on the final authority of the community. While it is acknowledged that the selection process, though not the criteria, lacked any strict institutionalized pattern, there were generally accepted guidelines on the qualifications and prerequisites of leadership.

According to the prevalent Muslim perspective, this era is understood as a time when the ideal most closely matched the reality. 'All through this period it had been the Book of God and the practices of His Messenger – that is, the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* – which had guided the leaders and the led, set the standards of their moral conduct, and inspired their actions'.¹¹⁶ In this Islamic era, the ruler and the ruled, the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak, were uniformly held accountable and the independence of the judiciary was established. Muslim writers, viewing their own history, see it as an epoch of freedom and equality, of God-consciousness and humility, of social justice, which recognized no privileges, and of an impartial law, which accepted no pressure groups or vested interests. Notwithstanding, this era endured considerable upheaval. Significant trials and tribulations¹¹⁷ arose during the latter portion of Uthman's leadership and became nearly insurmountable during Ali's sojourn¹¹⁸ – differences as to the possibilities and prospects for the growth and further development of Muslim political institutions. These controversies remain outside the scope of this thesis as this analysis was intended to show the use of the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings by each caliph and illustrate the concepts of *shura* and *bay'a*.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we defined the 'foundational' political values that emanate from the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and the Rashidun era. Collectively, Muslims – those socialized in their own teleological and peculiar epistemological outlook will, naturally, struggle to concretize those values. Granted, the act

of concretization can turn dogmatic, if essence and context are ignored. Indeed, it may turn into militant fundamentalism if, among other attributes, there is an emphasis on form rather than principle. Yet overall this chapter has aimed to present a clear indication of what political values are upheld in Islamic political discourse, substantiated by their own sources of legitimacy.

By extracting political values from the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and the Rashidun era, one may reasonably begin to discuss the contours of an Islamic political culture. It was learned that those enduring political values, permeating its polity, include notions such as the sovereignty of God and, through that, the residual sovereignty of people; people's inherent goodness and their equality; the concept of the 'Ummah', which is inclusive, and distinguishing; the evolutionary process of truth, moral codes and law by a succession of Prophets and Messengers; and, the continuation of those timeless laws by committed human beings as caliphs. In addition, there was recognition of the inherent wisdom of the masses and this speaks strongly for an egalitarian ethos in the Islamic tradition. Leaders are responsible and accountable to people and should establish a consultative, decision-making pattern. Actually, the need for consultation, or '*shura*', among the people was emphasized. That concept leads to the related value of '*ijma*' or consensus. Without consensus or a mechanism to affect it, stability would be impossible.

At that point, we further extracted the necessity of leadership accountability to people to ensure transparency and the independence of the judiciary as guarantor of the entire political order. The importance of the independence of the judiciary is crucial since it is this political institution that regulates the parameters of manoeuvrability of all other spheres. Also, the establishment of justice means that the people strive to connect the revelation with the land, so that sovereignty will be God's alone and human beings will be equal under His revealed commands. This active effort toward recognizing revelation and establishing justice is the wherewithal of political action in Islam. Therefore, the Qur'anic principles for political thought include equality, freedom of religion, supremacy of the law and independence of the judiciary. The state should establish the means by which land is not solely private but communal, belonging collectively to all citizens; this includes natural resources and minerals under the physical space occupied. As life is temporal, political culture should include a thought of attaining goodness in this world and the next.

Following that, this chapter demonstrated the manner in which the first four caliphs implemented some of these 'foundational' values during their leadership. Specifically, we focused on the process of succession, consultation and consensus. Those 'foundational' values represent the ideals that are meant to be actualized as an Ideal Islamic civic culture. This Islamic civic culture is the political embodiment of the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings and the Rashidun era. The following chapter takes those political values and imagines the contours of a city constructed on the basis of those ideals.

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5 Islamic civic culture¹

Introduction

Following an exposition of the major political values in Islam, using the Qur'an, Sunnah and Rashidun Era, this study asks, 'What kind of city would the concretization of those values create?' 'What kind of political order best represents those values?' Or, 'What would be the guiding *eidos* in that political system?' This chapter aims to highlight the consequence of those political values as creating an Islamic civic culture, a high classicalism which may be referred to as 'La Convivencia'. That term describes the period of Moorish rule over the Iberian Peninsula – present-day Portugal, Spain and Sicily, in which Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities positively engaged with one another and exchanged ideas in relative harmony. Moreover, during the renown '*millet*' system in Ottoman Turkey the words used to describe civilizational harmony were '*hosgoru*', which literally means '*to see the other in a good way*'.² These historical eras impressed upon the world a lasting legacy of civilizational concord that would resonate in cities of *pax Islamica* from Toledo, Seville, Lisbon and Palermo to, more contemporary, Sarajevo and Istanbul. It was this Islamic civic culture that initiated the world's first truly cosmopolitan cities.

Literally, both the terms '*La Convivencia*' and '*Hosgoru*' have been translated as positive intellectual forces for encouraging interaction, holding exacting sophistication and nuance. They incorporate a host of other beliefs, values and ideas that revolve around the embracing interplay of racial, cultural and religious forces. However, in this chapter it is used to describe the normative values of plurality found in the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings. Implementing those values is not an option, but rather a testament to fulfilling an individual's covenant with God and part of a conceptual framework that mandates it throughout society. Therefore, this understanding of tolerance differs from the traditional definitions and nuances associated with those terms, which may be associated with hegemony. More clearly, Marcuse speaks of this hegemonic tendency when he suggests that 'today tolerance appears again as what it was in its origins, at the beginning of the modern period – a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. Conversely, what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression'.³

That, however, is not what plurality and tolerance, according to Islamic civic culture, do. Instead, this chapter seeks to elucidate the parameters of coexistence in Islam and, hopefully, to build bridges of mutual understanding.

In our global village, a comprehensive understanding of Islam and the Judeo–Christo–Islamic relationship is becoming increasingly important.⁴ Together, these three Abrahamic faiths make up more than half of the world's population. In particular, Islam and Christianity are the world's fastest growing religions. More importantly, these three faith-based communities inherit a commonality in religious foundations, values and interests in the modern world. In that regard, as John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed succinctly state, a better understanding of what makes us similar and what makes us different can enable us to transcend barriers of prejudice and strengthen our sense of togetherness.⁵ Hence, in this chapter, we shall attempt to understand the spirit of coexistence in Islam, first by discussing the importance of analyzing this issue – the proverbial 'Why?'; second, by proceeding to establish a conceptual framework for mutual acceptance and tolerance as premised in Islam – 'How?'; and third, by delineating a normative framework for understanding coexistence in Islam, utilizing the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* – 'What?' In conclusion, we will examine, explore and discuss those findings, along with their implications for an Islamic civic culture that nurtures a better understanding between civilizations.

The dynamics of 'coexistence in Islam', in reality, can occur in a threefold manner. First, they can occur in a Muslim context where intolerance may exist in groups with competing Islamic schools of thought. Second, they can occur in the interrelationship between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in territorial space where Muslims are in a majority, but with a substantial non-Muslim minority, for instance in Malaysia, Nigeria or Lebanon. Third, they can arise where Muslims are in a minority context such as in Russia, but especially where there is a marked racial and cultural diversity, such as in Europe and the United States. However, while those specific contextual dynamics exist, it is assumed that the normative values outlined throughout this book substantiate themselves, from the textual sources of Islam. Moreover, those substantiated values are intended for all normative times and circumstances. Granted, shifts may occur in the practice or applicability of normative values in changing environments. Yet our intention in this chapter is to substantiate, based on evidence, the values of coexistence that Islam espouses under all normative situations. By doing so, it aims to articulate the contours of an Islamic civic culture. Of course, it does not look at the circumstances that people may or may not find themselves in and take reality as representative of normative value. It aims, purely and simply, to analyze the principles of 'coexistence' in Islamic theological sources of legitimacy, irrespective of whether they are implemented.

The importance of peaceful coexistence

To begin with, the tremendous interdependence of our era underlines the importance of successfully removing racial, cultural and religious barriers in a

manner that nurtures understanding, togetherness and tolerance. The rapid coming together of the world, therefore, both poses risks and provides opportunities. The potential and positive aspects of 'globalization' rest with an honest pursuit of equity, fairness, and even-handedness – or simply justice – of people among themselves.⁶ The ideals of 'peaceful coexistence', 'consultation,' 'unity through diversity,' 'pluralism' and 'multiculturalism' respond to the challenges of globalization through inclusion. Where motivating drives are other than genuine inclusion, the result is hegemony and perpetual strife between those who support the status quo and those who wish to uproot it; between the inward concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, and the explosive poverty of the many.⁷

In parts of the Middle East, authoritative power structures and the resultant sociopolitical system ridicule the most sacred and cherished traditions of a subjugated populace. Illiteracy, gender rights, unemployment, inadequate education, poor infrastructure, lack of clean – or continuous – sources of water, and limited sociopolitical mobility aggravate tensions.⁸ More importantly, political exclusion and corresponding oppression by repressive regimes obliterate opportunities for stability. These factors are further inflamed with a continuous 'demonization' of Arab and Muslim peoples; this makes finding solutions ever more difficult. The problems are socio-economic and political – religion is of minor significance but is tactfully exploited to represent the totality of the crisis. Also, this demonization of Arabs and Muslims results in the justification for political suppression by both internal and external forces. Considerable discussion and analysis have revolved around this alleged 'battle for the soul of Islam' when in reality the battle exists somewhere else entirely.⁹ There is no 'great battle', there is only a 'great smokescreen' concealing the actual fiend.

Most newspapers and media conglomerates, owned by self-proclaimed heroes of conservatism, are clumsily attempting to baffle the electorate in the closed arms of the neocon bully, masquerading as the *incorruptus domina*, when in reality things are far less chaste.¹⁰ This study aims to confront this process of demonization of Islam – its way of life, its value system and its moral force. Hoping to redirect attention toward root causes, this chapter begins by establishing the spirit of peaceful coexistence in Islam.

A clear distinction exists between normative and non-normative frameworks. By normative framework this study means to delineate the spirit of coexistence and plurality in Islam, as emanating from the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* under all circumstances that are free from duress of any sort, including between Muslims themselves and between Muslims and non-Muslims in Muslim majority areas, as well as where Muslims are living as minorities. Non-normative frameworks arise from extraordinary situations that could include war, political exclusion, oppression, deprivation or the doctrine of necessity.

Thus, studying the concept of tolerance, mutual acceptance and peaceful coexistence is extremely important since the political setbacks in parts of the Muslim world are presented as purely religious when they are actually socio-economic and geopolitical. Representing Islam as the *magnus malum* – or

great evil – distracts from the really pressing issues at the source of the crisis. It is not Islam but rather a host of other geopolitical or socio-economic issues that are the basis of the malaise in Muslim society. If anything, the sacred is being manipulated by vested interests to legitimize their socio-economic or geopolitical purposes. These manipulations lead to two tragedies: first, indigenous leaders perpetuate their illegitimate power, pacify the masses and suppress basic rights; and second, foreign nations attempt to promote their vested interests *vis-à-vis* Muslim states.¹¹ Phrases that are used while dealing with the news about Muslim societies are highly loaded, poorly thought out and are often undefined. For example, these include ‘political Islam’, ‘Islamists’, ‘separation of religion and politics’ and ‘secular Islam’. Without adequate definition these terms serve only to perpetuate misunderstandings. Similarly, the demarcation between sacred and secular is itself open to a variety of opinions and counter-opinions, and more often than not is misleading and simplistic.¹² Nevertheless, this analysis focuses on the spirit of coexistence in Islam, which reveals that while religion may be used as a unifying factor in a Muslim context, it does not negate the pressing issues for which religion, as a source of moral inspiration, is then taken to motivate action.

The conceptual framework for inclusion

In Islam, the imperative manifestation of inclusivity is profound, conceptual and required. It is not an option, but rather a testament to fulfilling an individual’s covenant with God and part of a conceptual framework that mandates it throughout society. To clarify, the conceptual framework for inclusion is a consequence of the Islamic principle of *Tawhid* – unity of God, truth and humanity.¹³ Moreover, there is a direct epistemological and ontological link between these Islamic principles and the normative, conceptual and non-optional manifestations of a theologically mandated ‘inclusive’ Islamic society. This process is achieved in two ways: first, horizontally, in which the ideals as articulated in the Qur’an and the *Sunnah* which represent the direction of human behavior are delineated; second, vertically, in which those principles are meant to be manifested in society.




Figure 5.1 The normative characteristics of Islamic Civic Culture

In other words, tolerance in Islam is predicated on both horizontal and vertical equality. The ideals, as articulated in the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, establish a horizontal equality and plurality based on a coherent epistemological and ontological rationale. Then it is intended to flow vertically downwards from the source to humanity in order that it manifests throughout society. Therefore, tolerance is not noticeable because those with the power to institute their choices over the rest of society do so at their discretion. On the contrary, it is mandatory since, according to Islamic sources, God has created all human beings in a state of equality and goodness and requires an appreciation of diversity.¹⁴ Overall, tolerance is both the inherent recognition and embracing of diversity and plurality.

The spirit of coexistence in Islam: a normative framework

To make clear a coherent philosophical outlook on coexistence in Islam, we begin with verses from the Qur'an that declare that God, after having created every single soul, asked them to testify that there is nothing worthy of worship except Him. The Qur'an states: 'When your Lord drew forth from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves [saying]: "Am I not your Lord?" they said: "Yes! We do testify!" [This was] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection: "Of this we were unaware."' ¹⁵ Interestingly, these verses declare that all of humanity – past, present and future generations – were, at once, drawn forth from Adam's children and asked to make witness to God. This incidence, imbuing every human being with intrinsic goodness and recognition of the Divine, holds significant philosophical ramifications from which the origins of tolerance and the spirit of coexistence spring. Implicit is the idea that every single human being had an indistinguishable spiritual experience and this represents an unequivocal endorsement of an inherent kinship in the entire human family. Moreover, it suggests that within all of humanity exist the same seeds of spirituality that were first planted when God created our souls and asked us to offer our loyal testimony. This means that the attributes necessary for tolerance lie in the inherent 'connectedness' of every individual towards one another. The momentous significance of this Qur'anic verse is, precisely, in laying the foundation for understanding a key component in human nature and human beings' intrinsic relationship towards one another.

From that point onwards, the Qur'an further develops the preceding philosophical outlook by declaring, first, that every nation was sent a guide in their own language;¹⁶ second, by stating: 'And certainly We raised in every nation a messenger saying: Serve Allah and shun the Satan';¹⁷ and, third, in the manner in which the Qur'an refers to itself as the 'Reminder'.¹⁸ Collectively, these Qur'anic verses develop a narrative of an 'interconnected' humanity and also share two implicit assumptions: the inherent togetherness in the human family and a gradual, evolutionary process towards the perfection of faith. In support of this, the Qur'an states: 'This day have I perfected for you your

religion and completed My favour on you and chosen for you Islam as a religion ... surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful'.¹⁹ Upon closer examination, one can only perfect something already created or already set in motion. This setting in motion began with the spark of divinity from which every human soul began, which planted the seed of spirituality in each one of us. That seed, then, was watered and nurtured, through the ages, by a series of Prophets and Messengers, ending, according to Islamic theology, with Prophet Muhammad.

From the beginnings of human life on earth this gradual development of faith was initiated by Prophet Adam and would end with Prophet Muhammad. This assertion, too, is an indispensable characteristic for nurturing tolerance and mandating peaceful coexistence. It does so by pointing to the 'unity of truth' by declaring that all nations and their divinely ordained messengers were essentially saying the same thing in different times and to different degrees. This is clear when considering the importance of the Qur'an referring to itself as the '*Reminder*'. After all, one can only remind someone of something they have previously been told.

To put this in perspective, an Islamic theological articulation of this dynamic process of faith could be understood in the following instance: Imagine being in a room of complete darkness with your vision having become accustomed to the obscurity. In that pitch darkness, you sit with your eyes wide open but see nothing. Then, all of a sudden, bright lights are turned on. Startled, your most natural instinct is to close your eyes. The intrusive light, the conqueror of the shadows, leaves you sightless. You attempt to open your eyes but find it difficult, though you persist. It takes time to adjust to the light. Slowly, your eyes begin to adjust to the light, but only if you keep trying. You could very well just turn away and keep your eyes closed, securing the darkness. However, your instinct chooses to confront the intruding light, refocus its energy, and eventually become accustomed to it. Clearly, too much light at once blinds you. Similarly, too much information at once is overwhelming. A sudden illumination of knowledge – without time to refocus and adjust, makes one want to run for the security of ignorance. Confronted with things that will remain forever, one needs to embrace them slowly.

The Qur'anic history of religion follows a certain pattern that is based on the dynamic process of faith. First, Prophet Adam was given divinely sanctioned knowledge. Then, this spiritual process of enlightenment slowly continued throughout the ages with the Prophets Abraham, Moses and Jesus until it reached its climax with Prophet Muhammad. This continuous development of faith, beginning with Prophet Adam and culminating with Prophet Muhammad, included numerous other Messengers, Prophets and guides. In total, according to Prophetic sayings, there were 124,000 Prophets and messengers who were chosen to remind humanity of their purpose and were unanimously revealing the unity of God, humanity, and truth.²⁰ From this, it is plausible to extrapolate that Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, Zoroaster, and a host of others *could* be included in this category of Messengers, as long as they came before Prophet Muhammad. This is evidence of the inherent inclusive vision in Islamic sources of legitimacy.

Granted, many Muslims may or may not accept this. However, the evidence is striking and one may argue persuasively for this inherent ethic in Muslim theology.

While the Qur'an recognizes the legitimacy of other faiths, it reserves for itself the designation of the 'perfection of faith'. Still, as Khaled Abou El Fadl affirms, this does not exclude the possibility of other frames of thought.²¹ Throughout the Qur'anic discourse, the people of Judaic and Christian religious backgrounds are granted a special rank: 'People of the Book' – *'ahl al-kitab'*. Others, too, were accepted in this tolerant vision, with particular titles of being 'protected people' – *'dhimmi'*.²² In addition, the Qur'an clearly accepts the reality of diversity and peaceful coexistence by stating, 'O humankind, God has created you from a male and a female and made you into diverse nations and tribes so that you may know each other. Verily, the most honoured of you in the Sight of God is he who is the most righteous'.²³ From this verse, the Qur'an asserts diversity as part of the Divine intent and purpose of creation. Supporting that, the Qur'an further declares: 'If the Lord had willed, He would have made humankind into a single nation but they will not cease to be diverse ... And for this God created humanity'.²⁴

That obvious endorsement of human diversity is further strengthened by the following verse specifying the notion of plurality of religious beliefs and laws: 'To each of you God has prescribed a Law and a Way. If God would have willed, He would have made you a single people. But God's purpose is to test you in what He has given each of you. So strive in the pursuit of virtue and know that you will all return to God in the hereafter, and He will resolve all the matters in which you disagree'.²⁵ Here is an explicit endorsement of human diversity – racial, cultural and religious. The emphasis is on 'the pursuit of virtue' – deeds, not verbal professions, or in other words, you are what you do, not what you say. Then, to further reinforce this embracing perspective, the Qur'an declares: 'Those who believe, those who follow the Jewish Scriptures, the Christians, the Sabians, and any who believe in God and the final Day, and do good, all shall have their reward with their Lord and they will not come to fear or grief'.²⁶ Taken together, these sacred verses indisputably indicate tolerance, plurality, peaceful coexistence and acceptance of the existence of other faiths as a reality. Granted, the Qur'an clearly claims that Islam is the perfection of faith, though in my view this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that God would accept other paths to salvation. The Qur'an insists on God's absolute right to bestow His Mercy on whomever He wishes.²⁷

The myth of the 'Other'

At variance with an interconnected humanity, with each individual being innately good, is the prevalent idea of self-image being a dissociative construction of an opposing alter-image. In simpler words, 'I am who I am, precisely because I am not you'. Whether in social anthropology or social psychology, analysis is on uniqueness vis-à-vis others, or group identification leading to a sense of

‘belonging’, which then leads to objectifying the ‘Other’.²⁸ Be it a narcissistic cult of authenticity, which, in its quest for uniqueness, develops exclusion, or analyzing others prior to distinct formation of self-identity, it is clear; there is always the ‘Other’ – those who exist outside the realm of all-inclusive acceptability. This propensity to define ourselves in opposition to something else is a fearful phenomenon in the social sciences. G.W.F. Hegel (d. 1831) states: ‘On approaching the other it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as another being; secondly, it has thereby subdued that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other’.²⁹ Here, Hegel argues that identity formation results in a clash of self-consciousness, between two or more people, that often requires debasing the other. Similarly, the pioneering literary masterworks of Simone de Beauvoir took the idea of the ‘Other’ and applied it to the manner in which men made women the ‘Other’ in order to establish patriarchy.³⁰ Edward Said (d. 2003), too, in his monumental and impacting work *Orientalism*, eloquently articulates the manner in which Arabs and Muslims are denigrated in the construction of a European self-identity.³¹ Collectively, these reputable scholars, while diverging on what constitutes the ‘Other’, converge in describing a tendency to craft self-identity by denying, debasing or, in its most menacing manifestation, demonizing the ‘Other’.

Quite the opposite, this article argues that Islamic civic culture, even while acknowledging diversity, does not endorse the concept of the ‘Other’ as a dialectical clash between ‘in’ and ‘out’ individuals or groups premised on race, culture or religion. Plainly, Islam encourages the development of ‘identity’ on love of God, through the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad – manifested through faith and adherence to principles – and opposes identity premised on hatred of a concrete, tangible other. Rather, it emphasizes commonality and ‘interconnectedness’. It is noted that there needs to be a contextual analysis of why some Muslims, both of the past and in the present, may articulate a sharply different viewpoint. However, my aim here is to establish from the main Islamic sources a clear and coherent picture of coexistence. Hence, self-identity in Islam does not require the construction of a heathen alter-image in a sweeping tangible form – be it race, culture or religious persuasion. Granted, the Qur’an and the Prophetic sayings arguably mention the oppression, ignorance and insulting ‘mocking’ behavior of the ‘disbelievers’.³² Yet they remain an abstraction without form; the emphasis is on what one does. For instance, the Qur’an mentions that there are ‘disbelievers’ from ‘among the People of the Book’ but it does not lay a sweeping indictment on all of them.³³ It specifies. Disbelievers are described as such based on their behavior of duplicity,³⁴ spreading corruption and mischief throughout the earth³⁵ and usurping the rights of orphans,³⁶ not simply because they happen to be non-Muslims.

More importantly, the Qur’an refers to disbelievers as those who ‘reject faith’³⁷ and ‘faith’ may be translated in the Qur’anic lexicon as ‘*din*’ – which, interestingly enough, means ‘binding-together’ or ‘that which binds’.³⁸ In other words, those that are characterized as disbelievers are rejecting that which binds

humanity together – those who wish to unbind, separate, exclude or isolate people from one another. There is profound symbolism in the word *din* itself, in that it is meant to bring people together with the aspiration of cohesion. Note that the Qur'anic emphasis on the 'interconnectedness' or 'unity' of God, truth and humanity is consistent with this definition of '*din*' as binding together. Granted, some may argue that defining '*din*' as binding is imaginative; nevertheless, this definition does correspond with the overall Qur'anic message that aims to establish justice, peace and togetherness on earth, which can only be accomplished with a corresponding vision.

Further emphasizing that, the 'Pact of the Virtuous' – a historic event in which Prophet Muhammad participated – is singled out for its importance in dismissing the conflicting concept of the 'Other'. This alliance, known in Arabic as '*Hilf al-Fudul*' or, simply, the 'Pact of the Virtuous' [*Hilf al-muhayyibin*], was the result of 'Abd Allah ibn Jud'an, chief of the Taym tribe, who decided to invite to his home all those seeking an end to chronic conflicts and the consequent oppression'.³⁹ Tariq Ramadan, commenting on this monumental pact, states: 'Chiefs and members of numerous tribes thus pledged their collective duty to intervene in conflicts and side with the oppressed against the oppressors, whoever they might be and whatever alliances might link them to other tribes. This alliance ... was special in that it placed respect for the principles of justice and support of the oppressed above all other considerations of kinship or power'.⁴⁰ From it, Ramadan, rightly, deduces a primary lesson and quotes Prophet Muhammad, who recalls the incident: 'I was present in Abd Allah ibn Judan's house when a pact was concluded, so excellent that I would not exchange my part in it even for a herd of red camels; and, if now, in Islam, I was asked to take part in it, I would be glad to accept it'.⁴¹ Here it is striking to note the manner in which Prophet Muhammad acknowledges the legitimacy of principles, specifically those of justice and ending oppression, above and beyond where they are initiated. Emphasis is on whether the act is in accordance with the overall Islamic vision, as it is, in this case, to ending oppression. After all, Prophet Muhammad was praising the motivation and outcome of an alliance that had begun prior to him receiving Divine revelation. Ramadan elaborates further by suggesting that:

the message of Islam is by no means a closed value system at variance or conflicting with other value systems. From the very start, the Prophet did not conceive the content of his message as the expression of pure otherness versus what the Arabs or the other societies of his time were producing. Islam does not establish a closed universe of reference but rather relies on a set of universal principles that can coincide with the fundamentals and values of other beliefs and religious traditions (even those produced by a polytheistic society such as that of Makkah at the time).⁴²

This, too, is a clear and outright rejection of an exclusivist and isolationist philosophy.

To further emphasize the Islamic spirit of peaceful coexistence and pluralism, which naturally delegitimizes the concept of the 'Other', the following seven examples will be offered. First, when Muslims were being persecuted in the early days of the Prophet's mission, he was informed by God to tell his Companions to seek refuge with a pious Christian king in Abyssinia. Upon arriving in Abyssinia, this small, weak, and persecuted group of Muslims was granted asylum. This historical event, well documented in Muslim history, remarkably displays the ability of Muslims of the time to positively interact with others. It offers a powerful and approving symbol for interreligious interaction. More importantly, this incident took place in the formative phase of Islam's growth and development. At this juncture, the Christian King of Abyssinia, by providing sanctuary to the Muslims, saved them from imminent annihilation. As a consequence one may reasonably presume that racial, religious and cultural interaction is normal for Muslims, both on a theoretical and on a practical level. Likewise, Prophet Muhammad, solely by virtue of sending the persecuted Muslims to Abyssinia, establishes a premise of not viewing Christians as the 'Other'. Conversely, where a particular Muslim society feels the pressures of intimidation and threat, then that would naturally lead to inwardness and isolation.

Second, inclusiveness was displayed by Prophet Muhammad when he entered Makkah under the protection of a pagan Arab, al-Mut'im ibn 'Udayy: "Finally, the Prophet sent a man from the tribe of Khuza'ah to al-Mut'im ibn Udayy, the leader of the Banu Nawfal ibn Abd Manaf, asking for his protection. Al-Mut'im agreed, immediately called his people and told them to put on their armour and place themselves at the corners of the *Ka'bah* to provide protection to Muhammad. Then the Messenger entered Makkah with Zayd and stopped at the *Ka'bah*. There, he touched the corner of the House, prayed and returned to his house under the protection of al-Mut'im and his armed retinue'.⁴³ This historical event occurred amidst the tribulations facing Prophet Muhammad while seeking support for his small, but growing, community. Amongst all those who refused to offer them sanctuary, it was, above all, a pagan Arab who guaranteed them protection. Here, too, is a clear instance in which Prophet Muhammad refused to see a pagan Arab as the 'Other'. In this is a clear message for Muslims – namely, the ability of Prophet Muhammad to seek protection from someone outside his faith, which thereby implies giving trust.

Third, to further explain Prophet Muhammad's behaviour towards those outside his racial, cultural and religious beliefs, there is a well-known incident involving an elderly Jewish lady who would consistently throw rubbish on him whenever he walked by. When a few days passed in which she was nowhere to be seen, Prophet Muhammad inquired about her whereabouts. Upon hearing that she was sick and bedridden, he compassionately visited her.⁴⁴ This is a testament to the gentleness, mercy and compassionate character of Prophet Muhammad, who saw humanity in people regardless of their religious persuasion, ethnic identity, or even their behaviour towards him. Thus, since Prophet Muhammad's example is the one that all Muslims are

encouraged to emulate, it is reasonable to assume that this is the ideal manner of interacting with others; one that negates the contemporary concept of an anti-ego 'Other'.

Fourth, in another display of his courtesy, Prophet Muhammad stood up, out of respect, when the funeral of a Jewish man was passing by. Upon seeing him stand, one of his companions asked why he was doing so when the funeral was for a non-Muslim. Prophet Muhammad replied that he stood out of respect for the death of another human being.⁴⁵ This, too, unmistakably reveals that Islamic civic culture aims to instil respect towards different communities. Here it is clear that Prophet Muhammad's behaviour was not encouraging an 'us' versus 'them' mentality. Rather, it was emphasizing pluralism and tolerance.

Fifth, when Prophet Muhammad was leaving Ta'if, where he was not only rejected by the polytheists and but also verbally and physically abused – to the extent that his sandals had soaked with his blood – two heavenly Angels approached him. On seeing the Prophet's condition, the two Angels offered to bring together the surrounding mountains and crush all the people in the valley. However, Prophet Muhammad refused since his hope was that perhaps the future generations of those people might accept Islam. Captivatingly, the Prophet Muhammad chose to display compassion and magnanimity to those who were physically harming him. This instance clearly indicates his ability to see the inherent and intrinsic humanity in those that were treating him inhumanely. What is interesting here is that he chose to 'see' people according to their intrinsic nature and potential, rather than the immediate manifestations of their outbursts of hostility. This too, coherently and consistently, follows the preceding sections on the innate goodness in humanity and its inherent interconnectedness.

Sixth, according to an authentic Prophetic saying, 'Abu Hurayrah reported: Messenger of Allah said, "He who believes in Allah and the Last Day let him not harm his neighbor; and he who believes in Allah and the Last Day let him show hospitality to his guest; and he who believes in Allah and the Last Day let him speak good or remain silent."'⁴⁶ This Prophetic saying shows that no differentiation exists between race, religion or creed in respect to one's neighbours. This represents a principled approach to humanity, further emphasizing the interconnectedness of peoples.

Seventh, as Eltigani Hamid points out, the interaction between Moses (peace be upon him) and Pharaoh, presumably Ramses N (1279 BC–1212 BC), as detailed in the Qur'an, indicates the manner in which to interact with those whose views are not only different but hostile. This incident is described by Hamid in a threefold manner: first, 'Moses (peace be upon him) attempts to communicate with Pharaoh – as an equal and someone who is not different from him in essence; second, Moses (peace be upon him) hopes to convince Pharaoh to change his cruel, unjust, and oppressive ways; thirdly, Pharaoh, however, refuses to comply and doubles the cruelty he inflicts on the Israelites'.⁴⁷ What is particularly important in this event is that it reveals Moses' attempts to reason with Pharaoh on a premise of 'togetherness'. The implication of

that is that Moses was sent as a Messenger to both the Israelites and Pharaoh. Moses was an Egyptian by birth and an Israelite by descent. Moses' message was addressed to the entire populace of historic Egypt – he was not solely interested in saving the Israelites while others were damned. Rather, he was interested in saving everyone that fell within his territorial space. Moreover, Moses was not trying to take Egyptians from their land, but was seeking to alter Pharaoh's unjust ways. In other words, Moses was struggling for justice and sought to put an end to Pharaoh's tyranny.

This difficult period was characterized by a struggle between Pharaoh and Moses concerning 'authority in the land' – whether that belongs to God or to Pharaoh.⁴⁸ At first, Moses tried to convince Pharaoh of God's message and to lighten the punishment of the Israelites, yet the latter remained unmoved. Then Moses had to choose between two options: migration with his religion or confining to live in Egypt but without his religion. 'The second option was impossible to accept since it implied Moses' rejection of his principles and forsaking his Prophetic mission. The former option was also disagreeable since Moses' purpose was not to flee but to enrich and convince'.⁴⁹ What he eventually decided upon was to honourably ask Pharaoh to allow the Israelites to leave with him. Pharaoh refused to do this since it would compromise his authority. After rejecting this option, Pharaoh imposed harsher restrictions on the Israelites – doubling their hard labour. Consequently, the Israelites suffered even more since they could not leave and were too weak to offer serious resistance.

Responding to their misfortune, 'Allah told them to be patient – establish prayer and give glad tidings to those that believe'.⁵⁰ What followed this is well known. However, it is pertinent to point out, for purposes of analysis, that this parable contains an important lesson, particularly for Muslims living in non-Muslim-majority countries. Those Muslims are encouraged to view the land that they live in as their own, similar to Prophet Moses' attitude. The space they legally live in is their land, albeit emotional and identity attachments to ancestral homelands need not be denied. Certainly, identity is a complex human construct that is not always clear-cut.⁵¹ Therefore, peaceful coexistence includes respect of shared public space and protection from infringement on private space and is a strong component in Islam. This parable informs the reader that Moses, when confronting the tyrannical Pharaoh, urged him to change his ways – choosing the option of leaving only after all other efforts had proven fruitless. Therefore, Muslims living in non-Muslim-majority countries must positively engage their surroundings, taking Prophet Moses' example for inspiration. If it really becomes impossible for Muslims to practice their faith then they are required to migrate to safer lands – but only as a last resort.

Taken as a whole, these seven points provide an insight into the spirit of peaceful coexistence, mutual tolerance and the myth of the 'Other' in Islamic parlance. In fact, Islamic theology rejects a construction of a concrete 'Other' and, instead, builds on the philosophical belief in the interconnectedness of humanity. From Prophet Moses' interaction with Pharaoh to the standards of

compassion and mercy displayed by Prophet Muhammad in his interactions with those distant from his racial, cultural or religious persuasion, the underlying theme of recognizing, respecting and reaching out is undeniable. Hence, there is no 'Other' in Islamic philosophy, which is tangible by race, culture or religious persuasion. It exists as an abstraction, a metaphysical anomaly which, thereby, prevents the process of demonization and allows the spirit of '*la Convivencia*' to flourish.

Linguistic heritage

In addition to the previous points, of particular importance is the linguistic heritage of the Qur'an that indicates a deep level of coexistence and tolerance. Linguistically, the concept of foreign words in a language has been often understood as 'borrowing'.⁵² And, as Hamza A. Tzortzis eloquently points out, all languages contain 'borrowed' words – he cites the example of English and the word 'philosophy' coming from two Greek words, 'philo' – the love of – and 'sophia' – wisdom.⁵³ However, this 'borrowing' may also be considered to be 'sharing' or 'embracing'. The language of the Qur'an – *fus'hah* Arabic – is different from pre-Islamic Arabic. And, according to Islamic theology, *fus'hah* Arabic was specifically created as something miraculous and enduring.⁵⁴ Notwithstanding that, an interesting debate has been going on in scholarly circles on whether the Qur'an only contains words of the Arabic language, or whether it has borrowed and assimilated some words to follow Arabic syntax, grammar and style. Regardless of whether there is a presence of foreign vocabulary in the Qur'an, what is more important to ask, if we assume that there is, is why? In response, perhaps, these foreign words were originally Arabic, 'borrowed' or 'shared' by other cultures and then reintroduced into the Qur'anic lexicon. Jalal al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman b. Abu Bakr al-Suyūti (d. 911/1505) argues that these foreign words had already been naturalized into the Arabic language before the revelation of the Qur'an.⁵⁵ Furthermore, he argues that there are 118 expressions from different languages found in the Qur'an that have been Qur'anically amalgamated.⁵⁶ Yet, for purposes of this analysis, it is our contention that the 'sharing' of words from other languages in the lexicon of the Qur'an testifies to its acceptance of diversity. Granted, this is mere conjecture; however, this line of reasoning follows the detailed extrication of the spirit of acceptance that the Islamic sources of legitimacy espouse. Some examples of the linguistic diversity in the Qur'an are: in verse 17: 35, the word '*qistas*' is from Greek; in 15: 74, the word '*sijil*' is from Persian; in 78: 25, the word '*ghassaq*' is from Turkish; in 2: 63, the word '*al-tur*' is from Syriac.⁵⁷ These words, and many others, collectively point to the plurality inherent in the Islamic linguistic tradition – vocabulary and language as a force to transform diversity into oneness. On a practical level, when people of diverse communities interact and speak of shared vocabulary in their languages, feelings of togetherness are promoted. It is a sign of the universality of the Qur'anic message that it employs words from other languages within its

vocabulary. Symbolically, then, it would not be an unlikely thing to deduce that in a strict linguistic sense, the Qur'an has employed a method to dispel the concept of the 'Other' by incorporating words from other languages.

Jihad, jizyah and justice

Notwithstanding this inclusive vision, another popular accusation against the spirit of coexistence, mutual acceptance and tolerance in Islam is the notion of '*jihad*' – which today has unfortunately been associated with religious intolerance, forcible conversions and relentless warfare.⁵⁸ Esposito states that the importance of *jihad* is rooted in the Qur'an's command to struggle (the literal meaning of the word) in the path of God and in the example of the Prophet Muhammad [peace be on him] and his early companions. In its most general meaning, *jihad* refers to an obligation incumbent on all Muslims, individuals and the community, to follow and realize God's will: to lead a virtuous life and to extend the Islamic community through preaching, education, example and writing. *Jihad* also includes the right, indeed the obligation, to defend Islam and the community from aggression.⁵⁹ In the Qur'an we find, in three separate verses, the explicit statement: 'there is no compulsion in matters of faith'.⁶⁰ This ideal has been manifested not only in theory, but also in practice. From the rise of Islam as a coalescing and coherent identity beginning 1432 years ago, Muslim empires have generally displayed remarkable tolerance of the 'other'.⁶¹ There is absolutely no Islamic justification for purging different communities from within a territorial expanse ruled by Muslims – and this has not been done. This point is verified with reference to three separate geographical areas: the Balkans, the Iberian Peninsula and South Asia. In these dissimilar areas Muslims established their rule for well over 500 years, but remained a minority or eventually were driven out. While it is undeniable that in these geographical areas atrocities were committed at certain times, this study argues that rather than being representative of Islam's normative framework and, thereby, religiously sanctified, those acts were perpetrated for political expediency or were retaliatory measures in a state of war. In each of these areas Muslim rulers had at least 500 years to forcibly convert the people, but did not do so. Perhaps this is one of the clearest responses to those who insist that Islam was spread by the sword.⁶²

The term '*jihad*' means 'struggle', and Prophet Muhammad has said that the 'greatest *jihad* is the *jihad* against the "*nafs*" – or inner self'.⁶³ Interestingly, Islamic theology does not have a concept of 'Holy war'.⁶⁴ And, as Abou El-Fadl suggests, neither classical nor contemporary scholars of even minor repute have used that term, '*al-Harb al-Muqaddasah*', in their writings.⁶⁵ War, in Islamic theology, is never holy. Rather, it is either justified or not and never exists in the realm of unlimited warfare.⁶⁶ In support of this, the Qur'an instructs Muslims not to haughtily turn away unbelievers who seek to make peace with Muslims. 'If God would have willed, He would have given the unbelievers power over you (Muslims) and they would have fought you

Muslims. Therefore, if they, unbelievers, withdraw from you and refuse to fight you, and instead send guarantees of peace, know that God has not given you a license to fight them'.⁶⁷

Another issue of contention is the '*jizyah*' – or poll tax – which is allegedly supposed to be imposed on all non-Muslims living in Muslim territorial rule. During the time when the Qur'an was revealed, it was common practice to impose taxes on hostile alien groups.⁶⁸ Building on historical practice, classical Muslim jurists argued that the poll tax was money collected from non-Muslims for protection – not as a method to demean.⁶⁹ Since *zakah* – an annual compulsory charity on Muslims amounting to 2.5 per cent of expendable income – was not taken from non-Muslims, a tax was imposed on non-Muslims since they shared in the space that the polity provided. If, however, protection was unfeasible, no tax was supposed to be levied. In fact, 'Umar b. al-Khattab – the Second Rightly Guided Caliph (13–23/634–643) and close companion of the Prophet Muhammad, returned the *jizyah* of an Arab Christian tribe that he was unable to defend against Byzantium aggression'.⁷⁰

The Qur'an does not pronounce an unwavering rule in favour of *jizyah*. Once more, as Abou El Fadl cautions, attention to historical circumstance is essential. The Qur'an endorsed a poll tax as a response to particular groups hostile to early Muslims. Importantly, Prophet Muhammad did not collect a poll tax from every non-Muslim tribe that submitted to Muslim sovereignty and, in fact, in the case of a large number of non-Muslim tribes that were impoverished, the Prophet paid them a periodic sum of money or goods.⁷¹ These tribes were known as 'those whose hearts have been reconciled'.⁷² In short, there are numerous indicators that the poll tax is not a theologically mandated practice, but a functional solution that was adopted in response to a specific set of historical circumstances. Only a fragmentary, superficial or ahistorical reading of the Qur'an could conclude otherwise.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to securely anchor the spirit of coexistence and pluralism as espoused in the Qur'an, the sayings of Prophet Muhammad and the Rashidun Era. This was not undertaken to explain isolated actions of people – irrespective of how they justify their actions. Nor was it intended to discuss the reasons for behavioural change in minority or majority settings. Actually, this chapter makes it clear that the normative principles as espoused by a complete reading of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* leave little room to deny a strong ethic of acceptance of diversity, tolerance of differing beliefs and upholding the spirit of coexistence. By doing so, this chapter attempts to articulate an ideal civic culture towards which Muslims are encouraged to develop. Included in explaining an Islamic civic culture is the 'myth' of the 'Other', which mandates a comprehensive reading of the Qur'anic text, since that is greater than the sum of its individual verses. Overall, the Qur'anic verses cited above establish a coherent philosophical outlook towards the

interconnectedness of humanity, life and truth – all of which is established on the Islamic concept of ‘*Tawhid*’ – or the oneness of God.

The current state of geopolitical and socio-economic affairs, along with perceived injustices, is promoting non-normative frameworks that exacerbate existing tensions and result in abnormal behaviour. Hence, the spirit of coexistence and the ideal of tolerance in Islam cannot be dismissed dogmatically by uncritical, ahistorical and fragmentary readings of the Qur’an. Tolerance is not, as suggested uncharitably by glib Western critics, something alien to the spirit of Islam.⁷³ After all, the lasting historical legacy of civilizational concord and the development of the concept of ‘*La Convivencia*’ itself, arose out of Islamic Spain, Portugal and Sicily. Clearly, the principles associated with ‘*La Convivencia*’ emanate from the Qur’an and the *Sunnah* and are conceptual, mandatory and normative. Therefore, not less but rather greater understanding and adherence to the entirety of the Islamic message will lead to individual and societal stability.

With respect to the non-normative framework, discussions of Islam need to be carried out with a full understanding that the real issue is not about doctrine or theology, but is primarily about Muslim people and their political life, which is defined by a legacy of colonial rule and contemporary political exclusion, with consequent oppression, that continues to this day – disguised in multiple ways and denied only by those who wish to maintain the current international status quo. Paolo Friere, in his inspiring work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, writes:

Never in history has violence been initiated by the oppressed. How could they be the initiators, if they themselves are the result of violence? How could they be the sponsors of something whose objective inauguration called forth from their existence as oppressed? There would be no oppressed had there been no prior situation of violence to establish their subjugation. Violence is initiated by those who oppress, exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons – not by those who are oppressed, exploited, or unrecognized.⁷⁴

By focusing on Islam, vested interests have distracted attention from the real geopolitical and socio-economical struggle.⁷⁵ By dismissing analyses of the root causes, and aggressively dismissing links between foreign policies and corporate economic strangulation, or ignoring the fact that beyond the poverty, illiteracy and chronic injustices is the profound impact of political exclusion, great violence is being perpetrated to portray the hunted as the hunter. This is often conveyed by the political cost–benefit analysis that characterizes children’s lives throughout the Middle East as expendable.⁷⁶ Granted, ‘[t]he world’s most pressing problems do not result from either excessive or insufficient tolerance in Islam’; neither are they a result of a caricatured portrait of Islam in the West.⁷⁷ Instead, the problem is the perpetuation of tyranny and an international system of oppression. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, oppression

is a 'prolonged, harsh, and cruel treatment or control'. Also, oppression has the following characteristics: 'mistreatment, systematic, institutionalized, socially condoned, elite sanctioned, of a group, by a group or people acting on behalf of society as a whole'.⁷⁸ And purely economic interests no longer drive the current gulf between the rich and poor – a gulf which is unparalleled in human history. Instead, it seems to be more a question of power: 'power to control and suppress; power to annihilate challenging ideas and provocative perspectives, especially those that might expose the grave injustices that shape the world. We are witnessing an age of monumental oppression in which institutions and mass media play a strategic role in marginalizing opposition' and manufacturing the consent necessary to sustain global political domination and economic pillage.⁷⁹ We are witnessing greater and ever more restrictions placed on our liberty, masquerading in the name of freedom.

Overall, this chapter shows that the principles of mutual acceptance, respect for diversity and sincere recognition of different paths to God are verified by the Qur'anic verses and Prophetic sayings. Clearly, this study posits that those ideals should be adapted to the present political context of Muslim polities, which, in turn, would lead to stability. Islam is an idealistic faith – in that it gives its followers ideals to try to attain and live by, both socially and politically. The real world exists in a specific context. Henceforth, a believer must look towards those ideals and work for their concretization into society. This, precisely, is a motivating drive for conscientious Muslims today – to move from the real, where they are, to the 'ideal', where they wish to be.

Notes

- 1 Chak, Farhan Mujahid. 'La Convivencia: The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam', in *Islamic Studies*, 48, (2009): 567–90. This chapter has been significantly revised from the author's previous article.
- 2 Kaya, Ayhan. *Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey*, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) p. 11.
- 3 Marcuse, Herbert. 'Repressive Tolerance', in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore Jr and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 95.
- 4 See, Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi, *Dialogue of Abrahamic Faiths* (Baltimore, MD: Al-Sadawi Publications, 1991) pp. 2–9.
- 5 See, John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (New York: Gallup Press, 2007) pp. 3–13.
- 6 See, Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our World* (New York: Routledge, 2007) p. 3.
- 7 See, Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005) p. 1.
- 8 See, Mohammed M. Hafeez, *Why Muslims Rebel?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) pp. 203–10.
- 9 On 4 September 2005, a BBC panel discussion elaborated on 'the battle for the soul of Islam', which avoided any analysis of the root causes of instability.
- 10 See, Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1989). See also Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Random House, 1981).

- 11 Chomsky, Noam. *Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002) p. 16.
- 12 Esposito, John L. 'Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century', in John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East* (London: Hurst and Company Publishing, 2000) p. 1.
- 13 Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji. *Al-Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life*, 2nd edition, (Herndon, VA: Amana Publishers, 1994) p. 43.
- 14 See *Qur'an* 49: 13.
- 15 *Qur'an*: 7: 172. See, Hamid, Eltigani. *The Qur'an and Politics*, pp. 33–35.
- 16 See, *Qur'an* 14: 4.
- 17 See, *Qur'an* 16: 36.
- 18 This reference to the *Qur'an* also being called the 'Reminder' is mentioned in 68 verses throughout the *Qur'an*. For instance, see *Qur'an* 3: 58.
- 19 *Qur'an* 5: 03.
- 20 Hadith no. 21257 in the Musnad Ibn Hanbal. http://islamic-replies.ucoz.com/Number_Prophets_and_Messengers.html.
- 21 See, Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Place of Tolerance in Islam* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002) p. 15.
- 22 Ibid., p. 16.
- 23 *Qur'an* 49: 13
- 24 *Qur'an* 11: 118–19.
- 25 *Qur'an* 5: 49.
- 26 *Qur'an* 2: 63.
- 27 Abou El Fadl, Khaled. *The Place of Tolerance in Islam*, p. 17.
- 28 See M.R. Leary and J.P. Tangney, *Handbook of Self and Identity* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003) p. 3. See also, James E. Cote and Charles Levin, *Identity Formation, Agency, and Culture* (New York: Psychology Press, 2002) pp. 19–24.
- 29 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) p. 12.
- 30 See Simone de Beauvoir, 'Women: Myth and Reality', in Althea Prince and Susan Silva Wayne, *Feminisms and Womanisms: A Women's Studies Reader* (Toronto: Women's Press, 2004) pp. 59–65.
- 31 Said, Edward. *Orientalism*, (New York: Random House, 1979) pp. 8–18.
- 32 *Qur'an* 4: 140.
- 33 *Qur'an* 2: 105.
- 34 *Qur'an* 5: 61.
- 35 *Qur'an* 11: 116.
- 36 *Qur'an* 4: 2.
- 37 *Qur'an* 5: 57.
- 38 Ramadan, Tariq. *To Be a European Muslim*, (Leicester: Islamic Foundation Publishers, 1999) p. 13.
- 39 See, for details, Abu Bakr Ahmad b. al-Husayn al-Bayhaqi. *Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubri*, Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir 'Ata' (ed.), 10 vols, (Makkah al-Makarramah: Maktabah Dar al-Baz, 1414/1994) 6: 365–67.
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Part 2

Contextual and individual spheres of inquiry

6 The Pakistan movement and competing ideologies¹

Introduction

This chapter discusses the relationship between the ‘foundational’ political values of Islam and its impact on the Muslims residing in the British Raj, eventually culminating in the Pakistan movement. By doing so, it reveals how a dialectical relationship between the ‘foundational’ and ‘contextual’ led to the eventual formation of the Pakistan movement and a quest for a separate homeland for Muslims residing in the British Empire in South Asia.² To be clear, in 1947 the British Empire was partitioned; it was not ‘India’ per se, as is commonly and inaccurately believed. The territory that became Pakistan was, by and large, culturally, linguistically and racially different to that which became India. Herein, as well, resides an inherent source of disagreement based on these very interpretations. It is here, then, that the source of political instability arises, which Malik classifies as a clash of ideologies.³ Actually, Malik uses the term ‘ideology’ as signifying the ‘enduring conflict between the traditionalists and modernists characterized by mutual negation and denigration rather than dialogue’.⁴ This chapter then examines that mutual negation and ideological tussle – a tussle between the ‘foundational’ and the ‘contextual’, with its origins in diverse understandings of the sacred and the secular.

The relationship between the sacred and the secular is often multifaceted and perplexing. Religion and the formation of society, including the politicization of religion into formal institutions, have been, quite often, intricately intertwined. The ‘divinity’ of the ruler and his unique closeness to a ‘higher power’ was often explicit, and considerable attempts were made to legitimize authority based on such a rationalization. This was particularly true for the Middle East.⁵ Consequently, laws governing the temporal life of society were indistinguishable from laws pertaining to the ‘afterlife’.⁶ There existed a clear, rational link between ‘where people are’ – this world – and ‘where they will eventually go’ – the hereafter. Evidently, laws pertaining to religion and society were integrated to reflect this unanimity in thought. With the advent of Islam, in this geographical area, that premise did not alter. Rather, it built upon extant social construction by further coalescing the sacred and secular into a singularity. As a result, ‘sacredness’, or religion, permeated all aspects of society, including

its art, economics and politics. Iqbal eloquently articulates this Islamic premise by suggesting 'the Ultimate Reality is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material and the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being'.⁷

Contrarily, in Europe, the relationship between the secular and the sacred was entirely different. So, too, was the role religion was to have upon society. The initial persecution of Christians by the Romans resulted in the development of the separate institutions of church and state. Ahmad says of Christianity, 'Later, when it converted the Roman emperors and became the religion of the Roman Empire, its role as a religion remained distinct from the state'.⁸ In other words, the initial growth and development of Christianity was characterized by its isolation from political power. Even afterwards, when Roman emperors embraced Christianity, a rationalization of estrangement persisted. Therefore, the separation between church and state had clear, definable historical antecedents. Yet what did this all imply, socially, for Europe?

Eventually, the implication of this dichotomy was the development of two contradictory societal institutions and forces – led by a pope or emperor. Both were powerful, yet they often clashed with one another – two entirely separate, and diametrically opposed, value systems coexisting in society. The only rationalization, then, was to propose the autonomy of the each sphere: religion without power, and power without moral constraints. The 'Enlightenment' brought this battle for the soul of Europe to an end. Religion was stigmatized as trickery and with it people witnessed the withering away of the hitherto understood natural order. From this onslaught, religion retreated to the domain of the private and a newfound utilitarian morality came to dominate the public sphere. That, too, would eventually fade away in the cold, calculated egotistical calculation of 'bourgeois civilization left no other bond between man and man but naked self-interest and callous cash-payment'.⁹ Nevertheless, the trajectory of sacred and secular forces in Europe remains distinct.

Clearly, the contrary opinions held concerning the sacred and the secular in the Middle East and Europe led to different attitudes towards religion and society. Recognizing that, this article examines those deep assumptions to explain the unique fusion of religion, society and politics that led to the quest for Pakistan. To do so, it follows a three-fold strategy: first, it elaborates upon the role of religion and society, including notions of sacredness and secularism, in Islam. Second, it carefully examines Islamic axiology and its impact on society, which, ultimately, led to the propagation of a 'homeland' for Muslims living in the British Raj. Here, the demand for a separate homeland is demonstrative of those very assumptions at the basis of conflicting Middle Eastern and European attitudes towards sacredness and secularism. The fusion of those forces, temporal and spiritual, negated the possibility of conceiving of a society without a spiritual foundation. It is no wonder, then, that the vast majority of people embraced the idea of Pakistan, since it offered a rationalization reflecting those deeper aspirations resonating in people.¹⁰ Third, it examines the varied manner in which individuals reconcile the sacred and

secular, which thenceforth produces three variant political cultures. This explains Malik's assertion that a significant point of social tension in Pakistan is 'ideological' since each of them impacts religion, the formation of society and the political movement for Pakistan in their own ways.¹¹

The interaction of religion and society in Islam

Islam's perspective on sacredness and secularism would shape its impact on society and, in turn, affect notions of political power and leadership. Markedly, it began on an entirely different premise from that of Christianity. The Prophet Muhammad who was persecuted in Mecca became, in Medina, both the spiritual and temporal head of society. The factor of territoriality was of secondary importance.¹² Of primary importance, was the idea of the formation of a 'faith-centric community', or 'ummah', based on the interconnectedness, or unity, of the world, truth and God.¹³ The concept of the ummah is predominantly extraterritorial. It links people, first, in thought and belief, then spatially. Therefore, Islam attempts to inculcate two twin loyalties, one Universalist in scope and the other localizing in application. Of course the extent of universalizing can range considerably from generous inclusion to exclusivist paucity. Either as a wider 'Ummah' of humanity including all peoples and their orthodoxies, or as 'dhimmi' or 'People of the Book', to a restricted coterie alienating those within the Islamic tradition.¹⁴ Nonetheless, those twin loyalties are motivated by a belief in the fusion of sacredness and secularism, which connects peoples in their temporal existence.

The establishment of the first political order of Muslims in Medina coincided with their political domination, representing a sacred/secular fusion.¹⁵ From that moment onwards, political leadership in Islam attempts to be both sacred and secular. The ruler, according to Qur'anic exegesis, was a sacred leader in that he was bound by his commitments to God and, thereby, to people. His authority is rationalized on account of that commitment, which if broken is rendered void. Likewise, the ruler was a secular leader in that he was concerned with the sociopolitical and economic well being of the masses.¹⁶ This does not intend the leader to be a pope-like figure, since there exists no theologically sanctioned mediator between an individual and God in Islam. Nevertheless, there does exist a unique coalescing of the sacred ultimate reality needing to exist in the temporal, but being above it. This is, exactly, the high classicism that defines the parameters of Islamic discourse.

Classical Muslim political theory emphasizes the close relationship of religion, society and the prevailing political infrastructures. Al-Alwani concurs, citing Islamic jurisprudence, which amalgamates religion, law, the political infrastructure and society as a single totality, although with distinct spheres.¹⁷ Ahmed, on the other hand, states: 'the fusion of religion and political power was and remains an ideal in the Muslim tradition. But the absence of such a fusion is a historically experienced and recognized fact ... the many manifestations of this reality are important to comprehending Muslim polities'.¹⁸

This, precisely, is that upon which our examination develops – the multiplicity of those realities and how they reinforce different meanings to the role of religion, politics and society.

Certainly, the practical situation in Muslim society is testament to this ambiguity between ideals and reality. Throughout history the moral directives of religion have perpetually wrestled and competed with the contextual realities of 'realpolitik', and *Pax Islamica* was no different. During the early leadership of the first four caliphs, the moral directives of Islam were coalescing with the formation of the state, its political system and institutions. In other words, religion and the state were integrated. Yet there are scholars that dispute this. Shaban, for instance, points out that under the third caliph, Uthman, and the fourth, Ali, temporal or contextual factors, including trade and commerce, determined the principal state policies and religion became more a matter of individual piety.¹⁹ He is not alone; often those looking from the 'outside in' at Muslim polities offer similar accusations. Yet what is missing in their analysis is this: irrespective of whether moral directives were taking precedence or were sincere, the rationalization of power was premised on a spiritual narrative. The parameters within which legitimacy and authority were lost or gained were religiously sanctified. This was exhibited by the justification for the overthrow of the Umayyad caliphate.²⁰ So, too, with the Abbasids, their successors, even though they were no *Priest Kings*. Individuals at the forefront of rebellion justified their behaviour by claiming a better representation of the ideal. So, even while religion may have influenced the state machinery only through enfranchisement and the employment of theologians in the state's administration of justice, what is crucial is that the political leadership was honouring tradition, elevating those ideals expounded in Islam.

During the rise of Muslim empires in South Asia, the same situation persisted. Tension between the moral directives of religion, those 'foundational' principles emanating from Islamic sources of legitimacy and the societal context of Muslims in the British Raj, led to a struggle between the 'ideal' and the 'real'. This natural ambiguity led Ahmad to state that numerous 'political theorists of Medieval Muslim India glibly referred to the togetherness of religion and the formation of society, including its political systems and institutions. In actuality, except for the judiciary, the Mughal Empire ran the administration in a civil and secular pattern'.²¹ Here Ahmed mistakenly juxtaposes a European cultural dichotomy upon Mughal rulership by characterizing civic activity as removed from religion. Since when was it agreed that sacredness did not entail temporal activity? This is, exactly, what Islam does; it adds an ethical dimension to the temporal, which shapes the narrative and consequent institutions.

Certainly, only when a perceived threat occurs do Muslim politics often enter into a stage of refocusing on 'foundational' moral directives.²² Interestingly, it was not when Muslims ruled, but when they were threatened and suffered an actual loss of power that there was a re-evaluation, which often meant a reattachment to the moral directives of religious doctrine. Yet rather

than dismissing that motivation, is this type of soul-searching not true for any society fearing decline? Does not an inability to effectively respond to challenges compel people to critical self-examination? Is this not, similarly, occurring in Europe today? That same fear of loss of social identity and increasing political exclusion, in early eighteenth-century South Asia, permeates the thought of Shah Waliullah. After the collapse of the Mughal Empire and the death of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, he initiated a movement essentially concerned with purifying and protecting Muslim identity.²³ He was a 'saintly scholar' whose influence on later Muslim thinkers is considered immense.²⁴ However, it is important to ask, what were those teachings that resonated so profoundly? Specifically, he wished to reintroduce that long-standing rationalization that blended the sacred and secular in society, and thereby mandated leadership which would protect communitarian interests.

Leadership and the Pakistan movement

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the sentiments of many Muslims in the British Raj reflected a deep insecurity, a keen awareness of their loss of power and the forced cultural encroachment by a hostile Hindu majority.²⁵ That fear was further compounded by British malfeasance that made them feel more under threat. This led to Muslims holding ambivalent feelings toward their place in society. In response, their political leadership offered a wide array of options, ranging from a united non-communal stance to confront the colonizers to a separate homeland for Muslims. According to Alavi, Muslim political leadership produced 'secular', 'modernist' and 'fundamentalist' varieties.²⁶ Syed, alternatively, broadly classifies Muslim political leadership into Muslim nationalists and their ideological counterparts, including Maulana Maudoodi.²⁷ Malik, with more precision, delineates eight classifications for Muslim political leadership.²⁸ Notwithstanding that, this book classifies Muslim political leadership into three types, based on their manner of reconciling the moral imperatives of Islam and its impact on society. Admittedly, this simplification does not cover the entire spectrum of Muslim leadership during the British Raj. However, it is comprehensive enough to reveal stark distinctions that broadly characterise the ambit of political leadership. First, the 'traditionalists', who focused on a permanence of both the moral directives and their concrete application. They 'live in the past', so to speak, ignoring context, and embraced the nouveau Indian narrative since no 'pure' Islamic polity existed. Second, the 'secularists', who were not overly concerned about Muslim identity, Islam or its moral directives. They wished to 'bury the past' and often held regional loyalties or a broader Indian one. Third, the 'revivalists', who attempted to contextualize the moral directives of Islam in their new societal circumstances. By doing so, they advocated a separate homeland for Muslims and wished to 'reconcile the past, in the present, for the future'. Those who would contextualize the moral directives of Islam, recognizing the modicum of social manoeuvrability, won this struggle for political leadership. In other

words, the 'revivalists', with a vision that coalesced the sacred and secular in society, found popular acceptance.

Traditionalist leaders

The traditionalist leadership type is described as such, primarily, by refusing to consider a re-evaluation of Islamic principles in light of contextual realities. For them, substance and form were both 'unchanging' and this included the majority of 'ulema', or religious scholars, in the British Raj during the early twentieth century. It is these aversions to adaptation that, by and large, have seen traditionalists support the status quo – irrespective of whether or not it is just. At this time, many, but not all, of the religious scholars were among one of three dominant Islamic groups, namely the Bareilvi, Deobandi and, eventually, Jamaat-i-Islami. And, among those, the majority of religious scholars were Bareilvi Sunni Muslims who followed a moribund and anti-intellectual form of Islam based on rudimentary mysticism and other superstitions.²⁹ The Bareilvi had a largely 'Sufi' outlook and extensively mingled with other religious communities.

Another group, characterized under the 'traditionalist' designation, is the Deobandi. In 1867, an orthodox Sunni seat of learning was established in the city of Deoband in Northern India. Deobandis, as they were known, were strict followers of a historic understanding of Shari'ah (Islamic law), and resented any Muslim political leader who indulged in reformulating Islamic principles to adapt to present circumstances. As a consequence, 'the Deobandis remained loyal to the Congress which was deemed a nationalist organization struggling for the liberation of the homeland'.³⁰ Furthermore, for the Deobandis, the idea of Pakistan was dismissed as a ploy of the Muslim modernists, who wanted to establish their own worldly power.

The Jamaat-i-Islami, founded by Maulana Maudoodi in 1941, remains the most influential political religious party in Pakistan today.³¹ The 'Jamaat-i-Islami was opposed to the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 and its Emir (chief) Maulana Maudoodi, bitterly opposed the establishment of Pakistan as a Muslim national state'.³² Malik suggests that Maudoodi opposed the campaign for Pakistan because he believed it would not become an Islamic state. 'He maintained that 99.9 per cent of the Indian Muslims were thoroughly degenerate. They had little or no knowledge of Islam, their moral and intellectual orientations were un-Islamic and in many cases, they could not tell right from wrong'.³³ This obvious display of disdain towards people continues to be a significant feature of many 'traditionalist' ulema. Strikingly, those entrusted with the spiritual well-being of society were marred by an elitist attitude towards others. Perhaps this explains their inability to gather significant grass-roots support and provide effective political leadership during the Pakistan movement – and even now. However, there is strong evidence that this, today, is no longer the situation. Now, the Jamaat-Islami remains, after Pakistan's Justice Movement party, the only other party that chooses its leadership democratically.³⁴ In addition, the

historic aversion of these religious groups to the Pakistan movement does not reflect their current perspectives.

Yet, taking those three major religious forces into consideration, a single, important question remains: why did many of the religiously educated classes of scholars formerly refuse to support the Pakistan movement? According to Qureshi, the 'ulema were opposed to Pakistan on two grounds: 1) Islam is a universal religion and therefore must not be confined to and identified with a national state; and 2) the leadership of the Muslim League, mainly comprising the westernized Muslims, could not work for Islam'.³⁵ The majority of ulema, who had organized themselves in the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, had thrown their lot in with the Indian National Congress party and opposed the demand for Pakistan. In other words, they accepted a narrative that did not resonate in the hearts of the majority of Muslims. Maudoodi went so far as to say that if the Muslims did not stop supporting the demand for a separate homeland, he would leave them and the people could 'all go to hell'.³⁶ Nevertheless, once Pakistan came into being these groups joined a hectic race to convert it into a theocratic state.

The religious parties, run by the religious scholars, lacked a consensus-based program for Muslims in the British Raj. Not only did they not support the creation of Pakistan, they vehemently opposed it and offered no alternatives to address Muslim concerns. Qureshi states that the 'ulema were respected by the Muslim masses and even followed them in their religious matters, but these same Muslim masses had followed the politicians in their politics and fought to the bitter end for the achievement of Pakistan in spite of opposition to Pakistan and vilification of Jinnah by the more reputed and generally respected ulema of pro-Congress leanings'.³⁷ Here, what is of utmost significance is that people chose to ignore their religious leaders. Why? Clearly, the narrative presented by traditionalists did not resonate with them. By failing to present the moral directives of Islam into their contextual realities, they were unable to gain popular acceptance.

The secularists

The 'secularist' leadership type includes individuals who were thoroughly secularist in their philosophical outlook. By definition, they were not overly concerned about Muslim identity or religious doctrine. Malik characterizes this type of Muslim leadership as 'non-communal' and provides three sub-classifications: 'First, the secular/trans-communal rightist provincial politics that included the Unionists Party in Punjab, and various political groups in Sindh; second, secular non-communal provincial politics such as the Krishak Proja Party in Bengal; third, the secular non-communal nationalists such as the ruling Congress party in the North West Frontier Province'.³⁸ Subtleties aside, all these secularist elites shared a commonality in considering religion as unimportant for political identity. Ultimately, by doing so, they disassociated themselves from the social currency of their own environment. By refusing to

consider the importance of Islamic moral directives they alienated themselves from all the people who are attached to their religion. Similar to 'traditionalists', these leaders often viewed the masses as inferior and looked down upon their practice of faith as 'backward'.³⁹ The only difference, in this respect, between them was one condemning improper faith, and the other condemning it altogether.

Secular elites such as the Unionist Party in the province of Punjab, Khudai Khidmatgar in the North West Frontier Province, and the Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, concentrated policies and strategies in their respective regions.⁴⁰ Malik suggests: 'the Krishak Proja Party led by Fazl ul-Haq was quite different than the Punjabi Unionists, but both maintained an essentially regional characteristic'.⁴¹ Accordingly, the wider appeal of these leaders was negligible. Not only did their refutation of religious norms isolate them from people, but also their emphasis on regional loyalties further disqualified them. By refusing to clothe their ambitions, regional or otherwise, in the framework of accepted social values, they ultimately became inconsequential. Moreover, many 'secular' elites came from the feudal/land-owning class that, Gardezi argues, 'owes its origin primarily to the colonial policy pursued by the British'.⁴² As the administrative and economic needs of the British Raj dictated, they superimposed, on the indigenous stratification systems, 'small groups of functionaries and privileged classes whose orientations and interests were deflected from the common concerns of their own people to serve the interests of the Empire'.⁴³ To solidify their power base, the British authorities granted permanent land-settlement programmes to reward loyal subjects. 'Large tracts of land were in some instances awarded to people who were ruthless enough to indenture masses of labourers to dig a canal or build a strategic road. These landowning gentry came to be known as *zamindars*, *talukdars*, *jagirdars*, *mansabdars*, *nawabs*, and so forth'.⁴⁴ Many of the landowning gentry eventually supported the movement for Pakistan; yet this does not negate the fact that political leaders from this class emphasized a regional political agenda.

By not focusing on the moral directives of Islam, and its manifestation in society, these secularists failed to capture the imagination of the majority of the masses and delegitimized their qualifications for leadership. Thus they failed to muster the support of the people; this is not surprising as they often viewed them and their traditions as impediments to growth, prosperity and progress.⁴⁵

The revivalists

Lastly, the 'revivalist' type of leadership attempted to contextualize the moral directives of Islam and eventually demanded a separate homeland for Muslims in the British Raj. This leadership type includes the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, considered to be the 'ideologue' of Pakistan, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, known as the *Quaid-e-Azam*. Of course there were others, such as secular Muslim nationalists like 'Humayun Kabir and Mian Iftikhar ud-Din who,

unlike the regional-provincial secular elites, moved in the mainstream nationalist-ideological movements'.⁴⁶ The definitive characteristic of this typology is not commitment to religious ritual, but rather an appreciation of the established social narrative of their society. Ahmed states:

Muslim society, in responding to modernity, and when confronted by two clear choices of leadership in the last century, rejected both. The first was traditionalist, orthodox and exemplified by the 'ulema,' the clerics and religious figures of Islam. The second type of leadership rejected Islam altogether either by adopting extreme forms of Sufistic or unorthodox behaviour or by mimicking other cultures like the British or Hindu. There was a third way: a synthesis of many principles.⁴⁷

That, precisely, is how we describe both Jinnah and Iqbal, who attempted to re-evaluate the moral directives of Islam while being cognizant of their contextual realities. Unlike others, they believed in their people, cherished their civilization and honoured tradition. That allowed them to secure the support of the people, who eagerly followed them on their quest to create a homeland for Muslims.

Muhammad Iqbal

Muhammad Iqbal was born into a middle-class Kashmiri family in the city of Sialkot. He studied at Cambridge and obtained a British law degree and a PhD in Persian metaphysics from Germany.⁴⁸ His poetic talent catapulted him into the limelight, granting him enormous mass appeal. He emerged as a leading Muslim thinker, known throughout the entire Muslim world. However, Ahmed suggests that 'despite great vigour and force in his reflections it is difficult to identify any one particular comprehensive message that he gave to his audience. That he looked toward Islam, as a civilizational force, for solutions to the problems facing the Muslim community is probably the best way to describe his theoretical propensity'.⁴⁹ Through his respect for the common person, Iqbal secured the appreciation of the masses, cherishing their traditions, beliefs and values.

Iqbal's perspective on the individual and society was against unbridled individualism, which may ignore human responsibility to one another, and a totalitarian state, which undermined individual creativity. Both the individual and society are supposed to submit to higher ethics – in Islamic parlance, a submission to revelation.⁵⁰ Here, two important points need clarification. First, the individual and society are not seen as antagonistic towards one another and this is a result of the peculiar amalgamation of certain moral directives and society. Second, this higher ethics seeks to streamline the efforts of individuals in order to create a unified social vision, and, at the same time, create a social environment that would allow its members to realize their personal potential in the most effective way.⁵¹ Political leadership, then, is the

vehicle responsible for carrying out that responsibility by defining what that 'code' actually amounts to in society. Iqbal's most important intellectual contribution articulated this necessity in Muslim society – the requisite ability to reconstruct its enduring principles conducive to space-time.⁵²

Furthermore, Iqbal offered poignant reflections condemning capitalism and its consequential exploitation of people. He was emphatic about his preference for social democracy, which he believed was commensurate with Islam. 'The acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam'.⁵³ His praise for socialism stemmed from his concern for social justice. In this regard he came out openly in favour of the 'rights of the workers and peasants, expressing abhorrence for any economic system that exploited the labour of the working people. Pertaining to land, he emphasized that, in Islam, land belonged to God and, therefore, the fruits of agricultural labour should rightly go to the tiller'.⁵⁴ However, even while insisting on ethics and politics, he did not suggest a theocratic form of governance. Rather, he believed that if moral principles, like accountability, are absent in political leadership then the result is tyranny. Supportive of this, he stated: 'In Islam, the spiritual and temporal are not two distinct domains ... Islam is a single unanalyzable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies ... the State, according to Islam, is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization. It is in this sense alone that the State in Islam is a theocracy, not that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility'.⁵⁵

Clearly, Iqbal's concept of Muslim politics was religio-political: 'Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam, God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state are organic to each other'.⁵⁶ With these critical reflections on the moral directives of Islam, their impact on society and the responsibility of human agency to uphold that, it is unsurprising that 'political separatism found its most explicit expression in the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal's Presidential Address to the Muslim League in 1930'.⁵⁷ In that presidential address at the thirtieth annual session of the Muslim League, Iqbal asserted that Muslims had every right to full and free development of their culture and traditions. The situation was dire, and in his latter years he would pass the torch of leadership to none other than Muhammad Ali Jinnah.⁵⁸

Muhammad Ali Jinnah

The undisputed political leader of the Pakistan movement was Mohammed Ali Jinnah, called Quaid-i-Azam or Great Leader, born in the ethnic minority of Khoja Shias, though committed to Sunni Islam early in his life.⁵⁹ He, too, understood that the moral directives emanating from the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings required contextualizing. As such, he championed the cause of a separate homeland for Muslims with great perseverance and resolution. This is, exactly, where many academics who argue Jinnah had 'little to do with

religious dogma in his life' misrepresent the entirety of his narrative.⁶⁰ His acceptance of the dominant social narrative, represented through its values, was more important than, simply, adhering to religious rituals. He was committed to a narrative that unified the secular and sacred, understood the ethical foundations of a polity and supported the indigenous value system that exemplified those ethics. Therefore, it resonated with people. Naturally, his primary concern was for the rights of his community, who increasingly lived as oppressed people living in the British Raj. Jinnah said, 'Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state'.⁶¹ As Abbott remarks, this was the beginning of the infamous two-nation theory.⁶² Malik concurs and suggests that, for Jinnah, 'Islam was a solidifying and activating force, which gave an identity to the community whose only alternative was to accept the position of a permanent minority'.⁶³ That minority position frightened Jinnah, as he felt uneasy about the future treatment Muslims would endure under a Hindu majority. That fear of injustice compelled Jinnah to accept the helm of the Muslim League, the political party organized specifically to safeguard Muslim interests.

Events, including communal violence and coercive institutionalized 'Hindunization' throughout the British Raj, convinced Jinnah that Muslims had no choice but to demand their own homeland.⁶⁴ Recognizing the lack of support coming from the ulema, he organized another religio-political organization, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, headed by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani.⁶⁵ However, he was particularly cautious of not creating a theocracy. On August 11th, 1947, while addressing members of the constituent assembly in Pakistan, he said:

Now, if we want to make this great state of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly concentrate on the well being of the people, and specially of the masses and the poor ... You are free, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.⁶⁶

This demonstrates Jinnah's aspirations for the direction of the new State of Pakistan. Three days after this speech, on 14 August 1947, Pakistan became a new state.

Jinnah and Iqbal's concepts were simple and precise. They wished to protect the interests of their constituency from the perceived hegemony of the majority Hindu community. Both came to the conclusion that Muslim interests could only be safeguarded within the confines of a separate state. To that end, they were instrumental in conceiving of the Muslim League as a political party. 'Polarized as we are between the liberals and the theocrats, between the progressives and the sectarians, between the modernists and the orthodox, very few can cut across this divide'.⁶⁷ Both leaders were wary of extremes, as

represented by leaders that did not consider the moral directives of Islam and the traditionalists who refused to re-evaluate those values in their context. By 1946, as the elections to the assemblies proved, Muslim masses had identified themselves with this specific type of Muslim leader. Muslim voters, supporting the Muslim League, under the sagacious leadership of Jinnah, gave a clear verdict in favour of Pakistan: '440 Muslim seats were won by the Muslim League out of a total of 495. It won landslide victories in all the Muslim majority provinces except the North-West Frontier'.⁶⁸

Conclusion

The unique relationship that the revivalist encourages between the foundational and the contextual naturally led to the development of the Pakistan movement. Its origins are traced to the linkages between religion and society, as well as the sacred and secular, prior to the advent of Islam in the Middle East. However, when Islam did rise, it did not reject that extant social rationalization. Rather, it further developed it into a distinct coalescing of the sacred and secular. This, in essence, spiritualized the entirety of the Islamic narrative. Therefore, wherever Muslims found themselves, a similar holistic ethical and spiritual narrative would develop. Generations later, among the Muslim minority in South Asia, that narrative would develop along the lines of Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah – resonating with the majority of the people.

The situation in South Asia, from the late nineteenth century onwards, was tense, with the Muslim minority feeling threatened. Political exclusion, disempowerment and economic servitude crippled this once vibrant and regal community. With the decision of the British to relinquish control of these territories, a plethora of leaders arose advocating a wide range of paths. Three leadership types, in particular, were presented, distinguished by their method of interacting with the moral directives and foundational values of Islam and their context. First, the 'traditionalists,' who refused to accept the concept of the 'nation-state' since no such articulation, historically, existed in Islam and it would be impious to rationalize it now. They stressed the universality of Islam, and argued that too many Muslims would be left out of the map of Pakistan for it to be credible. However, they did little to address the concerns of the masses overwhelmed socio-economically and culturally. As a result, they 'lived in the past', so to speak, but not to recreate that utopia in the present. Interestingly, they found a strange convergence of opinion with the 'secularists', who were, also, competing in the political arena. This powerful, 'secular' class ignored the Islamic narrative in their society and, frankly speaking, belittled religiosity. In a way, they wished to 'bury the past'. For them, it was unimportant to fashion their narrative on the dominant social currency in their surroundings. How could they? Their self-conception was predominantly based on how different they were, and continued to be, from the masses. It is unsurprising, then, that those who were able to understand and reapply the moral directives of Islam into their contextual realities succeeded

in obtaining political leadership. The 'revivalists' captured the imagination of their constituency, reconciled their present, and connected it with their past. Furthermore, they provided people with a vision for the future. By doing so, they revealed, as the electoral victory of the Muslim League further supports, that leadership which balances the forces of tradition and modernity would find popular acceptance. The sweeping power of 'civic Islamism' following the Arab Spring is symptomatic of this reality.

Overall, the conflict between the traditionalists – those unwilling to contextualize the moral directives and foundational values of Islam – and the secularists – those that do not, essentially, care about Islamic social norms – plays out in contemporary Pakistani politics, and the wider Middle East. By using the formative phase of the Pakistan movement as an example, this study attempted to shed light on the manner in which that ideological tussle was resolved. In all likelihood, this tense ideological conflict will persist, and it is firmly believed that, if the 1946 elections are an indication, the future of Muslim polities will exhibit a similar pattern of success for 'revivalist' leadership if open, transparent elections are allowed.

Notes

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7 Constitutional development in Pakistan

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the history, development and legal transformations of Pakistan's constitution. By selecting a few crucial constitutional events for harder analysis, it evaluates the manipulation of the constitution as symptomatic of Pakistan's political culture. In other words, constitutional manipulation is, often, a result of different ideological approaches on managing the 'foundational' values and 'contextual' realities. Certainly, there are numerous other factors that exacerbate that tension, including the divisions of power and civilian–military relations. The military, especially, has always been in the background, pulled between these conflicting polarities, overseeing, and further complicating, the ideological tug-of-war. Mahmud goes as far to categorize Pakistan as 'a praetorian state, one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system ... Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army frequently intervenes in the government'.¹ Yet, overall, Pakistan's chronic constitutional crises are usually debated in either of three ways: first, Mahmud's praetorian model, criticizing the military; second, Newberg's claim of 'incomplete constitution-making [that] has placed the burdens of constitutional interpretation on state instruments ranging from the bureaucracy to the military to the judiciary';² third, Khan's thorough characterization of constitutional crises being a by-product of its manipulation by elites, whether economic, political or military.³ This chapter, developing from Khan, proposes a fourth reasoning that explores the ideological gradient of those ruling elites, irrespective of whether they are civilian or military. Actually, the confrontation between the secularists, traditionalists and revivalists, from the inception of the interim constitution until the removal of Nawaz Sharif's second government and the military dictatorship of General Musharraf, provides ample evidence of ideological incoherence.

History

To begin with, the creation of the nation-state of Pakistan was inspired by 'revivalist' Muslim political leaders who attempted to contextualize the

'foundational' values of their society. Their aim was to guarantee, protect and preserve their minority communities' socio-cultural and economic rights. And they could not do that with the Government of India Act in 1935, which effectively put complete political power in the hands of the majority Hindu population without minority safeguards.⁴ This led to intense communal violence and 'it was not merely a question of religious differences as that phrase is generally misunderstood. The differences were even more pervasive and created maladjustment between the two peoples in almost every situation of their daily lives'.⁵

The Government of India Act in 1935 was an interim constitution in which the British Empire retained control, while administration was relegated to the Indian government. Official British concerns revolved around the method of transferring administrative power. Actually, though, the British aspired to maintain their suzerainty. But due to intense pressure from both rival political groups, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Gandhi, it became apparent that the British Raj would end. Therefore, they drafted an interim constitution that gave the semblance of overlordship to Britain, but became an empowering document signing the British *bon voyage* letter. Newberg states:

by the time the *Government of India Act* was passed in 1935, tensions between colonizer and colonized had taken the forms of dialectic between British constitutional experiments and (British) Indians' reaction to them. It was a document of partial self-rule for India, a constitutional outline that ... emphasized British parliamentary control ... Local, communal, and provincial politics could not conform to this kind of state.⁶

Why not? What was preventing society from conforming to this kind of political arrangement, which maintained a modicum of British authority with significant local delegation? The answer was in the beneficiaries of the transfer of administrative powers being, almost exclusively, the Hindu community.

Fearing for their rights, the Muslim League wanted assurances. Yet those assurances were not forthcoming from the All India Congress Party (Congress Party), who were administering for the British Raj. Then, in March 1940, the Lahore Resolution was passed in which the Muslim league demanded their sovereignty with explicit safeguards.⁷ Resultantly, violence became endemic. Commenting on the butchery, Winston Churchill, addressing the House of Commons in December 1946, said, 'indeed it is certain that more people have lost their lives or been wounded in India by violence since the Nehru Government was installed in office four months ago than the previous ninety years'.⁸ Even now this brutal lingering memory continues to rekindle resentment. Clearly, the responsibility to prevent carnage rested with the administrative body led by the Congress Party. What has now become evident is that they not only hindered strategies to quell the violence, but also were directly involved.⁹

Frustrated at the penetrating bloodshed, the British government called an emergency meeting, forcing the Muslim League and the Congress Party back

to the bargaining table in hopes of convincing the latter to abide by the Cabinet Mission Plan.¹⁰ The Cabinet Mission Plan was geared toward a division of power and saw provincial autonomy as one of its main goals. Although they had agreed to it in June 1946, the Congress Party wanted to interpret it in 'their terms'.¹¹ This lack of cooperation, and the wave of violence inflicted on the largely defenceless Muslim population, convinced Britain to accept the two-nation theory; that is that the existence of Pakistan was inevitable.

Birth of a nation: the interim constitution 1947–58

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947 as a result of an Act of the Parliament in the United Kingdom, which partitioned the British Raj into India and Pakistan. The act stated that the erstwhile 'India Act of 1935' would be the constitution of both countries until each developed a new constitution. However, in Pakistan's case, key mutations were implemented, including its name. The new 'Act of 1947', as it began to be called, remained a 'colonial constitution' in which the Governor-General had nearly absolute power, including the ability to appoint or dismiss ministers and to assent to or withhold assent from a bill.¹² This inherent institutional authoritarianism consolidated the power of the Prime Minister and Governor-General into the office of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. And it set a negative precedent that hindered effective checks and balances on power. Not only that, such levels of absolute authority are in stark contrast to the Qur'anic principles of accountability, consultation and consensus. This resulted in the whole constitutional process being marred by rewarding authoritarianism. Moreover, it developed into serious conflicting ideological attitudes towards a separation of power. Certainly, the Constituent Assembly that was formed to write Pakistan's new constitution had to address other concerns, such as 'provincial autonomy, representation in the Federal Legislature, language of the country', but the role of religion was critical.¹³ Actually, nothing was more disagreeable than conflicting visions of the role of religion in the constitution.

Exploring constitutional development

Simply perusing the myriad of texts dealing with Pakistan's troubled constitutional development, one is struck by ideological tension associated with the role of religion and the state. Khan mentions that troubles arose between the uncompromising stances between those whom he identified as modernist and those who were orthodox.¹⁴ This book concurs that, indeed, the chronic ideological challenges Pakistan faces are crippling civil society, and, in particular, constitutional development. While the secularist/modernists preferred to formulate a constitution without any specified role of religion in the state apparatus, the traditionalists/orthodox proposed a historical Islamic state that attempted to recreate the peculiarities of a bygone era. Clearly both imposed a superstructure upon the demands of constitutional development that did

not recognise the processes of permanence and change that require commitment and reinvention, not rejection or imitation. Consequently, their ideological superstructures did not fit the required paradigm. The revivalists, those with a balanced approach between the modern requisites of a contemporary nation-state and remaining committed to their enduring values, were few and were unable to convince enough of the population. The sheer force, then, of the other two extremes, which either did not respect their own people's religious convictions or believed they were religiously inadequate, marginalized them.

In March 1949, as representative of Pakistan's commitment to the 'revivalist' legacy of its spiritual forefathers, the *Objectives Resolution* was passed, following 18 months of deliberations by the Constituent Assembly. Qasmi states that 'the question therefore, during this period of Pakistan's history, was not about the admissibility of the role of Islam in Pakistan but the *kind* of Islam to be established and the extent of its influence in the working of the state'.¹⁵ The Objectives Resolution was intended to, therefore, be a beacon as to 'what kind of Islam' the state aimed for. During this time, Liaquat Ali Khan was the Prime Minister and Khwaja Nazimuddin became the Governor-General. Both wholeheartedly supported the *Objectives Resolution*, declaring that it mandated democracy, freedom, equality and social justice, as enunciated by Islam. Actually, it goes so far as to articulate the idea that sovereignty belongs to God, but that people's chosen representatives reflect that. In pluralist terms, it provided for the security of fundamental rights of all to 'freely profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures'.¹⁶ Moreover, the *Resolution* provided for the independence of the judiciary.

With this directing document in place, a 'Basic Principles Committee' of reputed Islamic scholars was formed to advise on matters arising out of the *Objectives Resolution*.¹⁷ This was critical since it recognized the necessity of establishing a link between theoretical values and their practical application. Yet, tragedy struck with the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, dealing a fatal blow to the revivalists. Now there were no serious contenders capable of steering the country away from polarizations. As a proponent of 'Islamic democracy', Liaquat Ali Khan voiced moderation, and was thoroughly trusted by the entire cabinet in Pakistan.¹⁸ His untimely death, some say a result of disgruntled traditionalists furious at his perceived liberalism, left the political arena vacant, without a moderate voice.¹⁹ Both the traditionalists and the secularists would never be able to see eye to eye, and were constantly attempting to undermine each other.

In December 1952, under the prime ministership of Khwaja Nazimuddin, a report by the Basic Principles Committee suggested a religious-based democracy in which representation was split evenly between the two wings of Pakistan. This report did not meet with much popular approval, especially by the provincial economic leaders of the Punjab – a major force in both wings of the country. Straight away, Pakistan faced a serious constitutional deadlock. It began as a result of disapproval by a powerful economic minority in Pakistan's most populous province and soon degenerated into open ideological conflict.

Yet other unfortunate events exacerbated the matter. Specifically, the province of Punjab was facing severe food shortages as a result of 'landlords who had turned hostile due to the modest reforms made by the Daultana government in favour of agricultural tenants'.²⁰ This chaotic situation was further enflamed by a sudden and violent 'anti-Ahmadiyya' protest. Feldman states that it was through the 'ignorance and intolerance' of the traditionalists that the unity of Pakistan was being disrupted.²¹ Leading the agitation were members of the shadowy 'Ahrar' movement, who had initially opposed the creation of Pakistan. Overall, this chaotic situation involved traditionalists who were using political instability to confront an affluent minority and force the government to bend the constitution to their religious demands; a food crisis aggravated by an exploitative feudal class in cohorts with a secular Punjab economic elite who were resisting land reform, 'not to mention an excuse to extract a more acceptable constitutional deal for the Punjab'.²² Both traditionalists and secularists were responsible for the violence, and often do so by entirely delegitimizing the other. Moreover, what we see is that neither side was committed to agreed-upon ethical or legal boundaries. Then, with violence spiralling out of control, in February 1953, martial law was declared for the first time in Pakistan's history.

On 16 April 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed exercised his rights under section 10 of the Act of 1947 and replaced Khwaja Nazimuddin with Mohammed Ali as prime minister. The military was indirectly ruling the country. A façade of civilian leadership remained in place, though, with Ghulam Muhammad retaining the position of Governor-General. All the while, the constitutional crisis was paralyzing the country even further, and two important questions were raised: What were the powers of the Governor-General with respect to dissolution and removal of the Constituent Assembly? and Could the Constituent Assembly amend the constitution without the assent of the Governor-General?

On 6 July 1954, the Constituent Assembly passed an act giving the judiciary power to grant 'prerogative writs'.²³ Soon thereafter, on 21 September, the Constituent Assembly passed another bill reducing the Governor-General's authority of dissolution. Of course, the Governor-General did not give his assent to these two bills, on account of his absence. Upon returning to Pakistan, the furious Governor-General challenged the decision and, hastily, dissolved the Constituent Assembly on 24 October 1954. 'The Governor-General had come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery had broken down and that the Constituent Assembly had lost the confidence of the people'.²⁴ Mahmud claims that this was a praetorian move²⁵ and Khan contends that the Governor-General's decision to dissolve the Constituent Assembly was thoroughly undemocratic and that 'his motivation was purely personal'.²⁶ Clearly, the Governor-General's decision was illegitimate in that he, so off-handedly, discarded the will of the Constituent Assembly, simply because they curtailed his powers. In spite, he brought down the entire house. This type of egotistical and short-sighted behaviour has been a constant source of tension

in Pakistan. In the end, what remains is that political leaders cannot share power, there is no agreed framework for politics and a narrative of false bravado justifies authoritarianism.

The Governor-General's unwillingness to accept curbs on his power set a negative precedent. In any political system, checks and balances on the exercise of power are crucial to prevent autocracy. His failure to accept the Assembly's will not only contradicted the 'Objectives Resolution' but also ridiculed ideals in Islamic political thought. And, to make matters worse, after dissolving the Assembly he whimsically appointed new executive members who immediately started making claims about a new constitution. Then Moulvi Tamizuddin – the then President (Speaker) of the Constituent Assembly – challenged the Governor-General's dissolution and brought the issue to the judiciary to decide. This led to a series of constitutional cases that would haunt Pakistan for decades afterwards.

The constitutional cases

The chaotic political atmosphere spawned a series of constitutional issues challenging the emergency proclamation by the Governor-General. In particular, there were three constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that were crucial: (1) *Federation of Pakistan et al. v. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan*;²⁷ (2) *Usif Patel and Two others v. The Crown*;²⁸ and (3) *Special Reference made by the Governor-General of Pakistan*.²⁹ These cases dealt with the powers of the Governor-General, including his right of assent and dissolution, and changed the entire political direction of the country.

First, Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, 'a man of high repute and sincere convictions ... challenged the proclamation as unconstitutional ... and asked for a writ of *mandamus* to restrain the government from interfering with the exercise of his functions as President of the Assembly and a writ for *quo warranto* with a view to determining the validity of certain appointments to the Governor-General's Council of Ministers'.³⁰ Previously, the Chief Court of Sindh had granted writs of *mandamus* and *quo warranto* to Tamizuddin. This was reversed at the Supreme Court level because the power of adjudication was not in a lower court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court decided that since the prerogative writs were not given assent by the Governor-General they were inconsequential. Here, Khan notes 'the judgement of the Supreme Court paved the way for future justifications by the judiciary to patently issue arbitrary, malicious, and capricious acts of the executive on hyper-technical grounds for self-serving theories or concepts'.³¹ In this circumstance, the judiciary, rather than being a guarantor of the people's will, imposed a superstructure that undermined stability. Moreover, what was troubling was the character assassination of Maulvi Tamizuddin as 'ultra-orthodox' when it is clear he was supporting legal-rationalism and respect for institutionalism. In other words, this discrediting based on perceived religiosity, or lack thereof, is a common theme in Pakistan's politics.

Consequently, the Supreme Court judgement in the Tamizuddin case resulted in 46 Acts on the statute books becoming invalid.³² The country was thrown into a legal void. In response, the Governor-General promulgated the Emergency Powers Ordinance IX of 1955, which essentially gave him sweeping powers to frame the constitution, invalidate laws passed by the Constituent Assembly that had not received his assent, and authenticate the central budget. This, too, was challenged, in the case *Usif Patel v. The Crown*, which argued that powers to make constitutional provisions could not be exercised by the Governor-General through an ordinance. 'The court, therefore, held Section 2 of the ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General – Ordinance No. IX of 1955 – as *ultra vires*'.³³ In other words, the Governor-General was deemed to have exercised authority beyond his mandate and, therefore, his quest for emergency powers was rejected. Yet this was not the end of the dangerous legal scenario. The Governor-General immediately began a retaliatory round of Supreme Court proceedings known as the '*Special Reference made by the Governor-General of Pakistan*'.

Certainly, the Supreme Court agreed that the Governor-General's emergency powers were *ultra vires*. However, in further adjudication, the federal court argued for the 'doctrine of necessity' as constitutional justification for his wide powers.³⁴ The doctrine of necessity deemed that, if circumstances warranted, the Governor-General had the authority to dismiss the Assembly. In effect, this brought everything back to square one. It was this negative practice that allowed the Governor-General to dissolve the Assembly and ignore the representatives of the people.

These constitutional cases left a major impact on the political culture of the country. The entire constitutional and administrative set-up was shaken to its very foundations. By denying the Assembly the authority to curtail his powers, and by dissolving the Assembly, the Governor-General initiated a sequence of events that would lead to chronic political instability in Pakistan. His actions were in direct contradiction to the 'foundational' values of accountability, mutual consultation and appreciating the will of the people. Challenging his authoritarianism, Moulvi Tamizuddin filed a constitutional case against his sweeping powers and dissolution of parliament. However, the Supreme Court overturned a decision in his favour. The two other constitutional cases that followed, first rejected the Governor-General's request for emergency power and then, surreptitiously, allowed it. In the wake of these constitutional cases, the appointees of the Governor-General were considered *ultra vires* and there now needed to be a new Constituent Assembly.

The constitution of 1956

Following the federal court decision, a new Constituent Assembly was elected. Immediately, members began preparing a constitution and within eight months a first draft had been completed. Though Pakistan's political system would remain parliamentary, a president and a vice-president were included,

each with expanded powers. The prime minister remained the head of the executive, but real power was entrusted to the president. 'The draft provided for a strong centre; its framers were guided by the principle that maximum autonomy should be granted to the provinces'.³⁵ Consequently, the division of powers had more enumerated areas in the provincial list, with areas such as Industries and Railways. Also, the provinces were given a residuary power, something that had never been given to them in the past.³⁶ The *Objectives Resolution*, described in the introduction to this chapter, was included as a preamble. As Khan states, 'after nine years of effort, Pakistan succeeded in framing a constitution which became effective on 23rd of March 1956, proclaiming Pakistan as an Islamic Republic'.³⁷

The 1956 Constitution declared Pakistan an 'Islamic Republic' wherein the principles of freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed. Further Islamic provisions were contained in the 'Directive Principles of State Policy' but, interestingly, were not enforceable in the courts. They, only, were supposed to serve as a guide to state authorities for policy formation. According to the 'Directive Principles', steps needed to be taken to enable Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the Holy Qur'an and *Sunnah*. Further, 'the state was to endeavour to provide facilities whereby Muslims might be able to understand the meaning of life according to the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, to promote amity and observance of Islamic moral standards and to secure the proper organization of zakat and waqf'.³⁸ Yet no specific mechanism was institutionalized that would honour this commitment.

Most importantly, the 1956 Constitution deemed that 'no law could be repugnant to the *Qur'an* or Prophetic sayings' and that existing laws 'shall be brought into conformity with such injunctions'.³⁹ Also, the National Assembly could only decide whether a law was repugnant to Islam. 'Article 198 provided that the president should appoint, within one year of the day of commencement of the constitution, a commission to make recommendations for bringing existing laws into conformity with the injunctions of Islam and to specify the stages by which the measures should be brought into effect'.⁴⁰ They were also to compile, for the parliament, such Islamic injunctions as could be given legislative effect. It was made clear, too, that nothing become prejudicial to non-Muslims. It is crucial to recognize that the Islamic provisions were a direct attempt to frame the constitution with 'foundational' values in mind. Tensions arose as to what exactly constituted those values and how to institutionalize them. Traditionalists and secularists were at odds concerning precise definitions and meanings. Eventually, the chronic bickering over definitions led to constitutional collapse.

Collapse of the 1956 Constitution

Pakistan began as parliamentary democracy; however, it was ill suited for that form of political organization. After the passing of the 1956 Constitution,

'within a short period of about two-and-a-half years (March, 1956 to October, 1958) there were six changes of government, one of which lasted just for four hours and another four days'.⁴¹ Mahmud characterizes this as manipulative attempts by the president to subvert provincial autonomy, connecting it to a praetorian manoeuvre.⁴² However, Mahmud's analysis does not entirely reflect the immense disharmony that provoked presidential dismissals. Notwithstanding its illegality, dismissal was a result of the combative politics by over a dozen political parties. Actually, the situation was so bad that members of the Assembly violently attacked the deputy speaker of the House, who eventually died from his injuries.⁴³ When Mahmud claims that a representative government was just around the corner, it doesn't effectively portray the seriousness of the internal and political disorder. 'The repercussions of this political instability were serious. The country's economy was shattered. In East Pakistan the army had to be called twice to handle distribution of food and check smuggling across the border (with India). Millions of refugees, who had been living in sub-human conditions since 1947, remained neglected'.⁴⁴

During this disarray, ideological tensions were only further aggravating. And no-one quite understood how to manage these multiple crises. When Ghulam Muhammad became ill and unable to continue as Governor-General, Major-General Iskander Mirza assumed the Office of President in the interim period. He was a self-described secularist and the importance of connecting the present to an ethical current animating his society was unimportant. 'He publicly voiced his conviction that religion and politics ought to be kept quite separate', which displayed a remarkable ignorance of his own society and the ideological forefathers of the Pakistan movement.⁴⁵ The prime minister, at that time, was Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and he selected Dr Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan. Interestingly, Dr Khan Sahib, a close friend of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, originally vehemently 'opposed the creation of Pakistan and was a strong congressman'.⁴⁶ It is striking to note that the very forces that were against the creation of 'Pakistan as a model Islamic state' were invested with the powers to steer the country toward that direction. Such brazen disregard for the sentimentality of people and cronyism was bound to conjure deep resentment.

In addition, there was the ever-presence of ideological coercion. Khan mentions that 'President Iskander Mirza had reconciled himself to having Suhrawardy as prime minister ... (but) on three conditions: one, that he would not alter Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy; two, that he would not meddle with the army; and three, that he would keep the left-wing Awami League, led by Maulana Bhashani, firmly in harness'.⁴⁷ It was apparent that secularists, led by President Iskander Mirza, were enforcing their ideological vision on the rest of society, and, here, on Prime Minister Suhrawardy. Reacting, the traditionalists were becoming increasingly hostile and aggressive in return. This presents a classic example of ideology leading to political engineering, which, in turn, leads to political instability.

Further troubling, the new Provincial Assembly in East Pakistan was demanding independence. Collectively, these issues forced the president to

abrogate the constitution and call in the army to restore order. On 8 October 1958, President Mirza, along with General Ayub Khan, declared martial law.⁴⁸ This use of the President's power and the abrogation of the constitution resulted in yet another constitutional case.

The Dosso case⁴⁹

The Dosso case expanded on the controversial 'doctrine of necessity' to include the legality of the usurpation of state power. Basing its theory on Hans Kelsen's theory of 'revolutionary legality', the court concluded that any regime that has the people's approval can gain legitimacy and is therefore a valid government. 'If the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled constitution but by reference to its own success'.⁵⁰ Consequently, power became a legitimating factor in Pakistani politics, allowing for its usurpation. Naturally, in such a predicament, only those with physical/military strength are able to do so, thereby setting a precedent of 'might is right'. Actually, it is this exact clause that has always been used to justify military rule in the country.⁵¹

This judicial verdict had only one dissenting opinion – Justice Cornelius. The majority, led by Chief Justice Munir, 'held that a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'état is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a constitution'.⁵² The dissent based his decision on the strict rule of the law, that any abrogation would constitute an illegal act. This constitutional case has been severely criticised by Mahmud⁵³ and Newberg.⁵⁴ While the former reiterated his theme of praetorian domination, the latter depicted a decision that was politically biased. Ultimately, this developed into a complete disregard for constitutionalism and prevented the establishment of an agreed-upon framework for politics.

The third constitution: General Ayub Khan

In 1958 General Ayub Khan became the martial law administrator and, soon after, deposed President Iskander Mirza, initiating Pakistan's first direct form of military rule. Chaudhury insists that the army was reluctant to enter the power game and did so under compulsion.⁵⁵ However, there is clear evidence that as early as 1952 the military was becoming increasingly independent and was establishing its own linkages with foreign countries, particularly the US.⁵⁶ This provides hard evidence of the military's role in intervening in the political process and foreshadows the ongoing civil-military competition for political control. Nonetheless, recognizing that the constant instability was untenable, General Ayub Khan appointed a 'Constitution Commission to determine what was failing within the country to bring about such disturbances and

ineffectiveness'.⁵⁷ To aid their task, the Commission sent out thousands of questionnaires, in Urdu and Bengali, asking for people's opinions. From the information gathered, they concluded that instability was rooted in three distinct issues:

First, the role of Islam was ill-defined and torn between the orthodox [traditionalists] and modernists [secularists]; second, increasing calls for independence, centred on economic difficulties and disparities, were compounding the issue of East Pakistan's autonomy; third, unless there were social, economic, and educational reforms, the possibility of having an effective universal franchise was impossible.⁵⁸

Interestingly, the most serious issue remained the role of Islam and combative competition between traditionalists and secularists. Then, in total disregard of the commission's findings, the new constitution was thoroughly secularized.

The constitution of 1962

The 1962 Constitution contained 250 Articles, divided into 12 parts and 3 schedules. Paralleling the 1956 Constitution, the *Objectives Resolution* remained as a preamble with minor semantic alterations. For instance, the first paragraph of the 1956 preamble – 'authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him (Allah) is a sacred trust' – became 'within the limits prescribed by God' in the 1962 Constitution; there was no reference to the fact that people would exercise authority.⁵⁹ Presumably this was intended to avoid difficulties in determining the extent of those limits by competing ideological political actors. However, what may have been intended to decrease ideological bickering was in fact exacerbating. The 1962 Constitution renamed Pakistan the 'Republic of Pakistan', dropping the word 'Islamic'.⁶⁰ This clearly displayed Ayub Khan's secularist mindset and is indicative of the confusion rampant throughout the political leadership, since even something so elementary could not be agreed upon.

Yet that was not all. In a bid to compensate for that omission, the 1962 Constitution contained significant Islamic provisions. It reaffirmed that the nation-state of Pakistan was based on an Islamic ideology and placed emphasis on the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, with the qualification that these principles should be observed as enunciated by Islam. Moreover, it reintroduced the 1956 constitutional passage that stated: 'Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and should be provided with facilities whereby they may be able to understand the meaning of life according to those principles and concepts'.⁶¹ In addition, the 1962 Constitution formulated the Council of Islamic Ideology that would offer policy options considering Muhammad Iqbal's concerns – a revivalist approach. Likewise, 'The Council of Islamic Ideology under the

new constitution represents the first instance in modern history where an effort was made to bring Islam in contact with modern political, legal, ethical, social, and economic conditions and to present new and unanticipated problems for solution to a jurisprudence which has for almost one thousand years been in a static condition'.⁶² Yet, notwithstanding lip service paid to Islam, it remained without teeth or institutional guarantees. Essentially, the 1962 Constitution aims to say everything without any concrete method to do anything. And it was this confusion that was debilitating.

The 1962 Constitution prescribed a strong executive power concentrated in the position of a president. The president was to be directly elected to his position by an established electoral college of not less than 80,000 people.⁶³ This system involved indirect franchise, which was implemented to facilitate a smoother functioning of the political system. The electoral colleges were responsible for government within their regions. Ayub Khan was against a universal direct franchise owing to the 'genius of the people'.⁶⁴ This system, called 'Basic Democracy', was an indirect election of the president based on restricted franchise. With this, Ayub Khan had hoped that partisan politics would be reduced.⁶⁵ However, this system rested on the belief that people are incapable of deciding what is best for them. By restricting the electoral franchise, he directly contradicted the 'foundational' value of the people not collectively erring and, simply put, alienated most of his countrymen. Yet this should not be surprising, since most politicians come from the landowning and feudal classes of society that, rather than being harbingers of peace, justice and equality, perpetuate exploitation on a massive scale.⁶⁶ The entire concept of the inherent equality of people is beyond their grasp.

The 1962 Constitution, by abolishing the positions of the prime minister and vice-president, gave definitive authority to the president, with renewed powers of dissolution and veto. It was clear that the authors of this constitution took threats to the territorial integrity of Pakistan very seriously. So seriously, in fact, that their solution was to entirely consolidate power, stifling dissent. Of course, more funds were assigned to East Pakistan and the country became officially bilingual. Moreover, the Assembly would sit in Dacca, in East Pakistan, as opposed to Karachi, in West Pakistan. The question remained, however: was this enough? Achieving unity by disallowing dissent, by ideological imposition, and, instead, throwing some money at the situation, hoping to resolve deep-seated, structural imbalances, was hardly stabilizing.

Ayub Khan's resignation

During the 11 years of Ayub Khan's rule the country prospered economically. Khan's government set a precedent in key growth areas and expanded the education levels of the whole country.⁶⁷ Even a staunch critic like Mahmud recognized Khan's accomplishments. 'Nevertheless, the new order did enjoy political stability and high economic growth for a few years. This prompted commentators to hail Pakistan as a model of political and economic

development for newly independent states. But, that was not enough. Persistent demands for representation, fundamental rights, and democracy continued, erupting into a popular mass movement by fall of 1968'.⁶⁸ Added to this was the growing 'traditionalist' resentment at Ayub Khan for his secular lifestyle, making polygamy illegal and expanding women's rights with respect to divorce.⁶⁹ Resultantly, traditionalists capitalized on cementing his image as unrepresentative of the people's values and rioting became widespread.

In response to the ongoing protests, rather than negotiate, strong-arm tactics were employed to eradicate myopic politics. General Ayub had little time to waste on compromises and conversation, viewing partisan politics as Pakistan's main evil. Even to this day, political parties are seen as unrepresentative of the people and operate as 'families', with little concern for the well-being of the masses.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, banning them outright was surely not the solution. Through the Political Party Act, all political parties became illegal. In particular, this authoritarian decision was directed at the traditionalists in the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, and resulted in the pivotal '*Maudoodi case*'.⁷¹ This tenacious legal edifice was unable to withstand the various constitutional cases that were filed against this act. By infringing on the freedom of association, the military overstepped its powers. In its verdict, the Supreme Court, presided over by Chief Justice Cornelius, declared the Political Party Act was a violation of appellant rights by unfairly curbing freedom of association. Interestingly, Justice Cornelius was the first Catholic to head the Supreme Court of Pakistan who protected the rights of a 'traditionalist' political party with the self-declared aims of limiting political power minorities could hold. Khan states that 'this judgement is one of the most important ones in the constitutional law of Pakistan upholding the fundamental right of freedom of association. It gave protection to the political parties against the government that was using its power arbitrarily to ban them and stifle their activities'.⁷²

Following that judgement, the government's ability to suppress rioting was limited. Powerful political protests, organized by the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, rocked the country, demanding 'Islam' – without specifying what that meant. Conflict between the traditionalists and the secularists was exacerbating political instability, with the former demanding the resignation of the secularist General Ayub Khan. This precarious situation was further inflamed by growing dissatisfaction with the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, rising student protests, and political rallies that were culminating in harsh government repression.⁷³ Collectively, this led to a total breakdown.

By 1968, a total of 45 politicians had been incarcerated.⁷⁴ And, as repression increased, so did opposition to Ayub Khan's leadership, who had this to say:

my system unfortunately broke down at the pyramid level. When the Provincial and Central Assemblies were formed and if they could run politics without the party system, it could have worked. But unfortunately it is not possible. I was perhaps trying to lay down rules for a game,

which is too old now to change its rules. But I wish to God they had listened to me.⁷⁵

Notwithstanding his sincerity, his inability to lead was a consequence of his distance from his people. And rather than blame partisan politics, ideology is a prime factor motivating each toward their agenda. By virtue of there being no agreeable, coherent ideology guiding the political parties, they clash. Finally, political parties, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami, cooperated with elements of the military to coerce Ayub Khan to relinquish power.

The political vacuum that erupted with Ayub's resignation created chaos throughout both wings of Pakistan. Of particular importance was the threatening political climate in East Pakistan. With the future uncertain, the traditionalists began fearing a communist takeover in East Pakistan and organized several processions to warn the population. 'The leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Mawlana Maudoodi, said the "tongues of those who speak of communism will be torn out." In response, Bhashani, a secularist Bengali, said, "the house of religious fanatics will be burned"'.⁷⁶ Clearly, both the traditionalists and secularists were creating confusion and havoc throughout the country with antagonistic jingoism. At this point, the Army Chief General Yahya Khan was in power and immediately placed the country under martial law. He announced the abrogation of the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly.⁷⁷ Soon thereafter, General Yahya Khan prepared for new elections.

The 1970 Elections and the Rise of Zulfikar Bhutto

The 1970 elections were the first in Pakistan to be conducted on the basis of universal adult franchise, and were generally regarded as fair, free and without violence.⁷⁸ The results of the election were indisputable. No party won significant representation outside their geographical origins and this state of affairs continues today. 'In West Pakistan, the People's Party of Pakistan led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had won the majority with 81 seats. In East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League had guaranteed all but one seat for a total of 151'.⁷⁹ Clearly, the Awami League had the official mandate to form the next government, but the political and military leadership in West Pakistan was unwilling to concede power. There was a continuous postponement of reconvening the National Assembly, which, eventually, led to constitutional breakdown. Here Mahmud places sole culpability on the army,⁸⁰ while Newberg suggests that both the army and Bhutto were responsible. By the writ of the law, the Awami League and Mujibur Rahman should have controlled the central government, but neither Bhutto nor the military were willing to concede without a fight.⁸¹ Khan claims, persuasively, that Bhutto recognized the futility of Pakistan's current geography and aspired to be the sole leader of West Pakistan.⁸² Jennings, too, argues that it is clear that Bhutto did not want to relinquish control of the country and his selfishness led to civil war.⁸³

Following his electoral victory, Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League emphasized the infamous 'Six Points' – which aimed for maximum autonomy, a paramilitary force based in Dacca and a certain level of financial independence for East Pakistan.⁸⁴ Tragically, these points, many of which were legitimate, were dismissed outright by many political and military elites in West Pakistan. Comprehending the distinction between maintaining 'togetherness' and enforcing 'sameness' was far from them. In their minds, there could be no compromise to the 'unity' of Pakistan. Consequently, the shuttle diplomacy initiated by General Yahya Khan was in vain, since the distrustful political atmosphere obviated conciliation. His attempt to convince Mujibur Rahman to adopt a conciliatory approach merely delayed the inevitable. It did not help matters that Zulfikar Bhutto was becoming increasingly vocal about his fears of Pakistan splintering, especially if the Awami League was given power. Irresponsibly, he openly invited the military to intervene and protect the country's territorial integrity. These perceptions were forcing the political and military establishment in West Pakistan to become increasingly intolerant of the Awami League leadership. Eventually, mass rioting became pervasive and, in response, the Army initiated a brutal crackdown. The ensuing civil war and the coordinated attack by the Indian army sealed Pakistan's fate, thereby creating the new state of Bangladesh.

By disenfranchising the people of East Pakistan, rejecting serious discussions with the representatives of the Awami League and using violence to impose order, the federation of Pakistan fractured. Founded as a homeland for diverse Muslims, with equal opportunity, Pakistan had become a battlefield of competing nationalities vying for power. The mutual mistrust and personal ambitions of the secularist, regional forces of Bhutto and Rahman spelled disaster for the country. It is for this reason, perhaps, that General Zia insisted, 'take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse'.⁸⁵ Also, without a 'coherent ideology', mutually agreeable to all peoples in the federation of Pakistan, it was only a matter of time before the country would fracture into two sovereign states.⁸⁶ This separation was a devastating event, draining the country both economically and morally. The constitutional issues were forever dramatically altered. For Bhutto, the new events catapulted him onto centre stage, since he was now the majority leader. Later, he became the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the President, and then quickly began developing a new constitution with two primary concerns – protection of his political power and the role of Islam in the state.⁸⁷ Note, that secularists and traditionalists were vigorously manipulating the role of Islam in the state. Yet prior to detailing Bhutto's method of constitution making, another important constitutional development took place in the Asma Jilani case.

The Asma Jilani case

During the initial years of Bhutto's governance of a truncated Pakistan, a constitutional case came to the forefront of the judiciary's agenda – the *Asma*

Jilani case.⁸⁸ Although heard in 1972, this case referred to General Ayub Khan's action in 1969 when he transferred power to General Yahya Khan. Specifically, this case revoked the Dosso case, stating that any military seizure of power was illegal and treasonous. The court took a robust position in protecting Pakistan's constitution by prescribing exemplary punishment for those who tried to supersede it. 'That on account of his holding the coercive apparatus of the State, the people and the courts are silenced temporarily, but let it be laid down firmly that the order which the usurper imposes will remain illegal and courts will not recognize its rule and act upon them as *de jure*. As soon as the first opportunity arises, when the coercive apparatus falls from the hands of the usurper, he should be tried for high treason and suitably punished. This alone will serve as a deterrent to would be adventurers'.⁸⁹ However, with all the hoopla surrounding this case, it reneged on its principled position and legitimised Bhutto's political leadership as an act of 'implied mandate'.

Having overturned the Dosso case, and confronted with limitations on the application of the 'doctrine of necessity', the court employed the doctrine of 'implied mandate' first enunciated by Hugo Grotius. According to Grotius, courts may validate certain necessary acts of a usurper done in the interest of preserving the state, because the lawful sovereign would also want these acts to be undertaken.⁹⁰ The implied mandate placed limitations on military seizure of political power, mandating that elections be held, but was vague on a specific time frame. Clearly, the courts took a favourable attitude toward Bhutto's government, following the war and secession of East Pakistan. Overall, then, the judgement was meaningless at it seemed to close the door to unlawful usurpation of power, then opened another under the guise of 'implied mandate'.

The constitution of 1973

Following the judicial sanction of his authority, Bhutto quickly began the task of constitution making. In 1973 a constitution was formed, 'with the consensus of all the political parties in the National Assembly. It contained 280 articles divided into 12 parts and six schedules'.⁹¹ Paralleling the previous constitutions of 1956 and 1962, it provided for the 'Fundamental Rights' of citizens. Moreover, it asserted that if any existing law, custom, or usage which had the force of law contravened any provision of those fundamental rights, it would be void ... no authority in Pakistan ... was competent to make any law, regulation, or any order which might be repugnant to any of its provisions.⁹² And the judiciary was given power to enforce these fundamental rights and decide if a law was repugnant to any of these provisions.

Specifically, two characteristics in the 1973 Constitution stand out as ideological considerations: (1) Principles of Policy and (2) Islamic Provisions.⁹³ Both sections were interrelated, but it is interesting to note the difficulties in negotiations during its formation. First, the Principles of Policy was made to

ensure 'the responsibility of each organ and authority of the state and those performing functions under them to act in accordance with those principles'.⁹⁴ Again, those principles included that no law should be enacted which is repugnant to Islamic injunctions as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic sayings.⁹⁵ Additionally, the State should endeavour to facilitate the learning of Arabic, to promote observance of Islamic moral standards, and to secure the proper organization of mosques and encourage international Muslim unity. Overall, it sought to stabilize society through an enlightened rendering of Islamic law – or a revivalist approach. For instance, the traditionalists did not, initially, support the inclusion of full rights for women's participation in public life. Yet, the constitution-makers decided that approach poorly reflected the Islamic message and disregarded those objections. Similarly, secularists did not endorse seeking legitimacy by referring to Islam. That stance, too, was unheeded by the constitution-makers, who revealed the necessity of rationalizing authority and legitimacy in Islamic values. Clearly, the Principles of Policy emanate from a revivalist ideological approach that attempts to contextualize the 'foundational' values of Islamic political culture.

Second, the Islamic Provisions in the 1973 Constitution section reaffirmed Islam as the state religion of Pakistan, acknowledged diversity of religious thought and established the 'Council of Islamic Ideology' that would make recommendations to bring existing laws into conformity with Islamic injunctions. The Council was also to advise on those injunctions requiring legislation. This part of the constitution, along with the Principles of Policy section, aimed to securely anchor Pakistan between ideological extremes. In fact, it embodied the best possible arrangement to accommodate the various political parties, their demands, economic interests, and ideological manifestos ...⁹⁶ Specifically, it appeased the traditionalists by Article 2 that declares Islam the state religion. Simultaneously, it placated secularists with Article 15, which elevates freedom of speech and expression. By balancing these ideological extremes, this constitution addressed a key factor in political instability. However, its chronic manipulation by numerous amendments, and the inability of politicians to abide by its writ and spirit, exacerbated political tensions.

The scourge of constitutional amendments

Prior to the inauguration of the 1973 Constitution, Bhutto attempted to abrogate it, and this would eventually become possible through a rendering of 'implied mandate'. Specifically, Part I, Section 7 of the 1973 Constitution stated that any abrogation of the constitution was considered high treason.⁹⁷ Yet the writ of law was not enough to prohibit political opportunism. With the insertion of 'implied mandate', usurpation of power was possible. Actually, from that point until now there have been 20 constitutional amendments.⁹⁸ And the principles of accountability, pluralism and fundamental rights have all been sharply restricted by many of those amendments.

Initially, among the earlier amendments, they limited the guarantees for civil rights and independent courts, but also sharply heightened the institutional and political power of the prime minister.⁹⁹ Sadly, this has been a tendency until today – most politicians are unable to share power and devise ever more devious methods of concentrating power. Consequently, this has left little respect for the law. Sarmad Ali persuasively argues that this sad state of affairs began with Zulfikar Bhutto.¹⁰⁰ Using amendments, first to secure his own power base and then to placate rival ideologies, he was constantly walking a tight-rope between secular and traditionalist forces. For the traditionalists, he restricted the rights of a religious minority group called the Ahmadiyya and passed the Second Amendment, which declares them heretics.¹⁰¹ Contrarily, to conciliate secularist forces, he began the construction, in Karachi, of the biggest casino in Asia, with the assistance of a local land developer.¹⁰² The building stands unfinished to this day – having finally become a shopping centre – as a monument to the failure of his government to maintain a coherent ideology with respect to the role of Islam and the state.

People, civic society actors and non-governmental organizations were aware of the infringements on their rights, and they acted by filing numerous constitutional cases to challenge the validity of the amendments.¹⁰³ As a matter of fact, six amendments were introduced between 8 May 1974 and 4 January 1977, and a seventh on 16 May 1977.¹⁰⁴ Yet it was not until the Seventh Amendment had been implemented that the courts took a stand, since it restricted their ability to hear cases of military abuse during times of ‘civil unrest’.¹⁰⁵ The Arbey case challenged the legality of the Seventh Amendment.¹⁰⁶ In its verdict, the Arbey case recognized that any interpretation of the law must abide by the *Objectives Resolution* and that this rule could not be altered.¹⁰⁷ In effect, the courts had decided that the government had gone too far and identified Islam, federalism and democracy as the essential features of the 1973 Constitution. Thereafter, it concluded that if these features did not survive on account of an amendment, then such an amendment would be *ultra vires*.¹⁰⁸ Yet, even with the courts cautioning Bhutto, he had no respect for constitutionalism. In May 1977, when elections were held in Pakistan, the first since 1970, Bhutto’s party, the People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP), fraudulently won. To everyone’s disbelief, the polls declared the PPP victorious, immediately setting off protests and claims of widespread rigging. Of course, evidence of fraud was staggering. ‘All political parties in Pakistan joined together to form one party against the PPP. This nine-party alliance was undeniably going to win’.¹⁰⁹ Hence, when it did not, grand protests astounded the country, and then on 5 July 1977 the military, led by General Zia-ul-Haq, took over.

This, though, led to a major problem, since the 1973 Constitution considered usurpation an act of treason. In his defence, General Zia said that the constitution was in abeyance until fair elections could be held. The Supreme Court accepted that interpretation when they heard the constitutional case in the Nusrat Bhutto case.¹¹⁰ Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, filed a petition against General Zia and wanted serious sanctions to be taken

against him for treason. The court looked at the doctrine of necessity again and, thereby, justified the military takeover by General Zia via implied mandate. Then, once he had the approval of the judicial authorities, General Zia arrested Bhutto and had his bail application denied on account of accusations of murder. He was tried in a military tribunal, and the presiding judges ruled that the murder of the two politicians was the work of the Federal Security Force and that Bhutto had commanded the act. Bhutto faced a military court and was hanged.¹¹¹

If Pakistan had been fortunate, with the hanging of Zulfiqar Bhutto constitutional amendments would have ended. But they only increased in fervour and intensity. The Chief of Army staff, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, proclaimed Martial Law on 5 July 1977. His martial rule lasted until 1985 and he continued to rule as president from 1985 to 1988. During this time, the 1973 Constitution remained supreme, excluding certain parts held in abeyance out of necessity. The Supreme Court of Pakistan recognized the right of the Chief Martial Law Administrator – General Zia – to perform all such acts or legislative measures, which included the power to amend the Constitution. By this verdict, General Zia was able to make a series of amendments, which changed the whole complexion of the 1973 Constitution. Khan, commenting on these amendments, says General Zia ‘could amend and alter the constitution at will and he kept making amendments to the constitution every now and then. In some cases, such amendments were made through the chief martial law administrator’s orders and others through presidential orders. It was after all his sweet will as to when, how, and in what manner, he made such amendments’.¹¹²

General Zia, a traditionalist, was a proponent of Islam and vigorously appealed to religious sensibilities. His approach for aggressive Islamization began in 1979 with the promulgation of the ‘Hudood’ laws and continued until February 1985.¹¹³ Some of the key amendments General Zia initiated in his drive for Pakistan’s Islamization were top-heavy religious enforcement, and included empowering the Supreme Courts to declare any law un-Islamic if it was repugnant to the Islamic injunctions. In addition, Hudood laws were introduced on 9 February 1979 that prescribed ‘hadd’ punishments covering three areas: (1) alcohol: the consumption, manufacture, import, export, transport, bottling, selling or serving of any intoxicant; (2) cases of theft or robbery; and, (3) the offence of ‘adultery’.¹¹⁴ These laws generated considerable controversy among the secularists, who saw them as limiting their personal freedoms. Proponents, alternatively, argue that these laws are derivative of Islamic injunctions, and, resultantly, are permanent. Undoubtedly, these laws have been abused to embarrass political opponents, or even by police for blackmail. Recently, this ‘hadd’ law was used to falsely accuse an innocent Pakistani Christian of desecration of the Qur’an.¹¹⁵ However, the courts threw out that case, and have generally been cautious in the application of these laws and ‘hadd’ punishments. Actually, despite more than twenty years of being introduced in the constitution, ‘no one has been stoned to death and no one’s hand or foot has been amputated’.¹¹⁶

Notwithstanding his intent, these amendments were enforcing respect for Islam, which cannot be coerced. Rather, law should prohibit hate speech, including disregard of religious sensibilities. This protects the people's sensitivities concerning their faith. Instead, a sloppy and poorly thought-out ruling has become the bane of Pakistan, in direct contradiction of the Qur'anic restriction on compulsion in matters of faith. These constitutional amendments were motivated by a coercive traditionalist approach for managing dissent, which is simply browbeating. Following these amendments, in 1985 general elections were held on a non-party basis. That required the consequent National Assembly to make another significant revision – the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution.

In 1985, Pakistan returned to a pseudo-democratic state, with General Zia discarding his military uniform to become President. To maintain authority over the civilian government, he passed the Eighth Amendment.¹¹⁷ This fundamentally altered the basic structure and essential features of the 1973 Constitution, bringing it in line with the military's preferences. 'It created a strong executive, a weak legislature, a docile judiciary, and it diminished provincial autonomy'.¹¹⁸ Also, this amendment prevented any laws enacted during the eight years of martial law from being challenged. In addition, the head of the state was no longer the Prime Minister, but the President, who had all the powers of dissolution. In effect, General Zia's constitutional tampering was based on a praetorian tendency to concentrate power and he could now dissolve parliament at will. Khan contends that 'the balance that Zia struck between the powers of the prime minister and the president began to tell immediately on the new political system. Popular will had been flouted and national politics had changed from parliamentary democracy to military dictatorship'.¹¹⁹ Maluka adds that General Zia 'deliberately contrived constitutional devices in which he, as life-long president of the country, was above the parameters of the constitution and unaccountable to the people'.¹²⁰ All in all, this reflects the typical traditionalist approach to the 'foundational' aspects of Islamic political culture – distrust of the average citizen and, therefore, a tendency to limit representative government. Comparatively, though, while Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Bhutto and General Zia were ideologically poles apart, their disregard for the sanctity of the Constitution and the will of the people were strikingly similar. Then, suddenly, on 17 August 1988, President Zia was killed, suspiciously, in a plane crash.

With the death of President Zia, Benazir Bhutto would become Pakistan's first female Prime Minister in 1988. However, she and the Pakistan People's Party were unable to secure an 'absolute majority in parliament, and therefore did not do any harm to the constitution of 1973'.¹²¹ Even though the constitution was spared from amendments during her tenure, that situation would not last. During the second Nawaz Sharif government, currently in his third stint as Prime Minister, the Thirteenth Amendment was passed on 31 March 1997.¹²² This amendment took away the president's power to dissolve assemblies, and gave it to the prime minister. Subsequently, the Fourteenth Amendment was

passed, which banned members of parliament from crossing party lines.¹²³ Constitutional manipulation was commonplace and would continue unabated until October 1997, when the Supreme Court heard a petition on the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹²⁴ At that point, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claimed the judiciary was undermining parliamentary sovereignty. Responding, the judiciary charged Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with contempt. Then, in one of the darkest days in Pakistan's legal history, unruly political party members from the PML-N stormed the Supreme Court ransacking the sanctity of that office. Eventually, in a clear indication of suppression of judicial independence, both the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the President resigned. The situation in Pakistan concerning respect for the rule of law kept moving from bad to worse.

Then the Fifteenth Amendment, associated with the 'Shari'ah Bill', approved on 28 August 1998, declared the Holy Quran and Sunnah as guiding principles for running government. However, that implication was already there in various forms in the constitution. Critics argue that Nawaz Sharif did this in order to appear a religious reviver. Sarmad surmises that under the banner of an Islamic system, Nawaz Sharif tried to get absolute powers.¹²⁵ This amendment was passed by the National Assembly but could not be passed in the Senate and has now become effectively dead. And, as if these ongoing constitutional crises were not enough, Pakistan was thrust into another disaster. The debacle of Kargil, which led to a brief war between nuclear rivals India and Pakistan, altered the political scenario once again. After the fallout of Kargil, General Musharraf, in 2001, organized a coup against Nawaz Sharif and sent him packing to Saudi Arabia. And, he, too, was no different to his predecessors in disregarding the sanctity of the Constitution. In fact, he 'declared 29 amendments to the constitution. Included in the amendments were the President's right to dismiss parliament and to expand his tenure in office by five years'.¹²⁶ Similar accusations, as always, resurfaced stating that the General wished to perpetuate dictatorship under the guise of democracy. In particular, the Seventeenth Amendment, which became effective in December 2003, gave the president the powers of dissolving the assemblies and the LFO was made part of the constitution, effectively reversing the Thirteenth Amendment.¹²⁷

Today, with the stupendous lawyers' movement that returned Chief Justice Iftikhar to power, and the eventual passage of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Amendments, a beacon of hope shines in Pakistan. A sincere attempt is being made to restore parliamentary governance and ensure provincial autonomy. These amendments do the following: 'first, it repealed Presidential powers to dissolve parliament; second, it laid out a clear process for installing a caretaker set-up in order to hold free and fair elections; and, third, it aims for free, fair and transparent elections through an independent Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)'.¹²⁸ In particular, the 20th Constitutional Amendment Bill 2012 has given the ECP sweeping powers to minimize the government's role in the appointment and removal of its members. By doing so, it is attempting to anchor its independence.

Conclusion

This chapter reveals that the origins, development and manipulation of Pakistan's constitution reflect the ongoing ideological battle in Pakistan. It is not necessarily the text of the constitution that presents a problem but rather its manipulation by diverging ideological forces who have little regard for its sanctity. With rare exceptions, civil and military political leaders in Pakistan seem to be either unaware or indifferent to what constitutes the 'foundational' values which it would bode well to adhere to. Political expediency and opportunism, rather than commitment to cherished values, have become the norm. There are no mutually agreed rules of the political game, no acceptable framework from which to compromise and negotiate. Everyone plays for all or nothing. As a result, the Islamic political values that include accountability, trusting the will of the people and representative government are missing from the political arena.

From a historical perspective, the formation of the Pakistan movement, the establishment of the country and the development of its constitution were based on the desire to create a model Islamic state. These initiatives were led by a political leadership that represented the revivalist approach to the 'foundational' aspects of political culture in Muslim polities. Divergent ideological interpretations have proven incredibly difficult to reconcile. The traditionalists are 'wedded to the expansion of Islamic law and Islamic practices in various spheres of Pakistani national life'.¹²⁹ The secularists 'take a more restrictive view on the proper role of Islam in the State'.¹³⁰ The military has been pulled between these polarities – for example, the secularist General Ayub Khan and the traditionalist General Zia. The revivalists – those who wish to re-evaluate the 'foundational' aspects of Islamic political culture in their contextual settings – have been few, leaving the political arena to the extremes. The analysis of the constitutional development in Pakistan aptly symbolizes this controversy.

Malik contends that a major factor 'that destroys efforts for a vibrant political culture and national unity and blocks the evolution of a civil society has been the dismal record of adhering to constitutional norms in the country'.¹³¹ The previous sections in this chapter, outlining the numerous constitutional amendments, substantiate this allegation. Irrespective of whether the civilian or military leaderships subscribe to a traditionalist or secularist approach to the 'foundational' aspects of Islamic political culture, they all share a disregard for the sanctity of the Constitution. This is because 'various constitutional reports, schemes (including the One-Unit to bring parity between the two wings of the country), basic democracies through limited franchise, frequent martial laws, and unilateral amendments have persistently dented and delayed politico-constitutional processes and eroded official respect for constitutionalism'.¹³² Even now, politicians are bickering about whether the country should have a presidential or parliamentary form of government. Malik further states: 'these entire issues blur the real issue of an efficient and accountable government elected by adult universal franchise and with an independent judiciary and free press'.¹³³

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8 The ideological discord promoting civil and military hegemony

Introduction

This chapter analyses the oscillation between civilian and military hegemonic rule in Pakistan, including the effect therein of competing ideologies. To begin with, it examines the origins and rationale for military intervention in politics. By doing so, it reveals the deep ideological crises that intensify instability. Then Shafqat's authoritative analysis is used to discern a consequence of that ideological crisis, which is the growth of two conflicting political propensities in Pakistan, the 'military-hegemonic' and the 'dominant party' political systems.¹ The two hegemonic propensities exist in a symbiotic relationship, in which each at once opposes the other and, then, strengthens itself on the basis of that opposition. Afterwards, our analysis proceeds to examine how each hegemonic propensity reacts to ideological incoherence and assesses its impact on political instability. Critically, key questions were foremost during our inquiry: Why does the military continue to intervene in the political system? Why is there tension between civil and military spheres? What are the political conditions that mitigate military intervention? Is continuous military intervention a result of the lack of fit between ideological and political superstructures in terms of realities imposed by either the 'traditionalists' or 'secularists'? These important questions will be related back to the primary scope of this study that attempts to unravel the causes of ideological and political instability in Pakistan with reference to its political culture.

Military interventionism in Pakistan

What are the factors that precipitated military interventionism in Pakistan? And, what are the consequences of it? Certainly, the military may be a positive force in society, which emerges as an institution better organised, more competent than the civilian politicians and motivated to promote economic development.² Analysts like Moore argue that the military was a powerful developmental and modernizing tool that would assist Pakistan's economic and societal stability.³ Huntington, going further, advocates incessant military modernization, stating that 'the more discipline, efficiency and organizational skills that the military

exhibits than the less likelihood of military intervention in the political scene'.⁴ Shafqat disagrees, arguing that the 'fact of the matter was the more modern and professional the military became in developing countries its intervention in politics increased'.⁵ Indeed, for Pakistan, heightened military professionalism encouraged them to seek the means and resources to maintain their superiority and secure political control. The question is whether that, or something else, retarded civilian maturation and the growth of a stable polity?

The factors that facilitated the rise and growth of the military in Pakistani politics were, mainly, suggested to be threefold: first, the relationship between the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups; second, the geographical strategic importance of Pakistan, specifically in relation to US strategic interests; third, the perceived threat of India.⁶ Looking back, in 1947 Pakistani insecurity was heightened, with a low level of economic development, poor urbanization and non-existence of indigenous industry. Actually, at that time, only '100 Muslim officers of the rank of captain and above in the British Indian Army opted their services for Pakistan, and none of them was above the rank of colonel'.⁷ This precarious scenario was further confounded by the unequal distribution of military assets between India and Pakistan at the time of independence.⁸ With India receiving the lion's share of armaments, there existed a deep insecurity, even concerning the very existence of Pakistan. Then, soon after independence, war erupted between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, when the illegitimate and foreign Dogra ruler refused to accede to the wishes of Kashmiris.⁹ That event catapulted the military into the political limelight. Desperately, it sought to encourage economic development, hoping to raise the economic prowess of the burgeoning country and defend itself against potential aggression.

Here, interestingly, one asks why did the military seek resources for defence, when this clearly was the responsibility of the civilian leadership? The answer to that question, as well as the most important factor that abets military interventionism in Pakistan, is the paralysis of the civilian political leadership due to fragmentation, ideological fighting and factionalism.¹⁰ With the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, the civilian political class was in disarray. Hence the military began to intervene, and its strategy involved co-opting the bureaucracy. Together, they began facilitating the emergence of the financial-industrial groups. Accordingly, a patron-client relationship between the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups emerges. Shafqat states that this relationship enhanced the power of the military elites to improve various types of economic controls, while providing financial-industrial groups with expansion without any competitive pressure.¹¹ In essence, the military-bureaucratic elites provided a vital link between the local financial-industrial groups and international capitalists through a series of state-sponsored economic policies.

However, much more still needed to be done financially to secure the hegemony of the military-bureaucratic elites. And this came in the form of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) from the United States.¹² Although

signed in 1954, there were no sizable financial or military shipments to Pakistan until 1956. Since then, however, the United States has been the major supplier of military equipment and services. There were times that 'Pakistan was described as the most "allied ally" of the United States and to the chagrin of others, one of the client states of Asia'.¹³ Actually, with the MAP agreement, Pakistan was able to acquire funds and sophisticated war technology, which allowed the military establishment to penetrate even deeper into the political superstructure.¹⁴ In 1958, when the higher civil bureaucracy assumed effective political power, the generals found it opportune to enter the political arena openly. As Ahmed notes, 'Quite symbolic of this significant change was the dismissal of the national government, the dissolution of the national parliament and the appointment of a member of the Armed forces as a Minister in the new government'.¹⁵

Thus, the military assistance programme (MAP) tilted economic power towards the military-bureaucratic elite, thereby altering the domestic state of affairs. By providing desperately needed funds, the United States was able to secure a foothold for itself, as well as anchor the military's internal position. And by the late 1950s the military was equipped not only with formidable technical and material resources but also with an ideological stance favourable to world capitalist interests. Yet this military-to-military financial rapport between Pakistan and USA, recently described as a 'relationship from hell', has never been stable. From the Sino-Indian War of 1962, when the US refused to provide urgently required, and agreed, weapons spare parts, to Kargil, the war on terror, the Raymond Davis affair and the Salala massacre, there have been several times that this relationship has become embittered, thereby distressing the two countries' economic relationship.¹⁶ The reality is that Pakistan's military has never really trusted US intentions and has, from early on, sought more stable financial resources. Those concerns, then, eventually, led the military to directly intertwine itself as a financial-industrial class in its own right. In other words, the higher echelons of the military brass became, and continue to be, a significant player in the financial-industrial class who reap significant economic and political rewards.¹⁷

Now, with so much at stake, it is hardly surprising that the military often chooses to intervene politically, especially when it feels its interests are threatened. Of course, that intervention adds to political instability, even if by its coercive force it is able to establish its predominance. For that hegemony comes with a price, which is the inability of a civilian political superstructure to take root. And, often the military exacerbates civilian political instability to perpetuate its own dominance. However, it is not only military interventionism that has retarded civilian political maturation. Coming back to an earlier point, which requires emphasis, the origin of military interventions in Pakistan was in the inability of its political elite to formulate a coherent, agreeable and legitimate ideological superstructure. Here, this book emphasizes that specific failure as the '*principale raison*' facilitating military intervention. This is so since the disjointed ideological and political superstructures, of the 'traditionalist' or

‘secularist’ kind, are not flexible enough to contain instability. Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister, while commenting on military intervention in Pakistan, states that ‘it is not the inordinate ambition or a special taste for the politics but the failure of the political classes to govern effectively that the military intervention takes place in Pakistan’.¹⁸ In other words, that inability to govern actually means the failure of the political classes to present a popularly approved ideology, the absence of which invites the military. If genuine political forces were able to construct a corresponding political superstructure, then the crises could have been overcome by inherent mechanisms for managing discontent within it. However, the coercive imposition and consequent failure of the traditionalist and secularist superstructures facilitates military intervention, in as much as they are not based on the aspired foundational values. With the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, both ‘revivalists,’ ideological extremes sunk the country into deeper and deeper crises.

Two political propensities in Pakistan

Since the creation of the independent nation-state of Pakistan, it has been struggling to establish a workable, legitimate, balanced and representative political system. That, too, must be imagined while reconciling the forces of the foundational, contextual and the individual. This inability to construct a political order that balances between ideological polarities invites two contradictory political dispensations towards governance, the ‘military-hegemonic’ and the ‘dominant-party’. In the first political propensity, the primary objective was to curb participatory politics and to subjugate the political parties and other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony. Alternatively, the other’s primary concern was to subordinate the military-bureaucratic elites to civilian-led party dominance and substitute military rule.¹⁹ Both political dispensations have not been able to resolve Pakistan’s chronic political instability, and largely ignore entrenching it with local ethics. Even the leading potentates of Pakistan after 1947 ‘were unable to charter a course of action that institutionalized the historical aspirations of a people who had borne the oppression of exploitative class relations under centuries of pre-colonial and post-colonial modes of production’.²⁰ And, until now, Pakistan’s fractious political oscillating between civilian and military rule remains unconnected to the political aspirations of the masses.

Essentially, in either hegemonic political dispensation, establishing total and absolute control over the state and society emerged as the primary objective of Pakistan’s political development.²¹ Here, again, this conflict intensifies as various contenders in the political arena failed to develop a minimal consensus on the nature, direction and ideology of the political system that is in harmony with its enduring foundational values. Still, further exacerbating the political situation, both the civilian and military rulers view each other with total distrust and animosity.²² And this has been the state of

affairs since early on after Pakistan's inception. Certainly, one walks a slippery slope between respecting religious mores and coercively imposing them; between honouring diversity and maintaining a broad-based commitment to enduring core ideals; between freedom of speech and its limitations when infringing on the sensibilities of others. In these subtleties is found the path towards '*ummah wasat*', which is bemusing to many.

The inability to find that median has resulted in Pakistan's chronic political tumult and explains why, just looking at the times from 1947–54, nine provincial governors were dismissed.²³ Not just then, though, the failure of the civilian politicians to respect the demarcations of power and foster a consensual ideology led to the dismissal of four elected prime ministers from 1988 to 1999 when the military dismissed the fifth elected government and General Musharraf seized power.²⁴ Even now, the threat of military interventionism remains, with Tahir-ul-Qadri claiming his long march for democracy was cancelled due to this.²⁵ Thus, with no initiatives for presenting a popularly accepted ideology forthcoming, Pakistan's politics is doomed to swing between extremes, neither of which provides any real chance of resolving the deep imbalances.

A military-hegemonic political system

A military-hegemonic political system is regarded as the supremacy of the military in the political system. It achieves this by four processes: '(1) promotion of the "corporate interests" of the military; (2) political exclusion, i.e. exclusion of political leaders, political parties and urban middle class; (3) political control, i.e. control of the press and labour; (4) political inclusion, i.e. co-optation and consolidation of bureaucratic elites, financial-industrial groups and feudal classes'.²⁶ Taken together, these processes anchor the military's monopoly over decision-making that enables it to manipulate and steer the behaviour of political leaders and interest groups in a chosen direction. Moreover, often they are intertwined and go hand in hand with one another.

First, the Pakistani military's corporate interests are sustained by Siddiq's term '*Milbus*', which she defines as 'capital used for the benefit of the military fraternity, especially the officer cadre, which is not recorded as part of the defence budget or does not follow the normal accountability procedures of the state, making it an independent genre of capital'.²⁷ Effectively, the military engages in two broad but distinct sets of activities – 'profit making through the privatization of security' and 'military engagement in non-traditional roles such as farming, running hotels, airlines, banks or real estate agencies'.²⁸ Its most significant component is 'entrepreneurial activities that do not fall under the scope of the normal accountability procedures of the state, and are mainly for the gratification of military personnel and their cronies'.²⁹ Suffice to say the economic strength of the military continues unabated and its higher echelons use this privilege to maintain hegemony.³⁰

Second, the military's hegemony is further strengthened by political exclusion of all those who they feel are impediments to Pakistan's commitment to

peripheral capitalism and its structural imperative. And, to be precise, the method that has consistently been employed to remove political leaders and parties from the political arena was via ordinances. These included Section 144 of the Criminal Code, Security of Pakistan Act 1952, Public Offices Disqualification Order 1959, Press and Public Ordinance 1963, Political Organizations Ordinance 1962, Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1965, to name a few. Under military hegemony each of these became tools for repression and control. Third, political control, too, occurs 'on executive decrees or ordinances and manipulation of the judiciary, political exclusion and building strategic alliances'.³¹ Recall, in the preceding chapter, the constitutional amendments including the '*doctrine of necessity*', '*revolutionary-legality*' and '*implied mandate*' – all have been used to justify military intervention.³² While the constitution does not, in and of itself, justify military interventionism, it is often manipulated after military intervention takes place.

Fourth, political inclusion occurs by co-opting segments of civil society, including politicians and media, into an uneasy and unequal relationship, giving an appearance of democracy and respect for the rule of law.³³ Of particular note is the co-opting of feudals, not only into the military itself but also in the financial-industrial class. However, the primary thrust of the military is to deactivate those who were previously active – the political leaders – and restrict the participation of aspiring classes. The military-bureaucratic elites pursue policies to promote the financial-industrial groups and ensure the continued preponderance of the feudal classes in the rural structure.³⁴

Overall, a military hegemonic system may have a semblance of political stability, but, as Shafqat notes, stability hinges on the hegemony of the military in the political system.³⁵ In Pakistan, 'political order' and 'political stability' are achieved by establishing the hegemony of relatively strong institutions like the bureaucracy and the military.³⁶ Consequently, the weak political structures in Pakistan, like political parties, interest groups and parliaments, become weaker and further fragmented – which, in turn, serves the interest of the military. Therefore, it is not the absence of effective political institutions or a constitution, for that matter, but the military-bureaucratic elites' perceptions and beliefs that the political parties and the entire political process are chaotic and non-legitimate.³⁷ Shafqat adds, under military-hegemonic conditions, political parties and interest groups do not develop; they stagnate.³⁸ As a consequence, the military aims to be solely in control of political society and believes that it alone should be the real political base. This, in turn, produces anti-military hegemonic movements, which leads to the erosion of the military's power and creates a crisis of political instability.

Weakening of military hegemony

Since the military-bureaucratic elites monopolize power, authority and sources of economic patronage, the civilian political leaders have limited choices. Falk's theory outlines three options from which civilian political leaders must

choose: '1. Corroborate with the regime at the elite level and seek access to governmental patronage; 2. Build a coalition of like-minded political leaders and political parties and seek concessions from the regime within the framework of the military-hegemonic system; 3. Pursue a strategy of regime confrontation, mobilize the masses and build a broad coalition of groups and classes that are adversely affected by the regime's policies, thereby creating conditions which weaken the military hegemony'.³⁹ The political history of Pakistan reveals that the tactics employed by civilian political leaders against the military are confrontational. This illustrates a coercive rather than consultative manner of political negotiation.⁴⁰ A politics of protest and demonstration reflects the weakening of hegemonic control. The increase in political participation and, in particular, the agitation variety of it, results in an authoritarian response from the military-bureaucratic regime. More specifically, this occurs 'since processes and institutions that could promote negotiations leading to bargain, compromise and accommodation within the system are weak'.⁴¹ Eventually, the continuous pressure from the masses, organized by the civilian political leaders, places serious constraints on the military elites, which facilitates the erosion of military power and the decaying of the military-hegemonic system.

Clearly, with mounting resentment against military rule, an incrementally aggressive phenomenon begins to take place by those disgruntled segments of society that are not allowed to express their political discontent through institutional mechanisms. Urban professionals, industrial labour and, to a certain degree, disgruntled feudals – all those who are unable to operate in the political system – become politicised and anti-regime.⁴² Thereafter, politics under the military-hegemonic political system would show that protests and demonstrations emerge as an expression of political discontent. While military-bureaucratic institutions decay, confrontational politics intensifies in the already segmented society. Class and ethnic cleavages sharpen and antagonism against the military-bureaucratic hegemony increases.⁴³ This increases the volatility and unpredictability of outcomes.

What is important to emphasize is that all those excluded from power begin to rely on mass urban protests. These protests tend to encourage and incorporate demands that would have mass appeal or would cut across more than one group. Mass mobilization, then, becomes Pakistan's protest method of choice. However, such a strategy of 'regime confrontation and mass mobilization may produce a crisis of regime legitimacy and may cause breakdown of the military's hegemony or even the dominant party system but offers no stable, coherent and consensual alternative. Alternative institutions to replace the system do not develop in that they require more time and consensus, amongst the political leader', which is not forthcoming, particularly in view of the ideological divergence between them.⁴⁴ Because more energy is spent in mobilizing and demobilizing the masses, institution building that includes party building, resolution of conflict within the parliament through negotiations and bargaining, and tolerance of dissent does not occur, and they remain a low priority.⁴⁵ Consequently, even after the regime breakdown, the coercive instrument of

control, which evolved under the military-hegemonic system, is perceived to be the only viable mechanism to ensure political stability and political order. Nevertheless, once the military's grip on power is broken, it withdraws to the barracks, negotiates with civilian political leaders. This inaugurates the 'dominant-party' hegemonic system.

The 'dominant-party' political system

The origins of the civilian 'dominant-party' hegemonic dispensation in Pakistan have their roots in the formation of the Muslim League political party. As previously mentioned, those with a 'revivalist' perspective spearheaded the cause for Pakistan. Successfully, they created a political party, galvanized the masses and achieved a level of popular support, hitherto unknown. However, this civilian-based political organization, while in place prior to and during the independence movement for Pakistan, needed to change. Why? Since once Pakistan was created, it was no longer a freedom movement. What was required was it to become a national, inclusive and ideologically sound party. This did not occur and Ahmed characterizes this as due to 'the failure of the Muslim League to develop as a national, Democratic Party'.⁴⁶ Here, it is important to reiterate the reasons for that failure to transform and develop a stable, democratic political order. It was the ideological clash between the traditionalists and secularists that paralysed political action, which worked in the aspiration and interest of the military and bureaucratic elite.

The failure of the Muslim League political leadership to transform into a national, democratic and ideologically coherent party, following the independence of Pakistan, led to serious consequences. As the founding and ruling party, one of their first challenges was to establish a national political structure based on democratic ideals while remaining cognizant of the logistical quagmire of maintaining control over a territory which was splintered into two geographical units and that contained powerful ethnic divisions.⁴⁷ On the contrary, while 'West Pakistan' is represented by its striking heterogeneity, 'East Pakistan', present-day Bangladesh, is represented by its rich homogeneity. As Noman states, at that time, 'East Pakistan' contained 54 per cent of the total Pakistani population and was exclusively Bengali.⁴⁸ Even though this ethnic demographical reality may have posed some problems for the Muslim League, considering that they had overcome greater obstacles in the past, it was assumed that they were capable of providing such an enlightened leadership. Yet that did not take place, largely as a consequence of the imbalances and hierarchies of power within the Muslim elites in the British Empire in South Asia. The core leadership of the Muslim League came from the Muslim minority provinces in North India and during the movement for Pakistan they had controlled key positions in the political party.⁴⁹ That core leadership was comprised of ethnic 'Muhajirs', whose authority was not challenged from Muslim majority provinces, such as Bengal.⁵⁰ The support base of regional leaders was confined to their provinces. Following independence, the Muslim

League should have endeavoured to include those regional leaders into their political fold, but this hardly occurred and, as a result, minority groups began to feel alienated. This increased centrifugal forces. The only other ethnic group well represented was the 'Punjabis', primarily on account of their dominant representation in the military as part of the politicians and military establishment's rapprochement.⁵¹ Together, this 'Muhajir-Punjabi' nexus acquired key control over the decision-making posts at the apex of centralised state power. This ethnic composition has now gradually evolved to include others, but at that critical time following independence, the exclusion of other ethnicities was striking.⁵²

What began to take shape in Pakistan was a form of hereditary politics in which political parties were nothing more than family-based Mafias. In other words, the 'dominant-party' system is a 'family-mafia' style of political dispensation that is more oligarchic than democratic.⁵³ It is an equally hegemonic civilian-based political system that mirrored the coercive mannerisms of the military but lacked their organization, discipline and coherence.⁵⁴ Added to this, the dominance by an unrepresentative centre, the Muhajir-Punjabi elite, provoked dissension from the other regions, especially in the majority province of Bengal. As a consequence, regional elites, antagonised by the denial of heterogeneity in a multi-ethnic state such as Pakistan, mobilised popular support for greater provincial autonomy.⁵⁵

There are two primary hypotheses that shed light on the failure of the civilian political leaders to consolidate democratic propensities in Pakistan. First, that the success or failure of a democratic transition from military hegemony is dependent on the culture and structure of society.⁵⁶ For that reason, the failure of securing a democratic propensity was a reflection of culture in both the society and the state. Second, that the success or failure of a transition to a democratic polity was dependent on leadership.⁵⁷ In other words, the manner in which the civilian political leaders and elites managed the shift towards a democratic and participatory political system determined the outcome. The first hypothesis has largely been discredited, as democracies are not all similar and manifest themselves differently in different societies. As Malik adds, the failure of civilian governance is abetted by the feudal nature of the national economy, where bureaucrats and politicians operate as latter day *mai-bap* (parents) dispensing largesse and ad hoc doses of administrative and land reform'.⁵⁸ Thus, the failure of the civilian political leadership to firmly root participatory politics rests in their tendency to behave in an equally hegemonic manner. Shafqat notes that the 'initial transition to democracy was anti-authoritarian, but not necessarily pro-democratic. Such a transition created an environment of political liberalism, encouraged associational activity, challenged the declining authoritarian institutions, but also relied on the same authoritarian institutions'.⁵⁹ Seen in this context, the political leaders espouse totalitarian methods for transitioning towards a democratic polity. Thus, civilian political leaders failed by the choices they made – which included radical usage of ideology, incapacity to

build a coalition of interest groups, degenerative economic policies and poor performance.⁶⁰

In addition, the failure of the civilian political leaders, whether through the 'dominant party' or the opposition parties, is their strong tendency to attempt to cripple the other powerful stakeholders in society. These hegemonic intentions of political leaders have become pronounced and crucial whenever the issue of appointments of top positions in the armed forces, higher judiciary, ambassadorial postings and civil bureaucracy have arisen.⁶¹ Thus the 'dominant-party' hegemonic system demands not only the dominance of the ruling party over the opposition political parties, but also attempts to impose their supremacy over elected officials, representative institutions and over non-elected offices and non-institutions. In total, the ruling party attempts to secure its total hegemony without any inclination to power sharing. As a result, the excluded stakeholders of power resent this clear infringement on their sacred space and react viciously to guard its political territory.⁶² These tensions between the adherents of two systems have prompted combative relations between the proponents of the military-hegemonic and dominant-party systems.

Persistence of hegemonic forces

With hindsight, whenever the military-hegemonic system shows signs of decay or weakness, the dominant party system resurfaces. And then, when the civilian 'dominant-party' superstructure pushes too far, it collapses, only to re-invite the military. Shafqat elaborates, citing the period 1971–77, in which the pre-occupation of the political leadership and aspiring urban middle classes was how to contain the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups in order to establish the dominance of the elected political leadership and civilian political institutions.⁶³ Here the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the creation of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) is important since he was the first political leader to attempt to secure the supremacy of civilian institutions and become partially successful. However, he too exhibited strong hegemonic characteristics. Owing to his social status, his leadership style was uncompromising, dictatorial and the main supporters for his political party also came from the large feudal classes in Sind.⁶⁴ Here, we notice that Bhutto's leadership style was secularist, authoritarian and confrontational with regard to other opposition parties and the military rulers.⁶⁵ Such a leadership style, rooted in confrontation and tyranny, could hardly bode well for Pakistan's political future.

Interestingly, that moment in Pakistan's history revealed that the collapse of the military-hegemonic political system and the emergence of civilian political leadership does not necessarily entail the emergence of effective political leadership, broadening of political participation and consolidation of democratic processes and institutions.⁶⁶ As a matter of fact, the 'dominant-party' system functioned as an extension of the 'military-hegemony' political system in that it discouraged the formation of associational groups and

opposition parties could not build consensus on ideology, vision or the workings of parliamentary democracy.

Certainly, the political participation of aspiring urban middle classes expanded, and was meant to establish the supremacy of elected political leadership in the political system. This, though, initiated a process of resistance by the military-bureaucratic elites, the financial-industrial groups and a segment of the feudal classes, who dominated the economy and were, therefore, reluctant to support the process of building civilian democratic institutions.⁶⁷ Creating civilian institutions meant changing the nature of the economic structure and dismantling the hegemonic position of the military in the political system.

Evidently, the hegemonic position of the military elites persisted and constrained the process of civilian-based political development. The continuity and deeply entrenched nature of military-bureaucratic elites promoted suspicions about the very nature of participatory politics, political parties and interest groups.⁶⁸ As a result, the ambiguity about civilian institutions as viable alternatives to military hegemonic systems continued and led to the process of returning to redemocratization in the latter years of General Zia's rule.⁶⁹

In the post-1985 phase of redemocratization, Pakistan continued to suffer from similar disabilities and predicaments of the successor civilian regimes. Despite greater political liberalization, most political parties, specifically in power, show a propensity for the acquisition of unbridled power, in the form of the 'dominant-party' system as a possible alternative to the military-hegemonic system.⁷⁰ During this second period of redemocratization, especially after the mysterious sabotage of General Zia's plane, which resulted in his death, Pakistan's civil society was making a gradual comeback with 'a free and critical press, freer judiciary, a comparatively assertive intermediate class, the emergence of human rights groups, various non-governmental organizations and a growing vigilance on socio-economic and regional issues were making it look difficult for the military to contemplate a comeback'.⁷¹ However, the failure of the politicians in consolidating democratic institutions, respecting the demarcations of political power and fostering a consensual and coherent ideology led to the dismissal of four elected prime ministers.⁷²

It must be reiterated that regime change in Pakistan occurs as a consequence of a decline in the military's hegemonic capacity, which is a result of the tactic of regime confrontation and mass mobilization utilised by political parties and other excluded segments of society. Constrained and conditioned by the military-hegemonic political system, the political parties have continued to reveal a preference for the dominant-party system, which exhibits partisanship and confrontation as its political norms. 'These conditions have put an enormous responsibility on elites and political leaders, to expand areas of negotiation, identify issues of agreements and disagreements, then negotiate and bargain, minimize potential conflict and build consensus in a manner that the interests of a large number of political contestants and economic competitors are protected'.⁷³ However, so far the political leaders have failed to develop a consensus to restrict the military's political role, while their actions and conduct has

continued to solidify the trend towards a dominant-party system. In this book, it is argued that the reason the political leaders are unable to achieve consensus and restrict the role of the military is an inadequate balance between the foundational, contextual and individual.

Regime change from military-hegemonic to possible democratic entails changes at all levels – local, regional and national. Even decision-makers and decision-making procedures at various levels also change, and yet authoritarian structures remain intact, as the case of Pakistan reveals, although in a number of countries regime change has resulted in readjustment of existing institutions.⁷⁴ It is equally important to recognize that, anticipating or conceding its hegemonic position, the military certainly attempts to disengage from the political scene, but the degree of its disengagement is closely linked with the ability of the political parties and their leadership to develop consensus on developing civilian participatory institutions, effective management of political conflict and credible economic policies.⁷⁵ Therefore, the continuous fluctuation between a civilian-based ‘dominant-party’ and ‘military-hegemonic’ political system has hampered consensus building between the ruling party and opposition political parties as well as with the military. It has promoted tendencies of confrontation, violence and polarization in the political process and society. The longer the civilian political leadership takes to build a consensus on the type of political system, the easier it becomes for the military to retain its military hegemony. Under such conditions, the Pakistani case amply demonstrates that the military elites began to indulge in political manipulation and undercut the political process and development of civilian institutions to return the political structure towards the military-oriented power. Thus, it is a vicious cycle; for the military establishment, democratisation implies ‘deviation’ from their vision of society, which therefore leads to the return of the ‘reluctant’ generals.⁷⁶

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have revealed that military interventionism in Pakistan results significantly, if not entirely, from the failure to develop a coherent ideological superstructure. That failure, then, leads to the development of Shafqat’s two conflicting political propensities, the ‘military-hegemonic’ and the ‘dominant-party’ system. First, the ‘dominant-party’ system, while demonstrating a preference for the civilian political leadership, parliamentary institutions and possible restoration of democratic processes, is non-consensual and confrontational. Civilian political leaders, primarily coming from a feudal social origin, conduct themselves in a manner unsupportive for the growth and development of democratic institutions.⁷⁷ Clearly, according to the research undertaken, there is a significant emphasis on the incompetence of the civilian and military political leadership in Pakistan.⁷⁸ This political leadership, whether civilian or military, stems from feudal, upper-class social origins and struggles only for total, unchecked and absolute control over the reins of power. The ‘dominant-party’ civilian-based political system was intended to encourage participatory and

representative politics; however, it rapidly degenerated into an overbearing, confrontational and ideologically divided political dispensation. As a consequence of chronic ideological divisions, which were seriously exacerbated with the death of the leading figures in the political movement for Pakistan, ideological extremes began dominating the political arena. In that political scenario, achieving consensus was proving impossible to attain. In response, the military intervened to secure its internal and external interests. However, having tasted political power and secured their economic interests, they would not let go without being compelled to do so:

The most serious consequence of the military's involvement in economic ventures relates to their sense of judgment regarding the political control of the state. The financial autonomy of the armed forces ... establishes the officer cadre's interest in retaining political control of the state. Since political power nurtures greater financial benefits, the military fraternity see it as beneficial to perpetuate it. In this respect, economic and political interests are linked in a cyclic process: political power guarantees economic benefits, which, in turn, motivate the officer cadre to remain powerful.⁷⁹

Thus, the military elites have every reason to grasp, wield and retain political power. They have no incentive to let go unless they are coerced out of the political system. The best that can be hoped for, in this political scenario, is that a political leadership emerges that represents a balance between the 'foundational' and 'contextual' spheres of inquiry – 'revivalists', who will be able to both confront hegemonic characteristics and rid Pakistan of military interventionism. In other words, an appropriate ideological political superstructure and culture needs to be developed in consonance with enduring 'foundational' values. Otherwise, under the current political state of affairs, the military elites will only make a cosmetic retreat to the barracks while a civilian government takes the flak without wielding real power. This was pretty much the situation for much of the 1990s, after General Zia's death. It was only after former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deluded in thinking that his large parliamentary majority gave him real power, and tried to dismiss General Musharraf, that the military staged its coup in 1999.⁸⁰

The military-hegemonic system, in summation, grew out of both internal and external factors. Civilian political infighting, lack of consensus and the failure of the civilian political leaders contributed to this malaise. The military-hegemonic regime advanced the interests of the military-bureaucratic elites, consolidated the financial industrial groups, co-opted a segment of the feudal class, and led to laissez-faire economic growth and development. At the same time, through domination and exclusionary policies, the military regime promoted centralization and authoritarianism, restricted associational group activity and suppressed the growth and development of political parties. This chapter emphasizes that in Pakistan, while political order was maintained through military hegemony, unequal growth led to the concentration of economic wealth in the

hands of a few, which, in turn, politicized the excluded groups and classes.⁸¹ In other words, the economic policies of the military regime promoted class inequalities. This scenario, coupled with centralization, political suppression and authoritarianism, evoked politics of regime confrontation. Since under the military regime associational group activity is discouraged and the functioning of political parties is restricted, political leaders excluded from the political system resort to coalition-building, mass mobilization and confrontation. More importantly, civil society is unable to organize and develop, thereby nullifying methods of resolving conflict within the political system. Thus mass protest movements emerge as a consequence of the exclusionary policies of the military hegemonic system. Such mass movements focus only on regime change.

In this chapter we have shown that the inability of the civilian leadership to construct a political order that recognises the foundational aspects of political culture in Muslim polities and then apply it, according to a revivalist interpretation, in their context was a major contributor towards ideological and political instability. Without this 'revivalist' leadership, the military elites find it most opportune to intervene in the political system. Thereafter, it is clear that over the years the military-bureaucratic elites, through various policies of inclusion and exclusion, have created a coalition of interests that not only supported but advocated the perpetuation of the military-hegemonic system. Likewise, political parties, despite fragmentation, and weak institutional infrastructure, have continued to retain adherents and advocates who express pro-democracy sentiments but in reality continue to reveal a preference for civilian hegemony as an alternative to military hegemony. Consequently, 'democratic development in Pakistan has been arrested both by the functioning of military-hegemonic systems and also the constraints of political leaders to consolidate the dominant-party system rather than work for the creation, construction and consolidation of federal, parliamentary and democratic structures' which is in consonance with the 'foundational' political values in Islam.⁸² Consequently, disharmony and tension between democratic dispensations and autocratic reality continues to be the most pronounced characteristic of Pakistan's political development.⁸³

Yet there is light at the end of this dark tunnel. The recent lawyers' movement that returned the deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Iftikhar Chaudhury, to his position as the head of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is worthy of note. A new era seems to be emerging which is mandating respect for the rule of law. In addition, Imran Khan's political party, Tehrik-i-Insaf – Movement for Justice – is another promising development in the history of Pakistan. This is, perhaps, the first time since Independence, when a grassroots, popular mass mobilization is taking shape that is in line with the 'revivalists'. Both are positive indicators for the future of Pakistan.

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9 Conclusion

The real to the ideal

Conclusion

This book attempts to support Muslim societies in articulating indigenous solutions to the myriad of political challenges confronting them. Continuously facing intellectual and ethical alternatives to their own convictions, these rapidly changing societies are looking for pragmatic solutions that do not necessarily compromise their own principles, values and ideals. Specifically pertaining to the political realm, many Muslim polities grapple with the reconciliation of modernity and tradition. In other words, they attempt to intelligently contend with ‘permanence’ (*thabit*) and ‘change’ (*mutaghayir*). This process of reconciliation often leads to ideological and, consequently, political instability. Accordingly, with reconciliation not forthcoming, political institutions, or politics per se, fail to capture the imagination of the masses. That, then, was the *raison d’être* of this book – an exploration of the dynamics of political instability, or mismanagement of permanence and change, in Muslim polities, with Pakistan as a case study. Yet even to initiate confronting such a colossal enigma, our exploration necessitates a host of preliminary issues.

To begin with, this book analyses political culture, providing a thorough overview of the literature on it. Therein, it locates constant references to the ‘*core*’, ‘*enduring cultural component*’ or ‘*stock of knowledge*’ in society. Subsequently, those descriptive terms are used to explain the essence of political culture, alluding to its political values. However, that allusion is misleading, since what the ‘*core*’ precisely consists of, amounts to or how it may alter is left largely undefined. Therefore, this study proceeded to define that ‘*core*’, in regards to Muslim polities, and labelled it as the ‘*foundational*’ aspect of Islamic political culture. More clearly, the ‘*foundational*’ represents those aspects of permanence in Islamic political culture and consists of deeply cherished political ideals. Yet this articulation is only the first sphere of inquiry essential to understand the complexity of Islamic political culture in Muslim polities. Specifically, understanding it involves three spheres of inquiry: ‘*foundational*’ (what endures or should be), ‘*contextual*’ (what is) and ‘*individual*’ (the agent for movement).

These three spheres of inquiry are engaged in an ongoing triangular relationship. In other words, this interplay involves the '*foundational*' political values – or, 'the ideals'; the '*contextual*' in which those political values find depth, meaning and expression, as in Pakistan – 'the real'; and the '*individual*' by the method and manner that political leadership chooses to interact with both the '*foundational*' and '*contextual*'.

The differing method and manner in which 'individual' political leaders, choose to interact with the '*foundational*' produces three variant political cultures: '*traditionalist*', '*secularist*' and '*revivalist*'. Amongst these variant political culture types, both the '*traditionalist*' and '*secularist*' methods of interaction are unable to achieve equilibrium. As a result, they both contribute towards ideological and political instability. On the other hand, the '*revivalist*' method of interaction between the three spheres of inquiry produces a balance, with the belief that the principle endures but the manner of its application is dependent on space-time. Of course, the complexity of managing that requires an enlightened '*asabiyya*' or, as Toynbee would have it, '*creative minority*', capable of steering society in that direction.

Theoretical assertions

This book defined a profound internal ideological and, consequently, political challenge confronting Muslim polities. That is the management of permanence and change, expressed by the interplay between the '*foundational*', the '*contextual*' and the '*individual*', thereby producing three variant political culture types: traditionalist, secularist and revivalist. Actually, the manner in which this occurs goes to the heart of political instability in Muslim polities as each variant typology confronts the others. Moreover, this characterization is not specific to Pakistan, but rather applies to the entire Muslim heartland, and is particularly relevant for the Middle East. As a matter of fact, in Muslim-majority countries, through the process of several centuries of socialization, the '*foundational*' values permeate society. Volatility appears when new forms of learning, or counter-epistemologies, are introduced into '*contextual*' realities that starkly contrast with the conventional enduring cultural component. This volatility is further intensified when elites, or 'individuals', controlling the state enforce their '*secularist*' or '*traditionalist*' vision upon the rest of society. With that egregious imposition, the attitudinal condition of rebellion is brought forth and, if the state's repressive response is indiscriminate, brings about massive violence. In other words, the findings of this book support Hafez's analysis outlining the causes of 'why Muslims rebel?' when unpopular governments brutally and indiscriminately stifle opposition.¹ He eloquently argues that 'Muslims rebel because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate repression on the other'.² While that assertion is valid, the lurking ideological incoherence and consequent polarization is what this book suggests causes institutional exclusion, secular state repression and reactive traditionalist counter-violence.

To clarify, this book commenced by analysing the concept of political culture to seek therein the roots of political instability. Yet what was revealing was that the term 'political culture' is defined in numerous ways dependant on its usage. Furthermore, the concept itself was originally intended to promote the modernization theory of development and notions of 'cultural lag'.³ In other words, there was a strong Euro-centricity inherent in its norm, which impeded its effectiveness in becoming an explanatory variable. This insight, however, did not assist us in decoding a methodology through which to study, even grasp, political culture in Muslim polities. It only revealed to us the dearth of relevant literature and the necessity of exploring different processes to do political culture research. During that exploration, our most salient finding was in locating the 'gap' therein, which Inglehart discusses as the 'enduring cultural component that makes political life distinct for polities'.⁴

To further explain, a human being comes into a world of existing meanings, types, roles, 'formulae', 'stock of knowledge' and 'significant symbols'.⁵ That, then, shapes political life and makes it distinct. Yet those terms failed to tackle 'how' is it that one would go about and understand what they consist of in a given polity? Therefore, this book ventured to define that 'enduring cultural component' that saturates Muslim polities. It did so by labelling it as the 'foundational' values, which provide the basis for understanding the entirety of Islamic political culture. In other words, the 'gap' in political culture research was, precisely, the missing explanation of what the 'enduring cultural component' would consist of.

Our analysis then proceeded to define that enduring cultural component, or, as we stated, 'foundational' values, which deal with those patterns of behaviour, norms and cultural assumptions that together represent an aspect of permanence and the core ideological and political platform of Islam. Clearly, these 'foundational' values present a vision of where its society is meant to progress towards. In other words, without knowing 'who I am' one is incapable of understanding the entirety of political culture and concretizing it into political institutions – 'where I should go'. And, here, finding out 'who I am' involves a phenomenological approach to political culture research. That, then, led us to rationalize that the underlying enduring political values are to be found interspersed between the Qur'an, the Prophetic sayings, the Khulafa-Rashidun era and Qur'anic epistemology. Collectively, these four constituents represent the cornerstone of Islamic theology – the Qur'an and Prophetic sayings; the practical application of that theology in political society for Sunni orthodoxy – the Khulafa-Rashidun; and the epistemological thread that weaves it all together.

Taking that together, from those constituents, this study extracted political values that include placing sovereignty in God, but also in people as His representatives on earth; Humanity is one and individuals are born of good and sound nature; all individuals are born equal, irrespective of race or gender with the right to own land; mutual consultation, consensus, and inclusion are necessary for stability, in both private and public spheres; people must choose their representatives; giving an oath of allegiance to political leaders; leaders are accountable to the people and no one is above the law;




Figure 9.1 This graph outlines the entire research and analytical scope of this study. It begins with describing political culture research trends, leading to Islamic political culture and its three spheres of inquiry. Then, it deconstructs each of those spheres; foundational, contextual and individual.

leaders are the servants of the people they represent; and those who want leadership should not have it. Certainly, that is not all. Still, what we have collected from the ‘foundational’ values represent the political high classicism to which Islamic scholars such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Khaldun, Malik Bennabi and Muhammad Iqbal, and a host of others, allude. It is, precisely, to this high classicism that Muslim polities compare their current political structures so as to measure discrepancies with regard to it. And in this discrepancy resides the inherent tension that endures in Muslim polities. In support of that, Wael Hallaq eloquently emphasizes, ‘as a world civilization, Islam developed a historically grounded paradigmatic moral-legal ethic that defined its identity. Obviously, there can be no Islam, nor any specifically Islamic moral-legal culture outside of history, for it is history and its forces and circumstances that gave rise to this legal-moral identity. To be a Muslim individual today is to be, in fundamental ways, connected with that Shari’a-defined ethic, for it is this ethic that shaped what Islam is and has been ... *There is no Muslim identity without this ethic*’.⁶ Thus, in other words, to suggest that contemporary Muslim identity can rid itself of this ethic, which permeated it to the core, amounts to ‘claiming that citizens of Euro-America could still be

who they are but without their historical roots, without their socioeconomic history, without their legal history, without their political history, and without the Enlightenment and its values'.⁷ Thus, in as much as the modern Western state and its citizen are the product of a historically determined phenomenon, the Muslim identity of today is inextricably connected with a particular moral-legal ethic that was historically determined by the supremely central values of the Shari'a.⁸ Likewise, this book contends that in Muslim political life there exists a lurking and compelling cultural force that cannot be neglected, and that needs to be thoroughly understood. Both traditionalists and secularists misunderstand, albeit in different ways, that pervasive cultural force. Either, by romanticizing imitation or ignoring it altogether, fails to grasp the dynamics of stability.

Concerning factors that inhibit accurately understanding Islam's relationship with politics, Eqbal Ahmed offers a wonderful insight by stating that the 'field of Islamic studies, strewn with ancient potholes and modern mines, is dominated by apparently different but actually complementary adversaries – the 'traditionalist' ulama and the modern 'orientalists'. Their methods are different; so are their intentions. Yet, with few exceptions, both tend to view Islam's relationship to politics in fundamentalist and textual terms'.⁹ How so? Well, both misunderstand the separation between religion and politics in Islam, hold an effectively stagnant view of Islam and interpret change as interfering with religious orthodoxy. The interplay between the Westerners' academic orthodoxy and the ulama's theological orthodoxy has set the terms for the prevalent discourse on Islam.¹⁰ Learning from that, this study argued that both the 'traditionalist' and 'secularist' political culture types exhibit similar non-consensual and authoritarian power tendencies augmenting political instability. One wishes to live in the past, the other wishes to bury it.

Therefore, in efforts to unravel the precise obstacles to political stability, this book put forward its theory that the dynamic interplay between the 'individual', the 'foundational' and the 'contextual' explains the growth of competing political culture typologies. This contest of supremacy is ongoing – and, resultantly, produces an 'activist and insurrectionary' political climate. Often, the Muslim heartland from Pakistan to Mauritania has been described as lands of insolence, rebellion and dissidence. Eqbal Ahmed explains this recurrence of insurrection and insolence, at least partly, by 'the fact that wherever Islam took hold, it had its origins in a counter-tradition, a dissident point of view'.¹¹ 'In many regions such as North Africa and Central Asia the spread of Islam was dialectically linked with social revolt. In other places, such as South Asia, Islam's egalitarian precepts and emphasis on social justice (both widely violated in practice) offered an escape to the disinherited from the harsh realities of oppression. In its exemplary form, Islam is a religion of the oppressed'.¹² Advancing from that, this book offers a slightly different explanation, arguing that insurrectionary tendency is a manifestation of the individuals reacting to the ideals and their absence in reality. The metaphysical demands of those ideals – or, as we have labelled it, the permanent 'foundational' values, and their application or lack thereof in reality – the

contextual, is what motivates rebellion. This was alluded to by Eqbal Ahmed when he states that:

For centuries a complementary tension, creative in its impact on society and individuals had existed between particularist and universalist loyalties and loci of Muslim political life. Typically, a Muslim held two sets of identity: one – immediate, social and spatially particular; the other – historical, ideological, cultural and global. Almost all Muslims lived in intensely community-orientated societies, which, paradoxically, eschewed isolation. The paradox had a political dimension. The interests and demands of local authority – that is, the extended family, tribe, city, guild and ethnic and linguistic group – in principle, competed with the universal expectations of the ‘Ummah’, the vast Islamicate, that is, the worldwide community of people who embrace the teachings of the Holy Qur’an and practise Islam.¹³

In other words, the stability of Muslim political life has largely depended on the extent to which these complementary tensions are reconciled and the achievement of such reconciliation has been a preoccupation of politics in Islamic civilization.

Applying the ‘foundational’ values

Here, it is, in efforts to examine the practical applicability of those previously stated theoretical assertions, this book went on to investigate the expression of those foundational values, and the role of rival political culture typologies, in Pakistan. And it did so, initially, by exploring the interplay of religion and society, the Pakistan movement for self-determination and the eventual creation of a new nation-state. In essence, Islam’s relationship with politics began on a unique syntheses between the sacred and secular, which are often misconstrued in absolutist terms. The Prophet Muhammad who was persecuted in Mecca became, in Medina, both the spiritual and temporal head of state.¹⁴ The factor of territoriality was of secondary importance. Of primary importance was the idea of the formation of a ‘faith-centric community’, or ‘ummah’, based on the interconnectedness, togetherness, or unity of the world, truth and, ultimately, on the unity of God.¹⁵ Notwithstanding that, the establishment of the first political order of Muslims in Medina coincided with their political domination and empowerment.¹⁶ Therefore, leadership in Islam attempts to be both spiritual and temporal. The ruler, according to Qur’anic exegesis, was a spiritual leader in that he was bound by his commitments to God and, thereby, to people. Also, the ruler was secular in that he was concerned with the sociopolitical and economic well-being of the masses.¹⁷

Furthermore, by analysing the formative phase of the Pakistan movement, three leadership types, along with their corresponding political culture variants, were clearly demarcated based on their interaction with ‘foundational’ values in their ‘contextual’ realities. Simply put, and to reiterate, the typologies are,

first, the *traditionalist* – those who appreciate the ‘foundational’ values but refuse to contextualise. Or, one who seeks a restoration and imitation of the past, in its most idealised form, yet does not consider the contextual imperative that necessitates thoughtful deliberation. Without exception, they have failed to attract the majority of workers, peasants and intelligentsia and are vehemently anti-Pakistan.¹⁸ Second, the *secularists* are those that consider ethics as cumbersome and unrelated to public life. They are rooted in either the parasitic feudal or economically advantageous class and, therefore, are not secular in the manner that term is descriptive in a liberal, democratic European or North American ethos.¹⁹ They, too, were unsympathetic to the request of supporting a separate Muslim identity. Third, the *revivalists* are those who appreciate the ‘foundational’ values and struggle to re-assert it into their contexts. For them, tradition is not through changelessness but continuity, which is perpetuated by teaching the skills of the master, but does not require imitations of his performance. Therefore, every generation can, indeed must, make something new of what is learnt. Tradition lives through a stream of individual interpretations and re-invention of what has gone before, what is needed now and a vision for the future. This is the process of continuity that permits it to be passed down and effectively re-invented generation to generation. If societies are expected to mature, live and change in line with cherished principles, the individuals who comprise those societies must permit new applications to the ‘foundational’ values, consider contextual nuances, and liberate themselves to introduce new interpretations. If this process of re-invention and re-implementation of timeless and enduring values is acceptable to the populace at large, then, the result will be political stability. This is precisely what occurred, since the entire concept of a having a nation-state was new, but it was presented to people as a continuation of an ancient idea of bringing the diverse Muslim community together.

What was evident was that among these rival political cultural variants, competing for the hearts and minds of people, the revivalists were victorious. Success went to the ‘revivalists’, such as Jinnah and Iqbal, since they sought continuity of values with changing circumstances as necessary for effective leadership.²⁰ It is for this reason that Jinnah, in particular, was able to galvanize the masses in a common direction and create a new nation-state – Pakistan. Moreover, it is important to note that neither the ‘traditionalist’ ulama nor ‘secularist’ leaders, both of whom had either economic or spiritual influence, were able to sway the masses in a direction of their choosing. Rather, in the British Raj in South Asia, by 1946, as the elections proved, Muslim masses had identified themselves with this specific type of Muslim leader. Muslim voters, supporting the Muslim League, under the sagacious leadership of Jinnah, gave a clear verdict in favour of Pakistan: ‘440 Muslim seats were won by the Muslim League out of a total of 495. It won landslide victories in all the Muslim majority provinces except the North-West Frontier’.²¹ A clear message was being sent to both secularists and traditionalists that even with their economic and religious authority, they remained out of touch with their social reality.

To further highlight this contest of variant political culture typologies and their corresponding ideologues this book went on to examine Pakistan's constitutional development and civil/military relations. All in all, the conflict between the 'traditionalists' and 'secularists' plays itself out in contemporary Pakistani politics as those factions continuously try to work out a compromise.²² Yet particularly telling was the fact that this tension is easily discernible when studying the history of constitution-making in Pakistan.²³ The chronic antagonism and combative interplay between the variant political culture types posed serious problems for constitutional development. In other words, a major underlying factor for ongoing political instability in Muslim polities is the inability of those societies to achieve ideological coherence. That inability accentuates instability, which thereby affects the politics and propensity of violence.

Final thoughts

Interestingly, over the last decade, the theoretical assertions of this book have been proven true. The sweeping away of despotic political orders by the AKP in Turkey, the lawyers' movement in Pakistan, and the Arab awakening in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, all reveal the prevalence of Islamic-orientated or 'revivalist' political forces. Yet, those political forces are still engaged in an ongoing combative contest for power with their adversaries. And this rivalry is intensifying. On the one hand, this 'revivalist' political force has introduced a democratic ethos in the region. On the other, they are cautioned to be wary of the necessity to learn effective methods to manage this ideological competitiveness. Sadiki, comparing Tunisia and Egypt, argues that Islamist political forces swept to power following the Arab Spring, and that this trend will continue elsewhere. Skilfully, he outlines four factors that these new political forces need to come to terms with – namely, constituency, political recruitment, change and maneuvering.²⁴ More clearly, the persuasiveness of 'civic Islamism', to borrow Sadiki's term, requires these political forces to secure their constituency discipline, seek out more recruits through plurality and inclusion, adapt to their changing circumstances and negotiate with ideological counterparts.²⁵ In addition to that compelling insight, this study adds that their success and longevity largely depends on how this civic Islamic force seriously and compassionately considers the aspirations of its own people, penetrates and impedes the effectiveness of the entrenched deep state with ruses, maintains its own camaraderie in the face of setbacks, and is willing to give up power to prevent violence. Besides, their responsibility is larger than securing power in the state, since they must set down the rules of the game and rigidly adhere to it, even if that requires a loss of power.

Looking closely, Pakistan today presents an image of a country plagued by political, civil-military, ethnic, sectarian and, most importantly, ideological divides. 'Never before has public faith in the country's future sunk so low. There is widespread and growing cynicism among the people. The country as

a whole appears to be adrift, lacking confidence about its future'.²⁶ Yet, this book maintains a more optimistic outlook, since the Objectives Resolution and Jinnah and Iqbal's vision of a tolerant, progressive and egalitarian society remain a point of consensus.²⁷ Moreover, there is encouragement to be drawn from the opinion of ordinary Pakistanis on a host of central policy issues. These ordinary Pakistanis were surveyed on some fifty critical issues facing the nation, at domestic, regional and global levels.²⁸ The results counter the force of anti-democratic culture allowed to run riot on the populace by both the civil and military leaders for the better part of Pakistan's national history. And those results bear directly upon the prospects of fostering a culture of common citizenship and social solidarity in a country often perceived as riven by fault lines of regionalism and ethnicity.²⁹ Strikingly, in direct opposition to Pakistan's intelligentsia and political leadership, the vast majority of the respondents, 82 per cent, had a positive view of their country, and wanted to remain there permanently.³⁰ A clear majority, 75 per cent, 'demanded a ban on the religio-sectarian parties that spawned hatred and violence, and a similar proportion favoured restrictions on political sermons in the mosques. An overwhelming majority expected the state to improve standards of health and education. Overall, 58 per cent of Pakistanis felt that they were better off in the 1990s than before partition'.³¹ Taken together, the surveys display an extraordinary level of consensus across divisions of region, class and gender on the future vision of Pakistan. If only, Pakistan's intelligentsia, civil society representatives and elites would listen to their people. Of course, the growth of a new political force in Pakistan, in the form of Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI) has also fundamentally altered the political playing field.

From championing the cause of transparency, fair elections and judicial independence, Imran Khan's political tsunami has been, irrespective of setbacks, just that. Most prominently, by assisting the lawyers' movement, it was instrumental in the reinstatement of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This represents a monumental moment in Pakistan's history. Here, clearly, the judiciary secured its independence from both civil and military hegemonic forces attempting to manipulate it. In that regard, it was noted in this study that judicial independence is a cornerstone of the 'foundational' values. Muslim polities, then, should seek its empowerment and reform in order to begin to nurture stable political systems. Nonetheless, even with the restoration of an independent judiciary, challenges persist. Attempts to reform the Election Commission of Pakistan, to ensure fair elections, were extremely difficult and only after numerous appeals was it revealed that 37.2 million bogus voters were registered in 2007.³² Confronting such a massive and deeply entrenched level of corruption will, obviously, produce serious reactions by those who wish to maintain the status quo. Still, change came and that hurdle was overcome, with a thorough cleansing of the nearly 83 million eligible voters. But this was only a small step to ensure enfranchisement of the people and many serious challenges remain. This is where the revivalist forces need to be strategic and long-term thinkers, by securing the sympathy of the masses, and

slowly, steadily confronting traditionalist or secularist extremists who will not give up power quietly. Ultimately, people need to be convinced that too, without coercion, and when and if that occurs, they will provide all the legitimacy that the revivalist forces require.

The recent elections in Pakistan, in May 2013, brought Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif his third term in office, although they did not fulfil people's high expectations of transformation. Then again, real and lasting change is almost always a painfully slow process. Against popular opinion, Imran Khan's party lost, yet irrefutable evidence proves that rigging took place and had, at times, institutional support.³³ Pitiable supervision by the Election Commission of Pakistan, which spent more time in self-flattery than in providing competent observation, allowed several instances of wrongdoings. It is incumbent upon the ECP to investigate these irregularities and respond to evidence-based complaints. Granted, this may not have affected the overall outcome, but readily responding to accusations of impropriety gives more legitimacy to the process. Still, notwithstanding that, cheating did not prevent Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI) from becoming the country's second most important political party, with 35 MNAs. The eminent Dr Maleeha Lodhi, while commenting on the election, persuasively writes that 'it has been read as the triumph of old politics, as reassertion of tradition rather than a break from the past, and as the ascendancy of deep-seated electoral allegiances over new political alignments. In fact, the election was a vote for experience as well as for change'.³⁴ What that meant was that people voted for two-time former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif due to his experience and Imran Khan's PTI party on its promise of change. Actually, The PTI beat the PPP – a 45-year-old party – into second place at the national level by getting more votes (but fewer seats) and emerged as the winning party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.³⁵ In other words, the real success story belonged to Imran Khan's PTI.

By motivating young voters, as well as the educated middle class and women, to get out of their drawing rooms, Imran Khan encouraged a significant section of urban Pakistanis to get involved in election politics. That extraordinary politicization, of a hitherto uninterested segment of voters, is important to acknowledge and accommodate. It would bode well for the country for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to reach out to them. Of course, he does not need anyone's support following his remarkable election triumph. However, as Lodhi points out, 'parliamentary numbers alone do not make a strong government. It is leadership, vision and political will – traits absent in his predecessor – that will empower Sharif to navigate the complex array of internal and external challenges to chart a decisive way forward'.³⁶ Arduous, but essential, decisions are needed to reverse the downward economic trend in order to lift up the country. To do so requires Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to build a national consensus on the policy direction he will want the country to take, especially concerning security challenges. Admittedly, he has got off to a welcome start by his conciliatory gestures in visiting Imran Khan in hospital and declaring his support for PTI's right to form a government in Peshawar.

For the 'secularist' Pakistan People's Party, the election was a disaster. 'A once mighty political force saw its position crumble as the electorate punished party leaders for their disastrous and scandal-plagued record in office. The PPP lost two thirds of the National Assembly seats it won in 2008. The party was all but wiped out from Punjab, where it secured only two seats but none from its traditional stronghold of southern Punjab'.³⁷ As for the PTI, its leaders had raised exceedingly high expectations, especially among its supporters, about their party's first electoral test. The results did not live up to these expectations. But the party emerged as a significant national force. It polled more votes than the PPP and swept Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it has formed its first government. This, Lodhi adds, 'represents the party's coming of political age. But it is how effectively and responsibly Khan plays his opposition role in parliament that will determine his political future'.³⁸

Furthermore, there were three other major lessons learned from this election, which are the high voter turnout, rejection of dynastic politics and rejection of secular or traditionalist politics. First, widely commented upon, was the high voter turnout – around '60 per cent according to the ECP, which is 16 per cent higher than in the last election. This matched the turnout of the historic 1970 election, a level never witnessed in any election during the 1990s or in 2008, when turnout was a modest 44 per cent'.³⁹ Second, voters scorned numerous influential political families at the ballot box, including that of former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani. Of course, this in no means implies the end of dynastic politics, but it underscores the fact that a feudal surname is not enough to provide surety for electoral triumph. Third, and most importantly, was the popular rejection of extremists, be they secular or traditionalist. Millions of voters defied threats from militants and turned up at polling stations, braving and casting aside the environment of fear generated by the pre-election violence. In addition, the defeat of many secular politicians, in presumably safe constituencies, such as Asfandiyar Wali, Manzoor Wattoo and former Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, is striking.

Admittedly, the public generally shares a clearer view than many of their leaders about the policies that could ultimately move their country towards a 'revivalist' vision. Evidently, with the rejection of extremists of all hues, ordinary Pakistanis see a future in democratisation and privileging of the social sector over competing ideological agendas – and remain a largely tolerant society supportive of equal rights for women and minorities. With those closing thoughts, this study presented the requisites necessary for Pakistan to nurture a political system emanating from the 'foundational' values, or ideals, in Islam. The challenge, then, remains to actualize it in reality. Irrespective, though, against all odds Pakistan persists – and in the words of Neruda, 'you can cut all the flowers but you cannot keep spring from coming'.⁴⁰

Notes

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